instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
struct key *key;
size_t desclen, quotalen;
int ret;
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!desc || !*desc)
goto error;
if (type->vet_description) {
ret = type->vet_description(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
desclen = strlen(desc);
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
user = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
* its description */
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&user->lock);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
goto no_quota;
}
user->qnkeys++;
user->qnbytes += quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto no_memory_2;
key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
key->index_key.type = type;
key->user = user;
key->quotalen = quotalen;
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
key_alloc_serial(key);
error:
return key;
security_error:
kfree(key->description);
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
no_memory_3:
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
no_memory_2:
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
no_memory_1:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto error;
no_quota:
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
goto error;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_attr_files_free(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
int status = 0;
*res = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
xdr_decode_hyper(p, res);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_FREE;
}
dprintk("%s: files free=%Lu\n", __func__, (unsigned long long)*res);
return status;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SetMaskForEvent(int deviceid, Mask mask, int event)
{
if (deviceid < 0 || deviceid >= MAXDEVICES)
FatalError("SetMaskForEvent: bogus device id");
event_filters[deviceid][event] = mask;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_main_run_string(gs_main_instance * minst, const char *str, int user_errors,
int *pexit_code, ref * perror_object)
{
return gs_main_run_string_with_length(minst, str, (uint) strlen(str),
user_errors,
pexit_code, perror_object);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int file_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
jas_stream_fileobj_t *fileobj = JAS_CAST(jas_stream_fileobj_t *, obj);
return write(fileobj->fd, buf, cnt);
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 73,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(bcmath)
{
REGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::OnThemeChanged() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
gfx::NativeThemeWin::instance()->CloseHandles();
if (webview())
webview()->themeChanged();
#else // defined(OS_WIN)
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _tiffCloseProc(thandle_t fd)
{
return (CloseHandle(fd) ? 0 : -1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 86,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
remove_rule_rcu__(rule);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int CameraClient::getOrientation(int degrees, bool mirror) {
if (!mirror) {
if (degrees == 0) return 0;
else if (degrees == 90) return HAL_TRANSFORM_ROT_90;
else if (degrees == 180) return HAL_TRANSFORM_ROT_180;
else if (degrees == 270) return HAL_TRANSFORM_ROT_270;
} else { // Do mirror (horizontal flip)
if (degrees == 0) { // FLIP_H and ROT_0
return HAL_TRANSFORM_FLIP_H;
} else if (degrees == 90) { // FLIP_H and ROT_90
return HAL_TRANSFORM_FLIP_H | HAL_TRANSFORM_ROT_90;
} else if (degrees == 180) { // FLIP_H and ROT_180
return HAL_TRANSFORM_FLIP_V;
} else if (degrees == 270) { // FLIP_H and ROT_270
return HAL_TRANSFORM_FLIP_V | HAL_TRANSFORM_ROT_90;
}
}
ALOGE("Invalid setDisplayOrientation degrees=%d", degrees);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_open_confirm(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_open_confirm *open_conf)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
if (argp->minorversion >= 1)
return nfserr_notsupp;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &open_conf->oc_req_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
open_conf->oc_seqid = be32_to_cpup(p++);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, extractTo)
{
char *error = NULL;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
phar_entry_info *entry;
char *pathto, *filename;
size_t pathto_len, filename_len;
int ret, i;
int nelems;
zval *zval_files = NULL;
zend_bool overwrite = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|z!b", &pathto, &pathto_len, &zval_files, &overwrite) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->archive->fname, "rb", IGNORE_URL|STREAM_MUST_SEEK, NULL);
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, %s cannot be found", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
php_stream_close(fp);
if (pathto_len < 1) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, extraction path must be non-zero length");
return;
}
if (pathto_len >= MAXPATHLEN) {
char *tmp = estrndup(pathto, 50);
/* truncate for error message */
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0, "Cannot extract to \"%s...\", destination directory is too long for filesystem", tmp);
efree(tmp);
return;
}
if (php_stream_stat_path(pathto, &ssb) < 0) {
ret = php_stream_mkdir(pathto, 0777, PHP_STREAM_MKDIR_RECURSIVE, NULL);
if (!ret) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to create path \"%s\" for extraction", pathto);
return;
}
} else if (!(ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0,
"Unable to use path \"%s\" for extraction, it is a file, must be a directory", pathto);
return;
}
if (zval_files) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(zval_files)) {
case IS_NULL:
goto all_files;
case IS_STRING:
filename = Z_STRVAL_P(zval_files);
filename_len = Z_STRLEN_P(zval_files);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
nelems = zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(zval_files));
if (nelems == 0 ) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
for (i = 0; i < nelems; i++) {
zval *zval_file;
if ((zval_file = zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(zval_files), i)) != NULL) {
switch (Z_TYPE_P(zval_file)) {
case IS_STRING:
break;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, array of filenames to extract contains non-string value");
return;
}
if (NULL == (entry = zend_hash_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, Z_STR_P(zval_file)))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Phar Error: attempted to extract non-existent file \"%s\" from phar \"%s\"", Z_STRVAL_P(zval_file), phar_obj->archive->fname);
}
if (FAILURE == phar_extract_file(overwrite, entry, pathto, pathto_len, &error)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Extraction from phar \"%s\" failed: %s", phar_obj->archive->fname, error);
efree(error);
return;
}
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
default:
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_InvalidArgumentException, 0,
"Invalid argument, expected a filename (string) or array of filenames");
return;
}
if (NULL == (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, filename, filename_len))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Phar Error: attempted to extract non-existent file \"%s\" from phar \"%s\"", filename, phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (FAILURE == phar_extract_file(overwrite, entry, pathto, pathto_len, &error)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Extraction from phar \"%s\" failed: %s", phar_obj->archive->fname, error);
efree(error);
return;
}
} else {
phar_archive_data *phar;
all_files:
phar = phar_obj->archive;
/* Extract all files */
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&(phar->manifest))) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_PTR(&phar->manifest, entry) {
if (FAILURE == phar_extract_file(overwrite, entry, pathto, pathto_len, &error)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0,
"Extraction from phar \"%s\" failed: %s", phar->fname, error);
efree(error);
return;
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: upnp_event_var_change_notify(enum subscriber_service_enum service)
{
struct subscriber * sub;
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; sub = sub->entries.le_next) {
if(sub->service == service && sub->notify == NULL)
upnp_event_create_notify(sub);
}
}
Commit Message: upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 89,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf, *p;
int ret;
unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
/* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
return -1;
}
/* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
return -1;
}
/* ...and no handshake in progress. */
if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
/*
* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14
* - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
*/
OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
/*-
* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
* as payload to distuingish different messages and add
* some random stuff.
* - Message Type, 1 byte
* - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
* - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
* - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
* - Padding
*/
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
p = buf;
/* Message Type */
*p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
/* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
s2n(payload, p);
/* Sequence number */
s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
/* 16 random bytes */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
p += 16;
/* Random padding */
RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buf, 3 + payload + padding,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
}
OPENSSL_free(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,172
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_filter *filter;
if (sk->sk_destruct)
sk->sk_destruct(sk);
filter = rcu_dereference_check(sk->sk_filter,
atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) == 0);
if (filter) {
sk_filter_uncharge(sk, filter);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(sk->sk_filter, NULL);
}
sock_disable_timestamp(sk, SK_FLAGS_TIMESTAMP);
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc))
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: optmem leakage (%d bytes) detected.\n",
__func__, atomic_read(&sk->sk_omem_alloc));
if (sk->sk_peer_cred)
put_cred(sk->sk_peer_cred);
put_pid(sk->sk_peer_pid);
put_net(sock_net(sk));
sk_prot_free(sk->sk_prot_creator, sk);
}
Commit Message: net: cleanups in sock_setsockopt()
Use min_t()/max_t() macros, reformat two comments, use !!test_bit() to
match !!sock_flag()
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setEncMode(IVE_ENC_MODE_T e_enc_mode) {
IV_STATUS_T status;
ive_ctl_set_enc_mode_ip_t s_enc_mode_ip;
ive_ctl_set_enc_mode_op_t s_enc_mode_op;
s_enc_mode_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_enc_mode_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_ENC_MODE;
s_enc_mode_ip.e_enc_mode = e_enc_mode;
s_enc_mode_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_enc_mode_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_enc_mode_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_enc_mode_ip_t);
s_enc_mode_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_enc_mode_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_enc_mode_ip, &s_enc_mode_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to set in header encode mode = 0x%x\n",
s_enc_mode_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::BindFrameNavigationControl(
mojom::FrameNavigationControlAssociatedRequest request) {
frame_navigation_control_binding_.Bind(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetHostedDocumentURLBlockingThread(const FilePath& gdata_cache_path,
GURL* url) {
std::string json;
if (!file_util::ReadFileToString(gdata_cache_path, &json)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Unable to read file " << gdata_cache_path.value();
return;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Hosted doc content " << json;
scoped_ptr<base::Value> val(base::JSONReader::Read(json));
base::DictionaryValue* dict_val;
if (!val.get() || !val->GetAsDictionary(&dict_val)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Parse failure for " << json;
return;
}
std::string edit_url;
if (!dict_val->GetString("url", &edit_url)) {
NOTREACHED() << "url field doesn't exist in " << json;
return;
}
*url = GURL(edit_url);
DVLOG(1) << "edit url " << *url;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PdfMetafileSkia* PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::metafile() {
DCHECK(IsRendering());
return metafile_.get();
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KURL Document::openSearchDescriptionURL()
{
static const char openSearchMIMEType[] = "application/opensearchdescription+xml";
static const char openSearchRelation[] = "search";
if (!frame() || frame()->tree().parent())
return KURL();
if (!loadEventFinished())
return KURL();
if (!head())
return KURL();
for (HTMLLinkElement* linkElement = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::firstChild(*head()); linkElement; linkElement = Traversal<HTMLLinkElement>::nextSibling(*linkElement)) {
if (!equalIgnoringCase(linkElement->type(), openSearchMIMEType) || !equalIgnoringCase(linkElement->rel(), openSearchRelation))
continue;
if (linkElement->href().isEmpty())
continue;
return linkElement->href();
}
return KURL();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 53,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ass_shaper_skip_characters(TextInfo *text_info)
{
int i;
GlyphInfo *glyphs = text_info->glyphs;
for (i = 0; i < text_info->length; i++) {
if ((glyphs[i].symbol <= 0x202e && glyphs[i].symbol >= 0x202a)
|| (glyphs[i].symbol <= 0x200f && glyphs[i].symbol >= 0x200b)
|| (glyphs[i].symbol <= 0x2063 && glyphs[i].symbol >= 0x2060)
|| glyphs[i].symbol == 0xfeff
|| glyphs[i].symbol == 0x00ad
|| glyphs[i].symbol == 0x034f) {
glyphs[i].symbol = 0;
glyphs[i].skip++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: blink::WebString RenderFrameImpl::GetDevToolsFrameToken() {
return devtools_frame_token_;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_request_direct_streamlocal(void)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target, *originator;
u_short originator_port;
target = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
originator_port = packet_get_int();
packet_check_eom();
debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
!no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 168,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_METER(const struct ofpact_meter *meter,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version >= OFP13_VERSION) {
instruction_put_OFPIT13_METER(out)->meter_id = htonl(meter->meter_id);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_ctl_dev_register(struct snd_device *device)
{
struct snd_card *card = device->device_data;
int err, cardnum;
char name[16];
if (snd_BUG_ON(!card))
return -ENXIO;
cardnum = card->number;
if (snd_BUG_ON(cardnum < 0 || cardnum >= SNDRV_CARDS))
return -ENXIO;
sprintf(name, "controlC%i", cardnum);
if ((err = snd_register_device(SNDRV_DEVICE_TYPE_CONTROL, card, -1,
&snd_ctl_f_ops, card, name)) < 0)
return err;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 36,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_mfra_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
int i;
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mfra");
/* An empty mfra atom is enough to indicate to the publishing point that
* the stream has ended. */
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_ISML)
return update_size(pb, pos);
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++) {
MOVTrack *track = &mov->tracks[i];
if (track->nb_frag_info)
mov_write_tfra_tag(pb, track);
}
avio_wb32(pb, 16);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mfro");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version + flags */
avio_wb32(pb, avio_tell(pb) + 4 - pos);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSSPropertyID SVGElement::CssPropertyIdForSVGAttributeName(
const QualifiedName& attr_name) {
if (!attr_name.NamespaceURI().IsNull())
return CSSPropertyInvalid;
static HashMap<StringImpl*, CSSPropertyID>* property_name_to_id_map = nullptr;
if (!property_name_to_id_map) {
property_name_to_id_map = new HashMap<StringImpl*, CSSPropertyID>;
const QualifiedName* const attr_names[] = {
&kAlignmentBaselineAttr,
&kBaselineShiftAttr,
&kBufferedRenderingAttr,
&kClipAttr,
&kClipPathAttr,
&kClipRuleAttr,
&svg_names::kColorAttr,
&kColorInterpolationAttr,
&kColorInterpolationFiltersAttr,
&kColorRenderingAttr,
&kCursorAttr,
&svg_names::kDirectionAttr,
&kDisplayAttr,
&kDominantBaselineAttr,
&kFillAttr,
&kFillOpacityAttr,
&kFillRuleAttr,
&kFilterAttr,
&kFloodColorAttr,
&kFloodOpacityAttr,
&kFontFamilyAttr,
&kFontSizeAttr,
&kFontStretchAttr,
&kFontStyleAttr,
&kFontVariantAttr,
&kFontWeightAttr,
&kImageRenderingAttr,
&kLetterSpacingAttr,
&kLightingColorAttr,
&kMarkerEndAttr,
&kMarkerMidAttr,
&kMarkerStartAttr,
&kMaskAttr,
&kMaskTypeAttr,
&kOpacityAttr,
&kOverflowAttr,
&kPaintOrderAttr,
&kPointerEventsAttr,
&kShapeRenderingAttr,
&kStopColorAttr,
&kStopOpacityAttr,
&kStrokeAttr,
&kStrokeDasharrayAttr,
&kStrokeDashoffsetAttr,
&kStrokeLinecapAttr,
&kStrokeLinejoinAttr,
&kStrokeMiterlimitAttr,
&kStrokeOpacityAttr,
&kStrokeWidthAttr,
&kTextAnchorAttr,
&kTextDecorationAttr,
&kTextRenderingAttr,
&kTransformOriginAttr,
&kUnicodeBidiAttr,
&kVectorEffectAttr,
&kVisibilityAttr,
&kWordSpacingAttr,
&kWritingModeAttr,
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(attr_names); i++) {
CSSPropertyID property_id = cssPropertyID(attr_names[i]->LocalName());
DCHECK_GT(property_id, 0);
property_name_to_id_map->Set(attr_names[i]->LocalName().Impl(),
property_id);
}
}
return property_name_to_id_map->at(attr_name.LocalName().Impl());
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_wdlt(GetByteContext *gb, uint8_t *frame, int width, int height)
{
const uint8_t *frame_end = frame + width * height;
uint8_t *line_ptr;
int count, i, v, lines, segments;
int y = 0;
lines = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
if (lines > height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
while (lines--) {
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) < 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16u(gb);
while ((segments & 0xC000) == 0xC000) {
unsigned skip_lines = -(int16_t)segments;
unsigned delta = -((int16_t)segments * width);
if (frame_end - frame <= delta || y + lines + skip_lines > height)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += delta;
y += skip_lines;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
}
if (frame_end <= frame)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (segments & 0x8000) {
frame[width - 1] = segments & 0xFF;
segments = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
}
line_ptr = frame;
if (frame_end - frame < width)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frame += width;
y++;
while (segments--) {
if (frame - line_ptr <= bytestream2_peek_byte(gb))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
line_ptr += bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
count = (int8_t)bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
if (count >= 0) {
if (frame - line_ptr < count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (bytestream2_get_buffer(gb, line_ptr, count * 2) != count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
line_ptr += count * 2;
} else {
count = -count;
if (frame - line_ptr < count * 2)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
v = bytestream2_get_le16(gb);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
bytestream_put_le16(&line_ptr, v);
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dfa: Fix off by 1 error
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1345/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6062963045695488
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_intrmgr_initialize_all_timers(E1000ECore *core, bool create)
{
int i;
core->radv.delay_reg = RADV;
core->rdtr.delay_reg = RDTR;
core->raid.delay_reg = RAID;
core->tadv.delay_reg = TADV;
core->tidv.delay_reg = TIDV;
core->radv.delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_DELAY_NS_RES;
core->rdtr.delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_DELAY_NS_RES;
core->raid.delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_DELAY_NS_RES;
core->tadv.delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_DELAY_NS_RES;
core->tidv.delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_DELAY_NS_RES;
core->radv.core = core;
core->rdtr.core = core;
core->raid.core = core;
core->tadv.core = core;
core->tidv.core = core;
core->itr.core = core;
core->itr.delay_reg = ITR;
core->itr.delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_THROTTLING_NS_RES;
for (i = 0; i < E1000E_MSIX_VEC_NUM; i++) {
core->eitr[i].core = core;
core->eitr[i].delay_reg = EITR + i;
core->eitr[i].delay_resolution_ns = E1000_INTR_THROTTLING_NS_RES;
}
if (!create) {
return;
}
core->radv.timer =
timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, e1000e_intrmgr_on_timer, &core->radv);
core->rdtr.timer =
timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, e1000e_intrmgr_on_timer, &core->rdtr);
core->raid.timer =
timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, e1000e_intrmgr_on_timer, &core->raid);
core->tadv.timer =
timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, e1000e_intrmgr_on_timer, &core->tadv);
core->tidv.timer =
timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL, e1000e_intrmgr_on_timer, &core->tidv);
core->itr.timer = timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL,
e1000e_intrmgr_on_throttling_timer,
&core->itr);
for (i = 0; i < E1000E_MSIX_VEC_NUM; i++) {
core->eitr[i].timer =
timer_new_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL,
e1000e_intrmgr_on_msix_throttling_timer,
&core->eitr[i]);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_bind(int fd, struct sockaddr __user *addr, int addrlen)
{
sa_family_t sa_family;
if (addrlen == 112 &&
get_user(sa_family, &addr->sa_family) == 0 &&
sa_family == AF_UNIX)
addrlen = 110;
return sys_bind(fd, addr, addrlen);
}
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool validateKeyEvent(int32_t action) {
if (! isValidKeyAction(action)) {
ALOGE("Key event has invalid action code 0x%x", action);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pdf_object_destroy(struct pdf_object *object)
{
switch (object->type) {
case OBJ_stream:
case OBJ_image:
free(object->stream.text);
break;
case OBJ_page:
flexarray_clear(&object->page.children);
break;
case OBJ_bookmark:
flexarray_clear(&object->bookmark.children);
break;
}
free(object);
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionInstallDialogView::UpdateInstallResultHistogram(bool accepted)
const {
if (prompt_->type() == ExtensionInstallPrompt::INSTALL_PROMPT)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Extensions.InstallPrompt.Accepted", accepted);
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 131,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXTreeSnapshotCallback AddFrame(bool is_root) {
return base::Bind(&AXTreeSnapshotCombiner::ReceiveSnapshot,
this,
is_root);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_tos_move_after_char(fz_context *ctx, pdf_text_object_state *tos)
{
fz_union_rect(&tos->text_bbox, &tos->char_bbox);
fz_pre_translate(&tos->tm, tos->char_tx, tos->char_ty);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool parse_extranonce(struct pool *pool, json_t *val)
{
char *nonce1;
int n2size;
nonce1 = json_array_string(val, 0);
if (!nonce1) {
return false;
}
n2size = json_integer_value(json_array_get(val, 1));
if (!n2size) {
free(nonce1);
return false;
}
cg_wlock(&pool->data_lock);
pool->nonce1 = nonce1;
pool->n1_len = strlen(nonce1) / 2;
free(pool->nonce1bin);
pool->nonce1bin = (unsigned char *)calloc(pool->n1_len, 1);
if (unlikely(!pool->nonce1bin))
quithere(1, "Failed to calloc pool->nonce1bin");
hex2bin(pool->nonce1bin, pool->nonce1, pool->n1_len);
pool->n2size = n2size;
cg_wunlock(&pool->data_lock);
applog(LOG_NOTICE, "%s extranonce change requested", get_pool_name(pool));
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::CacheUsersWallpapers() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
user_manager::UserList users = user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetUsers();
if (!users.empty()) {
user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users.begin();
it++;
for (int cached = 0; it != users.end() && cached < kMaxWallpapersToCache;
++it, ++cached) {
CacheUserWallpaper((*it)->GetAccountId());
}
}
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::SiteInstanceDeleting(
SiteInstance* site_instance) {
if (!site_instance->HasProcess())
return;
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(
site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
if (!service)
return;
const Extension* extension =
service->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(site_instance->GetSiteURL()));
if (!extension)
return;
service->process_map()->Remove(extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID(),
site_instance->GetId());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInfoMap::UnregisterExtensionProcess,
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->info_map(),
extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID(),
site_instance->GetId()));
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::postNotification(AXObject* object,
AXNotification notification) {
if (!object)
return;
m_modificationCount++;
m_notificationsToPost.push_back(std::make_pair(object, notification));
if (!m_notificationPostTimer.isActive())
m_notificationPostTimer.startOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: flx_set_color (FlxColorSpaceConverter * flxpal, guint colr, guint red,
guint green, guint blue, gint scale)
{
g_return_if_fail (flxpal != NULL);
g_return_if_fail (colr < 0x100);
flxpal->palvec[(colr * 3)] = red << scale;
flxpal->palvec[(colr * 3) + 1] = green << scale;
flxpal->palvec[(colr * 3) + 2] = blue << scale;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 13,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tChecksumCheckResult ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
ULONG virtioFlags,
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pPacketPages,
ULONG ulPacketLength,
ULONG ulDataOffset)
{
tOffloadSettingsFlags f = pContext->Offload.flags;
tChecksumCheckResult res, resIp;
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ppr;
ULONG flagsToCalculate = 0;
res.value = 0;
resIp.value = 0;
if (f.fRxIPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrIpChecksum; // check only
if (!(virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID))
{
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM)
{
flagsToCalculate |= pcrFixXxpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum;
}
else
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV4Checksum;
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrTcpV6Checksum;
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum) flagsToCalculate |= pcrUdpV6Checksum;
}
}
ppr = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(pPacketPages, ulPacketLength - ETH_HEADER_SIZE, ulDataOffset + ETH_HEADER_SIZE, flagsToCalculate, __FUNCTION__);
if (virtioFlags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID)
{
pContext->extraStatistics.framesRxCSHwOK++;
ppr.xxpCheckSum = ppresCSOK;
}
if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 && !ppr.IsFragment)
{
if (f.fRxIPChecksum)
{
res.flags.IpOK = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSOK;
res.flags.IpFailed = ppr.ipCheckSum == ppresCSBad;
}
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPChecksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPChecksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
else if (ppr.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(ppr.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if(ppr.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if (f.fRxTCPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.TcpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.TcpFailed = !res.flags.TcpOK;
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (f.fRxUDPv6Checksum)
{
res.flags.UdpOK = ppr.xxpCheckSum == ppresCSOK || ppr.fixedXxpCS;
res.flags.UdpFailed = !res.flags.UdpOK;
}
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 168,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CheckClientDownloadRequest::NotifyRequestFinished(
DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
weakptr_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
DVLOG(2) << "SafeBrowsing download verdict for: " << item_->DebugString(true)
<< " verdict:" << reason << " result:" << static_cast<int>(result);
item_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vt_reset_keyboard(int fd) {
int kb;
/* If we can't read the default, then default to unicode. It's 2017 after all. */
kb = vt_default_utf8() != 0 ? K_UNICODE : K_XLATE;
if (ioctl(fd, KDSKBMODE, kb) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 1
| 169,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cib_construct_reply(xmlNode * request, xmlNode * output, int rc)
{
int lpc = 0;
xmlNode *reply = NULL;
const char *name = NULL;
const char *value = NULL;
const char *names[] = {
F_CIB_OPERATION,
F_CIB_CALLID,
F_CIB_CLIENTID,
F_CIB_CALLOPTS
};
static int max = DIMOF(names);
crm_trace("Creating a basic reply");
reply = create_xml_node(NULL, "cib-reply");
crm_xml_add(reply, F_TYPE, T_CIB);
for (lpc = 0; lpc < max; lpc++) {
name = names[lpc];
value = crm_element_value(request, name);
crm_xml_add(reply, name, value);
}
crm_xml_add_int(reply, F_CIB_RC, rc);
if (output != NULL) {
crm_trace("Attaching reply output");
add_message_xml(reply, F_CIB_CALLDATA, output);
}
return reply;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_SVTCA( INS_ARG )
{
Short A, B;
(void)args;
if ( CUR.opcode & 1 )
A = 0x4000;
else
A = 0;
B = A ^ 0x4000;
CUR.GS.freeVector.x = A;
CUR.GS.projVector.x = A;
CUR.GS.dualVector.x = A;
CUR.GS.freeVector.y = B;
CUR.GS.projVector.y = B;
CUR.GS.dualVector.y = B;
COMPUTE_Funcs();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,466
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileReaderLoader::OnDataPipeReadable(MojoResult result) {
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK) {
if (!received_all_data_)
Failed(FileError::kNotReadableErr);
return;
}
while (true) {
uint32_t num_bytes;
const void* buffer;
MojoResult result = consumer_handle_->BeginReadData(
&buffer, &num_bytes, MOJO_READ_DATA_FLAG_NONE);
if (result == MOJO_RESULT_SHOULD_WAIT) {
if (!IsSyncLoad())
return;
result = mojo::Wait(consumer_handle_.get(), MOJO_HANDLE_SIGNAL_READABLE);
if (result == MOJO_RESULT_OK)
continue;
}
if (result == MOJO_RESULT_FAILED_PRECONDITION) {
if (!received_all_data_)
Failed(FileError::kNotReadableErr);
return;
}
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK) {
Failed(FileError::kNotReadableErr);
return;
}
OnReceivedData(static_cast<const char*>(buffer), num_bytes);
consumer_handle_->EndReadData(num_bytes);
if (BytesLoaded() >= total_bytes_) {
received_all_data_ = true;
if (received_on_complete_)
OnFinishLoading();
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 155,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codeCursorHintFixExpr(Walker *pWalker, Expr *pExpr){
int rc = WRC_Continue;
struct CCurHint *pHint = pWalker->u.pCCurHint;
if( pExpr->op==TK_COLUMN ){
if( pExpr->iTable!=pHint->iTabCur ){
Vdbe *v = pWalker->pParse->pVdbe;
int reg = ++pWalker->pParse->nMem; /* Register for column value */
sqlite3ExprCodeGetColumnOfTable(
v, pExpr->pTab, pExpr->iTable, pExpr->iColumn, reg
);
pExpr->op = TK_REGISTER;
pExpr->iTable = reg;
}else if( pHint->pIdx!=0 ){
pExpr->iTable = pHint->iIdxCur;
pExpr->iColumn = sqlite3ColumnOfIndex(pHint->pIdx, pExpr->iColumn);
assert( pExpr->iColumn>=0 );
}
}else if( pExpr->op==TK_AGG_FUNCTION ){
/* An aggregate function in the WHERE clause of a query means this must
** be a correlated sub-query, and expression pExpr is an aggregate from
** the parent context. Do not walk the function arguments in this case.
**
** todo: It should be possible to replace this node with a TK_REGISTER
** expression, as the result of the expression must be stored in a
** register at this point. The same holds for TK_AGG_COLUMN nodes. */
rc = WRC_Prune;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setSelectionRangeForBinding(
unsigned start,
unsigned end,
const String& direction,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!input_type_->SupportsSelectionAPI()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"The input element's type ('" +
input_type_->FormControlType() +
"') does not support selection.");
return;
}
TextControlElement::setSelectionRangeForBinding(start, end, direction);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_MSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(gd)
{
T1_CloseLib();
#if HAVE_GD_BUNDLED && HAVE_LIBFREETYPE
gdFontCacheMutexShutdown();
#endif
UNREGISTER_INI_ENTRIES();
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gboolean webkit_web_view_has_selection(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
return !core(webView)->selection().isNone();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_init(PCIDevice *pci_dev)
{
PVSCSIState *s = PVSCSI(pci_dev);
trace_pvscsi_state("init");
/* PCI subsystem ID, subsystem vendor ID, revision */
if (PVSCSI_USE_OLD_PCI_CONFIGURATION(s)) {
pci_set_word(pci_dev->config + PCI_SUBSYSTEM_ID, 0x1000);
} else {
pci_set_word(pci_dev->config + PCI_SUBSYSTEM_VENDOR_ID,
PCI_VENDOR_ID_VMWARE);
pci_set_word(pci_dev->config + PCI_SUBSYSTEM_ID,
PCI_DEVICE_ID_VMWARE_PVSCSI);
pci_config_set_revision(pci_dev->config, 0x2);
}
/* PCI latency timer = 255 */
pci_dev->config[PCI_LATENCY_TIMER] = 0xff;
/* Interrupt pin A */
pci_config_set_interrupt_pin(pci_dev->config, 1);
memory_region_init_io(&s->io_space, OBJECT(s), &pvscsi_ops, s,
"pvscsi-io", PVSCSI_MEM_SPACE_SIZE);
pci_register_bar(pci_dev, 0, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY, &s->io_space);
pvscsi_init_msi(s);
if (pci_is_express(pci_dev) && pci_bus_is_express(pci_dev->bus)) {
pcie_endpoint_cap_init(pci_dev, PVSCSI_EXP_EP_OFFSET);
}
s->completion_worker = qemu_bh_new(pvscsi_process_completion_queue, s);
if (!s->completion_worker) {
pvscsi_cleanup_msi(s);
return -ENOMEM;
}
scsi_bus_new(&s->bus, sizeof(s->bus), DEVICE(pci_dev),
&pvscsi_scsi_info, NULL);
/* override default SCSI bus hotplug-handler, with pvscsi's one */
qbus_set_hotplug_handler(BUS(&s->bus), DEVICE(s), &error_abort);
pvscsi_reset_state(s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_inject_pit_timer_irqs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_pit *pit = vcpu->kvm->arch.vpit;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
struct kvm_kpit_state *ps;
if (pit) {
int inject = 0;
ps = &pit->pit_state;
/* Try to inject pending interrupts when
* last one has been acked.
*/
spin_lock(&ps->inject_lock);
if (atomic_read(&ps->pit_timer.pending) && ps->irq_ack) {
ps->irq_ack = 0;
inject = 1;
}
spin_unlock(&ps->inject_lock);
if (inject)
__inject_pit_timer_intr(kvm);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
ASSERT(!flickProvider);
flickProvider = new QtFlickProvider(q, pageView.data());
const QQuickWebViewExperimental* experimental = q->experimental();
QObject::connect(flickProvider, SIGNAL(contentWidthChanged()), experimental, SIGNAL(contentWidthChanged()));
QObject::connect(flickProvider, SIGNAL(contentHeightChanged()), experimental, SIGNAL(contentHeightChanged()));
QObject::connect(flickProvider, SIGNAL(contentXChanged()), experimental, SIGNAL(contentXChanged()));
QObject::connect(flickProvider, SIGNAL(contentYChanged()), experimental, SIGNAL(contentYChanged()));
interactionEngine.reset(new QtViewportInteractionEngine(q, pageView.data(), flickProvider));
pageView->eventHandler()->setViewportInteractionEngine(interactionEngine.data());
QObject::connect(interactionEngine.data(), SIGNAL(contentSuspendRequested()), q, SLOT(_q_suspend()));
QObject::connect(interactionEngine.data(), SIGNAL(contentResumeRequested()), q, SLOT(_q_resume()));
QObject::connect(interactionEngine.data(), SIGNAL(contentWasMoved(const QPointF&)), q, SLOT(_q_commitPositionChange(const QPointF&)));
QObject::connect(interactionEngine.data(), SIGNAL(contentWasScaled()), q, SLOT(_q_commitScaleChange()));
_q_resume();
if (loadSuccessDispatchIsPending) {
QQuickWebViewPrivate::loadDidSucceed();
loadSuccessDispatchIsPending = false;
}
_q_onVisibleChanged();
QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page **nfs4_alloc_pages(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct page **pages;
int i;
pages = kcalloc(size, sizeof(struct page *), gfp_flags);
if (!pages) {
dprintk("%s: can't alloc array of %zu pages\n", __func__, size);
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(gfp_flags);
if (!pages[i]) {
dprintk("%s: failed to allocate page\n", __func__);
nfs4_free_pages(pages, size);
return NULL;
}
}
return pages;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr3_rmt_hdr_set(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
void *ptr,
xfs_ino_t ino,
uint32_t offset,
uint32_t size,
xfs_daddr_t bno)
{
struct xfs_attr3_rmt_hdr *rmt = ptr;
if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb))
return 0;
rmt->rm_magic = cpu_to_be32(XFS_ATTR3_RMT_MAGIC);
rmt->rm_offset = cpu_to_be32(offset);
rmt->rm_bytes = cpu_to_be32(size);
uuid_copy(&rmt->rm_uuid, &mp->m_sb.sb_uuid);
rmt->rm_owner = cpu_to_be64(ino);
rmt->rm_blkno = cpu_to_be64(bno);
return sizeof(struct xfs_attr3_rmt_hdr);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 44,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
*/
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
*num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
} else {
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
else
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void start_auth_vnc(VncState *vs)
{
make_challenge(vs);
/* Send client a 'random' challenge */
vnc_write(vs, vs->challenge, sizeof(vs->challenge));
vnc_flush(vs);
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_vnc, sizeof(vs->challenge));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void _zend_ts_hash_init_ex(TsHashTable *ht, uint nSize, dtor_func_t pDestructor, zend_bool persistent, zend_bool bApplyProtection ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
#ifdef ZTS
ht->mx_reader = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->mx_writer = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->reader = 0;
#endif
_zend_hash_init_ex(TS_HASH(ht), nSize, pDestructor, persistent, bApplyProtection ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_calc_match(struct ebt_entry_match *m, int *off)
{
*off += ebt_compat_match_offset(m->u.match, m->match_size);
*off += ebt_compat_entry_padsize();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init dcache_init_early(void)
{
unsigned int loop;
/* If hashes are distributed across NUMA nodes, defer
* hash allocation until vmalloc space is available.
*/
if (hashdist)
return;
dentry_hashtable =
alloc_large_system_hash("Dentry cache",
sizeof(struct hlist_bl_head),
dhash_entries,
13,
HASH_EARLY,
&d_hash_shift,
&d_hash_mask,
0,
0);
for (loop = 0; loop < (1U << d_hash_shift); loop++)
INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(dentry_hashtable + loop);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_public_encrypt)
{
zval **key, *crypted;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int cryptedlen;
unsigned char *cryptedbuf;
int successful = 0;
long keyresource = -1;
long padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
char * data;
int data_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "szZ|l", &data, &data_len, &crypted, &key, &padding) == FAILURE)
return;
RETVAL_FALSE;
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(key, 1, NULL, 0, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key parameter is not a valid public key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cryptedlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
cryptedbuf = emalloc(cryptedlen + 1);
switch (pkey->type) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
successful = (RSA_public_encrypt(data_len,
(unsigned char *)data,
cryptedbuf,
pkey->pkey.rsa,
padding) == cryptedlen);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "key type not supported in this PHP build!");
}
if (successful) {
zval_dtor(crypted);
cryptedbuf[cryptedlen] = '\0';
ZVAL_STRINGL(crypted, (char *)cryptedbuf, cryptedlen, 0);
cryptedbuf = NULL;
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (keyresource == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (cryptedbuf) {
efree(cryptedbuf);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::SavePage(
const SavePageParams& save_page_params,
std::unique_ptr<OfflinePageArchiver> archiver,
const SavePageCallback& callback) {
auto task = base::MakeUnique<CreateArchiveTask>(
GetArchiveDirectory(save_page_params.client_id.name_space),
save_page_params, archiver.get(),
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelTaskified::OnCreateArchiveDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), callback));
pending_archivers_.push_back(std::move(archiver));
task_queue_.AddTask(std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NO_INLINE void jspeBlockNoBrackets() {
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
while (lex->tk && lex->tk!='}') {
JsVar *a = jspeStatement();
jsvCheckReferenceError(a);
jsvUnLock(a);
if (JSP_HAS_ERROR) {
if (lex && !(execInfo.execute&EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED)) {
execInfo.execute = (JsExecFlags)(execInfo.execute | EXEC_ERROR_LINE_REPORTED);
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvObjectGetChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, JSV_STRING_0);
if (stackTrace) {
jsvAppendPrintf(stackTrace, "at ");
jspAppendStackTrace(stackTrace);
jsvUnLock(stackTrace);
}
}
}
if (JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE)
return;
if (!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE) {
jspeSkipBlock();
return;
}
}
} else {
jspeSkipBlock();
}
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if interpreting a file full of '{' (fix #1448)
CWE ID: CWE-674
| 0
| 82,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MultibufferDataSource::StartCallback() {
DCHECK(render_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!init_cb_) {
SetReader(nullptr);
return;
}
bool success = reader_ && reader_->Available() > 0 && url_data() &&
(!assume_fully_buffered() ||
url_data()->length() != kPositionNotSpecified);
if (success) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
total_bytes_ = url_data()->length();
}
streaming_ =
!assume_fully_buffered() && (total_bytes_ == kPositionNotSpecified ||
!url_data()->range_supported());
media_log_->SetDoubleProperty("total_bytes",
static_cast<double>(total_bytes_));
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("streaming", streaming_);
} else {
SetReader(nullptr);
}
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (stop_signal_received_)
return;
if (success) {
if (total_bytes_ != kPositionNotSpecified) {
host_->SetTotalBytes(total_bytes_);
if (assume_fully_buffered())
host_->AddBufferedByteRange(0, total_bytes_);
}
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("single_origin", single_origin_);
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("passed_cors_access_check",
DidPassCORSAccessCheck());
media_log_->SetBooleanProperty("range_header_supported",
url_data()->range_supported());
}
render_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(std::move(init_cb_), success));
UpdateBufferSizes();
UpdateLoadingState_Locked(true);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 1
| 172,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UsbFindDevicesFunction::UsbFindDevicesFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ContentLayerCount() {
return paint_artifact_compositor()
->GetExtraDataForTesting()
->content_layers.size();
}
Commit Message: [BGPT] Add a fast-path for transform-origin changes.
This patch adds a fast-path for updating composited transform-origin
changes without requiring a PaintArtifactCompositor update. This
closely follows the approach of https://crrev.com/651338.
Bug: 952473
Change-Id: I8b82909c1761a7aa16705813207739d29596b0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580260
Commit-Queue: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: vmpstr <vmpstr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653749}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,110
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: magic_setflags(struct magic_set *ms, int flags)
{
if (ms == NULL)
return -1;
#if !defined(HAVE_UTIME) && !defined(HAVE_UTIMES)
if (flags & MAGIC_PRESERVE_ATIME)
return -1;
#endif
ms->flags = flags;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 45,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Handle<Object> GetInternalImpl(Handle<JSObject> holder,
uint32_t entry) {
return GetImpl(holder, entry);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ixheaacd_fwd_modulation(const WORD32 *p_time_in1, WORD32 *real_subband,
WORD32 *imag_subband,
ia_sbr_qmf_filter_bank_struct *qmf_bank,
ia_qmf_dec_tables_struct *qmf_dec_tables_ptr) {
WORD32 i;
const WORD32 *p_time_in2 = &p_time_in1[2 * NO_ANALYSIS_CHANNELS - 1];
WORD32 temp1, temp2;
WORD32 *t_real_subband = real_subband;
WORD32 *t_imag_subband = imag_subband;
const WORD16 *tcos;
for (i = NO_ANALYSIS_CHANNELS - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
temp1 = ixheaacd_shr32(*p_time_in1++, HQ_SHIFT_VAL);
temp2 = ixheaacd_shr32(*p_time_in2--, HQ_SHIFT_VAL);
*t_real_subband++ = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(temp1, temp2);
;
*t_imag_subband++ = ixheaacd_add32(temp1, temp2);
;
}
ixheaacd_cos_sin_mod(real_subband, qmf_bank,
(WORD16 *)qmf_dec_tables_ptr->w1024,
(WORD32 *)qmf_dec_tables_ptr->dig_rev_table2_128);
tcos = qmf_bank->t_cos;
for (i = (qmf_bank->usb - qmf_bank->lsb - 1); i >= 0; i--) {
WORD16 cosh, sinh;
WORD32 re, im;
re = *real_subband;
im = *imag_subband;
cosh = *tcos++;
sinh = *tcos++;
*real_subband++ = ixheaacd_add32(ixheaacd_mult32x16in32_shl(re, cosh),
ixheaacd_mult32x16in32_shl(im, sinh));
*imag_subband++ = ixheaacd_sub32_sat(ixheaacd_mult32x16in32_shl(im, cosh),
ixheaacd_mult32x16in32_shl(re, sinh));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 162,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *Sys_LoadGameDll(const char *name,
intptr_t (QDECL **entryPoint)(int, ...),
intptr_t (*systemcalls)(intptr_t, ...))
{
void *libHandle;
void (*dllEntry)(intptr_t (*syscallptr)(intptr_t, ...));
assert(name);
Com_Printf( "Loading DLL file: %s\n", name);
libHandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name);
if(!libHandle)
{
Com_Printf("Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) failed:\n\"%s\"\n", name, Sys_LibraryError());
return NULL;
}
dllEntry = Sys_LoadFunction( libHandle, "dllEntry" );
*entryPoint = Sys_LoadFunction( libHandle, "vmMain" );
if ( !*entryPoint || !dllEntry )
{
Com_Printf ( "Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) failed to find vmMain function:\n\"%s\" !\n", name, Sys_LibraryError( ) );
Sys_UnloadLibrary(libHandle);
return NULL;
}
Com_Printf ( "Sys_LoadGameDll(%s) found vmMain function at %p\n", name, *entryPoint );
dllEntry( systemcalls );
return libHandle;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 96,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnOpen(
int request_id, const GURL& origin_url, fileapi::FileSystemType type,
int64 requested_size, bool create) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
if (type == fileapi::kFileSystemTypeTemporary) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenFileSystemTemporary"));
} else if (type == fileapi::kFileSystemTypePersistent) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenFileSystemPersistent"));
}
context_->OpenFileSystem(origin_url, type, create, base::Bind(
&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidOpenFileSystem, this, request_id));
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rm_read_packet(AVFormatContext *s, AVPacket *pkt)
{
RMDemuxContext *rm = s->priv_data;
AVStream *st = NULL; // init to silence compiler warning
int i, len, res, seq = 1;
int64_t timestamp, pos;
int flags;
for (;;) {
if (rm->audio_pkt_cnt) {
st = s->streams[rm->audio_stream_num];
res = ff_rm_retrieve_cache(s, s->pb, st, st->priv_data, pkt);
if(res < 0)
return res;
flags = 0;
} else {
if (rm->old_format) {
RMStream *ast;
st = s->streams[0];
ast = st->priv_data;
timestamp = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
len = !ast->audio_framesize ? RAW_PACKET_SIZE :
ast->coded_framesize * ast->sub_packet_h / 2;
flags = (seq++ == 1) ? 2 : 0;
pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
} else {
len = rm_sync(s, ×tamp, &flags, &i, &pos);
if (len > 0)
st = s->streams[i];
}
if (avio_feof(s->pb))
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (len <= 0)
return AVERROR(EIO);
res = ff_rm_parse_packet (s, s->pb, st, st->priv_data, len, pkt,
&seq, flags, timestamp);
if (res < -1)
return res;
if((flags&2) && (seq&0x7F) == 1)
av_add_index_entry(st, pos, timestamp, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
if (res)
continue;
}
if( (st->discard >= AVDISCARD_NONKEY && !(flags&2))
|| st->discard >= AVDISCARD_ALL){
av_packet_unref(pkt);
} else
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int count_cow_clusters(BDRVQcowState *s, int nb_clusters,
uint64_t *l2_table, int l2_index)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nb_clusters; i++) {
uint64_t l2_entry = be64_to_cpu(l2_table[l2_index + i]);
int cluster_type = qcow2_get_cluster_type(l2_entry);
switch(cluster_type) {
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_NORMAL:
if (l2_entry & QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED) {
goto out;
}
break;
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_UNALLOCATED:
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_COMPRESSED:
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_ZERO:
break;
default:
abort();
}
}
out:
assert(i <= nb_clusters);
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HttpNetworkTransactionTest()
: spdy_util_(GetParam()),
session_deps_(GetParam()),
old_max_group_sockets_(ClientSocketPoolManager::max_sockets_per_group(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)),
old_max_pool_sockets_(ClientSocketPoolManager::max_sockets_per_pool(
HttpNetworkSession::NORMAL_SOCKET_POOL)) {
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 129,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sparc_pmu_add(struct perf_event *event, int ef_flags)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
int n0, ret = -EAGAIN;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
perf_pmu_disable(event->pmu);
n0 = cpuc->n_events;
if (n0 >= MAX_HWEVENTS)
goto out;
cpuc->event[n0] = event;
cpuc->events[n0] = event->hw.event_base;
cpuc->current_idx[n0] = PIC_NO_INDEX;
event->hw.state = PERF_HES_UPTODATE;
if (!(ef_flags & PERF_EF_START))
event->hw.state |= PERF_HES_STOPPED;
/*
* If group events scheduling transaction was started,
* skip the schedulability test here, it will be performed
* at commit time(->commit_txn) as a whole
*/
if (cpuc->group_flag & PERF_EVENT_TXN)
goto nocheck;
if (check_excludes(cpuc->event, n0, 1))
goto out;
if (sparc_check_constraints(cpuc->event, cpuc->events, n0 + 1))
goto out;
nocheck:
cpuc->n_events++;
cpuc->n_added++;
ret = 0;
out:
perf_pmu_enable(event->pmu);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *BlobToImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,const void *blob,
const size_t length,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const MagickInfo
*magick_info;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*blob_info,
*clone_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if ((blob == (const void *) NULL) || (length == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),BlobError,
"ZeroLengthBlobNotPermitted","`%s'",image_info->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
blob_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
blob_info->blob=(void *) blob;
blob_info->length=length;
if (*blob_info->magick == '\0')
(void) SetImageInfo(blob_info,0,exception);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(blob_info->magick,exception);
if (magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateError,"NoDecodeDelegateForThisImageFormat","`%s'",
blob_info->magick);
blob_info=DestroyImageInfo(blob_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (GetMagickBlobSupport(magick_info) != MagickFalse)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Native blob support for this image format.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,blob_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) FormatLocaleString(blob_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s:%s",
blob_info->magick,filename);
image=ReadImage(blob_info,exception);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) DetachBlob(image->blob);
blob_info=DestroyImageInfo(blob_info);
return(image);
}
/*
Write blob to a temporary file on disk.
*/
blob_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
blob_info->length=0;
*blob_info->filename='\0';
status=BlobToFile(blob_info->filename,blob,length,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(blob_info->filename);
blob_info=DestroyImageInfo(blob_info);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
clone_info=CloneImageInfo(blob_info);
(void) FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s:%s",
blob_info->magick,blob_info->filename);
image=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image
*images;
/*
Restore original filenames and image format.
*/
for (images=GetFirstImageInList(image); images != (Image *) NULL; )
{
(void) CopyMagickString(images->filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(images->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(images->magick,magick_info->name,
MagickPathExtent);
images=GetNextImageInList(images);
}
}
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(blob_info->filename);
blob_info=DestroyImageInfo(blob_info);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ImageBitmapFactories& ImageBitmapFactories::fromInternal(DOMWindow& object)
{
ImageBitmapFactories* supplement = static_cast<ImageBitmapFactories*>(Supplement<DOMWindow>::from(object, supplementName()));
if (!supplement) {
supplement = new ImageBitmapFactories();
Supplement<DOMWindow>::provideTo(object, supplementName(), adoptPtr(supplement));
}
return *supplement;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int writepng_encode_image(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr)
{
png_structp png_ptr = (png_structp)mainprog_ptr->png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = (png_infop)mainprog_ptr->info_ptr;
/* as always, setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a
* PNG-writing libpng function */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_write_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr);
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = NULL;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = NULL;
return 2;
}
/* and now we just write the whole image; libpng takes care of interlacing
* for us */
png_write_image(png_ptr, mainprog_ptr->row_pointers);
/* since that's it, we also close out the end of the PNG file now--if we
* had any text or time info to write after the IDATs, second argument
* would be info_ptr, but we optimize slightly by sending NULL pointer: */
png_write_end(png_ptr, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool set_plugin_info_called() const {
return set_plugin_info_called_;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExclusiveAccessContext* BrowserView::GetExclusiveAccessContext() {
return this;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int platform_get_irq_byname(struct platform_device *dev, const char *name)
{
struct resource *r;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OF_IRQ) && dev->dev.of_node) {
int ret;
ret = of_irq_get_byname(dev->dev.of_node, name);
if (ret > 0 || ret == -EPROBE_DEFER)
return ret;
}
r = platform_get_resource_byname(dev, IORESOURCE_IRQ, name);
return r ? r->start : -ENXIO;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 63,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcXvListImageFormats(ClientPtr client)
{
XvPortPtr pPort;
XvImagePtr pImage;
int i;
xvListImageFormatsReply rep;
xvImageFormatInfo info;
REQUEST(xvListImageFormatsReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvListImageFormatsReq);
VALIDATE_XV_PORT(stuff->port, pPort, DixReadAccess);
rep = (xvListImageFormatsReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.num_formats = pPort->pAdaptor->nImages,
.length =
bytes_to_int32(pPort->pAdaptor->nImages * sz_xvImageFormatInfo)
};
_WriteListImageFormatsReply(client, &rep);
pImage = pPort->pAdaptor->pImages;
for (i = 0; i < pPort->pAdaptor->nImages; i++, pImage++) {
info.id = pImage->id;
info.type = pImage->type;
info.byte_order = pImage->byte_order;
memcpy(&info.guid, pImage->guid, 16);
info.bpp = pImage->bits_per_pixel;
info.num_planes = pImage->num_planes;
info.depth = pImage->depth;
info.red_mask = pImage->red_mask;
info.green_mask = pImage->green_mask;
info.blue_mask = pImage->blue_mask;
info.format = pImage->format;
info.y_sample_bits = pImage->y_sample_bits;
info.u_sample_bits = pImage->u_sample_bits;
info.v_sample_bits = pImage->v_sample_bits;
info.horz_y_period = pImage->horz_y_period;
info.horz_u_period = pImage->horz_u_period;
info.horz_v_period = pImage->horz_v_period;
info.vert_y_period = pImage->vert_y_period;
info.vert_u_period = pImage->vert_u_period;
info.vert_v_period = pImage->vert_v_period;
memcpy(&info.comp_order, pImage->component_order, 32);
info.scanline_order = pImage->scanline_order;
_WriteImageFormatInfo(client, &info);
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t aac_show_bios_version(struct device *device,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev*)class_to_shost(device)->hostdata;
int len, tmp;
tmp = le32_to_cpu(dev->adapter_info.biosrev);
len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d.%d-%d[%d]\n",
tmp >> 24, (tmp >> 16) & 0xff, tmp & 0xff,
le32_to_cpu(dev->adapter_info.biosbuild));
return len;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServiceWorkerProviderHost* ServiceWorkerContextCore::GetProviderHost(
int provider_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
auto found = providers_->find(provider_id);
if (found == providers_->end())
return nullptr;
return found->second.get();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_siocwandev(struct net *net, struct compat_ifreq __user *uifr32)
{
compat_uptr_t uptr32;
struct ifreq ifr;
void __user *saved;
int err;
if (copy_from_user(&ifr, uifr32, sizeof(struct compat_ifreq)))
return -EFAULT;
if (get_user(uptr32, &uifr32->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu))
return -EFAULT;
saved = ifr.ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.raw_hdlc;
ifr.ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.raw_hdlc = compat_ptr(uptr32);
err = dev_ioctl(net, SIOCWANDEV, &ifr, NULL);
if (!err) {
ifr.ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.raw_hdlc = saved;
if (copy_to_user(uifr32, &ifr, sizeof(struct compat_ifreq)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 82,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_tcp6_sock(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
{
const struct in6_addr *dest, *src;
__u16 destp, srcp;
int timer_active;
unsigned long timer_expires;
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sp);
const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sp);
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sp);
const struct fastopen_queue *fastopenq = &icsk->icsk_accept_queue.fastopenq;
int rx_queue;
int state;
dest = &sp->sk_v6_daddr;
src = &sp->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
srcp = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_REO_TIMEOUT ||
icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_LOSS_PROBE) {
timer_active = 1;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_PROBE0) {
timer_active = 4;
timer_expires = icsk->icsk_timeout;
} else if (timer_pending(&sp->sk_timer)) {
timer_active = 2;
timer_expires = sp->sk_timer.expires;
} else {
timer_active = 0;
timer_expires = jiffies;
}
state = sk_state_load(sp);
if (state == TCP_LISTEN)
rx_queue = sp->sk_ack_backlog;
else
/* Because we don't lock the socket,
* we might find a transient negative value.
*/
rx_queue = max_t(int, tp->rcv_nxt - tp->copied_seq, 0);
seq_printf(seq,
"%4d: %08X%08X%08X%08X:%04X %08X%08X%08X%08X:%04X "
"%02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5u %8d %lu %d %pK %lu %lu %u %u %d\n",
i,
src->s6_addr32[0], src->s6_addr32[1],
src->s6_addr32[2], src->s6_addr32[3], srcp,
dest->s6_addr32[0], dest->s6_addr32[1],
dest->s6_addr32[2], dest->s6_addr32[3], destp,
state,
tp->write_seq - tp->snd_una,
rx_queue,
timer_active,
jiffies_delta_to_clock_t(timer_expires - jiffies),
icsk->icsk_retransmits,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(sp)),
icsk->icsk_probes_out,
sock_i_ino(sp),
atomic_read(&sp->sk_refcnt), sp,
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_rto),
jiffies_to_clock_t(icsk->icsk_ack.ato),
(icsk->icsk_ack.quick << 1) | icsk->icsk_ack.pingpong,
tp->snd_cwnd,
state == TCP_LISTEN ?
fastopenq->max_qlen :
(tcp_in_initial_slowstart(tp) ? -1 : tp->snd_ssthresh)
);
}
Commit Message: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 65,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RestartHangMonitorTimeout() {
if (hang_monitor_timeout_)
hang_monitor_timeout_->Restart(hung_renderer_delay_);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameLoadType FrameLoader::DetermineFrameLoadType(
const FrameLoadRequest& request) {
if (frame_->Tree().Parent() &&
!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad())
return kFrameLoadTypeInitialInChildFrame;
if (!frame_->Tree().Parent() && !Client()->BackForwardLength()) {
if (Opener() && request.GetResourceRequest().Url().IsEmpty())
return kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
return kFrameLoadTypeStandard;
}
if (request.GetResourceRequest().GetCacheMode() ==
mojom::FetchCacheMode::kValidateCache)
return kFrameLoadTypeReload;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().GetCacheMode() ==
mojom::FetchCacheMode::kBypassCache)
return kFrameLoadTypeReloadBypassingCache;
if (request.ReplacesCurrentItem() ||
(!state_machine_.CommittedMultipleRealLoads() &&
DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(frame_->GetDocument()->Url(), BlankURL())))
return kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().Url() == document_loader_->UrlForHistory()) {
if (request.GetResourceRequest().HttpMethod() == HTTPNames::POST)
return kFrameLoadTypeStandard;
if (!request.OriginDocument())
return kFrameLoadTypeReload;
return kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
}
if (request.GetSubstituteData().FailingURL() ==
document_loader_->UrlForHistory() &&
document_loader_->LoadType() == kFrameLoadTypeReload)
return kFrameLoadTypeReload;
if (request.GetResourceRequest().Url().IsEmpty() &&
request.GetSubstituteData().FailingURL().IsEmpty()) {
return kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
}
if (request.OriginDocument() &&
!request.OriginDocument()->CanCreateHistoryEntry())
return kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
return kFrameLoadTypeStandard;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bindText(
sqlite3_stmt *pStmt, /* The statement to bind against */
int i, /* Index of the parameter to bind */
const void *zData, /* Pointer to the data to be bound */
int nData, /* Number of bytes of data to be bound */
void (*xDel)(void*), /* Destructor for the data */
u8 encoding /* Encoding for the data */
){
Vdbe *p = (Vdbe *)pStmt;
Mem *pVar;
int rc;
rc = vdbeUnbind(p, i);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
if( zData!=0 ){
pVar = &p->aVar[i-1];
rc = sqlite3VdbeMemSetStr(pVar, zData, nData, encoding, xDel);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && encoding!=0 ){
rc = sqlite3VdbeChangeEncoding(pVar, ENC(p->db));
}
if( rc ){
sqlite3Error(p->db, rc);
rc = sqlite3ApiExit(p->db, rc);
}
}
sqlite3_mutex_leave(p->db->mutex);
}else if( xDel!=SQLITE_STATIC && xDel!=SQLITE_TRANSIENT ){
xDel((void*)zData);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 151,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetSamplerParameterfv(GLuint client_id,
GLenum pname,
GLfloat* params,
GLsizei params_size) {
Sampler* sampler = GetSampler(client_id);
if (!sampler) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetSamplerParamterfv", "unknown sampler");
return;
}
api()->glGetSamplerParameterfvFn(sampler->service_id(), pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual int create() {
int nlctrlFamily = genl_ctrl_resolve(mInfo->cmd_sock, "nlctrl");
int ret = mMsg.create(nlctrlFamily, CTRL_CMD_GETFAMILY, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
ret = mMsg.put_string(CTRL_ATTR_FAMILY_NAME, mName);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lexer_scan_identifier (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
bool propety_name) /**< property name */
{
skip_spaces (context_p);
context_p->token.line = context_p->line;
context_p->token.column = context_p->column;
if (context_p->source_p < context_p->source_end_p
&& (lit_char_is_identifier_start (context_p->source_p) || context_p->source_p[0] == LIT_CHAR_BACKSLASH))
{
lexer_parse_identifier (context_p, false);
if (propety_name && context_p->token.lit_location.length == 3)
{
skip_spaces (context_p);
if (context_p->source_p < context_p->source_end_p
&& context_p->source_p[0] != LIT_CHAR_COLON)
{
if (lexer_compare_identifier_to_current (context_p, &lexer_get_literal))
{
context_p->token.type = LEXER_PROPERTY_GETTER;
}
else if (lexer_compare_identifier_to_current (context_p, &lexer_set_literal))
{
context_p->token.type = LEXER_PROPERTY_SETTER;
}
}
}
return;
}
if (propety_name)
{
lexer_next_token (context_p);
if (context_p->token.type == LEXER_LITERAL
|| context_p->token.type == LEXER_RIGHT_BRACE)
{
return;
}
}
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_IDENTIFIER_EXPECTED);
} /* lexer_scan_identifier */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long macvtap_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
return macvtap_ioctl(file, cmd, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 34,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~PrintWebViewHelperTestBase() {}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FetchManager::Loader::Dispose() {
probe::detachClientRequest(execution_context_, this);
fetch_manager_ = nullptr;
if (threadable_loader_) {
if (fetch_request_data_->Keepalive())
threadable_loader_->Detach();
else
threadable_loader_->Cancel();
threadable_loader_ = nullptr;
}
if (integrity_verifier_)
integrity_verifier_->Cancel();
execution_context_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 154,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct dst_entry *inet_csk_route_req(const struct sock *sk,
struct flowi4 *fl4,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct net *net = read_pnet(&ireq->ireq_net);
struct ip_options_rcu *opt = ireq->opt;
struct rtable *rt;
flowi4_init_output(fl4, ireq->ir_iif, ireq->ir_mark,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
sk->sk_protocol, inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk),
(opt && opt->opt.srr) ? opt->opt.faddr : ireq->ir_rmt_addr,
ireq->ir_loc_addr, ireq->ir_rmt_port,
htons(ireq->ir_num), sk->sk_uid);
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (opt && opt->opt.is_strictroute && rt->rt_uses_gateway)
goto route_err;
return &rt->dst;
route_err:
ip_rt_put(rt);
no_route:
__IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent
syzkaller found a way to trigger double frees from ip_mc_drop_socket()
It turns out that leave a copy of parent mc_list at accept() time,
which is very bad.
Very similar to commit 8b485ce69876 ("tcp: do not inherit
fastopen_req from parent")
Initial report from Pray3r, completed by Andrey one.
Thanks a lot to them !
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Pray3r <pray3r.z@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 66,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::releaseLayerResources()
{
if (!isAcceleratedCompositingActive())
return;
if (m_frameLayers)
m_frameLayers->releaseLayerResources();
Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->dispatchSyncMessage(
Platform::createMethodCallMessage(&WebPagePrivate::releaseLayerResourcesCompositingThread, this));
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool ehci_periodic_enabled(EHCIState *s)
{
return ehci_enabled(s) && (s->usbcmd & USBCMD_PSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint64 WebContentsImpl::GetUploadPosition() const {
return upload_position_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,670
|
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