instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendIO::WriteData(EntryImpl* entry, int index, int offset,
net::IOBuffer* buf, int buf_len, bool truncate) {
operation_ = OP_WRITE;
entry_ = entry;
index_ = index;
offset_ = offset;
buf_ = buf;
buf_len_ = buf_len;
truncate_ = truncate;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *state)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
mark_reg_not_init(env, regs, i);
regs[i].live = REG_LIVE_NONE;
regs[i].parent = NULL;
}
/* frame pointer */
regs[BPF_REG_FP].type = PTR_TO_STACK;
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_FP);
regs[BPF_REG_FP].frameno = state->frameno;
/* 1st arg to a function */
regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_CTX;
mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_1);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 91,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ImportBlueQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_association *new_asoc;
sctp_init_chunk_t *peer_init;
struct sctp_chunk *repl;
struct sctp_ulpevent *ev, *ai_ev = NULL;
int error = 0;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chk_p;
struct sock *sk;
/* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
* control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
*/
if (ep == sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock)->ep) {
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* Make sure that the COOKIE_ECHO chunk has a valid length.
* In this case, we check that we have enough for at least a
* chunk header. More detailed verification is done
* in sctp_unpack_cookie().
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations
* on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an
* ABORT.
*/
sk = ep->base.sk;
if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING) ||
(sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sk_acceptq_is_full(sk)))
return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.
*/
chunk->subh.cookie_hdr =
(struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data;
if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
goto nomem;
/* 5.1 D) Upon reception of the COOKIE ECHO chunk, Endpoint
* "Z" will reply with a COOKIE ACK chunk after building a TCB
* and moving to the ESTABLISHED state.
*/
new_asoc = sctp_unpack_cookie(ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, &error,
&err_chk_p);
/* FIXME:
* If the re-build failed, what is the proper error path
* from here?
*
* [We should abort the association. --piggy]
*/
if (!new_asoc) {
/* FIXME: Several errors are possible. A bad cookie should
* be silently discarded, but think about logging it too.
*/
switch (error) {
case -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
goto nomem;
case -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE:
sctp_send_stale_cookie_err(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
err_chk_p);
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
case -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG:
default:
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
}
/* Delay state machine commands until later.
*
* Re-build the bind address for the association is done in
* the sctp_unpack_cookie() already.
*/
/* This is a brand-new association, so these are not yet side
* effects--it is safe to run them here.
*/
peer_init = &chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_init[0];
if (!sctp_process_init(new_asoc, chunk,
&chunk->subh.cookie_hdr->c.peer_addr,
peer_init, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto nomem_init;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Now that we've populate required fields in
* sctp_process_init, set up the assocaition shared keys as
* necessary so that we can potentially authenticate the ACK
*/
error = sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(new_asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (error)
goto nomem_init;
/* SCTP-AUTH: auth_chunk pointer is only set when the cookie-echo
* is supposed to be authenticated and we have to do delayed
* authentication. We've just recreated the association using
* the information in the cookie and now it's much easier to
* do the authentication.
*/
if (chunk->auth_chunk) {
struct sctp_chunk auth;
sctp_ierror_t ret;
/* set-up our fake chunk so that we can process it */
auth.skb = chunk->auth_chunk;
auth.asoc = chunk->asoc;
auth.sctp_hdr = chunk->sctp_hdr;
auth.chunk_hdr = (sctp_chunkhdr_t *)skb_push(chunk->auth_chunk,
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
skb_pull(chunk->auth_chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t));
auth.transport = chunk->transport;
ret = sctp_sf_authenticate(net, ep, new_asoc, type, &auth);
/* We can now safely free the auth_chunk clone */
kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk);
if (ret != SCTP_IERROR_NO_ERROR) {
sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
}
repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
if (!repl)
goto nomem_init;
/* RFC 2960 5.1 Normal Establishment of an Association
*
* D) IMPLEMENTATION NOTE: An implementation may choose to
* send the Communication Up notification to the SCTP user
* upon reception of a valid COOKIE ECHO chunk.
*/
ev = sctp_ulpevent_make_assoc_change(new_asoc, 0, SCTP_COMM_UP, 0,
new_asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams,
new_asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams,
NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ev)
goto nomem_ev;
/* Sockets API Draft Section 5.3.1.6
* When a peer sends a Adaptation Layer Indication parameter , SCTP
* delivers this notification to inform the application that of the
* peers requested adaptation layer.
*/
if (new_asoc->peer.adaptation_ind) {
ai_ev = sctp_ulpevent_make_adaptation_indication(new_asoc,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ai_ev)
goto nomem_aiev;
}
/* Add all the state machine commands now since we've created
* everything. This way we don't introduce memory corruptions
* during side-effect processing and correclty count established
* associations.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_PASSIVEESTABS);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_HB_TIMERS_START, SCTP_NULL());
if (new_asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE])
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_START,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_AUTOCLOSE));
/* This will send the COOKIE ACK */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
/* Queue the ASSOC_CHANGE event */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP, SCTP_ULPEVENT(ev));
/* Send up the Adaptation Layer Indication event */
if (ai_ev)
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_EVENT_ULP,
SCTP_ULPEVENT(ai_ev));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
nomem_aiev:
sctp_ulpevent_free(ev);
nomem_ev:
sctp_chunk_free(repl);
nomem_init:
sctp_association_free(new_asoc);
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:
The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]
When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
from the existing association to authenticate the
COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]
Commit bbd0d59809f9 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.
Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.
The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.
Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.
Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809f9 created a skb clone in that case.
I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.
Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 166,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_trap_or_bp(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int code,
const char *str)
{
siginfo_t info;
char b[40];
#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP
if (kgdb_ll_trap(DIE_TRAP, str, regs, code, regs_to_trapnr(regs), SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
#endif /* CONFIG_KGDB_LOW_LEVEL_TRAP */
if (notify_die(DIE_TRAP, str, regs, code, regs_to_trapnr(regs), SIGTRAP) == NOTIFY_STOP)
return;
/*
* A short test says that IRIX 5.3 sends SIGTRAP for all trap
* insns, even for trap and break codes that indicate arithmetic
* failures. Weird ...
* But should we continue the brokenness??? --macro
*/
switch (code) {
case BRK_OVERFLOW:
case BRK_DIVZERO:
scnprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%s instruction in kernel code", str);
die_if_kernel(b, regs);
if (code == BRK_DIVZERO)
info.si_code = FPE_INTDIV;
else
info.si_code = FPE_INTOVF;
info.si_signo = SIGFPE;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_addr = (void __user *) regs->cp0_epc;
force_sig_info(SIGFPE, &info, current);
break;
case BRK_BUG:
die_if_kernel("Kernel bug detected", regs);
force_sig(SIGTRAP, current);
break;
case BRK_MEMU:
/*
* Address errors may be deliberately induced by the FPU
* emulator to retake control of the CPU after executing the
* instruction in the delay slot of an emulated branch.
*
* Terminate if exception was recognized as a delay slot return
* otherwise handle as normal.
*/
if (do_dsemulret(regs))
return;
die_if_kernel("Math emu break/trap", regs);
force_sig(SIGTRAP, current);
break;
default:
scnprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%s instruction in kernel code", str);
die_if_kernel(b, regs);
force_sig(SIGTRAP, current);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ut64 Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr_end)(ELFOBJ *bin, const char *section_name) {
RBinElfSection *section = get_section_by_name (bin, section_name);
return section? section->rva + section->size: UT64_MAX;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_fh(__be32 *p, struct svc_fh *fhp)
{
unsigned int size;
fh_init(fhp, NFS3_FHSIZE);
size = ntohl(*p++);
if (size > NFS3_FHSIZE)
return NULL;
memcpy(&fhp->fh_handle.fh_base, p, size);
fhp->fh_handle.fh_size = size;
return p + XDR_QUADLEN(size);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void imap_free_idata(struct ImapData **idata)
{
if (!idata)
return;
FREE(&(*idata)->capstr);
mutt_list_free(&(*idata)->flags);
imap_mboxcache_free(*idata);
mutt_buffer_free(&(*idata)->cmdbuf);
FREE(&(*idata)->buf);
mutt_bcache_close(&(*idata)->bcache);
FREE(&(*idata)->cmds);
FREE(idata);
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *am_request_hostname(request_rec *r)
{
const char *url;
apr_uri_t uri;
int ret;
url = am_reconstruct_url(r);
ret = apr_uri_parse(r->pool, url, &uri);
if (ret != APR_SUCCESS) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Failed to parse request URL: %s", url);
return NULL;
}
if (uri.hostname == NULL) {
/* This shouldn't happen, since the request URL is built with a hostname,
* but log a message to make any debuggin around this code easier.
*/
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"No hostname in request URL: %s", url);
return NULL;
}
return uri.hostname;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_NPUSHW( INS_ARG )
{
Int L, K;
L = (Int)CUR.code[CUR.IP + 1];
if ( BOUNDS( L, CUR.stackSize+1-CUR.top ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Stack_Overflow;
return;
}
CUR.IP += 2;
for ( K = 0; K < L; K++ )
{ args[K] = GET_ShortIns();
DBG_PRINT1(" %d", args[K]);
}
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
CUR.new_top += L;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_event_enable(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
struct task_struct *task = ctx->task;
if (!task) {
/*
* Enable the event on the cpu that it's on
*/
cpu_function_call(event->cpu, __perf_event_enable, event);
return;
}
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (event->state >= PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE)
goto out;
/*
* If the event is in error state, clear that first.
* That way, if we see the event in error state below, we
* know that it has gone back into error state, as distinct
* from the task having been scheduled away before the
* cross-call arrived.
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ERROR)
event->state = PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF;
retry:
if (!ctx->is_active) {
__perf_event_mark_enabled(event, ctx);
goto out;
}
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
if (!task_function_call(task, __perf_event_enable, event))
return;
raw_spin_lock_irq(&ctx->lock);
/*
* If the context is active and the event is still off,
* we need to retry the cross-call.
*/
if (ctx->is_active && event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF) {
/*
* task could have been flipped by a concurrent
* perf_event_context_sched_out()
*/
task = ctx->task;
goto retry;
}
out:
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct inet6_skb_parm *opt = IP6CB(skb);
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
u32 mtu;
if (net->ipv6.devconf_all->forwarding == 0)
goto error;
if (skb_warn_if_lro(skb))
goto drop;
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_FWD, skb)) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto drop;
skb_forward_csum(skb);
/*
* We DO NOT make any processing on
* RA packets, pushing them to user level AS IS
* without ane WARRANTY that application will be able
* to interpret them. The reason is that we
* cannot make anything clever here.
*
* We are not end-node, so that if packet contains
* AH/ESP, we cannot make anything.
* Defragmentation also would be mistake, RA packets
* cannot be fragmented, because there is no warranty
* that different fragments will go along one path. --ANK
*/
if (opt->ra) {
u8 *ptr = skb_network_header(skb) + opt->ra;
if (ip6_call_ra_chain(skb, (ptr[2]<<8) + ptr[3]))
return 0;
}
/*
* check and decrement ttl
*/
if (hdr->hop_limit <= 1) {
/* Force OUTPUT device used as source address */
skb->dev = dst->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT, 0);
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net,
ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
/* XXX: idev->cnf.proxy_ndp? */
if (net->ipv6.devconf_all->proxy_ndp &&
pneigh_lookup(&nd_tbl, net, &hdr->daddr, skb->dev, 0)) {
int proxied = ip6_forward_proxy_check(skb);
if (proxied > 0)
return ip6_input(skb);
else if (proxied < 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
}
if (!xfrm6_route_forward(skb)) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
dst = skb_dst(skb);
/* IPv6 specs say nothing about it, but it is clear that we cannot
send redirects to source routed frames.
We don't send redirects to frames decapsulated from IPsec.
*/
if (skb->dev == dst->dev && opt->srcrt == 0 && !skb_sec_path(skb)) {
struct in6_addr *target = NULL;
struct inet_peer *peer;
struct rt6_info *rt;
/*
* incoming and outgoing devices are the same
* send a redirect.
*/
rt = (struct rt6_info *) dst;
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY)
target = &rt->rt6i_gateway;
else
target = &hdr->daddr;
peer = inet_getpeer_v6(net->ipv6.peers, &rt->rt6i_dst.addr, 1);
/* Limit redirects both by destination (here)
and by source (inside ndisc_send_redirect)
*/
if (inet_peer_xrlim_allow(peer, 1*HZ))
ndisc_send_redirect(skb, target);
if (peer)
inet_putpeer(peer);
} else {
int addrtype = ipv6_addr_type(&hdr->saddr);
/* This check is security critical. */
if (addrtype == IPV6_ADDR_ANY ||
addrtype & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST | IPV6_ADDR_LOOPBACK))
goto error;
if (addrtype & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
ICMPV6_NOT_NEIGHBOUR, 0);
goto error;
}
}
mtu = dst_mtu(dst);
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
if ((!skb->local_df && skb->len > mtu && !skb_is_gso(skb)) ||
(IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size && IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size > mtu)) {
/* Again, force OUTPUT device used as source address */
skb->dev = dst->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net,
ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INTOOBIGERRORS);
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net,
ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (skb_cow(skb, dst->dev->hard_header_len)) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
/* Mangling hops number delayed to point after skb COW */
hdr->hop_limit--;
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
IP6_ADD_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);
return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_FORWARD, skb, skb->dev, dst->dev,
ip6_forward_finish);
error:
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INADDRERRORS);
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect GetWindowRect(GdkWindow* window) {
gint width = gdk_window_get_width(window);
gint height = gdk_window_get_height(window);
return gfx::Rect(width, height);
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MultibufferDataSource::SeekTask_Locked() {
DCHECK(render_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (stop_signal_received_)
return;
if (read_op_)
return;
url_data()->AddBytesRead(bytes_read_);
bytes_read_ = 0;
if (reader_) {
int64_t pos = reader_->Tell();
int64_t available = reader_->Available();
for (auto i = seek_positions_.rbegin(); i != seek_positions_.rend(); ++i) {
int64_t new_pos = *i;
int64_t available_at_new_pos = reader_->AvailableAt(new_pos);
if (total_bytes_ != kPositionNotSpecified) {
if (new_pos + available_at_new_pos >= total_bytes_) {
continue;
}
}
if (available_at_new_pos < available) {
pos = new_pos;
available = available_at_new_pos;
}
}
reader_->Seek(pos);
}
seek_positions_.clear();
UpdateLoadingState_Locked(false);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_metadata_from_renditions(AVFormatContext *s, struct playlist *pls,
enum AVMediaType type)
{
int rend_idx = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pls->n_main_streams; i++) {
AVStream *st = pls->main_streams[i];
if (st->codecpar->codec_type != type)
continue;
for (; rend_idx < pls->n_renditions; rend_idx++) {
struct rendition *rend = pls->renditions[rend_idx];
if (rend->type != type)
continue;
if (rend->language[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "language", rend->language, 0);
if (rend->name[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "comment", rend->name, 0);
st->disposition |= rend->disposition;
}
if (rend_idx >=pls->n_renditions)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::ExecuteCommand(int command_id, int event_flags) {
DestroyTouchSelection();
switch (command_id) {
case IDC_PASTE_AND_GO:
model()->PasteAndGo(GetClipboardText());
return;
case IDS_SHOW_URL:
model()->Unelide(true /* exit_query_in_omnibox */);
return;
case IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES:
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
return;
case IDC_SEND_TAB_TO_SELF:
send_tab_to_self::RecordSendTabToSelfClickResult(
send_tab_to_self::kOmniboxMenu, SendTabToSelfClickResult::kClickItem);
send_tab_to_self::CreateNewEntry(location_bar_view_->GetWebContents());
return;
case IDS_APP_PASTE:
ExecuteTextEditCommand(ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE);
return;
default:
if (Textfield::IsCommandIdEnabled(command_id)) {
Textfield::ExecuteCommand(command_id, event_flags);
return;
}
OnBeforePossibleChange();
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->ExecuteCommand(command_id);
OnAfterPossibleChange(true);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pdo_stmt_do_next_rowset(pdo_stmt_t *stmt TSRMLS_DC)
{
/* un-describe */
if (stmt->columns) {
int i;
struct pdo_column_data *cols = stmt->columns;
for (i = 0; i < stmt->column_count; i++) {
efree(cols[i].name);
}
efree(stmt->columns);
stmt->columns = NULL;
stmt->column_count = 0;
}
if (!stmt->methods->next_rowset(stmt TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* Set the executed flag to 0 to reallocate columns on next execute */
stmt->executed = 0;
return 0;
}
pdo_stmt_describe_columns(stmt TSRMLS_CC);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnTempFileForPrintingWritten(int render_view_id,
int browser_fd) {
close(browser_fd);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ptrace_disable(struct task_struct *child)
{
/* make sure the single step bit is not set. */
user_disable_single_step(child);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DidGetHostQuota(QuotaStatusCode status,
const std::string& host,
StorageType type,
int64 host_quota) {
DCHECK_EQ(this->host(), host);
DCHECK_EQ(this->type(), type);
if (quota_status_ == kQuotaStatusUnknown || quota_status_ == kQuotaStatusOk)
quota_status_ = status;
host_quota_ = host_quota;
CheckCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t ehci_caps_read(void *ptr, hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
EHCIState *s = ptr;
return s->caps[addr];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_import_stub(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, struct symbol_t *symbol, int idx) {
int i, j, nsyms, stridx;
const char *symstr;
if (idx < 0) {
return 0;
}
symbol->offset = 0LL;
symbol->addr = 0LL;
symbol->name[0] = '\0';
if (!bin || !bin->sects) {
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if ((bin->sects[i].flags & SECTION_TYPE) == S_SYMBOL_STUBS && bin->sects[i].reserved2 > 0) {
nsyms = (int)(bin->sects[i].size / bin->sects[i].reserved2);
if (nsyms > bin->size) {
bprintf ("mach0: Invalid symbol table size\n");
}
for (j = 0; j < nsyms; j++) {
if (bin->sects) {
if (bin->sects[i].reserved1 + j >= bin->nindirectsyms) {
continue;
}
}
if (bin->indirectsyms) {
if (idx != bin->indirectsyms[bin->sects[i].reserved1 + j]) {
continue;
}
}
if (idx > bin->nsymtab) {
continue;
}
symbol->type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_LOCAL;
symbol->offset = bin->sects[i].offset + j * bin->sects[i].reserved2;
symbol->addr = bin->sects[i].addr + j * bin->sects[i].reserved2;
symbol->size = 0;
stridx = bin->symtab[idx].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char *)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "???";
}
if (*symstr == '_') {
symstr++;
}
snprintf (symbol->name, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH, "imp.%s", symstr);
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_format_mra(struct cm_mra_msg *mra_msg,
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
enum cm_msg_response msg_mraed, u8 service_timeout,
const void *private_data, u8 private_data_len)
{
cm_format_mad_hdr(&mra_msg->hdr, CM_MRA_ATTR_ID, cm_id_priv->tid);
cm_mra_set_msg_mraed(mra_msg, msg_mraed);
mra_msg->local_comm_id = cm_id_priv->id.local_id;
mra_msg->remote_comm_id = cm_id_priv->id.remote_id;
cm_mra_set_service_timeout(mra_msg, service_timeout);
if (private_data && private_data_len)
memcpy(mra_msg->private_data, private_data, private_data_len);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *GetXMLTreeOrdered(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
return(xml_info->ordered);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __udp6_lib_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct udp_table *udptable,
int proto)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct sock *sk;
struct udphdr *uh;
const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
u32 ulen = 0;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr)))
goto discard;
saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
ulen = ntohs(uh->len);
if (ulen > skb->len)
goto short_packet;
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP) {
/* UDP validates ulen. */
/* Check for jumbo payload */
if (ulen == 0)
ulen = skb->len;
if (ulen < sizeof(*uh))
goto short_packet;
if (ulen < skb->len) {
if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, ulen))
goto short_packet;
saddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
daddr = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
}
}
if (udp6_csum_init(skb, uh, proto))
goto csum_error;
/*
* Multicast receive code
*/
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(daddr))
return __udp6_lib_mcast_deliver(net, skb,
saddr, daddr, udptable, proto);
/* Unicast */
/*
* check socket cache ... must talk to Alan about his plans
* for sock caches... i'll skip this for now.
*/
sk = __udp6_lib_lookup_skb(skb, uh->source, uh->dest, udptable);
if (sk) {
int ret;
if (!uh->check && !udp_sk(sk)->no_check6_rx) {
sock_put(sk);
udp6_csum_zero_error(skb);
goto csum_error;
}
if (inet_get_convert_csum(sk) && uh->check && !IS_UDPLITE(sk))
skb_checksum_try_convert(skb, IPPROTO_UDP, uh->check,
ip6_compute_pseudo);
ret = udpv6_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
sock_put(sk);
/* a return value > 0 means to resubmit the input, but
* it wants the return to be -protocol, or 0
*/
if (ret > 0)
return -ret;
return 0;
}
if (!uh->check) {
udp6_csum_zero_error(skb);
goto csum_error;
}
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard;
if (udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_error;
UDP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_NOPORTS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH, ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH, 0);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
short_packet:
net_dbg_ratelimited("UDP%sv6: short packet: From [%pI6c]:%u %d/%d to [%pI6c]:%u\n",
proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE ? "-Lite" : "",
saddr, ntohs(uh->source),
ulen, skb->len,
daddr, ntohs(uh->dest));
goto discard;
csum_error:
UDP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_CSUMERRORS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
discard:
UDP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, UDP_MIB_INERRORS, proto == IPPROTO_UDPLITE);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_probe_request(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
struct mgmt_body_t pbody;
int offset = 0;
int ret;
memset(&pbody, 0, sizeof(pbody));
ret = parse_elements(ndo, &pbody, p, offset, length);
PRINT_SSID(pbody);
PRINT_RATES(pbody);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_venc::dev_get_vui_timing_info(OMX_U32 *enabled)
{
#ifdef _MSM8974_
return handle->venc_get_vui_timing_info(enabled);
#else
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Get vui timing information is not supported");
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hwahc_op_urb_dequeue(struct usb_hcd *usb_hcd, struct urb *urb,
int status)
{
struct wusbhc *wusbhc = usb_hcd_to_wusbhc(usb_hcd);
struct hwahc *hwahc = container_of(wusbhc, struct hwahc, wusbhc);
return wa_urb_dequeue(&hwahc->wa, urb, status);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validate_entries( bool ignore_invalid_entry ) {
HASHITER it = hash_iter_begin( ConfigTab, TABLESIZE );
unsigned int invalid_entries = 0;
MyString tmp;
MyString output = "The following configuration macros appear to contain default values that must be changed before Condor will run. These macros are:\n";
while( ! hash_iter_done(it) ) {
char * val = hash_iter_value(it);
if( strstr(val, FORBIDDEN_CONFIG_VAL) ) {
char * name = hash_iter_key(it);
MyString filename;
int line_number;
param_get_location(name, filename, line_number);
tmp.sprintf(" %s (found on line %d of %s)\n", name, line_number, filename.Value());
output += tmp;
invalid_entries++;
}
hash_iter_next(it);
}
hash_iter_delete(&it);
if(invalid_entries > 0) {
if(ignore_invalid_entry) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "%s", output.Value());
} else {
EXCEPT(output.Value());
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 1 | 165,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init_dns_resolver(void)
{
struct cred *cred;
struct key *keyring;
int ret;
/* create an override credential set with a special thread keyring in
* which DNS requests are cached
*
* this is used to prevent malicious redirections from being installed
* with add_key().
*/
cred = prepare_kernel_cred(NULL);
if (!cred)
return -ENOMEM;
keyring = keyring_alloc(".dns_resolver",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred,
(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
goto failed_put_cred;
}
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_dns_resolver);
if (ret < 0)
goto failed_put_key;
/* instruct request_key() to use this special keyring as a cache for
* the results it looks up */
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, &keyring->flags);
cred->thread_keyring = keyring;
cred->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING;
dns_resolver_cache = cred;
kdebug("DNS resolver keyring: %d\n", key_serial(keyring));
return 0;
failed_put_key:
key_put(keyring);
failed_put_cred:
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_cb(struct findall_data *data, void *rockp)
{
struct list_rock *rock = (struct list_rock *)rockp;
if (!data) {
if (!(rock->last_attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN))
rock->last_attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASNOCHILDREN;
perform_output(NULL, NULL, rock);
return 0;
}
size_t last_len = (rock->last_name ? strlen(rock->last_name) : 0);
const char *extname = data->extname;
int last_name_is_ancestor =
rock->last_name
&& strlen(extname) >= last_len
&& extname[last_len] == imapd_namespace.hier_sep
&& !memcmp(rock->last_name, extname, last_len);
list_callback_calls++;
/* list_response will calculate haschildren/hasnochildren flags later
* if they're required but not yet set, but it's a little cheaper to
* precalculate them now while we're iterating the mailboxes anyway.
*/
if (last_name_is_ancestor || (rock->last_name && !data->mbname && !strcmp(rock->last_name, extname)))
rock->last_attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN;
else if (!(rock->last_attributes & MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN))
rock->last_attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASNOCHILDREN;
if (!perform_output(data->extname, data->mbentry, rock))
return 0;
if (!data->mbname)
rock->last_attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_HASCHILDREN | MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NONEXISTENT;
else if (data->mb_category == MBNAME_ALTINBOX)
rock->last_attributes |= MBOX_ATTRIBUTE_NOINFERIORS;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::beginParsingChildren()
{
clearIsParsingChildrenFinished();
StyleResolver* styleResolver = document()->styleResolverIfExists();
if (styleResolver && attached())
styleResolver->pushParentElement(this);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadExtent(const DictionaryValue* manifest,
const char* key,
URLPatternSet* extent,
const char* list_error,
const char* value_error,
URLPattern::ParseOption parse_strictness,
std::string* error) {
Value* temp = NULL;
if (!manifest->Get(key, &temp))
return true;
if (temp->GetType() != Value::TYPE_LIST) {
*error = list_error;
return false;
}
ListValue* pattern_list = static_cast<ListValue*>(temp);
for (size_t i = 0; i < pattern_list->GetSize(); ++i) {
std::string pattern_string;
if (!pattern_list->GetString(i, &pattern_string)) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(value_error,
base::UintToString(i),
errors::kExpectString);
return false;
}
URLPattern pattern(kValidWebExtentSchemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = pattern.Parse(pattern_string,
parse_strictness);
if (parse_result == URLPattern::PARSE_ERROR_EMPTY_PATH) {
pattern_string += "/";
parse_result = pattern.Parse(pattern_string, parse_strictness);
}
if (parse_result != URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
value_error,
base::UintToString(i),
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
if (pattern.match_all_urls()) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
value_error,
base::UintToString(i),
errors::kCannotClaimAllURLsInExtent);
return false;
}
if (pattern.host().empty()) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
value_error,
base::UintToString(i),
errors::kCannotClaimAllHostsInExtent);
return false;
}
if (pattern.path().find('*') != std::string::npos) {
*error = ExtensionErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
value_error,
base::UintToString(i),
errors::kNoWildCardsInPaths);
return false;
}
pattern.SetPath(pattern.path() + '*');
extent->AddPattern(pattern);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::setCTM(const AffineTransform& affine)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
platformContext()->canvas()->setMatrix(affine);
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 107,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~BrowserCompositorOutputSurface() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (!client_)
return;
output_surface_proxy_->RemoveSurface(surface_id_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *set_protocols(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
const char *arg)
{
core_server_config *conf =
ap_get_core_module_config(cmd->server->module_config);
const char **np;
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_DIR_LOC_FILE);
if (err) {
return err;
}
np = (const char **)apr_array_push(conf->protocols);
*np = arg;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_unsubscribe_port(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs = arg;
int result = -ENXIO;
struct snd_seq_client *receiver = NULL, *sender = NULL;
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport = NULL, *dport = NULL;
if ((receiver = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->dest.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sender = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->sender.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(sender, subs->sender.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((dport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(receiver, subs->dest.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
result = check_subscription_permission(client, sport, dport, subs);
if (result < 0)
goto __end;
result = snd_seq_port_disconnect(client, sender, sport, receiver, dport, subs);
if (! result) /* broadcast announce */
snd_seq_client_notify_subscription(SNDRV_SEQ_ADDRESS_SUBSCRIBERS, 0,
subs, SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_PORT_UNSUBSCRIBED);
__end:
if (sport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(sport);
if (dport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(dport);
if (sender)
snd_seq_client_unlock(sender);
if (receiver)
snd_seq_client_unlock(receiver);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string RegisterMockedHttpURLLoad(const std::string& file_name) {
return URLTestHelpers::RegisterMockedURLLoadFromBase(
WebString::FromUTF8(base_url_), testing::CoreTestDataPath(),
WebString::FromUTF8(file_name))
.GetString()
.Utf8();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
unsigned data_len, int *al)
{
unsigned i;
unsigned proto_len;
const unsigned char *selected;
unsigned char selected_len;
int r;
if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
return 0;
if (data_len < 2)
goto parse_error;
/* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
* length-prefixed strings. */
i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
((unsigned) data[1]);
data_len -= 2;
data += 2;
if (data_len != i)
goto parse_error;
if (data_len < 2)
goto parse_error;
for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
{
proto_len = data[i];
i++;
if (proto_len == 0)
goto parse_error;
if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
goto parse_error;
i += proto_len;
}
r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
{
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return -1;
}
memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
}
return 0;
parse_error:
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static WORD32 ihevcd_parse_vui_parameters(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
vui_t *ps_vui,
WORD32 sps_max_sub_layers_minus1)
{
WORD32 ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
UWORD16 u2_sar_width = 0;
UWORD16 u2_sar_height = 0;
BITS_PARSE("aspect_ratio_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc = SAR_UNUSED;
u2_sar_width = 0;
u2_sar_height = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_info_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("aspect_ratio_idc", ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc, ps_bitstrm, 8);
switch(ps_vui->u1_aspect_ratio_idc)
{
case SAR_1_1:
u2_sar_width = 1;
u2_sar_height = 1;
break;
case SAR_12_11:
u2_sar_width = 12;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_10_11:
u2_sar_width = 10;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_16_11:
u2_sar_width = 16;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_40_33:
u2_sar_width = 40;
u2_sar_height = 33;
break;
case SAR_24_11:
u2_sar_width = 24;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_20_11:
u2_sar_width = 20;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_32_11:
u2_sar_width = 32;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_80_33:
u2_sar_width = 80;
u2_sar_height = 33;
break;
case SAR_18_11:
u2_sar_width = 18;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_15_11:
u2_sar_width = 15;
u2_sar_height = 11;
break;
case SAR_64_33:
u2_sar_width = 64;
u2_sar_height = 33;
break;
case SAR_160_99:
u2_sar_width = 160;
u2_sar_height = 99;
break;
case SAR_4_3:
u2_sar_width = 4;
u2_sar_height = 3;
break;
case SAR_3_2:
u2_sar_width = 3;
u2_sar_height = 2;
break;
case SAR_2_1:
u2_sar_width = 2;
u2_sar_height = 1;
break;
case EXTENDED_SAR:
BITS_PARSE("sar_width", u2_sar_width, ps_bitstrm, 16);
BITS_PARSE("sar_height", u2_sar_height, ps_bitstrm, 16);
break;
default:
u2_sar_width = 0;
u2_sar_height = 0;
break;
}
}
ps_vui->u2_sar_width = u2_sar_width;
ps_vui->u2_sar_height = u2_sar_height;
BITS_PARSE("overscan_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_overscan_info_present_flag)
BITS_PARSE("overscan_appropriate_flag", ps_vui->u1_overscan_appropriate_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("video_signal_type_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_video_format = VID_FMT_UNSPECIFIED;
ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries = 2;
ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics = 2;
ps_vui->u1_matrix_coefficients = 2;
if(ps_vui->u1_video_signal_type_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("video_format", ps_vui->u1_video_format, ps_bitstrm, 3);
BITS_PARSE("video_full_range_flag", ps_vui->u1_video_full_range_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("colour_description_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_colour_description_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("colour_primaries", ps_vui->u1_colour_primaries, ps_bitstrm, 8);
BITS_PARSE("transfer_characteristics", ps_vui->u1_transfer_characteristics, ps_bitstrm, 8);
BITS_PARSE("matrix_coeffs", ps_vui->u1_matrix_coefficients, ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
}
BITS_PARSE("chroma_loc_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field = 0;
ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_chroma_loc_info_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field", ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_top_field, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field", ps_vui->u1_chroma_sample_loc_type_bottom_field, ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("neutral_chroma_indication_flag", ps_vui->u1_neutral_chroma_indication_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("field_seq_flag", ps_vui->u1_field_seq_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("frame_field_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_frame_field_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("default_display_window_flag", ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset = 0;
ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset = 0;
if(ps_vui->u1_default_display_window_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_left_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_left_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_right_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_right_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_top_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_top_offset, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("def_disp_win_bottom_offset", ps_vui->u4_def_disp_win_bottom_offset, ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("vui_timing_info_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_vui_timing_info_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("vui_num_units_in_tick", ps_vui->u4_vui_num_units_in_tick, ps_bitstrm, 32);
BITS_PARSE("vui_time_scale", ps_vui->u4_vui_time_scale, ps_bitstrm, 32);
BITS_PARSE("vui_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag", ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_poc_proportional_to_timing_flag)
UEV_PARSE("vui_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1", ps_vui->u1_num_ticks_poc_diff_one_minus1, ps_bitstrm);
BITS_PARSE("vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag", ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if(ps_vui->u1_vui_hrd_parameters_present_flag)
{
ret = ihevcd_parse_hrd_parameters(ps_bitstrm, &ps_vui->s_vui_hrd_parameters, 1, sps_max_sub_layers_minus1);
RETURN_IF((ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS), ret);
}
}
BITS_PARSE("bitstream_restriction_flag", ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag = 1;
ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag = 0;
ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc = 0;
ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom = 2;
ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom = 1;
ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal = 15;
ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical = 15;
if(ps_vui->u1_bitstream_restriction_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("tiles_fixed_structure_flag", ps_vui->u1_tiles_fixed_structure_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag", ps_vui->u1_motion_vectors_over_pic_boundaries_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
BITS_PARSE("restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag", ps_vui->u1_restricted_ref_pic_lists_flag, ps_bitstrm, 1);
UEV_PARSE("min_spatial_segmentation_idc", ps_vui->u4_min_spatial_segmentation_idc, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("max_bytes_per_pic_denom", ps_vui->u1_max_bytes_per_pic_denom, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("max_bits_per_min_cu_denom", ps_vui->u1_max_bits_per_mincu_denom, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("log2_max_mv_length_horizontal", ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_horizontal, ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("log2_max_mv_length_vertical", ps_vui->u1_log2_max_mv_length_vertical, ps_bitstrm);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_video::omx_c2d_conv::open(unsigned int height,unsigned int width,
ColorConvertFormat src, ColorConvertFormat dest,unsigned int src_stride)
{
bool status = false;
pthread_mutex_lock(&c_lock);
if (!c2dcc) {
c2dcc = mConvertOpen(width, height, width, height,
src,dest,0,src_stride);
if (c2dcc) {
src_format = src;
status = true;
} else
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("mConvertOpen failed");
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c_lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_convert_sglist(PVSCSIRequest *r)
{
int chunk_size;
uint64_t data_length = r->req.dataLen;
PVSCSISGState sg = r->sg;
while (data_length) {
while (!sg.resid) {
pvscsi_get_next_sg_elem(&sg);
trace_pvscsi_convert_sglist(r->req.context, r->sg.dataAddr,
r->sg.resid);
}
assert(data_length > 0);
chunk_size = MIN((unsigned) data_length, sg.resid);
if (chunk_size) {
qemu_sglist_add(&r->sgl, sg.dataAddr, chunk_size);
}
sg.dataAddr += chunk_size;
data_length -= chunk_size;
sg.resid -= chunk_size;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 164,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_global_enables(struct smi_info *smi_info, u8 enables)
{
unsigned char msg[3];
unsigned char *resp;
unsigned long resp_len;
int rv;
resp = kmalloc(IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resp)
return -ENOMEM;
msg[0] = IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST << 2;
msg[1] = IPMI_SET_BMC_GLOBAL_ENABLES_CMD;
msg[2] = enables;
smi_info->handlers->start_transaction(smi_info->si_sm, msg, 3);
rv = wait_for_msg_done(smi_info);
if (rv) {
dev_warn(smi_info->io.dev,
"Error getting response from set global enables command: %d\n",
rv);
goto out;
}
resp_len = smi_info->handlers->get_result(smi_info->si_sm,
resp, IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH);
if (resp_len < 3 ||
resp[0] != (IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST | 1) << 2 ||
resp[1] != IPMI_SET_BMC_GLOBAL_ENABLES_CMD) {
dev_warn(smi_info->io.dev,
"Invalid return from set global enables command: %ld %x %x\n",
resp_len, resp[0], resp[1]);
rv = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (resp[2] != 0)
rv = 1;
out:
kfree(resp);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 90,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::CheckForFileRemoval(DownloadItemImpl* download_item) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if ((download_item->GetState() == DownloadItem::COMPLETE) &&
!download_item->GetFileExternallyRemoved() &&
delegate_) {
delegate_->CheckForFileExistence(
download_item,
base::BindOnce(&DownloadManagerImpl::OnFileExistenceChecked,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), download_item->GetId()));
}
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string_regex_flags (const char *regex, int default_flags, int *flags)
{
const char *ptr_regex, *ptr_flags;
int set_flag, flag;
char *pos;
ptr_regex = regex;
if (flags)
*flags = default_flags;
while (strncmp (ptr_regex, "(?", 2) == 0)
{
pos = strchr (ptr_regex, ')');
if (!pos)
break;
if (!isalpha ((unsigned char)ptr_regex[2]) && (ptr_regex[2] != '-'))
break;
if (flags)
{
set_flag = 1;
for (ptr_flags = ptr_regex + 2; ptr_flags < pos; ptr_flags++)
{
flag = 0;
switch (ptr_flags[0])
{
case '-':
set_flag = 0;
break;
case 'e':
flag = REG_EXTENDED;
break;
case 'i':
flag = REG_ICASE;
break;
case 'n':
flag = REG_NEWLINE;
break;
case 's':
flag = REG_NOSUB;
break;
}
if (flag > 0)
{
if (set_flag)
*flags |= flag;
else
*flags &= ~flag;
}
}
}
ptr_regex = pos + 1;
}
return ptr_regex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcSetFontPath(ClientPtr client)
{
unsigned char *ptr;
unsigned long nbytes, total;
long nfonts;
int n;
REQUEST(xSetFontPathReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xSetFontPathReq);
nbytes = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xSetFontPathReq);
total = nbytes;
ptr = (unsigned char *) &stuff[1];
nfonts = stuff->nFonts;
while (--nfonts >= 0) {
if ((total == 0) || (total < (n = (*ptr + 1))))
return BadLength;
total -= n;
ptr += n;
}
if (total >= 4)
return BadLength;
return SetFontPath(client, stuff->nFonts, (unsigned char *) &stuff[1]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 15,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::ShouldSaveWindowPlacement() const {
switch (type_) {
case TYPE_TABBED:
return true;
case TYPE_POPUP:
return browser_defaults::kRestorePopups || is_devtools();
case TYPE_PANEL:
return false;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_pclr_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
int lutsize;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int j;
int_fast32_t x;
pclr->lutdata = 0;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &pclr->numlutents) ||
jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
lutsize = pclr->numlutents * pclr->numchans;
if (!(pclr->lutdata = jas_alloc2(lutsize, sizeof(int_fast32_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(pclr->bpc = jas_alloc2(pclr->numchans, sizeof(uint_fast8_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numchans; ++i) {
if (jp2_getuint8(in, &pclr->bpc[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < pclr->numlutents; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < pclr->numchans; ++j) {
if (jp2_getint(in, (pclr->bpc[j] & 0x80) != 0,
(pclr->bpc[j] & 0x7f) + 1, &x)) {
return -1;
}
pclr->lutdata[i * pclr->numchans + j] = x;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: task_function_call(struct task_struct *p, remote_function_f func, void *info)
{
struct remote_function_call data = {
.p = p,
.func = func,
.info = info,
.ret = -EAGAIN,
};
int ret;
do {
ret = smp_call_function_single(task_cpu(p), remote_function, &data, 1);
if (!ret)
ret = data.ret;
} while (ret == -EAGAIN);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ByteStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "byteStringAttribute");
V8StringResource<> cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLByteString>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setByteStringAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TestBrowserWindow::IsVisible() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aio_queue_work(struct kioctx * ctx)
{
unsigned long timeout;
/*
* if someone is waiting, get the work started right
* away, otherwise, use a longer delay
*/
smp_mb();
if (waitqueue_active(&ctx->wait))
timeout = 1;
else
timeout = HZ/10;
queue_delayed_work(aio_wq, &ctx->wq, timeout);
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ehci_advance_state(EHCIState *ehci, int async)
{
EHCIQueue *q = NULL;
int again;
do {
switch(ehci_get_state(ehci, async)) {
case EST_WAITLISTHEAD:
again = ehci_state_waitlisthead(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHENTRY:
again = ehci_state_fetchentry(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHQH:
q = ehci_state_fetchqh(ehci, async);
if (q != NULL) {
assert(q->async == async);
again = 1;
} else {
again = 0;
}
break;
case EST_FETCHITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchitd(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_FETCHSITD:
again = ehci_state_fetchsitd(ehci, async);
break;
case EST_ADVANCEQUEUE:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_advqueue(q);
break;
case EST_FETCHQTD:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_fetchqtd(q);
break;
case EST_HORIZONTALQH:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_horizqh(q);
break;
case EST_EXECUTE:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_execute(q);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
break;
case EST_EXECUTING:
assert(q != NULL);
if (async) {
ehci->async_stepdown = 0;
}
again = ehci_state_executing(q);
break;
case EST_WRITEBACK:
assert(q != NULL);
again = ehci_state_writeback(q);
if (!async) {
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
}
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Bad state!\n");
again = -1;
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
}
if (again < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "processing error - resetting ehci HC\n");
ehci_reset(ehci);
again = 0;
}
}
while (again);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElementFree(AppLayerProtoDetectProbingParserElement *p)
{
SCEnter();
SCFree(p);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void S_AL_UpdateEntityPosition( int entityNum, const vec3_t origin )
{
vec3_t sanOrigin;
VectorCopy( origin, sanOrigin );
S_AL_SanitiseVector( sanOrigin );
if ( entityNum < 0 || entityNum >= MAX_GENTITIES )
Com_Error( ERR_DROP, "S_UpdateEntityPosition: bad entitynum %i", entityNum );
VectorCopy( sanOrigin, entityList[entityNum].origin );
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_siocgstamp(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timeval ktv;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&ktv);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timeval(up, &ktv);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix info leak in compat dev_ifconf()
The implementation of dev_ifconf() for the compat ioctl interface uses
an intermediate ifc structure allocated in userland for the duration of
the syscall. Though, it fails to initialize the padding bytes inserted
for alignment and that for leaks four bytes of kernel stack. Add an
explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::SetAutoDiscardable(
bool auto_discardable) {
if (auto_discardable_ == auto_discardable)
return;
auto_discardable_ = auto_discardable;
for (auto& observer : *observers_)
observer.OnAutoDiscardableStateChange(GetWebContents(), auto_discardable_);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vhost_dev_alloc_iovecs(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
int i;
bool zcopy;
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
dev->vqs[i].indirect = kmalloc(sizeof *dev->vqs[i].indirect *
UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
dev->vqs[i].log = kmalloc(sizeof *dev->vqs[i].log * UIO_MAXIOV,
GFP_KERNEL);
dev->vqs[i].heads = kmalloc(sizeof *dev->vqs[i].heads *
UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
zcopy = vhost_zcopy_mask & (0x1 << i);
if (zcopy)
dev->vqs[i].ubuf_info =
kmalloc(sizeof *dev->vqs[i].ubuf_info *
UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->vqs[i].indirect || !dev->vqs[i].log ||
!dev->vqs[i].heads ||
(zcopy && !dev->vqs[i].ubuf_info))
goto err_nomem;
}
return 0;
err_nomem:
for (; i >= 0; --i)
vhost_vq_free_iovecs(&dev->vqs[i]);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BlockedPluginInfoBarDelegate::Cancel() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(
UserMetricsAction("BlockedPluginInfobar.AlwaysAllow"));
tab_contents_->profile()->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->AddExceptionForURL(
tab_contents_->GetURL(), CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS, std::string(),
CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW);
return PluginInfoBarDelegate::Cancel();
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 97,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __dev_close(struct net_device *dev)
{
int retval;
LIST_HEAD(single);
list_add(&dev->unreg_list, &single);
retval = __dev_close_many(&single);
list_del(&single);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
char *algs;
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(algs);
return r;
}
Commit Message: upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 48,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodAllowSharedUint8ArrayArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodAllowSharedUint8ArrayArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
MaybeShared<DOMUint8Array> uint8_array_arg;
uint8_array_arg = ToMaybeShared<MaybeShared<DOMUint8Array>>(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
if (!uint8_array_arg) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "Uint8Array"));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodAllowSharedUint8ArrayArg(uint8_array_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
/*
* Currently we do not handle the nested case where L2 has an
* APIC access page of its own; that page is still pinned.
* Hence, we skip the case where the VCPU is in guest mode _and_
* L1 prepared an APIC access page for L2.
*
* For the case where L1 and L2 share the same APIC access page
* (flexpriority=Y but SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES clear
* in the vmcs12), this function will only update either the vmcs01
* or the vmcs02. If the former, the vmcs02 will be updated by
* prepare_vmcs02. If the latter, the vmcs01 will be updated in
* the next L2->L1 exit.
*/
if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
!nested_cpu_has2(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean prpl_xfer_write_request(struct file_transfer *ft)
{
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = ft->data;
px->ui_wants_data = TRUE;
try_write_to_ui(ft, 0, 0);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_include(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, char **c, unsigned long base,
struct pxe_menu *cfg, int nest_level)
{
char *include_path;
char *s = *c;
int err;
char *buf;
int ret;
err = parse_sliteral(c, &include_path);
if (err < 0) {
printf("Expected include path: %.*s\n", (int)(*c - s), s);
return err;
}
err = get_pxe_file(cmdtp, include_path, base);
if (err < 0) {
printf("Couldn't retrieve %s\n", include_path);
return err;
}
buf = map_sysmem(base, 0);
ret = parse_pxefile_top(cmdtp, buf, base, cfg, nest_level);
unmap_sysmem(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_h263_decode_mba(MpegEncContext *s)
{
int i, mb_pos;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
if (s->mb_num - 1 <= ff_mba_max[i])
break;
mb_pos = get_bits(&s->gb, ff_mba_length[i]);
s->mb_x = mb_pos % s->mb_width;
s->mb_y = mb_pos / s->mb_width;
return mb_pos;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 14,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void DoCloseFlushPendingWriteTest(SocketStreamEvent* event) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < messages_.size(); i++) {
std::vector<char> frame;
frame.push_back('\0');
frame.insert(frame.end(), messages_[i].begin(), messages_[i].end());
frame.push_back('\xff');
EXPECT_TRUE(event->socket->SendData(&frame[0], frame.size()));
}
event->socket->Close();
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodXPathNSResolverArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodXPathNSResolverArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
XPathNSResolver* x_path_ns_resolver_arg;
x_path_ns_resolver_arg = ToXPathNSResolver(ScriptState::Current(info.GetIsolate()), info[0]);
if (!x_path_ns_resolver_arg) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodXPathNSResolverArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "XPathNSResolver")));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodXPathNSResolverArg(x_path_ns_resolver_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FLACParser::error_callback(
const FLAC__StreamDecoder * /* decoder */,
FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus status, void *client_data)
{
((FLACParser *) client_data)->errorCallback(status);
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nf_ct_frag6_expire(unsigned long data)
{
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq;
fq = container_of((struct inet_frag_queue *)data,
struct nf_ct_frag6_queue, q);
spin_lock(&fq->q.lock);
if (fq->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto out;
fq_kill(fq);
out:
spin_unlock(&fq->q.lock);
fq_put(fq);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(getCommentName)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
size_t name_len;
int idx;
zend_long flags = 0;
int comment_len = 0;
const char * comment;
char *name;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|l",
&name, &name_len, &flags) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (name_len < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Empty string as entry name");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
idx = zip_name_locate(intern, name, 0);
if (idx < 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
comment = zip_get_file_comment(intern, idx, &comment_len, (int)flags);
RETURN_STRINGL((char *)comment, (zend_long)comment_len);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vmxnet3_ring_write_curr_cell(Vmxnet3Ring *ring, void *buff)
{
vmw_shmem_write(vmxnet3_ring_curr_cell_pa(ring), buff, ring->cell_size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SplashError Splash::composite(SplashBitmap *src, int xSrc, int ySrc,
int xDest, int yDest, int w, int h,
GBool noClip, GBool nonIsolated,
GBool knockout, SplashCoord knockoutOpacity) {
SplashPipe pipe;
SplashColor pixel;
Guchar alpha;
Guchar *ap;
int x, y;
if (src->mode != bitmap->mode) {
return splashErrModeMismatch;
}
if(src->getSeparationList()->getLength() > bitmap->getSeparationList()->getLength()) {
for (x = bitmap->getSeparationList()->getLength(); x < src->getSeparationList()->getLength(); x++)
bitmap->getSeparationList()->append(((GfxSeparationColorSpace *)src->getSeparationList()->get(x))->copy());
}
if (src->alpha) {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, NULL, pixel,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, nonIsolated,
knockout, (Guchar)splashRound(knockoutOpacity * 255));
if (noClip) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
ap = src->getAlphaPtr() + (ySrc + y) * src->getWidth() + xSrc;
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
src->getPixel(xSrc + x, ySrc + y, pixel);
alpha = *ap++;
pipe.shape = alpha;
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
}
}
updateModX(xDest);
updateModX(xDest + w - 1);
updateModY(yDest);
updateModY(yDest + h - 1);
} else {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
ap = src->getAlphaPtr() + (ySrc + y) * src->getWidth() + xSrc;
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
src->getPixel(xSrc + x, ySrc + y, pixel);
alpha = *ap++;
if (state->clip->test(xDest + x, yDest + y)) {
pipe.shape = alpha;
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
updateModX(xDest + x);
updateModY(yDest + y);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
}
}
}
} else {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, NULL, pixel,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gFalse, nonIsolated);
if (noClip) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
src->getPixel(xSrc + x, ySrc + y, pixel);
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
}
}
updateModX(xDest);
updateModX(xDest + w - 1);
updateModY(yDest);
updateModY(yDest + h - 1);
} else {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
src->getPixel(xSrc + x, ySrc + y, pixel);
if (state->clip->test(xDest + x, yDest + y)) {
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
updateModX(xDest + x);
updateModY(yDest + y);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
}
}
}
}
return splashOk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_init_addrs(struct sctp_chunk *chunk, union sctp_addr *src,
union sctp_addr *dest)
{
memcpy(&chunk->source, src, sizeof(union sctp_addr));
memcpy(&chunk->dest, dest, sizeof(union sctp_addr));
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const cmsDICTentry* CMSEXPORT cmsDictNextEntry(const cmsDICTentry* e)
{
if (e == NULL) return NULL;
return e ->Next;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 40,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PixarLogEncode(TIFF* tif, uint8* bp, tmsize_t cc, uint16 s)
{
static const char module[] = "PixarLogEncode";
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
PixarLogState *sp = EncoderState(tif);
tmsize_t i;
tmsize_t n;
int llen;
unsigned short * up;
(void) s;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
n = cc / sizeof(float); /* XXX float == 32 bits */
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_12BITPICIO:
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_11BITLOG:
n = cc / sizeof(uint16); /* XXX uint16 == 16 bits */
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BIT:
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BITABGR:
n = cc;
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"%d bit input not supported in PixarLog",
td->td_bitspersample);
return 0;
}
llen = sp->stride * td->td_imagewidth;
for (i = 0, up = sp->tbuf; i < n; i += llen, up += llen) {
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
horizontalDifferenceF((float *)bp, llen,
sp->stride, up, sp->FromLT2);
bp += llen * sizeof(float);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
horizontalDifference16((uint16 *)bp, llen,
sp->stride, up, sp->From14);
bp += llen * sizeof(uint16);
break;
case PIXARLOGDATAFMT_8BIT:
horizontalDifference8((unsigned char *)bp, llen,
sp->stride, up, sp->From8);
bp += llen * sizeof(unsigned char);
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"%d bit input not supported in PixarLog",
td->td_bitspersample);
return 0;
}
}
sp->stream.next_in = (unsigned char *) sp->tbuf;
assert(sizeof(sp->stream.avail_in)==4); /* if this assert gets raised,
we need to simplify this code to reflect a ZLib that is likely updated
to deal with 8byte memory sizes, though this code will respond
appropriately even before we simplify it */
sp->stream.avail_in = (uInt) (n * sizeof(uint16));
if ((sp->stream.avail_in / sizeof(uint16)) != (uInt) n)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"ZLib cannot deal with buffers this size");
return (0);
}
do {
if (deflate(&sp->stream, Z_NO_FLUSH) != Z_OK) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "Encoder error: %s",
sp->stream.msg ? sp->stream.msg : "(null)");
return (0);
}
if (sp->stream.avail_out == 0) {
tif->tif_rawcc = tif->tif_rawdatasize;
TIFFFlushData1(tif);
sp->stream.next_out = tif->tif_rawdata;
sp->stream.avail_out = (uInt) tif->tif_rawdatasize; /* this is a safe typecast, as check is made already in PixarLogPreEncode */
}
} while (sp->stream.avail_in > 0);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 86,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodPromiseArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodPromiseArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodPromiseArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hugetlb_report_meminfo(struct seq_file *m)
{
struct hstate *h = &default_hstate;
seq_printf(m,
"HugePages_Total: %5lu\n"
"HugePages_Free: %5lu\n"
"HugePages_Rsvd: %5lu\n"
"HugePages_Surp: %5lu\n"
"Hugepagesize: %8lu kB\n",
h->nr_huge_pages,
h->free_huge_pages,
h->resv_huge_pages,
h->surplus_huge_pages,
1UL << (huge_page_order(h) + PAGE_SHIFT - 10));
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long debugctlmsr, cr4;
/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked))
vmx->entry_time = ktime_get();
/* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return;
if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
}
if (vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs) {
copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(vmx);
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;
}
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RSP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RIP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4)) {
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4 = cr4;
}
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
* exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
* case. */
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
if (vmx->guest_pkru_valid)
__write_pkru(vmx->guest_pkru);
atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
asm(
/* Store host registers */
"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* placeholder for guest rcx */
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
"je 1f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMWRITE_RSP_RDX) "\n\t"
"1: \n\t"
/* Reload cr2 if changed */
"mov %c[cr2](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_AX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"je 2f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX", %%cr2 \n\t"
"2: \n\t"
/* Check if vmlaunch of vmresume is needed */
"cmpl $0, %c[launched](%0) \n\t"
/* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */
"mov %c[rax](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%0), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdx](%0), %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rsi](%0), %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdi](%0), %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbp](%0), %%" _ASM_BP " \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %c[r8](%0), %%r8 \n\t"
"mov %c[r9](%0), %%r9 \n\t"
"mov %c[r10](%0), %%r10 \n\t"
"mov %c[r11](%0), %%r11 \n\t"
"mov %c[r12](%0), %%r12 \n\t"
"mov %c[r13](%0), %%r13 \n\t"
"mov %c[r14](%0), %%r14 \n\t"
"mov %c[r15](%0), %%r15 \n\t"
#endif
"mov %c[rcx](%0), %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* kills %0 (ecx) */
/* Enter guest mode */
"jne 1f \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMLAUNCH) "\n\t"
"jmp 2f \n\t"
"1: " __ex(ASM_VMX_VMRESUME) "\n\t"
"2: "
/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
"pop %0 \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DX ", %c[rdx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SI ", %c[rsi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DI ", %c[rdi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BP ", %c[rbp](%0) \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %%r8, %c[r8](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r9, %c[r9](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r10, %c[r10](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r11, %c[r11](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r12, %c[r12](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
#endif
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
"pop %%" _ASM_BP "; pop %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
".global vmx_return \n\t"
"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"
".popsection"
: : "c"(vmx), "d"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP),
[launched]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, __launched)),
[fail]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, fail)),
[host_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, host_rsp)),
[rax]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX])),
[rbx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX])),
[rcx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX])),
[rdx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX])),
[rsi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI])),
[rdi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI])),
[rbp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP])),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
[r8]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8])),
[r9]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9])),
[r10]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10])),
[r11]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11])),
[r12]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12])),
[r13]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13])),
[r14]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14])),
[r15]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15])),
#endif
[cr2]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.cr2)),
[wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong))
: "cc", "memory"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
, "rax", "rbx", "rdi", "rsi"
, "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15"
#else
, "eax", "ebx", "edi", "esi"
#endif
);
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
* a reasonable value ourselves.
*
* We can't defer this to vmx_load_host_state() since that function
* may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and restore segments
* around it, nullifying its effect.
*/
loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
#endif
vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) | (1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
vmx->exit_reason = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
/*
* eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
* back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
* XSAVE.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
vmx->guest_pkru = __read_pkru();
if (vmx->guest_pkru != vmx->host_pkru) {
vmx->guest_pkru_valid = true;
__write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
} else
vmx->guest_pkru_valid = false;
}
/*
* the KVM_REQ_EVENT optimization bit is only on for one entry, and if
* we did not inject a still-pending event to L1 now because of
* nested_run_pending, we need to re-enable this bit.
*/
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
vmx_complete_atomic_exit(vmx);
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
return(SSLv2_server_method());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
#endif
if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_1_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_1_server_method());
else if (ver == TLS1_2_VERSION)
return(TLSv1_2_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tlink_rb_insert(struct rb_root *root, struct tcon_link *new_tlink)
{
struct rb_node **new = &(root->rb_node), *parent = NULL;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
while (*new) {
tlink = rb_entry(*new, struct tcon_link, tl_rbnode);
parent = *new;
if (uid_gt(tlink->tl_uid, new_tlink->tl_uid))
new = &((*new)->rb_left);
else
new = &((*new)->rb_right);
}
rb_link_node(&new_tlink->tl_rbnode, parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&new_tlink->tl_rbnode, root);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smbXcli_req_unset_pending(struct tevent_req *req)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = state->conn;
size_t num_pending = talloc_array_length(conn->pending);
size_t i;
TALLOC_FREE(state->write_req);
if (state->smb1.mid != 0) {
/*
* This is a [nt]trans[2] request which waits
* for more than one reply.
*/
return;
}
tevent_req_set_cleanup_fn(req, NULL);
if (num_pending == 1) {
/*
* The pending read_smb tevent_req is a child of
* conn->pending. So if nothing is pending anymore, we need to
* delete the socket read fde.
*/
TALLOC_FREE(conn->pending);
conn->read_smb_req = NULL;
return;
}
for (i=0; i<num_pending; i++) {
if (req == conn->pending[i]) {
break;
}
}
if (i == num_pending) {
/*
* Something's seriously broken. Just returning here is the
* right thing nevertheless, the point of this routine is to
* remove ourselves from conn->pending.
*/
return;
}
/*
* Remove ourselves from the conn->pending array
*/
for (; i < (num_pending - 1); i++) {
conn->pending[i] = conn->pending[i+1];
}
/*
* No NULL check here, we're shrinking by sizeof(void *), and
* talloc_realloc just adjusts the size for this.
*/
conn->pending = talloc_realloc(NULL, conn->pending, struct tevent_req *,
num_pending - 1);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsKeyboardEnabled() {
if (g_accessibility_keyboard_enabled)
return true;
if (g_keyboard_show_override == keyboard::KEYBOARD_SHOW_OVERRIDE_DISABLED)
return false;
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableVirtualKeyboard) ||
g_touch_keyboard_enabled ||
(g_keyboard_show_override == keyboard::KEYBOARD_SHOW_OVERRIDE_ENABLED);
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u8 llc_data_accept_state(u8 state)
{
return state != LLC_CONN_STATE_NORMAL && state != LLC_CONN_STATE_BUSY &&
state != LLC_CONN_STATE_REJ;
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 68,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::timerFired(Timer<ImageLoader>*)
{
m_element->deref();
}
Commit Message: Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int avcodec_default_execute2(AVCodecContext *c, int (*func)(AVCodecContext *c2, void *arg2, int jobnr, int threadnr), void *arg, int *ret, int count)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int r = func(c, arg, i, 0);
if (ret)
ret[i] = r;
}
emms_c();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionsAPIClient::CreateVirtualKeyboardDelegate(
content::BrowserContext* context) const {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_index_entry_stage(const git_index_entry *entry)
{
return GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(entry);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode)
{
struct task_struct *task;
int allowed = 0;
/* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we
* may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that
* information.
*/
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return allowed;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<FrameView> FrameView::create(LocalFrame* frame, const IntSize& initialSize)
{
RefPtr<FrameView> view = adoptRef(new FrameView(frame));
view->Widget::setFrameRect(IntRect(view->location(), initialSize));
view->setLayoutSizeInternal(initialSize);
view->show();
return view.release();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestBinaryDataPOST() {
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL("/echo");
request.SetMethod("POST");
const char postdata_chars[] =
"\x00\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05postdata\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff";
std::string postdata(postdata_chars,
sizeof(postdata_chars) / sizeof(postdata_chars[0]));
request.AppendDataToBody(postdata.data(),
static_cast<uint32_t>(postdata.length()));
return LoadAndCompareBody(request, postdata);
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::Configure() {
DCHECK(widget_);
if (scoped_configure_) {
scoped_configure_->set_needs_configure();
return;
}
gfx::Vector2d origin_offset = pending_origin_config_offset_;
pending_origin_config_offset_ = gfx::Vector2d();
int resize_component =
resizer_ ? resizer_->details().window_component : HTCAPTION;
if (configure_callback_.is_null()) {
pending_origin_offset_ += origin_offset;
pending_resize_component_ = resize_component;
return;
}
uint32_t serial = configure_callback_.Run(
widget_->GetWindowBoundsInScreen().size(),
ash::wm::GetWindowState(widget_->GetNativeWindow())->GetStateType(),
IsResizing(), widget_->IsActive());
pending_configs_.push_back({serial, origin_offset, resize_component});
LOG_IF(WARNING, pending_configs_.size() > 100)
<< "Number of pending configure acks for shell surface has reached: "
<< pending_configs_.size();
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ClassAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->GetClassAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AuthenticatorInternalUnrecognizedErrorSheetModel::GetStepDescription() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_ERROR_INTERNAL_UNRECOGNIZED_DESCRIPTION);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ib_wq *mlx5_ib_create_wq(struct ib_pd *pd,
struct ib_wq_init_attr *init_attr,
struct ib_udata *udata)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev;
struct mlx5_ib_rwq *rwq;
struct mlx5_ib_create_wq_resp resp = {};
size_t min_resp_len;
int err;
if (!udata)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
min_resp_len = offsetof(typeof(resp), reserved) + sizeof(resp.reserved);
if (udata->outlen && udata->outlen < min_resp_len)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
dev = to_mdev(pd->device);
switch (init_attr->wq_type) {
case IB_WQT_RQ:
rwq = kzalloc(sizeof(*rwq), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rwq)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
err = prepare_user_rq(pd, init_attr, udata, rwq);
if (err)
goto err;
err = create_rq(rwq, pd, init_attr);
if (err)
goto err_user_rq;
break;
default:
mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "unsupported wq type %d\n",
init_attr->wq_type);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
rwq->ibwq.wq_num = rwq->core_qp.qpn;
rwq->ibwq.state = IB_WQS_RESET;
if (udata->outlen) {
resp.response_length = offsetof(typeof(resp), response_length) +
sizeof(resp.response_length);
err = ib_copy_to_udata(udata, &resp, resp.response_length);
if (err)
goto err_copy;
}
rwq->core_qp.event = mlx5_ib_wq_event;
rwq->ibwq.event_handler = init_attr->event_handler;
return &rwq->ibwq;
err_copy:
mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked(dev->mdev, &rwq->core_qp);
err_user_rq:
destroy_user_rq(dev, pd, rwq);
err:
kfree(rwq);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigationHandleImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::GetNavigationHandle() {
return navigation_request() ? navigation_request()->navigation_handle()
: nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI void var_destroy(php_unserialize_data_t *var_hashx)
{
void *next;
long i;
var_entries *var_hash = (*var_hashx)->first;
#if VAR_ENTRIES_DBG
fprintf(stderr, "var_destroy(%ld)\n", var_hash?var_hash->used_slots:-1L);
#endif
while (var_hash) {
next = var_hash->next;
efree(var_hash);
var_hash = next;
}
var_hash = (*var_hashx)->first_dtor;
while (var_hash) {
for (i = 0; i < var_hash->used_slots; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&var_hash->data[i]);
}
next = var_hash->next;
efree(var_hash);
var_hash = next;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::CompositorTaskQueue() {
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
return compositor_task_queue_;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static FILE *msg_cache_get(struct ImapData *idata, struct Header *h)
{
if (!idata || !h)
return NULL;
idata->bcache = msg_cache_open(idata);
char id[64];
snprintf(id, sizeof(id), "%u-%u", idata->uid_validity, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
return mutt_bcache_get(idata->bcache, id);
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 79,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport XMLTreeInfo *GetXMLTreePath(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info,const char *path)
{
char
**components,
subnode[MaxTextExtent],
tag[MaxTextExtent];
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
number_components;
ssize_t
j;
XMLTreeInfo
*node;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
node=xml_info;
components=GetPathComponents(path,&number_components);
if (components == (char **) NULL)
return((XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_components; i++)
{
GetPathComponent(components[i],SubimagePath,subnode);
GetPathComponent(components[i],CanonicalPath,tag);
node=GetXMLTreeChild(node,tag);
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
for (j=(ssize_t) StringToLong(subnode)-1; j > 0; j--)
{
node=GetXMLTreeOrdered(node);
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
}
if (node == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
break;
components[i]=DestroyString(components[i]);
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) number_components; i++)
components[i]=DestroyString(components[i]);
components=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(components);
return(node);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,969 |
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