instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_frag_queue(struct ipq *qp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff *prev, *next;
struct net_device *dev;
int flags, offset;
int ihl, end;
int err = -ENOENT;
u8 ecn;
if (qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_COMPLETE)
goto err;
if (!(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FRAG_COMPLETE) &&
unlikely(ip_frag_too_far(qp)) &&
unlikely(err = ip_frag_reinit(qp))) {
ipq_kill(qp);
goto err;
}
ecn = ip4_frag_ecn(ip_hdr(skb)->tos);
offset = ntohs(ip_hdr(skb)->frag_off);
flags = offset & ~IP_OFFSET;
offset &= IP_OFFSET;
offset <<= 3; /* offset is in 8-byte chunks */
ihl = ip_hdrlen(skb);
/* Determine the position of this fragment. */
end = offset + skb->len - ihl;
err = -EINVAL;
/* Is this the final fragment? */
if ((flags & IP_MF) == 0) {
/* If we already have some bits beyond end
* or have different end, the segment is corrrupted.
*/
if (end < qp->q.len ||
((qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) && end != qp->q.len))
goto err;
qp->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_LAST_IN;
qp->q.len = end;
} else {
if (end&7) {
end &= ~7;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
if (end > qp->q.len) {
/* Some bits beyond end -> corruption. */
if (qp->q.last_in & INET_FRAG_LAST_IN)
goto err;
qp->q.len = end;
}
}
if (end == offset)
goto err;
err = -ENOMEM;
if (pskb_pull(skb, ihl) == NULL)
goto err;
err = pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, end - offset);
if (err)
goto err;
/* Find out which fragments are in front and at the back of us
* in the chain of fragments so far. We must know where to put
* this fragment, right?
*/
prev = qp->q.fragments_tail;
if (!prev || FRAG_CB(prev)->offset < offset) {
next = NULL;
goto found;
}
prev = NULL;
for (next = qp->q.fragments; next != NULL; next = next->next) {
if (FRAG_CB(next)->offset >= offset)
break; /* bingo! */
prev = next;
}
found:
/* We found where to put this one. Check for overlap with
* preceding fragment, and, if needed, align things so that
* any overlaps are eliminated.
*/
if (prev) {
int i = (FRAG_CB(prev)->offset + prev->len) - offset;
if (i > 0) {
offset += i;
err = -EINVAL;
if (end <= offset)
goto err;
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!pskb_pull(skb, i))
goto err;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
}
err = -ENOMEM;
while (next && FRAG_CB(next)->offset < end) {
int i = end - FRAG_CB(next)->offset; /* overlap is 'i' bytes */
if (i < next->len) {
/* Eat head of the next overlapped fragment
* and leave the loop. The next ones cannot overlap.
*/
if (!pskb_pull(next, i))
goto err;
FRAG_CB(next)->offset += i;
qp->q.meat -= i;
if (next->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY)
next->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
break;
} else {
struct sk_buff *free_it = next;
/* Old fragment is completely overridden with
* new one drop it.
*/
next = next->next;
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
qp->q.fragments = next;
qp->q.meat -= free_it->len;
frag_kfree_skb(qp->q.net, free_it);
}
}
FRAG_CB(skb)->offset = offset;
/* Insert this fragment in the chain of fragments. */
skb->next = next;
if (!next)
qp->q.fragments_tail = skb;
if (prev)
prev->next = skb;
else
qp->q.fragments = skb;
dev = skb->dev;
if (dev) {
qp->iif = dev->ifindex;
skb->dev = NULL;
}
qp->q.stamp = skb->tstamp;
qp->q.meat += skb->len;
qp->ecn |= ecn;
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &qp->q.net->mem);
if (offset == 0)
qp->q.last_in |= INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN;
if (qp->q.last_in == (INET_FRAG_FIRST_IN | INET_FRAG_LAST_IN) &&
qp->q.meat == qp->q.len)
return ip_frag_reasm(qp, prev, dev);
write_lock(&ip4_frags.lock);
list_move_tail(&qp->q.lru_list, &qp->q.net->lru_list);
write_unlock(&ip4_frags.lock);
return -EINPROGRESS;
err:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::allowInlineScript(
Element* element,
const String& contextURL,
const String& nonce,
const WTF::OrdinalNumber& contextLine,
const String& scriptContent,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reportingPolicy) const {
DCHECK(element);
return isAllowedByAll<&CSPDirectiveList::allowInlineScript>(
m_policies, element, contextURL, nonce, contextLine, reportingPolicy,
scriptContent);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_inc_rx_completion_counter(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx)
{
vmxnet3_ring_inc(&s->rxq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserTestClipboardScope::GetText(std::string* result) {
ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread()->ReadAsciiText(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, result);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_hbaA_request_device_map(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&acb->rq_map_token) == 0) || ((acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_BUS_RESET) != 0 ) || ((acb->acb_flags & ACB_F_ABORT) != 0 )){
mod_timer(&acb->eternal_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(6 * HZ));
return;
} else {
acb->fw_flag = FW_NORMAL;
if (atomic_read(&acb->ante_token_value) == atomic_read(&acb->rq_map_token)){
atomic_set(&acb->rq_map_token, 16);
}
atomic_set(&acb->ante_token_value, atomic_read(&acb->rq_map_token));
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&acb->rq_map_token)) {
mod_timer(&acb->eternal_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(6 * HZ));
return;
}
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_GET_CONFIG, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
mod_timer(&acb->eternal_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(6 * HZ));
}
return;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::OnAcceleratedCompositingStateChange() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadHeap::PoisonEagerArena() {
RecursiveMutexLocker persistent_lock(
ProcessHeap::CrossThreadPersistentMutex());
arenas_[BlinkGC::kEagerSweepArenaIndex]->PoisonArena();
ProcessHeap::GetCrossThreadPersistentRegion()
.UnpoisonCrossThreadPersistents();
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipc_free(void* ptr, int size)
{
if(size > PAGE_SIZE)
vfree(ptr);
else
kfree(ptr);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fix abort when writing to rgf format
The rgf format (LEGO MINDSTORMS EV3 images) caused a software abort because
exception == NULL. When WriteRGFImage is called from WriteImage, it is only
passed two parameters, not three. So, removed the extra parameter and use
image->exception instead as in other coders.
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 168,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double GetUserSpaceCoordinateValue(const SVGInfo *svg_info,int type,
const char *string)
{
char
token[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*p;
double
value;
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",string);
assert(string != (const char *) NULL);
p=(const char *) string;
GetMagickToken(p,&p,token);
value=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
if (strchr(token,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
double
alpha,
beta;
if (type > 0)
{
if (svg_info->view_box.width == 0.0)
return(0.0);
return(svg_info->view_box.width*value/100.0);
}
if (type < 0)
{
if (svg_info->view_box.height == 0.0)
return(0.0);
return(svg_info->view_box.height*value/100.0);
}
alpha=value-svg_info->view_box.width;
beta=value-svg_info->view_box.height;
return(hypot(alpha,beta)/sqrt(2.0)/100.0);
}
GetMagickToken(p,&p,token);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"cm",2) == 0)
return(DefaultResolution*svg_info->scale[0]/2.54*value);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"em",2) == 0)
return(svg_info->pointsize*value);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"ex",2) == 0)
return(svg_info->pointsize*value/2.0);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"in",2) == 0)
return(DefaultResolution*svg_info->scale[0]*value);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"mm",2) == 0)
return(DefaultResolution*svg_info->scale[0]/25.4*value);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"pc",2) == 0)
return(DefaultResolution*svg_info->scale[0]/6.0*value);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"pt",2) == 0)
return(1.25*svg_info->scale[0]*value);
if (LocaleNCompare(token,"px",2) == 0)
return(value);
return(value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintPatcher::DerefPatch() {
DCHECK(begin_paint_.is_patched());
DCHECK(end_paint_.is_patched());
--refcount_;
if (refcount_ == 0) {
begin_paint_.Unpatch();
end_paint_.Unpatch();
}
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_seq_device_new(struct snd_card *card, int device, const char *id,
int argsize, struct snd_seq_device **result)
{
struct snd_seq_device *dev;
int err;
static struct snd_device_ops dops = {
.dev_free = snd_seq_device_dev_free,
.dev_register = snd_seq_device_dev_register,
.dev_disconnect = snd_seq_device_dev_disconnect,
};
if (result)
*result = NULL;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!id))
return -EINVAL;
dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev) + argsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
/* set up device info */
dev->card = card;
dev->device = device;
dev->id = id;
dev->argsize = argsize;
device_initialize(&dev->dev);
dev->dev.parent = &card->card_dev;
dev->dev.bus = &snd_seq_bus_type;
dev->dev.release = snd_seq_dev_release;
dev_set_name(&dev->dev, "%s-%d-%d", dev->id, card->number, device);
/* add this device to the list */
err = snd_device_new(card, SNDRV_DEV_SEQUENCER, dev, &dops);
if (err < 0) {
put_device(&dev->dev);
return err;
}
if (result)
*result = dev;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline USHORT CheckSumCalculator(tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages, ULONG ulStartOffset, ULONG len)
{
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pCurrentPage = &pDataPages[0];
ULONG ulCurrPageOffset = 0;
UINT32 u32RawCSum = 0;
while(ulStartOffset > 0)
{
ulCurrPageOffset = min(pCurrentPage->size, ulStartOffset);
if(ulCurrPageOffset < ulStartOffset)
pCurrentPage++;
ulStartOffset -= ulCurrPageOffset;
}
while(len > 0)
{
PVOID pCurrentPageDataStart = RtlOffsetToPointer(pCurrentPage->Virtual, ulCurrPageOffset);
ULONG ulCurrentPageDataLength = min(len, pCurrentPage->size - ulCurrPageOffset);
u32RawCSum += RawCheckSumCalculator(pCurrentPageDataStart, ulCurrentPageDataLength);
pCurrentPage++;
ulCurrPageOffset = 0;
len -= ulCurrentPageDataLength;
}
return RawCheckSumFinalize(u32RawCSum);
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Util::IsSignedIntegerFormat(uint32_t internal_format) {
switch (internal_format) {
case GL_R8I:
case GL_R16I:
case GL_R32I:
case GL_RG8I:
case GL_RG16I:
case GL_RG32I:
case GL_RGB8I:
case GL_RGB16I:
case GL_RGB32I:
case GL_RGBA8I:
case GL_RGBA16I:
case GL_RGBA32I:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 153,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageInfoUI::ChosenObjectInfo::~ChosenObjectInfo() {}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cifsFileInfo_put(struct cifsFileInfo *cifs_file)
{
struct inode *inode = cifs_file->dentry->d_inode;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(cifs_file->tlink);
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
struct cifsInodeInfo *cifsi = CIFS_I(inode);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(sb);
struct cifsLockInfo *li, *tmp;
struct cifs_fid fid;
struct cifs_pending_open open;
spin_lock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
if (--cifs_file->count > 0) {
spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
return;
}
if (server->ops->get_lease_key)
server->ops->get_lease_key(inode, &fid);
/* store open in pending opens to make sure we don't miss lease break */
cifs_add_pending_open_locked(&fid, cifs_file->tlink, &open);
/* remove it from the lists */
list_del(&cifs_file->flist);
list_del(&cifs_file->tlist);
if (list_empty(&cifsi->openFileList)) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "closing last open instance for inode %p\n",
cifs_file->dentry->d_inode);
/*
* In strict cache mode we need invalidate mapping on the last
* close because it may cause a error when we open this file
* again and get at least level II oplock.
*/
if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_STRICT_IO)
CIFS_I(inode)->invalid_mapping = true;
cifs_set_oplock_level(cifsi, 0);
}
spin_unlock(&cifs_file_list_lock);
cancel_work_sync(&cifs_file->oplock_break);
if (!tcon->need_reconnect && !cifs_file->invalidHandle) {
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
unsigned int xid;
xid = get_xid();
if (server->ops->close)
server->ops->close(xid, tcon, &cifs_file->fid);
_free_xid(xid);
}
cifs_del_pending_open(&open);
/*
* Delete any outstanding lock records. We'll lose them when the file
* is closed anyway.
*/
down_write(&cifsi->lock_sem);
list_for_each_entry_safe(li, tmp, &cifs_file->llist->locks, llist) {
list_del(&li->llist);
cifs_del_lock_waiters(li);
kfree(li);
}
list_del(&cifs_file->llist->llist);
kfree(cifs_file->llist);
up_write(&cifsi->lock_sem);
cifs_put_tlink(cifs_file->tlink);
dput(cifs_file->dentry);
cifs_sb_deactive(sb);
kfree(cifs_file);
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *decode_register(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u8 modrm_reg,
int byteop)
{
void *p;
int highbyte_regs = (ctxt->rex_prefix == 0) && byteop;
if (highbyte_regs && modrm_reg >= 4 && modrm_reg < 8)
p = (unsigned char *)reg_rmw(ctxt, modrm_reg & 3) + 1;
else
p = reg_rmw(ctxt, modrm_reg);
return p;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: btrfs_readpages(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
struct list_head *pages, unsigned nr_pages)
{
struct extent_io_tree *tree;
tree = &BTRFS_I(mapping->host)->io_tree;
return extent_readpages(tree, mapping, pages, nr_pages,
btrfs_get_extent);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGL2RenderingContextBase::IsBufferBoundToNonTransformFeedback(
WebGLBuffer* buffer) {
DCHECK(buffer);
if (bound_array_buffer_ == buffer ||
bound_vertex_array_object_->BoundElementArrayBuffer() == buffer ||
bound_copy_read_buffer_ == buffer || bound_copy_write_buffer_ == buffer ||
bound_pixel_pack_buffer_ == buffer ||
bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_ == buffer || bound_uniform_buffer_ == buffer) {
return true;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i <= max_bound_uniform_buffer_index_; ++i) {
if (bound_indexed_uniform_buffers_[i] == buffer)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t timerfd_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct timerfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
ssize_t res;
u64 ticks = 0;
if (count < sizeof(ticks))
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->wqh.lock);
if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
res = -EAGAIN;
else
res = wait_event_interruptible_locked_irq(ctx->wqh, ctx->ticks);
/*
* If clock has changed, we do not care about the
* ticks and we do not rearm the timer. Userspace must
* reevaluate anyway.
*/
if (timerfd_canceled(ctx)) {
ctx->ticks = 0;
ctx->expired = 0;
res = -ECANCELED;
}
if (ctx->ticks) {
ticks = ctx->ticks;
if (ctx->expired && ctx->tintv) {
/*
* If tintv != 0, this is a periodic timer that
* needs to be re-armed. We avoid doing it in the timer
* callback to avoid DoS attacks specifying a very
* short timer period.
*/
if (isalarm(ctx)) {
ticks += alarm_forward_now(
&ctx->t.alarm, ctx->tintv) - 1;
alarm_restart(&ctx->t.alarm);
} else {
ticks += hrtimer_forward_now(&ctx->t.tmr,
ctx->tintv) - 1;
hrtimer_restart(&ctx->t.tmr);
}
}
ctx->expired = 0;
ctx->ticks = 0;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->wqh.lock);
if (ticks)
res = put_user(ticks, (u64 __user *) buf) ? -EFAULT: sizeof(ticks);
return res;
}
Commit Message: timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org"
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usbnet_status_stop(struct usbnet *dev)
{
if (dev->interrupt) {
mutex_lock(&dev->interrupt_mutex);
WARN_ON(dev->interrupt_count == 0);
if (dev->interrupt_count && --dev->interrupt_count == 0)
usb_kill_urb(dev->interrupt);
dev_dbg(&dev->udev->dev,
"decremented interrupt URB count to %d\n",
dev->interrupt_count);
mutex_unlock(&dev->interrupt_mutex);
}
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 94,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GC_API void * GC_CALL GC_malloc_uncollectable(size_t lb)
{
void *op;
void **opp;
size_t lg;
DCL_LOCK_STATE;
if( SMALL_OBJ(lb) ) {
if (EXTRA_BYTES != 0 && lb != 0) lb--;
/* We don't need the extra byte, since this won't be */
/* collected anyway. */
lg = GC_size_map[lb];
opp = &(GC_uobjfreelist[lg]);
LOCK();
op = *opp;
if (EXPECT(0 != op, TRUE)) {
*opp = obj_link(op);
obj_link(op) = 0;
GC_bytes_allocd += GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
/* Mark bit ws already set on free list. It will be */
/* cleared only temporarily during a collection, as a */
/* result of the normal free list mark bit clearing. */
GC_non_gc_bytes += GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
UNLOCK();
} else {
UNLOCK();
op = (ptr_t)GC_generic_malloc((word)lb, UNCOLLECTABLE);
/* For small objects, the free lists are completely marked. */
}
GC_ASSERT(0 == op || GC_is_marked(op));
return((void *) op);
} else {
hdr * hhdr;
op = (ptr_t)GC_generic_malloc((word)lb, UNCOLLECTABLE);
if (0 == op) return(0);
GC_ASSERT(((word)op & (HBLKSIZE - 1)) == 0); /* large block */
hhdr = HDR(op);
/* We don't need the lock here, since we have an undisguised */
/* pointer. We do need to hold the lock while we adjust */
/* mark bits. */
LOCK();
set_mark_bit_from_hdr(hhdr, 0); /* Only object. */
GC_ASSERT(hhdr -> hb_n_marks == 0);
hhdr -> hb_n_marks = 1;
UNLOCK();
return((void *) op);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix calloc() overflow
* malloc.c (calloc): Check multiplication overflow in calloc(),
assuming REDIRECT_MALLOC.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode)
{
long err = 0;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
DECLARE_BITMAP(bm, MAX_NUMNODES);
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
err = compat_get_bitmap(bm, nmask, nr_bits);
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err |= copy_to_user(nm, bm, alloc_size);
}
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
return sys_set_mempolicy(mode, nm, nr_bits+1);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 1 | 168,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::IsComplete() const {
return (state_ == COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_sb_release(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = container_of(kobj, struct ext4_sb_info,
s_kobj);
complete(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int null_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{ return 0; }
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(request_rec *) ap_sub_req_lookup_uri(const char *new_uri,
const request_rec *r,
ap_filter_t *next_filter)
{
return ap_sub_req_method_uri("GET", new_uri, r, next_filter);
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init crypto_fpu_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_template(&crypto_fpu_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<std::string> splitAndLowercase(const StringPiece& str, char sep) {
return splitAndTransform(str, sep, ::tolower);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Test: ran libaapt2_tests64
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I1ebc017af623b6514cf0c493e8cd8e1d59ea26c3
(cherry picked from commit 4781057e78f63e0e99af109cebf3b6a78f4bfbb6)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::applyPropertiesToStyle(const CSSPropertyValue* properties, size_t count, RenderStyle* style)
{
StyleResolverState state(document(), document().documentElement(), style);
state.setStyle(style);
state.fontBuilder().initForStyleResolve(document(), style, state.useSVGZoomRules());
for (size_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
if (properties[i].value) {
switch (properties[i].property) {
case CSSPropertyFontSize:
case CSSPropertyLineHeight:
updateFont(state);
break;
default:
break;
}
StyleBuilder::applyProperty(properties[i].property, state, properties[i].value);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::beginTransparencyLayer(float)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void AdjustLinuxOOMScore(const std::string& process_type) {
const int kZygoteScore = 0;
const int kScoreBump = 100;
const int kRendererScore = chrome::kLowestRendererOomScore;
const int kMiscScore = kRendererScore - kScoreBump;
const int kPluginScore = kMiscScore - kScoreBump;
int score = -1;
DCHECK(kMiscScore > 0);
DCHECK(kPluginScore > 0);
if (process_type == switches::kPluginProcess ||
process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
score = kPluginScore;
} else if (process_type == switches::kPpapiBrokerProcess) {
score = kPluginScore + kScoreBump;
} else if (process_type == switches::kUtilityProcess ||
process_type == switches::kWorkerProcess ||
process_type == switches::kGpuProcess ||
process_type == switches::kServiceProcess) {
score = kMiscScore;
} else if (process_type == switches::kProfileImportProcess) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
score = kZygoteScore;
#ifndef DISABLE_NACL
} else if (process_type == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) {
score = kPluginScore;
#endif
} else if (process_type == switches::kZygoteProcess ||
process_type.empty()) {
score = kZygoteScore;
} else if (process_type == switches::kExtensionProcess ||
process_type == switches::kRendererProcess) {
LOG(WARNING) << "process type '" << process_type << "' "
<< "should be created through the zygote.";
score = kRendererScore;
} else {
NOTREACHED() << "Unknown process type";
}
if (score > -1)
base::AdjustOOMScore(base::GetCurrentProcId(), score);
}
Commit Message: Linux: Fix crash reporting for GPU and plugin processes.
BUG=96631
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7931005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101779 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err stsg_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *ptr = (GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *)s;
ptr->size += 6 + 4 * ptr->nb_groups;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit pfkey_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id);
pfkey_exit_proc(net);
BUG_ON(!hlist_empty(&net_pfkey->table));
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::OverloadedMethodFMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_overloadedMethodF");
test_object_v8_internal::OverloadedMethodFMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateDate (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt = NULL;
xmlChar *ret = NULL;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return NULL;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_DATE)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return NULL;
}
}
ret = exsltDateFormatDate(&(dt->value.date));
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::BlockImplSideInvalidationRequestsForTesting(
bool block) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothProfileChromeOSTest()
: callback_count_(0),
error_callback_count_(0),
profile_callback_count_(0),
connection_callback_count_(0),
last_profile_(NULL),
last_device_(NULL) {}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeExtDefList(xsltExtDefPtr extensiond)
{
xsltExtDefPtr cur;
while (extensiond != NULL) {
cur = extensiond;
extensiond = extensiond->next;
xsltFreeExtDef(cur);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect RenderBox::logicalVisualOverflowRectForPropagation(RenderStyle* parentStyle) const
{
IntRect rect = visualOverflowRectForPropagation(parentStyle);
if (!parentStyle->isHorizontalWritingMode())
return rect.transposedRect();
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void posix_cpu_timers_exit_group(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
cleanup_timers(tsk->signal->cpu_timers,
cputime_add(tsk->utime, tsk->signal->utime),
cputime_add(tsk->stime, tsk->signal->stime),
tsk->se.sum_exec_runtime + tsk->signal->sum_sched_runtime);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INLINE UWORD8 impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD32 u4_bit,u4_offset,u4_temp;
UWORD32 u4_curr_bit;
u4_offset = ps_stream->u4_offset;
u4_curr_bit = u4_offset & 0x1F;
u4_bit = ps_stream->u4_buf;
/* Move the current bit read from the current word to the
least significant bit positions of 'c'.*/
u4_bit >>= BITS_IN_INT - u4_curr_bit - 1;
u4_offset++;
/* If the last bit of the last word of the buffer has been read update
the currrent buf with next, and read next buf from bit stream buffer */
if (u4_curr_bit == 31)
{
ps_stream->u4_buf = ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt;
if (ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
u4_temp = *(ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)++;
CONV_LE_TO_BE(ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_temp)
}
}
ps_stream->u4_offset = u4_offset;
return (u4_bit & 0x1);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bound read in flush_bits
Bug: 28168413
Change-Id: I3db5432a08daf665e160c0dab2d1928a576418b4
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int write_reuc_extension(git_index *index, git_filebuf *file)
{
git_buf reuc_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
git_vector *out = &index->reuc;
git_index_reuc_entry *reuc;
struct index_extension extension;
size_t i;
int error = 0;
git_vector_foreach(out, i, reuc) {
if ((error = create_reuc_extension_data(&reuc_buf, reuc)) < 0)
goto done;
}
memset(&extension, 0x0, sizeof(struct index_extension));
memcpy(&extension.signature, INDEX_EXT_UNMERGED_SIG, 4);
extension.extension_size = (uint32_t)reuc_buf.size;
error = write_extension(file, &extension, &reuc_buf);
git_buf_free(&reuc_buf);
done:
return error;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_write_disk_vtable(void)
{
static struct archive_vtable av;
static int inited = 0;
if (!inited) {
av.archive_close = _archive_write_disk_close;
av.archive_filter_bytes = _archive_write_disk_filter_bytes;
av.archive_free = _archive_write_disk_free;
av.archive_write_header = _archive_write_disk_header;
av.archive_write_finish_entry
= _archive_write_disk_finish_entry;
av.archive_write_data = _archive_write_disk_data;
av.archive_write_data_block = _archive_write_disk_data_block;
inited = 1;
}
return (&av);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ib_cm_listen(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id, __be64 service_id, __be64 service_mask,
struct ib_cm_compare_data *compare_data)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv, *cur_cm_id_priv;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
service_mask = service_mask ? service_mask : ~cpu_to_be64(0);
service_id &= service_mask;
if ((service_id & IB_SERVICE_ID_AGN_MASK) == IB_CM_ASSIGN_SERVICE_ID &&
(service_id != IB_CM_ASSIGN_SERVICE_ID))
return -EINVAL;
cm_id_priv = container_of(cm_id, struct cm_id_private, id);
if (cm_id->state != IB_CM_IDLE)
return -EINVAL;
if (compare_data) {
cm_id_priv->compare_data = kzalloc(sizeof *compare_data,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cm_id_priv->compare_data)
return -ENOMEM;
cm_mask_copy(cm_id_priv->compare_data->data,
compare_data->data, compare_data->mask);
memcpy(cm_id_priv->compare_data->mask, compare_data->mask,
IB_CM_COMPARE_SIZE);
}
cm_id->state = IB_CM_LISTEN;
spin_lock_irqsave(&cm.lock, flags);
if (service_id == IB_CM_ASSIGN_SERVICE_ID) {
cm_id->service_id = cpu_to_be64(cm.listen_service_id++);
cm_id->service_mask = ~cpu_to_be64(0);
} else {
cm_id->service_id = service_id;
cm_id->service_mask = service_mask;
}
cur_cm_id_priv = cm_insert_listen(cm_id_priv);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cm.lock, flags);
if (cur_cm_id_priv) {
cm_id->state = IB_CM_IDLE;
kfree(cm_id_priv->compare_data);
cm_id_priv->compare_data = NULL;
ret = -EBUSY;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
void *addrp,
u32 addrlen,
u32 *out_sid)
{
int rc;
struct ocontext *c;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
switch (domain) {
case AF_INET: {
u32 addr;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
goto out;
addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
while (c) {
if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
break;
c = c->next;
}
break;
}
case AF_INET6:
rc = -EINVAL;
if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
goto out;
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
while (c) {
if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
c->u.node6.mask))
break;
c = c->next;
}
break;
default:
rc = 0;
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
goto out;
}
if (c) {
if (!c->sid[0]) {
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
&c->context[0],
&c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
*out_sid = c->sid[0];
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
}
rc = 0;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::NullableLongSequenceMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_nullableLongSequenceMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::NullableLongSequenceMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int process_output(unsigned char c, struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
int space, retval;
mutex_lock(&ldata->output_lock);
space = tty_write_room(tty);
retval = do_output_char(c, tty, space);
mutex_unlock(&ldata->output_lock);
if (retval < 0)
return -1;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 39,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
return (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)buffer;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _xml_xmlcharlen(const XML_Char *s)
{
int len = 0;
while (*s) {
len++;
s++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::DeviceAdded(device::BluetoothAdapter* adapter,
device::BluetoothDevice* device) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (device_chooser_controller_.get()) {
device_chooser_controller_->AddFilteredDevice(*device);
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xor_vectors(unsigned char *in1, unsigned char *in2,
unsigned char *out, unsigned int size)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void test_cpu_buff_start(struct trace_iterator *iter)
{
struct trace_seq *s = &iter->seq;
struct trace_array *tr = iter->tr;
if (!(tr->trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_ANNOTATE))
return;
if (!(iter->iter_flags & TRACE_FILE_ANNOTATE))
return;
if (cpumask_available(iter->started) &&
cpumask_test_cpu(iter->cpu, iter->started))
return;
if (per_cpu_ptr(iter->trace_buffer->data, iter->cpu)->skipped_entries)
return;
if (cpumask_available(iter->started))
cpumask_set_cpu(iter->cpu, iter->started);
/* Don't print started cpu buffer for the first entry of the trace */
if (iter->idx > 1)
trace_seq_printf(s, "##### CPU %u buffer started ####\n",
iter->cpu);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterEXRImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("EXR");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENEXR_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadEXRImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteEXRImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsEXR;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("High Dynamic-range (HDR)");
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->module=ConstantString("EXR");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap (
HANDLE_AAC_DRC self,
HANDLE_FDK_BITSTREAM hBs,
CAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo *pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo[],
UCHAR pceInstanceTag,
UCHAR channelMapping[], /* Channel mapping translating drcChannel index to canonical channel index */
int validChannels )
{
CDrcPayload threadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS];
CDrcPayload *validThreadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS];
CDrcParams *pParams;
UINT backupBsPosition;
int i, thread, validThreads = 0;
int numExcludedChns[MAX_DRC_THREADS];
FDK_ASSERT(self != NULL);
FDK_ASSERT(hBs != NULL);
FDK_ASSERT(pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo != NULL);
pParams = &self->params;
self->numThreads = 0;
backupBsPosition = FDKgetValidBits(hBs);
for (i = 0; i < self->numPayloads && self->numThreads < MAX_DRC_THREADS; i++) {
int bitsParsed;
/* Init payload data chunk. The memclear is very important because it initializes
the most values. Without it the module wouldn't work properly or crash. */
FDKmemclear(&threadBs[self->numThreads], sizeof(CDrcPayload));
threadBs[self->numThreads].channelData.bandTop[0] = (1024 >> 2) - 1;
/* Extract payload */
bitsParsed = aacDecoder_drcParse( hBs,
&threadBs[self->numThreads],
self->drcPayloadPosition[i] );
if (bitsParsed > 0) {
self->numThreads++;
}
}
self->numPayloads = 0;
if (self->dvbAncDataAvailable)
{ /* Append a DVB heavy compression payload thread if available. */
int bitsParsed;
/* Init payload data chunk. The memclear is very important because it initializes
the most values. Without it the module wouldn't work properly or crash. */
FDKmemclear(&threadBs[self->numThreads], sizeof(CDrcPayload));
threadBs[self->numThreads].channelData.bandTop[0] = (1024 >> 2) - 1;
/* Extract payload */
bitsParsed = aacDecoder_drcReadCompression( hBs,
&threadBs[self->numThreads],
self->dvbAncDataPosition );
if (bitsParsed > 0) {
self->numThreads++;
}
}
self->dvbAncDataAvailable = 0;
/* Reset the bitbufffer */
FDKpushBiDirectional(hBs, FDKgetValidBits(hBs) - backupBsPosition);
/* calculate number of valid bits in excl_chn_mask */
/* coupling channels not supported */
/* check for valid threads */
for (thread = 0; thread < self->numThreads; thread++) {
CDrcPayload *pThreadBs = &threadBs[thread];
int numExclChns = 0;
switch ((AACDEC_DRC_PAYLOAD_TYPE)pThreadBs->channelData.drcDataType) {
default:
continue;
case MPEG_DRC_EXT_DATA:
case DVB_DRC_ANC_DATA:
break;
}
if (pThreadBs->pceInstanceTag >= 0) { /* if PCE tag present */
if (pThreadBs->pceInstanceTag != pceInstanceTag) {
continue; /* don't accept */
}
}
/* calculate number of excluded channels */
if (pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask > 0) {
INT exclMask = pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask;
int ch;
for (ch = 0; ch < validChannels; ch++) {
numExclChns += exclMask & 0x1;
exclMask >>= 1;
}
}
if (numExclChns < validChannels) {
validThreadBs[validThreads] = pThreadBs;
numExcludedChns[validThreads] = numExclChns;
validThreads++;
}
}
if (validThreads > 1) {
int ch;
/* check consistency of excl_chn_mask amongst valid DRC threads */
for (ch = 0; ch < validChannels; ch++) {
int present = 0;
for (thread = 0; thread < validThreads; thread++) {
CDrcPayload *pThreadBs = validThreadBs[thread];
/* thread applies to this channel */
if ( (pThreadBs->channelData.drcDataType == MPEG_DRC_EXT_DATA)
&& ( (numExcludedChns[thread] == 0)
|| (!(pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask & (1<<ch))) ) ) {
present++;
}
}
if (present > 1) {
return -1;
}
}
}
/* map DRC bitstream information onto DRC channel information */
for (thread = 0; thread < validThreads; thread++)
{
CDrcPayload *pThreadBs = validThreadBs[thread];
INT exclMask = pThreadBs->excludedChnsMask;
AACDEC_DRC_PAYLOAD_TYPE drcPayloadType = (AACDEC_DRC_PAYLOAD_TYPE)pThreadBs->channelData.drcDataType;
int ch;
/* last progRefLevel transmitted is the one that is used
* (but it should really only be transmitted once per block!)
*/
if (pThreadBs->progRefLevel >= 0) {
self->progRefLevel = pThreadBs->progRefLevel;
self->progRefLevelPresent = 1;
self->prlExpiryCount = 0; /* Got a new value -> Reset counter */
}
if (drcPayloadType == DVB_DRC_ANC_DATA) {
/* Announce the presentation mode of this valid thread. */
self->presMode = pThreadBs->presMode;
}
/* SCE, CPE and LFE */
for (ch = 0; ch < validChannels; ch++) {
int mapedChannel = channelMapping[ch];
if ( ((exclMask & (1<<mapedChannel)) == 0)
&& ( (drcPayloadType == MPEG_DRC_EXT_DATA)
|| ((drcPayloadType == DVB_DRC_ANC_DATA) && self->params.applyHeavyCompression)
) ) {
/* copy thread to channel */
pAacDecoderStaticChannelInfo[ch]->drcData = pThreadBs->channelData;
}
}
/* CCEs not supported by now */
}
/* Increment and check expiry counter for the program reference level: */
if ( (pParams->expiryFrame > 0)
&& (self->prlExpiryCount++ > pParams->expiryFrame) )
{ /* The program reference level is too old, so set it back to the target level. */
self->progRefLevelPresent = 0;
self->progRefLevel = pParams->targetRefLevel;
self->prlExpiryCount = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack corruption happening in aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap()
In the aacDecoder_drcExtractAndMap() function, self->numThreads
can be used after having exceeded its intended max value,
MAX_DRC_THREADS, causing memory to be cleared after the
threadBs[MAX_DRC_THREADS] array.
The crash is prevented by never using self->numThreads with
a value equal to or greater than MAX_DRC_THREADS.
A proper fix will be required as there seems to be an issue as
to which entry in the threadBs array is meant to be initialized
and used.
Bug 26751339
Change-Id: I655cc40c35d4206ab72e83b2bdb751be2fe52b5a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunRoundTripErrorCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
if (test_temp_block[j] > 0) {
test_temp_block[j] += 2;
test_temp_block[j] /= 4;
test_temp_block[j] *= 4;
} else {
test_temp_block[j] -= 2;
test_temp_block[j] /= 4;
test_temp_block[j] *= 4;
}
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has an individual"
<< " roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average roundtrip "
<< "error > 1/5 per block";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OMXNodeInstance::onGetHandleFailed() {
delete this;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::InitializeURLRequest(
net::URLRequest* request,
const Referrer& referrer,
bool is_download,
int render_process_host_id,
int render_view_routing_id,
int render_frame_routing_id,
PreviewsState previews_state,
ResourceContext* context) {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!request->is_pending());
Referrer::SetReferrerForRequest(request, referrer);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = CreateRequestInfo(
render_process_host_id, render_view_routing_id, render_frame_routing_id,
previews_state, is_download, context);
info->AssociateWithRequest(request);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionSystemImpl::Shared::InitPrefs() {
bool extensions_disabled =
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDisableExtensions) ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExtensions);
extension_prefs_ = ExtensionPrefs::Create(
profile_->GetPrefs(),
profile_->GetPath().AppendASCII(ExtensionService::kInstallDirectoryName),
ExtensionPrefValueMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile_),
extensions_disabled);
lazy_background_task_queue_.reset(new LazyBackgroundTaskQueue(profile_));
event_router_.reset(new EventRouter(profile_, extension_prefs_.get()));
state_store_.reset(new StateStore(
profile_,
profile_->GetPath().AppendASCII(ExtensionService::kStateStoreName),
true));
rules_store_.reset(new StateStore(
profile_,
profile_->GetPath().AppendASCII(ExtensionService::kRulesStoreName),
false));
shell_window_geometry_cache_.reset(new ShellWindowGeometryCache(
profile_, extension_prefs_.get()));
blacklist_.reset(new Blacklist(extension_prefs_.get()));
standard_management_policy_provider_.reset(
new StandardManagementPolicyProvider(extension_prefs_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateBrowserPluginEmbedderIfNecessary() {
if (browser_plugin_embedder_)
return;
browser_plugin_embedder_.reset(BrowserPluginEmbedder::Create(this));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mp_encode_lua_type(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf, int level) {
int t = lua_type(L,-1);
/* Limit the encoding of nested tables to a specified maximum depth, so that
* we survive when called against circular references in tables. */
if (t == LUA_TTABLE && level == LUACMSGPACK_MAX_NESTING) t = LUA_TNIL;
switch(t) {
case LUA_TSTRING: mp_encode_lua_string(L,buf); break;
case LUA_TBOOLEAN: mp_encode_lua_bool(L,buf); break;
case LUA_TNUMBER:
#if LUA_VERSION_NUM < 503
mp_encode_lua_number(L,buf); break;
#else
if (lua_isinteger(L, -1)) {
mp_encode_lua_integer(L, buf);
} else {
mp_encode_lua_number(L, buf);
}
break;
#endif
case LUA_TTABLE: mp_encode_lua_table(L,buf,level); break;
default: mp_encode_lua_null(L,buf); break;
}
lua_pop(L,1);
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfssvc_release_fhandle(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_fhandle *resp)
{
fh_put(&resp->fh);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_card_ctl(sc_card_t *card, unsigned long cmd, void *ptr)
{
cac_private_data_t * priv = CAC_DATA(card);
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
sc_log(card->ctx, "cmd=%ld ptr=%p", cmd, ptr);
if (priv == NULL) {
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
}
switch(cmd) {
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_GET_ACA_PATH:
return cac_get_ACA_path(card, (sc_path_t *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_GET_SERIALNR:
return cac_get_serial_nr_from_CUID(card, (sc_serial_number_t *) ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_INIT_GET_GENERIC_OBJECTS:
return cac_get_init_and_get_count(&priv->general_list, &priv->general_current, (int *)ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_INIT_GET_CERT_OBJECTS:
return cac_get_init_and_get_count(&priv->pki_list, &priv->pki_current, (int *)ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_GET_NEXT_GENERIC_OBJECT:
return cac_fill_object_info(&priv->general_list, &priv->general_current, (sc_pkcs15_data_info_t *)ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_GET_NEXT_CERT_OBJECT:
return cac_fill_object_info(&priv->pki_list, &priv->pki_current, (sc_pkcs15_data_info_t *)ptr);
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_FINAL_GET_GENERIC_OBJECTS:
return cac_final_iterator(&priv->general_list);
case SC_CARDCTL_CAC_FINAL_GET_CERT_OBJECTS:
return cac_final_iterator(&priv->pki_list);
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hub_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_host_interface *desc;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct usb_device *hdev;
struct usb_hub *hub;
desc = intf->cur_altsetting;
hdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
/*
* Set default autosuspend delay as 0 to speedup bus suspend,
* based on the below considerations:
*
* - Unlike other drivers, the hub driver does not rely on the
* autosuspend delay to provide enough time to handle a wakeup
* event, and the submitted status URB is just to check future
* change on hub downstream ports, so it is safe to do it.
*
* - The patch might cause one or more auto supend/resume for
* below very rare devices when they are plugged into hub
* first time:
*
* devices having trouble initializing, and disconnect
* themselves from the bus and then reconnect a second
* or so later
*
* devices just for downloading firmware, and disconnects
* themselves after completing it
*
* For these quite rare devices, their drivers may change the
* autosuspend delay of their parent hub in the probe() to one
* appropriate value to avoid the subtle problem if someone
* does care it.
*
* - The patch may cause one or more auto suspend/resume on
* hub during running 'lsusb', but it is probably too
* infrequent to worry about.
*
* - Change autosuspend delay of hub can avoid unnecessary auto
* suspend timer for hub, also may decrease power consumption
* of USB bus.
*
* - If user has indicated to prevent autosuspend by passing
* usbcore.autosuspend = -1 then keep autosuspend disabled.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
if (hdev->dev.power.autosuspend_delay >= 0)
pm_runtime_set_autosuspend_delay(&hdev->dev, 0);
#endif
/*
* Hubs have proper suspend/resume support, except for root hubs
* where the controller driver doesn't have bus_suspend and
* bus_resume methods.
*/
if (hdev->parent) { /* normal device */
usb_enable_autosuspend(hdev);
} else { /* root hub */
const struct hc_driver *drv = bus_to_hcd(hdev->bus)->driver;
if (drv->bus_suspend && drv->bus_resume)
usb_enable_autosuspend(hdev);
}
if (hdev->level == MAX_TOPO_LEVEL) {
dev_err(&intf->dev,
"Unsupported bus topology: hub nested too deep\n");
return -E2BIG;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_USB_OTG_BLACKLIST_HUB
if (hdev->parent) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "ignoring external hub\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
#endif
/* Some hubs have a subclass of 1, which AFAICT according to the */
/* specs is not defined, but it works */
if ((desc->desc.bInterfaceSubClass != 0) &&
(desc->desc.bInterfaceSubClass != 1)) {
descriptor_error:
dev_err(&intf->dev, "bad descriptor, ignoring hub\n");
return -EIO;
}
/* Multiple endpoints? What kind of mutant ninja-hub is this? */
if (desc->desc.bNumEndpoints != 1)
goto descriptor_error;
endpoint = &desc->endpoint[0].desc;
/* If it's not an interrupt in endpoint, we'd better punt! */
if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_in(endpoint))
goto descriptor_error;
/* We found a hub */
dev_info(&intf->dev, "USB hub found\n");
hub = kzalloc(sizeof(*hub), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hub) {
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "couldn't kmalloc hub struct\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
kref_init(&hub->kref);
hub->intfdev = &intf->dev;
hub->hdev = hdev;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&hub->leds, led_work);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&hub->init_work, NULL);
INIT_WORK(&hub->events, hub_event);
usb_get_intf(intf);
usb_get_dev(hdev);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, hub);
intf->needs_remote_wakeup = 1;
pm_suspend_ignore_children(&intf->dev, true);
if (hdev->speed == USB_SPEED_HIGH)
highspeed_hubs++;
if (id->driver_info & HUB_QUIRK_CHECK_PORT_AUTOSUSPEND)
hub->quirk_check_port_auto_suspend = 1;
if (hub_configure(hub, endpoint) >= 0)
return 0;
hub_disconnect(intf);
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int cfs_rq_throttled(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isoent_make_sorted_files(struct archive_write *a, struct isoent *isoent,
struct idr *idr)
{
struct archive_rb_node *rn;
struct isoent **children;
children = malloc(isoent->children.cnt * sizeof(struct isoent *));
if (children == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
isoent->children_sorted = children;
ARCHIVE_RB_TREE_FOREACH(rn, &(idr->rbtree)) {
struct idrent *idrent = (struct idrent *)rn;
*children ++ = idrent->isoent;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(FrameSelection) {
visitor->Trace(frame_);
visitor->Trace(layout_selection_);
visitor->Trace(selection_editor_);
visitor->Trace(frame_caret_);
SynchronousMutationObserver::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_rfc3361(int dl, const uint8_t *data)
{
uint8_t enc;
unsigned int l;
char *sip = NULL;
struct in_addr addr;
char *p;
if (dl < 2) {
errno = EINVAL;
return 0;
}
enc = *data++;
dl--;
switch (enc) {
case 0:
if ((l = decode_rfc3397(NULL, 0, dl, data)) > 0) {
sip = xmalloc(l);
decode_rfc3397(sip, l, dl, data);
}
break;
case 1:
if (dl == 0 || dl % 4 != 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
break;
}
addr.s_addr = INADDR_BROADCAST;
l = ((dl / sizeof(addr.s_addr)) * ((4 * 4) + 1)) + 1;
sip = p = xmalloc(l);
while (dl != 0) {
memcpy(&addr.s_addr, data, sizeof(addr.s_addr));
data += sizeof(addr.s_addr);
p += snprintf(p, l - (p - sip), "%s ", inet_ntoa(addr));
dl -= sizeof(addr.s_addr);
}
*--p = '\0';
break;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return 0;
}
return sip;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int msg_cache_clean_cb(const char *id, struct BodyCache *bcache, void *data)
{
unsigned int uv, uid;
struct ImapData *idata = data;
if (sscanf(id, "%u-%u", &uv, &uid) != 2)
return 0;
/* bad UID */
if (uv != idata->uid_validity || !mutt_hash_int_find(idata->uid_hash, uid))
mutt_bcache_del(bcache, id);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 79,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_verify_back_channel_attrs(struct nfs41_create_session_args *args, struct nfs4_session *session)
{
struct nfs4_channel_attrs *sent = &args->bc_attrs;
struct nfs4_channel_attrs *rcvd = &session->bc_attrs;
if (rcvd->max_rqst_sz > sent->max_rqst_sz)
return -EINVAL;
if (rcvd->max_resp_sz < sent->max_resp_sz)
return -EINVAL;
if (rcvd->max_resp_sz_cached > sent->max_resp_sz_cached)
return -EINVAL;
/* These would render the backchannel useless: */
if (rcvd->max_ops == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (rcvd->max_reqs == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tlb_remove_table_smp_sync(void *arg)
{
/* Simply deliver the interrupt */
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isNativeCheckboxOrRadio() const {
Node* node = this->getNode();
if (!isHTMLInputElement(node))
return false;
HTMLInputElement* input = toHTMLInputElement(node);
return input->type() == InputTypeNames::checkbox ||
input->type() == InputTypeNames::radio;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginHtmlDialog::SetDialogSize(int width, int height) {
DCHECK(width >= 0 && height >= 0);
width_ = width;
height_ = height;
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupItemView::OnMouseExited(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
AutofillPopupController* controller = popup_view_->controller();
if (controller)
controller->SelectionCleared();
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sco_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int len, err = 0;
struct bt_voice voice;
u32 opt;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
set_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
clear_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
break;
case BT_VOICE:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN && sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND &&
sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECT2) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
voice.setting = sco_pi(sk)->setting;
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(voice), optlen);
if (copy_from_user((char *) &voice, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* Explicitly check for these values */
if (voice.setting != BT_VOICE_TRANSPARENT &&
voice.setting != BT_VOICE_CVSD_16BIT) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sco_pi(sk)->setting = voice.setting;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageInfo::RecordPageInfoAction(PageInfoAction action) {
if (action != PAGE_INFO_OPENED)
did_perform_action_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebsiteSettings.Action", action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
std::string histogram_name;
if (site_url_.SchemeIsCryptographic()) {
if (security_level_ == security_state::SECURE) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpsUrl.ValidNonEV",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
} else if (security_level_ == security_state::EV_SECURE) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpsUrl.ValidEV",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
} else if (security_level_ == security_state::NONE) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpsUrl.Downgraded",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
} else if (security_level_ == security_state::DANGEROUS) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpsUrl.Dangerous",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
}
return;
}
if (security_level_ == security_state::HTTP_SHOW_WARNING) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpUrl.Warning",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
} else if (security_level_ == security_state::DANGEROUS) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpUrl.Dangerous",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Security.PageInfo.Action.HttpUrl.Neutral",
action, PAGE_INFO_COUNT);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PictOpValid (CARD8 op)
{
if (/*PictOpMinimum <= op && */ op <= PictOpMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpDisjointMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpDisjointMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpConjointMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpConjointMaximum)
return TRUE;
if (PictOpBlendMinimum <= op && op <= PictOpBlendMaximum)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_I16 ConvertSustain (EAS_I32 sustain)
{
/* check for sustain level of zero */
if (sustain == 0)
return 0;
/* convert to log2 factor */
/*lint -e{704} use shift for performance */
sustain = (sustain * SUSTAIN_LINEAR_CONVERSION_FACTOR) >> 15;
if (sustain > SYNTH_FULL_SCALE_EG1_GAIN)
return SYNTH_FULL_SCALE_EG1_GAIN;
return (EAS_I16) sustain;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_close)
{
zval * zip;
zip_rsrc *z_rsrc = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &zip) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(z_rsrc, zip_rsrc *, &zip, -1, le_zip_dir_name, le_zip_dir);
/* really close the zip will break BC :-D */
zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(zip));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err ilst_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_Box *tag;
GF_Err e;
GF_ItemListBox *ptr;
ptr = (GF_ItemListBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ItemListBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
i=0;
while ( (tag = (GF_Box*)gf_list_enum(ptr->other_boxes, &i))) {
e = ilst_item_dump(tag, trace);
if(e) return e;
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ItemListBox", NULL, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::WillInitiatePaint() {
pepper_helper_->ViewWillInitiatePaint();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MockNetworkTransaction::GetFullRequestHeaders(
HttpRequestHeaders* headers) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timespec kts;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timespec(up, &kts);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix info leak in compat dev_ifconf()
The implementation of dev_ifconf() for the compat ioctl interface uses
an intermediate ifc structure allocated in userland for the duration of
the syscall. Though, it fails to initialize the padding bytes inserted
for alignment and that for leaks four bytes of kernel stack. Add an
explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(fputcsv)
{
char delimiter = ','; /* allow this to be set as parameter */
char enclosure = '"'; /* allow this to be set as parameter */
char escape_char = '\\'; /* allow this to be set as parameter */
php_stream *stream;
zval *fp = NULL, *fields = NULL;
int ret;
char *delimiter_str = NULL, *enclosure_str = NULL, *escape_str = NULL;
int delimiter_str_len = 0, enclosure_str_len = 0, escape_str_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ra|sss",
&fp, &fields, &delimiter_str, &delimiter_str_len,
&enclosure_str, &enclosure_str_len,
&escape_str, &escape_str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (delimiter_str != NULL) {
/* Make sure that there is at least one character in string */
if (delimiter_str_len < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "delimiter must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else if (delimiter_str_len > 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "delimiter must be a single character");
}
/* use first character from string */
delimiter = *delimiter_str;
}
if (enclosure_str != NULL) {
if (enclosure_str_len < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "enclosure must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else if (enclosure_str_len > 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "enclosure must be a single character");
}
/* use first character from string */
enclosure = *enclosure_str;
}
if (escape_str != NULL) {
if (escape_str_len < 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "escape must be a character");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else if (escape_str_len > 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "escape must be a single character");
}
/* use first character from string */
escape_char = *escape_str;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &fp);
ret = php_fputcsv(stream, fields, delimiter, enclosure, escape_char TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 52,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_vfs_lock(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *fl)
{
int res = 0;
switch (fl->fl_flags & (FL_POSIX|FL_FLOCK)) {
case FL_POSIX:
res = posix_lock_inode_wait(inode, fl);
break;
case FL_FLOCK:
res = flock_lock_inode_wait(inode, fl);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::OverloadedMethodJMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_overloadedMethodJ");
test_object_v8_internal::OverloadedMethodJMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::StartPrinting(
const WebKit::WebPrintParams& webkit_print_params) {
web_print_params_ = webkit_print_params;
gfx::Size print_layout_size(web_print_params_.printContentArea.width,
web_print_params_.printContentArea.height);
print_layout_size.set_height(static_cast<int>(
static_cast<double>(print_layout_size.height()) * 1.25));
web_view_->resize(print_layout_size);
expected_pages_count_ = frame_->printBegin(web_print_params_,
node_to_print_,
&use_browser_overlays_);
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: convert_to_string(const gs_memory_t *mem, os_ptr op1, os_ptr op)
{
uint len;
const byte *pstr = 0;
int code = obj_cvs(mem, op1, op->value.bytes, r_size(op), &len, &pstr);
if (code < 0) {
/*
* Some common downloaded error handlers assume that
* operator names don't exceed a certain fixed size.
* To work around this bit of bad design, we implement
* a special hack here: if we got a rangecheck, and
* the object is an operator whose name begins with
* %, ., or @, we just truncate the name.
*/
if (code == gs_error_rangecheck)
switch (r_btype(op1)) {
case t_oparray:
case t_operator:
if (pstr != 0)
switch (*pstr) {
case '%':
case '.':
case '@':
len = r_size(op);
memcpy(op->value.bytes, pstr, len);
goto ok;
}
}
return code;
}
ok:
*op1 = *op;
r_set_size(op1, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameView::updateWidgets()
{
ASSERT(!m_widgetUpdateSet.isEmpty());
if (m_nestedLayoutCount > 1 || m_widgetUpdateSet.isEmpty())
return true;
EmbeddedObjectSet objects;
objects.swap(m_widgetUpdateSet);
for (EmbeddedObjectSet::iterator it = objects.begin(); it != objects.end(); ++it) {
RenderEmbeddedObject& object = **it;
HTMLPlugInElement* element = toHTMLPlugInElement(object.node());
if (!element)
continue;
if (object.showsUnavailablePluginIndicator())
continue;
if (element->needsWidgetUpdate())
element->updateWidget();
object.updateWidgetPosition();
m_widgetUpdateSet.remove(&object);
}
return m_widgetUpdateSet.isEmpty();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned interleave_nodes(struct mempolicy *policy)
{
unsigned nid, next;
struct task_struct *me = current;
nid = me->il_next;
next = next_node(nid, policy->v.nodes);
if (next >= MAX_NUMNODES)
next = first_node(policy->v.nodes);
if (next < MAX_NUMNODES)
me->il_next = next;
return nid;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __gcm_hash_assoc_done(struct aead_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_gcm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_gcm_reqctx(req);
unsigned int remain;
if (!err) {
remain = gcm_remain(req->assoclen);
BUG_ON(!remain);
err = gcm_hash_remain(req, pctx, remain,
gcm_hash_assoc_remain_done);
if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY)
return;
}
__gcm_hash_assoc_remain_done(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct loop_device *lo = disk->private_data;
int err;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
* and remove configuration after last close.
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (lo->lo_state == Lo_bound) {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
* but flush possible ongoing bios in thread.
*/
blk_mq_freeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
}
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 169,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long BlockGroup::GetPrevTimeCode() const { return m_prev; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_mac_metadata(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname,
const void *metadata, size_t metadata_size)
{
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
(void)pathname; /* UNUSED */
(void)metadata; /* UNUSED */
(void)metadata_size; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _eina_unicode_to_hex(Eina_Unicode u)
{
if (u >= '0' && u <= '9')
return u - '0';
if (u >= 'a' && u <= 'f')
return 10 + u - 'a';
if (u >= 'A' && u <= 'F')
return 10 + u - 'A';
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 15,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::DidHandleMessage(
const std::string& app_id,
const base::Closure& message_handled_closure) {
auto in_flight_iterator = in_flight_message_deliveries_.find(app_id);
DCHECK(in_flight_iterator != in_flight_message_deliveries_.end());
in_flight_message_deliveries_.erase(in_flight_iterator);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
if (in_flight_message_deliveries_.empty())
in_flight_keep_alive_.reset();
#endif
message_handled_closure.Run();
if (push_messaging_service_observer_)
push_messaging_service_observer_->OnMessageHandled();
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaControlMuteButtonElement::defaultEventHandler(Event* event) {
if (event->type() == EventTypeNames::click) {
if (mediaElement().muted())
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.Unmute"));
else
Platform::current()->recordAction(
UserMetricsAction("Media.Controls.Mute"));
mediaElement().setMuted(!mediaElement().muted());
event->setDefaultHandled();
}
MediaControlInputElement::defaultEventHandler(event);
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 126,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ovl_dentry_release(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
if (oe) {
dput(oe->__upperdentry);
dput(oe->lowerdentry);
kfree_rcu(oe, rcu);
}
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: msPostGISRetrievePgVersion(PGconn *pgconn)
{
#ifndef POSTGIS_HAS_SERVER_VERSION
int pgVersion = 0;
char *strVersion = NULL;
char *strParts[3] = { NULL, NULL, NULL };
int i = 0, j = 0, len = 0;
int factor = 10000;
if (pgconn == NULL) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Layer does not have a postgis connection.", "msPostGISRetrievePgVersion()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
if (! PQparameterStatus(pgconn, "server_version") )
return MS_FAILURE;
strVersion = msStrdup(PQparameterStatus(pgconn, "server_version"));
if( ! strVersion )
return MS_FAILURE;
strParts[j] = strVersion;
j++;
len = strlen(strVersion);
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
if( strVersion[i] == '.' ) {
strVersion[i] = '\0';
if( j < 3 ) {
strParts[j] = strVersion + i + 1;
j++;
} else {
free(strVersion);
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Too many parts in version string.", "msPostGISRetrievePgVersion()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
}
}
for( j = 0; j < 3 && strParts[j]; j++ ) {
pgVersion += factor * atoi(strParts[j]);
factor = factor / 100;
}
free(strVersion);
return pgVersion;
#else
return PQserverVersion(pgconn);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 40,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message,
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP_WITH_PARAM(ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost, message,
render_frame_host)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ScreenOrientationHostMsg_LockRequest, OnLockRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ScreenOrientationHostMsg_Unlock, OnUnlockRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,195 |
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