instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_send_sge(struct ib_qp_init_attr *attr, int wqe_size)
{
int max_sge;
if (attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_RC)
max_sge = (min_t(int, wqe_size, 512) -
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg) -
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_raddr_seg)) /
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg);
else if (attr->qp_type == IB_QPT_XRC_INI)
max_sge = (min_t(int, wqe_size, 512) -
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_ctrl_seg) -
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_xrc_seg) -
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_raddr_seg)) /
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg);
else
max_sge = (wqe_size - sq_overhead(attr)) /
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg);
return min_t(int, max_sge, wqe_size - sq_overhead(attr) /
sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg));
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GraphicsContext3D::makeContextCurrent()
{
if (!m_private || m_renderStyle == RenderToCurrentGLContext)
return false;
return m_private->makeCurrentIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: [Qt] Remove an unnecessary masking from swapBgrToRgb()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=103630
Reviewed by Zoltan Herczeg.
Get rid of a masking command in swapBgrToRgb() to speed up a little bit.
* platform/graphics/qt/GraphicsContext3DQt.cpp:
(WebCore::swapBgrToRgb):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@136375 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 107,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_str_add(HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len, zval *pData ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
zend_string *key = zend_string_init(str, len, ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
zval *ret = _zend_hash_add_or_update_i(ht, key, pData, HASH_ADD ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
zend_string_release(key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext2_xattr_rehash(struct ext2_xattr_header *header,
struct ext2_xattr_entry *entry)
{
struct ext2_xattr_entry *here;
__u32 hash = 0;
ext2_xattr_hash_entry(header, entry);
here = ENTRY(header+1);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(here)) {
if (!here->e_hash) {
/* Block is not shared if an entry's hash value == 0 */
hash = 0;
break;
}
hash = (hash << BLOCK_HASH_SHIFT) ^
(hash >> (8*sizeof(hash) - BLOCK_HASH_SHIFT)) ^
le32_to_cpu(here->e_hash);
here = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(here);
}
header->h_hash = cpu_to_le32(hash);
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 94,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::StartFind(const std::string& text, bool case_sensitive) {
DCHECK(!text.empty());
if (pages_.empty())
return;
bool first_search = (current_find_text_ != text);
int character_to_start_searching_from = 0;
if (first_search) {
std::vector<PDFiumRange> old_selection = selection_;
StopFind();
current_find_text_ = text;
if (old_selection.empty()) {
next_page_to_search_ = 0;
last_page_to_search_ = pages_.size() - 1;
last_character_index_to_search_ = -1;
} else {
next_page_to_search_ = old_selection[0].page_index();
last_character_index_to_search_ = old_selection[0].char_index();
character_to_start_searching_from = old_selection[0].char_index();
last_page_to_search_ = next_page_to_search_;
}
}
int current_page = next_page_to_search_;
if (pages_[current_page]->available()) {
base::string16 str = base::UTF8ToUTF16(text);
if (0) {
SearchUsingPDFium(
str, case_sensitive, first_search, character_to_start_searching_from,
current_page);
} else {
SearchUsingICU(
str, case_sensitive, first_search, character_to_start_searching_from,
current_page);
}
if (!IsPageVisible(current_page))
pages_[current_page]->Unload();
}
if (next_page_to_search_ != last_page_to_search_ ||
(first_search && last_character_index_to_search_ != -1)) {
++next_page_to_search_;
}
if (next_page_to_search_ == static_cast<int>(pages_.size()))
next_page_to_search_ = 0;
bool end_of_search =
next_page_to_search_ == last_page_to_search_ &&
((pages_.size() == 1 && last_character_index_to_search_ == -1) ||
(pages_.size() == 1 && !first_search) ||
(pages_.size() > 1 && current_page == next_page_to_search_));
if (end_of_search) {
client_->NotifyNumberOfFindResultsChanged(find_results_.size(), true);
if (resume_find_index_.valid() && !current_find_index_.valid()) {
size_t resume_index = resume_find_index_.GetIndex();
if (resume_index >= find_results_.size()) {
resume_index = 0;
}
current_find_index_.SetIndex(resume_index);
client_->NotifySelectedFindResultChanged(resume_index);
}
resume_find_index_.Invalidate();
} else {
pp::CompletionCallback callback =
find_factory_.NewCallback(&PDFiumEngine::ContinueFind);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(
0, callback, case_sensitive ? 1 : 0);
}
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethod(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSC::JSValue result = toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->objMethod()));
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProfile(Image *image,const char *name,
const StringInfo *profile,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
return(SetImageProfileInternal(image,name,profile,MagickFalse,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/280
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int equalizer_init(effect_context_t *context)
{
ALOGV("%s", __func__);
equalizer_context_t *eq_ctxt = (equalizer_context_t *)context;
context->config.inputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_READ;
context->config.inputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO;
context->config.inputCfg.format = AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
context->config.inputCfg.samplingRate = 44100;
context->config.inputCfg.bufferProvider.getBuffer = NULL;
context->config.inputCfg.bufferProvider.releaseBuffer = NULL;
context->config.inputCfg.bufferProvider.cookie = NULL;
context->config.inputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_ALL;
context->config.outputCfg.accessMode = EFFECT_BUFFER_ACCESS_ACCUMULATE;
context->config.outputCfg.channels = AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_STEREO;
context->config.outputCfg.format = AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
context->config.outputCfg.samplingRate = 44100;
context->config.outputCfg.bufferProvider.getBuffer = NULL;
context->config.outputCfg.bufferProvider.releaseBuffer = NULL;
context->config.outputCfg.bufferProvider.cookie = NULL;
context->config.outputCfg.mask = EFFECT_CONFIG_ALL;
set_config(context, &context->config);
memset(&(eq_ctxt->offload_eq), 0, sizeof(struct eq_params));
offload_eq_set_preset(&(eq_ctxt->offload_eq), INVALID_PRESET);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 164,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::Process(size_t number_of_frames) {
AudioBus* output_bus = Output(0).Bus();
MutexTryLocker try_locker(process_lock_);
if (try_locker.Locked()) {
if (!MediaElement() || !source_sample_rate_) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
if (source_number_of_channels_ != output_bus->NumberOfChannels()) {
output_bus->Zero();
return;
}
AudioSourceProvider& provider = MediaElement()->GetAudioSourceProvider();
if (multi_channel_resampler_.get()) {
DCHECK_NE(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
multi_channel_resampler_->Process(&provider, output_bus,
number_of_frames);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(source_sample_rate_, Context()->sampleRate());
provider.ProvideInput(output_bus, number_of_frames);
}
if (is_origin_tainted_) {
output_bus->Zero();
}
} else {
output_bus->Zero();
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_node_path(struct inode *inode, long block,
int offset[4], unsigned int noffset[4])
{
const long direct_index = ADDRS_PER_INODE(inode);
const long direct_blks = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK;
const long dptrs_per_blk = NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
const long indirect_blks = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
const long dindirect_blks = indirect_blks * NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
int n = 0;
int level = 0;
noffset[0] = 0;
if (block < direct_index) {
offset[n] = block;
goto got;
}
block -= direct_index;
if (block < direct_blks) {
offset[n++] = NODE_DIR1_BLOCK;
noffset[n] = 1;
offset[n] = block;
level = 1;
goto got;
}
block -= direct_blks;
if (block < direct_blks) {
offset[n++] = NODE_DIR2_BLOCK;
noffset[n] = 2;
offset[n] = block;
level = 1;
goto got;
}
block -= direct_blks;
if (block < indirect_blks) {
offset[n++] = NODE_IND1_BLOCK;
noffset[n] = 3;
offset[n++] = block / direct_blks;
noffset[n] = 4 + offset[n - 1];
offset[n] = block % direct_blks;
level = 2;
goto got;
}
block -= indirect_blks;
if (block < indirect_blks) {
offset[n++] = NODE_IND2_BLOCK;
noffset[n] = 4 + dptrs_per_blk;
offset[n++] = block / direct_blks;
noffset[n] = 5 + dptrs_per_blk + offset[n - 1];
offset[n] = block % direct_blks;
level = 2;
goto got;
}
block -= indirect_blks;
if (block < dindirect_blks) {
offset[n++] = NODE_DIND_BLOCK;
noffset[n] = 5 + (dptrs_per_blk * 2);
offset[n++] = block / indirect_blks;
noffset[n] = 6 + (dptrs_per_blk * 2) +
offset[n - 1] * (dptrs_per_blk + 1);
offset[n++] = (block / direct_blks) % dptrs_per_blk;
noffset[n] = 7 + (dptrs_per_blk * 2) +
offset[n - 2] * (dptrs_per_blk + 1) +
offset[n - 1];
offset[n] = block % direct_blks;
level = 3;
goto got;
} else {
BUG();
}
got:
return level;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nl80211_send_remain_on_chan_event(
int cmd, struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, u64 cookie,
struct ieee80211_channel *chan,
enum nl80211_channel_type channel_type,
unsigned int duration, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, gfp);
if (!msg)
return;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, 0, 0, 0, cmd);
if (!hdr) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY, rdev->wiphy_idx);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_IFINDEX, netdev->ifindex);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_FREQ, chan->center_freq);
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY_CHANNEL_TYPE, channel_type);
NLA_PUT_U64(msg, NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE, cookie);
if (cmd == NL80211_CMD_REMAIN_ON_CHANNEL)
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_DURATION, duration);
if (genlmsg_end(msg, hdr) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_mlme_mcgrp.id, gfp);
return;
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
nlmsg_free(msg);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLayerRequestProtocolTLSUpgrade(Flow *f)
{
AppLayerRequestProtocolChange(f, 443, ALPROTO_TLS);
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkColor TabStrip::GetTabSeparatorColor() const {
return separator_color_;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaintArtifactCompositor::MightOverlap(const PendingLayer& layer_a,
const PendingLayer& layer_b) {
PropertyTreeState root_property_tree_state(TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root());
FloatClipRect bounds_a(layer_a.bounds);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(layer_a.property_tree_state,
root_property_tree_state, bounds_a);
FloatClipRect bounds_b(layer_b.bounds);
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRect(layer_b.property_tree_state,
root_property_tree_state, bounds_b);
return bounds_a.Rect().Intersects(bounds_b.Rect());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ctr_crypt_final(struct crypto_sparc64_aes_ctx *ctx,
struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
u8 *ctrblk = walk->iv;
u64 keystream[AES_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;
u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr;
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
ctx->ops->ecb_encrypt(&ctx->key[0], (const u64 *)ctrblk,
keystream, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
crypto_xor((u8 *) keystream, src, nbytes);
memcpy(dst, keystream, nbytes);
crypto_inc(ctrblk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::scrollingElement() {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ScrollTopLeftInteropEnabled() && InQuirksMode())
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
return ScrollingElementNoLayout();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromWBMPPtr (int size, void *data)
{
gdImagePtr im;
gdIOCtx *in = gdNewDynamicCtxEx(size, data, 0);
im = gdImageCreateFromWBMPCtx(in);
in->gd_free(in);
return im;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 91,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clean_up_interface_data(struct ipmi_smi *intf)
{
int i;
struct cmd_rcvr *rcvr, *rcvr2;
struct list_head list;
tasklet_kill(&intf->recv_tasklet);
free_smi_msg_list(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs);
free_recv_msg_list(&intf->waiting_events);
/*
* Wholesale remove all the entries from the list in the
* interface and wait for RCU to know that none are in use.
*/
mutex_lock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&list);
list_splice_init_rcu(&intf->cmd_rcvrs, &list, synchronize_rcu);
mutex_unlock(&intf->cmd_rcvrs_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(rcvr, rcvr2, &list, link)
kfree(rcvr);
for (i = 0; i < IPMI_IPMB_NUM_SEQ; i++) {
if ((intf->seq_table[i].inuse)
&& (intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg))
ipmi_free_recv_msg(intf->seq_table[i].recv_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::ModifyRequestForCSP(ResourceRequest& resource_request,
Document* origin_document) const {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::EmbedderCSPEnforcementEnabled() &&
!RequiredCSP().IsEmpty()) {
DCHECK(ContentSecurityPolicy::IsValidCSPAttr(RequiredCSP().GetString()));
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Sec_Required_CSP,
RequiredCSP());
}
if (resource_request.GetFrameType() !=
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNone) {
if (!resource_request.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Upgrade_Insecure_Requests)
.IsNull()) {
return;
}
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Upgrade_Insecure_Requests,
"1");
}
UpgradeInsecureRequest(resource_request, origin_document);
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 125,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setupM (gcry_cipher_hd_t c)
{
#if defined(GCM_USE_INTEL_PCLMUL) || defined(GCM_USE_ARM_PMULL)
unsigned int features = _gcry_get_hw_features ();
#endif
if (0)
;
#ifdef GCM_USE_INTEL_PCLMUL
else if (features & HWF_INTEL_PCLMUL)
{
c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_fn = _gcry_ghash_intel_pclmul;
_gcry_ghash_setup_intel_pclmul (c);
}
#endif
#ifdef GCM_USE_ARM_PMULL
else if (features & HWF_ARM_PMULL)
{
c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_fn = ghash_armv8_ce_pmull;
ghash_setup_armv8_ce_pmull (c);
}
#endif
#ifdef GCM_USE_ARM_NEON
else if (features & HWF_ARM_NEON)
{
c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_fn = ghash_armv7_neon;
ghash_setup_armv7_neon (c);
}
#endif
else
{
c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_fn = ghash_internal;
fillM (c);
}
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 89,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void blowfish_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
blowfish_dec_blk(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int DevToolsWindow::GetHeight(int container_height) {
if (height_ == -1) {
height_ = profile_->GetPrefs()->
GetInteger(prefs::kDevToolsHSplitLocation);
}
if (height_ == -1)
height_ = container_height / 3;
height_ = std::max(GetMinimumHeight(), height_);
height_ = std::min(container_height - kMinContentsSize, height_);
return height_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pix_norm1_c(uint8_t * pix, int line_size)
{
int s, i, j;
uint32_t *sq = ff_squareTbl + 256;
s = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < 16; j += 8) {
#if 0
s += sq[pix[0]];
s += sq[pix[1]];
s += sq[pix[2]];
s += sq[pix[3]];
s += sq[pix[4]];
s += sq[pix[5]];
s += sq[pix[6]];
s += sq[pix[7]];
#else
#if HAVE_FAST_64BIT
register uint64_t x=*(uint64_t*)pix;
s += sq[x&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>8)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>16)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>24)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>32)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>40)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>48)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>56)&0xff];
#else
register uint32_t x=*(uint32_t*)pix;
s += sq[x&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>8)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>16)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>24)&0xff];
x=*(uint32_t*)(pix+4);
s += sq[x&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>8)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>16)&0xff];
s += sq[(x>>24)&0xff];
#endif
#endif
pix += 8;
}
pix += line_size - 16;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Rd_WP_DWORD(Image *image,size_t *d)
{
unsigned char
b;
b=ReadBlobByte(image);
*d=b;
if (b < 0xFFU)
return;
b=ReadBlobByte(image);
*d=(size_t) b;
b=ReadBlobByte(image);
*d+=(size_t) b*256l;
if (*d < 0x8000)
return;
*d=(*d & 0x7FFF) << 16;
b=ReadBlobByte(image);
*d+=(size_t) b;
b=ReadBlobByte(image);
*d+=(size_t) b*256l;
return;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/85
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckAac(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 6);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 6 < buffer_size) {
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 6);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 12) == 0xfff);
reader.SkipBits(1);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 2) == 0);
reader.SkipBits(1 + 2);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 4) != 15); // Forbidden.
reader.SkipBits(1 + 3 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1);
int size = ReadBits(&reader, 13);
RCHECK(size > 0);
offset += size;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PutARGBImage(Display* display,
void* visual, int depth,
XID pixmap, void* pixmap_gc,
const uint8* data,
int width, int height) {
PutARGBImage(display,
visual, depth,
pixmap, pixmap_gc,
data, width, height,
0, 0, // src_x, src_y
0, 0, // dst_x, dst_y
width, height);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItemImpl::ExternalToInternalState(
DownloadState external_state) {
switch (external_state) {
case IN_PROGRESS:
return IN_PROGRESS_INTERNAL;
case COMPLETE:
return COMPLETE_INTERNAL;
case CANCELLED:
return CANCELLED_INTERNAL;
case INTERRUPTED:
return INTERRUPTED_INTERNAL;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return MAX_DOWNLOAD_INTERNAL_STATE;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void drop_user_return_notifiers(void *ignore)
{
struct kvm_shared_msrs *smsr = &__get_cpu_var(shared_msrs);
if (smsr->registered)
kvm_on_user_return(&smsr->urn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorFusionCallback(scoped_refptr<PlatformSensor> sensor) {
platform_sensor_fusion_callback_called_ = true;
fusion_sensor_ = static_cast<PlatformSensorFusion*>(sensor.get());
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string NormalizeLayoutTestURL(const std::string& url) {
std::string result = url;
size_t pos;
if (!url.find(file_url_pattern) &&
((pos = url.find(layout_tests_pattern)) != std::string::npos)) {
result.replace(0, pos + layout_tests_pattern_size, file_test_prefix);
} else if (!url.find(data_url_pattern)) {
std::string path = url.substr(data_url_pattern_size);
result.replace(data_url_pattern_size, url.length(), path);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v6_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, struct in6_addr *saddr,
struct tcphdr *th)
{
struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp;
struct hash_desc *desc;
hp = tcp_get_md5sig_pool();
if (!hp)
goto clear_hash_noput;
desc = &hp->md5_desc;
if (crypto_hash_init(desc))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_v6_md5_hash_pseudoheader(hp, daddr, saddr, th->doff << 2))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_header(hp, th))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key))
goto clear_hash;
if (crypto_hash_final(desc, md5_hash))
goto clear_hash;
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
return 0;
clear_hash:
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
clear_hash_noput:
memset(md5_hash, 0, 16);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_listen(struct ib_ucm_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct ib_ucm_listen cmd;
struct ib_ucm_context *ctx;
int result;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ib_ucm_ctx_get(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
result = ucm_validate_listen(cmd.service_id, cmd.service_mask);
if (result)
goto out;
result = ib_cm_listen(ctx->cm_id, cmd.service_id, cmd.service_mask);
out:
ib_ucm_ctx_put(ctx);
return result;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxLabColorSpace::getRGB(GfxColor *color, GfxRGB *rgb) {
double X, Y, Z;
double r, g, b;
getXYZ(color, &X, &Y, &Z);
#ifdef USE_CMS
if (XYZ2DisplayTransform != NULL && displayPixelType == PT_RGB) {
Guchar out[gfxColorMaxComps];
double in[gfxColorMaxComps];
in[0] = clip01(X);
in[1] = clip01(Y);
in[2] = clip01(Z);
XYZ2DisplayTransform->doTransform(in,out,1);
rgb->r = byteToCol(out[0]);
rgb->g = byteToCol(out[1]);
rgb->b = byteToCol(out[2]);
return;
}
#endif
X *= whiteX;
Y *= whiteY;
Z *= whiteZ;
r = xyzrgb[0][0] * X + xyzrgb[0][1] * Y + xyzrgb[0][2] * Z;
g = xyzrgb[1][0] * X + xyzrgb[1][1] * Y + xyzrgb[1][2] * Z;
b = xyzrgb[2][0] * X + xyzrgb[2][1] * Y + xyzrgb[2][2] * Z;
rgb->r = dblToCol(pow(clip01(r * kr), 0.5));
rgb->g = dblToCol(pow(clip01(g * kg), 0.5));
rgb->b = dblToCol(pow(clip01(b * kb), 0.5));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_fileid(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *fileid)
{
__be32 *p;
*fileid = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID)) {
READ_BUF(8);
READ64(*fileid);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_FILEID;
}
dprintk("%s: fileid=%Lu\n", __func__, (unsigned long long)*fileid);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::ScheduleAbortTask(AbortOperation abort_task) {
DCHECK_NE(FINISHED, state_);
DCHECK(used_);
abort_task_stack_.push(std::move(abort_task));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static JSValueRef releaseTouchPointCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
if (argumentCount < 1)
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
int index = static_cast<int>(JSValueToNumber(context, arguments[0], exception));
ASSERT(!exception || !*exception);
if (index < 0 || index >= (int)touches.size())
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
touches[index].m_state = BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased;
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfc_llcp_mac_is_down(struct nfc_dev *dev)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
local = nfc_llcp_find_local(dev);
if (local == NULL)
return;
local->remote_miu = LLCP_DEFAULT_MIU;
local->remote_lto = LLCP_DEFAULT_LTO;
/* Close and purge all existing sockets */
nfc_llcp_socket_release(local, true, 0);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UINT CSoundFile::GetNumPatterns() const
{
UINT i = 0;
while ((i < MAX_ORDERS) && (Order[i] < 0xFF)) i++;
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::setCTM(const AffineTransform& transform)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
#if USE(WXGC)
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
if (gc)
gc->SetTransform(transform);
#endif
return;
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::searchInResource(
const String& frame_id,
const String& url,
const String& query,
Maybe<bool> optional_case_sensitive,
Maybe<bool> optional_is_regex,
std::unique_ptr<SearchInResourceCallback> callback) {
if (!enabled_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::Error("Agent is not enabled."));
return;
}
inspector_resource_content_loader_->EnsureResourcesContentLoaded(
resource_content_loader_client_id_,
WTF::Bind(&InspectorPageAgent::SearchContentAfterResourcesContentLoaded,
WrapPersistent(this), frame_id, url, query,
optional_case_sensitive.fromMaybe(false),
optional_is_regex.fromMaybe(false),
WTF::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sta_info_destroy_addr_bss(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
const u8 *addr)
{
struct sta_info *sta;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->sta_mtx);
sta = sta_info_get_bss(sdata, addr);
ret = __sta_info_destroy(sta);
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->sta_mtx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MaybeRestoreConnections() {
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
return;
}
MaybeCreateIBus();
MaybeRestoreIBusConfig();
if (IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
ConnectPanelServiceSignals();
if (connection_change_handler_) {
LOG(INFO) << "Notifying Chrome that IBus is ready.";
connection_change_handler_(language_library_, true);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_duration_warn(struct irq_work *w)
{
u64 allowed_ns = ACCESS_ONCE(perf_sample_allowed_ns);
u64 avg_local_sample_len;
u64 local_samples_len;
local_samples_len = __this_cpu_read(running_sample_length);
avg_local_sample_len = local_samples_len/NR_ACCUMULATED_SAMPLES;
printk_ratelimited(KERN_WARNING
"perf interrupt took too long (%lld > %lld), lowering "
"kernel.perf_event_max_sample_rate to %d\n",
avg_local_sample_len, allowed_ns >> 1,
sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uas_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
struct uas_dev_info *devinfo =
(struct uas_dev_info *)sdev->host->hostdata;
sdev->hostdata = devinfo;
/*
* USB has unusual DMA-alignment requirements: Although the
* starting address of each scatter-gather element doesn't matter,
* the length of each element except the last must be divisible
* by the Bulk maxpacket value. There's currently no way to
* express this by block-layer constraints, so we'll cop out
* and simply require addresses to be aligned at 512-byte
* boundaries. This is okay since most block I/O involves
* hardware sectors that are multiples of 512 bytes in length,
* and since host controllers up through USB 2.0 have maxpacket
* values no larger than 512.
*
* But it doesn't suffice for Wireless USB, where Bulk maxpacket
* values can be as large as 2048. To make that work properly
* will require changes to the block layer.
*/
blk_queue_update_dma_alignment(sdev->request_queue, (512 - 1));
if (devinfo->flags & US_FL_MAX_SECTORS_64)
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(sdev->request_queue, 64);
else if (devinfo->flags & US_FL_MAX_SECTORS_240)
blk_queue_max_hw_sectors(sdev->request_queue, 240);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(wddx_packet_end)
{
zval *packet_id;
wddx_packet *packet = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &packet_id) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(packet, wddx_packet *, &packet_id, -1, "WDDX packet ID", le_wddx);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_E);
php_wddx_packet_end(packet);
ZVAL_STRINGL(return_value, packet->c, packet->len, 1);
zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(packet_id));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void Observe(NotificationType type,
const NotificationSource& source,
const NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type == NotificationType::NAV_LIST_PRUNED) {
notification_count_++;
details_ = *(Details<NavigationController::PrunedDetails>(details).ptr());
}
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::setAllowAnyHTTPSCertificateForLocalHost(bool allow)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->m_allowAnyHTTPSCertificateForLocalHost = allow;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hns_nic_net_up(struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct hns_nic_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct hnae_handle *h = priv->ae_handle;
int i, j;
int ret;
ret = hns_nic_init_irq(priv);
if (ret != 0) {
netdev_err(ndev, "hns init irq failed! ret=%d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; i < h->q_num * 2; i++) {
ret = hns_nic_ring_open(ndev, i);
if (ret)
goto out_has_some_queues;
}
ret = h->dev->ops->set_mac_addr(h, ndev->dev_addr);
if (ret)
goto out_set_mac_addr_err;
ret = h->dev->ops->start ? h->dev->ops->start(h) : 0;
if (ret)
goto out_start_err;
if (ndev->phydev)
phy_start(ndev->phydev);
clear_bit(NIC_STATE_DOWN, &priv->state);
(void)mod_timer(&priv->service_timer, jiffies + SERVICE_TIMER_HZ);
return 0;
out_start_err:
netif_stop_queue(ndev);
out_set_mac_addr_err:
out_has_some_queues:
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--)
hns_nic_ring_close(ndev, j);
set_bit(NIC_STATE_DOWN, &priv->state);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PopupContainer::hide()
{
m_listBox->abandon();
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ThreadSafeMatch(const Vector<UChar, inlineCapacity>& vector,
const QualifiedName& qname) {
return EqualIgnoringNullity(vector, qname.LocalName().Impl());
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_send_credentials_socket (int handle,
DBusError *error)
{
/* FIXME: for the session bus credentials shouldn't matter (?), but
* for the system bus they are presumably essential. A rough outline
* of a way to implement the credential transfer would be this:
*
* client waits to *read* a byte.
*
* server creates a named pipe with a random name, sends a byte
* contining its length, and its name.
*
* client reads the name, connects to it (using Win32 API).
*
* server waits for connection to the named pipe, then calls
* ImpersonateNamedPipeClient(), notes its now-current credentials,
* calls RevertToSelf(), closes its handles to the named pipe, and
* is done. (Maybe there is some other way to get the SID of a named
* pipe client without having to use impersonation?)
*
* client closes its handles and is done.
*
* Ralf: Why not sending credentials over the given this connection ?
* Using named pipes makes it impossible to be connected from a unix client.
*
*/
int bytes_written;
DBusString buf;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&buf, "\0", 1);
again:
bytes_written = _dbus_write_socket (handle, &buf, 0, 1 );
if (bytes_written < 0 && errno == EINTR)
goto again;
if (bytes_written < 0)
{
dbus_set_error (error, _dbus_error_from_errno (errno),
"Failed to write credentials byte: %s",
_dbus_strerror_from_errno ());
return FALSE;
}
else if (bytes_written == 0)
{
dbus_set_error (error, DBUS_ERROR_IO_ERROR,
"wrote zero bytes writing credentials byte");
return FALSE;
}
else
{
_dbus_assert (bytes_written == 1);
_dbus_verbose ("wrote 1 zero byte, credential sending isn't implemented yet\n");
return TRUE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCPeerConnection::setRemoteDescription(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> prpSessionDescription, PassRefPtr<VoidCallback> successCallback, PassRefPtr<RTCErrorCallback> errorCallback, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (m_readyState == ReadyStateClosing || m_readyState == ReadyStateClosed) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return;
}
RefPtr<RTCSessionDescription> sessionDescription = prpSessionDescription;
if (!sessionDescription) {
ec = TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR;
return;
}
RefPtr<RTCVoidRequestImpl> request = RTCVoidRequestImpl::create(scriptExecutionContext(), successCallback, errorCallback);
m_peerHandler->setRemoteDescription(request.release(), sessionDescription->descriptor());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AppLayerProtoDetectSetup(void)
{
SCEnter();
int i, j;
memset(&alpd_ctx, 0, sizeof(alpd_ctx));
uint16_t spm_matcher = SinglePatternMatchDefaultMatcher();
uint16_t mpm_matcher = PatternMatchDefaultMatcher();
alpd_ctx.spm_global_thread_ctx = SpmInitGlobalThreadCtx(spm_matcher);
if (alpd_ctx.spm_global_thread_ctx == NULL) {
SCLogError(SC_ERR_FATAL, "Unable to alloc SpmGlobalThreadCtx.");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
for (i = 0; i < FLOW_PROTO_DEFAULT; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
MpmInitCtx(&alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[i].ctx_pm[j].mpm_ctx, mpm_matcher);
}
}
AppLayerExpectationSetup();
SCReturnInt(0);
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveUniformsiv(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context())
return error::kUnknownCommand;
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformsiv& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveUniformsiv*>(cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLenum pname = static_cast<GLenum>(c.pname);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.indices_bucket_id);
if (!bucket) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!validators_->uniform_parameter.IsValid(pname)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glGetActiveUniformsiv", pname, "pname");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(bucket->size() / sizeof(GLuint));
const GLuint* indices = bucket->GetDataAs<const GLuint*>(0, bucket->size());
typedef cmds::GetActiveUniformsiv::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.params_shm_id, c.params_shm_offset, Result::ComputeSize(count));
GLint* params = result ? result->GetData() : nullptr;
if (params == nullptr) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->size != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveUniformsiv");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint activeUniforms = 0;
program->GetProgramiv(GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &activeUniforms);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (indices[i] >= static_cast<GLuint>(activeUniforms)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glGetActiveUniformsiv", "index >= active uniforms");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
GLuint service_id = program->service_id();
GLint link_status = GL_FALSE;
api()->glGetProgramivFn(service_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &link_status);
if (link_status != GL_TRUE) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glGetActiveUniformsiv", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_id, count, indices, pname, params);
result->SetNumResults(count);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
{
int nid, nid2;
X509_ALGOR *alg;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
return 1;
if (nid == NID_rsassaPss)
return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL);
/* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */
if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) {
if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void airo_networks_initialize(struct airo_info *ai)
{
int i;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ai->network_free_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ai->network_list);
for (i = 0; i < AIRO_MAX_NETWORK_COUNT; i++)
list_add_tail(&ai->networks[i].list,
&ai->network_free_list);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_alloc_ioend(
struct inode *inode,
unsigned int type,
xfs_off_t offset,
struct buffer_head *bh)
{
struct xfs_ioend *ioend;
struct bio *bio;
bio = bio_alloc_bioset(GFP_NOFS, BIO_MAX_PAGES, xfs_ioend_bioset);
xfs_init_bio_from_bh(bio, bh);
ioend = container_of(bio, struct xfs_ioend, io_inline_bio);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ioend->io_list);
ioend->io_type = type;
ioend->io_inode = inode;
ioend->io_size = 0;
ioend->io_offset = offset;
INIT_WORK(&ioend->io_work, xfs_end_io);
ioend->io_append_trans = NULL;
ioend->io_bio = bio;
return ioend;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't BUG() on mixed direct and mapped I/O
We've had reports of generic/095 causing XFS to BUG() in
__xfs_get_blocks() due to the existence of delalloc blocks on a
direct I/O read. generic/095 issues a mix of various types of I/O,
including direct and memory mapped I/O to a single file. This is
clearly not supported behavior and is known to lead to such
problems. E.g., the lack of exclusion between the direct I/O and
write fault paths means that a write fault can allocate delalloc
blocks in a region of a file that was previously a hole after the
direct read has attempted to flush/inval the file range, but before
it actually reads the block mapping. In turn, the direct read
discovers a delalloc extent and cannot proceed.
While the appropriate solution here is to not mix direct and memory
mapped I/O to the same regions of the same file, the current
BUG_ON() behavior is probably overkill as it can crash the entire
system. Instead, localize the failure to the I/O in question by
returning an error for a direct I/O that cannot be handled safely
due to delalloc blocks. Be careful to allow the case of a direct
write to post-eof delalloc blocks. This can occur due to speculative
preallocation and is safe as post-eof blocks are not accompanied by
dirty pages in pagecache (conversely, preallocation within eof must
have been zeroed, and thus dirtied, before the inode size could have
been increased beyond said blocks).
Finally, provide an additional warning if a direct I/O write occurs
while the file is memory mapped. This may not catch all problematic
scenarios, but provides a hint that some known-to-be-problematic I/O
methods are in use.
Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 93,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DecodeIPV6ExtHdrs(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
SCEnter();
uint8_t *orig_pkt = pkt;
uint8_t nh = 0; /* careful, 0 is actually a real type */
uint16_t hdrextlen = 0;
uint16_t plen;
char dstopts = 0;
char exthdr_fh_done = 0;
int hh = 0;
int rh = 0;
int eh = 0;
int ah = 0;
nh = IPV6_GET_NH(p);
plen = len;
while(1)
{
/* No upper layer, but we do have data. Suspicious. */
if (nh == IPPROTO_NONE && plen > 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_DATA_AFTER_NONE_HEADER);
SCReturn;
}
if (plen < 2) { /* minimal needed in a hdr */
SCReturn;
}
switch(nh)
{
case IPPROTO_TCP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeTCP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeUDP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_ICMPV6:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeICMPV6(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_SCTP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeSCTP(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
hdrextlen = 8 + (*(pkt+1) * 8); /* 8 bytes + length in 8 octet units */
SCLogDebug("hdrextlen %"PRIu8, hdrextlen);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
if (rh) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_RH);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
rh = 1;
IPV6_EXTHDR_SET_RH(p);
uint8_t ip6rh_type = *(pkt + 2);
if (ip6rh_type == 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_RH_TYPE_0);
}
p->ip6eh.rh_type = ip6rh_type;
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
case IPPROTO_HOPOPTS:
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
{
IPV6OptHAO hao_s, *hao = &hao_s;
IPV6OptRA ra_s, *ra = &ra_s;
IPV6OptJumbo jumbo_s, *jumbo = &jumbo_s;
uint16_t optslen = 0;
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
hdrextlen = (*(pkt+1) + 1) << 3;
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
uint8_t *ptr = pkt + 2; /* +2 to go past nxthdr and len */
/* point the pointers to right structures
* in Packet. */
if (nh == IPPROTO_HOPOPTS) {
if (hh) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_HH);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
hh = 1;
optslen = ((*(pkt + 1) + 1 ) << 3) - 2;
}
else if (nh == IPPROTO_DSTOPTS)
{
if (dstopts == 0) {
optslen = ((*(pkt + 1) + 1 ) << 3) - 2;
dstopts = 1;
} else if (dstopts == 1) {
optslen = ((*(pkt + 1) + 1 ) << 3) - 2;
dstopts = 2;
} else {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_DH);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
}
if (optslen > plen) {
/* since the packet is long enough (we checked
* plen against hdrlen, the optlen must be malformed. */
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
/* skip past this extension so we can continue parsing the rest
* of the packet */
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
/** \todo move into own function to loaded on demand */
uint16_t padn_cnt = 0;
uint16_t other_cnt = 0;
uint16_t offset = 0;
while(offset < optslen)
{
if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_PAD1)
{
padn_cnt++;
offset++;
ptr++;
continue;
}
if (offset + 1 >= optslen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
/* length field for each opt */
uint8_t ip6_optlen = *(ptr + 1);
/* see if the optlen from the packet fits the total optslen */
if ((offset + 1 + ip6_optlen) > optslen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_PADN) /* PadN */
{
padn_cnt++;
/* a zero padN len would be weird */
if (ip6_optlen == 0)
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_ZERO_LEN_PADN);
}
else if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_RA) /* RA */
{
ra->ip6ra_type = *(ptr);
ra->ip6ra_len = ip6_optlen;
if (ip6_optlen < sizeof(ra->ip6ra_value)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
memcpy(&ra->ip6ra_value, (ptr + 2), sizeof(ra->ip6ra_value));
ra->ip6ra_value = SCNtohs(ra->ip6ra_value);
other_cnt++;
}
else if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_JUMBO) /* Jumbo */
{
jumbo->ip6j_type = *(ptr);
jumbo->ip6j_len = ip6_optlen;
if (ip6_optlen < sizeof(jumbo->ip6j_payload_len)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
memcpy(&jumbo->ip6j_payload_len, (ptr+2), sizeof(jumbo->ip6j_payload_len));
jumbo->ip6j_payload_len = SCNtohl(jumbo->ip6j_payload_len);
}
else if (*ptr == IPV6OPT_HAO) /* HAO */
{
hao->ip6hao_type = *(ptr);
hao->ip6hao_len = ip6_optlen;
if (ip6_optlen < sizeof(hao->ip6hao_hoa)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_INVALID_OPTLEN);
break;
}
memcpy(&hao->ip6hao_hoa, (ptr+2), sizeof(hao->ip6hao_hoa));
other_cnt++;
} else {
if (nh == IPPROTO_HOPOPTS)
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_HOPOPTS_UNKNOWN_OPT);
else
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_DSTOPTS_UNKNOWN_OPT);
other_cnt++;
}
uint16_t optlen = (*(ptr + 1) + 2);
ptr += optlen; /* +2 for opt type and opt len fields */
offset += optlen;
}
/* flag packets that have only padding */
if (padn_cnt > 0 && other_cnt == 0) {
if (nh == IPPROTO_HOPOPTS)
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_HOPOPTS_ONLY_PADDING);
else
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_DSTOPTS_ONLY_PADDING);
}
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_FRAGMENT:
{
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
/* store the offset of this extension into the packet
* past the ipv6 header. We use it in defrag for creating
* a defragmented packet without the frag header */
if (exthdr_fh_done == 0) {
p->ip6eh.fh_offset = pkt - orig_pkt;
exthdr_fh_done = 1;
}
uint16_t prev_hdrextlen = hdrextlen;
hdrextlen = sizeof(IPV6FragHdr);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
/* for the frag header, the length field is reserved */
if (*(pkt + 1) != 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_FH_NON_ZERO_RES_FIELD);
/* non fatal, lets try to continue */
}
if (IPV6_EXTHDR_ISSET_FH(p)) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_FH);
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
/* set the header flag first */
IPV6_EXTHDR_SET_FH(p);
/* parse the header and setup the vars */
DecodeIPV6FragHeader(p, pkt, hdrextlen, plen, prev_hdrextlen);
/* if FH has offset 0 and no more fragments are coming, we
* parse this packet further right away, no defrag will be
* needed. It is a useless FH then though, so we do set an
* decoder event. */
if (p->ip6eh.fh_more_frags_set == 0 && p->ip6eh.fh_offset == 0) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_USELESS_FH);
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
/* the rest is parsed upon reassembly */
p->flags |= PKT_IS_FRAGMENT;
SCReturn;
}
case IPPROTO_ESP:
{
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
hdrextlen = sizeof(IPV6EspHdr);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
if (eh) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_EH);
SCReturn;
}
eh = 1;
nh = IPPROTO_NONE;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_AH:
{
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
/* we need the header as a minimum */
hdrextlen = sizeof(IPV6AuthHdr);
/* the payload len field is the number of extra 4 byte fields,
* IPV6AuthHdr already contains the first */
if (*(pkt+1) > 0)
hdrextlen += ((*(pkt+1) - 1) * 4);
SCLogDebug("hdrextlen %"PRIu8, hdrextlen);
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
IPV6AuthHdr *ahhdr = (IPV6AuthHdr *)pkt;
if (ahhdr->ip6ah_reserved != 0x0000) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_AH_RES_NOT_NULL);
}
if (ah) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_EXTHDR_DUPL_AH);
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
ah = 1;
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
}
case IPPROTO_IPIP:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
DecodeIPv4inIPv6(tv, dtv, p, pkt, plen, pq);
SCReturn;
/* none, last header */
case IPPROTO_NONE:
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
SCReturn;
case IPPROTO_ICMP:
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p,IPV6_WITH_ICMPV4);
SCReturn;
/* no parsing yet, just skip it */
case IPPROTO_MH:
case IPPROTO_HIP:
case IPPROTO_SHIM6:
hdrextlen = 8 + (*(pkt+1) * 8); /* 8 bytes + length in 8 octet units */
if (hdrextlen > plen) {
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_TRUNC_EXTHDR);
SCReturn;
}
nh = *pkt;
pkt += hdrextlen;
plen -= hdrextlen;
break;
default:
ENGINE_SET_EVENT(p, IPV6_UNKNOWN_NEXT_HEADER);
IPV6_SET_L4PROTO(p,nh);
SCReturn;
}
}
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int JBIG2MMRDecoder::getWhiteCode() {
const CCITTCode *p;
Guint code;
if (bufLen == 0) {
buf = str->getChar() & 0xff;
bufLen = 8;
++nBytesRead;
}
while (1) {
if (bufLen >= 11 && ((buf >> (bufLen - 7)) & 0x7f) == 0) {
if (bufLen <= 12) {
code = buf << (12 - bufLen);
} else {
code = buf >> (bufLen - 12);
}
p = &whiteTab1[code & 0x1f];
} else {
if (bufLen <= 9) {
code = buf << (9 - bufLen);
} else {
code = buf >> (bufLen - 9);
}
p = &whiteTab2[code & 0x1ff];
}
if (p->bits > 0 && p->bits <= (int)bufLen) {
bufLen -= p->bits;
return p->n;
}
if (bufLen >= 12) {
break;
}
buf = (buf << 8) | (str->getChar() & 0xff);
bufLen += 8;
++nBytesRead;
}
error(str->getPos(), "Bad white code in JBIG2 MMR stream");
--bufLen;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nntp_fetch_headers(struct Context *ctx, void *hc, anum_t first,
anum_t last, int restore)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = ctx->data;
struct FetchCtx fc;
struct Header *hdr = NULL;
char buf[HUGE_STRING];
int rc = 0;
int oldmsgcount = ctx->msgcount;
anum_t current;
anum_t first_over = first;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
void *hdata = NULL;
#endif
/* if empty group or nothing to do */
if (!last || first > last)
return 0;
/* init fetch context */
fc.ctx = ctx;
fc.first = first;
fc.last = last;
fc.restore = restore;
fc.messages = mutt_mem_calloc(last - first + 1, sizeof(unsigned char));
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
fc.hc = hc;
#endif
/* fetch list of articles */
if (NntpListgroup && nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUP && !nntp_data->deleted)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_message(_("Fetching list of articles..."));
if (nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUPrange)
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LISTGROUP %s %u-%u\r\n", nntp_data->group, first, last);
else
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LISTGROUP %s\r\n", nntp_data->group);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, fetch_numbers, &fc);
if (rc > 0)
{
mutt_error("LISTGROUP: %s", buf);
}
if (rc == 0)
{
for (current = first; current <= last && rc == 0; current++)
{
if (fc.messages[current - first])
continue;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", current);
if (nntp_data->bcache)
{
mutt_debug(2, "#1 mutt_bcache_del %s\n", buf);
mutt_bcache_del(nntp_data->bcache, buf);
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
if (fc.hc)
{
mutt_debug(2, "mutt_hcache_delete %s\n", buf);
mutt_hcache_delete(fc.hc, buf, strlen(buf));
}
#endif
}
}
}
else
{
for (current = first; current <= last; current++)
fc.messages[current - first] = 1;
}
/* fetching header from cache or server, or fallback to fetch overview */
if (!ctx->quiet)
{
mutt_progress_init(&fc.progress, _("Fetching message headers..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, ReadInc, last - first + 1);
}
for (current = first; current <= last && rc == 0; current++)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&fc.progress, current - first + 1, -1);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", current);
#endif
/* delete header from cache that does not exist on server */
if (!fc.messages[current - first])
continue;
/* allocate memory for headers */
if (ctx->msgcount >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
/* try to fetch header from cache */
hdata = mutt_hcache_fetch(fc.hc, buf, strlen(buf));
if (hdata)
{
mutt_debug(2, "mutt_hcache_fetch %s\n", buf);
ctx->hdrs[ctx->msgcount] = hdr = mutt_hcache_restore(hdata);
mutt_hcache_free(fc.hc, &hdata);
hdr->data = 0;
/* skip header marked as deleted in cache */
if (hdr->deleted && !restore)
{
mutt_header_free(&hdr);
if (nntp_data->bcache)
{
mutt_debug(2, "#2 mutt_bcache_del %s\n", buf);
mutt_bcache_del(nntp_data->bcache, buf);
}
continue;
}
hdr->read = false;
hdr->old = false;
}
else
#endif
/* don't try to fetch header from removed newsgroup */
if (nntp_data->deleted)
continue;
/* fallback to fetch overview */
else if (nntp_data->nserv->hasOVER || nntp_data->nserv->hasXOVER)
{
if (NntpListgroup && nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUP)
break;
else
continue;
}
/* fetch header from server */
else
{
FILE *fp = mutt_file_mkstemp();
if (!fp)
{
mutt_perror("mutt_file_mkstemp() failed!");
rc = -1;
break;
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "HEAD %u\r\n", current);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, fetch_tempfile, fp);
if (rc)
{
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
if (rc < 0)
break;
/* invalid response */
if (mutt_str_strncmp("423", buf, 3) != 0)
{
mutt_error("HEAD: %s", buf);
break;
}
/* no such article */
if (nntp_data->bcache)
{
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", current);
mutt_debug(2, "#3 mutt_bcache_del %s\n", buf);
mutt_bcache_del(nntp_data->bcache, buf);
}
rc = 0;
continue;
}
/* parse header */
hdr = ctx->hdrs[ctx->msgcount] = mutt_header_new();
hdr->env = mutt_rfc822_read_header(fp, hdr, 0, 0);
hdr->received = hdr->date_sent;
mutt_file_fclose(&fp);
}
/* save header in context */
hdr->index = ctx->msgcount++;
hdr->read = false;
hdr->old = false;
hdr->deleted = false;
hdr->data = mutt_mem_calloc(1, sizeof(struct NntpHeaderData));
NHDR(hdr)->article_num = current;
if (restore)
hdr->changed = true;
else
{
nntp_article_status(ctx, hdr, NULL, NHDR(hdr)->article_num);
if (!hdr->read)
nntp_parse_xref(ctx, hdr);
}
if (current > nntp_data->last_loaded)
nntp_data->last_loaded = current;
first_over = current + 1;
}
if (!NntpListgroup || !nntp_data->nserv->hasLISTGROUP)
current = first_over;
/* fetch overview information */
if (current <= last && rc == 0 && !nntp_data->deleted)
{
char *cmd = nntp_data->nserv->hasOVER ? "OVER" : "XOVER";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s %u-%u\r\n", cmd, current, last);
rc = nntp_fetch_lines(nntp_data, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, parse_overview_line, &fc);
if (rc > 0)
{
mutt_error("%s: %s", cmd, buf);
}
}
if (ctx->msgcount > oldmsgcount)
mx_update_context(ctx, ctx->msgcount - oldmsgcount);
FREE(&fc.messages);
if (rc != 0)
return -1;
mutt_clear_error();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qcow2_update_snapshot_refcount(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t l1_table_offset, int l1_size, int addend)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
uint64_t *l1_table, *l2_table, l2_offset, offset, l1_size2, l1_allocated;
int64_t old_offset, old_l2_offset;
int i, j, l1_modified = 0, nb_csectors, refcount;
int ret;
l2_table = NULL;
l1_table = NULL;
l1_size2 = l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->cache_discards = true;
/* WARNING: qcow2_snapshot_goto relies on this function not using the
* l1_table_offset when it is the current s->l1_table_offset! Be careful
* when changing this! */
if (l1_table_offset != s->l1_table_offset) {
l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(l1_size2, 512));
l1_allocated = 1;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, l1_table_offset, l1_table, l1_size2);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
for(i = 0;i < l1_size; i++)
be64_to_cpus(&l1_table[i]);
} else {
assert(l1_size == s->l1_size);
l1_table = s->l1_table;
l1_allocated = 0;
}
for(i = 0; i < l1_size; i++) {
l2_offset = l1_table[i];
if (l2_offset) {
old_l2_offset = l2_offset;
l2_offset &= L1E_OFFSET_MASK;
ret = qcow2_cache_get(bs, s->l2_table_cache, l2_offset,
(void**) &l2_table);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
for(j = 0; j < s->l2_size; j++) {
uint64_t cluster_index;
offset = be64_to_cpu(l2_table[j]);
old_offset = offset;
offset &= ~QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED;
switch (qcow2_get_cluster_type(offset)) {
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_COMPRESSED:
nb_csectors = ((offset >> s->csize_shift) &
s->csize_mask) + 1;
if (addend != 0) {
ret = update_refcount(bs,
(offset & s->cluster_offset_mask) & ~511,
nb_csectors * 512, addend,
QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
}
/* compressed clusters are never modified */
refcount = 2;
break;
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_NORMAL:
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_ZERO:
cluster_index = (offset & L2E_OFFSET_MASK) >> s->cluster_bits;
if (!cluster_index) {
/* unallocated */
refcount = 0;
break;
}
if (addend != 0) {
refcount = qcow2_update_cluster_refcount(bs,
cluster_index, addend,
QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT);
} else {
refcount = get_refcount(bs, cluster_index);
}
if (refcount < 0) {
ret = refcount;
goto fail;
}
break;
case QCOW2_CLUSTER_UNALLOCATED:
refcount = 0;
break;
default:
abort();
}
if (refcount == 1) {
offset |= QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED;
}
if (offset != old_offset) {
if (addend > 0) {
qcow2_cache_set_dependency(bs, s->l2_table_cache,
s->refcount_block_cache);
}
l2_table[j] = cpu_to_be64(offset);
qcow2_cache_entry_mark_dirty(s->l2_table_cache, l2_table);
}
}
ret = qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &l2_table);
if (ret < 0) {
goto fail;
}
if (addend != 0) {
refcount = qcow2_update_cluster_refcount(bs, l2_offset >>
s->cluster_bits, addend, QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT);
} else {
refcount = get_refcount(bs, l2_offset >> s->cluster_bits);
}
if (refcount < 0) {
ret = refcount;
goto fail;
} else if (refcount == 1) {
l2_offset |= QCOW_OFLAG_COPIED;
}
if (l2_offset != old_l2_offset) {
l1_table[i] = l2_offset;
l1_modified = 1;
}
}
}
ret = bdrv_flush(bs);
fail:
if (l2_table) {
qcow2_cache_put(bs, s->l2_table_cache, (void**) &l2_table);
}
s->cache_discards = false;
qcow2_process_discards(bs, ret);
/* Update L1 only if it isn't deleted anyway (addend = -1) */
if (ret == 0 && addend >= 0 && l1_modified) {
for (i = 0; i < l1_size; i++) {
cpu_to_be64s(&l1_table[i]);
}
ret = bdrv_pwrite_sync(bs->file, l1_table_offset, l1_table, l1_size2);
for (i = 0; i < l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&l1_table[i]);
}
}
if (l1_allocated)
g_free(l1_table);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MemoryMappedFile::MemoryMappedFile()
: file_(base::kInvalidPlatformFileValue),
data_(NULL),
length_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabsUpdateFunction::TabsUpdateFunction() : web_contents_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_v6_addr_v4map(struct sctp_sock *sp, union sctp_addr *addr)
{
if (sp->v4mapped && AF_INET == addr->sa.sa_family)
sctp_v4_map_v6(addr);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 29,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::ClearImportsController() {
fetcher_->ClearContext();
imports_controller_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_user_dscr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *data)
{
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_complete_abort(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct megasas_cmd *cmd)
{
if (cmd->sync_cmd) {
cmd->sync_cmd = 0;
cmd->cmd_status_drv = 0;
wake_up(&instance->abort_cmd_wait_q);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_video::omx_release_meta_buffer(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *buffer)
{
if (buffer && meta_mode_enable) {
encoder_media_buffer_type *media_ptr;
struct pmem Input_pmem;
unsigned int index_pmem = 0;
bool meta_error = false;
index_pmem = (buffer - m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (mUsesColorConversion &&
(index_pmem < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual)) {
if (!dev_free_buf((&m_pInput_pmem[index_pmem]),PORT_INDEX_IN)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("omx_release_meta_buffer dev free failed");
}
} else {
media_ptr = (encoder_media_buffer_type *) buffer->pBuffer;
if (media_ptr && media_ptr->meta_handle) {
if (media_ptr->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeCameraSource &&
media_ptr->meta_handle->numFds == 1 &&
media_ptr->meta_handle->numInts >= 2) {
Input_pmem.fd = media_ptr->meta_handle->data[0];
Input_pmem.buffer = media_ptr;
Input_pmem.size = media_ptr->meta_handle->data[2];
Input_pmem.offset = media_ptr->meta_handle->data[1];
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("EBD fd = %d, offset = %d, size = %d",Input_pmem.fd,
Input_pmem.offset,
Input_pmem.size);
} else if (media_ptr->buffer_type == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
private_handle_t *handle = (private_handle_t *)media_ptr->meta_handle;
Input_pmem.buffer = media_ptr;
Input_pmem.fd = handle->fd;
Input_pmem.offset = 0;
Input_pmem.size = handle->size;
} else {
meta_error = true;
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Meta Error set in EBD");
}
if (!meta_error)
meta_error = !dev_free_buf(&Input_pmem,PORT_INDEX_IN);
if (meta_error) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR(" Warning dev_free_buf failed flush value is %d",
input_flush_progress);
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ion_client *ion_client_create(struct ion_device *dev,
const char *name)
{
struct ion_client *client;
struct task_struct *task;
struct rb_node **p;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct ion_client *entry;
pid_t pid;
if (!name) {
pr_err("%s: Name cannot be null\n", __func__);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
get_task_struct(current->group_leader);
task_lock(current->group_leader);
pid = task_pid_nr(current->group_leader);
/*
* don't bother to store task struct for kernel threads,
* they can't be killed anyway
*/
if (current->group_leader->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
put_task_struct(current->group_leader);
task = NULL;
} else {
task = current->group_leader;
}
task_unlock(current->group_leader);
client = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ion_client), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!client)
goto err_put_task_struct;
client->dev = dev;
client->handles = RB_ROOT;
idr_init(&client->idr);
mutex_init(&client->lock);
client->task = task;
client->pid = pid;
client->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!client->name)
goto err_free_client;
down_write(&dev->lock);
client->display_serial = ion_get_client_serial(&dev->clients, name);
client->display_name = kasprintf(
GFP_KERNEL, "%s-%d", name, client->display_serial);
if (!client->display_name) {
up_write(&dev->lock);
goto err_free_client_name;
}
p = &dev->clients.rb_node;
while (*p) {
parent = *p;
entry = rb_entry(parent, struct ion_client, node);
if (client < entry)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (client > entry)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
}
rb_link_node(&client->node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&client->node, &dev->clients);
client->debug_root = debugfs_create_file(client->display_name, 0664,
dev->clients_debug_root,
client, &debug_client_fops);
if (!client->debug_root) {
char buf[256], *path;
path = dentry_path(dev->clients_debug_root, buf, 256);
pr_err("Failed to create client debugfs at %s/%s\n",
path, client->display_name);
}
up_write(&dev->lock);
return client;
err_free_client_name:
kfree(client->name);
err_free_client:
kfree(client);
err_put_task_struct:
if (task)
put_task_struct(current->group_leader);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, stopBuffering)
{
char *error;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Cannot write out phar archive, phar is read-only");
return;
}
phar_obj->arc.archive->donotflush = 0;
phar_flush(phar_obj->arc.archive, 0, 0, 0, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Condor_Auth_SSL :: init_OpenSSL(void)
{
if (!SSL_library_init()) {
return AUTH_SSL_ERROR;
}
SSL_load_error_strings();
return AUTH_SSL_A_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string BackendImpl::HistogramName(const char* name, int experiment) const {
if (!experiment)
return base::StringPrintf("DiskCache.%d.%s", cache_type_, name);
return base::StringPrintf("DiskCache.%d.%s_%d", cache_type_,
name, experiment);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnrollDevice(const std::string& username) {
base::RunLoop loop;
policy::EnterpriseInstallAttributes::LockResult result;
connector_->GetInstallAttributes()->LockDevice(
username, policy::DEVICE_MODE_ENTERPRISE, kDeviceId,
base::Bind(&CopyLockResult, &loop, &result));
loop.Run();
EXPECT_EQ(policy::EnterpriseInstallAttributes::LOCK_SUCCESS, result);
RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppListControllerDelegate::CanDoShowAppInfoFlow() {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!app_list::switches::IsMacViewsAppListEnabled())
return false;
#endif
return CanShowAppInfoDialog();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_currenticcdirectory(const gs_gstate * pgs, gs_param_string * pval)
{
static const char *const rfs = DEFAULT_DIR_ICC; /* as good as any other */
const gs_lib_ctx_t *lib_ctx = pgs->memory->gs_lib_ctx;
if (lib_ctx->profiledir == NULL) {
pval->data = (const byte *)rfs;
pval->size = strlen(rfs);
pval->persistent = true;
} else {
pval->data = (const byte *)(lib_ctx->profiledir);
pval->size = lib_ctx->profiledir_len;
pval->persistent = false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SetImpl(Handle<JSObject> holder, uint32_t entry, Object* value) {
uint32_t length = static_cast<uint32_t>(GetString(*holder)->length());
if (entry < length) {
return; // String contents are read-only.
}
BackingStoreAccessor::SetImpl(holder->elements(), entry - length, value);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tlink_rb_insert(struct rb_root *root, struct tcon_link *new_tlink)
{
struct rb_node **new = &(root->rb_node), *parent = NULL;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
while (*new) {
tlink = rb_entry(*new, struct tcon_link, tl_rbnode);
parent = *new;
if (tlink->tl_uid > new_tlink->tl_uid)
new = &((*new)->rb_left);
else
new = &((*new)->rb_right);
}
rb_link_node(&new_tlink->tl_rbnode, parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&new_tlink->tl_rbnode, root);
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Editor::canDeleteRange(const EphemeralRange& range) const {
if (range.isCollapsed())
return false;
Node* startContainer = range.startPosition().computeContainerNode();
Node* endContainer = range.endPosition().computeContainerNode();
if (!startContainer || !endContainer)
return false;
return hasEditableStyle(*startContainer) && hasEditableStyle(*endContainer);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool via_data_reduction_proxy) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
if (!g_browser_process)
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (!prefs)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetDefaultProfile()->
GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthEnabled);
#else
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = false;
#endif
chrome_browser_net::UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy, prefs);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 171,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sched_move_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int on_rq, running;
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
rq = task_rq_lock(tsk, &flags);
running = task_current(rq, tsk);
on_rq = tsk->on_rq;
if (on_rq)
dequeue_task(rq, tsk, 0);
if (unlikely(running))
tsk->sched_class->put_prev_task(rq, tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
if (tsk->sched_class->task_move_group)
tsk->sched_class->task_move_group(tsk, on_rq);
else
#endif
set_task_rq(tsk, task_cpu(tsk));
if (unlikely(running))
tsk->sched_class->set_curr_task(rq);
if (on_rq)
enqueue_task(rq, tsk, 0);
task_rq_unlock(rq, tsk, &flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int skt_disconnect(int fd)
{
INFO("fd %d", fd);
if (fd != AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
{
shutdown(fd, SHUT_RDWR);
close(fd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouter::OnPolicySpecifiedPasswordChanged(
const std::string& user_name) {
if (event_router_) {
auto event_value = std::make_unique<base::ListValue>();
event_value->Append(std::make_unique<base::Value>(user_name));
auto extension_event = std::make_unique<Event>(
events::SAFE_BROWSING_PRIVATE_ON_POLICY_SPECIFIED_PASSWORD_CHANGED,
api::safe_browsing_private::OnPolicySpecifiedPasswordChanged::
kEventName,
std::move(event_value));
event_router_->BroadcastEvent(std::move(extension_event));
}
if (client_) {
base::Value event(base::Value::Type::DICTIONARY);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyUserName, user_name);
event.SetStringKey(kKeyProfileUserName, GetProfileUserName());
ReportRealtimeEvent(kKeyPasswordChangedEvent, std::move(event));
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_service_dump_stats(int severity)
{
int i,j;
rend_service_t *service;
rend_intro_point_t *intro;
const char *safe_name;
origin_circuit_t *circ;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Service configured in %s:",
rend_service_escaped_dir(service));
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
safe_name = safe_str_client(intro->extend_info->nickname);
circ = find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
if (!circ) {
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: no circuit",
j, safe_name);
continue;
}
tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: circuit is %s",
j, safe_name, circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
const struct iovec *from, int from_offset,
int len)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
int i, copy = start - offset;
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
/* Copy header. */
if (copy > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (memcpy_fromiovecend(skb->data + offset, from, from_offset,
copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from_offset += copy;
}
/* Copy paged appendix. Hmm... why does this look so complicated? */
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
int end;
const skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + skb_frag_size(frag);
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
int err;
u8 *vaddr;
struct page *page = skb_frag_page(frag);
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vaddr = kmap(page);
err = memcpy_fromiovecend(vaddr + frag->page_offset +
offset - start,
from, from_offset, copy);
kunmap(page);
if (err)
goto fault;
if (!(len -= copy))
return 0;
offset += copy;
from_offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + frag_iter->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (skb_copy_datagram_from_iovec(frag_iter,
offset - start,
from,
from_offset,
copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
from_offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
if (!len)
return 0;
fault:
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ossl_statem_in_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s)
{
return s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void efx_pci_remove_main(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RFS_ACCEL
free_irq_cpu_rmap(efx->net_dev->rx_cpu_rmap);
efx->net_dev->rx_cpu_rmap = NULL;
#endif
efx_nic_fini_interrupt(efx);
efx_fini_channels(efx);
efx_fini_port(efx);
efx->type->fini(efx);
efx_fini_napi(efx);
efx_remove_all(efx);
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: devzvol_prunedir(struct sdev_node *ddv)
{
struct sdev_node *dv;
ASSERT(RW_READ_HELD(&ddv->sdev_contents));
sdcmn_err13(("prunedir '%s'", ddv->sdev_name));
ASSERT(strncmp(ddv->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR, strlen(ZVOL_DIR)) == 0);
if (rw_tryupgrade(&ddv->sdev_contents) == 0) {
rw_exit(&ddv->sdev_contents);
rw_enter(&ddv->sdev_contents, RW_WRITER);
}
dv = SDEV_FIRST_ENTRY(ddv);
while (dv) {
sdcmn_err13(("sdev_name '%s'", dv->sdev_name));
switch (devzvol_validate(dv)) {
case SDEV_VTOR_VALID:
case SDEV_VTOR_SKIP:
dv = SDEV_NEXT_ENTRY(ddv, dv);
continue;
case SDEV_VTOR_INVALID:
sdcmn_err7(("prunedir: destroy invalid "
"node: %s\n", dv->sdev_name));
break;
}
if ((SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VDIR) &&
(sdev_cleandir(dv, NULL, 0) != 0)) {
dv = SDEV_NEXT_ENTRY(ddv, dv);
continue;
}
SDEV_HOLD(dv);
/* remove the cache node */
sdev_cache_update(ddv, &dv, dv->sdev_name,
SDEV_CACHE_DELETE);
SDEV_RELE(dv);
dv = SDEV_FIRST_ENTRY(ddv);
}
rw_downgrade(&ddv->sdev_contents);
}
Commit Message: 5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr
Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <keith.wesolowski@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pseudo_begin_execution()
{
thisRemoteResource->beginExecution();
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* Type_MLU_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsMLUdup((cmsMLU*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetEditingValue(const String& value) {
if (!GetLayoutObject() || !IsTextField())
return;
SetInnerEditorValue(value);
SubtreeHasChanged();
unsigned max = value.length();
SetSelectionRange(max, max);
DispatchInputEvent();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MemStream::setPos(Guint pos, int dir) {
Guint i;
if (dir >= 0) {
i = pos;
} else {
i = start + length - pos;
}
if (i < start) {
i = start;
} else if (i > start + length) {
i = start + length;
}
bufPtr = buf + i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 hash_name(const char *name)
{
unsigned long hash = init_name_hash();
unsigned long len = 0, c;
c = (unsigned char)*name;
do {
len++;
hash = partial_name_hash(c, hash);
c = (unsigned char)name[len];
} while (c && c != '/');
return hashlen_create(end_name_hash(hash), len);
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SoftOpus::isConfigured() const {
return mInputBufferCount >= 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mincore_pte_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
unsigned char *vec)
{
unsigned long next;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep;
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
do {
pte_t pte = *ptep;
pgoff_t pgoff;
next = addr + PAGE_SIZE;
if (pte_none(pte))
mincore_unmapped_range(vma, addr, next, vec);
else if (pte_present(pte))
*vec = 1;
else if (pte_file(pte)) {
pgoff = pte_to_pgoff(pte);
*vec = mincore_page(vma->vm_file->f_mapping, pgoff);
} else { /* pte is a swap entry */
swp_entry_t entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (is_migration_entry(entry)) {
/* migration entries are always uptodate */
*vec = 1;
} else {
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
pgoff = entry.val;
*vec = mincore_page(&swapper_space, pgoff);
#else
WARN_ON(1);
*vec = 1;
#endif
}
}
vec++;
} while (ptep++, addr = next, addr != end);
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep - 1, ptl);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void AddImpl(Handle<JSObject> object, uint32_t index,
Handle<Object> value, PropertyAttributes attributes,
uint32_t new_capacity) {
DCHECK_EQ(NONE, attributes);
ElementsKind from_kind = object->GetElementsKind();
ElementsKind to_kind = Subclass::kind();
if (IsDictionaryElementsKind(from_kind) ||
IsFastDoubleElementsKind(from_kind) !=
IsFastDoubleElementsKind(to_kind) ||
Subclass::GetCapacityImpl(*object, object->elements()) !=
new_capacity) {
Subclass::GrowCapacityAndConvertImpl(object, new_capacity);
} else {
if (IsFastElementsKind(from_kind) && from_kind != to_kind) {
JSObject::TransitionElementsKind(object, to_kind);
}
if (IsFastSmiOrObjectElementsKind(from_kind)) {
DCHECK(IsFastSmiOrObjectElementsKind(to_kind));
JSObject::EnsureWritableFastElements(object);
}
}
Subclass::SetImpl(object, index, *value);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::UpgradeDraggedFileSystemPermissions(
const std::string& file_system_url) {
CHECK(web_contents_->GetURL().SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme));
file_helper_->UpgradeDraggedFileSystemPermissions(
file_system_url,
base::Bind(&DevToolsUIBindings::ShowDevToolsConfirmInfoBar,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
{
if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
return current_mapping[tclass].value;
return tclass;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chunk_io(struct pstore *ps, void *area, chunk_t chunk, int rw,
int metadata)
{
struct dm_io_region where = {
.bdev = dm_snap_cow(ps->store->snap)->bdev,
.sector = ps->store->chunk_size * chunk,
.count = ps->store->chunk_size,
};
struct dm_io_request io_req = {
.bi_rw = rw,
.mem.type = DM_IO_VMA,
.mem.ptr.vma = area,
.client = ps->io_client,
.notify.fn = NULL,
};
struct mdata_req req;
if (!metadata)
return dm_io(&io_req, 1, &where, NULL);
req.where = &where;
req.io_req = &io_req;
/*
* Issue the synchronous I/O from a different thread
* to avoid generic_make_request recursion.
*/
INIT_WORK_ONSTACK(&req.work, do_metadata);
queue_work(ps->metadata_wq, &req.work);
flush_workqueue(ps->metadata_wq);
return req.result;
}
Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LocationAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->location()), impl);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadInfo() {
scoped_ptr<LoadInfoMap> info_map(GetLoadInfoForAllRoutes());
if (info_map->empty() || !scheduler_->HasLoadingClients()) {
update_load_states_timer_->Stop();
return;
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadInfoOnUIThread,
base::Passed(&info_map)));
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,855 |
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