instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpol_rebind_policy(struct mempolicy *pol, const nodemask_t *newmask)
{
if (!pol)
return;
if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))
return;
mpol_ops[pol->mode].rebind(pol, newmask);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy
I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled. The related call trace is as follows.
BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798
INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
mpol_new+0x66/0x80
SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
__mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::outputBufferWidth() {
return mIsAdaptive ? mAdaptiveMaxWidth : mWidth;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ipip_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(banner);
err = register_pernet_device(&ipip_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = xfrm4_tunnel_register(&ipip_handler, AF_INET);
if (err < 0) {
unregister_pernet_device(&ipip_net_ops);
printk(KERN_INFO "ipip init: can't register tunnel\n");
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_unpeer_node(
address_node *addr
)
{
unpeer_node * my_node;
u_int u;
char * pch;
my_node = emalloc_zero(sizeof(*my_node));
/*
* From the parser's perspective an association ID fits into
* its generic T_String definition of a name/address "address".
* We treat all valid 16-bit numbers as association IDs.
*/
pch = addr->address;
while (*pch && isdigit(*pch))
pch++;
if (!*pch
&& 1 == sscanf(addr->address, "%u", &u)
&& u <= ASSOCID_MAX) {
my_node->assocID = (associd_t)u;
destroy_address_node(addr);
my_node->addr = NULL;
} else {
my_node->assocID = 0;
my_node->addr = addr;
}
return my_node;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tcp_reset(struct sock *sk)
{
/* We want the right error as BSD sees it (and indeed as we do). */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE:
return;
default:
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
}
/* This barrier is coupled with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */
smp_wmb();
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible(net::URLRequest* request,
ProfileIOData* io_data,
int child_id,
int route_id) {
std::string google_chrome_signin_value;
std::string google_accounts_signin_value;
request->GetResponseHeaderByName("Google-Chrome-SignIn",
&google_chrome_signin_value);
request->GetResponseHeaderByName("Google-Accounts-SignIn",
&google_accounts_signin_value);
if (!google_accounts_signin_value.empty() ||
!google_chrome_signin_value.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " g-a-s='" << google_accounts_signin_value << "'"
<< " g-c-s='" << google_chrome_signin_value << "'";
}
if (!gaia::IsGaiaSignonRealm(request->original_url().GetOrigin()))
return;
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string> > pairs;
base::SplitStringIntoKeyValuePairs(google_accounts_signin_value, '=', ',',
&pairs);
std::string session_index;
std::string email;
for (size_t i = 0; i < pairs.size(); ++i) {
const std::pair<std::string, std::string>& pair = pairs[i];
const std::string& key = pair.first;
const std::string& value = pair.second;
if (key == "email") {
TrimString(value, "\"", &email);
} else if (key == "sessionindex") {
session_index = value;
}
}
if (!email.empty())
io_data->set_reverse_autologin_pending_email(email);
if (!email.empty() || !session_index.empty()) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " email=" << email
<< " sessionindex=" << session_index;
}
AutoAccept auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE;
signin::Source source = signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN;
GURL continue_url;
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
base::SplitString(google_chrome_signin_value, ',', &tokens);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tokens.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& token = tokens[i];
if (token == "accepted") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_ACCEPTED;
} else if (token == "configure") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_CONFIGURE;
} else if (token == "rejected-for-profile") {
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_REJECTED_FOR_PROFILE;
}
}
source = GetSigninSource(request->url(), &continue_url);
if (source != signin::SOURCE_UNKNOWN)
auto_accept = AUTO_ACCEPT_EXPLICIT;
if (auto_accept != AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE) {
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarIfPossible:"
<< " auto_accept=" << auto_accept;
}
if (session_index.empty() && email.empty() &&
auto_accept == AUTO_ACCEPT_NONE && !continue_url.is_valid()) {
return;
}
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OneClickSigninHelper::ShowInfoBarUIThread, session_index,
email, auto_accept, source, continue_url, child_id, route_id));
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 1 | 171,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_set_device_only(gs_gstate * pgs, gx_device * dev)
{
rc_assign(pgs->device, dev, "gx_set_device_only");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: remove_waiting_conn(conn c)
{
tube t;
size_t i;
if (!conn_waiting(c)) return NULL;
c->type &= ~CONN_TYPE_WAITING;
global_stat.waiting_ct--;
for (i = 0; i < c->watch.used; i++) {
t = c->watch.items[i];
t->stat.waiting_ct--;
ms_remove(&t->waiting, c);
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void raisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::GetterContext, "raisesExceptionLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
int jsValue = imp->raisesExceptionLongAttribute(exceptionState);
if (UNLIKELY(exceptionState.throwIfNeeded()))
return;
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, jsValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddProfilesAndCards() {
std::vector<autofill::AutofillProfile> profiles;
autofill::AutofillProfile profile;
profile.set_guid(base::GenerateGUID());
profile.set_origin(kWebOrigin);
profile.SetRawInfo(autofill::NAME_FIRST, base::ASCIIToUTF16("Bob"));
profile.SetRawInfo(autofill::NAME_LAST, base::ASCIIToUTF16("Smith"));
profile.SetRawInfo(autofill::ADDRESS_HOME_ZIP, base::ASCIIToUTF16("94043"));
profile.SetRawInfo(autofill::EMAIL_ADDRESS,
base::ASCIIToUTF16("sue@example.com"));
profile.SetRawInfo(autofill::COMPANY_NAME, base::ASCIIToUTF16("Company X"));
profiles.push_back(profile);
profile.set_guid(base::GenerateGUID());
profile.set_origin(autofill::kSettingsOrigin);
profiles.push_back(profile);
personal_data_manager_->SetProfiles(&profiles);
base::TaskScheduler::GetInstance()->FlushForTesting();
std::vector<autofill::CreditCard> cards;
autofill::CreditCard card;
card.set_guid(base::GenerateGUID());
card.set_origin(kWebOrigin);
card.SetRawInfo(autofill::CREDIT_CARD_NUMBER,
base::ASCIIToUTF16("1234-5678-9012-3456"));
cards.push_back(card);
card.set_guid(base::GenerateGUID());
card.set_origin(autofill::kSettingsOrigin);
cards.push_back(card);
personal_data_manager_->SetCreditCards(&cards);
base::TaskScheduler::GetInstance()->FlushForTesting();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 154,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in_standby_l(struct stream_in *in)
{
struct audio_device *adev = in->dev;
int status = 0;
lock_input_stream(in);
if (!in->standby) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&adev->lock);
status = do_in_standby_l(in);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&adev->lock);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&in->lock);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit rmd128_mod_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int sctp_wspace(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
int amt;
if (asoc->ep->sndbuf_policy)
amt = asoc->sndbuf_used;
else
amt = sk_wmem_alloc_get(asoc->base.sk);
if (amt >= asoc->base.sk->sk_sndbuf) {
if (asoc->base.sk->sk_userlocks & SOCK_SNDBUF_LOCK)
amt = 0;
else {
amt = sk_stream_wspace(asoc->base.sk);
if (amt < 0)
amt = 0;
}
} else {
amt = asoc->base.sk->sk_sndbuf - amt;
}
return amt;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltIsDigitZero(unsigned int ch)
{
/*
* Reference: ftp://ftp.unicode.org/Public/UNIDATA/UnicodeData.txt
*/
switch (ch) {
case 0x0030: case 0x0660: case 0x06F0: case 0x0966:
case 0x09E6: case 0x0A66: case 0x0AE6: case 0x0B66:
case 0x0C66: case 0x0CE6: case 0x0D66: case 0x0E50:
case 0x0E60: case 0x0F20: case 0x1040: case 0x17E0:
case 0x1810: case 0xFF10:
return TRUE;
default:
return FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::Widget* widget() { return widget_; }
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_ParserFree(XML_Parser parser)
{
TAG *tagList;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *entityList;
if (parser == NULL)
return;
/* free m_tagStack and m_freeTagList */
tagList = parser->m_tagStack;
for (;;) {
TAG *p;
if (tagList == NULL) {
if (parser->m_freeTagList == NULL)
break;
tagList = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = NULL;
}
p = tagList;
tagList = tagList->parent;
FREE(parser, p->buf);
destroyBindings(p->bindings, parser);
FREE(parser, p);
}
/* free m_openInternalEntities and m_freeInternalEntities */
entityList = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
for (;;) {
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity;
if (entityList == NULL) {
if (parser->m_freeInternalEntities == NULL)
break;
entityList = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = NULL;
}
openEntity = entityList;
entityList = entityList->next;
FREE(parser, openEntity);
}
destroyBindings(parser->m_freeBindingList, parser);
destroyBindings(parser->m_inheritedBindings, parser);
poolDestroy(&parser->m_tempPool);
poolDestroy(&parser->m_temp2Pool);
FREE(parser, (void *)parser->m_protocolEncodingName);
#ifdef XML_DTD
/* external parameter entity parsers share the DTD structure
parser->m_dtd with the root parser, so we must not destroy it
*/
if (!parser->m_isParamEntity && parser->m_dtd)
#else
if (parser->m_dtd)
#endif /* XML_DTD */
dtdDestroy(parser->m_dtd, (XML_Bool)!parser->m_parentParser, &parser->m_mem);
FREE(parser, (void *)parser->m_atts);
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
FREE(parser, (void *)parser->m_attInfo);
#endif
FREE(parser, parser->m_groupConnector);
FREE(parser, parser->m_buffer);
FREE(parser, parser->m_dataBuf);
FREE(parser, parser->m_nsAtts);
FREE(parser, parser->m_unknownEncodingMem);
if (parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease)
parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease(parser->m_unknownEncodingData);
FREE(parser, parser);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionApiNewTabTest() {}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 116,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_time_access(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, struct timespec *time)
{
int status = 0;
time->tv_sec = 0;
time->tv_nsec = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[1] & (FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[1] & FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS)) {
status = decode_attr_time(xdr, time);
if (status == 0)
status = NFS_ATTR_FATTR_ATIME;
bitmap[1] &= ~FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS;
}
dprintk("%s: atime=%ld\n", __func__, (long)time->tv_sec);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::vertexAttrib2f(GLuint index,
GLfloat v0,
GLfloat v1) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->VertexAttrib2f(index, v0, v1);
SetVertexAttribType(index, kFloat32ArrayType);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *CL_RefMalloc( int size ) {
return Z_TagMalloc( size, TAG_RENDERER );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void VectorClamp(DDSVector4 *value)
{
value->x = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->z));
value->w = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->w));
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rxrpc_request_key(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct key *key;
char *description;
_enter("");
if (optlen <= 0 || optlen > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
return -EINVAL;
description = kmalloc(optlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!description)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(description, optval, optlen)) {
kfree(description);
return -EFAULT;
}
description[optlen] = 0;
key = request_key(&key_type_rxrpc, description, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
kfree(description);
_leave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
return PTR_ERR(key);
}
rx->key = key;
kfree(description);
_leave(" = 0 [key %x]", key->serial);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void iwl_reprogram_ap_sta(struct iwl_priv *priv, struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx)
{
unsigned long flags;
int sta_id = ctx->ap_sta_id;
int ret;
struct iwl_addsta_cmd sta_cmd;
struct iwl_link_quality_cmd lq;
bool active, have_lq = false;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
if (!(priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return;
}
memcpy(&sta_cmd, &priv->stations[sta_id].sta, sizeof(sta_cmd));
sta_cmd.mode = 0;
if (priv->stations[sta_id].lq) {
memcpy(&lq, priv->stations[sta_id].lq, sizeof(lq));
have_lq = true;
}
active = priv->stations[sta_id].used & IWL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE;
priv->stations[sta_id].used &= ~IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
if (active) {
ret = iwl_send_remove_station(
priv, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr,
sta_id, true);
if (ret)
IWL_ERR(priv, "failed to remove STA %pM (%d)\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr, ret);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
priv->stations[sta_id].used |= IWL_STA_DRIVER_ACTIVE;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
ret = iwl_send_add_sta(priv, &sta_cmd, CMD_SYNC);
if (ret)
IWL_ERR(priv, "failed to re-add STA %pM (%d)\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr, ret);
if (have_lq)
iwl_send_lq_cmd(priv, ctx, &lq, CMD_SYNC, true);
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrame::SetIsAdSubframeIfNecessary() {
DCHECK(ad_tracker_);
Frame* parent = Tree().Parent();
if (!parent)
return;
bool parent_is_ad =
parent->IsLocalFrame() && ToLocalFrame(parent)->IsAdSubframe();
if (parent_is_ad || ad_tracker_->IsAdScriptInStack())
SetIsAdSubframe();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoProcessMessage(
const std::string& name, const JsArgList& args,
const JsEventHandler* sender) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), host_->core_thread_.message_loop());
syncapi_->GetJsBackend()->ProcessMessage(name, args, sender);
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~GpuCommandBufferMemoryTracker() {
delete gpu_memory_manager_tracking_group_;
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_random_seed(struct iw_context *ctx, int randomize, int rand_seed)
{
ctx->randomize = randomize;
ctx->random_seed = rand_seed;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 65,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestDidNavigate(int page_id, const GURL& url) {
ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params params;
InitNavigateParams(¶ms, page_id, url, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED);
DidNavigate(GetRenderViewHostForTesting(), params);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::canUndo() const
{
return !m_undoStack.isEmpty();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char *dir_name,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
struct path path;
int retval = 0;
int mnt_flags = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (!dir_name || !*dir_name || !memchr(dir_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
if (data_page)
((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = kern_path(dir_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &path,
type_page, flags, data_page);
if (!retval && !may_mount())
retval = -EPERM;
if (retval)
goto dput_out;
/* Default to relatime unless overriden */
if (!(flags & MS_NOATIME))
mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
/* Separate the per-mountpoint flags */
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
data_page);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page);
dput_out:
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void comps_objrtree_destroy(COMPS_ObjRTree * rt) {
comps_hslist_destroy(&(rt->subnodes));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_iodone_work(
struct work_struct *work)
{
struct xfs_buf *bp =
container_of(work, xfs_buf_t, b_iodone_work);
bool read = !!(bp->b_flags & XBF_READ);
bp->b_flags &= ~(XBF_READ | XBF_WRITE | XBF_READ_AHEAD);
if (read && bp->b_ops)
bp->b_ops->verify_read(bp);
if (bp->b_iodone)
(*(bp->b_iodone))(bp);
else if (bp->b_flags & XBF_ASYNC)
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
else {
ASSERT(read && bp->b_ops);
complete(&bp->b_iowait);
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: search_state_new(void) {
struct search_state *state = (struct search_state *) mm_malloc(sizeof(struct search_state));
if (!state) return NULL;
memset(state, 0, sizeof(struct search_state));
state->refcount = 1;
state->ndots = 1;
return state;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_spare_extension_and_crc(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, guint8 dch_crc_present,
int offset, guint header_length)
{
int crc_size = 0;
int remain = tvb_captured_length_remaining(tvb, offset);
/* Payload CRC (optional) */
if ((dch_crc_present == 1) || ((dch_crc_present == 2) && (remain >= 2))) {
crc_size = 2;
}
if (remain > crc_size) {
proto_item *ti;
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_spare_extension, tvb,
offset, remain-crc_size, ENC_NA);
proto_item_append_text(ti, " (%u octets)", remain-crc_size);
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_fp_spare_extension, "Spare Extension present (%u bytes)", remain-crc_size);
offset += remain-crc_size;
}
if (crc_size) {
proto_item * pi = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_payload_crc, tvb, offset, crc_size,
ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if (preferences_payload_checksum) {
guint16 calc_crc, read_crc;
guint8 * data = (guint8 *)tvb_memdup(wmem_packet_scope(), tvb, header_length, offset-header_length);
calc_crc = crc16_8005_noreflect_noxor(data, offset-header_length);
read_crc = tvb_get_bits16(tvb, offset*8, 16, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
if (calc_crc == read_crc) {
proto_item_append_text(pi, " [correct]");
} else {
proto_item_append_text(pi, " [incorrect, should be 0x%x]", calc_crc);
expert_add_info(pinfo, pi, &ei_fp_bad_payload_checksum);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int STBV_CDECL uint32_compare(const void *p, const void *q)
{
uint32 x = * (uint32 *) p;
uint32 y = * (uint32 *) q;
return x < y ? -1 : x > y;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWindow(
RenderFrameHost* opener,
int32_t render_view_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_route_id,
int32_t main_frame_widget_route_id,
const mojom::CreateNewWindowParams& params,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
DCHECK_EQ((render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
(main_frame_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
DCHECK_EQ((render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
(main_frame_widget_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
DCHECK(opener);
int render_process_id = opener->GetProcess()->GetID();
SiteInstance* source_site_instance = opener->GetSiteInstance();
DCHECK(!RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id));
bool is_guest = BrowserPluginGuest::IsGuest(this);
DCHECK(!params.opener_suppressed || render_view_route_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> site_instance =
params.opener_suppressed && !is_guest
? SiteInstance::CreateForURL(GetBrowserContext(), params.target_url)
: source_site_instance;
const std::string& partition_id =
GetContentClient()->browser()->
GetStoragePartitionIdForSite(GetBrowserContext(),
site_instance->GetSiteURL());
StoragePartition* partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetBrowserContext(), site_instance.get());
DOMStorageContextWrapper* dom_storage_context =
static_cast<DOMStorageContextWrapper*>(partition->GetDOMStorageContext());
SessionStorageNamespaceImpl* session_storage_namespace_impl =
static_cast<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl*>(session_storage_namespace);
CHECK(session_storage_namespace_impl->IsFromContext(dom_storage_context));
if (delegate_ &&
!delegate_->ShouldCreateWebContents(
this, opener, source_site_instance, render_view_route_id,
main_frame_route_id, main_frame_widget_route_id,
params.window_container_type, opener->GetLastCommittedURL(),
params.frame_name, params.target_url, partition_id,
session_storage_namespace)) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh =
RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, main_frame_route_id);
if (rfh) {
DCHECK(rfh->IsRenderFrameLive());
rfh->Init();
}
return;
}
CreateParams create_params(GetBrowserContext(), site_instance.get());
create_params.routing_id = render_view_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_routing_id = main_frame_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_widget_routing_id = main_frame_widget_route_id;
create_params.main_frame_name = params.frame_name;
create_params.opener_render_process_id = render_process_id;
create_params.opener_render_frame_id = opener->GetRoutingID();
create_params.opener_suppressed = params.opener_suppressed;
if (params.disposition == WindowOpenDisposition::NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB)
create_params.initially_hidden = true;
create_params.renderer_initiated_creation =
main_frame_route_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
WebContentsImpl* new_contents = nullptr;
if (!is_guest) {
create_params.context = view_->GetNativeView();
create_params.initial_size = GetContainerBounds().size();
new_contents = static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(
WebContents::Create(create_params));
} else {
new_contents = GetBrowserPluginGuest()->CreateNewGuestWindow(create_params);
}
new_contents->GetController().SetSessionStorageNamespace(
partition_id,
session_storage_namespace);
if (!params.frame_name.empty())
new_contents->GetRenderManager()->CreateProxiesForNewNamedFrame();
if (!params.opener_suppressed) {
if (!is_guest) {
WebContentsView* new_view = new_contents->view_.get();
new_view->CreateViewForWidget(
new_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget(), false);
}
DCHECK_NE(MSG_ROUTING_NONE, main_frame_widget_route_id);
pending_contents_[std::make_pair(
render_process_id, main_frame_widget_route_id)] = new_contents;
AddDestructionObserver(new_contents);
}
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->WebContentsCreated(this, render_process_id,
opener->GetRoutingID(), params.frame_name,
params.target_url, new_contents);
}
if (opener) {
for (auto& observer : observers_) {
observer.DidOpenRequestedURL(new_contents, opener, params.target_url,
params.referrer, params.disposition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
false, // started_from_context_menu
true); // renderer_initiated
}
}
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
ExitFullscreen(true);
if (params.opener_suppressed) {
bool was_blocked = false;
if (delegate_) {
gfx::Rect initial_rect;
base::WeakPtr<WebContentsImpl> weak_new_contents =
new_contents->weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
delegate_->AddNewContents(
this, new_contents, params.disposition, initial_rect,
params.user_gesture, &was_blocked);
if (!weak_new_contents)
return; // The delegate deleted |new_contents| during AddNewContents().
}
if (!was_blocked) {
OpenURLParams open_params(params.target_url, params.referrer,
WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK,
true /* is_renderer_initiated */);
open_params.user_gesture = params.user_gesture;
if (delegate_ && !is_guest &&
!delegate_->ShouldResumeRequestsForCreatedWindow()) {
new_contents->delayed_open_url_params_.reset(
new OpenURLParams(open_params));
} else {
new_contents->OpenURL(open_params);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hmac_sha256_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
return hash_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, HASH_ALGO_SHA256);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLTextAreaElement::subtreeHasChanged()
{
setChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent(true);
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
if (!focused())
return;
calculateAndAdjustDirectionality();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 114,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: line_interpt(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LINE *l1 = PG_GETARG_LINE_P(0);
LINE *l2 = PG_GETARG_LINE_P(1);
Point *result;
result = line_interpt_internal(l1, l2);
if (result == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
PG_RETURN_POINT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect WebPagePrivate::adjustRectOffsetForFrameOffset(const IntRect& rect, const Node* node)
{
if (!node)
return rect;
const Node* tnode = node;
IntRect adjustedRect = rect;
do {
Frame* frame = tnode->document()->frame();
if (!frame)
continue;
Node* ownerNode = static_cast<Node*>(frame->ownerElement());
tnode = ownerNode;
if (ownerNode && (ownerNode->hasTagName(HTMLNames::iframeTag) || ownerNode->hasTagName(HTMLNames::frameTag))) {
IntRect iFrameRect;
do {
iFrameRect = rectForNode(ownerNode);
adjustedRect.move(iFrameRect.x(), iFrameRect.y());
adjustedRect.intersect(iFrameRect);
ownerNode = ownerNode->parentNode();
} while (iFrameRect.isEmpty() && ownerNode);
} else
break;
} while (tnode = tnode->parentNode());
return adjustedRect;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_debugregs *dbgregs)
{
if (dbgregs->flags)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(vcpu->arch.db, dbgregs->db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
vcpu->arch.dr6 = dbgregs->dr6;
vcpu->arch.dr7 = dbgregs->dr7;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t __disk_events_show(unsigned int events, char *buf)
{
const char *delim = "";
ssize_t pos = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disk_events_strs); i++)
if (events & (1 << i)) {
pos += sprintf(buf + pos, "%s%s",
delim, disk_events_strs[i]);
delim = " ";
}
if (pos)
pos += sprintf(buf + pos, "\n");
return pos;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hci_sock_cleanup(void)
{
bt_procfs_cleanup(&init_net, "hci");
bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_HCI);
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: esis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *pptr, u_int length)
{
const uint8_t *optr;
u_int li,esis_pdu_type,source_address_length, source_address_number;
const struct esis_header_t *esis_header;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES-IS"));
if (length <= 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_qflag ? "bad pkt!" : "no header at all!"));
return;
}
esis_header = (const struct esis_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*esis_header);
li = esis_header->length_indicator;
optr = pptr;
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (esis_header->nlpid != NLPID_ESIS) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nlpid 0x%02x packet not supported", esis_header->nlpid));
return;
}
if (esis_header->version != ESIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " version %d packet not supported", esis_header->version));
return;
}
if (li > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator(%u) > PDU size (%u)!", li, length));
return;
}
if (li < sizeof(struct esis_header_t) + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator %u < min PDU size:", li));
while (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", *pptr++));
return;
}
esis_pdu_type = esis_header->type & ESIS_PDU_TYPE_MASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s, length %u",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(esis_pdu_values,"unknown type (%u)",esis_pdu_type),
length));
return;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u\n\t%s (%u)",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
length,
tok2str(esis_pdu_values,"unknown type: %u", esis_pdu_type),
esis_pdu_type));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", v: %u%s", esis_header->version, esis_header->version == ESIS_VERSION ? "" : "unsupported" ));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->cksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, pptr, EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->cksum), 7, li);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holding time: %us, length indicator: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->holdtime), li));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", sizeof(struct esis_header_t));
pptr += sizeof(struct esis_header_t);
li -= sizeof(struct esis_header_t);
switch (esis_pdu_type) {
case ESIS_PDU_REDIRECT: {
const uint8_t *dst, *snpa, *neta;
u_int dstl, snpal, netal;
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
dstl = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, dstl);
if (li < dstl) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
dst = pptr;
pptr += dstl;
li -= dstl;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isonsap_string(ndo, dst, dstl)));
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
snpal = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, snpal);
if (li < snpal) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
snpa = pptr;
pptr += snpal;
li -= snpal;
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
netal = *pptr;
pptr++;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, netal);
if (li < netal) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
neta = pptr;
pptr += netal;
li -= netal;
if (netal == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, snpa)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isonsap_string(ndo, neta, netal)));
break;
}
case ESIS_PDU_ESH:
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
source_address_number = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Number of Source Addresses: %u", source_address_number));
while (source_address_number > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NET (length: %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, pptr, source_address_length)));
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
source_address_number--;
}
break;
case ESIS_PDU_ISH: {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad ish/li"));
return;
}
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad ish/li"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NET (length: %u): %s", source_address_length, isonsap_string(ndo, pptr, source_address_length)));
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
break;
}
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ndo->ndo_snapend - pptr);
}
return;
}
/* now walk the options */
while (li != 0) {
u_int op, opli;
const uint8_t *tptr;
if (li < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opts/li"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
op = *pptr++;
opli = *pptr++;
li -= 2;
if (opli > li) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", opt (%d) too long", op));
return;
}
li -= opli;
tptr = pptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option #%u, length %u, value: ",
tok2str(esis_option_values,"Unknown",op),
op,
opli));
switch (op) {
case ESIS_OPTION_ES_CONF_TIME:
if (opli == 2) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(bad length)"));
break;
case ESIS_OPTION_PROTOCOLS:
while (opli>0) {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (opli>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
opli--;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined Options that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ESIS_OPTION_QOS_MAINTENANCE:
case ESIS_OPTION_SECURITY:
case ESIS_OPTION_PRIORITY:
case ESIS_OPTION_ADDRESS_MASK:
case ESIS_OPTION_SNPA_MASK:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", opli);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", opli);
pptr += opli;
}
trunc:
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12999/IS-IS: Add a missing length check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static toff_t TIFFSeekBlob(thandle_t image,toff_t offset,int whence)
{
return((toff_t) SeekBlob((Image *) image,(MagickOffsetType) offset,whence));
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void CopyPixels(PixelPacket *destination,
const PixelPacket *source,const MagickSizeType number_pixels)
{
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT) || (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH <= 8)
(void) memcpy(destination,source,(size_t) number_pixels*sizeof(*source));
#else
{
register MagickOffsetType
i;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(*source)) < MagickMaxBufferExtent)
{
(void) memcpy(destination,source,(size_t) number_pixels*
sizeof(*source));
return;
}
#pragma omp parallel for
for (i=0; i < (MagickOffsetType) number_pixels; i++)
destination[i]=source[i];
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 168,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::SetTabBlocked(int index, bool blocked) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
if (contents_data_[index]->blocked == blocked)
return;
contents_data_[index]->blocked = blocked;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabBlockedStateChanged(contents_data_[index]->contents,
index));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_fill_flex_info(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
ext4_group_t flex_group_count;
ext4_group_t flex_group;
int groups_per_flex = 0;
size_t size;
int i;
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) {
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = 0;
return 1;
}
/* We allocate both existing and potentially added groups */
flex_group_count = ((sbi->s_groups_count + groups_per_flex - 1) +
((le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_reserved_gdt_blocks) + 1) <<
EXT4_DESC_PER_BLOCK_BITS(sb))) / groups_per_flex;
size = flex_group_count * sizeof(struct flex_groups);
sbi->s_flex_groups = ext4_kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (sbi->s_flex_groups == NULL) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory for %u flex groups",
flex_group_count);
goto failed;
}
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, i, NULL);
flex_group = ext4_flex_group(sbi, i);
atomic_add(ext4_free_inodes_count(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].free_inodes);
atomic_add(ext4_free_group_clusters(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].free_clusters);
atomic_add(ext4_used_dirs_count(sb, gdp),
&sbi->s_flex_groups[flex_group].used_dirs);
}
return 1;
failed:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TerminateServiceWorkerOnIO(
base::WeakPtr<ServiceWorkerContextCore> context_weak,
int64_t version_id) {
if (ServiceWorkerContextCore* context = context_weak.get()) {
if (ServiceWorkerVersion* version = context->GetLiveVersion(version_id))
version->StopWorker(base::DoNothing());
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult DataPipeProducerDispatcher::EndWriteData(
uint32_t num_bytes_written) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (is_closed_ || in_transit_)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!in_two_phase_write_)
return MOJO_RESULT_FAILED_PRECONDITION;
MojoResult rv = MOJO_RESULT_OK;
if (num_bytes_written > available_capacity_ ||
num_bytes_written % options_.element_num_bytes != 0 ||
write_offset_ + num_bytes_written > options_.capacity_num_bytes) {
rv = MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
} else {
DCHECK_LE(num_bytes_written + write_offset_, options_.capacity_num_bytes);
available_capacity_ -= num_bytes_written;
write_offset_ =
(write_offset_ + num_bytes_written) % options_.capacity_num_bytes;
base::AutoUnlock unlock(lock_);
NotifyWrite(num_bytes_written);
}
in_two_phase_write_ = false;
watchers_.NotifyState(GetHandleSignalsStateNoLock());
return rv;
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long long Track::GetCodecDelay() const
{
return m_info.codecDelay;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyTexture() {
if (!host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active())
return scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>();
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>();
std::map<uint64, scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> >::iterator it =
image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_);
if (it == image_transport_clients_.end())
return scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>();
ui::Texture* container = it->second;
DCHECK(container);
WebKit::WebGLId texture_id =
gl_helper->CopyTexture(container->PrepareTexture(), container->size());
if (!texture_id)
return scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>();
return scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>(
factory->CreateOwnedTexture(
container->size(), device_scale_factor_, texture_id));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FS_Delete( char *filename ) {
char *ospath;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
if ( !filename || filename[0] == 0 ) {
return 0;
}
if ( Q_strncmp( filename, "save/", 5 ) != 0 ) {
return 0;
}
ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, filename );
if ( remove( ospath ) != -1 ) { // success
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_websocket_close(lua_State *L)
{
apr_socket_t *sock;
char prelude[2];
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
sock = ap_get_conn_socket(r->connection);
/* Send a header that says: socket is closing. */
prelude[0] = 0x88; /* closing socket opcode */
prelude[1] = 0; /* zero length frame */
ap_rwrite(prelude, 2, r);
/* Close up tell the MPM and filters to back off */
apr_socket_close(sock);
r->output_filters = NULL;
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CreatePixels(
char **dataptr,
unsigned int data_size,
unsigned int width,
unsigned int height,
unsigned int cpp,
unsigned int *pixels,
XpmColor *colors)
{
char *s;
unsigned int x, y, h, offset;
if(height <= 1)
return;
h = height - 1;
offset = width * cpp + 1;
if(offset <= width || offset <= cpp)
return;
/* why trust h? */
for (y = 0; y < h; y++, dataptr++) {
s = *dataptr;
/* why trust width? */
for (x = 0; x < width; x++, pixels++) {
if(cpp > (data_size - (s - *dataptr)))
return;
strncpy(s, colors[*pixels].string, cpp); /* why trust pixel? */
s += cpp;
}
*s = '\0';
if(offset > data_size)
return;
*(dataptr + 1) = *dataptr + offset;
}
/* duplicate some code to avoid a test in the loop */
s = *dataptr;
/* why trust width? */
for (x = 0; x < width; x++, pixels++) {
if(cpp > data_size - (s - *dataptr))
return;
strncpy(s, colors[*pixels].string, cpp); /* why should we trust *pixel? */
s += cpp;
}
*s = '\0';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hash_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
sock_kzfree_s(sk, ctx->result,
crypto_ahash_digestsize(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(&ctx->req)));
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
af_alg_release_parent(sk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_hash - Only export and import on sockets with data
The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received
any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes.
This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on
sockets that have received data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Harsh Jain <harshjain.prof@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 49,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_uverbs_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *file = filp->private_data;
const struct uverbs_api_write_method *method_elm;
struct uverbs_api *uapi = file->device->uapi;
struct ib_uverbs_ex_cmd_hdr ex_hdr;
struct ib_uverbs_cmd_hdr hdr;
struct uverbs_attr_bundle bundle;
int srcu_key;
ssize_t ret;
if (!ib_safe_file_access(filp)) {
pr_err_once("uverbs_write: process %d (%s) changed security contexts after opening file descriptor, this is not allowed.\n",
task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
return -EACCES;
}
if (count < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
method_elm = uapi_get_method(uapi, hdr.command);
if (IS_ERR(method_elm))
return PTR_ERR(method_elm);
if (method_elm->is_ex) {
if (count < (sizeof(hdr) + sizeof(ex_hdr)))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&ex_hdr, buf + sizeof(hdr), sizeof(ex_hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
}
ret = verify_hdr(&hdr, &ex_hdr, count, method_elm);
if (ret)
return ret;
srcu_key = srcu_read_lock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
buf += sizeof(hdr);
memset(bundle.attr_present, 0, sizeof(bundle.attr_present));
bundle.ufile = file;
bundle.context = NULL; /* only valid if bundle has uobject */
if (!method_elm->is_ex) {
size_t in_len = hdr.in_words * 4 - sizeof(hdr);
size_t out_len = hdr.out_words * 4;
u64 response = 0;
if (method_elm->has_udata) {
bundle.driver_udata.inlen =
in_len - method_elm->req_size;
in_len = method_elm->req_size;
if (bundle.driver_udata.inlen)
bundle.driver_udata.inbuf = buf + in_len;
else
bundle.driver_udata.inbuf = NULL;
} else {
memset(&bundle.driver_udata, 0,
sizeof(bundle.driver_udata));
}
if (method_elm->has_resp) {
/*
* The macros check that if has_resp is set
* then the command request structure starts
* with a '__aligned u64 response' member.
*/
ret = get_user(response, (const u64 *)buf);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
if (method_elm->has_udata) {
bundle.driver_udata.outlen =
out_len - method_elm->resp_size;
out_len = method_elm->resp_size;
if (bundle.driver_udata.outlen)
bundle.driver_udata.outbuf =
u64_to_user_ptr(response +
out_len);
else
bundle.driver_udata.outbuf = NULL;
}
} else {
bundle.driver_udata.outlen = 0;
bundle.driver_udata.outbuf = NULL;
}
ib_uverbs_init_udata_buf_or_null(
&bundle.ucore, buf, u64_to_user_ptr(response),
in_len, out_len);
} else {
buf += sizeof(ex_hdr);
ib_uverbs_init_udata_buf_or_null(&bundle.ucore, buf,
u64_to_user_ptr(ex_hdr.response),
hdr.in_words * 8, hdr.out_words * 8);
ib_uverbs_init_udata_buf_or_null(
&bundle.driver_udata, buf + bundle.ucore.inlen,
u64_to_user_ptr(ex_hdr.response) + bundle.ucore.outlen,
ex_hdr.provider_in_words * 8,
ex_hdr.provider_out_words * 8);
}
ret = method_elm->handler(&bundle);
out_unlock:
srcu_read_unlock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu, srcu_key);
return (ret) ? : count;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionSettingsHandler::GetExtension(const ListValue* args) {
std::string extension_id = UTF16ToUTF8(ExtractStringValue(args));
CHECK(!extension_id.empty());
return extension_service_->GetExtensionById(extension_id, true);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int redisSupervisedUpstart(void) {
const char *upstart_job = getenv("UPSTART_JOB");
if (!upstart_job) {
serverLog(LL_WARNING,
"upstart supervision requested, but UPSTART_JOB not found");
return 0;
}
serverLog(LL_NOTICE, "supervised by upstart, will stop to signal readiness");
raise(SIGSTOP);
unsetenv("UPSTART_JOB");
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *__unix_find_socket_byname(struct net *net,
struct sockaddr_un *sunname,
int len, int type, unsigned int hash)
{
struct sock *s;
struct hlist_node *node;
sk_for_each(s, node, &unix_socket_table[hash ^ type]) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
if (!net_eq(sock_net(s), net))
continue;
if (u->addr->len == len &&
!memcmp(u->addr->name, sunname, len))
goto found;
}
s = NULL;
found:
return s;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void try_to_free_low(struct hstate *h, unsigned long count,
nodemask_t *nodes_allowed)
{
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MSCFree(void* ptr)
{
free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
{
int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
return;
if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
if (phash_nid)
*phash_nid = hash_nid;
}
if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
if (psign_nid)
*psign_nid = sign_nid;
}
if (psignhash_nid) {
if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
else
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_mig_release(void)
{
if (reds->mig_spice) {
free(reds->mig_spice->cert_subject);
free(reds->mig_spice->host);
free(reds->mig_spice);
reds->mig_spice = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::HighEntropyConstantConstantGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_highEntropyConstant_ConstantGetter");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kV8TestObject_HighEntropyConstant_ConstantGetter);
Dactyloscoper::Record(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kV8TestObject_HighEntropyConstant_ConstantGetter);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, "1");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct ofproto *p = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct ofputil_packet_out po;
struct ofproto_packet_out opo;
uint64_t ofpacts_stub[1024 / 8];
struct ofpbuf ofpacts;
enum ofperr error;
COVERAGE_INC(ofproto_packet_out);
error = reject_slave_controller(ofconn);
if (error) {
return error;
}
/* Decode message. */
ofpbuf_use_stub(&ofpacts, ofpacts_stub, sizeof ofpacts_stub);
error = ofputil_decode_packet_out(&po, oh, &ofpacts);
if (error) {
ofpbuf_uninit(&ofpacts);
return error;
}
po.ofpacts = ofpbuf_steal_data(&ofpacts); /* Move to heap. */
error = ofproto_packet_out_init(p, ofconn, &opo, &po);
if (error) {
free(po.ofpacts);
return error;
}
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
opo.version = p->tables_version;
error = ofproto_packet_out_start(p, &opo);
if (!error) {
ofproto_packet_out_finish(p, &opo);
}
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
ofproto_packet_out_uninit(&opo);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parserInit(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName)
{
parser->m_processor = prologInitProcessor;
XmlPrologStateInit(&parser->m_prologState);
if (encodingName != NULL) {
parser->m_protocolEncodingName = copyString(encodingName, &(parser->m_mem));
}
parser->m_curBase = NULL;
XmlInitEncoding(&parser->m_initEncoding, &parser->m_encoding, 0);
parser->m_userData = NULL;
parser->m_handlerArg = NULL;
parser->m_startElementHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endElementHandler = NULL;
parser->m_characterDataHandler = NULL;
parser->m_processingInstructionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_commentHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_defaultHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_notStandaloneHandler = NULL;
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler = NULL;
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg = parser;
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler = NULL;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_xmlDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_bufferPtr = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_bufferEnd = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_parseEndByteIndex = 0;
parser->m_parseEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_declElementType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL;
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
memset(&parser->m_position, 0, sizeof(POSITION));
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NONE;
parser->m_eventPtr = NULL;
parser->m_eventEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_positionPtr = NULL;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = NULL;
parser->m_defaultExpandInternalEntities = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_tagLevel = 0;
parser->m_tagStack = NULL;
parser->m_inheritedBindings = NULL;
parser->m_nSpecifiedAtts = 0;
parser->m_unknownEncodingMem = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
parser->m_parentParser = NULL;
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_INITIALIZED;
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_isParamEntity = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_paramEntityParsing = XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif
parser->m_hash_secret_salt = 0;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UninstalledExtensionInfo::UninstalledExtensionInfo(
const Extension& extension)
: extension_id(extension.id()),
extension_api_permissions(extension.api_permissions()),
extension_type(extension.GetType()),
update_url(extension.update_url()) {}
Commit Message: Prevent extensions from defining homepages with schemes other than valid web extents.
BUG=84402
TEST=ExtensionManifestTest.ParseHomepageURLs
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7089014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87722 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 100,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType CheckMemoryOverflow(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
size;
size=count*quantum;
if ((count == 0) || (quantum != (size/count)))
{
errno=ENOMEM;
return(MagickTrue);
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void arch_show_smap(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
return;
seq_printf(m, "ProtectionKey: %8u\n", vma_pkey(vma));
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage __visible void __sched schedule(void)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
sched_submit_work(tsk);
do {
preempt_disable();
__schedule(false);
sched_preempt_enable_no_resched();
} while (need_resched());
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanReadDirectory(
int child_id, const FilePath& directory) {
return HasPermissionsForFile(child_id,
directory,
kEnumerateDirectoryPermissions);
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int robots_fsio_write(pr_fh_t *fh, int fd, const char *buf,
size_t bufsz) {
if (fd != AUTH_ROBOTS_TXT_FD) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return (int) bufsz;
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API ModPlugNote* ModPlug_GetPattern(ModPlugFile* file, int pattern, unsigned int* numrows)
{
int c;
int r;
int numr;
int numc;
ModPlugNote note;
if(!file) return NULL;
if(numrows){
*numrows = openmpt_module_get_pattern_num_rows(file->mod,pattern);
}
if(pattern<0||pattern>=openmpt_module_get_num_patterns(file->mod)){
return NULL;
}
if(!file->patterns){
file->patterns = malloc(sizeof(ModPlugNote*)*openmpt_module_get_pattern_num_rows(file->mod,pattern));
if(!file->patterns) return NULL;
memset(file->patterns,0,sizeof(ModPlugNote*)*openmpt_module_get_pattern_num_rows(file->mod,pattern));
}
if(!file->patterns[pattern]){
file->patterns[pattern] = malloc(sizeof(ModPlugNote)*openmpt_module_get_pattern_num_rows(file->mod,pattern)*openmpt_module_get_num_channels(file->mod));
if(!file->patterns[pattern]) return NULL;
memset(file->patterns[pattern],0,sizeof(ModPlugNote)*openmpt_module_get_pattern_num_rows(file->mod,pattern)*openmpt_module_get_num_channels(file->mod));
}
numr = openmpt_module_get_pattern_num_rows(file->mod,pattern);
numc = openmpt_module_get_num_channels(file->mod);
for(r=0;r<numr;r++){
for(c=0;c<numc;c++){
memset(¬e,0,sizeof(ModPlugNote));
note.Note = openmpt_module_get_pattern_row_channel_command(file->mod,pattern,r,c,OPENMPT_MODULE_COMMAND_NOTE);
note.Instrument = openmpt_module_get_pattern_row_channel_command(file->mod,pattern,r,c,OPENMPT_MODULE_COMMAND_INSTRUMENT);
note.VolumeEffect = openmpt_module_get_pattern_row_channel_command(file->mod,pattern,r,c,OPENMPT_MODULE_COMMAND_VOLUMEEFFECT);
note.Effect = openmpt_module_get_pattern_row_channel_command(file->mod,pattern,r,c,OPENMPT_MODULE_COMMAND_EFFECT);
note.Volume = openmpt_module_get_pattern_row_channel_command(file->mod,pattern,r,c,OPENMPT_MODULE_COMMAND_VOLUME);
note.Parameter = openmpt_module_get_pattern_row_channel_command(file->mod,pattern,r,c,OPENMPT_MODULE_COMMAND_PARAMETER);
memcpy(&file->patterns[pattern][r*numc+c],¬e,sizeof(ModPlugNote));
}
}
return file->patterns[pattern];
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 87,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabPinnedStateChanged(TabContentsWrapper* contents, int index) {
if (!profile()->HasSessionService())
return;
SessionService* session_service = profile()->GetSessionService();
if (session_service) {
session_service->SetPinnedState(
session_id(),
GetTabContentsAt(index)->controller().session_id(),
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->IsTabPinned(index));
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DeviceManagerImpl::DeviceManagerImpl(
mojo::InterfaceRequest<DeviceManager> request,
scoped_ptr<DeviceManagerDelegate> delegate,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> service_task_runner)
: binding_(this, request.Pass()),
delegate_(delegate.Pass()),
service_task_runner_(service_task_runner),
weak_factory_(this) {
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UpdateFrameNavigationTiming(WebFrame* frame,
base::TimeTicks browser_navigation_start,
base::TimeTicks renderer_navigation_start) {
DCHECK(!browser_navigation_start.is_null());
if (frame->provisionalDataSource()) {
base::TimeTicks navigation_start = std::min(
browser_navigation_start, renderer_navigation_start);
double navigation_start_seconds =
(navigation_start - base::TimeTicks()).InSecondsF();
frame->provisionalDataSource()->setNavigationStartTime(
navigation_start_seconds);
}
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_rm_idx(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
int err;
ext4_fsblk_t leaf;
/* free index block */
path--;
leaf = ext4_idx_pblock(path->p_idx);
if (unlikely(path->p_hdr->eh_entries == 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "path->p_hdr->eh_entries == 0");
return -EIO;
}
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
return err;
le16_add_cpu(&path->p_hdr->eh_entries, -1);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
return err;
ext_debug("index is empty, remove it, free block %llu\n", leaf);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, leaf, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA | EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit RenderWidgetHostVisibilityObserver(RenderWidgetHostImpl* rwhi,
bool expected_visibility_state)
: expected_visibility_state_(expected_visibility_state),
observer_(this),
was_observed_(false),
did_fail_(false),
render_widget_(rwhi) {
observer_.Add(render_widget_);
message_loop_runner_ = new MessageLoopRunner;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int addrconf_ifid_sit(u8 *eui, struct net_device *dev)
{
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_ISATAP)
return __ipv6_isatap_ifid(eui, *(__be32 *)dev->dev_addr);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ghash_setup_armv7_neon (gcry_cipher_hd_t c)
{
_gcry_ghash_setup_armv7_neon(c->u_mode.gcm.u_ghash_key.key);
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 89,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
{
u_int i;
if (proposal == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
free(proposal[i]);
free(proposal);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_free_body(regex_t* reg)
{
if (IS_NOT_NULL(reg)) {
ops_free(reg);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(reg->string_pool)) {
xfree(reg->string_pool);
reg->string_pool_end = reg->string_pool = 0;
}
if (IS_NOT_NULL(reg->exact)) xfree(reg->exact);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(reg->repeat_range)) xfree(reg->repeat_range);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(reg->extp)) {
free_regex_ext(reg->extp);
reg->extp = 0;
}
onig_names_free(reg);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ZEXPORT inflateInit2_(strm, windowBits, version, stream_size)
z_streamp strm;
int windowBits;
const char *version;
int stream_size;
{
int ret;
struct inflate_state FAR *state;
if (version == Z_NULL || version[0] != ZLIB_VERSION[0] ||
stream_size != (int)(sizeof(z_stream)))
return Z_VERSION_ERROR;
if (strm == Z_NULL) return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
strm->msg = Z_NULL; /* in case we return an error */
if (strm->zalloc == (alloc_func)0) {
#ifdef Z_SOLO
return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
#else
strm->zalloc = zcalloc;
strm->opaque = (voidpf)0;
#endif
}
if (strm->zfree == (free_func)0)
#ifdef Z_SOLO
return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
#else
strm->zfree = zcfree;
#endif
state = (struct inflate_state FAR *)
ZALLOC(strm, 1, sizeof(struct inflate_state));
if (state == Z_NULL) return Z_MEM_ERROR;
Tracev((stderr, "inflate: allocated\n"));
strm->state = (struct internal_state FAR *)state;
state->window = Z_NULL;
ret = inflateReset2(strm, windowBits);
if (ret != Z_OK) {
ZFREE(strm, state);
strm->state = Z_NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Avoid shifts of negative values inflateMark().
The C standard says that bit shifts of negative integers is
undefined. This casts to unsigned values to assure a known
result.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 72,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct priv *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_cipher(ctx->child);
crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tweak);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int show_timer(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct k_itimer *timer;
struct timers_private *tp = m->private;
int notify;
static const char * const nstr[] = {
[SIGEV_SIGNAL] = "signal",
[SIGEV_NONE] = "none",
[SIGEV_THREAD] = "thread",
};
timer = list_entry((struct list_head *)v, struct k_itimer, list);
notify = timer->it_sigev_notify;
seq_printf(m, "ID: %d\n", timer->it_id);
seq_printf(m, "signal: %d/%p\n",
timer->sigq->info.si_signo,
timer->sigq->info.si_value.sival_ptr);
seq_printf(m, "notify: %s/%s.%d\n",
nstr[notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID],
(notify & SIGEV_THREAD_ID) ? "tid" : "pid",
pid_nr_ns(timer->it_pid, tp->ns));
seq_printf(m, "ClockID: %d\n", timer->it_clock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int raw_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) uaddr;
u32 tb_id = RT_TABLE_LOCAL;
int ret = -EINVAL;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
goto out;
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
tb_id = l3mdev_fib_table_by_index(sock_net(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if) ? : tb_id;
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type_table(sock_net(sk), addr->sin_addr.s_addr,
tb_id);
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (addr->sin_addr.s_addr && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = addr->sin_addr.s_addr;
if (chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */
sk_dst_reset(sk);
ret = 0;
out: return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: ipv4: fix for a race condition in raw_sendmsg
inet->hdrincl is racy, and could lead to uninitialized stack pointer
usage, so its value should be read only once.
Fixes: c008ba5bdc9f ("ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after raw_probe_proto_opt")
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 59,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::fillAvailableMeasure(LayoutUnit availableLogicalWidth) const
{
LayoutUnit marginStart = 0;
LayoutUnit marginEnd = 0;
return fillAvailableMeasure(availableLogicalWidth, marginStart, marginEnd);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ServiceWorkerContextCore::GetClientProviderHostIterator(
const GURL& origin,
bool include_reserved_clients) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
return base::WrapUnique(new ProviderHostIterator(
providers_.get(), base::BindRepeating(IsSameOriginClientProviderHost,
origin, include_reserved_clients)));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void convert_4u32s_C1R(const OPJ_BYTE* pSrc, OPJ_INT32* pDst,
OPJ_SIZE_T length)
{
OPJ_SIZE_T i;
for (i = 0; i < (length & ~(OPJ_SIZE_T)1U); i += 2U) {
OPJ_UINT32 val = *pSrc++;
pDst[i + 0] = (OPJ_INT32)(val >> 4);
pDst[i + 1] = (OPJ_INT32)(val & 0xFU);
}
if (length & 1U) {
OPJ_UINT8 val = *pSrc++;
pDst[i + 0] = (OPJ_INT32)(val >> 4);
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 61,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t pxa2xx_mm_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
unsigned size)
{
PXA2xxState *s = (PXA2xxState *) opaque;
switch (addr) {
case MDCNFG ... SA1110:
if ((addr & 3) == 0)
return s->mm_regs[addr >> 2];
default:
printf("%s: Bad register " REG_FMT "\n", __FUNCTION__, addr);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::notifyFlushRequired(const GraphicsLayer*)
{
scheduleRootLayerCommit();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x25_device_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event,
void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
struct x25_neigh *nb;
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), &init_net))
return NOTIFY_DONE;
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_X25
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LLC)
|| dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER
#endif
) {
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_UP:
x25_link_device_up(dev);
break;
case NETDEV_GOING_DOWN:
nb = x25_get_neigh(dev);
if (nb) {
x25_terminate_link(nb);
x25_neigh_put(nb);
}
break;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
x25_kill_by_device(dev);
x25_route_device_down(dev);
x25_link_device_down(dev);
break;
}
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaCookieManagerService::ExternalCcResultFetcher::TimeoutForTests() {
Timeout();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 129,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_send_dreq(struct ib_ucm_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
return ib_ucm_send_private_data(file, inbuf, in_len, ib_send_cm_dreq);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnForwardResourceTimingToParent(
const ResourceTimingInfo& resource_timing) {
if (!is_active())
return;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node()->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (!proxy) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RFH_NO_PROXY_TO_PARENT);
return;
}
proxy->Send(new FrameMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent(proxy->GetRoutingID(),
resource_timing));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::startSSHD( int /*cmd*/, Stream* s )
{
MyString error_msg;
Sock *sock = (Sock*)s;
char const *fqu = sock->getFullyQualifiedUser();
MyString job_owner;
getJobOwnerFQUOrDummy(job_owner);
if( !fqu || job_owner != fqu ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Unauthorized attempt to start sshd by '%s'\n",
fqu ? fqu : "");
return FALSE;
}
ClassAd input;
s->decode();
if( !input.initFromStream(*s) || !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to read request in START_SSHD.\n");
return FALSE;
}
#if !defined(HAVE_SSH_TO_JOB)
return SSHDFailed(s,"This version of condor_starter does not support ssh access.");
#else
ClassAd *jobad = NULL;
ClassAd *machinead = NULL;
if( jic ) {
jobad = jic->jobClassAd();
machinead = jic->machClassAd();
}
bool enabled = param_boolean("ENABLE_SSH_TO_JOB",true,true,machinead,jobad);
if( !enabled ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"Rejecting request, because ENABLE_SSH_TO_JOB=false");
}
if( !jic || !jobad ) {
return SSHDRetry(s,"Rejecting request, because job not yet initialized.");
}
if( !m_job_environment_is_ready ) {
return SSHDRetry(s,"Rejecting request, because the job execution environment is not yet ready.");
}
if( m_all_jobs_done ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"Rejecting request, because the job is finished.");
}
if( suspended ) {
return SSHDRetry(s,"This slot is currently suspended.");
}
MyString preferred_shells;
input.LookupString(ATTR_SHELL,preferred_shells);
MyString slot_name;
input.LookupString(ATTR_NAME,slot_name);
if( !jic->userPrivInitialized() ) {
return SSHDRetry(s,"Rejecting request, because job execution account not yet established.");
}
MyString libexec;
if( !param(libexec,"LIBEXEC") ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"LIBEXEC not defined, so cannot find condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup");
}
MyString ssh_to_job_sshd_setup;
MyString ssh_to_job_shell_setup;
ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.sprintf(
"%s%ccondor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup",libexec.Value(),DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
ssh_to_job_shell_setup.sprintf(
"%s%ccondor_ssh_to_job_shell_setup",libexec.Value(),DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
if( access(ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.Value(),X_OK)!=0 ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"Cannot execute %s: %s",
ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.Value(),strerror(errno));
}
if( access(ssh_to_job_shell_setup.Value(),X_OK)!=0 ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"Cannot execute %s: %s",
ssh_to_job_shell_setup.Value(),strerror(errno));
}
MyString sshd_config_template;
if( !param(sshd_config_template,"SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE") ) {
if( param(sshd_config_template,"LIB") ) {
sshd_config_template.sprintf_cat("%ccondor_ssh_to_job_sshd_config_template",DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
}
else {
return SSHDFailed(s,"SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD_CONFIG_TEMPLATE and LIB are not defined. At least one of them is required.");
}
}
if( access(sshd_config_template.Value(),F_OK)!=0 ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"%s does not exist!",sshd_config_template.Value());
}
MyString ssh_keygen;
MyString ssh_keygen_args;
ArgList ssh_keygen_arglist;
param(ssh_keygen,"SSH_TO_JOB_SSH_KEYGEN","/usr/bin/ssh-keygen");
param(ssh_keygen_args,"SSH_TO_JOB_SSH_KEYGEN_ARGS","\"-N '' -C '' -q -f %f -t rsa\"");
ssh_keygen_arglist.AppendArg(ssh_keygen.Value());
if( !ssh_keygen_arglist.AppendArgsV2Quoted(ssh_keygen_args.Value(),&error_msg) ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,
"SSH_TO_JOB_SSH_KEYGEN_ARGS is misconfigured: %s",
error_msg.Value());
}
MyString client_keygen_args;
input.LookupString(ATTR_SSH_KEYGEN_ARGS,client_keygen_args);
if( !ssh_keygen_arglist.AppendArgsV2Raw(client_keygen_args.Value(),&error_msg) ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,
"Failed to produce ssh-keygen arg list: %s",
error_msg.Value());
}
MyString ssh_keygen_cmd;
if(!ssh_keygen_arglist.GetArgsStringSystem(&ssh_keygen_cmd,0,&error_msg)) {
return SSHDFailed(s,
"Failed to produce ssh-keygen command string: %s",
error_msg.Value());
}
int setup_pipe_fds[2];
setup_pipe_fds[0] = -1;
setup_pipe_fds[1] = -1;
if( !daemonCore->Create_Pipe(setup_pipe_fds) ) {
return SSHDFailed(
s,"Failed to create pipe for condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.");
}
int setup_std_fds[3];
setup_std_fds[0] = 0;
setup_std_fds[1] = setup_pipe_fds[1]; // write end of pipe
setup_std_fds[2] = setup_pipe_fds[1];
Env setup_env;
if( !GetJobEnv( jobad, &setup_env, &error_msg ) ) {
return SSHDFailed(
s,"Failed to get job environment: %s",error_msg.Value());
}
if( !slot_name.IsEmpty() ) {
setup_env.SetEnv("_CONDOR_SLOT_NAME",slot_name.Value());
}
int setup_opt_mask = 0;
if (!param_boolean("JOB_INHERITS_STARTER_ENVIRONMENT",false)) {
setup_opt_mask = DCJOBOPT_NO_ENV_INHERIT;
}
if( !preferred_shells.IsEmpty() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,
"Checking preferred shells: %s\n",preferred_shells.Value());
StringList shells(preferred_shells.Value(),",");
shells.rewind();
char *shell;
while( (shell=shells.next()) ) {
if( access(shell,X_OK)==0 ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Will use shell %s\n",shell);
setup_env.SetEnv("_CONDOR_SHELL",shell);
break;
}
}
}
ArgList setup_args;
setup_args.AppendArg(ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.Value());
setup_args.AppendArg(GetWorkingDir());
setup_args.AppendArg(ssh_to_job_shell_setup.Value());
setup_args.AppendArg(sshd_config_template.Value());
setup_args.AppendArg(ssh_keygen_cmd.Value());
int setup_reaper = 1;
int setup_pid;
if( privSepHelper() ) {
setup_pid = privSepHelper()->create_process(
ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.Value(),
setup_args,
setup_env,
GetWorkingDir(),
setup_std_fds,
NULL,
0,
NULL,
setup_reaper,
setup_opt_mask,
NULL);
}
else {
setup_pid = daemonCore->Create_Process(
ssh_to_job_sshd_setup.Value(),
setup_args,
PRIV_USER_FINAL,
setup_reaper,
FALSE,
&setup_env,
GetWorkingDir(),
NULL,
NULL,
setup_std_fds,
NULL,
0,
NULL,
setup_opt_mask);
}
daemonCore->Close_Pipe(setup_pipe_fds[1]); // write-end of pipe
char *setup_output = NULL;
int setup_output_len = 0;
char pipe_buf[1024];
while( true ) {
int n = daemonCore->Read_Pipe(setup_pipe_fds[0],pipe_buf,1024);
if( n <= 0 ) {
break;
}
char *old_setup_output = setup_output;
setup_output = (char *)realloc(setup_output,setup_output_len+n+1);
if( !setup_output ) {
free( old_setup_output );
daemonCore->Close_Pipe(setup_pipe_fds[0]); // read-end of pipe
return SSHDFailed(s,"Out of memory");
}
memcpy(setup_output+setup_output_len,pipe_buf,n);
setup_output_len += n;
setup_output[setup_output_len] = '\0';
}
daemonCore->Close_Pipe(setup_pipe_fds[0]); // read-end of pipe
if( find_str_in_buffer(setup_output,setup_output_len,"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup SUCCESS") < 0 ) {
error_msg.sprintf("condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup failed: %s",
setup_output);
free( setup_output );
return SSHDFailed(s,"%s",error_msg.Value());
}
bool rc = true;
MyString session_dir;
if( rc ) {
rc = extract_delimited_data(
setup_output,
setup_output_len,
"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup SSHD DIR BEGIN\n",
"\ncondor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup SSHD DIR END\n",
session_dir,
&error_msg);
}
MyString sshd_user;
if( rc ) {
rc = extract_delimited_data(
setup_output,
setup_output_len,
"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup SSHD USER BEGIN\n",
"\ncondor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup SSHD USER END\n",
sshd_user,
&error_msg);
}
MyString public_host_key;
if( rc ) {
rc = extract_delimited_data_as_base64(
setup_output,
setup_output_len,
"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup PUBLIC SERVER KEY BEGIN\n",
"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup PUBLIC SERVER KEY END\n",
public_host_key,
&error_msg);
}
MyString private_client_key;
if( rc ) {
rc = extract_delimited_data_as_base64(
setup_output,
setup_output_len,
"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup AUTHORIZED CLIENT KEY BEGIN\n",
"condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup AUTHORIZED CLIENT KEY END\n",
private_client_key,
&error_msg);
}
free( setup_output );
if( !rc ) {
MyString msg;
return SSHDFailed(s,
"Failed to parse output of condor_ssh_to_job_sshd_setup: %s",
error_msg.Value());
}
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"StartSSHD: session_dir='%s'\n",session_dir.Value());
MyString sshd_config_file;
sshd_config_file.sprintf("%s%csshd_config",session_dir.Value(),DIR_DELIM_CHAR);
MyString sshd;
param(sshd,"SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD","/usr/sbin/sshd");
if( access(sshd.Value(),X_OK)!=0 ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,"Failed, because sshd not correctly configured (SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD=%s): %s.",sshd.Value(),strerror(errno));
}
ArgList sshd_arglist;
MyString sshd_arg_string;
param(sshd_arg_string,"SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD_ARGS","\"-i -e -f %f\"");
if( !sshd_arglist.AppendArgsV2Quoted(sshd_arg_string.Value(),&error_msg) )
{
return SSHDFailed(s,"Invalid SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD_ARGS (%s): %s",
sshd_arg_string.Value(),error_msg.Value());
}
char **argarray = sshd_arglist.GetStringArray();
sshd_arglist.Clear();
for(int i=0; argarray[i]; i++) {
char const *ptr;
MyString new_arg;
for(ptr=argarray[i]; *ptr; ptr++) {
if( *ptr == '%' ) {
ptr += 1;
if( *ptr == '%' ) {
new_arg += '%';
}
else if( *ptr == 'f' ) {
new_arg += sshd_config_file.Value();
}
else {
return SSHDFailed(s,
"Unexpected %%%c in SSH_TO_JOB_SSHD_ARGS: %s\n",
*ptr ? *ptr : ' ', sshd_arg_string.Value());
}
}
else {
new_arg += *ptr;
}
}
sshd_arglist.AppendArg(new_arg.Value());
}
deleteStringArray(argarray);
argarray = NULL;
ClassAd sshd_ad;
sshd_ad.CopyAttribute(ATTR_REMOTE_USER,jobad);
sshd_ad.CopyAttribute(ATTR_JOB_RUNAS_OWNER,jobad);
sshd_ad.Assign(ATTR_JOB_CMD,sshd.Value());
CondorVersionInfo ver_info;
if( !sshd_arglist.InsertArgsIntoClassAd(&sshd_ad,&ver_info,&error_msg) ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,
"Failed to insert args into sshd job description: %s",
error_msg.Value());
}
if( !setup_env.InsertEnvIntoClassAd(&sshd_ad,&error_msg,NULL,&ver_info) ) {
return SSHDFailed(s,
"Failed to insert environment into sshd job description: %s",
error_msg.Value());
}
ClassAd response;
response.Assign(ATTR_RESULT,true);
response.Assign(ATTR_REMOTE_USER,sshd_user);
response.Assign(ATTR_SSH_PUBLIC_SERVER_KEY,public_host_key.Value());
response.Assign(ATTR_SSH_PRIVATE_CLIENT_KEY,private_client_key.Value());
s->encode();
if( !response.put(*s) || !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to send response to START_SSHD.\n");
return FALSE;
}
MyString sshd_log_fname;
sshd_log_fname.sprintf(
"%s%c%s",session_dir.Value(),DIR_DELIM_CHAR,"sshd.log");
int std[3];
char const *std_fname[3];
std[0] = sock->get_file_desc();
std_fname[0] = "stdin";
std[1] = sock->get_file_desc();
std_fname[1] = "stdout";
std[2] = -1;
std_fname[2] = sshd_log_fname.Value();
SSHDProc *proc = new SSHDProc(&sshd_ad);
if( !proc ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to create SSHDProc.\n");
return FALSE;
}
if( !proc->StartJob(std,std_fname) ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"Failed to start sshd.\n");
return FALSE;
}
m_job_list.Append(proc);
if( this->suspended ) {
proc->Suspend();
}
return TRUE;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btm_sec_set_security_level (CONNECTION_TYPE conn_type, char *p_name, UINT8 service_id,
UINT16 sec_level, UINT16 psm, UINT32 mx_proto_id,
UINT32 mx_chan_id)
{
tBTM_SEC_SERV_REC *p_srec;
UINT16 index;
UINT16 first_unused_record = BTM_NO_AVAIL_SEC_SERVICES;
BOOLEAN record_allocated = FALSE;
BOOLEAN is_originator;
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
BOOLEAN is_ucd;
if (conn_type & CONNECTION_TYPE_ORIG_MASK)
is_originator = TRUE;
else
is_originator = FALSE;
if (conn_type & CONNECTION_TYPE_CONNLESS_MASK )
{
is_ucd = TRUE;
}
else
{
is_ucd = FALSE;
}
#else
is_originator = conn_type;
#endif
/* See if the record can be reused (same service name, psm, mx_proto_id,
service_id, and mx_chan_id), or obtain the next unused record */
p_srec = &btm_cb.sec_serv_rec[0];
for (index = 0; index < BTM_SEC_MAX_SERVICE_RECORDS; index++, p_srec++)
{
/* Check if there is already a record for this service */
if (p_srec->security_flags & BTM_SEC_IN_USE)
{
#if BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN > 0
if (p_srec->psm == psm &&
p_srec->mx_proto_id == mx_proto_id &&
service_id == p_srec->service_id &&
(!strncmp (p_name, (char *) p_srec->orig_service_name,
BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN) ||
!strncmp (p_name, (char *) p_srec->term_service_name,
BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN)))
#else
if (p_srec->psm == psm &&
p_srec->mx_proto_id == mx_proto_id &&
service_id == p_srec->service_id)
#endif
{
record_allocated = TRUE;
break;
}
}
/* Mark the first available service record */
else if (!record_allocated)
{
memset (p_srec, 0, sizeof(tBTM_SEC_SERV_REC));
record_allocated = TRUE;
first_unused_record = index;
}
}
if (!record_allocated)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING("BTM_SEC_REG: Out of Service Records (%d)", BTM_SEC_MAX_SERVICE_RECORDS);
return(record_allocated);
}
/* Process the request if service record is valid */
/* If a duplicate service wasn't found, use the first available */
if (index >= BTM_SEC_MAX_SERVICE_RECORDS)
{
index = first_unused_record;
p_srec = &btm_cb.sec_serv_rec[index];
}
p_srec->psm = psm;
p_srec->service_id = service_id;
p_srec->mx_proto_id = mx_proto_id;
if (is_originator)
{
p_srec->orig_mx_chan_id = mx_chan_id;
#if BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN > 0
BCM_STRNCPY_S ((char *)p_srec->orig_service_name, sizeof(p_srec->orig_service_name), p_name, BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN);
#endif
/* clear out the old setting, just in case it exists */
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if ( is_ucd )
{
p_srec->ucd_security_flags &=
~(BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT | BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_MITM |
BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_MASTER | BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_SLAVE);
}
else
#endif
{
p_srec->security_flags &=
~(BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT | BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_MITM |
BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_MASTER | BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_SLAVE);
}
/* Parameter validation. Originator should not set requirements for incoming connections */
sec_level &= ~(BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_MITM);
if (btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SP)
{
if (sec_level & BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE)
sec_level |= BTM_SEC_OUT_MITM;
}
/* Make sure the authenticate bit is set, when encrypt bit is set */
if (sec_level & BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT)
sec_level |= BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE;
/* outgoing connections usually set the security level right before
* the connection is initiated.
* set it to be the outgoing service */
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if ( is_ucd == FALSE )
#endif
{
btm_cb.p_out_serv = p_srec;
}
}
else
{
p_srec->term_mx_chan_id = mx_chan_id;
#if BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN > 0
BCM_STRNCPY_S ((char *)p_srec->term_service_name, sizeof(p_srec->term_service_name), p_name, BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN);
#endif
/* clear out the old setting, just in case it exists */
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if ( is_ucd )
{
p_srec->ucd_security_flags &=
~(BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_MITM |
BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_MASTER | BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_SLAVE);
}
else
#endif
{
p_srec->security_flags &=
~(BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT | BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_IN_MITM |
BTM_SEC_FORCE_MASTER | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_MASTER | BTM_SEC_FORCE_SLAVE | BTM_SEC_ATTEMPT_SLAVE);
}
/* Parameter validation. Acceptor should not set requirements for outgoing connections */
sec_level &= ~(BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHORIZE | BTM_SEC_OUT_ENCRYPT | BTM_SEC_OUT_AUTHENTICATE | BTM_SEC_OUT_MITM);
if (btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SP)
{
if (sec_level & BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE)
sec_level |= BTM_SEC_IN_MITM;
}
/* Make sure the authenticate bit is set, when encrypt bit is set */
if (sec_level & BTM_SEC_IN_ENCRYPT)
sec_level |= BTM_SEC_IN_AUTHENTICATE;
}
#if (L2CAP_UCD_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if ( is_ucd )
{
p_srec->security_flags |= (UINT16)(BTM_SEC_IN_USE);
p_srec->ucd_security_flags |= (UINT16)(sec_level | BTM_SEC_IN_USE);
}
else
{
p_srec->security_flags |= (UINT16)(sec_level | BTM_SEC_IN_USE);
}
BTM_TRACE_API("BTM_SEC_REG[%d]: id %d, conn_type 0x%x, psm 0x%04x, proto_id %d, chan_id %d",
index, service_id, conn_type, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id);
BTM_TRACE_API(" : security_flags: 0x%04x, ucd_security_flags: 0x%04x",
p_srec->security_flags, p_srec->ucd_security_flags);
#if BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN > 0
BTM_TRACE_API(" : service name [%s] (up to %d chars saved)",
p_name, BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN);
#endif
#else
p_srec->security_flags |= (UINT16)(sec_level | BTM_SEC_IN_USE);
BTM_TRACE_API("BTM_SEC_REG[%d]: id %d, is_orig %d, psm 0x%04x, proto_id %d, chan_id %d",
index, service_id, is_originator, psm, mx_proto_id, mx_chan_id);
#if BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN > 0
BTM_TRACE_API(" : sec: 0x%x, service name [%s] (up to %d chars saved)",
p_srec->security_flags, p_name, BTM_SEC_SERVICE_NAME_LEN);
#endif
#endif
return(record_allocated);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_run(gchar* command, gchar* file) {
gchar* cmd;
int retval=0;
if(command && *command) {
cmd = g_strdup_printf(command, file);
retval=system(cmd);
g_free(cmd);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,427 |
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