instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t dbg_lvl_store(struct device_driver *dd, const char *buf,
size_t count)
{
int retval = count;
if (sscanf(buf, "%u", &megasas_dbg_lvl) < 1) {
printk(KERN_ERR "megasas: could not set dbg_lvl\n");
retval = -EINVAL;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* CMSEXPORT cmsDupNamedColorList(const cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NewNC;
if (v == NULL) return NULL;
NewNC= cmsAllocNamedColorList(v ->ContextID, v -> nColors, v ->ColorantCount, v ->Prefix, v ->Suffix);
if (NewNC == NULL) return NULL;
while (NewNC ->Allocated < v ->Allocated)
GrowNamedColorList(NewNC);
memmove(NewNC ->Prefix, v ->Prefix, sizeof(v ->Prefix));
memmove(NewNC ->Suffix, v ->Suffix, sizeof(v ->Suffix));
NewNC ->ColorantCount = v ->ColorantCount;
memmove(NewNC->List, v ->List, v->nColors * sizeof(_cmsNAMEDCOLOR));
NewNC ->nColors = v ->nColors;
return NewNC;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 40,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_pi_state(struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(!atomic_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount));
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int validateseparationspace(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref **space)
{
int code = 0;
ref *sepspace = *space;
ref nameref, sref, sname, altspace, tref;
if (!r_is_array(sepspace))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* Validate parameters, check we have enough operands */
if (r_size(sepspace) != 4)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
/* Check separation name is a string or name object */
code = array_get(imemory, sepspace, 1, &sname);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&sname, t_name)) {
if (!r_has_type(&sname, t_string))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
else {
code = name_from_string(imemory, &sname, &sname);
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
}
/* Check the tint transform is a procedure */
code = array_get(imemory, sepspace, 3, &tref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
check_proc(tref);
/* Get the name of the alternate space */
code = array_get(imemory, sepspace, 2, &altspace);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (r_has_type(&altspace, t_name))
ref_assign(&nameref, &altspace);
else {
/* Make sure the alternate space is an array */
if (!r_is_array(&altspace))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
/* And has a name for its type */
code = array_get(imemory, &altspace, 0, &tref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tref, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
ref_assign(&nameref, &tref);
}
/* Convert alternate space name to string */
name_string_ref(imemory, &nameref, &sref);
/* Check its not /Indexed or /Pattern or /DeviceN */
if (r_size(&sref) == 7) {
if (strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "Indexed", 7) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "Pattern", 7) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "DeviceN", 7) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
}
/* and also not /Separation */
if (r_size(&sref) == 9 && strncmp((const char *)sref.value.const_bytes, "Separation", 9) == 0)
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
ref_assign(*space, &altspace);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StackTrace::OutputToStream(std::ostream* os) const {
StreamBacktraceOutputHandler handler(os);
ProcessBacktrace(trace_, count_, &handler);
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smb1cli_conn_set_encryption(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
struct smb_trans_enc_state *es)
{
/* Replace the old state, if any. */
if (conn->smb1.trans_enc) {
TALLOC_FREE(conn->smb1.trans_enc);
}
conn->smb1.trans_enc = es;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cipher_init(unsigned long state, const void *iv,
size_t iv_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *o;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *key1;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) iv, iv_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
key1 = o->attr;
if (tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key2, &o) == TEE_SUCCESS) {
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *key2 = o->attr;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
res = crypto_cipher_init(cs->ctx, cs->algo, cs->mode,
(uint8_t *)(key1 + 1), key1->key_size,
(uint8_t *)(key2 + 1), key2->key_size,
iv, iv_len);
} else {
res = crypto_cipher_init(cs->ctx, cs->algo, cs->mode,
(uint8_t *)(key1 + 1), key1->key_size,
NULL, 0, iv, iv_len);
}
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
cs->ctx_finalize = crypto_cipher_final;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_inet_pton(int af, const char *src, void *dst)
{
#if defined(EVENT__HAVE_INET_PTON) && !defined(USE_INTERNAL_PTON)
return inet_pton(af, src, dst);
#else
if (af == AF_INET) {
unsigned a,b,c,d;
char more;
struct in_addr *addr = dst;
if (sscanf(src, "%u.%u.%u.%u%c", &a,&b,&c,&d,&more) != 4)
return 0;
if (a > 255) return 0;
if (b > 255) return 0;
if (c > 255) return 0;
if (d > 255) return 0;
addr->s_addr = htonl((a<<24) | (b<<16) | (c<<8) | d);
return 1;
#ifdef AF_INET6
} else if (af == AF_INET6) {
struct in6_addr *out = dst;
ev_uint16_t words[8];
int gapPos = -1, i, setWords=0;
const char *dot = strchr(src, '.');
const char *eow; /* end of words. */
if (dot == src)
return 0;
else if (!dot)
eow = src+strlen(src);
else {
unsigned byte1,byte2,byte3,byte4;
char more;
for (eow = dot-1; eow >= src && EVUTIL_ISDIGIT_(*eow); --eow)
;
++eow;
/* We use "scanf" because some platform inet_aton()s are too lax
* about IPv4 addresses of the form "1.2.3" */
if (sscanf(eow, "%u.%u.%u.%u%c",
&byte1,&byte2,&byte3,&byte4,&more) != 4)
return 0;
if (byte1 > 255 ||
byte2 > 255 ||
byte3 > 255 ||
byte4 > 255)
return 0;
words[6] = (byte1<<8) | byte2;
words[7] = (byte3<<8) | byte4;
setWords += 2;
}
i = 0;
while (src < eow) {
if (i > 7)
return 0;
if (EVUTIL_ISXDIGIT_(*src)) {
char *next;
long r = strtol(src, &next, 16);
if (next > 4+src)
return 0;
if (next == src)
return 0;
if (r<0 || r>65536)
return 0;
words[i++] = (ev_uint16_t)r;
setWords++;
src = next;
if (*src != ':' && src != eow)
return 0;
++src;
} else if (*src == ':' && i > 0 && gapPos==-1) {
gapPos = i;
++src;
} else if (*src == ':' && i == 0 && src[1] == ':' && gapPos==-1) {
gapPos = i;
src += 2;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
if (setWords > 8 ||
(setWords == 8 && gapPos != -1) ||
(setWords < 8 && gapPos == -1))
return 0;
if (gapPos >= 0) {
int nToMove = setWords - (dot ? 2 : 0) - gapPos;
int gapLen = 8 - setWords;
/* assert(nToMove >= 0); */
if (nToMove < 0)
return -1; /* should be impossible */
memmove(&words[gapPos+gapLen], &words[gapPos],
sizeof(ev_uint16_t)*nToMove);
memset(&words[gapPos], 0, sizeof(ev_uint16_t)*gapLen);
}
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i) {
out->s6_addr[2*i ] = words[i] >> 8;
out->s6_addr[2*i+1] = words[i] & 0xff;
}
return 1;
#endif
} else {
return -1;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned short ReadDCMShort(DCMStreamInfo *stream_info,Image *image)
{
int
shift,
byte;
unsigned short
value;
if (image->compression != RLECompression)
return(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
shift=image->depth < 16 ? 4 : 8;
value=(unsigned short) ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
byte=ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image);
if (byte < 0)
return(0);
value|=(unsigned short) (byte << shift);
return(value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 77,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: point_copy(Point *pt)
{
Point *result;
if (!PointerIsValid(pt))
return NULL;
result = (Point *) palloc(sizeof(Point));
result->x = pt->x;
result->y = pt->y;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hash_uint32(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, unsigned i)
{
unsigned char intblk[4];
PUT_32BIT(intblk, i);
h->bytes(s, intblk, 4);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabsMoveFunction::MoveTab(int tab_id,
int* new_index,
int iteration,
base::ListValue* tab_values,
int* window_id,
std::string* error) {
Browser* source_browser = NULL;
TabStripModel* source_tab_strip = NULL;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
int tab_index = -1;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, browser_context(), include_incognito_information(),
&source_browser, &source_tab_strip, &contents, &tab_index,
error)) {
return false;
}
if (!source_browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
*error = tabs_constants::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
*new_index += iteration;
if (window_id) {
Browser* target_browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, *window_id, &target_browser, error))
return false;
if (!target_browser->window()->IsTabStripEditable()) {
*error = tabs_constants::kTabStripNotEditableError;
return false;
}
if (!target_browser->is_type_tabbed()) {
*error = tabs_constants::kCanOnlyMoveTabsWithinNormalWindowsError;
return false;
}
if (target_browser->profile() != source_browser->profile()) {
*error = tabs_constants::kCanOnlyMoveTabsWithinSameProfileError;
return false;
}
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowId(target_browser) !=
ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowId(source_browser)) {
TabStripModel* target_tab_strip = target_browser->tab_strip_model();
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> web_contents =
source_tab_strip->DetachWebContentsAt(tab_index);
if (!web_contents) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
tabs_constants::kTabNotFoundError, base::IntToString(tab_id));
return false;
}
if (*new_index > target_tab_strip->count() || *new_index < 0)
*new_index = target_tab_strip->count();
content::WebContents* web_contents_raw = web_contents.get();
target_tab_strip->InsertWebContentsAt(*new_index, std::move(web_contents),
TabStripModel::ADD_NONE);
if (has_callback()) {
tab_values->Append(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabObject(
web_contents_raw, ExtensionTabUtil::kScrubTab,
extension(), target_tab_strip, *new_index)
->ToValue());
}
return true;
}
}
if (*new_index >= source_tab_strip->count() || *new_index < 0)
*new_index = source_tab_strip->count() - 1;
if (*new_index != tab_index)
source_tab_strip->MoveWebContentsAt(tab_index, *new_index, false);
if (has_callback()) {
tab_values->Append(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabObject(
contents, ExtensionTabUtil::kScrubTab, extension(),
source_tab_strip, *new_index)
->ToValue());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int decide_ac_pred(MpegEncContext *s, int16_t block[6][64],
const int dir[6], uint8_t *st[6],
int zigzag_last_index[6])
{
int score = 0;
int i, n;
int8_t *const qscale_table = s->current_picture.qscale_table;
memcpy(zigzag_last_index, s->block_last_index, sizeof(int) * 6);
for (n = 0; n < 6; n++) {
int16_t *ac_val, *ac_val1;
score -= get_block_rate(s, block[n], s->block_last_index[n],
s->intra_scantable.permutated);
ac_val = s->ac_val[0][0] + s->block_index[n] * 16;
ac_val1 = ac_val;
if (dir[n]) {
const int xy = s->mb_x + s->mb_y * s->mb_stride - s->mb_stride;
/* top prediction */
ac_val -= s->block_wrap[n] * 16;
if (s->mb_y == 0 || s->qscale == qscale_table[xy] || n == 2 || n == 3) {
/* same qscale */
for (i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
const int level = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i]];
block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i]] = level - ac_val[i + 8];
ac_val1[i] = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i << 3]];
ac_val1[i + 8] = level;
}
} else {
/* different qscale, we must rescale */
for (i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
const int level = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i]];
block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i]] = level - ROUNDED_DIV(ac_val[i + 8] * qscale_table[xy], s->qscale);
ac_val1[i] = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i << 3]];
ac_val1[i + 8] = level;
}
}
st[n] = s->intra_h_scantable.permutated;
} else {
const int xy = s->mb_x - 1 + s->mb_y * s->mb_stride;
/* left prediction */
ac_val -= 16;
if (s->mb_x == 0 || s->qscale == qscale_table[xy] || n == 1 || n == 3) {
/* same qscale */
for (i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
const int level = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i << 3]];
block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i << 3]] = level - ac_val[i];
ac_val1[i] = level;
ac_val1[i + 8] = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i]];
}
} else {
/* different qscale, we must rescale */
for (i = 1; i < 8; i++) {
const int level = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i << 3]];
block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i << 3]] = level - ROUNDED_DIV(ac_val[i] * qscale_table[xy], s->qscale);
ac_val1[i] = level;
ac_val1[i + 8] = block[n][s->idsp.idct_permutation[i]];
}
}
st[n] = s->intra_v_scantable.permutated;
}
for (i = 63; i > 0; i--) // FIXME optimize
if (block[n][st[n][i]])
break;
s->block_last_index[n] = i;
score += get_block_rate(s, block[n], s->block_last_index[n], st[n]);
}
if (score < 0) {
return 1;
} else {
restore_ac_coeffs(s, block, dir, st, zigzag_last_index);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videoenc: Use 64 bit for times in mpeg4_encode_gop_header()
Fixes truncation
Fixes Assertion n <= 31 && value < (1U << n) failed at libavcodec/put_bits.h:169
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_2.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 81,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ExecuteJavaScript(
const base::string16& javascript,
const JavaScriptResultCallback& callback) {
CHECK(CanExecuteJavaScript());
int key = g_next_javascript_callback_id++;
Send(new FrameMsg_JavaScriptExecuteRequest(routing_id_,
javascript,
key, true));
javascript_callbacks_.emplace(key, callback);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int can_open_delegated(struct nfs_delegation *delegation, fmode_t fmode)
{
if (delegation == NULL)
return 0;
if ((delegation->type & fmode) != fmode)
return 0;
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATION_RETURNING, &delegation->flags))
return 0;
nfs_mark_delegation_referenced(delegation);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs_read(struct device_d *dev, FILE *file, void *buf, size_t insize)
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->priv;
if (insize > 1024)
insize = 1024;
if (insize && !kfifo_len(priv->fifo)) {
int ret = nfs_read_req(priv, file->pos, insize);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return kfifo_get(priv->fifo, buf, insize);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __sched wait_for_completion_killable(struct completion *x)
{
long t = wait_for_common(x, MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT, TASK_KILLABLE);
if (t == -ERESTARTSYS)
return t;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CSSStyleSheet::CanBeActivated(
const String& current_preferrable_name) const {
if (disabled())
return false;
if (owner_node_ && owner_node_->IsInShadowTree()) {
if (IsHTMLStyleElement(owner_node_) || IsSVGStyleElement(owner_node_))
return true;
if (IsHTMLLinkElement(owner_node_) &&
ToHTMLLinkElement(owner_node_)->IsImport())
return !IsAlternate();
}
if (!owner_node_ ||
owner_node_->getNodeType() == Node::kProcessingInstructionNode ||
!IsHTMLLinkElement(owner_node_) ||
!ToHTMLLinkElement(owner_node_)->IsEnabledViaScript()) {
if (!title_.IsEmpty() && title_ != current_preferrable_name)
return false;
}
if (IsAlternate() && title_.IsEmpty())
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY DeleteSecurityContext(PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
char* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phContext);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->DeleteSecurityContext == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->DeleteSecurityContext(phContext);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 167,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct bio *btrfs_dio_bio_alloc(struct block_device *bdev,
u64 first_sector, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
struct bio *bio;
bio = btrfs_bio_alloc(bdev, first_sector, BIO_MAX_PAGES, gfp_flags);
if (bio)
bio_associate_current(bio);
return bio;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryInternal(
const base::Optional<url::Origin>& origin,
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryRequest default_factory_request) {
auto* context = GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext();
bool bypass_redirect_checks = false;
network::mojom::TrustedURLLoaderHeaderClientPtrInfo header_client;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
context, this, GetProcess()->GetID(), false /* is_navigation */,
origin.value_or(url::Origin()), &default_factory_request,
&header_client, &bypass_redirect_checks);
}
devtools_instrumentation::WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
this, false /* is_navigation */, false /* is_download */,
&default_factory_request);
if (g_create_network_factory_callback_for_test.Get().is_null()) {
GetProcess()->CreateURLLoaderFactory(origin, std::move(header_client),
std::move(default_factory_request));
} else {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr original_factory;
GetProcess()->CreateURLLoaderFactory(origin, std::move(header_client),
mojo::MakeRequest(&original_factory));
g_create_network_factory_callback_for_test.Get().Run(
std::move(default_factory_request), GetProcess()->GetID(),
original_factory.PassInterface());
}
return bypass_redirect_checks;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_new_window(void *user_data, Evas_Object *webview, void *event_info)
{
Evas_Object **new_view = (Evas_Object **)event_info;
Browser_Window *window = window_create(NULL);
*new_view = window->webview;
windows = eina_list_append(windows, window);
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x25_wait_for_data(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
int rc = 0;
add_wait_queue_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
for (;;) {
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
rc = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
rc = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeout)
break;
rc = 0;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
release_sock(sk);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
} else
break;
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vm_entry_controls_reset_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
vmx->vm_entry_controls_shadow = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SocketStreamDispatcherHost::CancelSSLRequest(
const content::GlobalRequestID& id,
int error,
const net::SSLInfo* ssl_info) {
int socket_id = id.request_id;
DVLOG(1) << "SocketStreamDispatcherHost::CancelSSLRequest socket_id="
<< socket_id;
DCHECK_NE(content::kNoSocketId, socket_id);
SocketStreamHost* socket_stream_host = hosts_.Lookup(socket_id);
DCHECK(socket_stream_host);
if (ssl_info)
socket_stream_host->CancelWithSSLError(*ssl_info);
else
socket_stream_host->CancelWithError(error);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::HideDevToolsContainer() {
bool to_right = devtools_dock_side_ == DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_RIGHT;
gtk_container_remove(GTK_CONTAINER(to_right ? contents_hsplit_ :
contents_vsplit_),
devtools_container_->widget());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 34,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setJSTestObjLongLongSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setLongLongSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<long long>(exec, value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxColorSpace *GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::copy() {
return new GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_acquire(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_len != sizeof(struct sadb_msg)/8)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_seq == 0 || hdr->sadb_msg_errno == 0)
return 0;
x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, DUMMY_MARK, hdr->sadb_msg_seq);
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_ERROR;
wake_up(&net->xfrm.km_waitq);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock);
xfrm_state_put(x);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginHtmlDialog::Show() {
HtmlDialogWithoutContextMenuView* html_view =
new HtmlDialogWithoutContextMenuView(ProfileManager::GetDefaultProfile(),
this);
if (style_ & STYLE_BUBBLE) {
views::Window* bubble_window = BubbleWindow::Create(
parent_window_, gfx::Rect(),
static_cast<BubbleWindow::Style>(
BubbleWindow::STYLE_XBAR | BubbleWindow::STYLE_THROBBER),
html_view);
bubble_frame_view_ = static_cast<BubbleFrameView*>(
bubble_window->non_client_view()->frame_view());
} else {
views::Window::CreateChromeWindow(parent_window_, gfx::Rect(), html_view);
}
if (bubble_frame_view_) {
bubble_frame_view_->StartThrobber();
notification_registrar_.Add(this,
NotificationType::LOAD_COMPLETED_MAIN_FRAME,
NotificationService::AllSources());
}
html_view->InitDialog();
html_view->window()->Show();
is_open_ = true;
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isofile_register_hardlink(struct archive_write *a, struct isofile *file)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
struct hardlink *hl;
const char *pathname;
archive_entry_set_nlink(file->entry, 1);
pathname = archive_entry_hardlink(file->entry);
if (pathname == NULL) {
/* This `file` is a hardlink target. */
hl = malloc(sizeof(*hl));
if (hl == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
hl->nlink = 1;
/* A hardlink target must be the first position. */
file->hlnext = NULL;
hl->file_list.first = file;
hl->file_list.last = &(file->hlnext);
__archive_rb_tree_insert_node(&(iso9660->hardlink_rbtree),
(struct archive_rb_node *)hl);
} else {
hl = (struct hardlink *)__archive_rb_tree_find_node(
&(iso9660->hardlink_rbtree), pathname);
if (hl != NULL) {
/* Insert `file` entry into the tail. */
file->hlnext = NULL;
*hl->file_list.last = file;
hl->file_list.last = &(file->hlnext);
hl->nlink++;
}
archive_entry_unset_size(file->entry);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void signal_delivered(int sig, siginfo_t *info, struct k_sigaction *ka,
struct pt_regs *regs, int stepping)
{
sigset_t blocked;
/* A signal was successfully delivered, and the
saved sigmask was stored on the signal frame,
and will be restored by sigreturn. So we can
simply clear the restore sigmask flag. */
clear_restore_sigmask();
sigorsets(&blocked, ¤t->blocked, &ka->sa.sa_mask);
if (!(ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_NODEFER))
sigaddset(&blocked, sig);
set_current_blocked(&blocked);
tracehook_signal_handler(sig, info, ka, regs, stepping);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode override_login(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
char **userp, char **passwdp, char **optionsp)
{
bool user_changed = FALSE;
bool passwd_changed = FALSE;
CURLUcode uc;
if(data->set.str[STRING_USERNAME]) {
free(*userp);
*userp = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_USERNAME]);
if(!*userp)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
conn->bits.user_passwd = TRUE; /* enable user+password */
user_changed = TRUE;
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_PASSWORD]) {
free(*passwdp);
*passwdp = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_PASSWORD]);
if(!*passwdp)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
conn->bits.user_passwd = TRUE; /* enable user+password */
passwd_changed = TRUE;
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_OPTIONS]) {
free(*optionsp);
*optionsp = strdup(data->set.str[STRING_OPTIONS]);
if(!*optionsp)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
conn->bits.netrc = FALSE;
if(data->set.use_netrc != CURL_NETRC_IGNORED) {
char *nuser = NULL;
char *npasswd = NULL;
int ret;
if(data->set.use_netrc == CURL_NETRC_OPTIONAL)
nuser = *userp; /* to separate otherwise identical machines */
ret = Curl_parsenetrc(conn->host.name,
&nuser, &npasswd,
data->set.str[STRING_NETRC_FILE]);
if(ret > 0) {
infof(data, "Couldn't find host %s in the "
DOT_CHAR "netrc file; using defaults\n",
conn->host.name);
}
else if(ret < 0) {
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
else {
/* set bits.netrc TRUE to remember that we got the name from a .netrc
file, so that it is safe to use even if we followed a Location: to a
different host or similar. */
conn->bits.netrc = TRUE;
conn->bits.user_passwd = TRUE; /* enable user+password */
if(data->set.use_netrc == CURL_NETRC_OPTIONAL) {
/* prefer credentials outside netrc */
if(nuser && !*userp) {
free(*userp);
*userp = nuser;
user_changed = TRUE;
}
if(npasswd && !*passwdp) {
free(*passwdp);
*passwdp = npasswd;
passwd_changed = TRUE;
}
}
else {
/* prefer netrc credentials */
if(nuser) {
free(*userp);
*userp = nuser;
user_changed = TRUE;
}
if(npasswd) {
free(*passwdp);
*passwdp = npasswd;
passwd_changed = TRUE;
}
}
}
}
/* for updated strings, we update them in the URL */
if(user_changed) {
uc = curl_url_set(data->state.uh, CURLUPART_USER, *userp, 0);
if(uc)
return Curl_uc_to_curlcode(uc);
}
if(passwd_changed) {
uc = curl_url_set(data->state.uh, CURLUPART_PASSWORD, *passwdp, 0);
if(uc)
return Curl_uc_to_curlcode(uc);
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool vma_policy_mof(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct mempolicy *pol;
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->get_policy) {
bool ret = false;
pol = vma->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, vma->vm_start);
if (pol && (pol->flags & MPOL_F_MOF))
ret = true;
mpol_cond_put(pol);
return ret;
}
pol = vma->vm_policy;
if (!pol)
pol = get_task_policy(current);
return pol->flags & MPOL_F_MOF;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sas_discover_expander(struct domain_device *dev)
{
int res;
res = sas_notify_lldd_dev_found(dev);
if (res)
return res;
res = sas_ex_general(dev);
if (res)
goto out_err;
res = sas_ex_manuf_info(dev);
if (res)
goto out_err;
res = sas_expander_discover(dev);
if (res) {
SAS_DPRINTK("expander %016llx discovery failed(0x%x)\n",
SAS_ADDR(dev->sas_addr), res);
goto out_err;
}
sas_check_ex_subtractive_boundary(dev);
res = sas_check_parent_topology(dev);
if (res)
goto out_err;
return 0;
out_err:
sas_notify_lldd_dev_gone(dev);
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& PasswordInputType::FormControlType() const {
return InputTypeNames::password;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: point_slope(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *pt1 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
Point *pt2 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(point_sl(pt1, pt2));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tun_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[],
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::detachShader(WebGLProgram* program,
WebGLShader* shader) {
if (!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("detachShader", program) ||
!ValidateWebGLProgramOrShader("detachShader", shader))
return;
if (!program->DetachShader(shader)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "detachShader",
"shader not attached");
return;
}
ContextGL()->DetachShader(ObjectOrZero(program), ObjectOrZero(shader));
shader->OnDetached(ContextGL());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perContextEnabledLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "perContextEnabledLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setPerContextEnabledLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rds_send_xmit(struct rds_connection *conn)
{
struct rds_message *rm;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int tmp;
struct scatterlist *sg;
int ret = 0;
LIST_HEAD(to_be_dropped);
int batch_count;
unsigned long send_gen = 0;
restart:
batch_count = 0;
/*
* sendmsg calls here after having queued its message on the send
* queue. We only have one task feeding the connection at a time. If
* another thread is already feeding the queue then we back off. This
* avoids blocking the caller and trading per-connection data between
* caches per message.
*/
if (!acquire_in_xmit(conn)) {
rds_stats_inc(s_send_lock_contention);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/*
* we record the send generation after doing the xmit acquire.
* if someone else manages to jump in and do some work, we'll use
* this to avoid a goto restart farther down.
*
* The acquire_in_xmit() check above ensures that only one
* caller can increment c_send_gen at any time.
*/
conn->c_send_gen++;
send_gen = conn->c_send_gen;
/*
* rds_conn_shutdown() sets the conn state and then tests RDS_IN_XMIT,
* we do the opposite to avoid races.
*/
if (!rds_conn_up(conn)) {
release_in_xmit(conn);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
if (conn->c_trans->xmit_prepare)
conn->c_trans->xmit_prepare(conn);
/*
* spin trying to push headers and data down the connection until
* the connection doesn't make forward progress.
*/
while (1) {
rm = conn->c_xmit_rm;
/*
* If between sending messages, we can send a pending congestion
* map update.
*/
if (!rm && test_and_clear_bit(0, &conn->c_map_queued)) {
rm = rds_cong_update_alloc(conn);
if (IS_ERR(rm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(rm);
break;
}
rm->data.op_active = 1;
conn->c_xmit_rm = rm;
}
/*
* If not already working on one, grab the next message.
*
* c_xmit_rm holds a ref while we're sending this message down
* the connction. We can use this ref while holding the
* send_sem.. rds_send_reset() is serialized with it.
*/
if (!rm) {
unsigned int len;
batch_count++;
/* we want to process as big a batch as we can, but
* we also want to avoid softlockups. If we've been
* through a lot of messages, lets back off and see
* if anyone else jumps in
*/
if (batch_count >= send_batch_count)
goto over_batch;
spin_lock_irqsave(&conn->c_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&conn->c_send_queue)) {
rm = list_entry(conn->c_send_queue.next,
struct rds_message,
m_conn_item);
rds_message_addref(rm);
/*
* Move the message from the send queue to the retransmit
* list right away.
*/
list_move_tail(&rm->m_conn_item, &conn->c_retrans);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conn->c_lock, flags);
if (!rm)
break;
/* Unfortunately, the way Infiniband deals with
* RDMA to a bad MR key is by moving the entire
* queue pair to error state. We cold possibly
* recover from that, but right now we drop the
* connection.
* Therefore, we never retransmit messages with RDMA ops.
*/
if (rm->rdma.op_active &&
test_bit(RDS_MSG_RETRANSMITTED, &rm->m_flags)) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&conn->c_lock, flags);
if (test_and_clear_bit(RDS_MSG_ON_CONN, &rm->m_flags))
list_move(&rm->m_conn_item, &to_be_dropped);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&conn->c_lock, flags);
continue;
}
/* Require an ACK every once in a while */
len = ntohl(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len);
if (conn->c_unacked_packets == 0 ||
conn->c_unacked_bytes < len) {
__set_bit(RDS_MSG_ACK_REQUIRED, &rm->m_flags);
conn->c_unacked_packets = rds_sysctl_max_unacked_packets;
conn->c_unacked_bytes = rds_sysctl_max_unacked_bytes;
rds_stats_inc(s_send_ack_required);
} else {
conn->c_unacked_bytes -= len;
conn->c_unacked_packets--;
}
conn->c_xmit_rm = rm;
}
/* The transport either sends the whole rdma or none of it */
if (rm->rdma.op_active && !conn->c_xmit_rdma_sent) {
rm->m_final_op = &rm->rdma;
/* The transport owns the mapped memory for now.
* You can't unmap it while it's on the send queue
*/
set_bit(RDS_MSG_MAPPED, &rm->m_flags);
ret = conn->c_trans->xmit_rdma(conn, &rm->rdma);
if (ret) {
clear_bit(RDS_MSG_MAPPED, &rm->m_flags);
wake_up_interruptible(&rm->m_flush_wait);
break;
}
conn->c_xmit_rdma_sent = 1;
}
if (rm->atomic.op_active && !conn->c_xmit_atomic_sent) {
rm->m_final_op = &rm->atomic;
/* The transport owns the mapped memory for now.
* You can't unmap it while it's on the send queue
*/
set_bit(RDS_MSG_MAPPED, &rm->m_flags);
ret = conn->c_trans->xmit_atomic(conn, &rm->atomic);
if (ret) {
clear_bit(RDS_MSG_MAPPED, &rm->m_flags);
wake_up_interruptible(&rm->m_flush_wait);
break;
}
conn->c_xmit_atomic_sent = 1;
}
/*
* A number of cases require an RDS header to be sent
* even if there is no data.
* We permit 0-byte sends; rds-ping depends on this.
* However, if there are exclusively attached silent ops,
* we skip the hdr/data send, to enable silent operation.
*/
if (rm->data.op_nents == 0) {
int ops_present;
int all_ops_are_silent = 1;
ops_present = (rm->atomic.op_active || rm->rdma.op_active);
if (rm->atomic.op_active && !rm->atomic.op_silent)
all_ops_are_silent = 0;
if (rm->rdma.op_active && !rm->rdma.op_silent)
all_ops_are_silent = 0;
if (ops_present && all_ops_are_silent
&& !rm->m_rdma_cookie)
rm->data.op_active = 0;
}
if (rm->data.op_active && !conn->c_xmit_data_sent) {
rm->m_final_op = &rm->data;
ret = conn->c_trans->xmit(conn, rm,
conn->c_xmit_hdr_off,
conn->c_xmit_sg,
conn->c_xmit_data_off);
if (ret <= 0)
break;
if (conn->c_xmit_hdr_off < sizeof(struct rds_header)) {
tmp = min_t(int, ret,
sizeof(struct rds_header) -
conn->c_xmit_hdr_off);
conn->c_xmit_hdr_off += tmp;
ret -= tmp;
}
sg = &rm->data.op_sg[conn->c_xmit_sg];
while (ret) {
tmp = min_t(int, ret, sg->length -
conn->c_xmit_data_off);
conn->c_xmit_data_off += tmp;
ret -= tmp;
if (conn->c_xmit_data_off == sg->length) {
conn->c_xmit_data_off = 0;
sg++;
conn->c_xmit_sg++;
BUG_ON(ret != 0 &&
conn->c_xmit_sg == rm->data.op_nents);
}
}
if (conn->c_xmit_hdr_off == sizeof(struct rds_header) &&
(conn->c_xmit_sg == rm->data.op_nents))
conn->c_xmit_data_sent = 1;
}
/*
* A rm will only take multiple times through this loop
* if there is a data op. Thus, if the data is sent (or there was
* none), then we're done with the rm.
*/
if (!rm->data.op_active || conn->c_xmit_data_sent) {
conn->c_xmit_rm = NULL;
conn->c_xmit_sg = 0;
conn->c_xmit_hdr_off = 0;
conn->c_xmit_data_off = 0;
conn->c_xmit_rdma_sent = 0;
conn->c_xmit_atomic_sent = 0;
conn->c_xmit_data_sent = 0;
rds_message_put(rm);
}
}
over_batch:
if (conn->c_trans->xmit_complete)
conn->c_trans->xmit_complete(conn);
release_in_xmit(conn);
/* Nuke any messages we decided not to retransmit. */
if (!list_empty(&to_be_dropped)) {
/* irqs on here, so we can put(), unlike above */
list_for_each_entry(rm, &to_be_dropped, m_conn_item)
rds_message_put(rm);
rds_send_remove_from_sock(&to_be_dropped, RDS_RDMA_DROPPED);
}
/*
* Other senders can queue a message after we last test the send queue
* but before we clear RDS_IN_XMIT. In that case they'd back off and
* not try and send their newly queued message. We need to check the
* send queue after having cleared RDS_IN_XMIT so that their message
* doesn't get stuck on the send queue.
*
* If the transport cannot continue (i.e ret != 0), then it must
* call us when more room is available, such as from the tx
* completion handler.
*
* We have an extra generation check here so that if someone manages
* to jump in after our release_in_xmit, we'll see that they have done
* some work and we will skip our goto
*/
if (ret == 0) {
smp_mb();
if ((test_bit(0, &conn->c_map_queued) ||
!list_empty(&conn->c_send_queue)) &&
send_gen == conn->c_send_gen) {
rds_stats_inc(s_send_lock_queue_raced);
if (batch_count < send_batch_count)
goto restart;
queue_delayed_work(rds_wq, &conn->c_send_w, 1);
}
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: RDS: fix race condition when sending a message on unbound socket
Sasha's found a NULL pointer dereference in the RDS connection code when
sending a message to an apparently unbound socket. The problem is caused
by the code checking if the socket is bound in rds_sendmsg(), which checks
the rs_bound_addr field without taking a lock on the socket. This opens a
race where rs_bound_addr is temporarily set but where the transport is not
in rds_bind(), leading to a NULL pointer dereference when trying to
dereference 'trans' in __rds_conn_create().
Vegard wrote a reproducer for this issue, so kindly ask him to share if
you're interested.
I cannot reproduce the NULL pointer dereference using Vegard's reproducer
with this patch, whereas I could without.
Complete earlier incomplete fix to CVE-2015-6937:
74e98eb08588 ("RDS: verify the underlying transport exists before creating a connection")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 41,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Window::openMethodCustom(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
LocalDOMWindow* impl = toLocalDOMWindow(V8Window::toImpl(info.Holder()));
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "open", "Window", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(info.GetIsolate(), impl->frame(), exceptionState)) {
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TOSTRING_VOID(V8StringResource<TreatNullAndUndefinedAsNullString>, urlString, info[0]);
AtomicString frameName;
if (info[1]->IsUndefined() || info[1]->IsNull()) {
frameName = "_blank";
} else {
TOSTRING_VOID(V8StringResource<>, frameNameResource, info[1]);
frameName = frameNameResource;
}
TOSTRING_VOID(V8StringResource<TreatNullAndUndefinedAsNullString>, windowFeaturesString, info[2]);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<DOMWindow> openedWindow = impl->open(urlString, frameName, windowFeaturesString, callingDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), enteredDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()));
if (!openedWindow)
return;
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, openedWindow.release(), impl);
}
Commit Message: Reload frame in V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom after js call
R=marja@chromium.org
BUG=454954
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/901053006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189574 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void perf_get_data_addr(struct pt_regs *regs, u64 *addrp) { }
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SkipConditionalFeatureEntry(const FeatureEntry& entry) {
version_info::Channel channel = chrome::GetChannel();
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!strcmp("mus", entry.internal_name) &&
channel != version_info::Channel::DEV &&
channel != version_info::Channel::UNKNOWN) {
return true;
}
if (!strcmp(ui_devtools::kEnableUiDevTools, entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if ((!strcmp("data-reduction-proxy-lo-fi", entry.internal_name) ||
!strcmp("enable-data-reduction-proxy-lite-page", entry.internal_name)) &&
channel != version_info::Channel::BETA &&
channel != version_info::Channel::DEV &&
channel != version_info::Channel::CANARY &&
channel != version_info::Channel::UNKNOWN) {
return true;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!strcmp("enable-hdr", entry.internal_name) &&
base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::VERSION_WIN10) {
return true;
}
#endif // OS_WIN
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add search bar to Android password settings
By enabling the feature PasswordSearch, a search icon will appear in the
action bar in Chrome > Settings > Save Passwords.
Clicking the icon will trigger a search box that hides non-password
views.
Every newly typed letter will instantly filter passwords which
don't contain the query. Ignores case.
Update: instead of adding a new white icon, the ic_search is recolored.
Update: merged with WIP crrev/c/868213
Bug: 794108
Change-Id: I9b4e3c7754bb5b0cc56e3156a746bcbf44aa5bd3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866830
Commit-Queue: Friedrich Horschig <fhorschig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Theresa <twellington@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531891}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 129,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int smp_fetch_cookie(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
struct hdr_idx *idx = &txn->hdr_idx;
struct hdr_ctx *ctx = smp->ctx.a[2];
const struct http_msg *msg;
const char *hdr_name;
int hdr_name_len;
char *sol;
int occ = 0;
int found = 0;
if (!args || args->type != ARGT_STR)
return 0;
if (!ctx) {
/* first call */
ctx = &static_hdr_ctx;
ctx->idx = 0;
smp->ctx.a[2] = ctx;
}
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
if ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) {
msg = &txn->req;
hdr_name = "Cookie";
hdr_name_len = 6;
} else {
msg = &txn->rsp;
hdr_name = "Set-Cookie";
hdr_name_len = 10;
}
if (!occ && !(opt & SMP_OPT_ITERATE))
/* no explicit occurrence and single fetch => last cookie by default */
occ = -1;
/* OK so basically here, either we want only one value and it's the
* last one, or we want to iterate over all of them and we fetch the
* next one.
*/
sol = msg->chn->buf->p;
if (!(smp->flags & SMP_F_NOT_LAST)) {
/* search for the header from the beginning, we must first initialize
* the search parameters.
*/
smp->ctx.a[0] = NULL;
ctx->idx = 0;
}
smp->flags |= SMP_F_VOL_HDR;
while (1) {
/* Note: smp->ctx.a[0] == NULL every time we need to fetch a new header */
if (!smp->ctx.a[0]) {
if (!http_find_header2(hdr_name, hdr_name_len, sol, idx, ctx))
goto out;
if (ctx->vlen < args->data.str.len + 1)
continue;
smp->ctx.a[0] = ctx->line + ctx->val;
smp->ctx.a[1] = smp->ctx.a[0] + ctx->vlen;
}
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags |= SMP_F_CONST;
smp->ctx.a[0] = extract_cookie_value(smp->ctx.a[0], smp->ctx.a[1],
args->data.str.str, args->data.str.len,
(opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ,
&smp->data.str.str,
&smp->data.str.len);
if (smp->ctx.a[0]) {
found = 1;
if (occ >= 0) {
/* one value was returned into smp->data.str.{str,len} */
smp->flags |= SMP_F_NOT_LAST;
return 1;
}
}
/* if we're looking for last occurrence, let's loop */
}
/* all cookie headers and values were scanned. If we're looking for the
* last occurrence, we may return it now.
*/
out:
smp->flags &= ~SMP_F_NOT_LAST;
return found;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<Extension> LoadManifest(const std::string& dir,
const std::string& test_file) {
return LoadManifest(dir, test_file, Extension::NO_FLAGS);
}
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionService::~ExtensionService() {
ProviderCollection::const_iterator i;
for (i = external_extension_providers_.begin();
i != external_extension_providers_.end(); ++i) {
ExternalExtensionProviderInterface* provider = i->get();
provider->ServiceShutdown();
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (event_routers_initialized_) {
ExtensionFileBrowserEventRouter::GetInstance()->
StopObservingFileSystemEvents();
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *lookup_dcache(struct qstr *name, struct dentry *dir,
unsigned int flags, bool *need_lookup)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
int error;
*need_lookup = false;
dentry = d_lookup(dir, name);
if (dentry) {
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE) {
error = d_revalidate(dentry, flags);
if (unlikely(error <= 0)) {
if (error < 0) {
dput(dentry);
return ERR_PTR(error);
} else {
d_invalidate(dentry);
dput(dentry);
dentry = NULL;
}
}
}
}
if (!dentry) {
dentry = d_alloc(dir, name);
if (unlikely(!dentry))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
*need_lookup = true;
}
return dentry;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithDocumentLoader(DocumentLoader* loader) {
DCHECK(!document_loader_);
DCHECK(!imports_controller_);
document_loader_ = loader;
if (document_loader_)
parent_document_ = ParentDocument(document_loader_);
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_msnd_pnp_remove(struct pnp_card_link *pcard)
{
snd_msnd_unload(pnp_get_card_drvdata(pcard));
pnp_set_card_drvdata(pcard, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int catc_ctrl_async(struct catc *catc, u8 dir, u8 request, u16 value,
u16 index, void *buf, int len, void (*callback)(struct catc *catc, struct ctrl_queue *q))
{
struct ctrl_queue *q;
int retval = 0;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&catc->ctrl_lock, flags);
q = catc->ctrl_queue + catc->ctrl_head;
q->dir = dir;
q->request = request;
q->value = value;
q->index = index;
q->buf = buf;
q->len = len;
q->callback = callback;
catc->ctrl_head = (catc->ctrl_head + 1) & (CTRL_QUEUE - 1);
if (catc->ctrl_head == catc->ctrl_tail) {
dev_err(&catc->usbdev->dev, "ctrl queue full\n");
catc->ctrl_tail = (catc->ctrl_tail + 1) & (CTRL_QUEUE - 1);
retval = -1;
}
if (!test_and_set_bit(CTRL_RUNNING, &catc->flags))
catc_ctrl_run(catc);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&catc->ctrl_lock, flags);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasStencilAttachment() {
FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasStencilAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_stencil_format_ != 0 ||
offscreen_target_depth_format_ == GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
}
return back_buffer_has_stencil_;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node::NodeType Document::nodeType() const
{
return DOCUMENT_NODE;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::processBaseElement()
{
const AtomicString* href = 0;
const AtomicString* target = 0;
for (Element* element = ElementTraversal::firstWithin(this); element && (!href || !target); element = ElementTraversal::next(element)) {
if (element->hasTagName(baseTag)) {
if (!href) {
const AtomicString& value = element->fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr);
if (!value.isNull())
href = &value;
}
if (!target) {
const AtomicString& value = element->fastGetAttribute(targetAttr);
if (!value.isNull())
target = &value;
}
if (contentSecurityPolicy()->isActive())
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::ContentSecurityPolicyWithBaseElement);
}
}
KURL baseElementURL;
if (href) {
String strippedHref = stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(*href);
if (!strippedHref.isEmpty())
baseElementURL = KURL(url(), strippedHref);
}
if (m_baseElementURL != baseElementURL && contentSecurityPolicy()->allowBaseURI(baseElementURL)) {
m_baseElementURL = baseElementURL;
updateBaseURL();
}
m_baseTarget = target ? *target : nullAtom;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t cqspi_write(struct spi_nor *nor, loff_t to,
size_t len, const u_char *buf)
{
int ret;
ret = cqspi_set_protocol(nor, 0);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = cqspi_indirect_write_setup(nor, to);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = cqspi_indirect_write_execute(nor, buf, len);
if (ret)
return ret;
return (ret < 0) ? ret : len;
}
Commit Message: mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <cyrille.pitchen@atmel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserView::SplitHandleMoved(views::SingleSplitView* sender) {
for (int i = 0; i < sender->child_count(); ++i)
sender->child_at(i)->InvalidateLayout();
SchedulePaint();
Layout();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS median_filter()
{
ushort (*pix)[4];
int pass, c, i, j, k, med[9];
static const uchar opt[] = /* Optimal 9-element median search */
{ 1,2, 4,5, 7,8, 0,1, 3,4, 6,7, 1,2, 4,5, 7,8,
0,3, 5,8, 4,7, 3,6, 1,4, 2,5, 4,7, 4,2, 6,4, 4,2 };
for (pass=1; pass <= med_passes; pass++) {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("Median filter pass %d...\n"), pass);
for (c=0; c < 3; c+=2) {
for (pix = image; pix < image+width*height; pix++)
pix[0][3] = pix[0][c];
for (pix = image+width; pix < image+width*(height-1); pix++) {
if ((pix-image+1) % width < 2) continue;
for (k=0, i = -width; i <= width; i += width)
for (j = i-1; j <= i+1; j++)
med[k++] = pix[j][3] - pix[j][1];
for (i=0; i < (int) sizeof opt; i+=2)
if (med[opt[i]] > med[opt[i+1]])
SWAP (med[opt[i]] , med[opt[i+1]]);
pix[0][c] = CLIP(med[4] + pix[0][1]);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readAPListRid(struct airo_info *ai, APListRid *aplr)
{
return PC4500_readrid(ai, RID_APLIST, aplr, sizeof(*aplr), 1);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nw_buf_list *nw_buf_list_create(nw_buf_pool *pool, uint32_t limit)
{
nw_buf_list *list = malloc(sizeof(nw_buf_list));
if (list == NULL)
return NULL;
list->pool = pool;
list->count = 0;
list->limit = limit;
list->head = NULL;
list->tail = NULL;
return list;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 76,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Extension::DecodeIcon(const Extension* extension,
int preferred_icon_size,
ExtensionIconSet::MatchType match_type,
scoped_ptr<SkBitmap>* result) {
std::string path = extension->icons().Get(preferred_icon_size, match_type);
int size = extension->icons().GetIconSizeFromPath(path);
ExtensionResource icon_resource = extension->GetResource(path);
DecodeIconFromPath(icon_resource.GetFilePath(), size, result);
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mp_decode_to_lua_hash(lua_State *L, mp_cur *c, size_t len) {
assert(len <= UINT_MAX);
lua_newtable(L);
while(len--) {
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,c); /* key */
if (c->err) return;
mp_decode_to_lua_type(L,c); /* value */
if (c->err) return;
lua_settable(L,-3);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fabs(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, int n)
{
FRn &= ~(1 << (_FP_W_TYPE_SIZE - 1));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_apache_ini_dtor(request_rec *r, request_rec *p TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (strcmp(r->protocol, "INCLUDED")) {
zend_try { zend_ini_deactivate(TSRMLS_C); } zend_end_try();
} else {
typedef struct {
HashTable config;
} php_conf_rec;
char *str;
uint str_len;
php_conf_rec *c = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config, &php5_module);
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&c->config);
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(&c->config, &str, &str_len, NULL, 0, NULL) == HASH_KEY_IS_STRING;
zend_hash_move_forward(&c->config)
) {
zend_restore_ini_entry(str, str_len, ZEND_INI_STAGE_SHUTDOWN);
}
}
if (p) {
((php_struct *)SG(server_context))->r = p;
} else {
apr_pool_cleanup_run(r->pool, (void *)&SG(server_context), php_server_context_cleanup);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Location::hostname() const {
return DOMURLUtilsReadOnly::hostname(Url());
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::FrameScheduledClientNavigation(LocalFrame* frame) {
String frame_id = IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame);
frames_with_scheduled_client_navigation_.insert(frame_id);
if (!frames_with_scheduled_navigation_.Contains(frame_id)) {
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.Set(
frame_id,
BuildInitiatorObject(frame->GetDocument(), FetchInitiatorInfo()));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response DOMHandler::Disable() {
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_chpass_principal_3(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal, krb5_boolean keepold,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_timestamp now;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
int ret, ret2, hist_added;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
osa_pw_hist_ent hist;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey, *hist_keyblocks = NULL;
krb5_kvno act_kvno, hist_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
hist_added = 0;
memset(&hist, 0, sizeof(hist));
if (principal == NULL || password == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if ((krb5_principal_compare(handle->context,
principal, hist_princ)) == TRUE)
return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, adb.policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if (have_pol) {
/* Create a password history entry before we change kdb's key_data. */
ret = kdb_get_hist_key(handle, &hist_keyblocks, &hist_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = create_history_entry(handle->context, &hist_keyblocks[0],
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data, &hist);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if ((ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_pol ? &pol : NULL,
principal)))
goto done;
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple,
password, 0 /* increment kvno */,
keepold, kdb);
if (ret)
goto done;
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
/* the policy was loaded before */
ret = check_pw_reuse(handle->context, hist_keyblocks,
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
1, &hist);
if (ret)
goto done;
if (pol.pw_history_num > 1) {
/* If hist_kvno has changed since the last password change, we
* can't check the history. */
if (adb.admin_history_kvno == hist_kvno) {
ret = check_pw_reuse(handle->context, hist_keyblocks,
kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
adb.old_key_len, adb.old_keys);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
/* Don't save empty history. */
if (hist.n_key_data > 0) {
ret = add_to_history(handle->context, hist_kvno, &adb, &pol,
&hist);
if (ret)
goto done;
hist_added = 1;
}
}
if (pol.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = ts_incr(now, pol.pw_max_life);
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
#ifdef USE_PASSWORD_SERVER
if (kadm5_use_password_server () &&
(krb5_princ_size (handle->context, principal) == 1)) {
krb5_data *princ = krb5_princ_component (handle->context, principal, 0);
const char *path = "/usr/sbin/mkpassdb";
char *argv[] = { "mkpassdb", "-setpassword", NULL, NULL };
char *pstring = NULL;
if (!ret) {
pstring = malloc ((princ->length + 1) * sizeof (char));
if (pstring == NULL) { ret = ENOMEM; }
}
if (!ret) {
memcpy (pstring, princ->data, princ->length);
pstring [princ->length] = '\0';
argv[2] = pstring;
ret = kadm5_launch_task (handle->context, path, argv, password);
}
if (pstring != NULL)
free (pstring);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
#endif
ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* unlock principal on this KDC */
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* key data and attributes changed, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_ATTRIBUTES |
KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT;
/* | KADM5_CPW_FUNCTION */
if (hist_added)
kdb->mask |= KADM5_KEY_HIST;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, principal, keepold,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_chpass(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, principal,
keepold, new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
free(new_ks_tuple);
if (!hist_added && hist.key_data)
free_history_entry(handle->context, &hist);
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
kdb_free_keyblocks(handle, hist_keyblocks);
if (have_pol && (ret2 = kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol))
&& !ret)
ret = ret2;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90 | 0 | 84,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void php_register_server_variables(TSRMLS_D)
{
zval *array_ptr = NULL;
ALLOC_ZVAL(array_ptr);
array_init(array_ptr);
INIT_PZVAL(array_ptr);
if (PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER]);
}
PG(http_globals)[TRACK_VARS_SERVER] = array_ptr;
/* Server variables */
if (sapi_module.register_server_variables) {
sapi_module.register_server_variables(array_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* PHP Authentication support */
if (SG(request_info).auth_user) {
php_register_variable("PHP_AUTH_USER", SG(request_info).auth_user, array_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (SG(request_info).auth_password) {
php_register_variable("PHP_AUTH_PW", SG(request_info).auth_password, array_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (SG(request_info).auth_digest) {
php_register_variable("PHP_AUTH_DIGEST", SG(request_info).auth_digest, array_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* store request init time */
{
zval request_time_float, request_time_long;
Z_TYPE(request_time_float) = IS_DOUBLE;
Z_DVAL(request_time_float) = sapi_get_request_time(TSRMLS_C);
php_register_variable_ex("REQUEST_TIME_FLOAT", &request_time_float, array_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE(request_time_long) = IS_LONG;
Z_LVAL(request_time_long) = zend_dval_to_lval(Z_DVAL(request_time_float));
php_register_variable_ex("REQUEST_TIME", &request_time_long, array_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73807
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 63,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SplashOutputDev::drawImageMask(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height, GBool invert,
GBool inlineImg) {
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutImageMaskData imgMaskData;
if (state->getFillColorSpace()->isNonMarking()) {
return;
}
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgMaskData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width, 1, 1);
imgMaskData.imgStr->reset();
imgMaskData.invert = invert ? 0 : 1;
imgMaskData.width = width;
imgMaskData.height = height;
imgMaskData.y = 0;
splash->fillImageMask(&imageMaskSrc, &imgMaskData, width, height, mat,
t3GlyphStack != NULL);
if (inlineImg) {
while (imgMaskData.y < height) {
imgMaskData.imgStr->getLine();
++imgMaskData.y;
}
}
delete imgMaskData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ehci_flush_qh(EHCIQueue *q)
{
uint32_t *qh = (uint32_t *) &q->qh;
uint32_t dwords = sizeof(EHCIqh) >> 2;
uint32_t addr = NLPTR_GET(q->qhaddr);
put_dwords(q->ehci, addr + 3 * sizeof(uint32_t), qh + 3, dwords - 3);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::GetContextID() {
return command_buffer_->GetRouteID();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::SetIsUsed() {
is_unused_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void install_local_socket(asocket* s) {
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
s->id = local_socket_next_id++;
if (local_socket_next_id == 0) {
fatal("local socket id overflow");
}
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_list);
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Guint EmbedStream::getStart() {
error(errInternal, -1, "Internal: called getStart() on EmbedStream");
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuProcessHost::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
#if defined(USE_OZONE)
ui::OzonePlatform::GetInstance()
->GetGpuPlatformSupportHost()
->OnMessageReceived(message);
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
int ret = 0;
u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
u64 data = msr_info->data;
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_EFER:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
break;
case MSR_GS_BASE:
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
vmx_load_host_state(vmx);
vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
break;
#endif
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
if (!vmx_mpx_supported())
return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
return 1;
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
vcpu->arch.pat = data;
break;
}
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu) ||
(to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msr_ia32_feature_control &
FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated))
return 1;
vmx->nested.msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
return 1; /* they are read-only */
case MSR_IA32_XSS:
if (!vmx_xsaves_supported())
return 1;
/*
* The only supported bit as of Skylake is bit 8, but
* it is not supported on KVM.
*/
if (data != 0)
return 1;
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss = data;
if (vcpu->arch.ia32_xss != host_xss)
add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_XSS,
vcpu->arch.ia32_xss, host_xss);
else
clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_XSS);
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(vcpu))
return 1;
/* Check reserved bit, higher 32 bits should be zero */
if ((data >> 32) != 0)
return 1;
/* Otherwise falls through */
default:
msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_index);
if (msr) {
u64 old_msr_data = msr->data;
msr->data = data;
if (msr - vmx->guest_msrs < vmx->save_nmsrs) {
preempt_disable();
ret = kvm_set_shared_msr(msr->index, msr->data,
msr->mask);
preempt_enable();
if (ret)
msr->data = old_msr_data;
}
break;
}
ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::InvokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "invokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm(" << (void*)this << ")";
SetNetworkState(kNetworkNoSource);
played_time_ranges_ = TimeRanges::Create();
last_seek_time_ = 0;
duration_ = std::numeric_limits<double>::quiet_NaN();
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(true);
if (GetMediaControls())
GetMediaControls()->Reset();
ScheduleNextSourceChild();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void resize_console(struct port *port)
{
struct virtio_device *vdev;
/* The port could have been hot-unplugged */
if (!port || !is_console_port(port))
return;
vdev = port->portdev->vdev;
/* Don't test F_SIZE at all if we're rproc: not a valid feature! */
if (!is_rproc_serial(vdev) &&
virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_F_SIZE))
hvc_resize(port->cons.hvc, port->cons.ws);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlRecoverDoc(const xmlChar *cur) {
return(xmlSAXParseDoc(NULL, cur, 1));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckDts(const uint8_t* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 11);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 11 < buffer_size) {
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 11);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 32) == 0x7ffe8001);
reader.SkipBits(1 + 5);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 0); // CPF must be 0.
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 7) >= 5);
int frame_size = ReadBits(&reader, 14);
RCHECK(frame_size >= 95);
reader.SkipBits(6);
RCHECK(kSamplingFrequencyValid[ReadBits(&reader, 4)]);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 5) <= 25);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 1) == 0);
reader.SkipBits(1 + 1 + 1 + 1);
RCHECK(kExtAudioIdValid[ReadBits(&reader, 3)]);
reader.SkipBits(1 + 1);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 2) != 3);
offset += frame_size + 1;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 173,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void onMessages(const std::list<omx_message> &messages) {
if (messages.empty()) {
return;
}
sp<AMessage> notify = mNotify->dup();
bool first = true;
sp<MessageList> msgList = new MessageList();
for (std::list<omx_message>::const_iterator it = messages.cbegin();
it != messages.cend(); ++it) {
const omx_message &omx_msg = *it;
if (first) {
notify->setInt32("node", omx_msg.node);
first = false;
}
sp<AMessage> msg = new AMessage;
msg->setInt32("type", omx_msg.type);
switch (omx_msg.type) {
case omx_message::EVENT:
{
msg->setInt32("event", omx_msg.u.event_data.event);
msg->setInt32("data1", omx_msg.u.event_data.data1);
msg->setInt32("data2", omx_msg.u.event_data.data2);
break;
}
case omx_message::EMPTY_BUFFER_DONE:
{
msg->setInt32("buffer", omx_msg.u.buffer_data.buffer);
msg->setInt32("fence_fd", omx_msg.fenceFd);
break;
}
case omx_message::FILL_BUFFER_DONE:
{
msg->setInt32(
"buffer", omx_msg.u.extended_buffer_data.buffer);
msg->setInt32(
"range_offset",
omx_msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_offset);
msg->setInt32(
"range_length",
omx_msg.u.extended_buffer_data.range_length);
msg->setInt32(
"flags",
omx_msg.u.extended_buffer_data.flags);
msg->setInt64(
"timestamp",
omx_msg.u.extended_buffer_data.timestamp);
msg->setInt32(
"fence_fd", omx_msg.fenceFd);
break;
}
case omx_message::FRAME_RENDERED:
{
msg->setInt64(
"media_time_us", omx_msg.u.render_data.timestamp);
msg->setInt64(
"system_nano", omx_msg.u.render_data.nanoTime);
break;
}
default:
ALOGE("Unrecognized message type: %d", omx_msg.type);
break;
}
msgList->getList().push_back(msg);
}
notify->setObject("messages", msgList);
notify->post();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_bitstream_getbit_func(jpc_bitstream_t *bitstream)
{
int ret;
JAS_DBGLOG(1000, ("jpc_bitstream_getbit_func(%p)\n", bitstream));
ret = jpc_bitstream_getbit_macro(bitstream);
JAS_DBGLOG(1000, ("jpc_bitstream_getbit_func -> %d\n", ret));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Changed the JPC bitstream code to more gracefully handle a request
for a larger sized integer than what can be handled (i.e., return
with an error instead of failing an assert).
CWE ID: | 0 | 72,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCacheMetadataMap::RemoveFromCache(const std::string& resource_id) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
CacheMap::iterator iter = cache_map_.find(resource_id);
if (iter != cache_map_.end()) {
cache_map_.erase(iter);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SystemURLRequestContext() {
#if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
net::SetURLRequestContextForNSSHttpIO(this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OMX::CallbackDispatcherThread::threadLoop() {
return mDispatcher->loop();
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
{
struct key *keyring = info->data;
key_put(keyring);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ReadValue(const Message* m, PickleIterator* iter, Value** value,
int recursion) {
if (recursion > kMaxRecursionDepth) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Max recursion depth hit in ReadValue.";
return false;
}
int type;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &type))
return false;
switch (type) {
case Value::TYPE_NULL:
*value = Value::CreateNullValue();
break;
case Value::TYPE_BOOLEAN: {
bool val;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &val))
return false;
*value = Value::CreateBooleanValue(val);
break;
}
case Value::TYPE_INTEGER: {
int val;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &val))
return false;
*value = Value::CreateIntegerValue(val);
break;
}
case Value::TYPE_DOUBLE: {
double val;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &val))
return false;
*value = Value::CreateDoubleValue(val);
break;
}
case Value::TYPE_STRING: {
std::string val;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &val))
return false;
*value = Value::CreateStringValue(val);
break;
}
case Value::TYPE_BINARY: {
const char* data;
int length;
if (!m->ReadData(iter, &data, &length))
return false;
*value = base::BinaryValue::CreateWithCopiedBuffer(data, length);
break;
}
case Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY: {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> val(new DictionaryValue());
if (!ReadDictionaryValue(m, iter, val.get(), recursion))
return false;
*value = val.release();
break;
}
case Value::TYPE_LIST: {
scoped_ptr<ListValue> val(new ListValue());
if (!ReadListValue(m, iter, val.get(), recursion))
return false;
*value = val.release();
break;
}
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::SetDownloadFileFactoryForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadFileFactory> file_factory) {
in_progress_manager_->set_file_factory(std::move(file_factory));
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_is_share_active(sa_share_impl_t impl_share)
{
char line[512];
char *tab, *cur;
FILE *nfs_exportfs_temp_fp;
if (!nfs_available())
return (B_FALSE);
nfs_exportfs_temp_fp = fdopen(dup(nfs_exportfs_temp_fd), "r");
if (nfs_exportfs_temp_fp == NULL ||
fseek(nfs_exportfs_temp_fp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
fclose(nfs_exportfs_temp_fp);
return (B_FALSE);
}
while (fgets(line, sizeof (line), nfs_exportfs_temp_fp) != NULL) {
/*
* exportfs uses separate lines for the share path
* and the export options when the share path is longer
* than a certain amount of characters; this ignores
* the option lines
*/
if (line[0] == '\t')
continue;
tab = strchr(line, '\t');
if (tab != NULL) {
*tab = '\0';
cur = tab - 1;
} else {
/*
* there's no tab character, which means the
* NFS options are on a separate line; we just
* need to remove the new-line character
* at the end of the line
*/
cur = line + strlen(line) - 1;
}
/* remove trailing spaces and new-line characters */
while (cur >= line && (*cur == ' ' || *cur == '\n'))
*cur-- = '\0';
if (strcmp(line, impl_share->sharepath) == 0) {
fclose(nfs_exportfs_temp_fp);
return (B_TRUE);
}
}
fclose(nfs_exportfs_temp_fp);
return (B_FALSE);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_response (ksba_ocsp_t ocsp, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen)
{
gpg_error_t err;
struct tag_info ti;
const unsigned char *msgstart;
const unsigned char *endptr;
const char *s;
size_t len;
msgstart = msg;
err = parse_response_status (ocsp, &msg, &msglen, &len);
if (err)
return err;
msglen = len; /* We don't care about any extra bytes provided to us. */
if (ocsp->response_status)
{
/* fprintf (stderr,"response status found to be %d - stop\n", */
/* ocsp->response_status); */
return 0;
}
/* Now that we are sure that it is a BasicOCSPResponse, we can parse
the really important things:
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
*/
err = parse_sequence (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
endptr = msg + ti.length;
ocsp->hash_offset = msg - msgstart;
err = parse_response_data (ocsp, &msg, &msglen);
if (err)
return err;
ocsp->hash_length = msg - msgstart - ocsp->hash_offset;
/* The signatureAlgorithm and the signature. We only need to get the
length of both objects and let a specialized function do the
actual parsing. */
s = msg;
len = msglen;
err = parse_sequence (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
parse_skip (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
err= _ksba_ber_parse_tl (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
if (!(ti.class == CLASS_UNIVERSAL && ti.tag == TYPE_BIT_STRING
&& !ti.is_constructed) )
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
else if (!ti.length)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
else if (ti.length > msglen)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_BER);
parse_skip (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
len = len - msglen;
xfree (ocsp->sigval); ocsp->sigval = NULL;
err = _ksba_sigval_to_sexp (s, len, &ocsp->sigval);
if (err)
return err;
/* Parse the optional sequence of certificates. */
if (msg >= endptr)
return 0; /* It's optional, so stop now. */
err = parse_context_tag (&msg, &msglen, &ti, 0);
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ)
return 0; /* Not the right tag. Stop here. */
if (err)
return err;
err = parse_sequence (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
if (ti.ndef)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING);
{
ksba_cert_t cert;
struct ocsp_certlist_s *cl, **cl_tail;
assert (!ocsp->received_certs);
cl_tail = &ocsp->received_certs;
endptr = msg + ti.length;
while (msg < endptr)
{
/* Find the length of the certificate. */
s = msg;
err = parse_sequence (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
if (err)
return err;
err = ksba_cert_new (&cert);
if (err)
return err;
err = ksba_cert_init_from_mem (cert, msg - ti.nhdr,
ti.nhdr + ti.length);
if (err)
{
ksba_cert_release (cert);
return err;
}
parse_skip (&msg, &msglen, &ti);
cl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *cl);
if (!cl)
err = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
if (err)
{
ksba_cert_release (cert);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
}
cl->cert = cert;
*cl_tail = cl;
cl_tail = &cl->next;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellSurface::EndDrag(bool revert) {
DCHECK(widget_);
DCHECK(resizer_);
bool was_resizing = IsResizing();
if (revert)
resizer_->RevertDrag();
else
resizer_->CompleteDrag();
ash::Shell::GetInstance()->RemovePreTargetHandler(this);
widget_->GetNativeWindow()->ReleaseCapture();
resizer_.reset();
if (was_resizing)
Configure();
UpdateWidgetBounds();
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string BrowserView::GetWindowName() const {
return chrome::GetWindowName(browser_.get());
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebRtcAudioRenderer::Initialize(WebRtcAudioRendererSource* source) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
DCHECK_EQ(state_, UNINITIALIZED);
DCHECK(source);
DCHECK(!sink_);
DCHECK(!source_);
sink_ = AudioDeviceFactory::NewOutputDevice();
DCHECK(sink_);
int sample_rate = GetAudioOutputSampleRate();
DVLOG(1) << "Audio output hardware sample rate: " << sample_rate;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputSampleRate",
sample_rate, media::kUnexpectedAudioSampleRate);
if (std::find(&kValidOutputRates[0],
&kValidOutputRates[0] + arraysize(kValidOutputRates),
sample_rate) ==
&kValidOutputRates[arraysize(kValidOutputRates)]) {
DLOG(ERROR) << sample_rate << " is not a supported output rate.";
return false;
}
media::ChannelLayout channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO;
int buffer_size = 0;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO;
if (sample_rate == 96000 || sample_rate == 48000) {
buffer_size = (sample_rate / 100);
} else {
buffer_size = 2 * 440;
}
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
buffer_size = 3 * buffer_size;
DLOG(WARNING) << "Extending the output buffer size by a factor of three "
<< "since Windows XP has been detected.";
}
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MONO;
if (sample_rate == 48000) {
buffer_size = 480;
} else {
buffer_size = 440;
}
#elif defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_OPENBSD)
channel_layout = media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MONO;
buffer_size = 480;
#else
DLOG(ERROR) << "Unsupported platform";
return false;
#endif
params_.Reset(media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_PCM_LOW_LATENCY, channel_layout,
sample_rate, 16, buffer_size);
buffer_.reset(new int16[params_.frames_per_buffer() * params_.channels()]);
source_ = source;
source->SetRenderFormat(params_);
sink_->Initialize(params_, this);
sink_->SetSourceRenderView(source_render_view_id_);
sink_->Start();
state_ = PAUSED;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputChannelLayout",
channel_layout, media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_MAX);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("WebRTC.AudioOutputFramesPerBuffer",
buffer_size, kUnexpectedAudioBufferSize);
AddHistogramFramesPerBuffer(buffer_size);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_symlink(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp,
char *fname, int flen,
char *path,
struct svc_fh *resfhp)
{
struct dentry *dentry, *dnew;
__be32 err, cerr;
int host_err;
err = nfserr_noent;
if (!flen || path[0] == '\0')
goto out;
err = nfserr_exist;
if (isdotent(fname, flen))
goto out;
err = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, S_IFDIR, NFSD_MAY_CREATE);
if (err)
goto out;
host_err = fh_want_write(fhp);
if (host_err)
goto out_nfserr;
fh_lock(fhp);
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
dnew = lookup_one_len(fname, dentry, flen);
host_err = PTR_ERR(dnew);
if (IS_ERR(dnew))
goto out_nfserr;
host_err = vfs_symlink(d_inode(dentry), dnew, path);
err = nfserrno(host_err);
if (!err)
err = nfserrno(commit_metadata(fhp));
fh_unlock(fhp);
fh_drop_write(fhp);
cerr = fh_compose(resfhp, fhp->fh_export, dnew, fhp);
dput(dnew);
if (err==0) err = cerr;
out:
return err;
out_nfserr:
err = nfserrno(host_err);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_GlobalServers_f( void ) {
netadr_t to;
int count, i, masterNum;
char command[1024], *masteraddress;
if ((count = Cmd_Argc()) < 3 || (masterNum = atoi(Cmd_Argv(1))) < 0 || masterNum > MAX_MASTER_SERVERS - 1)
{
Com_Printf("usage: globalservers <master# 0-%d> <protocol> [keywords]\n", MAX_MASTER_SERVERS - 1);
return;
}
sprintf(command, "sv_master%d", masterNum + 1);
masteraddress = Cvar_VariableString(command);
if(!*masteraddress)
{
Com_Printf( "CL_GlobalServers_f: Error: No master server address given.\n");
return;
}
i = NET_StringToAdr(masteraddress, &to, NA_UNSPEC);
if(!i)
{
Com_Printf( "CL_GlobalServers_f: Error: could not resolve address of master %s\n", masteraddress);
return;
}
else if(i == 2)
to.port = BigShort(PORT_MASTER);
Com_Printf("Requesting servers from master %s...\n", masteraddress);
cls.numglobalservers = -1;
cls.pingUpdateSource = AS_GLOBAL;
if (to.type == NA_IP6 || to.type == NA_MULTICAST6)
{
int v4enabled = Cvar_VariableIntegerValue("net_enabled") & NET_ENABLEV4;
if(v4enabled)
{
Com_sprintf(command, sizeof(command), "getserversExt %s %s",
com_gamename->string, Cmd_Argv(2));
}
else
{
Com_sprintf(command, sizeof(command), "getserversExt %s %s ipv6",
com_gamename->string, Cmd_Argv(2));
}
}
else if ( !Q_stricmp( com_gamename->string, LEGACY_MASTER_GAMENAME ) )
Com_sprintf(command, sizeof(command), "getservers %s",
Cmd_Argv(2));
else
Com_sprintf(command, sizeof(command), "getservers %s %s",
com_gamename->string, Cmd_Argv(2));
for (i=3; i < count; i++)
{
Q_strcat(command, sizeof(command), " ");
Q_strcat(command, sizeof(command), Cmd_Argv(i));
}
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_SERVER, to, "%s", command );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vcard7816_vm_process_apdu(VCard *card, VCardAPDU *apdu,
VCardResponse **response)
{
int bytes_to_copy, next_byte_count, count;
VCardApplet *current_applet;
VCardBufferResponse *buffer_response;
vcard_7816_status_t status;
/* parse the class first */
if (apdu->a_gen_type != VCARD_7816_ISO) {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return VCARD_DONE;
}
/* use a switch so that if we need to support secure channel stuff later,
* we know where to put it */
switch (apdu->a_secure_messaging) {
case 0x0: /* no SM */
break;
case 0x4: /* proprietary SM */
case 0x8: /* header not authenticated */
case 0xc: /* header authenticated */
default:
/* for now, don't try to support secure channel stuff in the
* virtual card. */
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_SECURE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return VCARD_DONE;
}
/* now parse the instruction */
switch (apdu->a_ins) {
case VCARD7816_INS_MANAGE_CHANNEL: /* secure channel op */
case VCARD7816_INS_EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE: /* secure channel op */
case VCARD7816_INS_GET_CHALLENGE: /* secure channel op */
case VCARD7816_INS_INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE: /* secure channel op */
case VCARD7816_INS_ERASE_BINARY: /* applet control op */
case VCARD7816_INS_READ_BINARY: /* applet control op */
case VCARD7816_INS_WRITE_BINARY: /* applet control op */
case VCARD7816_INS_UPDATE_BINARY: /* applet control op */
case VCARD7816_INS_READ_RECORD: /* file op */
case VCARD7816_INS_WRITE_RECORD: /* file op */
case VCARD7816_INS_UPDATE_RECORD: /* file op */
case VCARD7816_INS_APPEND_RECORD: /* file op */
case VCARD7816_INS_ENVELOPE:
case VCARD7816_INS_PUT_DATA:
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break;
case VCARD7816_INS_SELECT_FILE:
if (apdu->a_p1 != 0x04) {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break;
}
/* side effect, deselect the current applet if no applet has been found
* */
current_applet = vcard_find_applet(card, apdu->a_body, apdu->a_Lc);
vcard_select_applet(card, apdu->a_channel, current_applet);
if (current_applet) {
unsigned char *aid;
int aid_len;
aid = vcard_applet_get_aid(current_applet, &aid_len);
*response = vcard_response_new(card, aid, aid_len, apdu->a_Le,
VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS);
} else {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
}
break;
case VCARD7816_INS_VERIFY:
if ((apdu->a_p1 != 0x00) || (apdu->a_p2 != 0x00)) {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_WRONG_PARAMETERS);
} else {
if (apdu->a_Lc == 0) {
/* handle pin count if possible */
count = vcard_emul_get_login_count(card);
if (count < 0) {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_DATA_NOT_FOUND);
} else {
if (count > 0xf) {
count = 0xf;
}
*response = vcard_response_new_status_bytes(
VCARD7816_SW1_WARNING_CHANGE,
0xc0 | count);
if (*response == NULL) {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_EXC_ERROR_MEMORY_FAILURE);
}
}
} else {
status = vcard_emul_login(card, apdu->a_body, apdu->a_Lc);
*response = vcard_make_response(status);
}
}
break;
case VCARD7816_INS_GET_RESPONSE:
buffer_response = vcard_get_buffer_response(card);
if (!buffer_response) {
*response = vcard_make_response(
VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_DATA_NOT_FOUND);
/* handle error */
break;
}
bytes_to_copy = MIN(buffer_response->len, apdu->a_Le);
next_byte_count = MIN(256, buffer_response->len - bytes_to_copy);
*response = vcard_response_new_bytes(
card, buffer_response->current, bytes_to_copy,
apdu->a_Le,
next_byte_count ?
VCARD7816_SW1_RESPONSE_BYTES : VCARD7816_SW1_SUCCESS,
next_byte_count);
buffer_response->current += bytes_to_copy;
buffer_response->len -= bytes_to_copy;
if (*response == NULL || (next_byte_count == 0)) {
vcard_set_buffer_response(card, NULL);
vcard_buffer_response_delete(buffer_response);
}
if (*response == NULL) {
*response =
vcard_make_response(VCARD7816_STATUS_EXC_ERROR_MEMORY_FAILURE);
}
break;
case VCARD7816_INS_GET_DATA:
*response =
vcard_make_response(VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break;
default:
*response =
vcard_make_response(VCARD7816_STATUS_ERROR_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break;
}
/* response should have been set somewhere */
assert(*response != NULL);
return VCARD_DONE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FindMatches( const char *s ) {
int i;
if ( Q_stricmpn( s, completionString, strlen( completionString ) ) ) {
return;
}
matchCount++;
if ( matchCount == 1 ) {
Q_strncpyz( shortestMatch, s, sizeof( shortestMatch ) );
return;
}
for ( i = 0 ; shortestMatch[i] ; i++ ) {
if ( i >= strlen( s ) ) {
shortestMatch[i] = 0;
break;
}
if ( tolower( shortestMatch[i] ) != tolower( s[i] ) ) {
shortestMatch[i] = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dev_added(struct tcmu_device *dev)
{
struct tcmur_handler *rhandler = tcmu_get_runner_handler(dev);
struct tcmur_device *rdev;
int32_t block_size, max_sectors;
int64_t dev_size;
int ret;
rdev = calloc(1, sizeof(*rdev));
if (!rdev)
return -ENOMEM;
tcmu_set_daemon_dev_private(dev, rdev);
ret = -EINVAL;
block_size = tcmu_get_attribute(dev, "hw_block_size");
if (block_size <= 0) {
tcmu_dev_err(dev, "Could not get hw_block_size\n");
goto free_rdev;
}
tcmu_set_dev_block_size(dev, block_size);
dev_size = tcmu_get_device_size(dev);
if (dev_size < 0) {
tcmu_dev_err(dev, "Could not get device size\n");
goto free_rdev;
}
tcmu_set_dev_num_lbas(dev, dev_size / block_size);
max_sectors = tcmu_get_attribute(dev, "hw_max_sectors");
if (max_sectors < 0)
goto free_rdev;
tcmu_set_dev_max_xfer_len(dev, max_sectors);
tcmu_dev_dbg(dev, "Got block_size %ld, size in bytes %lld\n",
block_size, dev_size);
ret = pthread_spin_init(&rdev->lock, 0);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_rdev;
ret = pthread_mutex_init(&rdev->caw_lock, NULL);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup_dev_lock;
ret = pthread_mutex_init(&rdev->format_lock, NULL);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup_caw_lock;
ret = setup_io_work_queue(dev);
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup_format_lock;
ret = setup_aio_tracking(rdev);
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup_io_work_queue;
ret = rhandler->open(dev);
if (ret)
goto cleanup_aio_tracking;
ret = tcmulib_start_cmdproc_thread(dev, tcmur_cmdproc_thread);
if (ret < 0)
goto close_dev;
return 0;
close_dev:
rhandler->close(dev);
cleanup_aio_tracking:
cleanup_aio_tracking(rdev);
cleanup_io_work_queue:
cleanup_io_work_queue(dev, true);
cleanup_format_lock:
pthread_mutex_destroy(&rdev->format_lock);
cleanup_caw_lock:
pthread_mutex_destroy(&rdev->caw_lock);
cleanup_dev_lock:
pthread_spin_destroy(&rdev->lock);
free_rdev:
free(rdev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourcePrefetchPredictor::IsUrlPreconnectable(
const GURL& main_frame_url) const {
return PredictPreconnectOrigins(main_frame_url, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,948 |
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