instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_rpcap_heur_udp (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void *data)
{
if (check_rpcap_heur (tvb, FALSE)) {
/* This is probably a rpcap udp package */
dissect_rpcap (tvb, pinfo, tree, data);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
#define WriteRunlengthPacket(image,pixel,length,p) \
{ \
if ((image->matte != MagickFalse) && (length != 0) &&\
(GetPixelOpacity(p) == (Quantum) TransparentOpacity)) \
{ \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q); \
} \
else \
{ \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.red),q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.green),q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.blue),q); \
} \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) MagickMin(length,0xff),q); \
}
static const char
hex_digits[][3] =
{
"00", "01", "02", "03", "04", "05", "06", "07", "08", "09", "0A", "0B",
"0C", "0D", "0E", "0F", "10", "11", "12", "13", "14", "15", "16", "17",
"18", "19", "1A", "1B", "1C", "1D", "1E", "1F", "20", "21", "22", "23",
"24", "25", "26", "27", "28", "29", "2A", "2B", "2C", "2D", "2E", "2F",
"30", "31", "32", "33", "34", "35", "36", "37", "38", "39", "3A", "3B",
"3C", "3D", "3E", "3F", "40", "41", "42", "43", "44", "45", "46", "47",
"48", "49", "4A", "4B", "4C", "4D", "4E", "4F", "50", "51", "52", "53",
"54", "55", "56", "57", "58", "59", "5A", "5B", "5C", "5D", "5E", "5F",
"60", "61", "62", "63", "64", "65", "66", "67", "68", "69", "6A", "6B",
"6C", "6D", "6E", "6F", "70", "71", "72", "73", "74", "75", "76", "77",
"78", "79", "7A", "7B", "7C", "7D", "7E", "7F", "80", "81", "82", "83",
"84", "85", "86", "87", "88", "89", "8A", "8B", "8C", "8D", "8E", "8F",
"90", "91", "92", "93", "94", "95", "96", "97", "98", "99", "9A", "9B",
"9C", "9D", "9E", "9F", "A0", "A1", "A2", "A3", "A4", "A5", "A6", "A7",
"A8", "A9", "AA", "AB", "AC", "AD", "AE", "AF", "B0", "B1", "B2", "B3",
"B4", "B5", "B6", "B7", "B8", "B9", "BA", "BB", "BC", "BD", "BE", "BF",
"C0", "C1", "C2", "C3", "C4", "C5", "C6", "C7", "C8", "C9", "CA", "CB",
"CC", "CD", "CE", "CF", "D0", "D1", "D2", "D3", "D4", "D5", "D6", "D7",
"D8", "D9", "DA", "DB", "DC", "DD", "DE", "DF", "E0", "E1", "E2", "E3",
"E4", "E5", "E6", "E7", "E8", "E9", "EA", "EB", "EC", "ED", "EE", "EF",
"F0", "F1", "F2", "F3", "F4", "F5", "F6", "F7", "F8", "F9", "FA", "FB",
"FC", "FD", "FE", "FF"
},
PostscriptProlog[] =
"%%BeginProlog\n"
"%\n"
"% Display a color image. The image is displayed in color on\n"
"% Postscript viewers or printers that support color, otherwise\n"
"% it is displayed as grayscale.\n"
"%\n"
"/DirectClassPacket\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Get a DirectClass packet.\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % red.\n"
" % green.\n"
" % blue.\n"
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).\n"
" %\n"
" currentfile color_packet readhexstring pop pop\n"
" compression 0 eq\n"
" {\n"
" /number_pixels 3 def\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get\n"
" /number_pixels exch 1 add 3 mul def\n"
" } ifelse\n"
" 0 3 number_pixels 1 sub\n"
" {\n"
" pixels exch color_packet putinterval\n"
" } for\n"
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval\n"
"} bind def\n"
"\n"
"/DirectClassImage\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Display a DirectClass image.\n"
" %\n"
" systemdict /colorimage known\n"
" {\n"
" columns rows 8\n"
" [\n"
" columns 0 0\n"
" rows neg 0 rows\n"
" ]\n"
" { DirectClassPacket } false 3 colorimage\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" %\n"
" % No colorimage operator; convert to grayscale.\n"
" %\n"
" columns rows 8\n"
" [\n"
" columns 0 0\n"
" rows neg 0 rows\n"
" ]\n"
" { GrayDirectClassPacket } image\n"
" } ifelse\n"
"} bind def\n"
"\n"
"/GrayDirectClassPacket\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Get a DirectClass packet; convert to grayscale.\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % red\n"
" % green\n"
" % blue\n"
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).\n"
" %\n"
" currentfile color_packet readhexstring pop pop\n"
" color_packet 0 get 0.299 mul\n"
" color_packet 1 get 0.587 mul add\n"
" color_packet 2 get 0.114 mul add\n"
" cvi\n"
" /gray_packet exch def\n"
" compression 0 eq\n"
" {\n"
" /number_pixels 1 def\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get\n"
" /number_pixels exch 1 add def\n"
" } ifelse\n"
" 0 1 number_pixels 1 sub\n"
" {\n"
" pixels exch gray_packet put\n"
" } for\n"
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval\n"
"} bind def\n"
"\n"
"/GrayPseudoClassPacket\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Get a PseudoClass packet; convert to grayscale.\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % index: index into the colormap.\n"
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).\n"
" %\n"
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get\n"
" /offset exch 3 mul def\n"
" /color_packet colormap offset 3 getinterval def\n"
" color_packet 0 get 0.299 mul\n"
" color_packet 1 get 0.587 mul add\n"
" color_packet 2 get 0.114 mul add\n"
" cvi\n"
" /gray_packet exch def\n"
" compression 0 eq\n"
" {\n"
" /number_pixels 1 def\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get\n"
" /number_pixels exch 1 add def\n"
" } ifelse\n"
" 0 1 number_pixels 1 sub\n"
" {\n"
" pixels exch gray_packet put\n"
" } for\n"
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval\n"
"} bind def\n"
"\n"
"/PseudoClassPacket\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Get a PseudoClass packet.\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % index: index into the colormap.\n"
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).\n"
" %\n"
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get\n"
" /offset exch 3 mul def\n"
" /color_packet colormap offset 3 getinterval def\n"
" compression 0 eq\n"
" {\n"
" /number_pixels 3 def\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get\n"
" /number_pixels exch 1 add 3 mul def\n"
" } ifelse\n"
" 0 3 number_pixels 1 sub\n"
" {\n"
" pixels exch color_packet putinterval\n"
" } for\n"
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval\n"
"} bind def\n"
"\n"
"/PseudoClassImage\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Display a PseudoClass image.\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % class: 0-PseudoClass or 1-Grayscale.\n"
" %\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /class exch def pop\n"
" class 0 gt\n"
" {\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /depth exch def pop\n"
" /grays columns 8 add depth sub depth mul 8 idiv string def\n"
" columns rows depth\n"
" [\n"
" columns 0 0\n"
" rows neg 0 rows\n"
" ]\n"
" { currentfile grays readhexstring pop } image\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % colors: number of colors in the colormap.\n"
" % colormap: red, green, blue color packets.\n"
" %\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /colors exch def pop\n"
" /colors colors 3 mul def\n"
" /colormap colors string def\n"
" currentfile colormap readhexstring pop pop\n"
" systemdict /colorimage known\n"
" {\n"
" columns rows 8\n"
" [\n"
" columns 0 0\n"
" rows neg 0 rows\n"
" ]\n"
" { PseudoClassPacket } false 3 colorimage\n"
" }\n"
" {\n"
" %\n"
" % No colorimage operator; convert to grayscale.\n"
" %\n"
" columns rows 8\n"
" [\n"
" columns 0 0\n"
" rows neg 0 rows\n"
" ]\n"
" { GrayPseudoClassPacket } image\n"
" } ifelse\n"
" } ifelse\n"
"} bind def\n"
"\n"
"/DisplayImage\n"
"{\n"
" %\n"
" % Display a DirectClass or PseudoClass image.\n"
" %\n"
" % Parameters:\n"
" % x & y translation.\n"
" % x & y scale.\n"
" % label pointsize.\n"
" % image label.\n"
" % image columns & rows.\n"
" % class: 0-DirectClass or 1-PseudoClass.\n"
" % compression: 0-none or 1-RunlengthEncoded.\n"
" % hex color packets.\n"
" %\n"
" gsave\n"
" /buffer 512 string def\n"
" /byte 1 string def\n"
" /color_packet 3 string def\n"
" /pixels 768 string def\n"
"\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /x exch def\n"
" token pop /y exch def pop\n"
" x y translate\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /x exch def\n"
" token pop /y exch def pop\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /pointsize exch def pop\n",
PostscriptEpilog[] =
" x y scale\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /columns exch def\n"
" token pop /rows exch def pop\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /class exch def pop\n"
" currentfile buffer readline pop\n"
" token pop /compression exch def pop\n"
" class 0 gt { PseudoClassImage } { DirectClassImage } ifelse\n"
" grestore\n";
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
date[MaxTextExtent],
**labels,
page_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
pointsize;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PixelPacket
pixel;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution,
scale;
RectangleInfo
geometry,
media_info,
page_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
size_t
bit,
byte,
imageListLength,
length,
page,
text_size;
ssize_t
j,
y;
time_t
timer;
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) memset(&bounds,0,sizeof(bounds));
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
page=1;
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
/*
Scale relative to dots-per-inch.
*/
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
resolution.x=image->x_resolution;
resolution.y=image->y_resolution;
if ((resolution.x == 0.0) || (resolution.y == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
resolution.x=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.x+0.5)/100.0);
resolution.y=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.y+0.5)/100.0);
}
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,image_info->page,MaxTextExtent);
else
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
else
if ((image->gravity != UndefinedGravity) &&
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,PSPageGeometry,MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(page_geometry,">",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
scale.x=PerceptibleReciprocal(resolution.x)*geometry.width*delta.x;
geometry.width=(size_t) floor(scale.x+0.5);
scale.y=PerceptibleReciprocal(resolution.y)*geometry.height*delta.y;
geometry.height=(size_t) floor(scale.y+0.5);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(page_geometry,&media_info);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,page_geometry,&page_info,
&image->exception);
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
geometry.x=(-page_info.x);
geometry.y=(ssize_t) (media_info.height+page_info.y-image->rows);
}
pointsize=12.0;
if (image_info->pointsize != 0.0)
pointsize=image_info->pointsize;
text_size=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
text_size=(size_t) (MultilineCensus(value)*pointsize+12);
if (page == 1)
{
/*
Output Postscript header.
*/
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") == 0)
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"%!PS-Adobe-3.0\n",MaxTextExtent);
else
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n",
MaxTextExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Creator: (ImageMagick)\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%%%%Title: (%s)\n",
image->filename);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
timer=GetMagickTime();
(void) FormatMagickTime(timer,MaxTextExtent,date);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%CreationDate: (%s)\n",date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
bounds.x1=(double) geometry.x;
bounds.y1=(double) geometry.y;
bounds.x2=(double) geometry.x+scale.x;
bounds.y2=(double) geometry.y+(geometry.height+text_size);
if ((image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) &&
(GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"%%%%BoundingBox: (atend)\n",
MaxTextExtent);
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%BoundingBox: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n",ceil(bounds.x1-0.5),
ceil(bounds.y1-0.5),floor(bounds.x2+0.5),floor(bounds.y2+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%HiResBoundingBox: %g %g %g %g\n",bounds.x1,bounds.y1,
bounds.x2,bounds.y2);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Embed Photoshop profile.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%BeginPhotoshop: %.20g",(double) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
{
if ((i % 32) == 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n% ");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%02X",
(unsigned int) (GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i] & 0xff));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%EndPhotoshop\n");
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"xmp");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
RestoreMSCWarning
{
/*
Embed XML profile.
*/
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%begin_xml_code\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"\n%%begin_xml_packet: %.20g\n",(double)
GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%end_xml_packet\n%end_xml_code\n");
}
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,
"%%DocumentNeededResources: font Times-Roman\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%DocumentData: Clean7Bit\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%LanguageLevel: 1\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") != 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Pages: 1\n");
else
{
/*
Compute the number of pages.
*/
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Orientation: Portrait\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%PageOrder: Ascend\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%%%%Pages: %.20g\n",
image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse ? (double)
GetImageListLength(image) : 1.0);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EndComments\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%%BeginDefaults\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EndDefaults\n\n");
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"EPI") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"EPSI") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"EPT") == 0))
{
Image
*preview_image;
Quantum
pixel;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create preview image.
*/
preview_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (preview_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Dump image as bitmap.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%BeginPreview: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n%% ",(double)
preview_image->columns,(double) preview_image->rows,1.0,
(double) ((((preview_image->columns+7) >> 3)*preview_image->rows+
35)/36));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(preview_image,0,y,preview_image->columns,1,
&preview_image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(preview_image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) preview_image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
pixel=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (pixel >= (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+8) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"% ");
};
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
}
if (bit != 0)
{
byte<<=(8-bit);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+8) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"% ");
};
};
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%%EndPreview\n");
preview_image=DestroyImage(preview_image);
}
/*
Output Postscript commands.
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(PostscriptProlog)-1,
(const unsigned char *) PostscriptProlog);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,
" /Times-Roman findfont pointsize scalefont setfont\n");
for (j=(ssize_t) MultilineCensus(value)-1; j >= 0; j--)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image," /label 512 string def\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,
" currentfile label readline pop\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
" 0 y %g add moveto label show pop\n",j*pointsize+12);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(PostscriptEpilog)-1,
(const unsigned char *) PostscriptEpilog);
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") == 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image," showpage\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"} bind def\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EndProlog\n");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%%%%Page: 1 %.20g\n",
(double) (page++));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%PageBoundingBox: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n",(double) geometry.x,
(double) geometry.y,geometry.x+(double) geometry.width,geometry.y+(double)
(geometry.height+text_size));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if ((double) geometry.x < bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=(double) geometry.x;
if ((double) geometry.y < bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=(double) geometry.y;
if ((double) (geometry.x+geometry.width-1) > bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=(double) geometry.x+geometry.width-1;
if ((double) (geometry.y+(geometry.height+text_size)-1) > bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=(double) geometry.y+(geometry.height+text_size)-1;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%%%PageResources: font Times-Roman\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") != 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"userdict begin\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"DisplayImage\n");
/*
Output image data.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n%g %g\n%g\n",
(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y,scale.x,scale.y,pointsize);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
labels=(char **) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
labels=StringToList(value);
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
for (i=0; labels[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%s \n",
labels[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
labels[i]=DestroyString(labels[i]);
}
labels=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(labels);
}
(void) memset(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
pixel.opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
index=(IndexPacket) 0;
x=0;
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
{
Quantum
pixel;
/*
Dump image as grayscale.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n1\n1\n1\n8\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(Quantum) ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(
GetPixelLuma(image,p)));
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) pixel,q);
if ((q-pixels+8) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
}
else
{
ssize_t
y;
Quantum
pixel;
/*
Dump image as bitmap.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n1\n1\n1\n1\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
pixel=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (pixel >= (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+2) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
};
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
{
byte<<=(8-bit);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+2) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
};
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
}
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(image->colors > 256) || (image->matte != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Dump DirectClass image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n0\n%d\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows,
compression == RLECompression ? 1 : 0);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
{
/*
Dump runlength-encoded DirectColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
pixel=(*p);
length=255;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((GetPixelRed(p) == pixel.red) &&
(GetPixelGreen(p) == pixel.green) &&
(GetPixelBlue(p) == pixel.blue) &&
(GetPixelOpacity(p) == pixel.opacity) &&
(length < 255) && (x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-1)))
length++;
else
{
if (x > 0)
{
WriteRunlengthPacket(image,pixel,length,p);
if ((q-pixels+10) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
}
length=0;
}
pixel=(*p);
p++;
}
WriteRunlengthPacket(image,pixel,length,p);
if ((q-pixels+10) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
default:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((image->matte != MagickFalse) &&
(GetPixelOpacity(p) == (Quantum) TransparentOpacity))
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q);
}
else
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelRed(p)),q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelGreen(p)),q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlue(p)),q);
}
if ((q-pixels+6) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
else
{
/*
Dump PseudoClass image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n%d\n%d\n0\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows,image->storage_class == PseudoClass ? 1 : 0,
compression == RLECompression ? 1 : 0);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
image->colors);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%02X%02X%02X\n",
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red),
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green),
ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
{
/*
Dump runlength-encoded PseudoColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
index=GetPixelIndex(indexes);
length=255;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((index == GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)) &&
(length < 255) && (x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1)))
length++;
else
{
if (x > 0)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) index,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t)
MagickMin(length,0xff),q);
i++;
if ((q-pixels+6) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
}
length=0;
}
index=GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
pixel.red=GetPixelRed(p);
pixel.green=GetPixelGreen(p);
pixel.blue=GetPixelBlue(p);
pixel.opacity=GetPixelOpacity(p);
p++;
}
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) index,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) MagickMin(length,0xff),q);
if ((q-pixels+6) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
default:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) GetPixelIndex(
indexes+x),q);
if ((q-pixels+4) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") != 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"end\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%PageTrailer\n");
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Trailer\n");
if (page > 2)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%BoundingBox: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n",ceil(bounds.x1-0.5),
ceil(bounds.y1-0.5),floor(bounds.x2+0.5),floor(bounds.y2+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"%%%%HiResBoundingBox: %g %g %g %g\n",bounds.x1,bounds.y1,
bounds.x2,bounds.y2);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EOF\n");
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 89,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestRenderWidgetHostView::WasUnOccluded() {
is_occluded_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int assign_guest_irq(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *dev,
struct kvm_assigned_irq *irq,
unsigned long guest_irq_type)
{
int id;
int r = -EEXIST;
if (dev->irq_requested_type & KVM_DEV_IRQ_GUEST_MASK)
return r;
id = kvm_request_irq_source_id(kvm);
if (id < 0)
return id;
dev->irq_source_id = id;
switch (guest_irq_type) {
case KVM_DEV_IRQ_GUEST_INTX:
r = assigned_device_enable_guest_intx(kvm, dev, irq);
break;
#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_MSI
case KVM_DEV_IRQ_GUEST_MSI:
r = assigned_device_enable_guest_msi(kvm, dev, irq);
break;
#endif
#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_MSIX
case KVM_DEV_IRQ_GUEST_MSIX:
r = assigned_device_enable_guest_msix(kvm, dev, irq);
break;
#endif
default:
r = -EINVAL;
}
if (!r) {
dev->irq_requested_type |= guest_irq_type;
kvm_register_irq_ack_notifier(kvm, &dev->ack_notifier);
} else
kvm_free_irq_source_id(kvm, dev->irq_source_id);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <hamo.by@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 34,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_dev(blkid_cache cache, blkid_dev *dev, char **cp)
{
char *start, *tmp, *end, *name;
int ret;
if ((ret = parse_start(cp)) <= 0)
return ret;
start = tmp = strchr(*cp, '>');
if (!start) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("blkid: short line parsing dev: %s", *cp));
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
start = skip_over_blank(start + 1);
end = skip_over_word(start);
DBG(READ, ul_debug("device should be %*s",
(int)(end - start), start));
if (**cp == '>')
*cp = end;
else
(*cp)++;
*tmp = '\0';
if (!(tmp = strrchr(end, '<')) || parse_end(&tmp) < 0) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("blkid: missing </device> ending: %s", end));
} else if (tmp)
*tmp = '\0';
if (end - start <= 1) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("blkid: empty device name: %s", *cp));
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
name = strndup(start, end - start);
if (name == NULL)
return -BLKID_ERR_MEM;
DBG(READ, ul_debug("found dev %s", name));
if (!(*dev = blkid_get_dev(cache, name, BLKID_DEV_CREATE))) {
free(name);
return -BLKID_ERR_MEM;
}
free(name);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 74,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppModalDialog::CreateAndShowDialog() {
native_dialog_ = CreateNativeDialog();
native_dialog_->ShowAppModalDialog();
}
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 103,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::SelectionBoundsChanged(
const gfx::Rect& start_rect,
WebKit::WebTextDirection start_direction,
const gfx::Rect& end_rect,
WebKit::WebTextDirection end_direction) {
im_context_->UpdateCaretBounds(gfx::UnionRects(start_rect, end_rect));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_entry_delref(phar_entry_data *idata TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = 0;
if (idata->internal_file && !idata->internal_file->is_persistent) {
if (--idata->internal_file->fp_refcount < 0) {
idata->internal_file->fp_refcount = 0;
}
if (idata->fp && idata->fp != idata->phar->fp && idata->fp != idata->phar->ufp && idata->fp != idata->internal_file->fp) {
php_stream_close(idata->fp);
}
/* if phar_get_or_create_entry_data returns a sub-directory, we have to free it */
if (idata->internal_file->is_temp_dir) {
destroy_phar_manifest_entry((void *)idata->internal_file);
efree(idata->internal_file);
}
}
phar_archive_delref(idata->phar TSRMLS_CC);
efree(idata);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveMockDownloadItem(int id) {
mock_download_item_factory_->RemoveItem(id);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int megasas_handle_io(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
uint32_t lba_count, lba_start_hi, lba_start_lo;
uint64_t lba_start;
bool is_write = (cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd == MFI_CMD_LD_WRITE);
uint8_t cdb[16];
int len;
struct SCSIDevice *sdev = NULL;
lba_count = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.header.data_len);
lba_start_lo = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.lba_lo);
lba_start_hi = le32_to_cpu(cmd->frame->io.lba_hi);
lba_start = ((uint64_t)lba_start_hi << 32) | lba_start_lo;
if (cmd->frame->header.target_id < MFI_MAX_LD &&
cmd->frame->header.lun_id == 0) {
sdev = scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, cmd->frame->header.target_id,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
}
trace_megasas_handle_io(cmd->index,
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id,
(unsigned long)lba_start, (unsigned long)lba_count);
if (!sdev) {
trace_megasas_io_target_not_present(cmd->index,
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
return MFI_STAT_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (cmd->frame->header.cdb_len > 16) {
trace_megasas_scsi_invalid_cdb_len(
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd], 1,
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id,
cmd->frame->header.cdb_len);
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = CHECK_CONDITION;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
cmd->iov_size = lba_count * sdev->blocksize;
if (megasas_map_sgl(s, cmd, &cmd->frame->io.sgl)) {
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(TARGET_FAILURE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = CHECK_CONDITION;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
megasas_encode_lba(cdb, lba_start, lba_count, is_write);
cmd->req = scsi_req_new(sdev, cmd->index,
cmd->frame->header.lun_id, cdb, cmd);
if (!cmd->req) {
trace_megasas_scsi_req_alloc_failed(
mfi_frame_desc[cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd],
cmd->frame->header.target_id, cmd->frame->header.lun_id);
megasas_write_sense(cmd, SENSE_CODE(NO_SENSE));
cmd->frame->header.scsi_status = BUSY;
s->event_count++;
return MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR;
}
len = megasas_enqueue_req(cmd, is_write);
if (len > 0) {
if (is_write) {
trace_megasas_io_write_start(cmd->index, lba_start, lba_count, len);
} else {
trace_megasas_io_read_start(cmd->index, lba_start, lba_count, len);
}
}
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
err = -EPERM;
else
err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
if (!err) {
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_PROPAGATION_MASK;
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!err) {
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsSyncableExtension(const Extension* extension) {
return GetSyncType(extension) == SYNC_TYPE_EXTENSION;
}
Commit Message: Fix syncing of NPAPI plugins.
This fix adds a check for |plugin| permission
while syncing NPAPI plugins.
BUG=252034
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16816024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207830 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_set_sec_context_option(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
const gss_buffer_t value)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_set_sec_context_option(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
value);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 166,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTSTATUS TCWriteDevice (PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject, PVOID buffer, LARGE_INTEGER offset, ULONG length)
{
return TCReadWriteDevice (TRUE, deviceObject, buffer, offset, length);
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_init_opendata_res(struct nfs4_opendata *p)
{
p->o_res.f_attr = &p->f_attr;
p->o_res.dir_attr = &p->dir_attr;
p->o_res.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
p->c_res.seqid = p->c_arg.seqid;
p->o_res.server = p->o_arg.server;
nfs_fattr_init(&p->f_attr);
nfs_fattr_init(&p->dir_attr);
nfs_fattr_init_names(&p->f_attr, &p->owner_name, &p->group_name);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLElement::accessKeyAction(bool sendMouseEvents)
{
dispatchSimulatedClick(0, sendMouseEvents);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoAudioOutputIPC::MojoAudioOutputIPC(FactoryAccessorCB factory_accessor)
: factory_accessor_(std::move(factory_accessor)),
binding_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {
DETACH_FROM_THREAD(thread_checker_);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::NotifySingleHost(AppCacheHost* host,
AppCacheEventID event_id) {
std::vector<int> ids(1, host->host_id());
host->frontend()->OnEventRaised(ids, event_id);
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who)
{
struct task_struct *g, *p;
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
long niceval, retval = -ESRCH;
struct pid *pgrp;
if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS)
return -EINVAL;
rcu_read_lock();
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
switch (which) {
case PRIO_PROCESS:
if (who)
p = find_task_by_vpid(who);
else
p = current;
if (p) {
niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
if (niceval > retval)
retval = niceval;
}
break;
case PRIO_PGRP:
if (who)
pgrp = find_vpid(who);
else
pgrp = task_pgrp(current);
do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) {
niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
if (niceval > retval)
retval = niceval;
} while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p);
break;
case PRIO_USER:
user = (struct user_struct *) cred->user;
if (!who)
who = cred->uid;
else if ((who != cred->uid) &&
!(user = find_user(who)))
goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */
do_each_thread(g, p) {
if (__task_cred(p)->uid == who) {
niceval = 20 - task_nice(p);
if (niceval > retval)
retval = niceval;
}
} while_each_thread(g, p);
if (who != cred->uid)
free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */
break;
}
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int isloop(enum js_AstType T)
{
return T == STM_DO || T == STM_WHILE ||
T == STM_FOR || T == STM_FOR_VAR ||
T == STM_FOR_IN || T == STM_FOR_IN_VAR;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::bindFramebuffer(GLenum target,
WebGLFramebuffer* buffer) {
if (!ValidateNullableWebGLObject("bindFramebuffer", buffer))
return;
if (target != GL_FRAMEBUFFER) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "bindFramebuffer", "invalid target");
return;
}
SetFramebuffer(target, buffer);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_clear_intr_skinny(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
u32 status;
u32 mfiStatus = 0;
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs;
regs = instance->reg_set;
/*
* Check if it is our interrupt
*/
status = readl(®s->outbound_intr_status);
if (!(status & MFI_SKINNY_ENABLE_INTERRUPT_MASK)) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Check if it is our interrupt
*/
if ((megasas_read_fw_status_reg_skinny(instance) & MFI_STATE_MASK) ==
MFI_STATE_FAULT) {
mfiStatus = MFI_INTR_FLAG_FIRMWARE_STATE_CHANGE;
} else
mfiStatus = MFI_INTR_FLAG_REPLY_MESSAGE;
/*
* Clear the interrupt by writing back the same value
*/
writel(status, ®s->outbound_intr_status);
/*
* dummy read to flush PCI
*/
readl(®s->outbound_intr_status);
return mfiStatus;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dequeue_mid(struct mid_q_entry *mid, bool malformed)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2
mid->when_received = jiffies;
#endif
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
if (!malformed)
mid->mid_state = MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED;
else
mid->mid_state = MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED;
list_del_init(&mid->qhead);
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Exif2tm(struct tm * timeptr, char * ExifTime)
{
int a;
timeptr->tm_wday = -1;
a = sscanf(ExifTime, "%d%*c%d%*c%d%*c%d:%d:%d",
&timeptr->tm_year, &timeptr->tm_mon, &timeptr->tm_mday,
&timeptr->tm_hour, &timeptr->tm_min, &timeptr->tm_sec);
if (a == 6){
timeptr->tm_isdst = -1;
timeptr->tm_mon -= 1; // Adjust for unix zero-based months
timeptr->tm_year -= 1900; // Adjust for year starting at 1900
return TRUE; // worked.
}
return FALSE; // Wasn't in Exif date format.
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::getNextResult(CaptureResult *frame) {
ATRACE_CALL();
Mutex::Autolock l(mOutputLock);
if (mResultQueue.empty()) {
return NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
}
if (frame == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: argument cannot be NULL", __FUNCTION__);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
CaptureResult &result = *(mResultQueue.begin());
frame->mResultExtras = result.mResultExtras;
frame->mMetadata.acquire(result.mMetadata);
mResultQueue.erase(mResultQueue.begin());
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smart_socket_close(asocket* s) {
D("SS(%d): closed", s->id);
if (s->pkt_first) {
put_apacket(s->pkt_first);
}
if (s->peer) {
s->peer->peer = 0;
s->peer->close(s->peer);
s->peer = 0;
}
free(s);
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidHideExternalPopupMenu() {
external_popup_menu_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void closeURLRecursively(Frame* frame)
{
FrameLoaderClientBlackBerry* frameLoaderClient = static_cast<FrameLoaderClientBlackBerry*>(frame->loader()->client());
frameLoaderClient->suppressChildFrameCreation();
frame->loader()->closeURL();
Vector<RefPtr<Frame>, 10> childFrames;
for (RefPtr<Frame> childFrame = frame->tree()->firstChild(); childFrame; childFrame = childFrame->tree()->nextSibling())
childFrames.append(childFrame);
unsigned size = childFrames.size();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < size; i++)
closeURLRecursively(childFrames[i].get());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned long copy_shmid_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shmid64_ds *in, int version)
{
switch (version) {
case IPC_64:
return copy_to_user(buf, in, sizeof(*in));
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shmid_ds out;
memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(&in->shm_perm, &out.shm_perm);
out.shm_segsz = in->shm_segsz;
out.shm_atime = in->shm_atime;
out.shm_dtime = in->shm_dtime;
out.shm_ctime = in->shm_ctime;
out.shm_cpid = in->shm_cpid;
out.shm_lpid = in->shm_lpid;
out.shm_nattch = in->shm_nattch;
return copy_to_user(buf, &out, sizeof(out));
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 42,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlXPtrStringRangeFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int i, startindex, endindex = 0, fendindex;
xmlNodePtr start, end = 0, fend;
xmlXPathObjectPtr set;
xmlLocationSetPtr oldset;
xmlLocationSetPtr newset;
xmlXPathObjectPtr string;
xmlXPathObjectPtr position = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr number = NULL;
int found, pos = 0, num = 0;
/*
* Grab the arguments
*/
if ((nargs < 2) || (nargs > 4))
XP_ERROR(XPATH_INVALID_ARITY);
if (nargs >= 4) {
CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NUMBER);
number = valuePop(ctxt);
if (number != NULL)
num = (int) number->floatval;
}
if (nargs >= 3) {
CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_NUMBER);
position = valuePop(ctxt);
if (position != NULL)
pos = (int) position->floatval;
}
CHECK_TYPE(XPATH_STRING);
string = valuePop(ctxt);
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) ||
((ctxt->value->type != XPATH_LOCATIONSET) &&
(ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)))
XP_ERROR(XPATH_INVALID_TYPE)
set = valuePop(ctxt);
newset = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(NULL);
if (set->nodesetval == NULL) {
goto error;
}
if (set->type == XPATH_NODESET) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp;
/*
* First convert to a location set
*/
tmp = xmlXPtrNewLocationSetNodeSet(set->nodesetval);
xmlXPathFreeObject(set);
set = tmp;
}
oldset = (xmlLocationSetPtr) set->user;
/*
* The loop is to search for each element in the location set
* the list of location set corresponding to that search
*/
for (i = 0;i < oldset->locNr;i++) {
#ifdef DEBUG_RANGES
xmlXPathDebugDumpObject(stdout, oldset->locTab[i], 0);
#endif
xmlXPtrGetStartPoint(oldset->locTab[i], &start, &startindex);
xmlXPtrGetEndPoint(oldset->locTab[i], &end, &endindex);
xmlXPtrAdvanceChar(&start, &startindex, 0);
xmlXPtrGetLastChar(&end, &endindex);
#ifdef DEBUG_RANGES
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"from index %d of ->", startindex);
xmlDebugDumpString(stdout, start->content);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "\n");
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"to index %d of ->", endindex);
xmlDebugDumpString(stdout, end->content);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "\n");
#endif
do {
fend = end;
fendindex = endindex;
found = xmlXPtrSearchString(string->stringval, &start, &startindex,
&fend, &fendindex);
if (found == 1) {
if (position == NULL) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newset,
xmlXPtrNewRange(start, startindex, fend, fendindex));
} else if (xmlXPtrAdvanceChar(&start, &startindex,
pos - 1) == 0) {
if ((number != NULL) && (num > 0)) {
int rindx;
xmlNodePtr rend;
rend = start;
rindx = startindex - 1;
if (xmlXPtrAdvanceChar(&rend, &rindx,
num) == 0) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newset,
xmlXPtrNewRange(start, startindex,
rend, rindx));
}
} else if ((number != NULL) && (num <= 0)) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newset,
xmlXPtrNewRange(start, startindex,
start, startindex));
} else {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newset,
xmlXPtrNewRange(start, startindex,
fend, fendindex));
}
}
start = fend;
startindex = fendindex;
if (string->stringval[0] == 0)
startindex++;
}
} while (found == 1);
}
/*
* Save the new value and cleanup
*/
error:
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPtrWrapLocationSet(newset));
xmlXPathFreeObject(set);
xmlXPathFreeObject(string);
if (position) xmlXPathFreeObject(position);
if (number) xmlXPathFreeObject(number);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: initialize_readline ()
{
rl_command_func_t *func;
char kseq[2];
if (bash_readline_initialized)
return;
rl_terminal_name = get_string_value ("TERM");
rl_instream = stdin;
rl_outstream = stderr;
/* Allow conditional parsing of the ~/.inputrc file. */
rl_readline_name = "Bash";
/* Add bindable names before calling rl_initialize so they may be
referenced in the various inputrc files. */
rl_add_defun ("shell-expand-line", shell_expand_line, -1);
#ifdef BANG_HISTORY
rl_add_defun ("history-expand-line", history_expand_line, -1);
rl_add_defun ("magic-space", tcsh_magic_space, -1);
#endif
rl_add_defun ("shell-forward-word", bash_forward_shellword, -1);
rl_add_defun ("shell-backward-word", bash_backward_shellword, -1);
rl_add_defun ("shell-kill-word", bash_kill_shellword, -1);
rl_add_defun ("shell-backward-kill-word", bash_backward_kill_shellword, -1);
#ifdef ALIAS
rl_add_defun ("alias-expand-line", alias_expand_line, -1);
# ifdef BANG_HISTORY
rl_add_defun ("history-and-alias-expand-line", history_and_alias_expand_line, -1);
# endif
#endif
/* Backwards compatibility. */
rl_add_defun ("insert-last-argument", rl_yank_last_arg, -1);
rl_add_defun ("operate-and-get-next", operate_and_get_next, -1);
rl_add_defun ("display-shell-version", display_shell_version, -1);
rl_add_defun ("edit-and-execute-command", emacs_edit_and_execute_command, -1);
#if defined (BRACE_COMPLETION)
rl_add_defun ("complete-into-braces", bash_brace_completion, -1);
#endif
#if defined (SPECIFIC_COMPLETION_FUNCTIONS)
rl_add_defun ("complete-filename", bash_complete_filename, -1);
rl_add_defun ("possible-filename-completions", bash_possible_filename_completions, -1);
rl_add_defun ("complete-username", bash_complete_username, -1);
rl_add_defun ("possible-username-completions", bash_possible_username_completions, -1);
rl_add_defun ("complete-hostname", bash_complete_hostname, -1);
rl_add_defun ("possible-hostname-completions", bash_possible_hostname_completions, -1);
rl_add_defun ("complete-variable", bash_complete_variable, -1);
rl_add_defun ("possible-variable-completions", bash_possible_variable_completions, -1);
rl_add_defun ("complete-command", bash_complete_command, -1);
rl_add_defun ("possible-command-completions", bash_possible_command_completions, -1);
rl_add_defun ("glob-complete-word", bash_glob_complete_word, -1);
rl_add_defun ("glob-expand-word", bash_glob_expand_word, -1);
rl_add_defun ("glob-list-expansions", bash_glob_list_expansions, -1);
#endif
rl_add_defun ("dynamic-complete-history", dynamic_complete_history, -1);
rl_add_defun ("dabbrev-expand", bash_dabbrev_expand, -1);
/* Bind defaults before binding our custom shell keybindings. */
if (RL_ISSTATE(RL_STATE_INITIALIZED) == 0)
rl_initialize ();
/* Bind up our special shell functions. */
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map (CTRL('E'), shell_expand_line, emacs_meta_keymap);
#ifdef BANG_HISTORY
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('^', history_expand_line, emacs_meta_keymap);
#endif
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map (CTRL ('O'), operate_and_get_next, emacs_standard_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map (CTRL ('V'), display_shell_version, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
/* In Bash, the user can switch editing modes with "set -o [vi emacs]",
so it is not necessary to allow C-M-j for context switching. Turn
off this occasionally confusing behaviour. */
kseq[0] = CTRL('J');
kseq[1] = '\0';
func = rl_function_of_keyseq (kseq, emacs_meta_keymap, (int *)NULL);
if (func == rl_vi_editing_mode)
rl_unbind_key_in_map (CTRL('J'), emacs_meta_keymap);
kseq[0] = CTRL('M');
func = rl_function_of_keyseq (kseq, emacs_meta_keymap, (int *)NULL);
if (func == rl_vi_editing_mode)
rl_unbind_key_in_map (CTRL('M'), emacs_meta_keymap);
#if defined (VI_MODE)
rl_unbind_key_in_map (CTRL('E'), vi_movement_keymap);
#endif
#if defined (BRACE_COMPLETION)
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('{', bash_brace_completion, emacs_meta_keymap); /*}*/
#endif /* BRACE_COMPLETION */
#if defined (SPECIFIC_COMPLETION_FUNCTIONS)
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('/', bash_complete_filename, emacs_meta_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('/', bash_possible_filename_completions, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
/* Have to jump through hoops here because there is a default binding for
M-~ (rl_tilde_expand) */
kseq[0] = '~';
kseq[1] = '\0';
func = rl_function_of_keyseq (kseq, emacs_meta_keymap, (int *)NULL);
if (func == 0 || func == rl_tilde_expand)
rl_bind_keyseq_in_map (kseq, bash_complete_username, emacs_meta_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('~', bash_possible_username_completions, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('@', bash_complete_hostname, emacs_meta_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('@', bash_possible_hostname_completions, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('$', bash_complete_variable, emacs_meta_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('$', bash_possible_variable_completions, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('!', bash_complete_command, emacs_meta_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('!', bash_possible_command_completions, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('g', bash_glob_complete_word, emacs_meta_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('*', bash_glob_expand_word, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('g', bash_glob_list_expansions, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
#endif /* SPECIFIC_COMPLETION_FUNCTIONS */
kseq[0] = TAB;
kseq[1] = '\0';
func = rl_function_of_keyseq (kseq, emacs_meta_keymap, (int *)NULL);
if (func == 0 || func == rl_tab_insert)
rl_bind_key_in_map (TAB, dynamic_complete_history, emacs_meta_keymap);
/* Tell the completer that we want a crack first. */
rl_attempted_completion_function = attempt_shell_completion;
/* Tell the completer that we might want to follow symbolic links or
do other expansion on directory names. */
set_directory_hook ();
rl_filename_rewrite_hook = bash_filename_rewrite_hook;
rl_filename_stat_hook = bash_filename_stat_hook;
/* Tell the filename completer we want a chance to ignore some names. */
rl_ignore_some_completions_function = filename_completion_ignore;
/* Bind C-xC-e to invoke emacs and run result as commands. */
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map (CTRL ('E'), emacs_edit_and_execute_command, emacs_ctlx_keymap);
#if defined (VI_MODE)
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('v', vi_edit_and_execute_command, vi_movement_keymap);
# if defined (ALIAS)
rl_bind_key_if_unbound_in_map ('@', posix_edit_macros, vi_movement_keymap);
# endif
rl_bind_key_in_map ('\\', bash_vi_complete, vi_movement_keymap);
rl_bind_key_in_map ('*', bash_vi_complete, vi_movement_keymap);
rl_bind_key_in_map ('=', bash_vi_complete, vi_movement_keymap);
#endif
rl_completer_quote_characters = "'\"";
/* This sets rl_completer_word_break_characters and rl_special_prefixes
to the appropriate values, depending on whether or not hostname
completion is enabled. */
enable_hostname_completion (perform_hostname_completion);
/* characters that need to be quoted when appearing in filenames. */
rl_filename_quote_characters = default_filename_quote_characters;
set_filename_bstab (rl_filename_quote_characters);
rl_filename_quoting_function = bash_quote_filename;
rl_filename_dequoting_function = bash_dequote_filename;
rl_char_is_quoted_p = char_is_quoted;
#if 0
/* This is superfluous and makes it impossible to use tab completion in
vi mode even when explicitly binding it in ~/.inputrc. sv_strict_posix()
should already have called posix_readline_initialize() when
posixly_correct was set. */
if (posixly_correct)
posix_readline_initialize (1);
#endif
bash_readline_initialized = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setRestoreType(OxideQQuickWebView::RestoreType type) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->proxy_) {
qWarning() <<
"OxideQQuickWebView: restoreType must be provided during construction";
return;
}
d->construct_props_->restore_type = ToInternalRestoreType(type);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long Segment::ParseHeaders()
{
long long total, available;
const int status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (total < 0) || (segment_stop <= total));
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
break;
long long pos = m_pos;
const long long element_start = pos;
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error
return id;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > available)
return (pos + 1);
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return result;
if (result > 0) //underflow (weird)
return (pos + 1);
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > available)
return pos + len;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return size;
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
const long long element_size = size + pos - element_start;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + size) > available)
return pos + size;
if (id == 0x0549A966) //Segment Info ID
{
if (m_pInfo)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pInfo = new (std::nothrow) SegmentInfo(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pInfo == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pInfo->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x0654AE6B) //Tracks ID
{
if (m_pTracks)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pTracks = new (std::nothrow) Tracks(this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pTracks->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
{
if (m_pCues == NULL)
{
m_pCues = new (std::nothrow) Cues(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pCues == NULL)
return -1;
}
}
else if (id == 0x014D9B74) //SeekHead ID
{
if (m_pSeekHead == NULL)
{
m_pSeekHead = new (std::nothrow) SeekHead(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pSeekHead == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pSeekHead->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
}
else if (id == 0x0043A770) //Chapters ID
{
if (m_pChapters == NULL)
{
m_pChapters = new (std::nothrow) Chapters(
this,
pos,
size,
element_start,
element_size);
if (m_pChapters == NULL)
return -1;
const long status = m_pChapters->Parse();
if (status)
return status;
}
}
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
}
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
if (m_pInfo == NULL) //TODO: liberalize this behavior
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (m_pTracks == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: robj *streamTypeLookupWriteOrCreate(client *c, robj *key) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWrite(c->db,key);
if (o == NULL) {
o = createStreamObject();
dbAdd(c->db,key,o);
} else {
if (o->type != OBJ_STREAM) {
addReply(c,shared.wrongtypeerr);
return NULL;
}
}
return o;
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setContextMenu(QQmlComponent* contextMenu) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->contents_view_->contextMenu() == contextMenu) {
return;
}
d->contents_view_->setContextMenu(contextMenu);
emit contextMenuChanged();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateStyleAndLayoutForNode(const Node* node) {
DCHECK(node);
if (!node->InActiveDocument())
return;
DisplayLockUtilities::ScopedChainForcedUpdate scoped_update_forced(node);
UpdateStyleAndLayout();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadMATImageV4(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct {
unsigned char Type[4];
unsigned int nRows;
unsigned int nCols;
unsigned int imagf;
unsigned int nameLen;
} MAT4_HDR;
long
ldblk;
EndianType
endian;
Image
*rotate_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MAT4_HDR
HDR;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumFormatType
format_type;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned int
depth;
(void) SeekBlob(image,0,SEEK_SET);
while (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Object parser loop.
*/
ldblk=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((ldblk > 9999) || (ldblk < 0))
break;
HDR.Type[3]=ldblk % 10; ldblk /= 10; /* T digit */
HDR.Type[2]=ldblk % 10; ldblk /= 10; /* P digit */
HDR.Type[1]=ldblk % 10; ldblk /= 10; /* O digit */
HDR.Type[0]=ldblk; /* M digit */
if (HDR.Type[3] != 0)
break; /* Data format */
if (HDR.Type[2] != 0)
break; /* Always 0 */
if (HDR.Type[0] == 0)
{
HDR.nRows=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
HDR.nCols=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
HDR.imagf=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
HDR.nameLen=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
HDR.nRows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
HDR.nCols=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
HDR.imagf=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
HDR.nameLen=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
endian=MSBEndian;
}
if ((HDR.imagf != 0) && (HDR.imagf != 1))
break;
if (HDR.nameLen > 0xFFFF)
return((Image *) NULL);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) HDR.nameLen; i++)
{
int
byte;
/*
Skip matrix name.
*/
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
image->columns=(size_t) HDR.nRows;
image->rows=(size_t) HDR.nCols;
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
Swap(image->columns,image->rows);
return(image);
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
switch(HDR.Type[1])
{
case 0:
format_type=FloatingPointQuantumFormat;
depth=64;
break;
case 1:
format_type=FloatingPointQuantumFormat;
depth=32;
break;
case 2:
format_type=UnsignedQuantumFormat;
depth=16;
break;
case 3:
format_type=SignedQuantumFormat;
depth=16;
break;
case 4:
format_type=UnsignedQuantumFormat;
depth=8;
break;
default:
format_type=UnsignedQuantumFormat;
depth=8;
break;
}
image->depth=depth;
if (HDR.Type[0] != 0)
SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,format_type);
status=SetQuantumDepth(image,quantum_info,depth);
status=SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,endian);
SetQuantumScale(quantum_info,1.0);
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
count=ReadBlob(image,depth/8*image->columns,(char *) pixels);
if (count == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,image->rows-y-1,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
if ((HDR.Type[1] == 2) || (HDR.Type[1] == 3))
FixSignedValues(image,q,(int) image->columns);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (HDR.imagf == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
/*
Read complex pixels.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,depth/8*image->columns,(char *) pixels);
if (count == -1)
break;
if (HDR.Type[1] == 0)
InsertComplexDoubleRow(image,(double *) pixels,y,0,0,exception);
else
InsertComplexFloatRow(image,(float *) pixels,y,0,0,exception);
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,90.0,exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=rotate_image;
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/362
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 62,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickStatusType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *offsets,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickStatusType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,8*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < offsets[y])
length=(size_t) offsets[y];
if (length > row_size + 256) // arbitrary number
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"InvalidLength",
image->filename);
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,8*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) offsets[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) offsets[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PreresolveJob::PreresolveJob(PreconnectRequest preconnect_request,
PreresolveInfo* info)
: url(std::move(preconnect_request.origin)),
num_sockets(preconnect_request.num_sockets),
allow_credentials(preconnect_request.allow_credentials),
network_isolation_key(
std::move(preconnect_request.network_isolation_key)),
info(info) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 172,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_asf_demux_class_init (GstASFDemuxClass * klass)
{
GstElementClass *gstelement_class;
gstelement_class = (GstElementClass *) klass;
gst_element_class_set_static_metadata (gstelement_class, "ASF Demuxer",
"Codec/Demuxer",
"Demultiplexes ASF Streams", "Owen Fraser-Green <owen@discobabe.net>");
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&audio_src_template);
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&video_src_template);
gst_element_class_add_static_pad_template (gstelement_class,
&gst_asf_demux_sink_template);
gstelement_class->change_state =
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_change_state);
gstelement_class->send_event =
GST_DEBUG_FUNCPTR (gst_asf_demux_element_send_event);
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rt_add_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt)
{
struct uncached_list *ul = raw_cpu_ptr(&rt_uncached_list);
rt->rt_uncached_list = ul;
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_add_tail(&rt->rt_uncached, &ul->head);
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 62,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OffscreenCanvas::IsAccelerated() const {
return context_ && context_->IsAccelerated();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::HighEntropyMethodWithMeasureMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_highEntropyMethodWithMeasure");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kV8TestObject_HighEntropyMethodWithMeasure_Method);
Dactyloscoper::Record(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kV8TestObject_HighEntropyMethodWithMeasure_Method);
test_object_v8_internal::HighEntropyMethodWithMeasureMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::HandleDragUpdate(
const base::Optional<BrowserRootView::DropIndex>& index) {
SetDropArrow(index);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long gfn_to_hva_many(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
gfn_t *nr_pages)
{
if (!slot || slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID)
return bad_hva();
if (nr_pages)
*nr_pages = slot->npages - (gfn - slot->base_gfn);
return gfn_to_hva_memslot(slot, gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_command(conn *c, char *command) {
token_t tokens[MAX_TOKENS];
size_t ntokens;
int comm;
assert(c != NULL);
MEMCACHED_PROCESS_COMMAND_START(c->sfd, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, "<%d %s\n", c->sfd, command);
/*
* for commands set/add/replace, we build an item and read the data
* directly into it, then continue in nread_complete().
*/
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory preparing response");
return;
}
ntokens = tokenize_command(command, tokens, MAX_TOKENS);
if (ntokens >= 3 &&
((strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "get") == 0) ||
(strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "bget") == 0))) {
process_get_command(c, tokens, ntokens, false);
} else if ((ntokens == 6 || ntokens == 7) &&
((strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "add") == 0 && (comm = NREAD_ADD)) ||
(strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "set") == 0 && (comm = NREAD_SET)) ||
(strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "replace") == 0 && (comm = NREAD_REPLACE)) ||
(strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "prepend") == 0 && (comm = NREAD_PREPEND)) ||
(strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "append") == 0 && (comm = NREAD_APPEND)) )) {
process_update_command(c, tokens, ntokens, comm, false);
} else if ((ntokens == 7 || ntokens == 8) && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "cas") == 0 && (comm = NREAD_CAS))) {
process_update_command(c, tokens, ntokens, comm, true);
} else if ((ntokens == 4 || ntokens == 5) && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "incr") == 0)) {
process_arithmetic_command(c, tokens, ntokens, 1);
} else if (ntokens >= 3 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "gets") == 0)) {
process_get_command(c, tokens, ntokens, true);
} else if ((ntokens == 4 || ntokens == 5) && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "decr") == 0)) {
process_arithmetic_command(c, tokens, ntokens, 0);
} else if (ntokens >= 3 && ntokens <= 5 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "delete") == 0)) {
process_delete_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else if ((ntokens == 4 || ntokens == 5) && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "touch") == 0)) {
process_touch_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else if (ntokens >= 2 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "stats") == 0)) {
process_stat(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else if (ntokens >= 2 && ntokens <= 4 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "flush_all") == 0)) {
time_t exptime = 0;
rel_time_t new_oldest = 0;
set_noreply_maybe(c, tokens, ntokens);
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.flush_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (!settings.flush_enabled) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR flush_all not allowed");
return;
}
if (ntokens != (c->noreply ? 3 : 2)) {
exptime = strtol(tokens[1].value, NULL, 10);
if(errno == ERANGE) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad command line format");
return;
}
}
/*
If exptime is zero realtime() would return zero too, and
realtime(exptime) - 1 would overflow to the max unsigned
value. So we process exptime == 0 the same way we do when
no delay is given at all.
*/
if (exptime > 0) {
new_oldest = realtime(exptime);
} else { /* exptime == 0 */
new_oldest = current_time;
}
if (settings.use_cas) {
settings.oldest_live = new_oldest - 1;
if (settings.oldest_live <= current_time)
settings.oldest_cas = get_cas_id();
} else {
settings.oldest_live = new_oldest;
}
out_string(c, "OK");
return;
} else if (ntokens == 2 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "version") == 0)) {
out_string(c, "VERSION " VERSION);
} else if (ntokens == 2 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "quit") == 0)) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
} else if (ntokens == 2 && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "shutdown") == 0)) {
if (settings.shutdown_command) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
raise(SIGINT);
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR: shutdown not enabled");
}
} else if (ntokens > 1 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "slabs") == 0) {
if (ntokens == 5 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "reassign") == 0) {
int src, dst, rv;
if (settings.slab_reassign == false) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR slab reassignment disabled");
return;
}
src = strtol(tokens[2].value, NULL, 10);
dst = strtol(tokens[3].value, NULL, 10);
if (errno == ERANGE) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad command line format");
return;
}
rv = slabs_reassign(src, dst);
switch (rv) {
case REASSIGN_OK:
out_string(c, "OK");
break;
case REASSIGN_RUNNING:
out_string(c, "BUSY currently processing reassign request");
break;
case REASSIGN_BADCLASS:
out_string(c, "BADCLASS invalid src or dst class id");
break;
case REASSIGN_NOSPARE:
out_string(c, "NOSPARE source class has no spare pages");
break;
case REASSIGN_SRC_DST_SAME:
out_string(c, "SAME src and dst class are identical");
break;
}
return;
} else if (ntokens == 4 &&
(strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "automove") == 0)) {
process_slabs_automove_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR");
}
} else if (ntokens > 1 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "lru_crawler") == 0) {
if (ntokens == 4 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "crawl") == 0) {
int rv;
if (settings.lru_crawler == false) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR lru crawler disabled");
return;
}
rv = lru_crawler_crawl(tokens[2].value, CRAWLER_EXPIRED, NULL, 0);
switch(rv) {
case CRAWLER_OK:
out_string(c, "OK");
break;
case CRAWLER_RUNNING:
out_string(c, "BUSY currently processing crawler request");
break;
case CRAWLER_BADCLASS:
out_string(c, "BADCLASS invalid class id");
break;
case CRAWLER_NOTSTARTED:
out_string(c, "NOTSTARTED no items to crawl");
break;
case CRAWLER_ERROR:
out_string(c, "ERROR an unknown error happened");
break;
}
return;
} else if (ntokens == 4 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "metadump") == 0) {
if (settings.lru_crawler == false) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR lru crawler disabled");
return;
}
if (!settings.dump_enabled) {
out_string(c, "ERROR metadump not allowed");
return;
}
int rv = lru_crawler_crawl(tokens[2].value, CRAWLER_METADUMP,
c, c->sfd);
switch(rv) {
case CRAWLER_OK:
out_string(c, "OK");
conn_set_state(c, conn_watch);
event_del(&c->event);
break;
case CRAWLER_RUNNING:
out_string(c, "BUSY currently processing crawler request");
break;
case CRAWLER_BADCLASS:
out_string(c, "BADCLASS invalid class id");
break;
case CRAWLER_NOTSTARTED:
out_string(c, "NOTSTARTED no items to crawl");
break;
case CRAWLER_ERROR:
out_string(c, "ERROR an unknown error happened");
break;
}
return;
} else if (ntokens == 4 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "tocrawl") == 0) {
uint32_t tocrawl;
if (!safe_strtoul(tokens[2].value, &tocrawl)) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad command line format");
return;
}
settings.lru_crawler_tocrawl = tocrawl;
out_string(c, "OK");
return;
} else if (ntokens == 4 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "sleep") == 0) {
uint32_t tosleep;
if (!safe_strtoul(tokens[2].value, &tosleep)) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR bad command line format");
return;
}
if (tosleep > 1000000) {
out_string(c, "CLIENT_ERROR sleep must be one second or less");
return;
}
settings.lru_crawler_sleep = tosleep;
out_string(c, "OK");
return;
} else if (ntokens == 3) {
if ((strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "enable") == 0)) {
if (start_item_crawler_thread() == 0) {
out_string(c, "OK");
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR failed to start lru crawler thread");
}
} else if ((strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN + 1].value, "disable") == 0)) {
if (stop_item_crawler_thread() == 0) {
out_string(c, "OK");
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR failed to stop lru crawler thread");
}
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR");
}
return;
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR");
}
} else if (ntokens > 1 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "watch") == 0) {
process_watch_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else if ((ntokens == 3 || ntokens == 4) && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "cache_memlimit") == 0)) {
process_memlimit_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else if ((ntokens == 3 || ntokens == 4) && (strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "verbosity") == 0)) {
process_verbosity_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else if (ntokens >= 3 && strcmp(tokens[COMMAND_TOKEN].value, "lru") == 0) {
process_lru_command(c, tokens, ntokens);
} else {
out_string(c, "ERROR");
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ciedefdomain(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
int code;
ref CIEdict, *tempref;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &CIEdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If we have a RangeDEF, get the values from that */
code = dict_find_string(&CIEdict, "RangeDEF", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
code = get_cie_param_array(imemory, tempref, 6, ptr);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else {
/* Default values for a CIEBasedDEF */
memcpy(ptr, default_0_1, 6*sizeof(float));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_wait_for_accept(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
int err = 0;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (list_empty(&ep->asocs)) {
sctp_release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (!sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))
break;
err = 0;
if (!list_empty(&ep->asocs))
break;
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerThread::setWorkerInspectorController(WorkerInspectorController* workerInspectorController)
{
MutexLocker locker(m_workerInspectorControllerMutex);
m_workerInspectorController = workerInspectorController;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXLayoutObject::lineBreaks(Vector<int>& lineBreaks) const {
if (!isTextControl())
return;
VisiblePosition visiblePos = visiblePositionForIndex(0);
VisiblePosition prevVisiblePos = visiblePos;
visiblePos = nextLinePosition(visiblePos, LayoutUnit(), HasEditableAXRole);
while (visiblePos.isNotNull() && !inSameLine(prevVisiblePos, visiblePos)) {
lineBreaks.push_back(indexForVisiblePosition(visiblePos));
prevVisiblePos = visiblePos;
visiblePos = nextLinePosition(visiblePos, LayoutUnit(), HasEditableAXRole);
if (visiblePos.deepEquivalent().compareTo(prevVisiblePos.deepEquivalent()) <
0)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_define_method_raw(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *c, mrb_sym mid, mrb_method_t m)
{
khash_t(mt) *h;
khiter_t k;
MRB_CLASS_ORIGIN(c);
h = c->mt;
if (MRB_FROZEN_P(c)) {
if (c->tt == MRB_TT_MODULE)
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FROZEN_ERROR, "can't modify frozen module");
else
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FROZEN_ERROR, "can't modify frozen class");
}
if (!h) h = c->mt = kh_init(mt, mrb);
k = kh_put(mt, mrb, h, mid);
kh_value(h, k) = m;
if (MRB_METHOD_PROC_P(m) && !MRB_METHOD_UNDEF_P(m)) {
struct RProc *p = MRB_METHOD_PROC(m);
p->flags |= MRB_PROC_SCOPE;
p->c = NULL;
mrb_field_write_barrier(mrb, (struct RBasic*)c, (struct RBasic*)p);
if (!MRB_PROC_ENV_P(p)) {
MRB_PROC_SET_TARGET_CLASS(p, c);
}
}
mc_clear_by_id(mrb, c, mid);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_SET_IP_ECN(const struct ofpact_ecn *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%smod_nw_ecn:%s%d",
colors.param, colors.end, a->ecn);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int backref_comp(struct sa_defrag_extent_backref *b1,
struct sa_defrag_extent_backref *b2)
{
if (b1->root_id < b2->root_id)
return -1;
else if (b1->root_id > b2->root_id)
return 1;
if (b1->inum < b2->inum)
return -1;
else if (b1->inum > b2->inum)
return 1;
if (b1->file_pos < b2->file_pos)
return -1;
else if (b1->file_pos > b2->file_pos)
return 1;
/*
* [------------------------------] ===> (a range of space)
* |<--->| |<---->| =============> (fs/file tree A)
* |<---------------------------->| ===> (fs/file tree B)
*
* A range of space can refer to two file extents in one tree while
* refer to only one file extent in another tree.
*
* So we may process a disk offset more than one time(two extents in A)
* and locate at the same extent(one extent in B), then insert two same
* backrefs(both refer to the extent in B).
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WorkerThread::doIdleGc(double deadlineSeconds)
{
bool gcFinished = false;
if (deadlineSeconds > Platform::current()->monotonicallyIncreasingTime())
gcFinished = isolate()->IdleNotificationDeadline(deadlineSeconds);
return gcFinished;
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_jpeg2000_reinit(Jpeg2000Component *comp, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty)
{
int reslevelno, bandno, cblkno, precno;
for (reslevelno = 0; reslevelno < codsty->nreslevels; reslevelno++) {
Jpeg2000ResLevel *rlevel = comp->reslevel + reslevelno;
for (bandno = 0; bandno < rlevel->nbands; bandno++) {
Jpeg2000Band *band = rlevel->band + bandno;
for(precno = 0; precno < rlevel->num_precincts_x * rlevel->num_precincts_y; precno++) {
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
tag_tree_zero(prec->zerobits, prec->nb_codeblocks_width, prec->nb_codeblocks_height);
tag_tree_zero(prec->cblkincl, prec->nb_codeblocks_width, prec->nb_codeblocks_height);
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < prec->nb_codeblocks_width * prec->nb_codeblocks_height; cblkno++) {
Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk = prec->cblk + cblkno;
cblk->length = 0;
cblk->lblock = 3;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: jpeg2000: fix dereferencing invalid pointers
Found-by: Laurent Butti <laurentb@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct ipv6_rt_hdr *ip6_rthdr_dup(struct ipv6_rt_hdr *src,
gfp_t gfp)
{
return src ? kmemdup(src, (src->hdrlen + 1) * 8, gfp) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_append_data_mtu did not care about pmtudisc and frag_size
If the socket had an IPV6_MTU value set, ip6_append_data_mtu lost track
of this when appending the second frame on a corked socket. This results
in the following splat:
[37598.993962] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[37598.994008] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2064!
[37598.994008] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[37598.994008] Modules linked in: tcp_lp uvcvideo videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_core videodev media vfat fat usb_storage fuse ebtable_nat xt_CHECKSUM bridge stp llc ipt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6table_mangle ip6t_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 iptable_nat
+nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat iptable_mangle nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables be2iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs bnx2i cnic uio cxgb4i cxgb4 cxgb3i cxgb3 mdio libcxgbi ib_iser rdma_cm ib_addr iw_cm ib_cm ib_sa ib_mad ib_core iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi
+scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm bnep iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_codec_conexant arc4 iwldvm mac80211 snd_hda_intel acpi_cpufreq mperf coretemp snd_hda_codec microcode cdc_wdm cdc_acm
[37598.994008] snd_hwdep cdc_ether snd_seq snd_seq_device usbnet mii joydev btusb snd_pcm bluetooth i2c_i801 e1000e lpc_ich mfd_core ptp iwlwifi pps_core snd_page_alloc mei cfg80211 snd_timer thinkpad_acpi snd tpm_tis soundcore rfkill tpm tpm_bios vhost_net tun macvtap macvlan kvm_intel kvm uinput binfmt_misc
+dm_crypt i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper drm i2c_core wmi video
[37598.994008] CPU 0
[37598.994008] Pid: 27320, comm: t2 Not tainted 3.9.6-200.fc18.x86_64 #1 LENOVO 27744PG/27744PG
[37598.994008] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff815443a5>] [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP: 0018:ffff88003670da18 EFLAGS: 00010202
[37598.994008] RAX: ffff88018105c018 RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000000006c0
[37598.994008] RDX: ffff88018105a6c0 RSI: ffff88018105a000 RDI: ffff8801e1b0aa00
[37598.994008] RBP: ffff88003670da78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88018105c040
[37598.994008] R10: ffff8801e1b0aa00 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000fff8
[37598.994008] R13: 00000000000004fc R14: 00000000ffff0504 R15: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] FS: 00007f28eea59740(0000) GS:ffff88023bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[37598.994008] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[37598.994008] CR2: 0000003d935789e0 CR3: 00000000365cb000 CR4: 00000000000407f0
[37598.994008] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[37598.994008] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[37598.994008] Process t2 (pid: 27320, threadinfo ffff88003670c000, task ffff88022c162ee0)
[37598.994008] Stack:
[37598.994008] ffff88022e098a00 ffff88020f973fc0 0000000000000008 00000000000004c8
[37598.994008] ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4 ffff88003670da78 ffff8801e1b0a200
[37598.994008] 0000000000000018 00000000000004c8 ffff88020f973fc0 00000000000004c4
[37598.994008] Call Trace:
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815fc21f>] ip6_append_data+0xccf/0xfe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8158d9f0>] ? ip_copy_metadata+0x1a0/0x1a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81661f66>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x16/0x40
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8161548d>] udpv6_sendmsg+0x1ed/0xc10
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2845>] ? sock_has_perm+0x75/0x90
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff815c3693>] inet_sendmsg+0x63/0xb0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff812a2973>] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x23/0x30
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153a450>] sock_sendmsg+0xb0/0xe0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810135d1>] ? __switch_to+0x181/0x4a0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8153d97d>] sys_sendto+0x12d/0x180
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff810dfb64>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x94/0xf0
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff81020ed1>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x231/0x240
[37598.994008] [<ffffffff8166a7e7>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[37598.994008] Code: fe 07 00 00 48 c7 c7 04 28 a6 81 89 45 a0 4c 89 4d b8 44 89 5d a8 e8 1b ac b1 ff 44 8b 5d a8 4c 8b 4d b8 8b 45 a0 e9 cf fe ff ff <0f> 0b 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 48 89 e5 48
[37598.994008] RIP [<ffffffff815443a5>] skb_copy_and_csum_bits+0x325/0x330
[37598.994008] RSP <ffff88003670da18>
[37599.007323] ---[ end trace d69f6a17f8ac8eee ]---
While there, also check if path mtu discovery is activated for this
socket. The logic was adapted from ip6_append_data when first writing
on the corked socket.
This bug was introduced with commit
0c1833797a5a6ec23ea9261d979aa18078720b74 ("ipv6: fix incorrect ipsec
fragment").
v2:
a) Replace IPV6_PMTU_DISC_DO with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE.
b) Don't pass ipv6_pinfo to ip6_append_data_mtu (suggestion by Gao
feng, thanks!).
c) Change mtu to unsigned int, else we get a warning about
non-matching types because of the min()-macro type-check.
Acked-by: Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ffs_free_inst(struct usb_function_instance *f)
{
struct f_fs_opts *opts;
opts = to_f_fs_opts(f);
ffs_dev_lock();
_ffs_free_dev(opts->dev);
ffs_dev_unlock();
kfree(opts);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al;
unsigned long resplen,n;
const unsigned char *p;
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS,
16384,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (n < 4)
{
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
n2l3(p, resplen);
if (resplen + 4 != n)
{
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
{
int ret;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto f_err;
}
if (ret < 0)
{
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_bm_backward_skip(UChar* s, UChar* end, OnigEncoding enc ARG_UNUSED,
int** skip)
{
int i, len;
if (IS_NULL(*skip)) {
*skip = (int* )xmalloc(sizeof(int) * ONIG_CHAR_TABLE_SIZE);
if (IS_NULL(*skip)) return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
}
len = end - s;
for (i = 0; i < ONIG_CHAR_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
(*skip)[i] = len;
for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
(*skip)[s[i]] = i;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void byteMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::byteMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dyn_lease *oldest_expired_lease(void)
{
struct dyn_lease *oldest_lease = NULL;
leasetime_t oldest_time = time(NULL);
unsigned i;
/* Unexpired leases have g_leases[i].expires >= current time
* and therefore can't ever match */
for (i = 0; i < server_config.max_leases; i++) {
if (g_leases[i].expires == 0 /* empty entry */
|| g_leases[i].expires < oldest_time
) {
oldest_time = g_leases[i].expires;
oldest_lease = &g_leases[i];
}
}
return oldest_lease;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUseProgram(GLuint program_id) {
const char* function_name = "glUseProgram";
GLuint service_id = 0;
Program* program = nullptr;
if (program_id) {
program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, function_name);
if (!program) {
return;
}
if (!program->IsValid()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "program not linked");
return;
}
service_id = program->service_id();
}
if (state_.bound_transform_feedback.get() &&
state_.bound_transform_feedback->active() &&
!state_.bound_transform_feedback->paused()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"transformfeedback is active and not paused");
return;
}
if (program == state_.current_program.get())
return;
if (state_.current_program.get()) {
program_manager()->UnuseProgram(shader_manager(),
state_.current_program.get());
}
state_.current_program = program;
LogClientServiceMapping(function_name, program_id, service_id);
api()->glUseProgramFn(service_id);
if (state_.current_program.get()) {
program_manager()->UseProgram(state_.current_program.get());
if (workarounds().clear_uniforms_before_first_program_use)
program_manager()->ClearUniforms(program);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be32 nfsd4_backchannel_ctl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_backchannel_ctl *bc)
{
struct nfsd4_session *session = cstate->session;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
__be32 status;
status = nfsd4_check_cb_sec(&bc->bc_cb_sec);
if (status)
return status;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
session->se_cb_prog = bc->bc_cb_program;
session->se_cb_sec = bc->bc_cb_sec;
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
nfsd4_probe_callback(session->se_client);
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add more to confusables list
U+04FB (ӻ) to f
U+050F (ԏ) to t
U+050B (ԋ) and U+0527 (ԧ) to h
U+0437(з) and U+04E1(ӡ) to 3
Add tests for the above entries and tests for ASCII-digit spoofing.
Bug: 816769,820068
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I6cd0a7e97cd0ec2df522ce30f632acfd7b78eee2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/962875
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543600}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __udp6_lib_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info,
struct udp_table *udptable)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
const struct ipv6hdr *hdr = (const struct ipv6hdr *)skb->data;
const struct in6_addr *saddr = &hdr->saddr;
const struct in6_addr *daddr = &hdr->daddr;
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr*)(skb->data+offset);
struct sock *sk;
int err;
sk = __udp6_lib_lookup(dev_net(skb->dev), daddr, uh->dest,
saddr, uh->source, inet6_iif(skb), udptable);
if (sk == NULL)
return;
if (type == ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG)
ip6_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, info);
if (type == NDISC_REDIRECT) {
ip6_sk_redirect(skb, sk);
goto out;
}
np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (!icmpv6_err_convert(type, code, &err) && !np->recverr)
goto out;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED && !np->recverr)
goto out;
if (np->recverr)
ipv6_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, uh->dest, ntohl(info), (u8 *)(uh+1));
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
out:
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextTrack::CueWillChange(TextTrackCue* cue) {
if (GetCueTimeline())
GetCueTimeline()->RemoveCue(this, cue);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err srpp_AddBox(GF_Box *s, GF_Box *a)
{
GF_SRTPProcessBox *ptr = (GF_SRTPProcessBox *)s;
switch(a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SCHI:
if (ptr->info) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->info = (GF_SchemeInformationBox *)a;
return GF_OK;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SCHM:
if (ptr->scheme_type) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->scheme_type = (GF_SchemeTypeBox *)a;
return GF_OK;
}
return gf_isom_box_add_default(s, a);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_array_insert(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *item, int i)
{
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_ARRAY(obj))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "not an array (%s)", pdf_objkindstr(obj));
if (i < 0 || i > ARRAY(obj)->len)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "index out of bounds");
if (!item)
item = PDF_OBJ_NULL;
prepare_object_for_alteration(ctx, obj, item);
if (ARRAY(obj)->len + 1 > ARRAY(obj)->cap)
pdf_array_grow(ctx, ARRAY(obj));
memmove(ARRAY(obj)->items + i + 1, ARRAY(obj)->items + i, (ARRAY(obj)->len - i) * sizeof(pdf_obj*));
ARRAY(obj)->items[i] = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, item);
ARRAY(obj)->len++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebPage::isDNSPrefetchEnabled() const
{
return d->m_page->settings()->dnsPrefetchingEnabled();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::OnPictureInPictureModeEnded() {
if (!client_ || !IsInPictureInPicture())
return;
client_->PictureInPictureStopped();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
{
for (;;) {
bio = BIO_find_type(bio, BIO_TYPE_MD);
if (bio == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST,
PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return NULL;
}
BIO_get_md_ctx(bio, pmd);
if (*pmd == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_FIND_DIGEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return NULL;
}
if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(*pmd) == nid)
return bio;
bio = BIO_next(bio);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: PKCS#7: Fix NULL dereference with missing EncryptedContent.
CVE-2015-1790
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeParcelable(const Parcelable& parcelable) {
status_t status = writeInt32(1); // parcelable is not null.
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
return parcelable.writeToParcel(this);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *find_cookie_value_end(char *s, const char *e)
{
int quoted, qdpair;
quoted = qdpair = 0;
for (; s < e; s++) {
if (qdpair) qdpair = 0;
else if (quoted) {
if (*s == '\\') qdpair = 1;
else if (*s == '"') quoted = 0;
}
else if (*s == '"') quoted = 1;
else if (*s == ',' || *s == ';') return s;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteICONImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
const char
*option;
IconFile
icon_file;
IconInfo
icon_info;
Image
*images,
*next;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
scanline_pad;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
bit,
byte,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
images=(Image *) NULL;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"icon:auto-resize");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
images=AutoResizeImage(image,option,&scene,&image->exception);
if (images == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"InvalidDimensions");
}
else
{
scene=0;
next=image;
do
{
if ((image->columns > 256L) || (image->rows > 256L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
scene++;
next=SyncNextImageInList(next);
} while ((next != (Image *) NULL) && (image_info->adjoin !=
MagickFalse));
}
/*
Dump out a ICON header template to be properly initialized later.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,1);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned char) scene);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&icon_file,0,sizeof(icon_file));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&icon_info,0,sizeof(icon_info));
scene=0;
next=(images != (Image *) NULL) ? images : image;
do
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].width);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].height);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].colors);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].reserved);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,icon_file.directory[scene].planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,icon_file.directory[scene].bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
icon_file.directory[scene].size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
icon_file.directory[scene].offset);
scene++;
next=SyncNextImageInList(next);
} while ((next != (Image *) NULL) && (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse));
scene=0;
next=(images != (Image *) NULL) ? images : image;
do
{
if ((next->columns > 255L) && (next->rows > 255L) &&
((next->compression == UndefinedCompression) ||
(next->compression == ZipCompression)))
{
Image
*write_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*png;
write_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickTrue,&image->exception);
if (write_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
images=DestroyImageList(images);
return(MagickFalse);
}
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(write_info->filename,"PNG:",MaxTextExtent);
/* Don't write any ancillary chunks except for gAMA */
(void) SetImageArtifact(write_image,"png:include-chunk","none,gama");
/* Only write PNG32 formatted PNG (32-bit RGBA), 8 bits per channel */
(void) SetImageArtifact(write_image,"png:format","png32");
png=(unsigned char *) ImageToBlob(write_info,write_image,&length,
&image->exception);
write_image=DestroyImage(write_image);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (png == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
images=DestroyImageList(images);
return(MagickFalse);
}
icon_file.directory[scene].width=0;
icon_file.directory[scene].height=0;
icon_file.directory[scene].colors=0;
icon_file.directory[scene].reserved=0;
icon_file.directory[scene].planes=1;
icon_file.directory[scene].bits_per_pixel=32;
icon_file.directory[scene].size=(size_t) length;
icon_file.directory[scene].offset=(size_t) TellBlob(image);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) length,png);
png=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(png);
}
else
{
/*
Initialize ICON raster file header.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
icon_info.file_size=14+12+28;
icon_info.offset_bits=icon_info.file_size;
icon_info.compression=BI_RGB;
if ((next->storage_class != DirectClass) && (next->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(next,DirectClass);
if (next->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Full color ICON raster.
*/
icon_info.number_colors=0;
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=32;
icon_info.compression=(size_t) BI_RGB;
}
else
{
size_t
one;
/*
Colormapped ICON raster.
*/
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (next->colors <= 256)
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (next->colors <= 16)
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=4;
if (next->colors <= 2)
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
one=1;
icon_info.number_colors=one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (icon_info.number_colors < next->colors)
{
(void) SetImageStorageClass(next,DirectClass);
icon_info.number_colors=0;
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned short) 24;
icon_info.compression=(size_t) BI_RGB;
}
else
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
icon_info.file_size+=3*(one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
icon_info.offset_bits+=3*(one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
icon_info.file_size+=(one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
icon_info.offset_bits+=(one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
}
bytes_per_line=(((next->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)+31) &
~31) >> 3;
icon_info.ba_offset=0;
icon_info.width=(ssize_t) next->columns;
icon_info.height=(ssize_t) next->rows;
icon_info.planes=1;
icon_info.image_size=bytes_per_line*next->rows;
icon_info.size=40;
icon_info.size+=(4*icon_info.number_colors);
icon_info.size+=icon_info.image_size;
icon_info.size+=(((icon_info.width+31) & ~31) >> 3)*icon_info.height;
icon_info.file_size+=icon_info.image_size;
icon_info.x_pixels=0;
icon_info.y_pixels=0;
switch (next->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
{
icon_info.x_pixels=(size_t) (100.0*next->x_resolution/2.54);
icon_info.y_pixels=(size_t) (100.0*next->y_resolution/2.54);
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
icon_info.x_pixels=(size_t) (100.0*next->x_resolution);
icon_info.y_pixels=(size_t) (100.0*next->y_resolution);
break;
}
}
icon_info.colors_important=icon_info.number_colors;
/*
Convert MIFF to ICON raster pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
icon_info.image_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
images=DestroyImageList(images);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(pixels,0,(size_t) icon_info.image_size);
switch (icon_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
size_t
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a ICON monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next,0,y,next->columns,1,&next->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(next);
q=pixels+(next->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) next->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
byte|=GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
}
if (bit != 0)
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << (8-bit));
if (next->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(next,SaveImageTag,y,next->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
size_t
nibble,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a ICON monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next,0,y,next->columns,1,&next->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(next);
q=pixels+(next->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) next->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=4;
byte|=((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) & 0x0f);
nibble++;
if (nibble == 2)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
}
}
if (nibble != 0)
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << 4);
if (next->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(next,SaveImageTag,y,next->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packet to ICON pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next,0,y,next->columns,1,&next->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(next);
q=pixels+(next->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) next->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if (next->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(next,SaveImageTag,y,next->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to ICON BGR888 or BGRA8888 pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next,0,y,next->columns,1,&next->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(next->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) next->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
if (next->matte == MagickFalse)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(QuantumRange);
else
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(p));
p++;
}
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 24)
for (x=3L*(ssize_t) next->columns; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (next->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(next,SaveImageTag,y,next->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
/*
Write 40-byte version 3+ bitmap header.
*/
icon_file.directory[scene].width=(unsigned char) icon_info.width;
icon_file.directory[scene].height=(unsigned char) icon_info.height;
icon_file.directory[scene].colors=(unsigned char)
icon_info.number_colors;
icon_file.directory[scene].reserved=0;
icon_file.directory[scene].planes=icon_info.planes;
icon_file.directory[scene].bits_per_pixel=icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
icon_file.directory[scene].size=icon_info.size;
icon_file.directory[scene].offset=(size_t) TellBlob(image);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) 40);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.height*2);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,icon_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.compression);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.x_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.y_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.number_colors);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) icon_info.colors_important);
if (next->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*icon_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
icon_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
(1UL << icon_info.bits_per_pixel),4UL*sizeof(*icon_colormap));
if (icon_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
images=DestroyImageList(images);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
q=icon_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) next->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(next->colormap[i].blue);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(next->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(next->colormap[i].red);
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (1UL << icon_info.bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (4UL*(1UL <<
icon_info.bits_per_pixel)),icon_colormap);
icon_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
icon_colormap);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) icon_info.image_size,pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
/*
Write matte mask.
*/
scanline_pad=(((next->columns+31) & ~31)-next->columns) >> 3;
for (y=((ssize_t) next->rows - 1); y >= 0; y--)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(next,0,y,next->columns,1,&next->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) next->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
if ((next->matte != MagickFalse) &&
(GetPixelOpacity(p) == (Quantum) TransparentOpacity))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) (byte << (8-bit)));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) 0);
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(next) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(next,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(next));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
next=SyncNextImageInList(next);
} while ((next != (Image *) NULL) && (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse));
offset=SeekBlob(image,0,SEEK_SET);
(void) offset;
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,1);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (scene+1));
scene=0;
next=(images != (Image *) NULL) ? images : image;
do
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].width);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].height);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].colors);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,icon_file.directory[scene].reserved);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,icon_file.directory[scene].planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,icon_file.directory[scene].bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
icon_file.directory[scene].size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
icon_file.directory[scene].offset);
scene++;
next=SyncNextImageInList(next);
} while ((next != (Image *) NULL) && (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse));
(void) CloseBlob(image);
images=DestroyImageList(images);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rad_request_authenticator(struct rad_handle *h, char *buf, size_t len)
{
if (len < LEN_AUTH)
return (-1);
memcpy(buf, h->request + POS_AUTH, LEN_AUTH);
if (len > LEN_AUTH)
buf[LEN_AUTH] = '\0';
return (LEN_AUTH);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SetOriginOfNewFrame(
const url::Origin& new_frame_creator) {
DCHECK(!has_committed_any_navigation_);
DCHECK(GetLastCommittedOrigin().opaque());
bool new_frame_should_be_sandboxed =
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin ==
(frame_tree_node()->active_sandbox_flags() &
blink::WebSandboxFlags::kOrigin);
url::Origin new_frame_origin = new_frame_should_be_sandboxed
? new_frame_creator.DeriveNewOpaqueOrigin()
: new_frame_creator;
SetLastCommittedOrigin(new_frame_origin);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int airo_set_frag(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_param *vwrq,
char *extra)
{
struct airo_info *local = dev->ml_priv;
int fthr = vwrq->value;
if(vwrq->disabled)
fthr = AIRO_DEF_MTU;
if((fthr < 256) || (fthr > AIRO_DEF_MTU)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
fthr &= ~0x1; /* Get an even value - is it really needed ??? */
readConfigRid(local, 1);
local->config.fragThresh = cpu_to_le16(fthr);
set_bit (FLAG_COMMIT, &local->flags);
return -EINPROGRESS; /* Call commit handler */
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_serialize_string(wddx_packet *packet, zval *var TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_S);
if (Z_STRLEN_P(var) > 0) {
char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
buf = php_escape_html_entities(Z_STRVAL_P(var), Z_STRLEN_P(var), &buf_len, 0, ENT_QUOTES, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
php_wddx_add_chunk_ex(packet, buf, buf_len);
efree(buf);
}
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRING_E);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::TryLoadingDoc(const std::string& password,
bool* needs_password) {
*needs_password = false;
if (doc_) {
FPDFAvail_IsDocAvail(fpdf_availability_, &download_hints_);
return true;
}
const char* password_cstr = nullptr;
if (!password.empty()) {
password_cstr = password.c_str();
password_tries_remaining_--;
}
if (doc_loader_.IsDocumentComplete() &&
!FPDFAvail_IsLinearized(fpdf_availability_)) {
doc_ = FPDF_LoadCustomDocument(&file_access_, password_cstr);
} else {
doc_ = FPDFAvail_GetDocument(fpdf_availability_, password_cstr);
}
if (!doc_) {
if (FPDF_GetLastError() == FPDF_ERR_PASSWORD)
*needs_password = true;
return false;
}
FPDFAvail_IsDocAvail(fpdf_availability_, &download_hints_);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint(bool fixed, bool useTransforms, TransformState& transformState) const
{
ASSERT(!view() || !view()->layoutStateEnabled());
bool isFixedPos = style()->position() == FixedPosition;
bool hasTransform = hasLayer() && layer()->transform();
if (hasTransform) {
fixed &= isFixedPos;
} else
fixed |= isFixedPos;
RenderObject* o = container();
if (!o)
return;
o->mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint(fixed, useTransforms, transformState);
LayoutSize containerOffset = offsetFromContainer(o, LayoutPoint());
bool preserve3D = useTransforms && (o->style()->preserves3D() || style()->preserves3D());
if (useTransforms && shouldUseTransformFromContainer(o)) {
TransformationMatrix t;
getTransformFromContainer(o, containerOffset, t);
transformState.applyTransform(t, preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
} else
transformState.move(-containerOffset.width(), -containerOffset.height(), preserve3D ? TransformState::AccumulateTransform : TransformState::FlattenTransform);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool jsvIsFunction(const JsVar *v) { return v && ((v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)==JSV_FUNCTION || (v->flags&JSV_VARTYPEMASK)==JSV_FUNCTION_RETURN); }
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FloatPoint WebPagePrivate::centerOfVisibleContentsRect() const
{
FloatRect visibleContentsRect = this->visibleContentsRect();
return FloatPoint(visibleContentsRect.x() + visibleContentsRect.width() / 2.0,
visibleContentsRect.y() + visibleContentsRect.height() / 2.0);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_pixel_buffer_object::~scoped_pixel_buffer_object() {
Release();
}
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String8 InputDispatcher::checkWindowReadyForMoreInputLocked(nsecs_t currentTime,
const sp<InputWindowHandle>& windowHandle, const EventEntry* eventEntry,
const char* targetType) {
if (windowHandle->getInfo()->paused) {
return String8::format("Waiting because the %s window is paused.", targetType);
}
ssize_t connectionIndex = getConnectionIndexLocked(windowHandle->getInputChannel());
if (connectionIndex < 0) {
return String8::format("Waiting because the %s window's input channel is not "
"registered with the input dispatcher. The window may be in the process "
"of being removed.", targetType);
}
sp<Connection> connection = mConnectionsByFd.valueAt(connectionIndex);
if (connection->status != Connection::STATUS_NORMAL) {
return String8::format("Waiting because the %s window's input connection is %s."
"The window may be in the process of being removed.", targetType,
connection->getStatusLabel());
}
if (connection->inputPublisherBlocked) {
return String8::format("Waiting because the %s window's input channel is full. "
"Outbound queue length: %d. Wait queue length: %d.",
targetType, connection->outboundQueue.count(), connection->waitQueue.count());
}
if (eventEntry->type == EventEntry::TYPE_KEY) {
if (!connection->outboundQueue.isEmpty() || !connection->waitQueue.isEmpty()) {
return String8::format("Waiting to send key event because the %s window has not "
"finished processing all of the input events that were previously "
"delivered to it. Outbound queue length: %d. Wait queue length: %d.",
targetType, connection->outboundQueue.count(), connection->waitQueue.count());
}
} else {
if (!connection->waitQueue.isEmpty()
&& currentTime >= connection->waitQueue.head->deliveryTime
+ STREAM_AHEAD_EVENT_TIMEOUT) {
return String8::format("Waiting to send non-key event because the %s window has not "
"finished processing certain input events that were delivered to it over "
"%0.1fms ago. Wait queue length: %d. Wait queue head age: %0.1fms.",
targetType, STREAM_AHEAD_EVENT_TIMEOUT * 0.000001f,
connection->waitQueue.count(),
(currentTime - connection->waitQueue.head->deliveryTime) * 0.000001f);
}
}
return String8::empty();
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t eth_rx(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
struct xlx_ethlite *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
unsigned int rxbase = s->rxbuf * (0x800 / 4);
/* DA filter. */
if (!(buf[0] & 0x80) && memcmp(&s->conf.macaddr.a[0], buf, 6))
return size;
if (s->regs[rxbase + R_RX_CTRL0] & CTRL_S) {
D(qemu_log("ethlite lost packet %x\n", s->regs[R_RX_CTRL0]));
return -1;
}
D(qemu_log("%s %zd rxbase=%x\n", __func__, size, rxbase));
memcpy(&s->regs[rxbase + R_RX_BUF0], buf, size);
s->regs[rxbase + R_RX_CTRL0] |= CTRL_S;
/* If c_rx_pingpong was set flip buffers. */
s->rxbuf ^= s->c_rx_pingpong;
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::UnrestrictedFloatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unrestrictedFloatAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::UnrestrictedFloatAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BlockEntry::Kind BlockGroup::GetKind() const { return kBlockGroup; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LongFrozenArrayMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
V8SetReturnValue(info, FreezeV8Object(ToV8(impl->longFrozenArrayMethod(), info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate()), info.GetIsolate()));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tracing_alloc_snapshot(void)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Snapshot feature not enabled, but snapshot allocation used");
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *ilookup5(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long hashval,
int (*test)(struct inode *, void *), void *data)
{
struct inode *inode;
again:
inode = ilookup5_nowait(sb, hashval, test, data);
if (inode) {
wait_on_inode(inode);
if (unlikely(inode_unhashed(inode))) {
iput(inode);
goto again;
}
}
return inode;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ResetSizeAndRepaintPendingFlags() {
resize_ack_pending_ = false;
repaint_ack_pending_ = false;
in_flight_size_.SetSize(0, 0);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,694 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void encode_locku(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct nfs_locku_args *args, struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 12+NFS4_STATEID_SIZE+16);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(OP_LOCKU);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(nfs4_lock_type(args->fl, 0));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(args->seqid->sequence->counter);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, args->stateid->data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, args->fl->fl_start);
xdr_encode_hyper(p, nfs4_lock_length(args->fl));
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_locku_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_sattr3(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp, struct nfsv3_sattr *sa3)
{
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_modeset = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if (sa3->sa_modeset) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_mode = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
}
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_uidset = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if (sa3->sa_uidset) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_uid = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
}
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_gidset = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if (sa3->sa_gidset) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_gid = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
}
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_sizeset = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if (sa3->sa_sizeset) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_size = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
}
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_atimetype = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if (sa3->sa_atimetype == NFSV3SATTRTIME_TOCLIENT) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
sa3->sa_atime.nfsv3_sec = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
sa3->sa_atime.nfsv3_nsec = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
}
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
sa3->sa_mtimetype = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if (sa3->sa_mtimetype == NFSV3SATTRTIME_TOCLIENT) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
sa3->sa_mtime.nfsv3_sec = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
sa3->sa_mtime.nfsv3_nsec = EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
}
return dp;
trunc:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int h2c_handle_window_update(struct h2c *h2c, struct h2s *h2s)
{
int32_t inc;
int error;
if (h2c->dfl != 4) {
error = H2_ERR_FRAME_SIZE_ERROR;
goto conn_err;
}
/* process full frame only */
if (h2c->dbuf->i < h2c->dfl)
return 0;
inc = h2_get_n32(h2c->dbuf, 0);
if (h2c->dsi != 0) {
/* stream window update */
/* it's not an error to receive WU on a closed stream */
if (h2s->st == H2_SS_CLOSED)
return 1;
if (!inc) {
error = H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto strm_err;
}
if (h2s->mws >= 0 && h2s->mws + inc < 0) {
error = H2_ERR_FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR;
goto strm_err;
}
h2s->mws += inc;
if (h2s->mws > 0 && (h2s->flags & H2_SF_BLK_SFCTL)) {
h2s->flags &= ~H2_SF_BLK_SFCTL;
if (h2s->cs && LIST_ISEMPTY(&h2s->list) &&
(h2s->cs->flags & CS_FL_DATA_WR_ENA)) {
/* This stream wanted to send but could not due to its
* own flow control. We can put it back into the send
* list now, it will be handled upon next send() call.
*/
LIST_ADDQ(&h2c->send_list, &h2s->list);
}
}
}
else {
/* connection window update */
if (!inc) {
error = H2_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
goto conn_err;
}
if (h2c->mws >= 0 && h2c->mws + inc < 0) {
error = H2_ERR_FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR;
goto conn_err;
}
h2c->mws += inc;
}
return 1;
conn_err:
h2c_error(h2c, error);
return 0;
strm_err:
if (h2s) {
h2s_error(h2s, error);
h2c->st0 = H2_CS_FRAME_E;
}
else
h2c_error(h2c, error);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int padlock_sha256_update_nano(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial, done;
const u8 *src;
/*The PHE require the out buffer must 128 bytes and 16-bytes aligned*/
u8 buf[128 + PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT - STACK_ALIGN] __attribute__
((aligned(STACK_ALIGN)));
u8 *dst = PTR_ALIGN(&buf[0], PADLOCK_ALIGNMENT);
int ts_state;
partial = sctx->count & 0x3f;
sctx->count += len;
done = 0;
src = data;
memcpy(dst, (u8 *)(sctx->state), SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
if ((partial + len) >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
/* Append the bytes in state's buffer to a block to handle */
if (partial) {
done = -partial;
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data,
done + SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
src = sctx->buf;
ts_state = irq_ts_save();
asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0"
: "+S"(src), "+D"(dst)
: "a"((long)-1), "c"((unsigned long)1));
irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
done += SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
src = data + done;
}
/* Process the left bytes from input data*/
if (len - done >= SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
ts_state = irq_ts_save();
asm volatile (".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa6,0xd0"
: "+S"(src), "+D"(dst)
: "a"((long)-1),
"c"((unsigned long)((len - done) / 64)));
irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
done += ((len - done) - (len - done) % 64);
src = data + done;
}
partial = 0;
}
memcpy((u8 *)(sctx->state), dst, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, src, len - done);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline __sum16 dccp_v6_csum_finish(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr)
{
return csum_ipv6_magic(saddr, daddr, skb->len, IPPROTO_DCCP, skb->csum);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *imap_set_flags(struct ImapData *idata, struct Header *h, char *s, int *server_changes)
{
struct Context *ctx = idata->ctx;
struct ImapHeader newh = { 0 };
struct ImapHeaderData old_hd;
bool readonly;
int local_changes;
local_changes = h->changed;
struct ImapHeaderData *hd = h->data;
newh.data = hd;
memcpy(&old_hd, hd, sizeof(old_hd));
mutt_debug(2, "parsing FLAGS\n");
s = msg_parse_flags(&newh, s);
if (!s)
return NULL;
/* Update tags system */
driver_tags_replace(&h->tags, mutt_str_strdup(hd->flags_remote));
/* YAUH (yet another ugly hack): temporarily set context to
* read-write even if it's read-only, so *server* updates of
* flags can be processed by mutt_set_flag. ctx->changed must
* be restored afterwards */
readonly = ctx->readonly;
ctx->readonly = false;
/* This is redundant with the following two checks. Removing:
* mutt_set_flag (ctx, h, MUTT_NEW, !(hd->read || hd->old));
*/
set_changed_flag(ctx, h, local_changes, server_changes, MUTT_OLD, old_hd.old,
hd->old, h->old);
set_changed_flag(ctx, h, local_changes, server_changes, MUTT_READ,
old_hd.read, hd->read, h->read);
set_changed_flag(ctx, h, local_changes, server_changes, MUTT_DELETE,
old_hd.deleted, hd->deleted, h->deleted);
set_changed_flag(ctx, h, local_changes, server_changes, MUTT_FLAG,
old_hd.flagged, hd->flagged, h->flagged);
set_changed_flag(ctx, h, local_changes, server_changes, MUTT_REPLIED,
old_hd.replied, hd->replied, h->replied);
/* this message is now definitively *not* changed (mutt_set_flag
* marks things changed as a side-effect) */
if (!local_changes)
h->changed = false;
ctx->changed &= !readonly;
ctx->readonly = readonly;
return s;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 79,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (compat20)
return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
else
return ssh_packet_send1(ssh);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaControlCastButtonElement::keepEventInNode(Event* event) {
return isUserInteractionEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 126,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringURLAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringURLAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,959 |
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