instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btif_hl_clean_pcb(btif_hl_pending_chan_cb_t *p_pcb)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__ );
memset(p_pcb, 0 , sizeof(btif_hl_pending_chan_cb_t));
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* GetNetworkInfoDict(const chromeos::Network* network) {
DictionaryValue* item = new DictionaryValue;
item->SetString("name", network->name());
item->SetString("device_path", network->device_path());
item->SetString("ip_address", network->ip_address());
item->SetString("status", network->GetStateString());
return item;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Range::~Range()
{
m_ownerDocument->detachRange(this);
#ifndef NDEBUG
rangeCounter.decrement();
#endif
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::AddFilter(IPC::MessageFilter* filter) {
channel()->AddFilter(filter);
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::AddExtension(const Extension* extension) {
scoped_refptr<const Extension> scoped_extension(extension);
if (!extensions_enabled() &&
!extension->is_theme() &&
extension->location() != Extension::COMPONENT &&
!Extension::IsExternalLocation(extension->location()))
return;
SetBeingUpgraded(extension, false);
unloaded_extension_paths_.erase(extension->id());
UntrackTerminatedExtension(extension->id());
if (disabled_extension_paths_.erase(extension->id()) > 0)
EnableExtension(extension->id());
InitializePermissions(extension);
bool disabled = extension_prefs_->IsExtensionDisabled(extension->id());
if (disabled) {
disabled_extensions_.push_back(scoped_extension);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UPDATE_DISABLED,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
Details<const Extension>(extension));
SyncExtensionChangeIfNeeded(*extension);
return;
}
extensions_.push_back(scoped_extension);
SyncExtensionChangeIfNeeded(*extension);
NotifyExtensionLoaded(extension);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mfhd_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MovieFragmentHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_MovieFragmentHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
{
bool allowed;
mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex);
/* It is not safe to use setgroups until a gid mapping in
* the user namespace has been established.
*/
allowed = ns->gid_map.nr_extents != 0;
/* Is setgroups allowed? */
allowed = allowed && (ns->flags & USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED);
mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex);
return allowed;
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadDIBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DIBInfo
dib_info;
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
ssize_t
bit,
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a DIB file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&dib_info,0,sizeof(dib_info));
dib_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (dib_info.size!=40)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Microsoft Windows 3.X DIB image file.
*/
dib_info.width=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.height=(short) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
dib_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS) &&
((dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 16) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32)))
{
dib_info.red_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.green_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
dib_info.blue_mask=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
}
image->matte=dib_info.bits_per_pixel == 32 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
image->columns=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.width);
image->rows=(size_t) MagickAbsoluteValue(dib_info.height);
image->depth=8;
if ((dib_info.number_colors != 0) || (dib_info.bits_per_pixel < 16))
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=dib_info.number_colors;
one=1;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << dib_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image_info->size)
{
RectangleInfo
geometry;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->size,&geometry);
if (flags & WidthValue)
if ((geometry.width != 0) && (geometry.width < image->columns))
image->columns=geometry.width;
if (flags & HeightValue)
if ((geometry.height != 0) && (geometry.height < image->rows))
image->rows=geometry.height;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
size_t
length,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*dib_colormap;
/*
Read DIB raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
length=(size_t) image->colors;
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
4*sizeof(*dib_colormap));
if (dib_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
packet_size=4;
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,dib_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=dib_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
if (packet_size == 4)
p++;
}
dib_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(dib_colormap);
}
/*
Read image data.
*/
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4)
dib_info.bits_per_pixel<<=1;
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*dib_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
length=bytes_per_line*image->rows;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->rows,MagickMax(
bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RGB) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_BITFIELDS))
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
}
else
{
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
status=DecodeImage(image,dib_info.compression ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,
pixels);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToRunlengthDecodeImage");
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=(double) dib_info.x_pixels/100.0;
image->y_resolution=(double) dib_info.y_pixels/100.0;
/*
Convert DIB raster image to pixel packets.
*/
switch (dib_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) ((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
if ((dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8) ||
(dib_info.compression == BI_RLE4))
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
word;
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (dib_info.compression == BI_RLE8)
bytes_per_line=2*image->columns;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
word=(*p++);
word|=(*p++ << 8);
if (dib_info.red_mask == 0)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 10) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 11) & 0x1f))));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor6to8(
(unsigned char) ((word >> 5) & 0x3f))));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ScaleColor5to8(
(unsigned char) (word & 0x1f))));
}
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
p=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (dib_info.height < 0)
{
Image
*flipped_image;
/*
Correct image orientation.
*/
flipped_image=FlipImage(image,exception);
if (flipped_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
DuplicateBlob(flipped_image,image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
image=flipped_image;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CLIENT* negotiate(int net, CLIENT *client, GArray* servers) {
char zeros[128];
uint64_t size_host;
uint32_t flags = NBD_FLAG_HAS_FLAGS;
uint16_t smallflags = 0;
uint64_t magic;
memset(zeros, '\0', sizeof(zeros));
if(!client || !client->modern) {
/* common */
if (write(net, INIT_PASSWD, 8) < 0) {
err_nonfatal("Negotiation failed: %m");
if(client)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(!client || client->modern) {
/* modern */
magic = htonll(opts_magic);
} else {
/* oldstyle */
magic = htonll(cliserv_magic);
}
if (write(net, &magic, sizeof(magic)) < 0) {
err_nonfatal("Negotiation failed: %m");
if(client)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
if(!client) {
/* modern */
uint32_t reserved;
uint32_t opt;
uint32_t namelen;
char* name;
int i;
if(!servers)
err("programmer error");
if (write(net, &smallflags, sizeof(uint16_t)) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
if (read(net, &reserved, sizeof(reserved)) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
if (read(net, &magic, sizeof(magic)) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
magic = ntohll(magic);
if(magic != opts_magic) {
close(net);
return NULL;
}
if (read(net, &opt, sizeof(opt)) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
opt = ntohl(opt);
if(opt != NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME) {
close(net);
return NULL;
}
if (read(net, &namelen, sizeof(namelen)) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
namelen = ntohl(namelen);
name = malloc(namelen+1);
name[namelen]=0;
if (read(net, name, namelen) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
for(i=0; i<servers->len; i++) {
SERVER* serve = &(g_array_index(servers, SERVER, i));
if(!strcmp(serve->servename, name)) {
CLIENT* client = g_new0(CLIENT, 1);
client->server = serve;
client->exportsize = OFFT_MAX;
client->net = net;
client->modern = TRUE;
return client;
}
}
return NULL;
}
/* common */
size_host = htonll((u64)(client->exportsize));
if (write(net, &size_host, 8) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
if (client->server->flags & F_READONLY)
flags |= NBD_FLAG_READ_ONLY;
if (!client->modern) {
/* oldstyle */
flags = htonl(flags);
if (write(client->net, &flags, 4) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
} else {
/* modern */
smallflags = (uint16_t)(flags & ~((uint16_t)0));
smallflags = htons(smallflags);
if (write(client->net, &smallflags, sizeof(smallflags)) < 0) {
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
}
}
/* common */
if (write(client->net, zeros, 124) < 0)
err("Negotiation failed: %m");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipip6_tunnel_clone_6rd(struct net_device *dev, struct sit_net *sitn)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
struct ip_tunnel *t = netdev_priv(dev);
if (t->dev == sitn->fb_tunnel_dev) {
ipv6_addr_set(&t->ip6rd.prefix, htonl(0x20020000), 0, 0, 0);
t->ip6rd.relay_prefix = 0;
t->ip6rd.prefixlen = 16;
t->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen = 0;
} else {
struct ip_tunnel *t0 = netdev_priv(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev);
memcpy(&t->ip6rd, &t0->ip6rd, sizeof(t->ip6rd));
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfsd4_cstate_assign_replay(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfs4_stateowner *so)
{
if (!nfsd4_has_session(cstate)) {
mutex_lock(&so->so_replay.rp_mutex);
cstate->replay_owner = nfs4_get_stateowner(so);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_response_api(const char *nurl, const char *method, unsigned int *rp_code)
{
struct MHD_Response *resp;
struct psensor *s;
char *page = NULL;
if (!strcmp(nurl, URL_BASE_API_1_1_SENSORS)) {
page = sensors_to_json_string(server_data.sensors);
#ifdef HAVE_GTOP
} else if (!strcmp(nurl, URL_API_1_1_SYSINFO)) {
page = sysinfo_to_json_string(&server_data.psysinfo);
} else if (!strcmp(nurl, URL_API_1_1_CPU_USAGE)) {
page = sensor_to_json_string(server_data.cpu_usage);
#endif
} else if (!strncmp(nurl, URL_BASE_API_1_1_SENSORS,
strlen(URL_BASE_API_1_1_SENSORS))
&& nurl[strlen(URL_BASE_API_1_1_SENSORS)] == '/') {
const char *sid = nurl + strlen(URL_BASE_API_1_1_SENSORS) + 1;
s = psensor_list_get_by_id(server_data.sensors, sid);
if (s)
page = sensor_to_json_string(s);
} else if (!strcmp(nurl, URL_API_1_1_SERVER_STOP)) {
server_stop_requested = 1;
page = strdup(HTML_STOP_REQUESTED);
}
if (page) {
*rp_code = MHD_HTTP_OK;
resp = MHD_create_response_from_data(strlen(page), page,
MHD_YES, MHD_NO);
MHD_add_response_header(resp, MHD_HTTP_HEADER_CONTENT_TYPE,
"application/json");
return resp;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 18,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setLooping(int loop)
{
ALOGV("MediaPlayer::setLooping");
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
mLoop = (loop != 0);
if (mPlayer != 0) {
return mPlayer->setLooping(loop);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mHasTimeToSample(false),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(NULL),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL),
mTotalSize(0) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 162,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppendEntry(const OriginInfoTableEntry& entry) {
entries_.push_back(entry);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_DetachItemFromObject(cJSON *object,const char *string) {int i=0;cJSON *c=object->child;while (c && cJSON_strcasecmp(c->string,string)) i++,c=c->next;if (c) return cJSON_DetachItemFromArray(object,i);return 0;}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_tracked_init_mutex( void )
{
vips_tracked_mutex = vips_g_mutex_new();
}
Commit Message: zero memory on malloc
to prevent write of uninit memory under some error conditions
thanks Balint
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( d, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( d, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries;
p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries;
pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k;
pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul )
goto mul;
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn )
goto modn;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
*p_sign_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
* and set r = xR mod n
*/
*p_key_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul;
mul:
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn;
modn:
#endif
/*
* Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop
* (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t)
*/
ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr );
#endif
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 169,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_send_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
int retval = 0;
/* If there is an outstanding ASCONF chunk, queue it for later
* transmission.
*/
if (asoc->addip_last_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&chunk->list, &asoc->addip_chunk_list);
goto out;
}
/* Hold the chunk until an ASCONF_ACK is received. */
sctp_chunk_hold(chunk);
retval = sctp_primitive_ASCONF(asoc, chunk);
if (retval)
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
else
asoc->addip_last_asconf = chunk;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acpi_ns_terminate(void)
{
acpi_status status;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE(ns_terminate);
#ifdef ACPI_EXEC_APP
{
union acpi_operand_object *prev;
union acpi_operand_object *next;
/* Delete any module-level code blocks */
next = acpi_gbl_module_code_list;
while (next) {
prev = next;
next = next->method.mutex;
prev->method.mutex = NULL; /* Clear the Mutex (cheated) field */
acpi_ut_remove_reference(prev);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Free the entire namespace -- all nodes and all objects
* attached to the nodes
*/
acpi_ns_delete_namespace_subtree(acpi_gbl_root_node);
/* Delete any objects attached to the root node */
status = acpi_ut_acquire_mutex(ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) {
return_VOID;
}
acpi_ns_delete_node(acpi_gbl_root_node);
(void)acpi_ut_release_mutex(ACPI_MTX_NAMESPACE);
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_INFO, "Namespace freed\n"));
return_VOID;
}
Commit Message: ACPICA: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
ACPICA commit a23325b2e583556eae88ed3f764e457786bf4df6
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek gmb_h virtual_box/virtual_box, BIOS
virtual_box 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling acpi_terminate() function. The function calls
acpi_ns_terminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list).
But the deletion code in acpi_ns_terminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(acpi_gbl_module_code_list) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in acpi_ns_terminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/a23325b2
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-755 | 1 | 168,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnSetSelectedColorInColorChooser(int color_chooser_id,
SkColor color) {
if (color_chooser_info_ &&
color_chooser_id == color_chooser_info_->identifier)
color_chooser_info_->chooser->SetSelectedColor(color);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_meta_mode(bool mode)
{
metadatamode = mode;
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: allocate_trace_buffer(struct trace_array *tr, struct trace_buffer *buf, int size)
{
enum ring_buffer_flags rb_flags;
rb_flags = tr->trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_OVERWRITE ? RB_FL_OVERWRITE : 0;
buf->tr = tr;
buf->buffer = ring_buffer_alloc(size, rb_flags);
if (!buf->buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
buf->data = alloc_percpu(struct trace_array_cpu);
if (!buf->data) {
ring_buffer_free(buf->buffer);
buf->buffer = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Allocate the first page for all buffers */
set_buffer_entries(&tr->trace_buffer,
ring_buffer_size(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, 0));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ACodec::cancelBufferToNativeWindow(BufferInfo *info) {
CHECK_EQ((int)info->mStatus, (int)BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_US);
ALOGV("[%s] Calling cancelBuffer on buffer %u",
mComponentName.c_str(), info->mBufferID);
info->checkWriteFence("cancelBufferToNativeWindow");
int err = mNativeWindow->cancelBuffer(
mNativeWindow.get(), info->mGraphicBuffer.get(), info->mFenceFd);
info->mFenceFd = -1;
ALOGW_IF(err != 0, "[%s] can not return buffer %u to native window",
mComponentName.c_str(), info->mBufferID);
info->mStatus = BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_NATIVE_WINDOW;
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~Level() {
state_->max_recursion_depth_++;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 vmci_transport_get_max_buffer_size(struct vsock_sock *vsk)
{
return vmci_trans(vsk)->queue_pair_max_size;
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unlazy_walk(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned seq)
{
struct dentry *parent = nd->path.dentry;
BUG_ON(!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU));
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_RCU;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_links(nd)))
goto out2;
if (unlikely(!legitimize_mnt(nd->path.mnt, nd->m_seq)))
goto out2;
if (unlikely(!lockref_get_not_dead(&parent->d_lockref)))
goto out1;
/*
* For a negative lookup, the lookup sequence point is the parents
* sequence point, and it only needs to revalidate the parent dentry.
*
* For a positive lookup, we need to move both the parent and the
* dentry from the RCU domain to be properly refcounted. And the
* sequence number in the dentry validates *both* dentry counters,
* since we checked the sequence number of the parent after we got
* the child sequence number. So we know the parent must still
* be valid if the child sequence number is still valid.
*/
if (!dentry) {
if (read_seqcount_retry(&parent->d_seq, nd->seq))
goto out;
BUG_ON(nd->inode != parent->d_inode);
} else {
if (!lockref_get_not_dead(&dentry->d_lockref))
goto out;
if (read_seqcount_retry(&dentry->d_seq, seq))
goto drop_dentry;
}
/*
* Sequence counts matched. Now make sure that the root is
* still valid and get it if required.
*/
if (nd->root.mnt && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT)) {
if (unlikely(!legitimize_path(nd, &nd->root, nd->root_seq))) {
rcu_read_unlock();
dput(dentry);
return -ECHILD;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
drop_dentry:
rcu_read_unlock();
dput(dentry);
goto drop_root_mnt;
out2:
nd->path.mnt = NULL;
out1:
nd->path.dentry = NULL;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
drop_root_mnt:
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_ROOT))
nd->root.mnt = NULL;
return -ECHILD;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 43,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxICCBasedColorSpace::GfxICCBasedColorSpace(int nCompsA, GfxColorSpace *altA,
Ref *iccProfileStreamA) {
nComps = nCompsA;
alt = altA;
iccProfileStream = *iccProfileStreamA;
rangeMin[0] = rangeMin[1] = rangeMin[2] = rangeMin[3] = 0;
rangeMax[0] = rangeMax[1] = rangeMax[2] = rangeMax[3] = 1;
#ifdef USE_CMS
transform = NULL;
lineTransform = NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleWaitAllAsyncTexImage2DCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::WaitAllAsyncTexImage2DCHROMIUM& c) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleWaitAsyncTexImage2DCHROMIUM");
GetAsyncPixelTransferManager()->WaitAllAsyncTexImage2D();
ProcessFinishedAsyncTransfers();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TS_ASN1_INTEGER_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_INTEGER *num)
{
BIGNUM *num_bn;
int result = 0;
char *hex;
num_bn = BN_new();
if (num_bn == NULL)
return -1;
ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(num, num_bn);
if ((hex = BN_bn2hex(num_bn))) {
result = BIO_write(bio, "0x", 2) > 0;
result = result && BIO_write(bio, hex, strlen(hex)) > 0;
OPENSSL_free(hex);
}
BN_free(num_bn);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 55,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubbleForLocalSave(
const CreditCard& card,
const base::Closure& save_card_callback) {
is_uploading_ = false;
is_reshow_ = false;
should_cvc_be_requested_ = false;
legal_message_lines_.clear();
AutofillMetrics::LogSaveCardPromptMetric(
AutofillMetrics::SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_SHOW_REQUESTED, is_uploading_,
is_reshow_,
pref_service_->GetInteger(
prefs::kAutofillAcceptSaveCreditCardPromptState));
card_ = card;
save_card_callback_ = save_card_callback;
ShowBubble();
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_clear_eofblocks_tag(
xfs_inode_t *ip)
{
trace_xfs_inode_clear_eofblocks_tag(ip);
return __xfs_inode_clear_blocks_tag(ip,
trace_xfs_perag_clear_eofblocks, XFS_ICI_EOFBLOCKS_TAG);
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: invalidate_cached_quoted_dollar_at ()
{
dispose_words (cached_quoted_dollar_at);
cached_quoted_dollar_at = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPS_HSList* comps_mrtree_keys(COMPS_MRTree * rt) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes, *ret;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
pair->added = 0;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
ret = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(ret, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
pair->added = 0;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key =
malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key+strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +
1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first != NULL) {
comps_hslist_append(ret, pair->key, 0);
pair->added = 1;
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first != NULL) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair);
}
/* current node hasn't data */
} else {
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
}
if (parent_pair->added == 0)
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VirtualAuthenticator::GetUserPresence(GetUserPresenceCallback callback) {
std::move(callback).Run(false);
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::HasValidFrame() const {
return texture_id_in_layer_ != 0 &&
content_view_core_ &&
!texture_size_in_layer_.IsEmpty() &&
texture_size_in_layer_ == content_view_core_->GetBounds().size();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void getRDB(void) {
int s = context->fd;
int fd;
unsigned long long payload = sendSync(s);
char buf[4096];
fprintf(stderr,"SYNC sent to master, writing %llu bytes to '%s'\n",
payload, config.rdb_filename);
/* Write to file. */
if (!strcmp(config.rdb_filename,"-")) {
fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
} else {
fd = open(config.rdb_filename, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0644);
if (fd == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error opening '%s': %s\n", config.rdb_filename,
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
while(payload) {
ssize_t nread, nwritten;
nread = read(s,buf,(payload > sizeof(buf)) ? sizeof(buf) : payload);
if (nread <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr,"I/O Error reading RDB payload from socket\n");
exit(1);
}
nwritten = write(fd, buf, nread);
if (nwritten != nread) {
fprintf(stderr,"Error writing data to file: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
payload -= nread;
}
close(s); /* Close the file descriptor ASAP as fsync() may take time. */
fsync(fd);
fprintf(stderr,"Transfer finished with success.\n");
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 81,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int on_message_complete(http_parser *parser)
{
parser_context *ctx = (parser_context *) parser->data;
http_subtransport *t = ctx->t;
t->parse_finished = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
{
int err;
while (*name=='/')
name++;
if (!*name)
return 0;
/* At this point we know we have a real path component. */
for(;;) {
u64 hash_len;
int type;
err = may_lookup(nd);
if (err)
return err;
hash_len = hash_name(name);
type = LAST_NORM;
if (name[0] == '.') switch (hashlen_len(hash_len)) {
case 2:
if (name[1] == '.') {
type = LAST_DOTDOT;
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
}
break;
case 1:
type = LAST_DOT;
}
if (likely(type == LAST_NORM)) {
struct dentry *parent = nd->path.dentry;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_JUMPED;
if (unlikely(parent->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_HASH)) {
struct qstr this = { { .hash_len = hash_len }, .name = name };
err = parent->d_op->d_hash(parent, &this);
if (err < 0)
return err;
hash_len = this.hash_len;
name = this.name;
}
}
nd->last.hash_len = hash_len;
nd->last.name = name;
nd->last_type = type;
name += hashlen_len(hash_len);
if (!*name)
goto OK;
/*
* If it wasn't NUL, we know it was '/'. Skip that
* slash, and continue until no more slashes.
*/
do {
name++;
} while (unlikely(*name == '/'));
if (unlikely(!*name)) {
OK:
/* pathname body, done */
if (!nd->depth)
return 0;
name = nd->stack[nd->depth - 1].name;
/* trailing symlink, done */
if (!name)
return 0;
/* last component of nested symlink */
err = walk_component(nd, WALK_GET | WALK_PUT);
} else {
err = walk_component(nd, WALK_GET);
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err) {
const char *s = get_link(nd);
if (unlikely(IS_ERR(s)))
return PTR_ERR(s);
err = 0;
if (unlikely(!s)) {
/* jumped */
put_link(nd);
} else {
nd->stack[nd->depth - 1].name = name;
name = s;
continue;
}
}
if (unlikely(!d_can_lookup(nd->path.dentry))) {
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
if (unlazy_walk(nd, NULL, 0))
return -ECHILD;
}
return -ENOTDIR;
}
}
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 43,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vring_used_flags_set_bit(VirtQueue *vq, int mask)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = vq->vdev;
hwaddr pa;
pa = vq->vring.used + offsetof(VRingUsed, flags);
virtio_stw_phys(vdev, pa, virtio_lduw_phys(vdev, pa) | mask);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDepthRangef(GLclampf znear, GLclampf zfar) {
state_.z_near = std::min(1.0f, std::max(0.0f, znear));
state_.z_far = std::min(1.0f, std::max(0.0f, zfar));
api()->glDepthRangeFn(znear, zfar);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SetHasReceivedUserGesture() {
Send(new FrameMsg_SetHasReceivedUserGesture(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_global(u_int cmd, struct au1200_lcd_global_regs_t *pdata)
{
unsigned int hi1, divider;
pdata->xsize = ((lcd->screen & LCD_SCREEN_SX) >> 19) + 1;
pdata->ysize = ((lcd->screen & LCD_SCREEN_SY) >> 8) + 1;
pdata->backcolor = lcd->backcolor;
pdata->colorkey = lcd->colorkey;
pdata->mask = lcd->colorkeymsk;
hi1 = (lcd->pwmhi >> 16) + 1;
divider = (lcd->pwmdiv & 0x3FFFF) + 1;
pdata->brightness = ((hi1 << 8) / divider) - 1;
au_sync();
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::PageTransition GetTransitionType(ui::PageTransition default_transition,
bool replaces_current_item,
bool is_main_frame,
WebNavigationType navigation_type) {
if (replaces_current_item && !is_main_frame) {
return ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_AUTO_SUBFRAME;
}
bool is_form_submit =
navigation_type == blink::kWebNavigationTypeFormSubmitted ||
navigation_type == blink::kWebNavigationTypeFormResubmitted;
if (ui::PageTransitionCoreTypeIs(default_transition,
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK) &&
is_form_submit) {
return ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORM_SUBMIT;
}
return default_transition;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double NetworkActionPredictor::CalculateConfidenceForDbEntry(
DBCacheMap::const_iterator iter) const {
const DBCacheValue& value = iter->second;
if (value.number_of_hits < kMinimumNumberOfHits)
return 0.0;
const double number_of_hits = value.number_of_hits * hit_weight_;
return number_of_hits / (number_of_hits + value.number_of_misses);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_mod(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
if ((that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0)
{
double gray, err;
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
image_pixel_convert_PLTE(that);
/* Image now has RGB channels... */
# if DIGITIZE
{
PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm = display->pm;
const unsigned int sample_depth = that->sample_depth;
const unsigned int calc_depth = (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ? 16 :
sample_depth);
const unsigned int gamma_depth = (sample_depth == 16 ? 16 :
(pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ? PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8 : sample_depth));
int isgray;
double r, g, b;
double rlo, rhi, glo, ghi, blo, bhi, graylo, grayhi;
/* Do this using interval arithmetic, otherwise it is too difficult to
* handle the errors correctly.
*
* To handle the gamma correction work out the upper and lower bounds
* of the digitized value. Assume rounding here - normally the values
* will be identical after this operation if there is only one
* transform, feel free to delete the png_error checks on this below in
* the future (this is just me trying to ensure it works!)
*/
r = rlo = rhi = that->redf;
rlo -= that->rede;
rlo = digitize(rlo, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
rhi += that->rede;
rhi = digitize(rhi, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
g = glo = ghi = that->greenf;
glo -= that->greene;
glo = digitize(glo, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
ghi += that->greene;
ghi = digitize(ghi, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
b = blo = bhi = that->bluef;
blo -= that->bluee;
blo = digitize(blo, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
bhi += that->greene;
bhi = digitize(bhi, calc_depth, 1/*round*/);
isgray = r==g && g==b;
if (data.gamma != 1)
{
PNG_CONST double power = 1/data.gamma;
PNG_CONST double abse = calc_depth == 16 ? .5/65535 : .5/255;
/* 'abse' is the absolute error permitted in linear calculations. It
* is used here to capture the error permitted in the handling
* (undoing) of the gamma encoding. Once again digitization occurs
* to handle the upper and lower bounds of the values. This is
* where the real errors are introduced.
*/
r = pow(r, power);
rlo = digitize(pow(rlo, power)-abse, calc_depth, 1);
rhi = digitize(pow(rhi, power)+abse, calc_depth, 1);
g = pow(g, power);
glo = digitize(pow(glo, power)-abse, calc_depth, 1);
ghi = digitize(pow(ghi, power)+abse, calc_depth, 1);
b = pow(b, power);
blo = digitize(pow(blo, power)-abse, calc_depth, 1);
bhi = digitize(pow(bhi, power)+abse, calc_depth, 1);
}
/* Now calculate the actual gray values. Although the error in the
* coefficients depends on whether they were specified on the command
* line (in which case truncation to 15 bits happened) or not (rounding
* was used) the maxium error in an individual coefficient is always
* 1/32768, because even in the rounding case the requirement that
* coefficients add up to 32768 can cause a larger rounding error.
*
* The only time when rounding doesn't occur in 1.5.5 and later is when
* the non-gamma code path is used for less than 16 bit data.
*/
gray = r * data.red_coefficient + g * data.green_coefficient +
b * data.blue_coefficient;
{
PNG_CONST int do_round = data.gamma != 1 || calc_depth == 16;
PNG_CONST double ce = 1. / 32768;
graylo = digitize(rlo * (data.red_coefficient-ce) +
glo * (data.green_coefficient-ce) +
blo * (data.blue_coefficient-ce), gamma_depth, do_round);
if (graylo <= 0)
graylo = 0;
grayhi = digitize(rhi * (data.red_coefficient+ce) +
ghi * (data.green_coefficient+ce) +
bhi * (data.blue_coefficient+ce), gamma_depth, do_round);
if (grayhi >= 1)
grayhi = 1;
}
/* And invert the gamma. */
if (data.gamma != 1)
{
PNG_CONST double power = data.gamma;
gray = pow(gray, power);
graylo = digitize(pow(graylo, power), sample_depth, 1);
grayhi = digitize(pow(grayhi, power), sample_depth, 1);
}
/* Now the error can be calculated.
*
* If r==g==b because there is no overall gamma correction libpng
* currently preserves the original value.
*/
if (isgray)
err = (that->rede + that->greene + that->bluee)/3;
else
{
err = fabs(grayhi-gray);
if (fabs(gray - graylo) > err)
err = fabs(graylo-gray);
/* Check that this worked: */
if (err > pm->limit)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[128];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, "rgb_to_gray error ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, err, 6);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " exceeds limit ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, pm->limit, 6);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# else /* DIGITIZE */
{
double r = that->redf;
double re = that->rede;
double g = that->greenf;
double ge = that->greene;
double b = that->bluef;
double be = that->bluee;
/* The true gray case involves no math. */
if (r == g && r == b)
{
gray = r;
err = re;
if (err < ge) err = ge;
if (err < be) err = be;
}
else if (data.gamma == 1)
{
/* There is no need to do the conversions to and from linear space,
* so the calculation should be a lot more accurate. There is a
* built in 1/32768 error in the coefficients because they only have
* 15 bits and are adjusted to make sure they add up to 32768, so
* the result may have an additional error up to 1/32768. (Note
* that adding the 1/32768 here avoids needing to increase the
* global error limits to take this into account.)
*/
gray = r * data.red_coefficient + g * data.green_coefficient +
b * data.blue_coefficient;
err = re * data.red_coefficient + ge * data.green_coefficient +
be * data.blue_coefficient + 1./32768 + gray * 5 * DBL_EPSILON;
}
else
{
/* The calculation happens in linear space, and this produces much
* wider errors in the encoded space. These are handled here by
* factoring the errors in to the calculation. There are two table
* lookups in the calculation and each introduces a quantization
* error defined by the table size.
*/
PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm = display->pm;
double in_qe = (that->sample_depth > 8 ? .5/65535 : .5/255);
double out_qe = (that->sample_depth > 8 ? .5/65535 :
(pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ? .5/(1<<PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8) :
.5/255));
double rhi, ghi, bhi, grayhi;
double g1 = 1/data.gamma;
rhi = r + re + in_qe; if (rhi > 1) rhi = 1;
r -= re + in_qe; if (r < 0) r = 0;
ghi = g + ge + in_qe; if (ghi > 1) ghi = 1;
g -= ge + in_qe; if (g < 0) g = 0;
bhi = b + be + in_qe; if (bhi > 1) bhi = 1;
b -= be + in_qe; if (b < 0) b = 0;
r = pow(r, g1)*(1-DBL_EPSILON); rhi = pow(rhi, g1)*(1+DBL_EPSILON);
g = pow(g, g1)*(1-DBL_EPSILON); ghi = pow(ghi, g1)*(1+DBL_EPSILON);
b = pow(b, g1)*(1-DBL_EPSILON); bhi = pow(bhi, g1)*(1+DBL_EPSILON);
/* Work out the lower and upper bounds for the gray value in the
* encoded space, then work out an average and error. Remove the
* previously added input quantization error at this point.
*/
gray = r * data.red_coefficient + g * data.green_coefficient +
b * data.blue_coefficient - 1./32768 - out_qe;
if (gray <= 0)
gray = 0;
else
{
gray *= (1 - 6 * DBL_EPSILON);
gray = pow(gray, data.gamma) * (1-DBL_EPSILON);
}
grayhi = rhi * data.red_coefficient + ghi * data.green_coefficient +
bhi * data.blue_coefficient + 1./32768 + out_qe;
grayhi *= (1 + 6 * DBL_EPSILON);
if (grayhi >= 1)
grayhi = 1;
else
grayhi = pow(grayhi, data.gamma) * (1+DBL_EPSILON);
err = (grayhi - gray) / 2;
gray = (grayhi + gray) / 2;
if (err <= in_qe)
err = gray * DBL_EPSILON;
else
err -= in_qe;
/* Validate that the error is within limits (this has caused
* problems before, it's much easier to detect them here.)
*/
if (err > pm->limit)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char buffer[128];
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, "rgb_to_gray error ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, err, 6);
pos = safecat(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, " exceeds limit ");
pos = safecatd(buffer, sizeof buffer, pos, pm->limit, 6);
png_error(pp, buffer);
}
}
}
# endif /* !DIGITIZE */
that->bluef = that->greenf = that->redf = gray;
that->bluee = that->greene = that->rede = err;
/* The sBIT is the minium of the three colour channel sBITs. */
if (that->red_sBIT > that->green_sBIT)
that->red_sBIT = that->green_sBIT;
if (that->red_sBIT > that->blue_sBIT)
that->red_sBIT = that->blue_sBIT;
that->blue_sBIT = that->green_sBIT = that->red_sBIT;
/* And remove the colour bit in the type: */
if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY;
else if (that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
that->colour_type = PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA;
}
this->next->mod(this->next, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void DestroyImageProfiles(Image *image)
{
if (image->profiles != (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
image->profiles=DestroySplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->profiles);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 69,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_gadget_disable_irq(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
/* mask all interrupts */
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DEVTEN, 0x00);
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static kvm_pfn_t hva_to_pfn(unsigned long addr, bool atomic, bool *async,
bool write_fault, bool *writable)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
kvm_pfn_t pfn = 0;
int npages, r;
/* we can do it either atomically or asynchronously, not both */
BUG_ON(atomic && async);
if (hva_to_pfn_fast(addr, write_fault, writable, &pfn))
return pfn;
if (atomic)
return KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
npages = hva_to_pfn_slow(addr, async, write_fault, writable, &pfn);
if (npages == 1)
return pfn;
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (npages == -EHWPOISON ||
(!async && check_user_page_hwpoison(addr))) {
pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_HWPOISON;
goto exit;
}
retry:
vma = find_vma_intersection(current->mm, addr, addr + 1);
if (vma == NULL)
pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
else if (vma->vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP)) {
r = hva_to_pfn_remapped(vma, addr, async, write_fault, writable, &pfn);
if (r == -EAGAIN)
goto retry;
if (r < 0)
pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
} else {
if (async && vma_is_valid(vma, write_fault))
*async = true;
pfn = KVM_PFN_ERR_FAULT;
}
exit:
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return pfn;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InspectorPageAgent::SharedBufferContent(RefPtr<const SharedBuffer> buffer,
const String& mime_type,
const String& text_encoding_name,
String* result,
bool* base64_encoded) {
if (!buffer)
return false;
String text_content;
std::unique_ptr<TextResourceDecoder> decoder =
CreateResourceTextDecoder(mime_type, text_encoding_name);
WTF::TextEncoding encoding(text_encoding_name);
const SharedBuffer::DeprecatedFlatData flat_buffer(std::move(buffer));
if (decoder) {
text_content = decoder->Decode(flat_buffer.Data(), flat_buffer.size());
text_content = text_content + decoder->Flush();
} else if (encoding.IsValid()) {
text_content = encoding.Decode(flat_buffer.Data(), flat_buffer.size());
}
MaybeEncodeTextContent(text_content, flat_buffer.Data(), flat_buffer.size(),
result, base64_encoded);
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ConvertBigEndian(BTHeaderRec* header) {
ConvertBigEndian(&header->treeDepth);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->rootNode);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->leafRecords);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->firstLeafNode);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->lastLeafNode);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->nodeSize);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->maxKeyLength);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->totalNodes);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->freeNodes);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->reserved1);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->clumpSize);
ConvertBigEndian(&header->attributes);
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CCLayerTreeHost::initialize()
{
TRACE_EVENT("CCLayerTreeHost::initialize", this, 0);
if (m_settings.enableCompositorThread) {
m_settings.acceleratePainting = false;
m_settings.showFPSCounter = false;
m_settings.showPlatformLayerTree = false;
m_proxy = CCThreadProxy::create(this);
} else
m_proxy = CCSingleThreadProxy::create(this);
m_proxy->start();
if (!m_proxy->initializeLayerRenderer())
return false;
m_compositorIdentifier = m_proxy->compositorIdentifier();
m_settings.acceleratePainting = m_proxy->layerRendererCapabilities().usingAcceleratedPainting;
setNeedsCommitThenRedraw();
m_contentsTextureManager = TextureManager::create(TextureManager::highLimitBytes(), m_proxy->layerRendererCapabilities().maxTextureSize);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: m_authenticate(struct Client *client_p, struct Client *source_p,
int parc, const char *parv[])
{
struct Client *agent_p = NULL;
struct Client *saslserv_p = NULL;
/* They really should use CAP for their own sake. */
if(!IsCapable(source_p, CLICAP_SASL))
return 0;
if (strlen(client_p->id) == 3)
{
exit_client(client_p, client_p, client_p, "Mixing client and server protocol");
return 0;
}
saslserv_p = find_named_client(ConfigFileEntry.sasl_service);
if (saslserv_p == NULL || !IsService(saslserv_p))
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_SASLABORTED), me.name, EmptyString(source_p->name) ? "*" : source_p->name);
return 0;
}
if(source_p->localClient->sasl_complete)
{
*source_p->localClient->sasl_agent = '\0';
source_p->localClient->sasl_complete = 0;
}
if(strlen(parv[1]) > 400)
{
sendto_one(source_p, form_str(ERR_SASLTOOLONG), me.name, EmptyString(source_p->name) ? "*" : source_p->name);
return 0;
}
if(!*source_p->id)
{
/* Allocate a UID. */
strcpy(source_p->id, generate_uid());
add_to_id_hash(source_p->id, source_p);
}
if(*source_p->localClient->sasl_agent)
agent_p = find_id(source_p->localClient->sasl_agent);
if(agent_p == NULL)
{
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s H %s %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
source_p->host, source_p->sockhost);
if (!strcmp(parv[1], "EXTERNAL") && source_p->certfp != NULL)
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s S %s %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
parv[1], source_p->certfp);
else
sendto_one(saslserv_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s S %s",
me.id, saslserv_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, saslserv_p->id,
parv[1]);
rb_strlcpy(source_p->localClient->sasl_agent, saslserv_p->id, IDLEN);
}
else
sendto_one(agent_p, ":%s ENCAP %s SASL %s %s C %s",
me.id, agent_p->servptr->name, source_p->id, agent_p->id,
parv[1]);
source_p->localClient->sasl_out++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SASL: Disallow beginning : and space anywhere in AUTHENTICATE parameter
This is a FIX FOR A SECURITY VULNERABILITY. All Charybdis users must
apply this fix if you support SASL on your servers, or unload m_sasl.so
in the meantime.
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 1 | 166,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void closeAllCursors(Vdbe *p){
if( p->pFrame ){
VdbeFrame *pFrame;
for(pFrame=p->pFrame; pFrame->pParent; pFrame=pFrame->pParent);
sqlite3VdbeFrameRestore(pFrame);
p->pFrame = 0;
p->nFrame = 0;
}
assert( p->nFrame==0 );
closeCursorsInFrame(p);
if( p->aMem ){
releaseMemArray(p->aMem, p->nMem);
}
while( p->pDelFrame ){
VdbeFrame *pDel = p->pDelFrame;
p->pDelFrame = pDel->pParent;
sqlite3VdbeFrameDelete(pDel);
}
/* Delete any auxdata allocations made by the VM */
if( p->pAuxData ) sqlite3VdbeDeleteAuxData(p->db, &p->pAuxData, -1, 0);
assert( p->pAuxData==0 );
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void BROTLI_NOINLINE DecodeCommandBlockSwitch(BrotliState* s) {
DecodeCommandBlockSwitchInternal(0, s);
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetEntriesString(Entries *entries, char *str)
{
Buffer buff;
if (str && *str) {
buff.buff = str;
buff.used = strlen(str);
GetEntries(entries, &buff, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ip6_forward_finish(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return dst_output(skb);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NaClIPCAdapter::CloseChannelOnIOThread() {
io_thread_data_.channel_->Close();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::setLogicalTopForChild(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit logicalTop, ApplyLayoutDeltaMode applyDelta)
{
if (isHorizontalWritingMode()) {
if (applyDelta == ApplyLayoutDelta && !RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
view()->addLayoutDelta(LayoutSize(0, child->y() - logicalTop));
child->setY(logicalTop);
} else {
if (applyDelta == ApplyLayoutDelta && !RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
view()->addLayoutDelta(LayoutSize(child->x() - logicalTop, 0));
child->setX(logicalTop);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_prepare_ipa_cmd(struct qeth_card *card, struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob,
char prot_type)
{
memcpy(iob->data, IPA_PDU_HEADER, IPA_PDU_HEADER_SIZE);
memcpy(QETH_IPA_CMD_PROT_TYPE(iob->data), &prot_type, 1);
memcpy(QETH_IPA_CMD_DEST_ADDR(iob->data),
&card->token.ulp_connection_r, QETH_MPC_TOKEN_LENGTH);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mprint(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t v;
float vf;
double vd;
int64_t t = 0;
char buf[128], tbuf[26];
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->b);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d",
(unsigned char)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%d"),
(unsigned char) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(char);
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->h);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u",
(unsigned short)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"),
(unsigned short) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(short);
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->l);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", (uint32_t) v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"), (uint32_t) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, p->q);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u",
(unsigned long long)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u"),
(unsigned long long) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int64_t);
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->reln == '=' || m->reln == '!') {
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + m->vallen;
}
else {
char *str = p->s;
/* compute t before we mangle the string? */
t = ms->offset + strlen(str);
if (*m->value.s == '\0')
str[strcspn(str, "\n")] = '\0';
if (m->str_flags & STRING_TRIM) {
char *last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*str))
str++;
last = str;
while (*last)
last++;
--last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*last))
last--;
*++last = '\0';
}
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), str) == -1)
return -1;
if (m->type == FILE_PSTRING)
t += file_pstring_length_size(m);
}
break;
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_WINDOWS, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
vf = p->f;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vf);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(float);
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
vd = p->d;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vd);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vd) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(double);
break;
case FILE_REGEX: {
char *cp;
int rval;
cp = strndup((const char *)ms->search.s, ms->search.rm_len);
if (cp == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, ms->search.rm_len);
return -1;
}
rval = file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), cp);
free(cp);
if (rval == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + ms->search.rm_len;
break;
}
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + m->vallen;
break;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
t = ms->offset;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid m->type (%d) in mprint()", m->type);
return -1;
}
return (int32_t)t;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(recvmsg, int, fd, struct msghdr __user *, msg,
unsigned int, flags)
{
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
return __sys_recvmsg(fd, msg, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::OnWebLayoutContentsSizeChanged(
const gfx::Size& contents_size) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = java_ref_.get(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
Java_AwContents_onWebLayoutContentsSizeChanged(
env, obj.obj(), contents_size.width(), contents_size.height());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_secret_key (ECC_secret_key *sk, mpi_ec_t ec, int flags)
{
int rc = 1;
mpi_point_struct Q;
gcry_mpi_t x1, y1;
gcry_mpi_t x2 = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t y2 = NULL;
point_init (&Q);
x1 = mpi_new (0);
if (ec->model == MPI_EC_MONTGOMERY)
y1 = NULL;
else
y1 = mpi_new (0);
/* G in E(F_p) */
if (!_gcry_mpi_ec_curve_point (&sk->E.G, ec))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("Bad check: Point 'G' does not belong to curve 'E'!\n");
goto leave;
}
/* G != PaI */
if (!mpi_cmp_ui (sk->E.G.z, 0))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("Bad check: 'G' cannot be Point at Infinity!\n");
goto leave;
}
/* Check order of curve. */
if (sk->E.dialect != ECC_DIALECT_ED25519 && !(flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_DJB_TWEAK))
{
_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point (&Q, sk->E.n, &sk->E.G, ec);
if (mpi_cmp_ui (Q.z, 0))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("check_secret_key: E is not a curve of order n\n");
goto leave;
}
}
/* Pubkey cannot be PaI */
if (!mpi_cmp_ui (sk->Q.z, 0))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("Bad check: Q can not be a Point at Infinity!\n");
goto leave;
}
/* pubkey = [d]G over E */
if (!_gcry_ecc_compute_public (&Q, ec, &sk->E.G, sk->d))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("Bad check: computation of dG failed\n");
goto leave;
}
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x1, y1, &Q, ec))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("Bad check: Q can not be a Point at Infinity!\n");
goto leave;
}
if ((flags & PUBKEY_FLAG_EDDSA))
; /* Fixme: EdDSA is special. */
else if (!mpi_cmp_ui (sk->Q.z, 1))
{
/* Fast path if Q is already in affine coordinates. */
if (mpi_cmp (x1, sk->Q.x) || (y1 && mpi_cmp (y1, sk->Q.y)))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug
("Bad check: There is NO correspondence between 'd' and 'Q'!\n");
goto leave;
}
}
else
{
x2 = mpi_new (0);
y2 = mpi_new (0);
if (_gcry_mpi_ec_get_affine (x2, y2, &sk->Q, ec))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("Bad check: Q can not be a Point at Infinity!\n");
goto leave;
}
if (mpi_cmp (x1, x2) || mpi_cmp (y1, y2))
{
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug
("Bad check: There is NO correspondence between 'd' and 'Q'!\n");
goto leave;
}
}
rc = 0; /* Okay. */
leave:
mpi_free (x2);
mpi_free (x1);
mpi_free (y1);
mpi_free (y2);
point_free (&Q);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char * coolkey_cuid_to_string(coolkey_cuid_t *cuid)
{
char *buf;
size_t len = sizeof(coolkey_cuid_t)*2 + 1;
buf = malloc(len);
if (buf == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
sc_bin_to_hex((u8 *)cuid, sizeof(*cuid), buf, len, 0);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t socket_read(const socket_t *socket, void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return recv(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtqueue_fill(VirtQueue *vq, const VirtQueueElement *elem,
unsigned int len, unsigned int idx)
{
unsigned int offset;
int i;
trace_virtqueue_fill(vq, elem, len, idx);
offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < elem->in_num; i++) {
size_t size = MIN(len - offset, elem->in_sg[i].iov_len);
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(elem->in_sg[i].iov_base,
elem->in_sg[i].iov_len,
1, size);
offset += size;
}
for (i = 0; i < elem->out_num; i++)
cpu_physical_memory_unmap(elem->out_sg[i].iov_base,
elem->out_sg[i].iov_len,
0, elem->out_sg[i].iov_len);
idx = (idx + vring_used_idx(vq)) % vq->vring.num;
/* Get a pointer to the next entry in the used ring. */
vring_used_ring_id(vq, idx, elem->index);
vring_used_ring_len(vq, idx, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PluginService* PluginService::GetInstance() {
return PluginServiceImpl::GetInstance();
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cgi_interpose_output( httpd_conn* hc, int rfd )
{
int r;
char buf[1024];
size_t headers_size, headers_len;
char* headers;
char* br;
int status;
char* title;
char* cp;
/* Make sure the connection is in blocking mode. It should already
** be blocking, but we might as well be sure.
*/
httpd_clear_ndelay( hc->conn_fd );
/* Slurp in all headers. */
headers_size = 0;
httpd_realloc_str( &headers, &headers_size, 500 );
headers_len = 0;
for (;;)
{
r = read( rfd, buf, sizeof(buf) );
if ( r < 0 && ( errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ) )
{
sleep( 1 );
continue;
}
if ( r <= 0 )
{
br = &(headers[headers_len]);
break;
}
httpd_realloc_str( &headers, &headers_size, headers_len + r );
(void) memmove( &(headers[headers_len]), buf, r );
headers_len += r;
headers[headers_len] = '\0';
if ( ( br = strstr( headers, "\015\012\015\012" ) ) != (char*) 0 ||
( br = strstr( headers, "\012\012" ) ) != (char*) 0 )
break;
}
/* If there were no headers, bail. */
if ( headers[0] == '\0' )
return;
/* Figure out the status. Look for a Status: or Location: header;
** else if there's an HTTP header line, get it from there; else
** default to 200.
*/
status = 200;
if ( strncmp( headers, "HTTP/", 5 ) == 0 )
{
cp = headers;
cp += strcspn( cp, " \t" );
status = atoi( cp );
}
if ( ( cp = strstr( headers, "Status:" ) ) != (char*) 0 &&
cp < br &&
( cp == headers || *(cp-1) == '\012' ) )
{
cp += 7;
cp += strspn( cp, " \t" );
status = atoi( cp );
}
else if ( ( cp = strstr( headers, "Location:" ) ) != (char*) 0 &&
cp < br &&
( cp == headers || *(cp-1) == '\012' ) )
status = 302;
/* Write the status line. */
switch ( status )
{
case 200: title = ok200title; break;
case 302: title = err302title; break;
case 304: title = err304title; break;
case 400: title = httpd_err400title; break;
#ifdef AUTH_FILE
case 401: title = err401title; break;
#endif /* AUTH_FILE */
case 403: title = err403title; break;
case 404: title = err404title; break;
case 408: title = httpd_err408title; break;
case 500: title = err500title; break;
case 501: title = err501title; break;
case 503: title = httpd_err503title; break;
default: title = "Something"; break;
}
(void) my_snprintf( buf, sizeof(buf), "HTTP/1.0 %d %s\015\012", status, title );
(void) httpd_write_fully( hc->conn_fd, buf, strlen( buf ) );
/* Write the saved headers. */
(void) httpd_write_fully( hc->conn_fd, headers, headers_len );
/* Echo the rest of the output. */
for (;;)
{
r = read( rfd, buf, sizeof(buf) );
if ( r < 0 && ( errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ) )
{
sleep( 1 );
continue;
}
if ( r <= 0 )
break;
if ( httpd_write_fully( hc->conn_fd, buf, r ) != r )
break;
}
shutdown( hc->conn_fd, SHUT_WR );
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_GetValue(NPP instance, NPNVariable variable, void *value)
{
D(bug("NPN_GetValue instance=%p, variable=%d [%s]\n", instance, variable, string_of_NPNVariable(variable)));
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_GetValue not called from the main thread\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
PluginInstance *plugin = NULL;
if (instance)
plugin = PLUGIN_INSTANCE(instance);
switch (variable) {
case NPNVxDisplay:
*(void **)value = x_display;
break;
case NPNVxtAppContext:
*(void **)value = XtDisplayToApplicationContext(x_display);
break;
case NPNVToolkit:
*(NPNToolkitType *)value = NPW_TOOLKIT;
break;
#if USE_XPCOM
case NPNVserviceManager: {
nsIServiceManager *sm;
int ret = NS_GetServiceManager(&sm);
if (NS_FAILED(ret)) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NS_GetServiceManager failed\n");
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
*(nsIServiceManager **)value = sm;
break;
}
case NPNVDOMWindow:
case NPNVDOMElement:
npw_printf("WARNING: %s is not supported by NPN_GetValue()\n", string_of_NPNVariable(variable));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
#endif
case NPNVnetscapeWindow:
if (plugin == NULL) {
npw_printf("ERROR: NPNVnetscapeWindow requires a non NULL instance\n");
return NPERR_INVALID_INSTANCE_ERROR;
}
if (plugin->browser_toplevel == NULL) {
GdkNativeWindow netscape_xid = None;
NPError error = g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, &netscape_xid);
if (error != NPERR_NO_ERROR)
return error;
if (netscape_xid == None)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
plugin->browser_toplevel = gdk_window_foreign_new(netscape_xid);
if (plugin->browser_toplevel == NULL)
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
*((GdkNativeWindow *)value) = GDK_WINDOW_XWINDOW(plugin->browser_toplevel);
break;
#if ALLOW_WINDOWLESS_PLUGINS
case NPNVSupportsWindowless:
#endif
case NPNVSupportsXEmbedBool:
case NPNVWindowNPObject:
case NPNVPluginElementNPObject:
return g_NPN_GetValue_real(instance, variable, value);
default:
switch (variable & 0xff) {
case 13: /* NPNVToolkit */
if (NPW_TOOLKIT == NPNVGtk2) {
*(NPNToolkitType *)value = NPW_TOOLKIT;
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
break;
}
D(bug("WARNING: unhandled variable %d (%s) in NPN_GetValue()\n", variable, string_of_NPNVariable(variable)));
return NPERR_INVALID_PARAM;
}
return NPERR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::frameDetached()
{
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
stopAllLoaders();
m_frame->document()->stopActiveDOMObjects();
detachFromParent();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StateBase* nextState() { return m_next; }
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char **check_cs_token_pair(void)
{
const char **p = (const char **) cs_token_pairs_list;
for (; p[0] != NULL; ++p)
if (t1_buf_prefix(p[0]) && t1_buf_suffix(p[1]))
return p;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetalayerMode::OnDisable() {
CommonPaletteTool::OnDisable();
Shell::Get()->highlighter_controller()->SetEnabled(false);
activated_via_button_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Disable metalayer tool when assistant is not available
BUG=b:68664196
TEST=unit tests and manually check on device
Change-Id: If4c997a048ffc7ec3afa3e9ab2199f8c2b140c7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828265
Reviewed-by: Vladislav Kaznacheev <kaznacheev@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jenny Zhang <jennyz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Xiaohui Chen <xiaohuic@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524881}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lldp_mgmt_addr_tlv_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
uint8_t mgmt_addr_len, intf_num_subtype, oid_len;
const u_char *tptr;
u_int tlen;
char *mgmt_addr;
tlen = len;
tptr = pptr;
if (tlen < 1) {
return 0;
}
mgmt_addr_len = *tptr++;
tlen--;
if (tlen < mgmt_addr_len) {
return 0;
}
mgmt_addr = lldp_network_addr_print(ndo, tptr, mgmt_addr_len);
if (mgmt_addr == NULL) {
return 0;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Management Address length %u, %s",
mgmt_addr_len, mgmt_addr));
tptr += mgmt_addr_len;
tlen -= mgmt_addr_len;
if (tlen < LLDP_INTF_NUM_LEN) {
return 0;
}
intf_num_subtype = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Interface Numbering (%u): %u",
tok2str(lldp_intf_numb_subtype_values, "Unknown", intf_num_subtype),
intf_num_subtype,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 1)));
tptr += LLDP_INTF_NUM_LEN;
tlen -= LLDP_INTF_NUM_LEN;
/*
* The OID is optional.
*/
if (tlen) {
oid_len = *tptr;
if (tlen < 1U + oid_len) {
return 0;
}
if (oid_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t OID length %u", oid_len));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 1, oid_len);
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13054/LLDP: add a missing length check
In lldp_private_8023_print() the case block for subtype 4 (Maximum Frame
Size TLV, IEEE 802.3bc-2009 Section 79.3.4) did not include the length
check and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void imap_logout_all(void)
{
struct ConnectionList *head = mutt_socket_head();
struct Connection *np, *tmp;
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(np, head, entries, tmp)
{
if (np->account.type == MUTT_ACCT_TYPE_IMAP && np->fd >= 0)
{
TAILQ_REMOVE(head, np, entries);
mutt_message(_("Closing connection to %s..."), np->account.host);
imap_logout((struct ImapData **) (void *) &np->data);
mutt_clear_error();
mutt_socket_free(np);
}
}
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SelectRightNameType(const ServerFieldTypeSet& old_types,
ServerFieldTypeSet* new_types,
bool is_credit_card) {
ServerFieldTypeSet upload_types;
if (old_types.count(NAME_FIRST) && old_types.count(CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FIRST)) {
if (is_credit_card) {
new_types->insert(CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FIRST);
} else {
new_types->insert(NAME_FIRST);
}
} else if (old_types.count(NAME_LAST) &&
old_types.count(CREDIT_CARD_NAME_LAST)) {
if (is_credit_card) {
new_types->insert(CREDIT_CARD_NAME_LAST);
} else {
new_types->insert(NAME_LAST);
}
} else if (old_types.count(NAME_FULL) &&
old_types.count(CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FULL)) {
if (is_credit_card) {
new_types->insert(CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FULL);
} else {
new_types->insert(NAME_FULL);
}
} else {
*new_types = old_types;
}
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiceResponseHandler::OnTokenExchangeFailure(
DiceTokenFetcher* token_fetcher,
const GoogleServiceAuthError& error) {
const std::string& email = token_fetcher->email();
const std::string& gaia_id = token_fetcher->gaia_id();
std::string account_id =
account_tracker_service_->PickAccountIdForAccount(gaia_id, email);
about_signin_internals_->OnRefreshTokenReceived(
base::StringPrintf("Failure (%s)", account_id.c_str()));
token_fetcher->delegate()->HandleTokenExchangeFailure(email, error);
DeleteTokenFetcher(token_fetcher);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 nfsd4_getdeviceinfo_rsize(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
{
u32 maxcount = 0, rlen = 0;
maxcount = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
rlen = min(op->u.getdeviceinfo.gd_maxcount, maxcount);
return (op_encode_hdr_size +
1 /* gd_layout_type*/ +
XDR_QUADLEN(rlen) +
2 /* gd_notify_types */) * sizeof(__be32);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __platform_driver_register(struct platform_driver *drv,
struct module *owner)
{
drv->driver.owner = owner;
drv->driver.bus = &platform_bus_type;
drv->driver.probe = platform_drv_probe;
drv->driver.remove = platform_drv_remove;
drv->driver.shutdown = platform_drv_shutdown;
return driver_register(&drv->driver);
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mempolicy *get_task_policy(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct mempolicy *pol = p->mempolicy;
int node;
if (pol)
return pol;
node = numa_node_id();
if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
pol = &preferred_node_policy[node];
/* preferred_node_policy is not initialised early in boot */
if (pol->mode)
return pol;
}
return &default_policy;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserPpapiHostImpl::IsPotentiallySecurePluginContext(
PP_Instance instance) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (it == instance_map_.end())
return false;
return it->second->renderer_data.is_potentially_secure_plugin_context;
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selftest_ctr_128 (void)
{
const int nblocks = 8+1;
const int blocksize = BLOCKSIZE;
const int context_size = sizeof(RIJNDAEL_context);
return _gcry_selftest_helper_ctr("AES", &rijndael_setkey,
&rijndael_encrypt, &_gcry_aes_ctr_enc, nblocks, blocksize,
context_size);
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 96,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::setLineCap(int lineCap) {
state->lineCap = lineCap;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalDOMWindow::RemovePostMessageTimer(PostMessageTimer* timer) {
post_message_timers_.erase(timer);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crc32c_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct chksum_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
mctx->key = ~0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::startPreviewL(Parameters ¶ms, bool restart) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
ALOGV("%s: state == %d, restart = %d", __FUNCTION__, params.state, restart);
if ( (params.state == Parameters::PREVIEW ||
params.state == Parameters::RECORD ||
params.state == Parameters::VIDEO_SNAPSHOT)
&& !restart) {
ALOGI("%s: Camera %d: Preview already active, ignoring restart",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
return OK;
}
if (params.state > Parameters::PREVIEW && !restart) {
ALOGE("%s: Can't start preview in state %s",
__FUNCTION__,
Parameters::getStateName(params.state));
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mStreamingProcessor->haveValidPreviewWindow()) {
params.state = Parameters::WAITING_FOR_PREVIEW_WINDOW;
return OK;
}
params.state = Parameters::STOPPED;
int lastPreviewStreamId = mStreamingProcessor->getPreviewStreamId();
res = mStreamingProcessor->updatePreviewStream(params);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to update preview stream: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
bool previewStreamChanged = mStreamingProcessor->getPreviewStreamId() != lastPreviewStreamId;
res = updateProcessorStream(mJpegProcessor, params);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't pre-configure still image "
"stream: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
Vector<int32_t> outputStreams;
bool callbacksEnabled = (params.previewCallbackFlags &
CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_ENABLE_MASK) ||
params.previewCallbackSurface;
if (callbacksEnabled) {
if (mStreamingProcessor->getRecordingStreamId() != NO_STREAM) {
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Clearing out recording stream before "
"creating callback stream", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
res = mStreamingProcessor->stopStream();
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't stop streaming to delete "
"recording stream", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
return res;
}
res = mStreamingProcessor->deleteRecordingStream();
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to delete recording stream before "
"enabling callbacks: %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId,
strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
res = mCallbackProcessor->updateStream(params);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to update callback stream: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
outputStreams.push(getCallbackStreamId());
} else if (previewStreamChanged && mCallbackProcessor->getStreamId() != NO_STREAM) {
/**
* Delete the unused callback stream when preview stream is changed and
* preview is not enabled. Don't need stop preview stream as preview is in
* STOPPED state now.
*/
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Delete unused preview callback stream.", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId);
res = mCallbackProcessor->deleteStream();
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to delete callback stream %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
if (params.zslMode && !params.recordingHint) {
res = updateProcessorStream(mZslProcessor, params);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to update ZSL stream: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
outputStreams.push(getZslStreamId());
}
outputStreams.push(getPreviewStreamId());
if (!params.recordingHint) {
if (!restart) {
res = mStreamingProcessor->updatePreviewRequest(params);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't set up preview request: "
"%s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId,
strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
res = mStreamingProcessor->startStream(StreamingProcessor::PREVIEW,
outputStreams);
} else {
if (!restart) {
res = mStreamingProcessor->updateRecordingRequest(params);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't set up preview request with "
"record hint: %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId,
strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
res = mStreamingProcessor->startStream(StreamingProcessor::RECORD,
outputStreams);
}
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to start streaming preview: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
params.state = Parameters::PREVIEW;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void normalize_rt_tasks(void)
{
struct task_struct *g, *p;
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
read_lock_irqsave(&tasklist_lock, flags);
do_each_thread(g, p) {
/*
* Only normalize user tasks:
*/
if (!p->mm)
continue;
p->se.exec_start = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
p->se.statistics.wait_start = 0;
p->se.statistics.sleep_start = 0;
p->se.statistics.block_start = 0;
#endif
if (!dl_task(p) && !rt_task(p)) {
/*
* Renice negative nice level userspace
* tasks back to 0:
*/
if (TASK_NICE(p) < 0 && p->mm)
set_user_nice(p, 0);
continue;
}
raw_spin_lock(&p->pi_lock);
rq = __task_rq_lock(p);
normalize_task(rq, p);
__task_rq_unlock(rq);
raw_spin_unlock(&p->pi_lock);
} while_each_thread(g, p);
read_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(HttpUrl, __construct)
{
zval *new_url = NULL, *old_url = NULL;
long flags = PHP_HTTP_URL_FROM_ENV;
zend_error_handling zeh;
php_http_expect(SUCCESS == zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|z!z!l", &old_url, &new_url, &flags), invalid_arg, return);
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, php_http_exception_bad_url_class_entry, &zeh TSRMLS_CC);
{
php_http_url_t *res_purl, *new_purl = NULL, *old_purl = NULL;
if (new_url) {
new_purl = php_http_url_from_zval(new_url, flags TSRMLS_CC);
if (!new_purl) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&zeh TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
}
if (old_url) {
old_purl = php_http_url_from_zval(old_url, flags TSRMLS_CC);
if (!old_purl) {
if (new_purl) {
php_http_url_free(&new_purl);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&zeh TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
}
res_purl = php_http_url_mod(old_purl, new_purl, flags TSRMLS_CC);
php_http_url_to_struct(res_purl, getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
php_http_url_free(&res_purl);
if (old_purl) {
php_http_url_free(&old_purl);
}
if (new_purl) {
php_http_url_free(&new_purl);
}
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&zeh TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void act_open_req_arp_failure(struct t3cdev *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
printk(KERN_ERR MOD "ARP failure duing connect\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MockPrinter::GetBitmapChecksum(
unsigned int page, std::string* checksum) const {
if (printer_status_ != PRINTER_READY || page >= pages_.size())
return false;
*checksum = pages_[page]->image().checksum();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfsd4_open_deleg_none_ext(struct nfsd4_open *open, int status)
{
open->op_delegate_type = NFS4_OPEN_DELEGATE_NONE_EXT;
if (status == -EAGAIN)
open->op_why_no_deleg = WND4_CONTENTION;
else {
open->op_why_no_deleg = WND4_RESOURCE;
switch (open->op_deleg_want) {
case NFS4_SHARE_WANT_READ_DELEG:
case NFS4_SHARE_WANT_WRITE_DELEG:
case NFS4_SHARE_WANT_ANY_DELEG:
break;
case NFS4_SHARE_WANT_CANCEL:
open->op_why_no_deleg = WND4_CANCELLED;
break;
case NFS4_SHARE_WANT_NO_DELEG:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void nested_release_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (vmx->nested.current_vmptr == -1ull)
return;
/* current_vmptr and current_vmcs12 are always set/reset together */
if (WARN_ON(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 == NULL))
return;
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
/* copy to memory all shadowed fields in case
they were modified */
copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;
vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull);
}
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
/* Flush VMCS12 to guest memory */
memcpy(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12, vmx->nested.cached_vmcs12,
VMCS12_SIZE);
kunmap(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page);
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page);
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageCanvasByGPU(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
HTMLCanvasElement* canvas,
GLenum target,
GLuint target_texture,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
if (!canvas->Is3d()) {
if (Extensions3DUtil::CanUseCopyTextureCHROMIUM(target) &&
canvas->GetOrCreateCanvas2DLayerBridge()) {
scoped_refptr<StaticBitmapImage> image =
canvas->GetCanvas2DLayerBridge()->NewImageSnapshot(
kPreferAcceleration);
if (!!image && image->CopyToTexture(
ContextGL(), target, target_texture,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(xoffset, yoffset), source_sub_rectangle)) {
return;
}
}
NOTREACHED();
} else {
WebGLRenderingContextBase* gl =
ToWebGLRenderingContextBase(canvas->RenderingContext());
ScopedTexture2DRestorer restorer(gl);
if (!gl->GetDrawingBuffer()->CopyToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, target_texture, unpack_premultiply_alpha_,
!unpack_flip_y_, IntPoint(xoffset, yoffset), source_sub_rectangle,
kBackBuffer)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mct_u232_break_ctl(struct tty_struct *tty, int break_state)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned char lcr;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
lcr = priv->last_lcr;
if (break_state)
lcr |= MCT_U232_SET_BREAK;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
mct_u232_set_line_ctrl(port, lcr);
} /* mct_u232_break_ctl */
Commit Message: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.
CVE-2016-3136
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t i6300esb_config_read(PCIDevice *dev, uint32_t addr, int len)
{
I6300State *d = WATCHDOG_I6300ESB_DEVICE(dev);
uint32_t data;
i6300esb_debug ("addr = %x, len = %d\n", addr, len);
if (addr == ESB_CONFIG_REG && len == 2) {
data =
(d->reboot_enabled ? 0 : ESB_WDT_REBOOT) |
(d->clock_scale == CLOCK_SCALE_1MHZ ? ESB_WDT_FREQ : 0) |
d->int_type;
return data;
} else if (addr == ESB_LOCK_REG && len == 1) {
data =
(d->free_run ? ESB_WDT_FUNC : 0) |
(d->locked ? ESB_WDT_LOCK : 0) |
(d->enabled ? ESB_WDT_ENABLE : 0);
return data;
} else {
return pci_default_read_config(dev, addr, len);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: writeRandomBytes_arc4random(void *target, size_t count) {
size_t bytesWrittenTotal = 0;
while (bytesWrittenTotal < count) {
const uint32_t random32 = arc4random();
size_t i = 0;
for (; (i < sizeof(random32)) && (bytesWrittenTotal < count);
i++, bytesWrittenTotal++) {
const uint8_t random8 = (uint8_t)(random32 >> (i * 8));
((uint8_t *)target)[bytesWrittenTotal] = random8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnJavaScriptExecuteRequest(
const base::string16& jscript,
int id,
bool notify_result) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_tracing", "OnJavaScriptExecuteRequest",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
v8::Handle<v8::Value> result =
frame_->executeScriptAndReturnValue(WebScriptSource(jscript));
if (notify_result) {
base::ListValue list;
if (!result.IsEmpty()) {
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = frame_->mainWorldScriptContext();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
V8ValueConverterImpl converter;
converter.SetDateAllowed(true);
converter.SetRegExpAllowed(true);
base::Value* result_value = converter.FromV8Value(result, context);
list.Set(0, result_value ? result_value : base::Value::CreateNullValue());
} else {
list.Set(0, base::Value::CreateNullValue());
}
Send(new FrameHostMsg_JavaScriptExecuteResponse(routing_id_, id, list));
}
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int putreg32(struct task_struct *child, unsigned regno, u32 value)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
switch (regno) {
SEG32(cs);
SEG32(ds);
SEG32(es);
SEG32(fs);
SEG32(gs);
SEG32(ss);
R32(ebx, bx);
R32(ecx, cx);
R32(edx, dx);
R32(edi, di);
R32(esi, si);
R32(ebp, bp);
R32(eax, ax);
R32(eip, ip);
R32(esp, sp);
case offsetof(struct user32, regs.orig_eax):
/*
* A 32-bit debugger setting orig_eax means to restore
* the state of the task restarting a 32-bit syscall.
* Make sure we interpret the -ERESTART* codes correctly
* in case the task is not actually still sitting at the
* exit from a 32-bit syscall with TS_COMPAT still set.
*/
regs->orig_ax = value;
if (syscall_get_nr(child, regs) >= 0)
task_thread_info(child)->status |= TS_COMPAT;
break;
case offsetof(struct user32, regs.eflags):
return set_flags(child, value);
case offsetof(struct user32, u_debugreg[0]) ...
offsetof(struct user32, u_debugreg[7]):
regno -= offsetof(struct user32, u_debugreg[0]);
return ptrace_set_debugreg(child, regno / 4, value);
default:
if (regno > sizeof(struct user32) || (regno & 3))
return -EIO;
/*
* Other dummy fields in the virtual user structure
* are ignored
*/
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,912 |
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