instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BlobURLRequestJob::ReadBytesItem(const BlobData::Item& item,
int bytes_to_read) {
DCHECK_GE(read_buf_->BytesRemaining(), bytes_to_read);
memcpy(read_buf_->data(),
item.bytes() + item.offset() + current_item_offset_,
bytes_to_read);
AdvanceBytesRead(bytes_to_read);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 115,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *g_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
mutex_lock(&graph_lock);
/* Nothing, tell g_show to print all functions are enabled */
if (!ftrace_graph_filter_enabled && !*pos)
return (void *)1;
return __g_next(m, pos);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SiteInstanceImpl::RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err moof_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MovieFragmentBox *ptr = (GF_MovieFragmentBox *)s;
if (ptr->mfhd) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *)ptr->mfhd);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->mfhd->size;
}
return gf_isom_box_array_size(s, ptr->TrackList);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableReducedReferrerGranularity(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetReducedReferrerGranularityEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2Decoder::GetServiceTextureId(uint32_t client_texture_id,
uint32_t* service_texture_id) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fuse_setup(struct fuse* fuse, gid_t gid, mode_t mask) {
char opts[256];
fuse->fd = open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR);
if (fuse->fd == -1) {
ERROR("failed to open fuse device: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
umount2(fuse->dest_path, MNT_DETACH);
snprintf(opts, sizeof(opts),
"fd=%i,rootmode=40000,default_permissions,allow_other,user_id=%d,group_id=%d",
fuse->fd, fuse->global->uid, fuse->global->gid);
if (mount("/dev/fuse", fuse->dest_path, "fuse", MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC |
MS_NOATIME, opts) != 0) {
ERROR("failed to mount fuse filesystem: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fuse->gid = gid;
fuse->mask = mask;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, __destruct)
{
zval *zobj = getThis();
phar_archive_object *phar_obj = (phar_archive_object*)((char*)Z_OBJ_P(zobj) - Z_OBJ_P(zobj)->handlers->offset);
if (phar_obj->archive && phar_obj->archive->is_persistent) {
zend_hash_str_del(&PHAR_G(phar_persist_map), (const char *) phar_obj->archive, sizeof(phar_obj->archive));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static SegmentInfo AffineEdge(const Image *image,const AffineMatrix *affine,
const double y,const SegmentInfo *edge)
{
double
intercept,
z;
register double
x;
SegmentInfo
inverse_edge;
/*
Determine left and right edges.
*/
inverse_edge.x1=edge->x1;
inverse_edge.y1=edge->y1;
inverse_edge.x2=edge->x2;
inverse_edge.y2=edge->y2;
z=affine->ry*y+affine->tx;
if (affine->sx >= MagickEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z/affine->sx);
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z+(double) image->columns)/affine->sx;
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if (affine->sx < -MagickEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z+(double) image->columns)/affine->sx;
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z/affine->sx);
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if ((z < 0.0) || ((size_t) floor(z+0.5) >= image->columns))
{
inverse_edge.x2=edge->x1;
return(inverse_edge);
}
/*
Determine top and bottom edges.
*/
z=affine->sy*y+affine->ty;
if (affine->rx >= MagickEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z/affine->rx);
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z+(double) image->rows)/affine->rx;
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if (affine->rx < -MagickEpsilon)
{
intercept=(-z+(double) image->rows)/affine->rx;
x=intercept;
if (x > inverse_edge.x1)
inverse_edge.x1=x;
intercept=(-z/affine->rx);
x=intercept;
if (x < inverse_edge.x2)
inverse_edge.x2=x;
}
else
if ((z < 0.0) || ((size_t) floor(z+0.5) >= image->rows))
{
inverse_edge.x2=edge->x2;
return(inverse_edge);
}
return(inverse_edge);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostView* RenderFrameHostManager::GetRenderWidgetHostView() const {
if (delegate_->GetInterstitialForRenderManager())
return delegate_->GetInterstitialForRenderManager()->GetView();
if (render_frame_host_)
return render_frame_host_->GetView();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns)
{
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
dec_mnt_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
kfree(ns);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpc_Glin(Pixel *out, const Pixel *in, const Background *back)
{
(void)back;
if (in->r == in->g && in->g == in->b)
out->r = out->g = out->b = ilinear_g22(in->g);
else
out->r = out->g = out->b = u16d(65535 *
YfromRGB(g22_to_d[in->r], g22_to_d[in->g], g22_to_d[in->b]));
out->a = 65535;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XcursorFilenameLoad (const char *file,
XcursorComments **commentsp,
XcursorImages **imagesp)
{
FILE *f;
XcursorBool ret;
if (!file)
return XcursorFalse;
f = fopen (file, "r");
if (!f)
return 0;
ret = XcursorFileLoad (f, commentsp, imagesp);
fclose (f);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextTrackLoader::TextTrackLoader(TextTrackLoaderClient& client, Document& document)
: m_client(client)
, m_document(document)
, m_cueLoadTimer(this, &TextTrackLoader::cueLoadTimerFired)
, m_state(Idle)
, m_newCuesAvailable(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Check CORS policy on redirect in TextTrackLoader
BUG=633885
TEST=new case in http/tests/security/text-track-crossorigin.html
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2367583002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421919}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 130,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTTP_Copy(struct http *to, const struct http * const fm)
{
to->conds = fm->conds;
to->logtag = fm->logtag;
to->status = fm->status;
to->protover = fm->protover;
to->nhd = fm->nhd;
assert(fm->nhd <= to->shd);
memcpy(to->hd, fm->hd, fm->nhd * sizeof *to->hd);
memcpy(to->hdf, fm->hdf, fm->nhd * sizeof *to->hdf);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuotaTask::Abort() {
DCHECK(original_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
observer_ = NULL;
Aborted();
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jas_iccgetsint32(jas_stream_t *in, jas_iccsint32_t *val)
{
ulonglong tmp;
if (jas_iccgetuint(in, 4, &tmp))
return -1;
*val = (tmp & 0x80000000) ? (-JAS_CAST(longlong, (((~tmp) &
0x7fffffff) + 1))) : JAS_CAST(longlong, tmp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::Focus() {
host_->Focus();
host_->SetInputMethodActive(true);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Capturer* Capturer::Create() {
return new CapturerMac();
}
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 98,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::ResumeParser() {
parser_blocked_count_--;
DCHECK_GE(parser_blocked_count_, 0);
if (parser_blocked_count_ != 0)
return;
if (committed_data_buffer_ && !committed_data_buffer_->IsEmpty()) {
base::AutoReset<bool> reentrancy_protector(&in_data_received_, true);
const char* segment;
size_t pos = 0;
while (size_t length = committed_data_buffer_->GetSomeData(segment, pos)) {
parser_->AppendBytes(segment, length);
pos += length;
}
committed_data_buffer_->Clear();
ProcessDataBuffer();
}
if (finished_loading_) {
finished_loading_ = false;
parser_->Finish();
parser_.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 154,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_deviceinitialmatrix(gx_device * dev, gs_matrix * pmat)
{
fill_dev_proc(dev, get_initial_matrix, gx_default_get_initial_matrix);
(*dev_proc(dev, get_initial_matrix)) (dev, pmat);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t timer_is_periodic(HPETTimer *t)
{
return t->config & HPET_TN_PERIODIC;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::DidScrollWithScrollbar(
ScrollbarPart part,
ScrollbarOrientation orientation) {
WebFeature scrollbar_use_uma;
switch (part) {
case kBackButtonStartPart:
case kForwardButtonStartPart:
case kBackButtonEndPart:
case kForwardButtonEndPart:
scrollbar_use_uma =
(orientation == kVerticalScrollbar
? WebFeature::kScrollbarUseVerticalScrollbarButton
: WebFeature::kScrollbarUseHorizontalScrollbarButton);
break;
case kThumbPart:
scrollbar_use_uma =
(orientation == kVerticalScrollbar
? WebFeature::kScrollbarUseVerticalScrollbarThumb
: WebFeature::kScrollbarUseHorizontalScrollbarThumb);
break;
case kBackTrackPart:
case kForwardTrackPart:
scrollbar_use_uma =
(orientation == kVerticalScrollbar
? WebFeature::kScrollbarUseVerticalScrollbarTrack
: WebFeature::kScrollbarUseHorizontalScrollbarTrack);
break;
default:
return;
}
UseCounter::Count(GetLayoutBox()->GetDocument(), scrollbar_use_uma);
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Direct_Move_X( TT_ExecContext exc,
TT_GlyphZone zone,
FT_UShort point,
FT_F26Dot6 distance )
{
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY && !exc->ignore_x_mode )
zone->cur[point].x = ADD_LONG( zone->cur[point].x, distance );
else
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL && !exc->backward_compatibility )
zone->cur[point].x = ADD_LONG( zone->cur[point].x, distance );
else
#endif
if ( NO_SUBPIXEL_HINTING )
zone->cur[point].x = ADD_LONG( zone->cur[point].x, distance );
zone->tags[point] |= FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_X;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_timer_cb (void *data, int remaining_calls)
{
struct t_irc_server *ptr_server;
struct t_irc_redirect *ptr_redirect, *ptr_next_redirect;
time_t current_time;
static struct timeval tv;
int away_check;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) data;
(void) remaining_calls;
current_time = time (NULL);
for (ptr_server = irc_servers; ptr_server;
ptr_server = ptr_server->next_server)
{
/* check if reconnection is pending */
if ((!ptr_server->is_connected)
&& (ptr_server->reconnect_start > 0)
&& (current_time >= (ptr_server->reconnect_start + ptr_server->reconnect_delay)))
{
irc_server_reconnect (ptr_server);
}
else
{
if (ptr_server->is_connected)
{
/* send queued messages */
irc_server_outqueue_send (ptr_server);
/* check for lag */
if ((weechat_config_integer (irc_config_network_lag_check) > 0)
&& (ptr_server->lag_check_time.tv_sec == 0)
&& (current_time >= ptr_server->lag_next_check))
{
irc_server_sendf (ptr_server, 0, NULL, "PING %s",
(ptr_server->current_address) ?
ptr_server->current_address : "weechat");
gettimeofday (&(ptr_server->lag_check_time), NULL);
ptr_server->lag = 0;
ptr_server->lag_last_refresh = 0;
}
else
{
/* check away (only if lag check was not done) */
away_check = IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_AWAY_CHECK);
if (away_check > 0)
{
if ((ptr_server->last_away_check == 0)
|| (current_time >= ptr_server->last_away_check + (away_check * 60)))
{
irc_server_check_away (ptr_server);
}
}
}
/* check if it's time to autojoin channels (after command delay) */
if ((ptr_server->command_time != 0)
&& (current_time >= ptr_server->command_time +
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(ptr_server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_COMMAND_DELAY)))
{
irc_server_autojoin_channels (ptr_server);
ptr_server->command_time = 0;
}
/* compute lag */
if (ptr_server->lag_check_time.tv_sec != 0)
{
gettimeofday (&tv, NULL);
ptr_server->lag = (int) weechat_util_timeval_diff (&(ptr_server->lag_check_time),
&tv);
/* refresh lag item if needed */
if (((ptr_server->lag_last_refresh == 0)
|| (current_time >= ptr_server->lag_last_refresh + weechat_config_integer (irc_config_network_lag_refresh_interval)))
&& (ptr_server->lag >= weechat_config_integer (irc_config_network_lag_min_show)))
{
ptr_server->lag_last_refresh = current_time;
weechat_bar_item_update ("lag");
}
/* lag timeout? => disconnect */
if ((weechat_config_integer (irc_config_network_lag_disconnect) > 0)
&& (ptr_server->lag / 1000 > weechat_config_integer (irc_config_network_lag_disconnect) * 60))
{
weechat_printf (ptr_server->buffer,
_("%s: lag is high, disconnecting "
"from server..."),
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
irc_server_disconnect (ptr_server, 0, 1);
}
}
/* remove redirects if timeout occurs */
ptr_redirect = ptr_server->redirects;
while (ptr_redirect)
{
ptr_next_redirect = ptr_redirect->next_redirect;
if ((ptr_redirect->start_time > 0)
&& (ptr_redirect->start_time + ptr_redirect->timeout < current_time))
{
irc_redirect_stop (ptr_redirect, "timeout");
}
ptr_redirect = ptr_next_redirect;
}
}
}
}
return WEECHAT_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntSize HTMLCanvasElement::BitmapSourceSize() const {
return IntSize(width(), height());
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferfv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const Vector<GLfloat>& value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferfv", buffer, value.size(), src_offset))
return;
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
ContextGL()->ClearBufferfv(buffer, drawbuffer, value.data() + src_offset);
MarkContextChanged(kCanvasChanged);
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDepthRangef(GLclampf zNear,
GLclampf zFar) {
api()->glDepthRangefFn(zNear, zFar);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void shared_msr_update(unsigned slot, u32 msr)
{
struct kvm_shared_msrs *smsr;
u64 value;
smsr = &__get_cpu_var(shared_msrs);
/* only read, and nobody should modify it at this time,
* so don't need lock */
if (slot >= shared_msrs_global.nr) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: invalid MSR slot!");
return;
}
rdmsrl_safe(msr, &value);
smsr->values[slot].host = value;
smsr->values[slot].curr = value;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfc_llcp_send_to_raw_sock(struct nfc_llcp_local *local,
struct sk_buff *skb, u8 direction)
{
struct sk_buff *skb_copy = NULL, *nskb;
struct sock *sk;
u8 *data;
read_lock(&local->raw_sockets.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, &local->raw_sockets.head) {
if (sk->sk_state != LLCP_BOUND)
continue;
if (skb_copy == NULL) {
skb_copy = __pskb_copy_fclone(skb, NFC_RAW_HEADER_SIZE,
GFP_ATOMIC, true);
if (skb_copy == NULL)
continue;
data = skb_push(skb_copy, NFC_RAW_HEADER_SIZE);
data[0] = local->dev ? local->dev->idx : 0xFF;
data[1] = direction & 0x01;
data[1] |= (RAW_PAYLOAD_LLCP << 1);
}
nskb = skb_clone(skb_copy, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nskb)
continue;
if (sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, nskb))
kfree_skb(nskb);
}
read_unlock(&local->raw_sockets.lock);
kfree_skb(skb_copy);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void EnforceRangeLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->enforceRangeLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FPDF_BOOL PDFiumEngine::IsDataAvail(FX_FILEAVAIL* param,
size_t offset,
size_t size) {
auto* file_avail = static_cast<FileAvail*>(param);
return file_avail->engine->doc_loader_->IsDataAvailable(offset, size);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShellSurface::SetFullscreen(bool fullscreen) {
TRACE_EVENT1("exo", "ShellSurface::SetFullscreen", "fullscreen", fullscreen);
if (!widget_)
CreateShellSurfaceWidget(ui::SHOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN);
ScopedConfigure scoped_configure(this, true);
widget_->SetFullscreen(fullscreen);
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_append_double (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_double (b, "double", -1, 123.4567));
b2 = get_bson ("test20.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mlx4_init_vlan_table(struct mlx4_dev *dev, struct mlx4_vlan_table *table)
{
int i;
mutex_init(&table->mutex);
for (i = 0; i < MLX4_MAX_VLAN_NUM; i++) {
table->entries[i] = 0;
table->refs[i] = 0;
}
table->max = 1 << dev->caps.log_num_vlans;
table->total = 0;
}
Commit Message: mlx4_en: Fix out of bounds array access
When searching for a free entry in either mlx4_register_vlan() or
mlx4_register_mac(), and there is no free entry, the loop terminates without
updating the local variable free thus causing out of array bounds access. Fix
this by adding a proper check outside the loop.
Signed-off-by: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.co.il>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_getdcbx(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_DCBX,
netdev->dcbnl_ops->getdcbx(netdev));
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnDownloadRenamedToIntermediateName(
const FilePath& full_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (!full_path.empty()) {
SetFullPath(full_path);
UpdateObservers();
}
delegate_->DownloadRenamedToIntermediateName(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
{
X509 *issuer = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
if (ctx->current_issuer)
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
/*
* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
* certificate in chain.
*/
else if (cnum < chnum)
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
else {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
if (issuer) {
/*
* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
*/
if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
if (!ikey) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
} else {
/* Verify CRL signature */
if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
return ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ovsinst_bitmap_from_openflow(ovs_be32 ofpit_bitmap, enum ofp_version version)
{
uint32_t ovsinst_bitmap = 0;
const struct ovsinst_map *x;
for (x = get_ovsinst_map(version); x->ofpit >= 0; x++) {
if (ofpit_bitmap & htonl(1u << x->ofpit)) {
ovsinst_bitmap |= 1u << x->ovsinst;
}
}
return ovsinst_bitmap;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smtp_read_thread(thread_t * thread)
{
smtp_t *smtp;
char *buffer;
char *reply;
ssize_t rcv_buffer_size;
int status = -1;
smtp = THREAD_ARG(thread);
if (thread->type == THREAD_READ_TIMEOUT) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Timeout reading data to remote SMTP server %s."
, FMT_SMTP_HOST());
SMTP_FSM_READ(QUIT, thread, 0);
return -1;
}
buffer = smtp->buffer;
rcv_buffer_size = read(thread->u.fd, buffer + smtp->buflen,
SMTP_BUFFER_LENGTH - smtp->buflen);
if (rcv_buffer_size == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN)
goto end;
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Error reading data from remote SMTP server %s."
, FMT_SMTP_HOST());
SMTP_FSM_READ(QUIT, thread, 0);
return 0;
} else if (rcv_buffer_size == 0) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Remote SMTP server %s has closed the connection."
, FMT_SMTP_HOST());
SMTP_FSM_READ(QUIT, thread, 0);
return 0;
}
/* received data overflow buffer size ? */
if (smtp->buflen >= SMTP_BUFFER_MAX) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Received buffer from remote SMTP server %s"
" overflow our get read buffer length."
, FMT_SMTP_HOST());
SMTP_FSM_READ(QUIT, thread, 0);
return 0;
} else {
smtp->buflen += (size_t)rcv_buffer_size;
buffer[smtp->buflen] = 0; /* NULL terminate */
}
end:
/* parse the buffer, finding the last line of the response for the code */
reply = buffer;
while (reply < buffer + smtp->buflen) {
char *p;
p = strstr(reply, "\r\n");
if (!p) {
memmove(buffer, reply,
smtp->buflen - (size_t)(reply - buffer));
smtp->buflen -= (size_t)(reply - buffer);
buffer[smtp->buflen] = 0;
thread_add_read(thread->master, smtp_read_thread,
smtp, thread->u.fd,
global_data->smtp_connection_to);
return 0;
}
if (reply[3] == '-') {
/* Skip over the \r\n */
reply = p + 2;
continue;
}
status = ((reply[0] - '0') * 100) + ((reply[1] - '0') * 10) + (reply[2] - '0');
reply = p + 2;
break;
}
memmove(buffer, reply, smtp->buflen - (size_t)(reply - buffer));
smtp->buflen -= (size_t)(reply - buffer);
buffer[smtp->buflen] = 0;
if (status == -1) {
thread_add_read(thread->master, smtp_read_thread, smtp,
thread->u.fd, global_data->smtp_connection_to);
return 0;
}
SMTP_FSM_READ(smtp->stage, thread, status);
/* Registering next smtp command processing thread */
if (smtp->stage != ERROR) {
thread_add_write(thread->master, smtp_send_thread, smtp,
smtp->fd, global_data->smtp_connection_to);
} else {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Can not read data from remote SMTP server %s."
, FMT_SMTP_HOST());
SMTP_FSM_READ(QUIT, thread, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 75,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltFreeDecimalFormat(xsltDecimalFormatPtr self)
{
if (self != NULL) {
if (self->digit)
xmlFree(self->digit);
if (self->patternSeparator)
xmlFree(self->patternSeparator);
if (self->decimalPoint)
xmlFree(self->decimalPoint);
if (self->grouping)
xmlFree(self->grouping);
if (self->percent)
xmlFree(self->percent);
if (self->permille)
xmlFree(self->permille);
if (self->zeroDigit)
xmlFree(self->zeroDigit);
if (self->minusSign)
xmlFree(self->minusSign);
if (self->infinity)
xmlFree(self->infinity);
if (self->noNumber)
xmlFree(self->noNumber);
if (self->name)
xmlFree(self->name);
xmlFree(self);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void red_channel_send(RedChannel *channel)
{
RingItem *link;
RingItem *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(link, next, &channel->clients) {
red_channel_client_send(SPICE_CONTAINEROF(link, RedChannelClient, channel_link));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: close_socket (int sok)
{
/* close the socket in 5 seconds so the QUIT message is not lost */
fe_timeout_add (5000, close_socket_cb, GINT_TO_POINTER (sok));
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 58,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
{
int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
if (s->divider == 0)
return;
/* Start bit. */
frame_size = 1;
/* Parity bit. */
frame_size++;
if (s->lcr & 0x10)
parity = 'E';
else
parity = 'O';
} else {
parity = 'N';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 164,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init crc32c_sparc64_mod_init(void)
{
if (sparc64_has_crc32c_opcode()) {
pr_info("Using sparc64 crc32c opcode optimized CRC32C implementation\n");
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
pr_info("sparc64 crc32c opcode not available.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FoobarIndexIsOdd(const std::string& foobarx_com) {
return (foobarx_com[6] - '0') % 2 == 1;
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fst_add_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
{
static int no_of_cards_added = 0;
struct fst_card_info *card;
int err = 0;
int i;
printk_once(KERN_INFO
pr_fmt("FarSync WAN driver " FST_USER_VERSION
" (c) 2001-2004 FarSite Communications Ltd.\n"));
#if FST_DEBUG
dbg(DBG_ASS, "The value of debug mask is %x\n", fst_debug_mask);
#endif
/*
* We are going to be clever and allow certain cards not to be
* configured. An exclude list can be provided in /etc/modules.conf
*/
if (fst_excluded_cards != 0) {
/*
* There are cards to exclude
*
*/
for (i = 0; i < fst_excluded_cards; i++) {
if ((pdev->devfn) >> 3 == fst_excluded_list[i]) {
pr_info("FarSync PCI device %d not assigned\n",
(pdev->devfn) >> 3);
return -EBUSY;
}
}
}
/* Allocate driver private data */
card = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fst_card_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (card == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Try to enable the device */
if ((err = pci_enable_device(pdev)) != 0) {
pr_err("Failed to enable card. Err %d\n", -err);
kfree(card);
return err;
}
if ((err = pci_request_regions(pdev, "FarSync")) !=0) {
pr_err("Failed to allocate regions. Err %d\n", -err);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
kfree(card);
return err;
}
/* Get virtual addresses of memory regions */
card->pci_conf = pci_resource_start(pdev, 1);
card->phys_mem = pci_resource_start(pdev, 2);
card->phys_ctlmem = pci_resource_start(pdev, 3);
if ((card->mem = ioremap(card->phys_mem, FST_MEMSIZE)) == NULL) {
pr_err("Physical memory remap failed\n");
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
kfree(card);
return -ENODEV;
}
if ((card->ctlmem = ioremap(card->phys_ctlmem, 0x10)) == NULL) {
pr_err("Control memory remap failed\n");
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
iounmap(card->mem);
kfree(card);
return -ENODEV;
}
dbg(DBG_PCI, "kernel mem %p, ctlmem %p\n", card->mem, card->ctlmem);
/* Register the interrupt handler */
if (request_irq(pdev->irq, fst_intr, IRQF_SHARED, FST_DEV_NAME, card)) {
pr_err("Unable to register interrupt %d\n", card->irq);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
iounmap(card->ctlmem);
iounmap(card->mem);
kfree(card);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* Record info we need */
card->irq = pdev->irq;
card->type = ent->driver_data;
card->family = ((ent->driver_data == FST_TYPE_T2P) ||
(ent->driver_data == FST_TYPE_T4P))
? FST_FAMILY_TXP : FST_FAMILY_TXU;
if ((ent->driver_data == FST_TYPE_T1U) ||
(ent->driver_data == FST_TYPE_TE1))
card->nports = 1;
else
card->nports = ((ent->driver_data == FST_TYPE_T2P) ||
(ent->driver_data == FST_TYPE_T2U)) ? 2 : 4;
card->state = FST_UNINIT;
spin_lock_init ( &card->card_lock );
for ( i = 0 ; i < card->nports ; i++ ) {
struct net_device *dev = alloc_hdlcdev(&card->ports[i]);
hdlc_device *hdlc;
if (!dev) {
while (i--)
free_netdev(card->ports[i].dev);
pr_err("FarSync: out of memory\n");
free_irq(card->irq, card);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
iounmap(card->ctlmem);
iounmap(card->mem);
kfree(card);
return -ENODEV;
}
card->ports[i].dev = dev;
card->ports[i].card = card;
card->ports[i].index = i;
card->ports[i].run = 0;
hdlc = dev_to_hdlc(dev);
/* Fill in the net device info */
/* Since this is a PCI setup this is purely
* informational. Give them the buffer addresses
* and basic card I/O.
*/
dev->mem_start = card->phys_mem
+ BUF_OFFSET ( txBuffer[i][0][0]);
dev->mem_end = card->phys_mem
+ BUF_OFFSET ( txBuffer[i][NUM_TX_BUFFER][0]);
dev->base_addr = card->pci_conf;
dev->irq = card->irq;
dev->netdev_ops = &fst_ops;
dev->tx_queue_len = FST_TX_QUEUE_LEN;
dev->watchdog_timeo = FST_TX_TIMEOUT;
hdlc->attach = fst_attach;
hdlc->xmit = fst_start_xmit;
}
card->device = pdev;
dbg(DBG_PCI, "type %d nports %d irq %d\n", card->type,
card->nports, card->irq);
dbg(DBG_PCI, "conf %04x mem %08x ctlmem %08x\n",
card->pci_conf, card->phys_mem, card->phys_ctlmem);
/* Reset the card's processor */
fst_cpureset(card);
card->state = FST_RESET;
/* Initialise DMA (if required) */
fst_init_dma(card);
/* Record driver data for later use */
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, card);
/* Remainder of card setup */
fst_card_array[no_of_cards_added] = card;
card->card_no = no_of_cards_added++; /* Record instance and bump it */
fst_init_card(card);
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
/*
* Allocate a dma buffer for transmit and receives
*/
card->rx_dma_handle_host =
pci_alloc_consistent(card->device, FST_MAX_MTU,
&card->rx_dma_handle_card);
if (card->rx_dma_handle_host == NULL) {
pr_err("Could not allocate rx dma buffer\n");
fst_disable_intr(card);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
iounmap(card->ctlmem);
iounmap(card->mem);
kfree(card);
return -ENOMEM;
}
card->tx_dma_handle_host =
pci_alloc_consistent(card->device, FST_MAX_MTU,
&card->tx_dma_handle_card);
if (card->tx_dma_handle_host == NULL) {
pr_err("Could not allocate tx dma buffer\n");
fst_disable_intr(card);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
iounmap(card->ctlmem);
iounmap(card->mem);
kfree(card);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
return 0; /* Success */
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static aClient *decode_puid(char *puid)
{
aClient *cptr;
char *it, *it2;
int cookie = 0;
if ((it = strrchr(puid, '!')) == NULL)
return NULL;
*it++ = '\0';
if ((it2 = strrchr(it, '.')) != NULL)
{
*it2++ = '\0';
cookie = atoi(it2);
}
if (stricmp(me.name, puid))
return NULL;
list_for_each_entry(cptr, &unknown_list, lclient_node)
if (cptr->local->sasl_cookie == cookie)
return cptr;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix AUTHENTICATE bug
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 73,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qmp_guest_set_time(int64_t time_ns, Error **errp)
{
int ret;
int status;
pid_t pid;
Error *local_err = NULL;
struct timeval tv;
/* year-2038 will overflow in case time_t is 32bit */
if (time_ns / 1000000000 != (time_t)(time_ns / 1000000000)) {
error_setg(errp, "Time %" PRId64 " is too large", time_ns);
return;
}
tv.tv_sec = time_ns / 1000000000;
tv.tv_usec = (time_ns % 1000000000) / 1000;
ret = settimeofday(&tv, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Failed to set time to guest");
return;
}
/* Set the Hardware Clock to the current System Time. */
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
setsid();
reopen_fd_to_null(0);
reopen_fd_to_null(1);
reopen_fd_to_null(2);
execle("/sbin/hwclock", "hwclock", "-w", NULL, environ);
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
} else if (pid < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to create child process");
return;
}
ga_wait_child(pid, &status, &local_err);
if (error_is_set(&local_err)) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
return;
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "child process has terminated abnormally");
return;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
error_setg(errp, "hwclock failed to set hardware clock to system time");
return;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 3,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
{
int sx = 0, sy = 0;
int dx = 0, dy = 0;
int depth = 0;
int notify = 0;
/* make sure to only copy if it's a plain copy ROP */
if (*s->cirrus_rop == cirrus_bitblt_rop_fwd_src ||
*s->cirrus_rop == cirrus_bitblt_rop_bkwd_src) {
int width, height;
depth = s->vga.get_bpp(&s->vga) / 8;
if (!depth) {
return 0;
}
s->vga.get_resolution(&s->vga, &width, &height);
/* extra x, y */
sx = (src % ABS(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch)) / depth;
sy = (src / ABS(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch));
dx = (dst % ABS(s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch)) / depth;
dy = (dst / ABS(s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch));
/* normalize width */
w /= depth;
/* if we're doing a backward copy, we have to adjust
our x/y to be the upper left corner (instead of the lower
right corner) */
if (s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch < 0) {
sx -= (s->cirrus_blt_width / depth) - 1;
dx -= (s->cirrus_blt_width / depth) - 1;
sy -= s->cirrus_blt_height - 1;
dy -= s->cirrus_blt_height - 1;
}
/* are we in the visible portion of memory? */
if (sx >= 0 && sy >= 0 && dx >= 0 && dy >= 0 &&
(sx + w) <= width && (sy + h) <= height &&
(dx + w) <= width && (dy + h) <= height) {
notify = 1;
}
}
/* we have to flush all pending changes so that the copy
is generated at the appropriate moment in time */
if (notify)
graphic_hw_update(s->vga.con);
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, s->vga.vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
s->vga.vram_ptr +
(s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask),
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_width, s->cirrus_blt_height);
if (notify) {
qemu_console_copy(s->vga.con,
sx, sy, dx, dy,
s->cirrus_blt_width / depth,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
}
/* we don't have to notify the display that this portion has
changed since qemu_console_copy implies this */
cirrus_invalidate_region(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr,
s->cirrus_blt_dstpitch, s->cirrus_blt_width,
s->cirrus_blt_height);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 16,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nntp_newsrc_gen_entries(struct Context *ctx)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = ctx->data;
anum_t last = 0, first = 1;
bool series;
int save_sort = SORT_ORDER;
unsigned int entries;
if (Sort != SORT_ORDER)
{
save_sort = Sort;
Sort = SORT_ORDER;
mutt_sort_headers(ctx, 0);
}
entries = nntp_data->newsrc_len;
if (!entries)
{
entries = 5;
nntp_data->newsrc_ent = mutt_mem_calloc(entries, sizeof(struct NewsrcEntry));
}
/* Set up to fake initial sequence from 1 to the article before the
* first article in our list */
nntp_data->newsrc_len = 0;
series = true;
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
/* search for first unread */
if (series)
{
/* We don't actually check sequential order, since we mark
* "missing" entries as read/deleted */
last = NHDR(ctx->hdrs[i])->article_num;
if (last >= nntp_data->first_message && !ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted &&
!ctx->hdrs[i]->read)
{
if (nntp_data->newsrc_len >= entries)
{
entries *= 2;
mutt_mem_realloc(&nntp_data->newsrc_ent, entries * sizeof(struct NewsrcEntry));
}
nntp_data->newsrc_ent[nntp_data->newsrc_len].first = first;
nntp_data->newsrc_ent[nntp_data->newsrc_len].last = last - 1;
nntp_data->newsrc_len++;
series = false;
}
}
/* search for first read */
else
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted || ctx->hdrs[i]->read)
{
first = last + 1;
series = true;
}
last = NHDR(ctx->hdrs[i])->article_num;
}
}
if (series && first <= nntp_data->last_loaded)
{
if (nntp_data->newsrc_len >= entries)
{
entries++;
mutt_mem_realloc(&nntp_data->newsrc_ent, entries * sizeof(struct NewsrcEntry));
}
nntp_data->newsrc_ent[nntp_data->newsrc_len].first = first;
nntp_data->newsrc_ent[nntp_data->newsrc_len].last = nntp_data->last_loaded;
nntp_data->newsrc_len++;
}
mutt_mem_realloc(&nntp_data->newsrc_ent, nntp_data->newsrc_len * sizeof(struct NewsrcEntry));
if (save_sort != Sort)
{
Sort = save_sort;
mutt_sort_headers(ctx, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 79,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetAvailableSpace(
const GetAvailableSpaceCallback& callback,
GDataErrorCode status,
scoped_ptr<base::Value> data) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
GDataFileError error = util::GDataToGDataFileError(status);
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(error, -1, -1);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AccountMetadataFeed> feed;
if (data.get())
feed = AccountMetadataFeed::CreateFrom(*data);
if (!feed.get()) {
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_FAILED, -1, -1);
return;
}
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK,
feed->quota_bytes_total(),
feed->quota_bytes_used());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 116,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Splash::fillGlyph(SplashCoord x, SplashCoord y,
SplashGlyphBitmap *glyph) {
SplashCoord xt, yt;
int x0, y0;
transform(state->matrix, x, y, &xt, &yt);
x0 = splashFloor(xt);
y0 = splashFloor(yt);
SplashClipResult clipRes = state->clip->testRect(x0 - glyph->x,
y0 - glyph->y,
x0 - glyph->x + glyph->w - 1,
y0 - glyph->y + glyph->h - 1);
if (clipRes != splashClipAllOutside) {
fillGlyph2(x0, y0, glyph, clipRes == splashClipAllInside);
}
opClipRes = clipRes;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZSTD_compressionParameters ZSTD_getCParams(int compressionLevel, unsigned long long srcSizeHint, size_t dictSize)
{
size_t const addedSize = srcSizeHint ? 0 : 500;
U64 const rSize = srcSizeHint+dictSize ? srcSizeHint+dictSize+addedSize : (U64)-1;
U32 const tableID = (rSize <= 256 KB) + (rSize <= 128 KB) + (rSize <= 16 KB); /* intentional underflow for srcSizeHint == 0 */
int row = compressionLevel;
DEBUGLOG(5, "ZSTD_getCParams (cLevel=%i)", compressionLevel);
if (compressionLevel == 0) row = ZSTD_CLEVEL_DEFAULT; /* 0 == default */
if (compressionLevel < 0) row = 0; /* entry 0 is baseline for fast mode */
if (compressionLevel > ZSTD_MAX_CLEVEL) row = ZSTD_MAX_CLEVEL;
{ ZSTD_compressionParameters cp = ZSTD_defaultCParameters[tableID][row];
if (compressionLevel < 0) cp.targetLength = (unsigned)(-compressionLevel); /* acceleration factor */
return ZSTD_adjustCParams_internal(cp, srcSizeHint, dictSize); }
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::SendSurroundingText(int max_surrounding_chars) {
const base::string16& surrounding = context_->surrounding_text;
int surrounding_length = surrounding.length(); // Cast to int.
int num_after_characters = std::min(
surrounding_length - context_->end_offset, max_surrounding_chars);
base::string16 after_text = surrounding.substr(
context_->end_offset, num_after_characters);
base::TrimWhitespace(after_text, base::TRIM_ALL, &after_text);
surrounding_callback_.Run(UTF16ToUTF8(after_text));
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 efx_get_u64_stat(void *field)
{
return *(u64 *) field;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mem_cgroup_resize_memsw_limit(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
unsigned long long val)
{
int retry_count;
u64 memlimit, memswlimit, oldusage, curusage;
int children = mem_cgroup_count_children(memcg);
int ret = -EBUSY;
int enlarge = 0;
/* see mem_cgroup_resize_res_limit */
retry_count = children * MEM_CGROUP_RECLAIM_RETRIES;
oldusage = res_counter_read_u64(&memcg->memsw, RES_USAGE);
while (retry_count) {
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -EINTR;
break;
}
/*
* Rather than hide all in some function, I do this in
* open coded manner. You see what this really does.
* We have to guarantee memcg->res.limit < memcg->memsw.limit.
*/
mutex_lock(&set_limit_mutex);
memlimit = res_counter_read_u64(&memcg->res, RES_LIMIT);
if (memlimit > val) {
ret = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&set_limit_mutex);
break;
}
memswlimit = res_counter_read_u64(&memcg->memsw, RES_LIMIT);
if (memswlimit < val)
enlarge = 1;
ret = res_counter_set_limit(&memcg->memsw, val);
if (!ret) {
if (memlimit == val)
memcg->memsw_is_minimum = true;
else
memcg->memsw_is_minimum = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&set_limit_mutex);
if (!ret)
break;
mem_cgroup_reclaim(memcg, GFP_KERNEL,
MEM_CGROUP_RECLAIM_NOSWAP |
MEM_CGROUP_RECLAIM_SHRINK);
curusage = res_counter_read_u64(&memcg->memsw, RES_USAGE);
/* Usage is reduced ? */
if (curusage >= oldusage)
retry_count--;
else
oldusage = curusage;
}
if (!ret && enlarge)
memcg_oom_recover(memcg);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
{
int r;
r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
return r;
/*
* If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
* parse the file as a flat list of keys.
*/
switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
case 0:
/* Key found => revoked */
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
/* Key not found => not revoked */
return 0;
default:
/* Some other error occurred */
return r;
}
}
Commit Message: use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for loading
keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This
doesn't appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but
was observed for novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 72,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetIPv4AddressFromIndex(int socket, uint32 index, uint32* address){
if (!index) {
*address = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
return OK;
}
ifreq ifr;
ifr.ifr_addr.sa_family = AF_INET;
if (!if_indextoname(index, ifr.ifr_name))
return ERR_FAILED;
int rv = ioctl(socket, SIOCGIFADDR, &ifr);
if (!rv)
return MapSystemError(rv);
*address = reinterpret_cast<sockaddr_in*>(&ifr.ifr_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::ImeCompositionUpdated(
const string16& text,
const std::vector<int>& clauses,
const std::vector<int>& target,
int cursor_position,
int plugin_id) {
if (instance_id_ != plugin_id)
return;
IPC::Message* msg = new PluginMsg_ImeCompositionUpdated(instance_id_,
text, clauses, target, cursor_position);
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gen_shift_rm_im(DisasContext *s, TCGMemOp ot, int op1, int op2,
int is_right, int is_arith)
{
int mask = (ot == MO_64 ? 0x3f : 0x1f);
/* load */
if (op1 == OR_TMP0)
gen_op_ld_v(s, ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
else
gen_op_mov_v_reg(ot, cpu_T0, op1);
op2 &= mask;
if (op2 != 0) {
if (is_right) {
if (is_arith) {
gen_exts(ot, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_T0, op2 - 1);
tcg_gen_sari_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
} else {
gen_extu(ot, cpu_T0);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_T0, op2 - 1);
tcg_gen_shri_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
}
} else {
tcg_gen_shli_tl(cpu_tmp4, cpu_T0, op2 - 1);
tcg_gen_shli_tl(cpu_T0, cpu_T0, op2);
}
}
/* store */
gen_op_st_rm_T0_A0(s, ot, op1);
/* update eflags if non zero shift */
if (op2 != 0) {
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_src, cpu_tmp4);
tcg_gen_mov_tl(cpu_cc_dst, cpu_T0);
set_cc_op(s, (is_right ? CC_OP_SARB : CC_OP_SHLB) + ot);
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: g_verify_neg_token_init(unsigned char **buf_in, unsigned int cur_size)
{
unsigned char *buf = *buf_in;
unsigned char *endptr = buf + cur_size;
int seqsize;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int bytes;
/*
* Verify this is a NegotiationToken type token
* - check for a0(context specific identifier)
* - get length and verify that enoughd ata exists
*/
if (g_get_tag_and_length(&buf, CONTEXT, cur_size, &bytes) < 0)
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
cur_size = bytes; /* should indicate bytes remaining */
/*
* Verify the next piece, it should identify this as
* a strucure of type NegTokenInit.
*/
if (*buf++ == SEQUENCE) {
if ((seqsize = gssint_get_der_length(&buf, cur_size, &bytes)) < 0)
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
/*
* Make sure we have the entire buffer as described
*/
if (seqsize > endptr - buf)
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
} else {
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
}
cur_size = seqsize; /* should indicate bytes remaining */
/*
* Verify that the first blob is a sequence of mechTypes
*/
if (*buf++ == CONTEXT) {
if ((seqsize = gssint_get_der_length(&buf, cur_size, &bytes)) < 0)
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
/*
* Make sure we have the entire buffer as described
*/
if (seqsize > endptr - buf)
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
} else {
return (G_BAD_TOK_HEADER);
}
/*
* At this point, *buf should be at the beginning of the
* DER encoded list of mech types that are to be negotiated.
*/
*buf_in = buf;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::updateSpellingUIWithMisspelledWord(const WTF::String&)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_frag_handling_from_string(const char *s,
enum ofputil_frag_handling *frag)
{
if (!strcasecmp(s, "normal")) {
*frag = OFPUTIL_FRAG_NORMAL;
} else if (!strcasecmp(s, "drop")) {
*frag = OFPUTIL_FRAG_DROP;
} else if (!strcasecmp(s, "reassemble")) {
*frag = OFPUTIL_FRAG_REASM;
} else if (!strcasecmp(s, "nx-match")) {
*frag = OFPUTIL_FRAG_NX_MATCH;
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bond_inetaddr_event(struct notifier_block *this, unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct in_ifaddr *ifa = ptr;
struct net_device *vlan_dev, *event_dev = ifa->ifa_dev->dev;
struct bond_net *bn = net_generic(dev_net(event_dev), bond_net_id);
struct bonding *bond;
struct vlan_entry *vlan;
list_for_each_entry(bond, &bn->dev_list, bond_list) {
if (bond->dev == event_dev) {
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_UP:
bond->master_ip = ifa->ifa_local;
return NOTIFY_OK;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
bond->master_ip = bond_glean_dev_ip(bond->dev);
return NOTIFY_OK;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
}
list_for_each_entry(vlan, &bond->vlan_list, vlan_list) {
vlan_dev = __vlan_find_dev_deep(bond->dev,
vlan->vlan_id);
if (vlan_dev == event_dev) {
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_UP:
vlan->vlan_ip = ifa->ifa_local;
return NOTIFY_OK;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
vlan->vlan_ip =
bond_glean_dev_ip(vlan_dev);
return NOTIFY_OK;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
}
}
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ATSParser::~ATSParser() {
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void RunWork() {
if (!base::TouchPlatformFile(file_, last_access_time_, last_modified_time_))
set_error_code(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowSetCookie(
const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party,
const std::string& cookie_line,
const content::ResourceContext& context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
net::CookieOptions* options) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data =
reinterpret_cast<ProfileIOData*>(context.GetUserData(NULL));
ContentSetting setting = io_data->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->
GetCookieContentSetting(url, first_party, true);
if (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_SESSION_ONLY)
options->set_force_session();
bool allow = setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW ||
setting == CONTENT_SETTING_SESSION_ONLY;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableFunction(
&TabSpecificContentSettings::CookieChanged,
render_process_id, render_view_id, url, cookie_line, *options,
!allow));
return allow;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int inet6_hash_frag(__be32 id, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr, u32 rnd)
{
u32 a, b, c;
a = (__force u32)saddr->s6_addr32[0];
b = (__force u32)saddr->s6_addr32[1];
c = (__force u32)saddr->s6_addr32[2];
a += JHASH_GOLDEN_RATIO;
b += JHASH_GOLDEN_RATIO;
c += rnd;
__jhash_mix(a, b, c);
a += (__force u32)saddr->s6_addr32[3];
b += (__force u32)daddr->s6_addr32[0];
c += (__force u32)daddr->s6_addr32[1];
__jhash_mix(a, b, c);
a += (__force u32)daddr->s6_addr32[2];
b += (__force u32)daddr->s6_addr32[3];
c += (__force u32)id;
__jhash_mix(a, b, c);
return c & (INETFRAGS_HASHSZ - 1);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageRotateBilinear(gdImagePtr src, const float degrees, const int bgColor)
{
float _angle = (float)((- degrees / 180.0f) * M_PI);
const unsigned int src_w = gdImageSX(src);
const unsigned int src_h = gdImageSY(src);
unsigned int new_width = abs((int)(src_w*cos(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*sin(_angle) + 0.5f));
unsigned int new_height = abs((int)(src_w*sin(_angle))) + abs((int)(src_h*cos(_angle) + 0.5f));
const gdFixed f_0_5 = gd_ftofx(0.5f);
const gdFixed f_H = gd_itofx(src_h/2);
const gdFixed f_W = gd_itofx(src_w/2);
const gdFixed f_cos = gd_ftofx(cos(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_sin = gd_ftofx(sin(-_angle));
const gdFixed f_1 = gd_itofx(1);
unsigned int i;
unsigned int dst_offset_x;
unsigned int dst_offset_y = 0;
unsigned int src_offset_x, src_offset_y;
gdImagePtr dst;
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
dst->saveAlphaFlag = 1;
for (i = 0; i < new_height; i++) {
unsigned int j;
dst_offset_x = 0;
for (j=0; j < new_width; j++) {
const gdFixed f_i = gd_itofx((int)i - (int)new_height / 2);
const gdFixed f_j = gd_itofx((int)j - (int)new_width / 2);
const gdFixed f_m = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_sin) + gd_mulfx(f_i,f_cos) + f_0_5 + f_H;
const gdFixed f_n = gd_mulfx(f_j,f_cos) - gd_mulfx(f_i,f_sin) + f_0_5 + f_W;
const unsigned int m = gd_fxtoi(f_m);
const unsigned int n = gd_fxtoi(f_n);
if ((m > 0) && (m < src_h - 1) && (n > 0) && (n < src_w - 1)) {
const gdFixed f_f = f_m - gd_itofx(m);
const gdFixed f_g = f_n - gd_itofx(n);
const gdFixed f_w1 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w2 = gd_mulfx(f_1-f_f, f_g);
const gdFixed f_w3 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_1-f_g);
const gdFixed f_w4 = gd_mulfx(f_f, f_g);
if (n < src_w - 1) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m;
}
if (m < src_h - 1) {
src_offset_x = n;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
if (!((n >= src_w - 1) || (m >= src_h - 1))) {
src_offset_x = n + 1;
src_offset_y = m + 1;
}
{
const int pixel1 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x];
register int pixel2, pixel3, pixel4;
if (src_offset_y + 1 >= src_h) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else if (src_offset_x + 1 >= src_w) {
pixel2 = bgColor;
pixel3 = bgColor;
pixel4 = bgColor;
} else {
pixel2 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y][src_offset_x + 1];
pixel3 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x];
pixel4 = src->tpixels[src_offset_y + 1][src_offset_x + 1];
}
{
const gdFixed f_r1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_r2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_r3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_r4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetRed(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_g1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_g2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_g3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_g4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetGreen(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_b1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_b2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_b3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_b4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetBlue(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_a1 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel1));
const gdFixed f_a2 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel2));
const gdFixed f_a3 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel3));
const gdFixed f_a4 = gd_itofx(gdTrueColorGetAlpha(pixel4));
const gdFixed f_red = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_r1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_r2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_r3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_r4);
const gdFixed f_green = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_g1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_g2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_g3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_g4);
const gdFixed f_blue = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_b1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_b2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_b3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_b4);
const gdFixed f_alpha = gd_mulfx(f_w1, f_a1) + gd_mulfx(f_w2, f_a2) + gd_mulfx(f_w3, f_a3) + gd_mulfx(f_w4, f_a4);
const unsigned char red = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_red), 0, 255);
const unsigned char green = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_green), 0, 255);
const unsigned char blue = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_blue), 0, 255);
const unsigned char alpha = (unsigned char) CLAMP(gd_fxtoi(f_alpha), 0, 127);
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = gdTrueColorAlpha(red, green, blue, alpha);
}
}
} else {
dst->tpixels[dst_offset_y][dst_offset_x++] = bgColor;
}
}
dst_offset_y++;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 58,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __mem_cgroup_commit_charge(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
struct page *page,
unsigned int nr_pages,
struct page_cgroup *pc,
enum charge_type ctype)
{
lock_page_cgroup(pc);
if (unlikely(PageCgroupUsed(pc))) {
unlock_page_cgroup(pc);
__mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(memcg, nr_pages);
return;
}
/*
* we don't need page_cgroup_lock about tail pages, becase they are not
* accessed by any other context at this point.
*/
pc->mem_cgroup = memcg;
/*
* We access a page_cgroup asynchronously without lock_page_cgroup().
* Especially when a page_cgroup is taken from a page, pc->mem_cgroup
* is accessed after testing USED bit. To make pc->mem_cgroup visible
* before USED bit, we need memory barrier here.
* See mem_cgroup_add_lru_list(), etc.
*/
smp_wmb();
switch (ctype) {
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_CACHE:
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_SHMEM:
SetPageCgroupCache(pc);
SetPageCgroupUsed(pc);
break;
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_MAPPED:
ClearPageCgroupCache(pc);
SetPageCgroupUsed(pc);
break;
default:
break;
}
mem_cgroup_charge_statistics(memcg, PageCgroupCache(pc), nr_pages);
unlock_page_cgroup(pc);
WARN_ON_ONCE(PageLRU(page));
/*
* "charge_statistics" updated event counter. Then, check it.
* Insert ancestor (and ancestor's ancestors), to softlimit RB-tree.
* if they exceeds softlimit.
*/
memcg_check_events(memcg, page);
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::documentWillBecomeInactive()
{
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (renderer())
renderView()->setIsInWindow(false);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void user_enable_block_step(struct task_struct *child)
{
enable_step(child, 1);
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 33,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestExtensionSystem::lazy_background_task_queue() {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int splice_pipe_to_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *ipipe,
struct pipe_inode_info *opipe,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf, *obuf;
int ret = 0, nbuf;
bool input_wakeup = false;
retry:
ret = ipipe_prep(ipipe, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = opipe_prep(opipe, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* Potential ABBA deadlock, work around it by ordering lock
* grabbing by pipe info address. Otherwise two different processes
* could deadlock (one doing tee from A -> B, the other from B -> A).
*/
pipe_double_lock(ipipe, opipe);
do {
if (!opipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
if (!ipipe->nrbufs && !ipipe->writers)
break;
/*
* Cannot make any progress, because either the input
* pipe is empty or the output pipe is full.
*/
if (!ipipe->nrbufs || opipe->nrbufs >= opipe->buffers) {
/* Already processed some buffers, break */
if (ret)
break;
if (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
/*
* We raced with another reader/writer and haven't
* managed to process any buffers. A zero return
* value means EOF, so retry instead.
*/
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
goto retry;
}
ibuf = ipipe->bufs + ipipe->curbuf;
nbuf = (opipe->curbuf + opipe->nrbufs) & (opipe->buffers - 1);
obuf = opipe->bufs + nbuf;
if (len >= ibuf->len) {
/*
* Simply move the whole buffer from ipipe to opipe
*/
*obuf = *ibuf;
ibuf->ops = NULL;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ipipe->curbuf = (ipipe->curbuf + 1) & (ipipe->buffers - 1);
ipipe->nrbufs--;
input_wakeup = true;
} else {
/*
* Get a reference to this pipe buffer,
* so we can copy the contents over.
*/
ibuf->ops->get(ipipe, ibuf);
*obuf = *ibuf;
/*
* Don't inherit the gift flag, we need to
* prevent multiple steals of this page.
*/
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
obuf->len = len;
opipe->nrbufs++;
ibuf->offset += obuf->len;
ibuf->len -= obuf->len;
}
ret += obuf->len;
len -= obuf->len;
} while (len);
pipe_unlock(ipipe);
pipe_unlock(opipe);
/*
* If we put data in the output pipe, wakeup any potential readers.
*/
if (ret > 0)
wakeup_pipe_readers(opipe);
if (input_wakeup)
wakeup_pipe_writers(ipipe);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Resource::CachedMetadataHandlerImpl::SetSerializedCachedMetadata(
const char* data,
size_t size) {
DCHECK(!cached_metadata_);
cached_metadata_ = CachedMetadata::CreateFromSerializedData(data, size);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iucv_sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct iucv_message txmsg;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
int cmsg_done;
long timeo;
char user_id[9];
char appl_id[9];
int err;
int noblock = msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: we do not support segmented records */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_EOR))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
err = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
/* Return if the socket is not in connected state */
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* initialize defaults */
cmsg_done = 0; /* check for duplicate headers */
txmsg.class = 0;
/* iterate over control messages */
for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg); cmsg;
cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_IUCV)
continue;
if (cmsg->cmsg_type & cmsg_done) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
cmsg_done |= cmsg->cmsg_type;
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case SCM_IUCV_TRGCLS:
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(TRGCLS_SIZE)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* set iucv message target class */
memcpy(&txmsg.class,
(void *) CMSG_DATA(cmsg), TRGCLS_SIZE);
break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
break;
}
}
/* allocate one skb for each iucv message:
* this is fine for SOCK_SEQPACKET (unless we want to support
* segmented records using the MSG_EOR flag), but
* for SOCK_STREAM we might want to improve it in future */
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER)
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
len + sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr) + ETH_HLEN,
noblock, &err);
else
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, len, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER)
skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(struct af_iucv_trans_hdr) + ETH_HLEN);
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto fail;
}
/* wait if outstanding messages for iucv path has reached */
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, noblock);
err = iucv_sock_wait(sk, iucv_below_msglim(sk), timeo);
if (err)
goto fail;
/* return -ECONNRESET if the socket is no longer connected */
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_CONNECTED) {
err = -ECONNRESET;
goto fail;
}
/* increment and save iucv message tag for msg_completion cbk */
txmsg.tag = iucv->send_tag++;
memcpy(CB_TAG(skb), &txmsg.tag, CB_TAG_LEN);
if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER) {
atomic_inc(&iucv->msg_sent);
err = afiucv_hs_send(&txmsg, sk, skb, 0);
if (err) {
atomic_dec(&iucv->msg_sent);
goto fail;
}
goto release;
}
skb_queue_tail(&iucv->send_skb_q, skb);
if (((iucv->path->flags & IUCV_IPRMDATA) & iucv->flags)
&& skb->len <= 7) {
err = iucv_send_iprm(iucv->path, &txmsg, skb);
/* on success: there is no message_complete callback
* for an IPRMDATA msg; remove skb from send queue */
if (err == 0) {
skb_unlink(skb, &iucv->send_skb_q);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
/* this error should never happen since the
* IUCV_IPRMDATA path flag is set... sever path */
if (err == 0x15) {
pr_iucv->path_sever(iucv->path, NULL);
skb_unlink(skb, &iucv->send_skb_q);
err = -EPIPE;
goto fail;
}
} else
err = pr_iucv->message_send(iucv->path, &txmsg, 0, 0,
(void *) skb->data, skb->len);
if (err) {
if (err == 3) {
user_id[8] = 0;
memcpy(user_id, iucv->dst_user_id, 8);
appl_id[8] = 0;
memcpy(appl_id, iucv->dst_name, 8);
pr_err("Application %s on z/VM guest %s"
" exceeds message limit\n",
appl_id, user_id);
err = -EAGAIN;
} else
err = -EPIPE;
skb_unlink(skb, &iucv->send_skb_q);
goto fail;
}
release:
release_sock(sk);
return len;
fail:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_config_time (krb5_context context,
const char *realm,
const char *name,
int def)
{
int ret;
ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL,
"realms",
realm,
name,
NULL);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
ret = krb5_config_get_time (context, NULL,
"libdefaults",
name,
NULL);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
return def;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_bitmap(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
unsigned long *bmp = pv;
int i, idx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_TO_U64S(size); i++) {
uint64_t w = bmp[idx++];
if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 4 && idx < BITS_TO_LONGS(size)) {
w |= ((uint64_t)bmp[idx++]) << 32;
}
qemu_put_be64(f, w);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vcc_destroy_socket(struct sock *sk)
{
struct atm_vcc *vcc = atm_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
set_bit(ATM_VF_CLOSE, &vcc->flags);
clear_bit(ATM_VF_READY, &vcc->flags);
if (vcc->dev) {
if (vcc->dev->ops->close)
vcc->dev->ops->close(vcc);
if (vcc->push)
vcc->push(vcc, NULL); /* atmarpd has no push */
module_put(vcc->owner);
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) != NULL) {
atm_return(vcc, skb->truesize);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
module_put(vcc->dev->ops->owner);
atm_dev_put(vcc->dev);
}
vcc_remove_socket(sk);
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
* to permit stateful resumption.
*/
if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
i = *(p++);
p+= i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
p+= i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p > limit)
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit)
{
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
{
int r;
if (size == 0)
{
/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
* currently have one. */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
{
/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
* decrypted rather than generating the session
* from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
* handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later. */
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r)
{
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static LocalFrame* FrameForExecutionContext(ExecutionContext* context) {
LocalFrame* frame = nullptr;
if (context->IsDocument())
frame = ToDocument(context)->GetFrame();
return frame;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlBufFree(xmlBufPtr buf) {
if (buf == NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG_BUFFER
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlBufFree: buf == NULL\n");
#endif
return;
}
if ((buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IO) &&
(buf->contentIO != NULL)) {
xmlFree(buf->contentIO);
} else if ((buf->content != NULL) &&
(buf->alloc != XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE)) {
xmlFree(buf->content);
}
xmlFree(buf);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl)
{
int n, ret;
unsigned int i, b, bl;
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return 0;
else
*outl = ret;
return 1;
}
b = ctx->cipher->block_size;
OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf);
if (b == 1) {
*outl = 0;
return 1;
}
bl = ctx->buf_len;
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) {
if (bl) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX,
EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
*outl = 0;
return 1;
}
n = b - bl;
for (i = bl; i < b; i++)
ctx->buf[i] = n;
ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, b);
if (ret)
*outl = b;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void klsi_105_close(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
int rc;
/* send READ_OFF */
rc = usb_control_msg(port->serial->dev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(port->serial->dev, 0),
KL5KUSB105A_SIO_CONFIGURE,
USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_DIR_OUT,
KL5KUSB105A_SIO_CONFIGURE_READ_OFF,
0, /* index */
NULL, 0,
KLSI_TIMEOUT);
if (rc < 0)
dev_err(&port->dev, "failed to disable read: %d\n", rc);
/* shutdown our bulk reads and writes */
usb_serial_generic_close(port);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix line-state error handling
The current implementation failed to detect short transfers when
attempting to read the line state, and also, to make things worse,
logged the content of the uninitialised heap transfer buffer.
Fixes: abf492e7b3ae ("USB: kl5kusb105: fix DMA buffers on stack")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 68,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::Copy(const GURL& src_path_url,
const GURL& dest_path_url,
const StatusCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(SetPendingOperationType(kOperationCopy));
base::PlatformFileError result = SetUpFileSystemPath(
src_path_url, &src_path_, &src_util_, PATH_FOR_READ);
if (result == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK)
result = SetUpFileSystemPath(
dest_path_url, &dest_path_, &dest_util_, PATH_FOR_CREATE);
if (result != base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
callback.Run(result);
delete this;
return;
}
GetUsageAndQuotaThenRunTask(
dest_path_.origin(), dest_path_.type(),
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DoCopy,
base::Unretained(this), callback),
base::Bind(callback, base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err iKMS_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ISMAKMSBox *p;
p = (GF_ISMAKMSBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "KMSBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "kms_URI=\"%s\">\n", p->URI);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("KMSBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_csr_get_subject)
{
zval * zcsr;
zend_bool use_shortnames = 1;
zend_resource *csr_resource;
X509_NAME * subject;
X509_REQ * csr;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z|b", &zcsr, &use_shortnames) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
csr = php_openssl_csr_from_zval(zcsr, 0, &csr_resource);
if (csr == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
subject = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(csr);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_name_entry(return_value, NULL, subject, use_shortnames);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usb_mixer_dev_free(struct snd_device *device)
{
struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = device->device_data;
snd_usb_mixer_free(mixer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_cipher_name_to_ary(const OBJ_NAME *name, VALUE ary)
{
rb_ary_push(ary, rb_str_new2(name->name));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 73,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dn_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,int *uaddr_len,int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_dn *sa = (struct sockaddr_dn *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
*uaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn);
lock_sock(sk);
if (peer) {
if ((sock->state != SS_CONNECTED &&
sock->state != SS_CONNECTING) &&
scp->accept_mode == ACC_IMMED) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
}
memcpy(sa, &scp->peer, sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn));
} else {
memcpy(sa, &scp->addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn));
}
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool destroyed() const { return destroyed_; }
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 105,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __weak ulong board_spl_fit_size_align(ulong size)
{
return size;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShellWindowViews::IsFullscreenOrPending() const {
return is_fullscreen_;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
mm_segment_t fs;
char str[sizeof("00000000 ") * 5 + 2 + 1], *p = str;
int i;
/*
* We need to switch to kernel mode so that we can use __get_user
* to safely read from kernel space. Note that we now dump the
* code first, just in case the backtrace kills us.
*/
fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
for (i = -4; i < 1; i++) {
unsigned int val, bad;
bad = __get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
if (!bad)
p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%08x) " : "%08x ", val);
else {
p += sprintf(p, "bad PC value");
break;
}
}
printk("%sCode: %s\n", lvl, str);
set_fs(fs);
}
Commit Message: arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::willSendSubmitEvent(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebFormElement& form) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
WillSendSubmitEvent(frame, form));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int l2cap_data_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u16 cid, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
sk = l2cap_get_chan_by_scid(&conn->chan_list, cid);
if (!sk) {
BT_DBG("unknown cid 0x%4.4x", cid);
goto drop;
}
BT_DBG("sk %p, len %d", sk, skb->len);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
goto drop;
if (l2cap_pi(sk)->imtu < skb->len)
goto drop;
/* If socket recv buffers overflows we drop data here
* which is *bad* because L2CAP has to be reliable.
* But we don't have any other choice. L2CAP doesn't
* provide flow control mechanism. */
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
goto done;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
done:
if (sk)
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OPENSSL_fork_parent(void)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330
| 0
| 12,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoActiveTexture(GLenum texture) {
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glActiveTextureFn(texture);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
active_texture_unit_ = static_cast<size_t>(texture) - GL_TEXTURE0;
DCHECK(active_texture_unit_ < kMaxTextureUnits);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,860
|
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