instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void follow_dotdot(struct nameidata *nd)
{
set_root(nd);
while(1) {
struct dentry *old = nd->path.dentry;
if (nd->path.dentry == nd->root.dentry &&
nd->path.mnt == nd->root.mnt) {
break;
}
if (nd->path.dentry != nd->path.mnt->mnt_root) {
/* rare case of legitimate dget_parent()... */
nd->path.dentry = dget_parent(nd->path.dentry);
dput(old);
break;
}
if (!follow_up(&nd->path))
break;
}
follow_mount(&nd->path);
nd->inode = nd->path.dentry->d_inode;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
RenderClientPtr pRenderClient = GetRenderClient(client);
xRenderQueryVersionReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0
};
REQUEST(xRenderQueryVersionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderQueryVersionReq);
pRenderClient->major_version = stuff->majorVersion;
pRenderClient->minor_version = stuff->minorVersion;
if ((stuff->majorVersion * 1000 + stuff->minorVersion) <
(SERVER_RENDER_MAJOR_VERSION * 1000 + SERVER_RENDER_MINOR_VERSION)) {
rep.majorVersion = stuff->majorVersion;
rep.minorVersion = stuff->minorVersion;
}
else {
rep.majorVersion = SERVER_RENDER_MAJOR_VERSION;
rep.minorVersion = SERVER_RENDER_MINOR_VERSION;
}
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.majorVersion);
swapl(&rep.minorVersion);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xRenderQueryVersionReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __register_ftrace_function(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return -ENODEV;
if (FTRACE_WARN_ON(ops == &global_ops))
return -EINVAL;
if (WARN_ON(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_ENABLED))
return -EBUSY;
/* We don't support both control and global flags set. */
if ((ops->flags & FL_GLOBAL_CONTROL_MASK) == FL_GLOBAL_CONTROL_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
#ifndef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS
/*
* If the ftrace_ops specifies SAVE_REGS, then it only can be used
* if the arch supports it, or SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED is also set.
* Setting SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED makes SAVE_REGS irrelevant.
*/
if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS &&
!(ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED))
return -EINVAL;
if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS_IF_SUPPORTED)
ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS;
#endif
if (!core_kernel_data((unsigned long)ops))
ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_DYNAMIC;
if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_GLOBAL) {
add_ftrace_list_ops(&ftrace_global_list, &global_ops, ops);
ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_ENABLED;
} else if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_CONTROL) {
if (control_ops_alloc(ops))
return -ENOMEM;
add_ftrace_list_ops(&ftrace_control_list, &control_ops, ops);
} else
add_ftrace_ops(&ftrace_ops_list, ops);
if (ftrace_enabled)
update_ftrace_function();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_sockent_client (struct sockent_client *sec) /* {{{ */
{
if (sec->fd >= 0)
{
close (sec->fd);
sec->fd = -1;
}
sfree (sec->addr);
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
sfree (sec->username);
sfree (sec->password);
if (sec->cypher != NULL)
gcry_cipher_close (sec->cypher);
#endif
} /* }}} void free_sockent_client */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::OriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_originTrialEnabledLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::OriginTrialEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pci_ne2000_exit(PCIDevice *pci_dev)
{
PCINE2000State *d = DO_UPCAST(PCINE2000State, dev, pci_dev);
NE2000State *s = &d->ne2000;
qemu_del_nic(s->nic);
qemu_free_irq(s->irq);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmcraid_abort_complete(struct pmcraid_cmd *cancel_cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_resource_entry *res;
u32 ioasc;
wait_for_completion(&cancel_cmd->wait_for_completion);
res = cancel_cmd->res;
cancel_cmd->res = NULL;
ioasc = le32_to_cpu(cancel_cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.ioasc);
/* If the abort task is not timed out we will get a Good completion
* as sense_key, otherwise we may get one the following responses
* due to subsequent bus reset or device reset. In case IOASC is
* NR_SYNC_REQUIRED, set sync_reqd flag for the corresponding resource
*/
if (ioasc == PMCRAID_IOASC_UA_BUS_WAS_RESET ||
ioasc == PMCRAID_IOASC_NR_SYNC_REQUIRED) {
if (ioasc == PMCRAID_IOASC_NR_SYNC_REQUIRED)
res->sync_reqd = 1;
ioasc = 0;
}
/* complete the command here itself */
pmcraid_return_cmd(cancel_cmd);
return PMCRAID_IOASC_SENSE_KEY(ioasc) ? FAILED : SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int checkDecodeLMN(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *CIEdict)
{
int code = 0, i;
ref *tempref, valref;
code = dict_find_string(CIEdict, "DecodeLMN", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
if (!r_is_array(tempref))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
if (r_size(tempref) != 3)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
for (i=0;i<3;i++) {
code = array_get(imemory, tempref, i, &valref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
check_proc(valref);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void UnrestrictedDoubleAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "unrestrictedDoubleAttribute");
double cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLUnrestrictedDouble>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setUnrestrictedDoubleAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opImageData(Object args[], int numArgs) {
error(getPos(), "Internal: got 'ID' operator");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct arm_pmu *__init armv6mpcore_pmu_init(void)
{
return &armv6mpcore_pmu;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlAutoCloseTag(htmlDocPtr doc, const xmlChar *name, htmlNodePtr elem) {
htmlNodePtr child;
if (elem == NULL) return(1);
if (xmlStrEqual(name, elem->name)) return(0);
if (htmlCheckAutoClose(elem->name, name)) return(1);
child = elem->children;
while (child != NULL) {
if (htmlAutoCloseTag(doc, name, child)) return(1);
child = child->next;
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MakeNavigateParams(const NavigationEntryImpl& entry,
const NavigationControllerImpl& controller,
WebContentsDelegate* delegate,
NavigationController::ReloadType reload_type,
ViewMsg_Navigate_Params* params) {
params->page_id = entry.GetPageID();
params->should_clear_history_list = entry.should_clear_history_list();
if (entry.should_clear_history_list()) {
params->pending_history_list_offset = -1;
params->current_history_list_offset = -1;
params->current_history_list_length = 0;
} else {
params->pending_history_list_offset = controller.GetIndexOfEntry(&entry);
params->current_history_list_offset =
controller.GetLastCommittedEntryIndex();
params->current_history_list_length = controller.GetEntryCount();
}
if (!entry.GetBaseURLForDataURL().is_empty()) {
params->base_url_for_data_url = entry.GetBaseURLForDataURL();
params->history_url_for_data_url = entry.GetVirtualURL();
}
params->referrer = entry.GetReferrer();
params->transition = entry.GetTransitionType();
params->page_state = entry.GetPageState();
params->navigation_type =
GetNavigationType(controller.GetBrowserContext(), entry, reload_type);
params->request_time = base::Time::Now();
params->extra_headers = entry.extra_headers();
params->transferred_request_child_id =
entry.transferred_global_request_id().child_id;
params->transferred_request_request_id =
entry.transferred_global_request_id().request_id;
params->is_overriding_user_agent = entry.GetIsOverridingUserAgent();
params->allow_download = !entry.IsViewSourceMode();
params->is_post = entry.GetHasPostData();
if(entry.GetBrowserInitiatedPostData()) {
params->browser_initiated_post_data.assign(
entry.GetBrowserInitiatedPostData()->front(),
entry.GetBrowserInitiatedPostData()->front() +
entry.GetBrowserInitiatedPostData()->size());
}
if (reload_type == NavigationControllerImpl::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL &&
entry.GetOriginalRequestURL().is_valid() && !entry.GetHasPostData()) {
params->url = entry.GetOriginalRequestURL();
} else {
params->url = entry.GetURL();
}
params->can_load_local_resources = entry.GetCanLoadLocalResources();
params->frame_to_navigate = entry.GetFrameToNavigate();
if (delegate)
delegate->AddNavigationHeaders(params->url, ¶ms->extra_headers);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Vector<RefPtr<Attr> >& Element::attrNodeList()
{
ASSERT(hasSyntheticAttrChildNodes());
return *attrNodeListForElement(this);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_scsi_handle_kick(struct vhost_work *work)
{
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = container_of(work, struct vhost_virtqueue,
poll.work);
struct vhost_scsi *vs = container_of(vq->dev, struct vhost_scsi, dev);
vhost_scsi_handle_vq(vs, vq);
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::setLoadState(LoadState state)
{
if (m_loadState == state)
return;
bool isFirstLoad = m_loadState == None;
if (state == Finished && m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document())
m_mainFrame->document()->updateStyleIfNeeded();
m_backingStore->d->setWebPageBackgroundColor(m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->view()
? m_mainFrame->view()->documentBackgroundColor()
: m_webSettings->backgroundColor());
m_loadState = state;
#if DEBUG_WEBPAGE_LOAD
BBLOG(Platform::LogLevelInfo, "WebPagePrivate::setLoadState %d", state);
#endif
switch (m_loadState) {
case Provisional:
if (isFirstLoad) {
if (m_backingStore->d->renderVisibleContents() && !m_backingStore->d->isSuspended() && !m_backingStore->d->shouldDirectRenderingToWindow())
m_backingStore->d->blitVisibleContents();
}
break;
case Committed:
{
#if ENABLE(ACCELERATED_2D_CANVAS)
if (m_page->settings()->canvasUsesAcceleratedDrawing()) {
SharedGraphicsContext3D::get()->makeContextCurrent();
GrContext* grContext = Platform::Graphics::getGrContext();
grContext->freeGpuResources();
}
#endif
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
releaseLayerResources();
#endif
m_backingStore->d->suspendBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->suspendScreenUpdates();
m_previousContentsSize = IntSize();
m_backingStore->d->resetRenderQueue();
m_backingStore->d->resetTiles();
m_backingStore->d->setScrollingOrZooming(false, false /* shouldBlit */);
m_shouldZoomToInitialScaleAfterLoadFinished = false;
m_userPerformedManualZoom = false;
m_userPerformedManualScroll = false;
m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode = false;
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = false;
if (m_resetVirtualViewportOnCommitted) // For DRT.
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize();
if (m_webSettings->viewportWidth() > 0)
m_virtualViewportSize = IntSize(m_webSettings->viewportWidth(), m_defaultLayoutSize.height());
static ViewportArguments defaultViewportArguments;
bool documentHasViewportArguments = false;
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->document() && m_mainFrame->document()->viewportArguments() != defaultViewportArguments)
documentHasViewportArguments = true;
if (!(m_didRestoreFromPageCache && documentHasViewportArguments)) {
m_viewportArguments = ViewportArguments();
m_userScalable = m_webSettings->isUserScalable();
resetScales();
dispatchViewportPropertiesDidChange(m_userViewportArguments);
if (m_userViewportArguments != defaultViewportArguments)
m_forceRespectViewportArguments = true;
} else {
Platform::IntSize virtualViewport = recomputeVirtualViewportFromViewportArguments();
m_webPage->setVirtualViewportSize(virtualViewport);
}
#if ENABLE(EVENT_MODE_METATAGS)
didReceiveCursorEventMode(ProcessedCursorEvents);
didReceiveTouchEventMode(ProcessedTouchEvents);
#endif
resetBlockZoom();
#if ENABLE(VIEWPORT_REFLOW)
toggleTextReflowIfEnabledForBlockZoomOnly();
#endif
m_inputHandler->setInputModeEnabled(false);
setScrollPosition(IntPoint::zero());
notifyTransformedScrollChanged();
m_backingStore->d->resumeBackingStoreUpdates();
m_backingStore->d->resumeScreenUpdates(BackingStore::None);
if (m_backingStore->d->renderVisibleContents() && !m_backingStore->d->isSuspended() && !m_backingStore->d->shouldDirectRenderingToWindow())
m_backingStore->d->blitVisibleContents();
updateCursor();
break;
}
case Finished:
case Failed:
m_client->scaleChanged();
m_backingStore->d->updateTiles(true /* updateVisible */, false /* immediate */);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::SetMemoryAllocation(
const GpuMemoryAllocation& allocation) {
Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_SetMemoryAllocation(
route_id_, allocation.renderer_allocation));
if (!surface_ || !MakeCurrent())
return;
surface_->SetFrontbufferAllocation(
allocation.browser_allocation.suggest_have_frontbuffer);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_wep_key(struct airo_info *ai, u16 index, const char *key,
u16 keylen, int perm, int lock)
{
static const unsigned char macaddr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0x01, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
WepKeyRid wkr;
int rc;
if (WARN_ON(keylen == 0))
return -1;
memset(&wkr, 0, sizeof(wkr));
wkr.len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(wkr));
wkr.kindex = cpu_to_le16(index);
wkr.klen = cpu_to_le16(keylen);
memcpy(wkr.key, key, keylen);
memcpy(wkr.mac, macaddr, ETH_ALEN);
if (perm) disable_MAC(ai, lock);
rc = writeWepKeyRid(ai, &wkr, perm, lock);
if (perm) enable_MAC(ai, lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bsg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct bsg_device *bd;
bd = bsg_get_device(inode, file);
if (IS_ERR(bd))
return PTR_ERR(bd);
file->private_data = bd;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *shmem_get_parent(struct dentry *child)
{
return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnDescriptorReadValueSuccess(
RemoteDescriptorReadValueCallback callback,
const std::vector<uint8_t>& value) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RecordDescriptorReadValueOutcome(UMAGATTOperationOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS, value);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double filter_bspline(const double x)
{
if (x>2.0f) {
return 0.0f;
} else {
double a, b, c, d;
/* Was calculated anyway cause the "if((x-1.0f) < 0)" */
const double xm1 = x - 1.0f;
const double xp1 = x + 1.0f;
const double xp2 = x + 2.0f;
if ((xp2) <= 0.0f) a = 0.0f; else a = xp2*xp2*xp2;
if ((xp1) <= 0.0f) b = 0.0f; else b = xp1*xp1*xp1;
if (x <= 0) c = 0.0f; else c = x*x*x;
if ((xm1) <= 0.0f) d = 0.0f; else d = xm1*xm1*xm1;
return (0.16666666666666666667f * (a - (4.0f * b) + (6.0f * c) - (4.0f * d)));
}
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_file_permissions_aux(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, char *fname, uint flen)
{ /* i_ctx_p is NULL running init files. */
/* fname must be reduced. */
if (i_ctx_p == NULL)
return 0;
if (check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_p, fname, flen, "PermitFileReading") < 0)
return_error(gs_error_invalidfileaccess);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usbnet_write_cmd_async(struct usbnet *dev, u8 cmd, u8 reqtype,
u16 value, u16 index, const void *data, u16 size)
{
struct usb_ctrlrequest *req = NULL;
struct urb *urb;
int err = -ENOMEM;
void *buf = NULL;
netdev_dbg(dev->net, "usbnet_write_cmd cmd=0x%02x reqtype=%02x"
" value=0x%04x index=0x%04x size=%d\n",
cmd, reqtype, value, index, size);
urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!urb) {
netdev_err(dev->net, "Error allocating URB in"
" %s!\n", __func__);
goto fail;
}
if (data) {
buf = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!buf) {
netdev_err(dev->net, "Error allocating buffer"
" in %s!\n", __func__);
goto fail_free;
}
}
req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct usb_ctrlrequest), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!req)
goto fail_free_buf;
req->bRequestType = reqtype;
req->bRequest = cmd;
req->wValue = cpu_to_le16(value);
req->wIndex = cpu_to_le16(index);
req->wLength = cpu_to_le16(size);
usb_fill_control_urb(urb, dev->udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(dev->udev, 0),
(void *)req, buf, size,
usbnet_async_cmd_cb, req);
urb->transfer_flags |= URB_FREE_BUFFER;
err = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (err < 0) {
netdev_err(dev->net, "Error submitting the control"
" message: status=%d\n", err);
goto fail_free;
}
return 0;
fail_free_buf:
kfree(buf);
fail_free:
kfree(req);
usb_free_urb(urb);
fail:
return err;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 94,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: folder_uncompressed_size(struct _7z_folder *f)
{
int n = (int)f->numOutStreams;
unsigned pairs = (unsigned)f->numBindPairs;
while (--n >= 0) {
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < pairs; i++) {
if (f->bindPairs[i].outIndex == (uint64_t)n)
break;
}
if (i >= pairs)
return (f->unPackSize[n]);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 53,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_FLIPOFF( INS_ARG )
{ (void)args;
CUR.GS.auto_flip = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init devinet_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < IN4_ADDR_HSIZE; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&inet_addr_lst[i]);
register_pernet_subsys(&devinet_ops);
register_gifconf(PF_INET, inet_gifconf);
register_netdevice_notifier(&ip_netdev_notifier);
queue_delayed_work(system_power_efficient_wq, &check_lifetime_work, 0);
rtnl_af_register(&inet_af_ops);
rtnl_register(PF_INET, RTM_NEWADDR, inet_rtm_newaddr, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_INET, RTM_DELADDR, inet_rtm_deladdr, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_INET, RTM_GETADDR, NULL, inet_dump_ifaddr, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_INET, RTM_GETNETCONF, inet_netconf_get_devconf,
inet_netconf_dump_devconf, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: grub_fshelp_read_file (grub_disk_t disk, grub_fshelp_node_t node,
void (*read_hook) (grub_disk_addr_t sector,
unsigned offset,
unsigned length,
void *closure),
void *closure, int flags,
grub_off_t pos, grub_size_t len, char *buf,
grub_disk_addr_t (*get_block) (grub_fshelp_node_t node,
grub_disk_addr_t block),
grub_off_t filesize, int log2blocksize)
{
grub_disk_addr_t i, blockcnt;
int blocksize = 1 << (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
/* Adjust LEN so it we can't read past the end of the file. */
if (pos + len > filesize)
len = filesize - pos;
blockcnt = ((len + pos) + blocksize - 1) >>
(log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS);
for (i = pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); i < blockcnt; i++)
{
grub_disk_addr_t blknr;
int blockoff = pos & (blocksize - 1);
int blockend = blocksize;
int skipfirst = 0;
blknr = get_block (node, i);
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
blknr = blknr << log2blocksize;
/* Last block. */
if (i == blockcnt - 1)
{
blockend = (len + pos) & (blocksize - 1);
/* The last portion is exactly blocksize. */
if (! blockend)
blockend = blocksize;
}
/* First block. */
if (i == (pos >> (log2blocksize + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS)))
{
skipfirst = blockoff;
blockend -= skipfirst;
}
/* If the block number is 0 this block is not stored on disk but
is zero filled instead. */
if (blknr)
{
disk->read_hook = read_hook;
disk->closure = closure;
grub_hack_lastoff = blknr * 512;
grub_disk_read_ex (disk, blknr, skipfirst, blockend, buf, flags);
disk->read_hook = 0;
if (grub_errno)
return -1;
}
else if (buf)
grub_memset (buf, 0, blockend);
if (buf)
buf += blocksize - skipfirst;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 168,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: assoc_array_walk(const struct assoc_array *array,
const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
const void *index_key,
struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
{
struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut;
struct assoc_array_node *node;
struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr;
unsigned long sc_segments, dissimilarity;
unsigned long segments;
int level, sc_level, next_sc_level;
int slot;
pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(array->root);
if (!cursor)
return assoc_array_walk_tree_empty;
level = 0;
/* Use segments from the key for the new leaf to navigate through the
* internal tree, skipping through nodes and shortcuts that are on
* route to the destination. Eventually we'll come to a slot that is
* either empty or contains a leaf at which point we've found a node in
* which the leaf we're looking for might be found or into which it
* should be inserted.
*/
jumped:
segments = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
pr_devel("segments[%d]: %lx\n", level, segments);
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(cursor))
goto follow_shortcut;
consider_node:
node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(cursor);
smp_read_barrier_depends();
slot = segments >> (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
slot &= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
ptr = ACCESS_ONCE(node->slots[slot]);
pr_devel("consider slot %x [ix=%d type=%lu]\n",
slot, level, (unsigned long)ptr & 3);
if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
/* The node doesn't have a node/shortcut pointer in the slot
* corresponding to the index key that we have to follow.
*/
result->terminal_node.node = node;
result->terminal_node.level = level;
result->terminal_node.slot = slot;
pr_devel("<--%s() = terminal_node\n", __func__);
return assoc_array_walk_found_terminal_node;
}
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
/* There is a pointer to a node in the slot corresponding to
* this index key segment, so we need to follow it.
*/
cursor = ptr;
level += ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
if ((level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) != 0)
goto consider_node;
goto jumped;
}
/* There is a shortcut in the slot corresponding to the index key
* segment. We follow the shortcut if its partial index key matches
* this leaf's. Otherwise we need to split the shortcut.
*/
cursor = ptr;
follow_shortcut:
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(cursor);
smp_read_barrier_depends();
pr_devel("shortcut to %d\n", shortcut->skip_to_level);
sc_level = level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP;
BUG_ON(sc_level > shortcut->skip_to_level);
do {
/* Check the leaf against the shortcut's index key a word at a
* time, trimming the final word (the shortcut stores the index
* key completely from the root to the shortcut's target).
*/
if ((sc_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) == 0)
segments = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, sc_level);
sc_segments = shortcut->index_key[sc_level >> ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT];
dissimilarity = segments ^ sc_segments;
if (round_up(sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE) > shortcut->skip_to_level) {
/* Trim segments that are beyond the shortcut */
int shift = shortcut->skip_to_level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
dissimilarity &= ~(ULONG_MAX << shift);
next_sc_level = shortcut->skip_to_level;
} else {
next_sc_level = sc_level + ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE;
next_sc_level = round_down(next_sc_level, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
}
if (dissimilarity != 0) {
/* This shortcut points elsewhere */
result->wrong_shortcut.shortcut = shortcut;
result->wrong_shortcut.level = level;
result->wrong_shortcut.sc_level = sc_level;
result->wrong_shortcut.sc_segments = sc_segments;
result->wrong_shortcut.dissimilarity = dissimilarity;
return assoc_array_walk_found_wrong_shortcut;
}
sc_level = next_sc_level;
} while (sc_level < shortcut->skip_to_level);
/* The shortcut matches the leaf's index to this point. */
cursor = ACCESS_ONCE(shortcut->next_node);
if (((level ^ sc_level) & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) != 0) {
level = sc_level;
goto jumped;
} else {
level = sc_level;
goto consider_node;
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix termination condition in assoc array garbage collection
This fixes CVE-2014-3631.
It is possible for an associative array to end up with a shortcut node at the
root of the tree if there are more than fan-out leaves in the tree, but they
all crowd into the same slot in the lowest level (ie. they all have the same
first nibble of their index keys).
When assoc_array_gc() returns back up the tree after scanning some leaves, it
can fall off of the root and crash because it assumes that the back pointer
from a shortcut (after label ascend_old_tree) must point to a normal node -
which isn't true of a shortcut node at the root.
Should we find we're ascending rootwards over a shortcut, we should check to
see if the backpointer is zero - and if it is, we have completed the scan.
This particular bug cannot occur if the root node is not a shortcut - ie. if
you have fewer than 17 keys in a keyring or if you have at least two keys that
sit into separate slots (eg. a keyring and a non keyring).
This can be reproduced by:
ring=`keyctl newring bar @s`
for ((i=1; i<=18; i++)); do last_key=`keyctl newring foo$i $ring`; done
keyctl timeout $last_key 2
Doing this:
echo 3 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay
first will speed things up.
If we do fall off of the top of the tree, we get the following oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
IP: [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
PGD dae15067 PUD cfc24067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: xt_nat xt_mark nf_conntrack_netbios_ns nf_conntrack_broadcast ip6t_rpfilter ip6t_REJECT xt_conntrack ebtable_nat ebtable_broute bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_ni
CPU: 0 PID: 26011 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.14.9-200.fc20.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8800918bd580 ti: ffff8800aac14000 task.ti: ffff8800aac14000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8136cea7>] [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP: 0018:ffff8800aac15d40 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8800aaecacc0
RDX: ffff8800daecf440 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff8800aadc2bc0
RBP: ffff8800aac15da8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: ffffffff8136ccc7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000070 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88011fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 00000000db10d000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Stack:
ffff8800aac15d50 0000000000000011 ffff8800aac15db8 ffffffff812e2a70
ffff880091a00600 0000000000000000 ffff8800aadc2bc3 00000000cd42c987
ffff88003702df20 ffff88003702dfa0 0000000053b65c09 ffff8800aac15fd8
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff812e2a70>] ? keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0x30/0x30
[<ffffffff812e3e75>] keyring_gc+0x75/0x80
[<ffffffff812e1424>] key_garbage_collector+0x154/0x3c0
[<ffffffff810a67b6>] process_one_work+0x176/0x430
[<ffffffff810a744b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x3a0
[<ffffffff810a7330>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3b0/0x3b0
[<ffffffff810ae1a8>] kthread+0xd8/0xf0
[<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff816ffb7c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff810ae0d0>] ? insert_kthread_work+0x40/0x40
Code: 08 4c 8b 22 0f 84 bf 00 00 00 41 83 c7 01 49 83 e4 fc 41 83 ff 0f 4c 89 65 c0 0f 8f 5a fe ff ff 48 8b 45 c0 4d 63 cf 49 83 c1 02 <4e> 8b 34 c8 4d 85 f6 0f 84 be 00 00 00 41 f6 c6 01 0f 84 92
RIP [<ffffffff8136cea7>] assoc_array_gc+0x2f7/0x540
RSP <ffff8800aac15d40>
CR2: 0000000000000018
---[ end trace 1129028a088c0cbd ]---
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 37,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_free_pit(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct hrtimer *timer;
if (kvm->arch.vpit) {
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS, &kvm->arch.vpit->dev);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&kvm->arch.vpit->speaker_dev);
kvm_unregister_irq_mask_notifier(kvm, 0,
&kvm->arch.vpit->mask_notifier);
kvm_unregister_irq_ack_notifier(kvm,
&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.irq_ack_notifier);
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
timer = &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.timer;
hrtimer_cancel(timer);
flush_kthread_work(&kvm->arch.vpit->expired);
kthread_stop(kvm->arch.vpit->worker_task);
kvm_free_irq_source_id(kvm, kvm->arch.vpit->irq_source_id);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
kfree(kvm->arch.vpit);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 37,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct vrend_linked_shader_program *add_shader_program(struct vrend_context *ctx,
struct vrend_shader *vs,
struct vrend_shader *fs,
struct vrend_shader *gs)
{
struct vrend_linked_shader_program *sprog = CALLOC_STRUCT(vrend_linked_shader_program);
char name[16];
int i;
GLuint prog_id;
GLint lret;
int id;
int last_shader;
if (!sprog)
return NULL;
/* need to rewrite VS code to add interpolation params */
if ((gs && gs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id) ||
(!gs && vs->compiled_fs_id != fs->id)) {
bool ret;
if (gs)
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(gs->glsl_prog,
&gs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, true, fs->key.flatshade);
else
vrend_patch_vertex_shader_interpolants(vs->glsl_prog,
&vs->sel->sinfo,
&fs->sel->sinfo, false, fs->key.flatshade);
ret = vrend_compile_shader(ctx, gs ? gs : vs);
if (ret == false) {
glDeleteShader(gs ? gs->id : vs->id);
free(sprog);
return NULL;
}
if (gs)
gs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
else
vs->compiled_fs_id = fs->id;
}
prog_id = glCreateProgram();
glAttachShader(prog_id, vs->id);
if (gs) {
if (gs->id > 0)
glAttachShader(prog_id, gs->id);
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &gs->sel->sinfo);
}
else
set_stream_out_varyings(prog_id, &vs->sel->sinfo);
glAttachShader(prog_id, fs->id);
if (fs->sel->sinfo.num_outputs > 1) {
if (util_blend_state_is_dual(&ctx->sub->blend_state, 0)) {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 1, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = true;
} else {
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 0, 0, "fsout_c0");
glBindFragDataLocationIndexed(prog_id, 1, 0, "fsout_c1");
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
}
} else
sprog->dual_src_linked = false;
if (vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
uint32_t mask = vs->sel->sinfo.attrib_input_mask;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
glBindAttribLocation(prog_id, i, name);
}
}
glLinkProgram(prog_id);
glGetProgramiv(prog_id, GL_LINK_STATUS, &lret);
if (lret == GL_FALSE) {
char infolog[65536];
int len;
glGetProgramInfoLog(prog_id, 65536, &len, infolog);
fprintf(stderr,"got error linking\n%s\n", infolog);
/* dump shaders */
report_context_error(ctx, VIRGL_ERROR_CTX_ILLEGAL_SHADER, 0);
fprintf(stderr,"vert shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", vs->id, vs->glsl_prog);
if (gs)
fprintf(stderr,"geom shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", gs->id, gs->glsl_prog);
fprintf(stderr,"frag shader: %d GLSL\n%s\n", fs->id, fs->glsl_prog);
glDeleteProgram(prog_id);
return NULL;
}
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT] = fs;
sprog->ss[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY] = gs;
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX], &vs->programs);
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT], &fs->programs);
if (gs)
list_add(&sprog->sl[PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY], &gs->programs);
last_shader = gs ? PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY : PIPE_SHADER_FRAGMENT;
sprog->id = prog_id;
list_addtail(&sprog->head, &ctx->sub->programs);
if (fs->key.pstipple_tex)
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "pstipple_sampler");
else
sprog->fs_stipple_loc = -1;
sprog->vs_ws_adjust_loc = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, "winsys_adjust");
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask) {
uint32_t mask = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
int nsamp = util_bitcount(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask);
int index;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask;
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask) {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
} else {
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
}
sprog->samp_locs[id] = calloc(nsamp, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->samp_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
index = 0;
while(mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
snprintf(name, 10, "%ssamp%d", prefix, i);
sprog->samp_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.shadow_samp_mask & (1 << i)) {
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadmask%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
snprintf(name, 14, "%sshadadd%d", prefix, i);
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id][index] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
index++;
}
}
} else {
sprog->samp_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_add_locs[id] = NULL;
sprog->shadow_samp_mask[id] = 0;
}
sprog->samplers_used_mask[id] = sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.samplers_used_mask;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts) {
sprog->const_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->const_locs[id]) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_consts; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%sconst0[%d]", prefix, i);
sprog->const_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->const_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (!vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding) {
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs) {
sprog->attrib_locs = calloc(vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs, sizeof(uint32_t));
if (sprog->attrib_locs) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_inputs; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "in_%d", i);
sprog->attrib_locs[i] = glGetAttribLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
} else
sprog->attrib_locs = NULL;
}
for (id = PIPE_SHADER_VERTEX; id <= last_shader; id++) {
if (sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos) {
const char *prefix = pipe_shader_to_prefix(id);
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = calloc(sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos, sizeof(uint32_t));
for (i = 0; i < sprog->ss[id]->sel->sinfo.num_ubos; i++) {
snprintf(name, 16, "%subo%d", prefix, i + 1);
sprog->ubo_locs[id][i] = glGetUniformBlockIndex(prog_id, name);
}
} else
sprog->ubo_locs[id] = NULL;
}
if (vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp) {
for (i = 0; i < vs->sel->sinfo.num_ucp; i++) {
snprintf(name, 10, "clipp[%d]", i);
sprog->clip_locs[i] = glGetUniformLocation(prog_id, name);
}
}
return sprog;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 1 | 164,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
if (kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0) != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return;
}
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err adkm_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox *)a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->header) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->header, trace);
if (ptr->au_format) gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box *)ptr->au_format, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AdobeDRMKeyManagementSystemBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cdrom_dummy_generic_packet(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
if (cgc->sense) {
cgc->sense->sense_key = 0x05;
cgc->sense->asc = 0x20;
cgc->sense->ascq = 0x00;
}
cgc->stat = -EIO;
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: information leak in cdrom_ioctl_media_changed()
This cast is wrong. "cdi->capacity" is an int and "arg" is an unsigned
long. The way the check is written now, if one of the high 32 bits is
set then we could read outside the info->slots[] array.
This bug is pretty old and it predates git.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_t1_init_timer_expire(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *repl = NULL;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
int attempts = asoc->init_err_counter + 1;
pr_debug("%s: timer T1 expired (INIT)\n", __func__);
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_T1_INIT_EXPIREDS);
if (attempts <= asoc->max_init_attempts) {
bp = (struct sctp_bind_addr *) &asoc->base.bind_addr;
repl = sctp_make_init(asoc, bp, GFP_ATOMIC, 0);
if (!repl)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
/* Choose transport for INIT. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_CHOOSE_TRANSPORT,
SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
/* Issue a sideeffect to do the needed accounting. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_RESTART,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(repl));
} else {
pr_debug("%s: giving up on INIT, attempts:%d "
"max_init_attempts:%d\n", __func__, attempts,
asoc->max_init_attempts);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ETIMEDOUT));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_Rename( const char *from, const char *to ) {
char *from_ospath, *to_ospath;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
from_ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, from );
to_ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, to );
if ( fs_debug->integer ) {
Com_Printf( "FS_Rename: %s --> %s\n", from_ospath, to_ospath );
}
FS_CheckFilenameIsMutable( to_ospath, __func__ );
rename(from_ospath, to_ospath);
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
content::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, 0, client_id);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<DataReductionProxyServer> GetProxiesForHTTP(
const data_reduction_proxy::ProxyConfig& proxy_config) {
std::vector<DataReductionProxyServer> proxies;
for (const auto& server : proxy_config.http_proxy_servers()) {
if (server.scheme() != ProxyServer_ProxyScheme_UNSPECIFIED) {
proxies.push_back(DataReductionProxyServer(net::ProxyServer(
protobuf_parser::SchemeFromProxyScheme(server.scheme()),
net::HostPortPair(server.host(), server.port()),
/* HTTPS proxies are marked as trusted. */
server.scheme() == ProxyServer_ProxyScheme_HTTPS)));
}
}
return proxies;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcessUDPHeader(tTcpIpPacketParsingResult _res, PVOID pIpHeader, ULONG len, USHORT ipHeaderSize)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = _res;
ULONG udpDataStart = ipHeaderSize + sizeof(UDPHeader);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpIncomplete;
res.TcpUdp = ppresIsUDP;
res.XxpIpHeaderSize = udpDataStart;
if (len >= udpDataStart)
{
UDPHeader *pUdpHeader = (UDPHeader *)RtlOffsetToPointer(pIpHeader, ipHeaderSize);
USHORT datagramLength = swap_short(pUdpHeader->udp_length);
res.xxpStatus = ppresXxpKnown;
DPrintf(2, ("udp: len %d, datagramLength %d\n", len, datagramLength));
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 168,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _logLuvNop(LogLuvState* sp, uint8* op, tmsize_t n)
{
(void) sp; (void) op; (void) n;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BrotliResult WriteRingBuffer(size_t* available_out, uint8_t** next_out,
size_t* total_out, BrotliState* s) {
size_t pos = (s->pos > s->ringbuffer_size) ?
(size_t)s->ringbuffer_size : (size_t)(s->pos);
uint8_t* start = s->ringbuffer
+ (s->partial_pos_out & (size_t)s->ringbuffer_mask);
size_t partial_pos_rb =
(s->rb_roundtrips * (size_t)s->ringbuffer_size) + pos;
size_t to_write = (partial_pos_rb - s->partial_pos_out);
size_t num_written = *available_out;
if (num_written > to_write) {
num_written = to_write;
}
if (s->meta_block_remaining_len < 0) {
return BROTLI_FAILURE();
}
memcpy(*next_out, start, num_written);
*next_out += num_written;
*available_out -= num_written;
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(to_write);
BROTLI_LOG_UINT(num_written);
s->partial_pos_out += (size_t)num_written;
*total_out = s->partial_pos_out;
if (num_written < to_write) {
return BROTLI_RESULT_NEEDS_MORE_OUTPUT;
}
return BROTLI_RESULT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_cookie()
{
if (non_null(cookie_reject_domains))
Cookie_reject_domains = make_domain_list(cookie_reject_domains);
if (non_null(cookie_accept_domains))
Cookie_accept_domains = make_domain_list(cookie_accept_domains);
if (non_null(cookie_avoid_wrong_number_of_dots))
Cookie_avoid_wrong_number_of_dots_domains
= make_domain_list(cookie_avoid_wrong_number_of_dots);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManager::OnWindowDestroying(aura::Window* window) {
window_observer_.Remove(window);
chromeos::WallpaperWindowStateManager::RestoreWindows(
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetActiveUser()->username_hash());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 127,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int madvise_inject_error(int behavior,
unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
{
struct page *page;
struct zone *zone;
unsigned int order;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
for (; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE << order) {
int ret;
ret = get_user_pages_fast(start, 1, 0, &page);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/*
* When soft offlining hugepages, after migrating the page
* we dissolve it, therefore in the second loop "page" will
* no longer be a compound page, and order will be 0.
*/
order = compound_order(compound_head(page));
if (PageHWPoison(page)) {
put_page(page);
continue;
}
if (behavior == MADV_SOFT_OFFLINE) {
pr_info("Soft offlining pfn %#lx at process virtual address %#lx\n",
page_to_pfn(page), start);
ret = soft_offline_page(page, MF_COUNT_INCREASED);
if (ret)
return ret;
continue;
}
pr_info("Injecting memory failure for pfn %#lx at process virtual address %#lx\n",
page_to_pfn(page), start);
ret = memory_failure(page_to_pfn(page), 0, MF_COUNT_INCREASED);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/* Ensure that all poisoned pages are removed from per-cpu lists */
for_each_populated_zone(zone)
drain_all_pages(zone);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/madvise.c: fix madvise() infinite loop under special circumstances
MADVISE_WILLNEED has always been a noop for DAX (formerly XIP) mappings.
Unfortunately madvise_willneed() doesn't communicate this information
properly to the generic madvise syscall implementation. The calling
convention is quite subtle there. madvise_vma() is supposed to either
return an error or update &prev otherwise the main loop will never
advance to the next vma and it will keep looping for ever without a way
to get out of the kernel.
It seems this has been broken since introduction. Nobody has noticed
because nobody seems to be using MADVISE_WILLNEED on these DAX mappings.
[mhocko@suse.com: rewrite changelog]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127115318.911-1-guoxuenan@huawei.com
Fixes: fe77ba6f4f97 ("[PATCH] xip: madvice/fadvice: execute in place")
Signed-off-by: chenjie <chenjie6@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: guoxuenan <guoxuenan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: Miao Xie <miaoxie@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <khandual@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 85,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xps_encode_font_char_imp(xps_font_t *font, int code)
{
byte *table;
/* no cmap selected: return identity */
if (font->cmapsubtable <= 0)
return code;
table = font->data + font->cmapsubtable;
switch (u16(table))
{
case 0: /* Apple standard 1-to-1 mapping. */
return table[code + 6];
case 4: /* Microsoft/Adobe segmented mapping. */
{
int segCount2 = u16(table + 6);
byte *endCount = table + 14;
byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2;
byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2;
byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2;
int i2;
for (i2 = 0; i2 < segCount2 - 3; i2 += 2)
{
int delta, roff;
int start = u16(startCount + i2);
continue;
delta = s16(idDelta + i2);
roff = s16(idRangeOffset + i2);
if ( roff == 0 )
{
return ( code + delta ) & 0xffff; /* mod 65536 */
return 0;
}
if ( roff == 0 )
{
return ( code + delta ) & 0xffff; /* mod 65536 */
return 0;
}
glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((code - start) << 1));
return (glyph == 0 ? 0 : glyph + delta);
}
case 6: /* Single interval lookup. */
{
int firstCode = u16(table + 6);
int entryCount = u16(table + 8);
if ( code < firstCode || code >= firstCode + entryCount )
return 0;
return u16(table + 10 + ((code - firstCode) << 1));
}
case 10: /* Trimmed array (like 6) */
{
int startCharCode = u32(table + 12);
int numChars = u32(table + 16);
if ( code < startCharCode || code >= startCharCode + numChars )
return 0;
return u32(table + 20 + (code - startCharCode) * 4);
}
case 12: /* Segmented coverage. (like 4) */
{
int nGroups = u32(table + 12);
byte *group = table + 16;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nGroups; i++)
{
int startCharCode = u32(group + 0);
int endCharCode = u32(group + 4);
int startGlyphID = u32(group + 8);
if ( code < startCharCode )
return 0;
if ( code <= endCharCode )
return startGlyphID + (code - startCharCode);
group += 12;
}
return 0;
}
case 2: /* High-byte mapping through table. */
case 8: /* Mixed 16-bit and 32-bit coverage (like 2) */
default:
gs_warn1("unknown cmap format: %d\n", u16(table));
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Given a GID, reverse the CMAP subtable lookup to turn it back into a character code
* We need a Unicode return value, so we might need to do some fixed tables for
* certain kinds of CMAP subtables (ie non-Unicode ones). That would be a future enhancement
* if we ever encounter such a beast.
*/
static int
xps_decode_font_char_imp(xps_font_t *font, int code)
{
byte *table;
/* no cmap selected: return identity */
if (font->cmapsubtable <= 0)
return code;
table = font->data + font->cmapsubtable;
switch (u16(table))
{
case 0: /* Apple standard 1-to-1 mapping. */
{
int i, length = u16(&table[2]) - 6;
if (length < 0 || length > 256)
return gs_error_invalidfont;
for (i=0;i<length;i++) {
if (table[6 + i] == code)
return i;
}
}
return 0;
case 4: /* Microsoft/Adobe segmented mapping. */
{
int segCount2 = u16(table + 6);
byte *endCount = table + 14;
byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2;
byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2;
byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2;
int i2;
if (segCount2 < 3 || segCount2 > 65535)
return gs_error_invalidfont;
byte *startCount = endCount + segCount2 + 2;
byte *idDelta = startCount + segCount2;
byte *idRangeOffset = idDelta + segCount2;
int i2;
if (segCount2 < 3 || segCount2 > 65535)
return gs_error_invalidfont;
for (i2 = 0; i2 < segCount2 - 3; i2 += 2)
if (roff == 0) {
glyph = (i + delta) & 0xffff;
} else {
glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((i - start) << 1));
}
if (glyph == code) {
return i;
}
}
}
if (roff == 0) {
glyph = (i + delta) & 0xffff;
} else {
glyph = u16(idRangeOffset + i2 + roff + ((i - start) << 1));
}
if (glyph == code) {
return i;
ch = u16(&table[10 + (i * 2)]);
if (ch == code)
return (firstCode + i);
}
}
return 0;
case 10: /* Trimmed array (like 6) */
{
unsigned int ch, i, length = u32(&table[20]);
int firstCode = u32(&table[16]);
for (i=0;i<length;i++) {
ch = u16(&table[10 + (i * 2)]);
if (ch == code)
return (firstCode + i);
}
}
return 0;
case 12: /* Segmented coverage. (like 4) */
{
unsigned int nGroups = u32(&table[12]);
int Group;
for (Group=0;Group<nGroups;Group++)
{
int startCharCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12)]);
int endCharCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12) + 4]);
int startGlyphCode = u32(&table[16 + (Group * 12) + 8]);
if (code >= startGlyphCode && code <= (startGlyphCode + (endCharCode - startCharCode))) {
return startGlyphCode + (code - startCharCode);
}
}
}
return 0;
case 2: /* High-byte mapping through table. */
case 8: /* Mixed 16-bit and 32-bit coverage (like 2) */
default:
gs_warn1("unknown cmap format: %d\n", u16(table));
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 164,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_check_space(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK)) {
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_QUEUE_SHRUNK);
/* pairs with tcp_poll() */
smp_mb__after_atomic();
if (sk->sk_socket &&
test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags))
tcp_new_space(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: daemon_AuthUserPwd(char *username, char *password, char *errbuf)
{
#ifdef _WIN32
/*
* Warning: the user which launches the process must have the
* SE_TCB_NAME right.
* This corresponds to have the "Act as part of the Operating System"
* turned on (administrative tools, local security settings, local
* policies, user right assignment)
* However, it seems to me that if you run it as a service, this
* right should be provided by default.
*
* XXX - hopefully, this returns errors such as ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE,
* which merely indicates that the user name or password is
* incorrect, not whether it's the user name or the password
* that's incorrect, so a client that's trying to brute-force
* accounts doesn't know whether it's the user name or the
* password that's incorrect, so it doesn't know whether to
* stop trying to log in with a given user name and move on
* to another user name.
*/
HANDLE Token;
if (LogonUser(username, ".", password, LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK, LOGON32_PROVIDER_DEFAULT, &Token) == 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "LogonUser() failed");
return -1;
}
if (ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(Token) == 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_win32_err(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
GetLastError(), "ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() failed");
CloseHandle(Token);
return -1;
}
CloseHandle(Token);
return 0;
#else
/*
* See
*
* http://www.unixpapa.com/incnote/passwd.html
*
* We use the Solaris/Linux shadow password authentication if
* we have getspnam(), otherwise we just do traditional
* authentication, which, on some platforms, might work, even
* with shadow passwords, if we're running as root. Traditional
* authenticaion won't work if we're not running as root, as
* I think these days all UN*Xes either won't return the password
* at all with getpwnam() or will only do so if you're root.
*
* XXX - perhaps what we *should* be using is PAM, if we have
* it. That might hide all the details of username/password
* authentication, whether it's done with a visible-to-root-
* only password database or some other authentication mechanism,
* behind its API.
*/
struct passwd *user;
char *user_password;
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
struct spwd *usersp;
#endif
char *crypt_password;
if ((user = getpwnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_GETSPNAM
if ((usersp = getspnam(username)) == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
user_password = usersp->sp_pwdp;
#else
/*
* XXX - what about other platforms?
* The unixpapa.com page claims this Just Works on *BSD if you're
* running as root - it's from 2000, so it doesn't indicate whether
* macOS (which didn't come out until 2001, under the name Mac OS
* X) behaves like the *BSDs or not, and might also work on AIX.
* HP-UX does something else.
*
* Again, hopefully PAM hides all that.
*/
user_password = user->pw_passwd;
#endif
crypt_password = crypt(password, user_password);
if (crypt_password == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed");
return -1;
}
if (strcmp(user_password, crypt_password) != 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Authentication failed: user name or password incorrect");
return -1;
}
if (setuid(user->pw_uid))
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setuid");
return -1;
}
/* if (setgid(user->pw_gid))
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "setgid");
return -1;
}
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: On UN*X, don't tell the client why authentication failed.
"no such user" tells the client that the user ID isn't valid and,
therefore, that it needn't bother trying to do password cracking for
that user ID; just saying that the authentication failed dosn't give
them that hint.
This resolves the third problem in Include Security issue F11: [libpcap]
Remote Packet Capture Daemon Multiple Authentication Improvements.
The Windows LogonUser() API returns ERROR_LOGON_FAILURE for both cases,
so the Windows code doesn't have this issue. Just return the same
"Authentication failed" message on Windows to the user.
For various authentication failures *other* than "no such user" and
"password not valid", log a message, as there's a problem that may need
debugging. We don't need to tell the end user what the problem is, as
they may not bother reporting it and, even if they do, they may not give
the full error message.
CWE ID: CWE-345 | 1 | 169,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static qboolean Sys_WritePIDFile( const char *gamedir )
{
char *pidFile = Sys_PIDFileName( gamedir );
FILE *f;
qboolean stale = qfalse;
if( pidFile == NULL )
return qfalse;
if( ( f = fopen( pidFile, "r" ) ) != NULL )
{
char pidBuffer[ 64 ] = { 0 };
int pid;
pid = fread( pidBuffer, sizeof( char ), sizeof( pidBuffer ) - 1, f );
fclose( f );
if(pid > 0)
{
pid = atoi( pidBuffer );
if( !Sys_PIDIsRunning( pid ) )
stale = qtrue;
}
else
stale = qtrue;
}
if( FS_CreatePath( pidFile ) ) {
return 0;
}
if( ( f = fopen( pidFile, "w" ) ) != NULL )
{
fprintf( f, "%d", Sys_PID( ) );
fclose( f );
}
else
Com_Printf( S_COLOR_YELLOW "Couldn't write %s.\n", pidFile );
return stale;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ospf6_print_lshdr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp, const u_char *dataend)
{
if ((const u_char *)(lshp + 1) > dataend)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_type);
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s, seq 0x%08x, age %us, length %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lshp->ls_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lshp->ls_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_age),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_length)-(u_int)sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_type), &lshp->ls_stateid);
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13036/OSPFv3: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DOMHandler::Wire(UberDispatcher* dispatcher) {
DOM::Dispatcher::wire(dispatcher, this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IsPinnedToTaskbarHelper::IsPinnedToTaskbarHelper(
std::unique_ptr<service_manager::Connector> connector,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback,
const ResultCallback& result_callback)
: connector_(std::move(connector)),
error_callback_(error_callback),
result_callback_(result_callback) {
DCHECK(error_callback_);
DCHECK(result_callback_);
connector_->BindInterface(chrome::mojom::kUtilWinServiceName,
&shell_util_win_ptr_);
shell_util_win_ptr_.set_connection_error_handler(base::Bind(
&IsPinnedToTaskbarHelper::OnConnectionError, base::Unretained(this)));
shell_util_win_ptr_->IsPinnedToTaskbar(
base::Bind(&IsPinnedToTaskbarHelper::OnIsPinnedToTaskbarResult,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Comment* Document::createComment(const String& data) {
return Comment::Create(*this, data);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_set_shadow_time(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_event_context *ctx,
u64 tstamp)
{
/*
* use the correct time source for the time snapshot
*
* We could get by without this by leveraging the
* fact that to get to this function, the caller
* has most likely already called update_context_time()
* and update_cgrp_time_xx() and thus both timestamp
* are identical (or very close). Given that tstamp is,
* already adjusted for cgroup, we could say that:
* tstamp - ctx->timestamp
* is equivalent to
* tstamp - cgrp->timestamp.
*
* Then, in perf_output_read(), the calculation would
* work with no changes because:
* - event is guaranteed scheduled in
* - no scheduled out in between
* - thus the timestamp would be the same
*
* But this is a bit hairy.
*
* So instead, we have an explicit cgroup call to remain
* within the time time source all along. We believe it
* is cleaner and simpler to understand.
*/
if (is_cgroup_event(event))
perf_cgroup_set_shadow_time(event, tstamp);
else
event->shadow_ctx_time = tstamp - ctx->timestamp;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect PaintLayerScrollableArea::RectForHorizontalScrollbar(
const IntRect& border_box_rect) const {
if (!HasHorizontalScrollbar())
return IntRect();
const IntRect& scroll_corner = ScrollCornerRect();
return IntRect(
HorizontalScrollbarStart(border_box_rect.X()),
border_box_rect.MaxY() - GetLayoutBox()->BorderBottom().ToInt() -
HorizontalScrollbar()->ScrollbarThickness(),
border_box_rect.Width() -
(GetLayoutBox()->BorderLeft() + GetLayoutBox()->BorderRight())
.ToInt() -
scroll_corner.Width(),
HorizontalScrollbar()->ScrollbarThickness());
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zval **php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr(zval *object, zval *member, int type, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *obj;
zval tmp_member;
zval **retval = NULL;
zip_prop_handler *hnd;
zend_object_handlers *std_hnd;
int ret;
if (member->type != IS_STRING) {
tmp_member = *member;
zval_copy_ctor(&tmp_member);
convert_to_string(&tmp_member);
member = &tmp_member;
key = NULL;
}
ret = FAILURE;
obj = (ze_zip_object *)zend_objects_get_address(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (obj->prop_handler != NULL) {
if (key) {
ret = zend_hash_quick_find(obj->prop_handler, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member)+1, key->hash_value, (void **) &hnd);
} else {
ret = zend_hash_find(obj->prop_handler, Z_STRVAL_P(member), Z_STRLEN_P(member)+1, (void **) &hnd);
}
}
if (ret == FAILURE) {
std_hnd = zend_get_std_object_handlers();
retval = std_hnd->get_property_ptr_ptr(object, member, type, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (member == &tmp_member) {
zval_dtor(member);
}
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_funcall(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self, const char *name, mrb_int argc, ...)
{
mrb_value argv[MRB_FUNCALL_ARGC_MAX];
va_list ap;
mrb_int i;
mrb_sym mid = mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, name);
if (argc > MRB_FUNCALL_ARGC_MAX) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_ARGUMENT_ERROR, "Too long arguments. (limit=" MRB_STRINGIZE(MRB_FUNCALL_ARGC_MAX) ")");
}
va_start(ap, argc);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
argv[i] = va_arg(ap, mrb_value);
}
va_end(ap);
return mrb_funcall_argv(mrb, self, mid, argc, argv);
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void stringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setStringAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: brand ()
{
/* From "Random number generators: good ones are hard to find",
Park and Miller, Communications of the ACM, vol. 31, no. 10,
October 1988, p. 1195. filtered through FreeBSD */
long h, l;
/* Can't seed with 0. */
if (rseed == 0)
rseed = 123459876;
h = rseed / 127773;
l = rseed % 127773;
rseed = 16807 * l - 2836 * h;
#if 0
if (rseed < 0)
rseed += 0x7fffffff;
#endif
return ((unsigned int)(rseed & 32767)); /* was % 32768 */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct discard_cmd *__create_discard_cmd(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct block_device *bdev, block_t lstart,
block_t start, block_t len)
{
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
struct list_head *pend_list;
struct discard_cmd *dc;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !len);
pend_list = &dcc->pend_list[plist_idx(len)];
dc = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(discard_cmd_slab, GFP_NOFS);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dc->list);
dc->bdev = bdev;
dc->lstart = lstart;
dc->start = start;
dc->len = len;
dc->ref = 0;
dc->state = D_PREP;
dc->error = 0;
init_completion(&dc->wait);
list_add_tail(&dc->list, pend_list);
atomic_inc(&dcc->discard_cmd_cnt);
dcc->undiscard_blks += len;
return dc;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void irc_core_init(void)
{
CHAT_PROTOCOL_REC *rec;
rec = g_new0(CHAT_PROTOCOL_REC, 1);
rec->name = "IRC";
rec->fullname = "Internet Relay Chat";
rec->chatnet = "ircnet";
rec->case_insensitive = TRUE;
rec->create_chatnet = create_chatnet;
rec->create_server_setup = create_server_setup;
rec->create_channel_setup = create_channel_setup;
rec->create_server_connect = create_server_connect;
rec->destroy_server_connect = destroy_server_connect;
rec->server_init_connect = irc_server_init_connect;
rec->server_connect = irc_server_connect;
rec->channel_create =
(CHANNEL_REC *(*) (SERVER_REC *, const char *,
const char *, int))
irc_channel_create;
rec->query_create =
(QUERY_REC *(*) (const char *, const char *, int))
irc_query_create;
chat_protocol_register(rec);
g_free(rec);
irc_session_init();
irc_chatnets_init();
irc_servers_init();
irc_channels_init();
irc_queries_init();
ctcp_init();
irc_commands_init();
irc_irc_init();
lag_init();
netsplit_init();
irc_expandos_init();
irc_cap_init();
sasl_init();
settings_check();
module_register("core", "irc");
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ID3::removeUnsynchronizationV2_4(bool iTunesHack) {
size_t oldSize = mSize;
size_t offset = 0;
while (mSize >= 10 && offset <= mSize - 10) {
if (!memcmp(&mData[offset], "\0\0\0\0", 4)) {
break;
}
size_t dataSize;
if (iTunesHack) {
dataSize = U32_AT(&mData[offset + 4]);
} else if (!ParseSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], &dataSize)) {
return false;
}
if (dataSize > mSize - 10 - offset) {
return false;
}
uint16_t flags = U16_AT(&mData[offset + 8]);
uint16_t prevFlags = flags;
if (flags & 1) {
if (mSize < 14 || mSize - 14 < offset || dataSize < 4) {
return false;
}
memmove(&mData[offset + 10], &mData[offset + 14], mSize - offset - 14);
mSize -= 4;
dataSize -= 4;
flags &= ~1;
}
if (flags & 2) {
size_t readOffset = offset + 11;
size_t writeOffset = offset + 11;
for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < dataSize; ++i) {
if (mData[readOffset - 1] == 0xff
&& mData[readOffset] == 0x00) {
++readOffset;
--mSize;
--dataSize;
}
mData[writeOffset++] = mData[readOffset++];
}
memmove(&mData[writeOffset], &mData[readOffset], oldSize - readOffset);
flags &= ~2;
}
if (flags != prevFlags || iTunesHack) {
WriteSyncsafeInteger(&mData[offset + 4], dataSize);
mData[offset + 8] = flags >> 8;
mData[offset + 9] = flags & 0xff;
}
offset += 10 + dataSize;
}
memset(&mData[mSize], 0, oldSize - mSize);
return true;
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 157,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_KillTimer(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param, int timer_id) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
engine->formfill_timers_.erase(timer_id);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdpdr_handle_ok(uint32 device, RD_NTHANDLE handle)
{
switch (g_rdpdr_device[device].device_type)
{
case DEVICE_TYPE_PARALLEL:
case DEVICE_TYPE_SERIAL:
case DEVICE_TYPE_PRINTER:
case DEVICE_TYPE_SCARD:
if (g_rdpdr_device[device].handle != handle)
return False;
break;
case DEVICE_TYPE_DISK:
if (g_fileinfo[handle].device_id != device)
return False;
break;
}
return True;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void opj_applyLUT8u_8u32s_C1P3R(
OPJ_UINT8 const* pSrc, OPJ_INT32 srcStride,
OPJ_INT32* const* pDst, OPJ_INT32 const* pDstStride,
OPJ_UINT8 const* const* pLUT,
OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 y;
OPJ_INT32* pR = pDst[0];
OPJ_INT32* pG = pDst[1];
OPJ_INT32* pB = pDst[2];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_R = pLUT[0];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_G = pLUT[1];
OPJ_UINT8 const* pLUT_B = pLUT[2];
for (y = height; y != 0U; --y) {
OPJ_UINT32 x;
for(x = 0; x < width; x++)
{
OPJ_UINT8 idx = pSrc[x];
pR[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_R[idx];
pG[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_G[idx];
pB[x] = (OPJ_INT32)pLUT_B[idx];
}
pSrc += srcStride;
pR += pDstStride[0];
pG += pDstStride[1];
pB += pDstStride[2];
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #834 from trylab/issue833
Fix issue 833.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TCStopThread (PKTHREAD kThread, PKEVENT wakeUpEvent)
{
if (wakeUpEvent)
KeSetEvent (wakeUpEvent, 0, FALSE);
KeWaitForSingleObject (kThread, Executive, KernelMode, FALSE, NULL);
ObDereferenceObject (kThread);
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sock_update_netprioidx(struct sock *sk)
{
if (in_interrupt())
return;
sk->sk_cgrp_prioidx = task_netprioidx(current);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int AdjustTree(
Rtree *pRtree, /* Rtree table */
RtreeNode *pNode, /* Adjust ancestry of this node. */
RtreeCell *pCell /* This cell was just inserted */
){
RtreeNode *p = pNode;
while( p->pParent ){
RtreeNode *pParent = p->pParent;
RtreeCell cell;
int iCell;
if( nodeParentIndex(pRtree, p, &iCell) ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_VTAB;
}
nodeGetCell(pRtree, pParent, iCell, &cell);
if( !cellContains(pRtree, &cell, pCell) ){
cellUnion(pRtree, &cell, pCell);
nodeOverwriteCell(pRtree, pParent, &cell, iCell);
}
p = pParent;
}
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::BeginNavigation(
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
mojom::BeginNavigationParamsPtr begin_params,
blink::mojom::BlobURLTokenPtr blob_url_token,
mojom::NavigationClientAssociatedPtrInfo navigation_client,
blink::mojom::NavigationInitiatorPtr navigation_initiator) {
if (is_attaching_inner_delegate_) {
return;
}
if (!is_active())
return;
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::BeginNavigation",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), "url",
common_params.url.possibly_invalid_spec());
DCHECK(IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled() == navigation_client.is_valid());
CommonNavigationParams validated_params = common_params;
GetProcess()->FilterURL(false, &validated_params.url);
if (!validated_params.base_url_for_data_url.is_empty()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
GetProcess(), bad_message::RFH_BASE_URL_FOR_DATA_URL_SPECIFIED);
return;
}
GetProcess()->FilterURL(true, &begin_params->searchable_form_url);
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanReadRequestBody(
GetSiteInstance(), validated_params.post_data)) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RFH_ILLEGAL_UPLOAD_PARAMS);
return;
}
if (validated_params.url.SchemeIs(kChromeErrorScheme)) {
mojo::ReportBadMessage("Renderer cannot request error page URLs directly");
return;
}
if (common_params.url.SchemeIsBlob() && !validated_params.url.SchemeIsBlob())
blob_url_token = nullptr;
if (blob_url_token && !validated_params.url.SchemeIsBlob()) {
mojo::ReportBadMessage("Blob URL Token, but not a blob: URL");
return;
}
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory;
if (blob_url_token) {
blob_url_loader_factory =
ChromeBlobStorageContext::URLLoaderFactoryForToken(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), std::move(blob_url_token));
}
if (blink::BlobUtils::MojoBlobURLsEnabled() &&
validated_params.url.SchemeIsBlob() && !blob_url_loader_factory) {
blob_url_loader_factory = ChromeBlobStorageContext::URLLoaderFactoryForUrl(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), validated_params.url);
}
if (waiting_for_init_) {
pending_navigate_ = std::make_unique<PendingNavigation>(
validated_params, std::move(begin_params),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), std::move(navigation_client),
std::move(navigation_initiator));
return;
}
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->OnBeginNavigation(
frame_tree_node(), validated_params, std::move(begin_params),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), std::move(navigation_client),
std::move(navigation_initiator));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zoutputpage(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code;
check_type(op[-1], t_integer);
check_type(*op, t_boolean);
if (gs_debug[':']) {
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory((gs_memory_t *)i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory);
print_resource_usage(minst, &(i_ctx_p->memory), "Outputpage start");
}
code = gs_output_page(igs, (int)op[-1].value.intval,
op->value.boolval);
if (code < 0)
return code;
pop(2);
if (gs_debug[':']) {
gs_main_instance *minst = get_minst_from_memory((gs_memory_t *)i_ctx_p->memory.current->non_gc_memory);
print_resource_usage(minst, &(i_ctx_p->memory), "Outputpage end");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Loader* Create(ExecutionContext* execution_context,
FetchManager* fetch_manager,
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
FetchRequestData* request,
bool is_isolated_world,
AbortSignal* signal) {
return new Loader(execution_context, fetch_manager, resolver, request,
is_isolated_world, signal);
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* SessionRestore::RestoreSession(Profile* profile,
Browser* browser,
uint32 behavior,
const std::vector<GURL>& urls_to_open) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos::BootTimesLoader::Get()->AddLoginTimeMarker(
"SessionRestore-Start", false);
#endif
DCHECK(profile);
profile = profile->GetOriginalProfile();
if (!SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile)) {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
profile->set_restored_last_session(true);
SessionRestoreImpl* restorer = new SessionRestoreImpl(
profile, browser, (behavior & SYNCHRONOUS) != 0,
(behavior & CLOBBER_CURRENT_TAB) != 0,
(behavior & ALWAYS_CREATE_TABBED_BROWSER) != 0,
urls_to_open);
return restorer->Restore();
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
TBR=sky@chromium.org
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void on_cl_l2cap_init(tBTA_JV_L2CAP_CL_INIT *p_init, uint32_t id)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
sock = btsock_l2cap_find_by_id_l(id);
if (sock) {
if (p_init->status != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
} else {
sock->handle = p_init->handle;
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _nfs4_call_sync_session(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
struct nfs_server *server,
struct rpc_message *msg,
struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res,
int cache_reply)
{
return nfs4_call_sync_sequence(clnt, server, msg, args, res, cache_reply, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct timespec ns_to_timespec(const s64 nsec)
{
struct timespec ts;
if (!nsec)
return (struct timespec) {0, 0};
ts.tv_sec = div_long_long_rem_signed(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &ts.tv_nsec);
if (unlikely(nsec < 0))
set_normalized_timespec(&ts, ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
return ts;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::handleKeyboardEvent(KeyboardEvent* keyboardEvent)
{
if (keyboardEvent->type() != eventNames().keypressEvent)
return;
const UChar charCode = WTF::Unicode::toLower(keyboardEvent->charCode());
if (charCode < ' ')
return;
keyboardEvent->setDefaultHandled();
int index = m_typeAhead.handleEvent(keyboardEvent, TypeAhead::MatchPrefix | TypeAhead::CycleFirstChar | TypeAhead::MatchIndex);
if (index < 0)
return;
setValueAsInteger(index, DispatchEvent);
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_ofile_delete_check(smb_ofile_t *of)
{
ASSERT(of->f_magic == SMB_OFILE_MAGIC);
mutex_enter(&of->f_mutex);
if (of->f_state != SMB_OFILE_STATE_OPEN) {
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
return (NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE);
}
if (of->f_granted_access &
(FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA |
FILE_APPEND_DATA | FILE_EXECUTE | DELETE)) {
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
return (NT_STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION);
}
mutex_exit(&of->f_mutex);
return (NT_STATUS_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 73,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wkbConvLineStringToShape(wkbObj *w, shapeObj *shape)
{
int type;
lineObj line;
/*endian = */wkbReadChar(w);
type = wkbTypeMap(w,wkbReadInt(w));
if( type != WKB_LINESTRING ) return MS_FAILURE;
wkbReadLine(w,&line);
msAddLineDirectly(shape, &line);
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 40,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewSizeObserver(content::WebContents* web_contents,
BrowserWindow* browser_window)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
browser_window_(browser_window) {
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcb_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, void *arg)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct net_device *netdev;
struct dcbmsg *dcb = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nlattr *tb[DCB_ATTR_MAX + 1];
u32 portid = skb ? NETLINK_CB(skb).portid : 0;
int ret = -EINVAL;
struct sk_buff *reply_skb;
struct nlmsghdr *reply_nlh = NULL;
const struct reply_func *fn;
if ((nlh->nlmsg_type == RTM_SETDCB) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
ret = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*dcb), tb, DCB_ATTR_MAX,
dcbnl_rtnl_policy);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (dcb->cmd > DCB_CMD_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
/* check if a reply function has been defined for the command */
fn = &reply_funcs[dcb->cmd];
if (!fn->cb)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_IFNAME])
return -EINVAL;
netdev = dev_get_by_name(net, nla_data(tb[DCB_ATTR_IFNAME]));
if (!netdev)
return -ENODEV;
if (!netdev->dcbnl_ops) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
reply_skb = dcbnl_newmsg(fn->type, dcb->cmd, portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
nlh->nlmsg_flags, &reply_nlh);
if (!reply_skb) {
ret = -ENOBUFS;
goto out;
}
ret = fn->cb(netdev, nlh, nlh->nlmsg_seq, tb, reply_skb);
if (ret < 0) {
nlmsg_free(reply_skb);
goto out;
}
nlmsg_end(reply_skb, reply_nlh);
ret = rtnl_unicast(reply_skb, net, portid);
out:
dev_put(netdev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BackendImpl::MaxFileSize() const {
return cache_type() == net::PNACL_CACHE ? max_size_ : max_size_ / 8;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_unhash_established(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
if (asoc->temp)
return;
sctp_local_bh_disable();
__sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: sctp: Fix another socket race during accept/peeloff
There is a race between sctp_rcv() and sctp_accept() where we
have moved the association from the listening socket to the
accepted socket, but sctp_rcv() processing cached the old
socket and continues to use it.
The easy solution is to check for the socket mismatch once we've
grabed the socket lock. If we hit a mis-match, that means
that were are currently holding the lock on the listening socket,
but the association is refrencing a newly accepted socket. We need
to drop the lock on the old socket and grab the lock on the new one.
A more proper solution might be to create accepted sockets when
the new association is established, similar to TCP. That would
eliminate the race for 1-to-1 style sockets, but it would still
existing for 1-to-many sockets where a user wished to peeloff an
association. For now, we'll live with this easy solution as
it addresses the problem.
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 34,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_xattrs(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
static int warning_done = 0;
/* If there aren't any extended attributes, then it's okay not
* to extract them, otherwise, issue a single warning. */
if (archive_entry_xattr_count(a->entry) != 0 && !warning_done) {
warning_done = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Cannot restore extended attributes on this system");
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
/* Warning was already emitted; suppress further warnings. */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Container::write(WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
{
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
file->Rewind();
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, this->tag);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, kChunk_WEBP);
size_t i, j;
std::vector<Chunk*> chunkVect;
for (i = 0; i < WEBP_CHUNK_NIL; i++) {
chunkVect = this->chunks[i];
for (j = 0; j < chunkVect.size(); j++) {
chunkVect.at(j)->write(handler);
}
}
XMP_Int64 lastOffset = file->Offset();
this->size = lastOffset - 8;
file->Seek(this->pos + 4, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
file->Seek(lastOffset, kXMP_SeekFromStart);
if (lastOffset < handler->initialFileSize) {
file->Truncate(lastOffset);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderViewImpl::RunJavaScriptMessage(ui::JavascriptMessageType type,
const string16& message,
const string16& default_value,
const GURL& frame_url,
string16* result) {
bool success = false;
string16 result_temp;
if (!result)
result = &result_temp;
SendAndRunNestedMessageLoop(new ViewHostMsg_RunJavaScriptMessage(
routing_id_, message, default_value, frame_url, type, &success, result));
return success;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::SetSize(const IntSize& new_size) {
if (new_size == Size())
return;
ignore_reset_ = true;
SetIntegralAttribute(kWidthAttr, new_size.Width());
SetIntegralAttribute(kHeightAttr, new_size.Height());
ignore_reset_ = false;
Reset();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *rep;
struct nlmsgerr *errmsg;
size_t payload = sizeof(*errmsg);
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(NETLINK_CB(in_skb).sk);
/* Error messages get the original request appened, unless the user
* requests to cap the error message.
*/
if (!(nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_CAP_ACK) && err)
payload += nlmsg_len(nlh);
skb = nlmsg_new(payload, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
struct sock *sk;
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(in_skb->sk),
in_skb->sk->sk_protocol,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid);
if (sk) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
return;
}
rep = __nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLMSG_ERROR, payload, 0);
errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
errmsg->error = err;
memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, payload > sizeof(*errmsg) ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
netlink_unicast(in_skb->sk, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 47,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void stvi_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_StereoVideoBox *ptr = (GF_StereoVideoBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->stereo_indication_type) gf_free(ptr->stereo_indication_type);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_fill_gen_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
u32 portid, u32 seq)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg;
int event = (NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8) | NFT_MSG_NEWGEN;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg), 0);
if (nlh == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
nfmsg->nfgen_family = AF_UNSPEC;
nfmsg->version = NFNETLINK_V0;
nfmsg->res_id = htons(net->nft.base_seq & 0xffff);
if (nla_put_be32(skb, NFTA_GEN_ID, htonl(net->nft.base_seq)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_trim(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_probe(AVProbeData *pd)
{
/* check file header */
if (!ff_guidcmp(pd->buf, &ff_asf_header))
return AVPROBE_SCORE_MAX/2;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: makeCorrections(const TranslationTableHeader *table, const InString *input,
OutString *output, int *posMapping, formtype *typebuf, int *realInlen,
int *posIncremented, int *cursorPosition, int *cursorStatus) {
int pos;
int transOpcode;
const TranslationTableRule *transRule;
int transCharslen;
int passCharDots;
const widechar *passInstructions;
int passIC; /* Instruction counter */
PassRuleMatch patternMatch;
TranslationTableRule *groupingRule;
widechar groupingOp;
const InString *origInput = input;
if (!table->corrections) return 1;
pos = 0;
output->length = 0;
*posIncremented = 1;
_lou_resetPassVariables();
while (pos < input->length) {
int length = input->length - pos;
const TranslationTableCharacter *character =
findCharOrDots(input->chars[pos], 0, table);
const TranslationTableCharacter *character2;
int tryThis = 0;
if (!findForPassRule(table, pos, 0, input, &transOpcode, &transRule,
&transCharslen, &passCharDots, &passInstructions, &passIC,
&patternMatch, &groupingRule, &groupingOp))
while (tryThis < 3) {
TranslationTableOffset ruleOffset = 0;
unsigned long int makeHash = 0;
switch (tryThis) {
case 0:
if (!(length >= 2)) break;
makeHash = (unsigned long int)character->lowercase << 8;
character2 = findCharOrDots(input->chars[pos + 1], 0, table);
makeHash += (unsigned long int)character2->lowercase;
makeHash %= HASHNUM;
ruleOffset = table->forRules[makeHash];
break;
case 1:
if (!(length >= 1)) break;
length = 1;
ruleOffset = character->otherRules;
break;
case 2: /* No rule found */
transOpcode = CTO_Always;
ruleOffset = 0;
break;
}
while (ruleOffset) {
transRule = (TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[ruleOffset];
transOpcode = transRule->opcode;
transCharslen = transRule->charslen;
if (tryThis == 1 || (transCharslen <= length &&
compareChars(&transRule->charsdots[0],
&input->chars[pos], transCharslen,
0, table))) {
if (*posIncremented && transOpcode == CTO_Correct &&
passDoTest(table, pos, input, transOpcode, transRule,
&passCharDots, &passInstructions, &passIC,
&patternMatch, &groupingRule, &groupingOp)) {
tryThis = 4;
break;
}
}
ruleOffset = transRule->charsnext;
}
tryThis++;
}
*posIncremented = 1;
switch (transOpcode) {
case CTO_Always:
if (output->length >= output->maxlength) goto failure;
posMapping[output->length] = pos;
output->chars[output->length++] = input->chars[pos++];
break;
case CTO_Correct: {
const InString *inputBefore = input;
int posBefore = pos;
if (appliedRules != NULL && appliedRulesCount < maxAppliedRules)
appliedRules[appliedRulesCount++] = transRule;
if (!passDoAction(table, &input, output, posMapping, transOpcode, &transRule,
passCharDots, passInstructions, passIC, &pos, patternMatch,
cursorPosition, cursorStatus, groupingRule, groupingOp))
goto failure;
if (input->bufferIndex != inputBefore->bufferIndex &&
inputBefore->bufferIndex != origInput->bufferIndex)
releaseStringBuffer(inputBefore->bufferIndex);
if (pos == posBefore) *posIncremented = 0;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
{ // We have to transform typebuf accordingly
int k;
formtype *typebuf_temp;
if ((typebuf_temp = malloc(output->length * sizeof(formtype))) == NULL)
_lou_outOfMemory();
for (k = 0; k < output->length; k++)
if (posMapping[k] < 0)
typebuf_temp[k] = typebuf[0]; // prepend to next
else if (posMapping[k] >= input->length)
typebuf_temp[k] = typebuf[input->length - 1]; // append to previous
else
typebuf_temp[k] = typebuf[posMapping[k]];
memcpy(typebuf, typebuf_temp, output->length * sizeof(formtype));
free(typebuf_temp);
}
failure:
*realInlen = pos;
if (input->bufferIndex != origInput->bufferIndex)
releaseStringBuffer(input->bufferIndex);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_itr(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
uint32_t interval = val & 0xffff;
trace_e1000e_irq_itr_set(val);
core->itr_guest_value = interval;
core->mac[index] = MAX(interval, E1000E_MIN_XITR);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *event_name(XHCIEvent *event)
{
return lookup_name(event->ccode, TRBCCode_names,
ARRAY_SIZE(TRBCCode_names));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_ring_pop_cmp_descr(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
/*
* According to Linux driver code it explicitly verifies that number
* of requests being processed by device is less then the size of
* completion queue, so device may omit completion queue overflow
* conditions check. We assume that this is true for other (Windows)
* drivers as well.
*/
uint32_t free_cmp_ptr =
mgr->filled_cmp_ptr++ & mgr->rxr_len_mask;
uint32_t free_cmp_page =
free_cmp_ptr / PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
uint32_t inpage_idx =
free_cmp_ptr % PVSCSI_MAX_NUM_CMP_ENTRIES_PER_PAGE;
return mgr->cmp_ring_pages_pa[free_cmp_page] +
inpage_idx * sizeof(PVSCSIRingCmpDesc);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void await_references(H264Context *h)
{
const int mb_xy = h->mb_xy;
const int mb_type = h->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy];
int refs[2][48];
int nrefs[2] = { 0 };
int ref, list;
memset(refs, -1, sizeof(refs));
if (IS_16X16(mb_type)) {
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, 0, 16, 0,
IS_DIR(mb_type, 0, 0), IS_DIR(mb_type, 0, 1), nrefs);
} else if (IS_16X8(mb_type)) {
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, 0, 8, 0,
IS_DIR(mb_type, 0, 0), IS_DIR(mb_type, 0, 1), nrefs);
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, 8, 8, 8,
IS_DIR(mb_type, 1, 0), IS_DIR(mb_type, 1, 1), nrefs);
} else if (IS_8X16(mb_type)) {
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, 0, 16, 0,
IS_DIR(mb_type, 0, 0), IS_DIR(mb_type, 0, 1), nrefs);
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, 4, 16, 0,
IS_DIR(mb_type, 1, 0), IS_DIR(mb_type, 1, 1), nrefs);
} else {
int i;
av_assert2(IS_8X8(mb_type));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
const int sub_mb_type = h->sub_mb_type[i];
const int n = 4 * i;
int y_offset = (i & 2) << 2;
if (IS_SUB_8X8(sub_mb_type)) {
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, n, 8, y_offset,
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 0),
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 1),
nrefs);
} else if (IS_SUB_8X4(sub_mb_type)) {
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, n, 4, y_offset,
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 0),
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 1),
nrefs);
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, n + 2, 4, y_offset + 4,
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 0),
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 1),
nrefs);
} else if (IS_SUB_4X8(sub_mb_type)) {
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, n, 8, y_offset,
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 0),
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 1),
nrefs);
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, n + 1, 8, y_offset,
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 0),
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 1),
nrefs);
} else {
int j;
av_assert2(IS_SUB_4X4(sub_mb_type));
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
int sub_y_offset = y_offset + 2 * (j & 2);
get_lowest_part_y(h, refs, n + j, 4, sub_y_offset,
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 0),
IS_DIR(sub_mb_type, 0, 1),
nrefs);
}
}
}
}
for (list = h->list_count - 1; list >= 0; list--)
for (ref = 0; ref < 48 && nrefs[list]; ref++) {
int row = refs[list][ref];
if (row >= 0) {
Picture *ref_pic = &h->ref_list[list][ref];
int ref_field = ref_pic->reference - 1;
int ref_field_picture = ref_pic->field_picture;
int pic_height = 16 * h->mb_height >> ref_field_picture;
row <<= MB_MBAFF(h);
nrefs[list]--;
if (!FIELD_PICTURE(h) && ref_field_picture) { // frame referencing two fields
ff_thread_await_progress(&ref_pic->tf,
FFMIN((row >> 1) - !(row & 1),
pic_height - 1),
1);
ff_thread_await_progress(&ref_pic->tf,
FFMIN((row >> 1), pic_height - 1),
0);
} else if (FIELD_PICTURE(h) && !ref_field_picture) { // field referencing one field of a frame
ff_thread_await_progress(&ref_pic->tf,
FFMIN(row * 2 + ref_field,
pic_height - 1),
0);
} else if (FIELD_PICTURE(h)) {
ff_thread_await_progress(&ref_pic->tf,
FFMIN(row, pic_height - 1),
ref_field);
} else {
ff_thread_await_progress(&ref_pic->tf,
FFMIN(row, pic_height - 1),
0);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rtnl_link_unregister(struct rtnl_link_ops *ops)
{
/* Close the race with cleanup_net() */
mutex_lock(&net_mutex);
rtnl_lock_unregistering_all();
__rtnl_link_unregister(ops);
rtnl_unlock();
mutex_unlock(&net_mutex);
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void h264bsdSampleAspectRatio(storage_t *pStorage, u32 *sarWidth, u32 *sarHeight)
{
/* Variables */
u32 w = 1;
u32 h = 1;
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
if (pStorage->activeSps &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParametersPresentFlag &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters &&
pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->aspectRatioPresentFlag )
{
switch (pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->aspectRatioIdc)
{
case ASPECT_RATIO_UNSPECIFIED: w = 0; h = 0; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_1_1: w = 1; h = 1; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_12_11: w = 12; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_10_11: w = 10; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_16_11: w = 16; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_40_33: w = 40; h = 33; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_24_11: w = 24; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_20_11: w = 20; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_32_11: w = 32; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_80_33: w = 80; h = 33; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_18_11: w = 18; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_15_11: w = 15; h = 11; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_64_33: w = 64; h = 33; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_160_99: w = 160; h = 99; break;
case ASPECT_RATIO_EXTENDED_SAR:
w = pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->sarWidth;
h = pStorage->activeSps->vuiParameters->sarHeight;
if ((w == 0) || (h == 0))
w = h = 0;
break;
default:
w = 0;
h = 0;
break;
}
}
/* set aspect ratio*/
*sarWidth = w;
*sarHeight = h;
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit hugetlb_exit(void)
{
struct hstate *h;
hugetlb_unregister_all_nodes();
for_each_hstate(h) {
kobject_put(hstate_kobjs[h - hstates]);
}
kobject_put(hugepages_kobj);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::RequestSmartClipExtract(SmartClipCallback callback,
gfx::Rect rect) {
static uint32_t next_id = 1;
uint32_t key = next_id++;
Send(new FrameMsg_ExtractSmartClipData(routing_id_, key, rect));
smart_clip_callbacks_.insert(std::make_pair(key, callback));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_kill_datagram(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int flags)
{
int err = 0;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
err = -ENOENT;
spin_lock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (skb == skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
atomic_dec(&skb->users);
err = 0;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
}
kfree_skb(skb);
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
sk_mem_reclaim_partial(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool parse_signature(struct MACH0_(obj_t) *bin, ut64 off) {
int i,len;
ut32 data;
bin->signature = NULL;
struct linkedit_data_command link = {0};
ut8 lit[sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command)] = {0};
struct blob_index_t idx = {0};
struct super_blob_t super = {{0}};
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command) > bin->size) {
return false;
}
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, lit, sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command));
if (len != sizeof (struct linkedit_data_command)) {
bprintf ("Failed to get data while parsing LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command\n");
return false;
}
link.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&lit[0], bin->big_endian);
link.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&lit[4], bin->big_endian);
link.dataoff = r_read_ble32 (&lit[8], bin->big_endian);
link.datasize = r_read_ble32 (&lit[12], bin->big_endian);
data = link.dataoff;
if (data > bin->size || data + sizeof (struct super_blob_t) > bin->size) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
return true;
}
super.blob.magic = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + data, little_);
super.blob.length = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + data + 4, little_);
super.count = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + data + 8, little_);
for (i = 0; i < super.count; ++i) {
if ((ut8 *)(bin->b->buf + data + i) > (ut8 *)(bin->b->buf + bin->size)) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
break;
}
struct blob_index_t bi;
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, data + 12 + (i * sizeof (struct blob_index_t)),
(ut8*)&bi, sizeof (struct blob_index_t)) < sizeof (struct blob_index_t)) {
break;
}
idx.type = r_read_ble32 (&bi.type, little_);
idx.offset = r_read_ble32 (&bi.offset, little_);
if (idx.type == CSSLOT_ENTITLEMENTS) {
ut64 off = data + idx.offset;
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct blob_t) > bin->size) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
break;
}
struct blob_t entitlements = {0};
entitlements.magic = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + off, little_);
entitlements.length = r_read_ble32 (bin->b->buf + off + 4, little_);
len = entitlements.length - sizeof (struct blob_t);
if (len <= bin->size && len > 1) {
bin->signature = calloc (1, len + 1);
if (bin->signature) {
ut8 *src = bin->b->buf + off + sizeof (struct blob_t);
if (off + sizeof (struct blob_t) + len < bin->b->length) {
memcpy (bin->signature, src, len);
bin->signature[len] = '\0';
return true;
}
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
return true;
}
} else {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("Malformed entitlement");
}
}
}
if (!bin->signature) {
bin->signature = (ut8 *)strdup ("No entitlement found");
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,849 |
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