instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int addnumber(JF, double value)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < F->numlen; ++i)
if (F->numtab[i] == value)
return i;
if (F->numlen >= F->numcap) {
F->numcap = F->numcap ? F->numcap * 2 : 16;
F->numtab = js_realloc(J, F->numtab, F->numcap * sizeof *F->numtab);
}
F->numtab[F->numlen] = value;
return F->numlen++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ip6_rt_check(const struct rt6key *rt_key,
const struct in6_addr *fl_addr,
const struct in6_addr *addr_cache)
{
return (rt_key->plen != 128 || !ipv6_addr_equal(fl_addr, &rt_key->addr)) &&
(!addr_cache || !ipv6_addr_equal(fl_addr, addr_cache));
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SupportsGroupPolicyEnabledComponentUpdates() const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(const char *filename, int filename_len, const char **ext_str, int *ext_len, int executable, int for_create, int is_complete) /* {{{ */
{
const char *pos, *slash;
*ext_str = NULL;
*ext_len = 0;
if (!filename_len || filename_len == 1) {
return FAILURE;
}
phar_request_initialize();
/* first check for alias in first segment */
pos = memchr(filename, '/', filename_len);
if (pos && pos != filename) {
/* check for url like http:// or phar:// */
if (*(pos - 1) == ':' && (pos - filename) < filename_len - 1 && *(pos + 1) == '/') {
*ext_len = -2;
*ext_str = NULL;
return FAILURE;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), (char *) filename, pos - filename)) {
*ext_str = pos;
*ext_len = -1;
return FAILURE;
}
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && zend_hash_str_exists(&cached_alias, (char *) filename, pos - filename)) {
*ext_str = pos;
*ext_len = -1;
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (zend_hash_num_elements(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map))) || PHAR_G(manifest_cached)) {
phar_archive_data *pphar;
if (is_complete) {
if (NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), (char *) filename, filename_len))) {
*ext_str = filename + (filename_len - pphar->ext_len);
woohoo:
*ext_len = pphar->ext_len;
if (executable == 2) {
return SUCCESS;
}
if (executable == 1 && !pphar->is_data) {
return SUCCESS;
}
if (!executable && pphar->is_data) {
return SUCCESS;
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, (char *) filename, filename_len))) {
*ext_str = filename + (filename_len - pphar->ext_len);
goto woohoo;
}
} else {
zend_string *str_key;
zend_ulong unused;
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)));
HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTENT != zend_hash_get_current_key(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), &str_key, &unused);
zend_hash_move_forward(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)))
) {
if (ZSTR_LEN(str_key) > (uint) filename_len) {
continue;
}
if (!memcmp(filename, ZSTR_VAL(str_key), ZSTR_LEN(str_key)) && ((uint)filename_len == ZSTR_LEN(str_key)
|| filename[ZSTR_LEN(str_key)] == '/' || filename[ZSTR_LEN(str_key)] == '\0')) {
if (NULL == (pphar = zend_hash_get_current_data_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map))))) {
break;
}
*ext_str = filename + (ZSTR_LEN(str_key) - pphar->ext_len);
goto woohoo;
}
}
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached)) {
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset(&cached_phars);
HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTENT != zend_hash_get_current_key(&cached_phars, &str_key, &unused);
zend_hash_move_forward(&cached_phars)
) {
if (ZSTR_LEN(str_key) > (uint) filename_len) {
continue;
}
if (!memcmp(filename, ZSTR_VAL(str_key), ZSTR_LEN(str_key)) && ((uint)filename_len == ZSTR_LEN(str_key)
|| filename[ZSTR_LEN(str_key)] == '/' || filename[ZSTR_LEN(str_key)] == '\0')) {
if (NULL == (pphar = zend_hash_get_current_data_ptr(&cached_phars))) {
break;
}
*ext_str = filename + (ZSTR_LEN(str_key) - pphar->ext_len);
goto woohoo;
}
}
}
}
}
pos = memchr(filename + 1, '.', filename_len);
next_extension:
if (!pos) {
return FAILURE;
}
while (pos != filename && (*(pos - 1) == '/' || *(pos - 1) == '\0')) {
pos = memchr(pos + 1, '.', filename_len - (pos - filename) + 1);
if (!pos) {
return FAILURE;
}
}
slash = memchr(pos, '/', filename_len - (pos - filename));
if (!slash) {
/* this is a url like "phar://blah.phar" with no directory */
*ext_str = pos;
*ext_len = strlen(pos);
/* file extension must contain "phar" */
switch (phar_check_str(filename, *ext_str, *ext_len, executable, for_create)) {
case SUCCESS:
return SUCCESS;
case FAILURE:
/* we are at the end of the string, so we fail */
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* we've found an extension that ends at a directory separator */
*ext_str = pos;
*ext_len = slash - pos;
switch (phar_check_str(filename, *ext_str, *ext_len, executable, for_create)) {
case SUCCESS:
return SUCCESS;
case FAILURE:
/* look for more extensions */
pos = strchr(pos + 1, '.');
if (pos) {
*ext_str = NULL;
*ext_len = 0;
}
goto next_extension;
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SerializerMarkupAccumulator::appendCustomAttributes(StringBuilder& result, const Element& element, Namespaces* namespaces)
{
if (!element.isFrameOwnerElement())
return;
const HTMLFrameOwnerElement& frameOwner = toHTMLFrameOwnerElement(element);
Frame* frame = frameOwner.contentFrame();
if (!frame || !frame->isLocalFrame())
return;
KURL url = toLocalFrame(frame)->document()->url();
if (url.isValid() && !url.protocolIsAbout())
return;
url = m_serializer->urlForBlankFrame(toLocalFrame(frame));
appendAttribute(result, element, Attribute(frameOwnerURLAttributeName(frameOwner), AtomicString(url.string())), namespaces);
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreClearState() {
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
api()->glClearColorFn(state_.color_clear_red, state_.color_clear_green,
state_.color_clear_blue, state_.color_clear_alpha);
api()->glClearStencilFn(state_.stencil_clear);
api()->glClearDepthFn(state_.depth_clear);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST,
state_.enable_flags.scissor_test);
RestoreDeviceWindowRectangles();
gfx::Vector2d scissor_offset = GetBoundFramebufferDrawOffset();
api()->glScissorFn(state_.scissor_x + scissor_offset.x(),
state_.scissor_y + scissor_offset.y(),
state_.scissor_width, state_.scissor_height);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_StopRecord_f( void ) {
int len;
if ( !clc.demorecording ) {
Com_Printf( "Not recording a demo.\n" );
return;
}
len = -1;
FS_Write( &len, 4, clc.demofile );
FS_Write( &len, 4, clc.demofile );
FS_FCloseFile( clc.demofile );
clc.demofile = 0;
clc.demorecording = qfalse;
Com_Printf( "Stopped demo.\n" );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OverrideThreadForMessage(
const IPC::Message& message, BrowserThread::ID* thread) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (message.type() == ClipboardHostMsg_ReadImage::ID)
*thread = BrowserThread::FILE;
#elif defined(USE_X11)
if (IPC_MESSAGE_CLASS(message) == ClipboardMsgStart)
*thread = BrowserThread::UI;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInClickWindow(const TouchEvent& event) const {
return IsInClickTimeWindow() && IsInsideManhattanSquare(event);
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlBufInflate(xmlBufPtr buf, size_t len) {
if (buf == NULL) return(-1);
xmlBufGrowInternal(buf, len + buf->size);
if (buf->error)
return(-1);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
unsigned short size;
unsigned short len;
unsigned char *data = *p;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
int sigalg_seen = 0;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
if (data > (d+n-len))
goto ri_check;
while (data <= (d+n-4))
{
n2s(data,type);
n2s(data,size);
if (data+size > (d+n))
goto ri_check;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
#endif
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
- Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
the value of the Host: field.
- Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*/
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
{
unsigned char *sdata;
int servname_type;
int dsize;
if (size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size )
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sdata = data;
while (dsize > 3)
{
servname_type = *(sdata++);
n2s(sdata,len);
dsize -= 3;
if (len > dsize)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->servername_done == 0)
switch (servname_type)
{
case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
if (!s->hit)
{
if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
}
else
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
&& strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
dsize -= len;
}
if (dsize != 0)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
{
if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit)
{
if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
{
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit)
{
if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
if (size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
else
s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
{
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
{
if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
{
int dsize;
if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sigalg_seen = 1;
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
if (size < 5)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
size--;
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
{
const unsigned char *sdata;
int dsize;
/* Read in responder_id_list */
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize > size )
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
while (dsize > 0)
{
OCSP_RESPID *id;
int idsize;
if (dsize < 4)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(data, idsize);
dsize -= 2 + idsize;
size -= 2 + idsize;
if (dsize < 0)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sdata = data;
data += idsize;
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
&sdata, idsize);
if (!id)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (data != sdata)
{
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
{
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
{
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (size < 2)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
n2s(data,dsize);
size -= 2;
if (dsize != size)
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
sdata = data;
if (dsize > 0)
{
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
{
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
}
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
&sdata, dsize);
if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
|| (data + dsize != sdata))
{
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
/* We don't know what to do with any other type
* so ignore it.
*/
else
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
{
switch(data[0])
{
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
{
/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.) */
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
{
if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
}
#endif
data+=size;
}
*p = data;
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
{
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::QueryHandleSignalsState(
MojoHandle handle,
MojoHandleSignalsState* signals_state) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> dispatcher = GetDispatcher(handle);
if (!dispatcher || !signals_state)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*signals_state = dispatcher->GetHandleSignalsState();
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void free_event_filter(struct event_filter *filter)
{
__free_filter(filter);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::removePositionedObjects(RenderBlock* o, ContainingBlockState containingBlockState)
{
TrackedRendererListHashSet* positionedDescendants = positionedObjects();
if (!positionedDescendants)
return;
RenderBox* r;
TrackedRendererListHashSet::iterator end = positionedDescendants->end();
Vector<RenderBox*, 16> deadObjects;
for (TrackedRendererListHashSet::iterator it = positionedDescendants->begin(); it != end; ++it) {
r = *it;
if (!o || r->isDescendantOf(o)) {
if (containingBlockState == NewContainingBlock)
r->setChildNeedsLayout(MarkOnlyThis);
RenderObject* p = r->parent();
while (p && !p->isRenderBlock())
p = p->parent();
if (p)
p->setChildNeedsLayout();
deadObjects.append(r);
}
}
for (unsigned i = 0; i < deadObjects.size(); i++)
removePositionedObject(deadObjects.at(i));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void multipath_resume(struct dm_target *ti)
{
struct multipath *m = (struct multipath *) ti->private;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
m->queue_if_no_path = m->saved_queue_if_no_path;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int empty_dir(struct inode *inode)
{
unsigned int offset;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de, *de1;
struct super_block *sb;
int err = 0;
sb = inode->i_sb;
if (inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2) ||
!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, inode, 0, 0, &err))) {
if (err)
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"error %d reading directory lblock 0", err);
else
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"bad directory (dir #%lu) - no data block",
inode->i_ino);
return 1;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(inode,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "checksum error reading directory "
"lblock 0");
return -EIO;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data;
de1 = ext4_next_entry(de, sb->s_blocksize);
if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino ||
!le32_to_cpu(de1->inode) ||
strcmp(".", de->name) ||
strcmp("..", de1->name)) {
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"bad directory (dir #%lu) - no `.' or `..'",
inode->i_ino);
brelse(bh);
return 1;
}
offset = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize) +
ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de1->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize);
de = ext4_next_entry(de1, sb->s_blocksize);
while (offset < inode->i_size) {
if (!bh ||
(void *) de >= (void *) (bh->b_data+sb->s_blocksize)) {
unsigned int lblock;
err = 0;
brelse(bh);
lblock = offset >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
bh = ext4_bread(NULL, inode, lblock, 0, &err);
if (!bh) {
if (err)
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"error %d reading directory "
"lblock %u", err, lblock);
offset += sb->s_blocksize;
continue;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(inode,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "checksum error "
"reading directory lblock 0");
return -EIO;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) bh->b_data;
}
if (ext4_check_dir_entry(inode, NULL, de, bh, offset)) {
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *)(bh->b_data +
sb->s_blocksize);
offset = (offset | (sb->s_blocksize - 1)) + 1;
continue;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode)) {
brelse(bh);
return 0;
}
offset += ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, sb->s_blocksize);
de = ext4_next_entry(de, sb->s_blocksize);
}
brelse(bh);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterIPLImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("IPL");
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Tab::MaybeAdjustLeftForPinnedTab(gfx::Rect* bounds,
int visual_width) const {
if (ShouldRenderAsNormalTab())
return;
const int pinned_width = TabStyle::GetPinnedWidth();
const int ideal_delta = width() - pinned_width;
const int ideal_x = (pinned_width - visual_width) / 2;
bounds->set_x(
bounds->x() +
gfx::ToRoundedInt(
(1 - static_cast<float>(ideal_delta) /
static_cast<float>(kPinnedTabExtraWidthToRenderAsNormal)) *
(ideal_x - bounds->x())));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_wcc_data(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp, int verbose)
{
if (verbose > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PRE:"));
if (!(dp = parse_pre_op_attr(ndo, dp, verbose)))
return (0);
if (verbose)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " POST:"));
return parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, verbose);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int panic_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event,
void *ptr)
{
struct ipmi_smi *intf;
struct ipmi_user *user;
if (has_panicked)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
has_panicked = 1;
/* For every registered interface, set it to run to completion. */
list_for_each_entry_rcu(intf, &ipmi_interfaces, link) {
if (!intf->handlers || intf->intf_num == -1)
/* Interface is not ready. */
continue;
if (!intf->handlers->poll)
continue;
/*
* If we were interrupted while locking xmit_msgs_lock or
* waiting_rcv_msgs_lock, the corresponding list may be
* corrupted. In this case, drop items on the list for
* the safety.
*/
if (!spin_trylock(&intf->xmit_msgs_lock)) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&intf->xmit_msgs);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&intf->hp_xmit_msgs);
} else
spin_unlock(&intf->xmit_msgs_lock);
if (!spin_trylock(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs_lock))
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs);
else
spin_unlock(&intf->waiting_rcv_msgs_lock);
intf->run_to_completion = 1;
if (intf->handlers->set_run_to_completion)
intf->handlers->set_run_to_completion(intf->send_info,
1);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(user, &intf->users, link) {
if (user->handler->ipmi_panic_handler)
user->handler->ipmi_panic_handler(
user->handler_data);
}
send_panic_events(intf, ptr);
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandleGetSyncStatus(const base::ListValue* args) {
AllowJavascript();
CHECK_EQ(1U, args->GetSize());
const base::Value* callback_id;
CHECK(args->Get(0, &callback_id));
ResolveJavascriptCallback(*callback_id, *GetSyncStatusDictionary());
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TypedUrlModelAssociator::Disassociate(int64 sync_id) {
DCHECK(expected_loop_ == MessageLoop::current());
SyncIdToTypedUrlMap::iterator iter = id_map_inverse_.find(sync_id);
if (iter == id_map_inverse_.end())
return;
CHECK(id_map_.erase(iter->second));
id_map_inverse_.erase(iter);
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_hrtimer_close(struct snd_timer *t)
{
struct snd_hrtimer *stime = t->private_data;
if (stime) {
hrtimer_cancel(&stime->hrt);
kfree(stime);
t->private_data = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: hrtimer: Fix stall by hrtimer_cancel()
hrtimer_cancel() waits for the completion from the callback, thus it
must not be called inside the callback itself. This was already a
problem in the past with ALSA hrtimer driver, and the early commit
[fcfdebe70759: ALSA: hrtimer - Fix lock-up] tried to address it.
However, the previous fix is still insufficient: it may still cause a
lockup when the ALSA timer instance reprograms itself in its callback.
Then it invokes the start function even in snd_timer_interrupt() that
is called in hrtimer callback itself, results in a CPU stall. This is
no hypothetical problem but actually triggered by syzkaller fuzzer.
This patch tries to fix the issue again. Now we call
hrtimer_try_to_cancel() at both start and stop functions so that it
won't fall into a deadlock, yet giving some chance to cancel the queue
if the functions have been called outside the callback. The proper
hrtimer_cancel() is called in anyway at closing, so this should be
enough.
Reported-and-tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 54,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PpapiPluginProcessHost::RequestPluginChannel(Client* client) {
base::ProcessHandle process_handle;
int renderer_id;
client->GetPpapiChannelInfo(&process_handle, &renderer_id);
PpapiMsg_CreateChannel* msg = new PpapiMsg_CreateChannel(
renderer_id, client->OffTheRecord());
msg->set_unblock(true);
if (Send(msg)) {
sent_requests_.push(client);
} else {
client->OnPpapiChannelOpened(IPC::ChannelHandle(), 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DataReductionProxySettings::DataReductionProxySettings()
: unreachable_(false),
deferred_initialization_(false),
prefs_(nullptr),
config_(nullptr),
clock_(base::DefaultClock::GetInstance()) {}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::UnregisterProxy( Proxy *proxy )
{
int rc;
GahpProxyInfo *gahp_proxy = NULL;
if ( ProxiesByFilename == NULL || proxy == NULL ||
can_cache_proxies == false ) {
return;
}
if ( master_proxy != NULL && proxy == master_proxy->proxy ) {
master_proxy->num_references--;
return;
}
rc = ProxiesByFilename->lookup( HashKey( proxy->proxy_filename ),
gahp_proxy );
if ( rc != 0 ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "GahpServer::UnregisterProxy() called with unknown proxy %s\n", proxy->proxy_filename );
return;
}
gahp_proxy->num_references--;
if ( gahp_proxy->num_references == 0 ) {
ProxiesByFilename->remove( HashKey( gahp_proxy->proxy->proxy_filename ) );
uncacheProxy( gahp_proxy );
ReleaseProxy( gahp_proxy->proxy, (TimerHandlercpp)&GahpServer::ProxyCallback,
this );
delete gahp_proxy;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(dev);
PVSCSIState *s = PVSCSI(d);
trace_pvscsi_state("reset");
pvscsi_reset_adapter(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ValueChunk::SetValue( std::string value, bool optionalNUL /* = false */ )
{
this->newValue.assign( value );
if ( (! optionalNUL) || ((value.size() & 1) == 1) ) {
this->newValue.append( 1, '\0' ); // append zero termination as explicit part of string
}
this->newSize = this->newValue.size() + 8;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs4_destroy_session(struct nfs4_session *session)
{
struct rpc_xprt *xprt;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
cred = nfs4_get_exchange_id_cred(session->clp);
nfs4_proc_destroy_session(session, cred);
if (cred)
put_rpccred(cred);
rcu_read_lock();
xprt = rcu_dereference(session->clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_xprt);
rcu_read_unlock();
dprintk("%s Destroy backchannel for xprt %p\n",
__func__, xprt);
xprt_destroy_backchannel(xprt, NFS41_BC_MIN_CALLBACKS);
nfs4_destroy_slot_tables(session);
kfree(session);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmnc_handle_wmvf_rectangle (GstVMncDec * dec, struct RfbRectangle *rect,
const guint8 * data, int len, gboolean decode)
{
/* Cursor position. */
dec->cursor.x = rect->x;
dec->cursor.y = rect->y;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm *kvm,
unsigned int id)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
unsigned long vm_base = kvm->arch.vm_base;
int r;
int cpu;
BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kvm_vcpu) > VCPU_STRUCT_SIZE/2);
r = -EINVAL;
if (id >= KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
printk(KERN_ERR"kvm: Can't configure vcpus > %ld",
KVM_MAX_VCPUS);
goto fail;
}
r = -ENOMEM;
if (!vm_base) {
printk(KERN_ERR"kvm: Create vcpu[%d] error!\n", id);
goto fail;
}
vcpu = (struct kvm_vcpu *)(vm_base + offsetof(struct kvm_vm_data,
vcpu_data[id].vcpu_struct));
vcpu->kvm = kvm;
cpu = get_cpu();
r = vti_vcpu_setup(vcpu, id);
put_cpu();
if (r) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG"kvm: vcpu_setup error!!\n");
goto fail;
}
return vcpu;
fail:
return ERR_PTR(r);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MimeHandlerViewContainer::~MimeHandlerViewContainer() {
if (loader_) {
DCHECK(is_embedded_);
loader_->Cancel();
}
if (render_frame()) {
g_mime_handler_view_container_map.Get()[render_frame()].erase(this);
if (g_mime_handler_view_container_map.Get()[render_frame()].empty())
g_mime_handler_view_container_map.Get().erase(render_frame());
}
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readOnlyVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->readOnlyVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CloseTab() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("CloseTab_Accelerator"),
profile_);
if (CanCloseTab())
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->CloseSelectedTabs();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillDownloadManager::StartRequest(
const std::string& form_xml,
const FormRequestData& request_data) {
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context =
Profile::GetDefaultRequestContext();
if (!request_context)
return false;
std::string request_url;
if (request_data.request_type == AutofillDownloadManager::REQUEST_QUERY)
request_url = AUTO_FILL_QUERY_SERVER_REQUEST_URL;
else
request_url = AUTO_FILL_UPLOAD_SERVER_REQUEST_URL;
URLFetcher *fetcher = URLFetcher::Create(fetcher_id_for_unittest_++,
GURL(request_url),
URLFetcher::POST,
this);
url_fetchers_[fetcher] = request_data;
fetcher->set_automatically_retry_on_5xx(false);
fetcher->set_request_context(request_context);
fetcher->set_upload_data("text/plain", form_xml);
fetcher->Start();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::OnAddPageDone(const OfflinePageItem& offline_page,
const AddPageCallback& callback,
ItemActionStatus status) {
AddPageResult result;
if (status == ItemActionStatus::SUCCESS) {
offline_pages_[offline_page.offline_id] = offline_page;
result = AddPageResult::SUCCESS;
ReportPageHistogramAfterSave(policy_controller_.get(), offline_pages_,
offline_page, GetCurrentTime());
offline_event_logger_.RecordPageSaved(offline_page.client_id.name_space,
offline_page.url.spec(),
offline_page.offline_id);
} else if (status == ItemActionStatus::ALREADY_EXISTS) {
archive_manager_->DeleteArchive(offline_page.file_path,
base::Bind([](bool) {}));
result = AddPageResult::ALREADY_EXISTS;
} else {
result = AddPageResult::STORE_FAILURE;
}
callback.Run(result, offline_page.offline_id);
if (status == ItemActionStatus::SUCCESS) {
for (Observer& observer : observers_)
observer.OfflinePageAdded(this, offline_page);
}
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::DisableAutoResizeForTesting(const gfx::Size& new_size) {
OnDisableAutoResize(new_size);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::setParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK(isSetParameterAllowed(index, params));
return internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
Commit Message: omx: prevent input port enable/disable for software codecs
Bug: 29421804
Change-Id: Iba1011e9af942a6dff7f659af769a51e3f5ba66f
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetSpritePosition(DeviceIntPtr pDev, int *px, int *py)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
*px = pSprite->hotPhys.x;
*py = pSprite->hotPhys.y;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FoFiType1C *FoFiType1C::load(char *fileName) {
FoFiType1C *ff;
char *fileA;
int lenA;
if (!(fileA = FoFiBase::readFile(fileName, &lenA))) {
return NULL;
}
ff = new FoFiType1C(fileA, lenA, gTrue);
if (!ff->parse()) {
delete ff;
return NULL;
}
return ff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OverlapMap()
: m_geometryMap(UseTransforms)
{
beginNewOverlapTestingContext();
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct usb_device *testdev_to_usbdev(struct usbtest_dev *test)
{
return interface_to_usbdev(test->intf);
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WM_SYMBOL long WildMidi_GetVersion (void) {
return (LIBWILDMIDI_VERSION);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t t;
#endif
/*
* When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL )
{
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( t );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %lu", t ) );
#else
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
p += 4;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lookup_metapath(struct gfs2_inode *ip, struct metapath *mp)
{
unsigned int end_of_metadata = ip->i_height - 1;
unsigned int x;
__be64 *ptr;
u64 dblock;
int ret;
for (x = 0; x < end_of_metadata; x++) {
ptr = metapointer(x, mp);
dblock = be64_to_cpu(*ptr);
if (!dblock)
return x + 1;
ret = gfs2_meta_indirect_buffer(ip, x+1, dblock, 0, &mp->mp_bh[x+1]);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
return ip->i_height;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sync_mm_rss(struct task_struct *task, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
__sync_task_rss_stat(task, mm);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLIFrameElement::CollectStyleForPresentationAttribute(
const QualifiedName& name,
const AtomicString& value,
MutableStylePropertySet* style) {
if (name == widthAttr) {
AddHTMLLengthToStyle(style, CSSPropertyWidth, value);
} else if (name == heightAttr) {
AddHTMLLengthToStyle(style, CSSPropertyHeight, value);
} else if (name == alignAttr) {
ApplyAlignmentAttributeToStyle(value, style);
} else if (name == frameborderAttr) {
if (!value.ToInt()) {
AddPropertyToPresentationAttributeStyle(
style, CSSPropertyBorderWidth, 0,
CSSPrimitiveValue::UnitType::kPixels);
}
} else {
HTMLFrameElementBase::CollectStyleForPresentationAttribute(name, value,
style);
}
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScaleYUVToRGB32(const uint8* y_buf,
const uint8* u_buf,
const uint8* v_buf,
uint8* rgb_buf,
int source_width,
int source_height,
int width,
int height,
int y_pitch,
int uv_pitch,
int rgb_pitch,
YUVType yuv_type,
Rotate view_rotate,
ScaleFilter filter) {
const int kFilterBufferSize = 4096;
if (source_width > kFilterBufferSize || view_rotate)
filter = FILTER_NONE;
unsigned int y_shift = yuv_type;
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_180) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_270) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_0) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_90)) {
y_buf += source_width - 1;
u_buf += source_width / 2 - 1;
v_buf += source_width / 2 - 1;
source_width = -source_width;
}
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_180) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == MIRROR_ROTATE_180)) {
y_buf += (source_height - 1) * y_pitch;
u_buf += ((source_height >> y_shift) - 1) * uv_pitch;
v_buf += ((source_height >> y_shift) - 1) * uv_pitch;
source_height = -source_height;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0)
return;
int source_dx = source_width * kFractionMax / width;
int source_dy = source_height * kFractionMax / height;
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
int source_dx_uv = source_dx;
#endif
if ((view_rotate == ROTATE_90) ||
(view_rotate == ROTATE_270)) {
int tmp = height;
height = width;
width = tmp;
tmp = source_height;
source_height = source_width;
source_width = tmp;
int original_dx = source_dx;
int original_dy = source_dy;
source_dx = ((original_dy >> kFractionBits) * y_pitch) << kFractionBits;
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
source_dx_uv = ((original_dy >> kFractionBits) * uv_pitch) << kFractionBits;
#endif
source_dy = original_dx;
if (view_rotate == ROTATE_90) {
y_pitch = -1;
uv_pitch = -1;
source_height = -source_height;
} else {
y_pitch = 1;
uv_pitch = 1;
}
}
uint8 yuvbuf[16 + kFilterBufferSize * 3 + 16];
uint8* ybuf =
reinterpret_cast<uint8*>(reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(yuvbuf + 15) & ~15);
uint8* ubuf = ybuf + kFilterBufferSize;
uint8* vbuf = ubuf + kFilterBufferSize;
int yscale_fixed = (source_height << kFractionBits) / height;
for (int y = 0; y < height; ++y) {
uint8* dest_pixel = rgb_buf + y * rgb_pitch;
int source_y_subpixel = (y * yscale_fixed);
if (yscale_fixed >= (kFractionMax * 2)) {
source_y_subpixel += kFractionMax / 2; // For 1/2 or less, center filter.
}
int source_y = source_y_subpixel >> kFractionBits;
const uint8* y0_ptr = y_buf + source_y * y_pitch;
const uint8* y1_ptr = y0_ptr + y_pitch;
const uint8* u0_ptr = u_buf + (source_y >> y_shift) * uv_pitch;
const uint8* u1_ptr = u0_ptr + uv_pitch;
const uint8* v0_ptr = v_buf + (source_y >> y_shift) * uv_pitch;
const uint8* v1_ptr = v0_ptr + uv_pitch;
int source_y_fraction = (source_y_subpixel & kFractionMask) >> 8;
int source_uv_fraction =
((source_y_subpixel >> y_shift) & kFractionMask) >> 8;
const uint8* y_ptr = y0_ptr;
const uint8* u_ptr = u0_ptr;
const uint8* v_ptr = v0_ptr;
if (filter & media::FILTER_BILINEAR_V) {
if (yscale_fixed != kFractionMax &&
source_y_fraction && ((source_y + 1) < source_height)) {
FilterRows(ybuf, y0_ptr, y1_ptr, source_width, source_y_fraction);
} else {
memcpy(ybuf, y0_ptr, source_width);
}
y_ptr = ybuf;
ybuf[source_width] = ybuf[source_width-1];
int uv_source_width = (source_width + 1) / 2;
if (yscale_fixed != kFractionMax &&
source_uv_fraction &&
(((source_y >> y_shift) + 1) < (source_height >> y_shift))) {
FilterRows(ubuf, u0_ptr, u1_ptr, uv_source_width, source_uv_fraction);
FilterRows(vbuf, v0_ptr, v1_ptr, uv_source_width, source_uv_fraction);
} else {
memcpy(ubuf, u0_ptr, uv_source_width);
memcpy(vbuf, v0_ptr, uv_source_width);
}
u_ptr = ubuf;
v_ptr = vbuf;
ubuf[uv_source_width] = ubuf[uv_source_width - 1];
vbuf[uv_source_width] = vbuf[uv_source_width - 1];
}
if (source_dx == kFractionMax) { // Not scaled
FastConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width);
} else {
if (filter & FILTER_BILINEAR_H) {
LinearScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
} else {
#if USE_MMX && defined(_MSC_VER)
if (width == (source_width * 2)) {
DoubleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width);
} else if ((source_dx & kFractionMask) == 0) {
ConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width,
source_dx >> kFractionBits);
} else if (source_dx_uv == source_dx) { // Not rotated.
ScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
} else {
RotateConvertYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width,
source_dx >> kFractionBits,
source_dx_uv >> kFractionBits);
}
#else
ScaleYUVToRGB32Row(y_ptr, u_ptr, v_ptr,
dest_pixel, width, source_dx);
#endif
}
}
}
EMMS();
}
Commit Message: Add check for zero-sized source YUV + tests.
Took the time to clean up said tests for improved coverage.
BUG=90173
TEST=media_unittests
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7794016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@99113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool NaClProcessHost::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid message with type = " << msg.type();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void drain_array_locked(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct array_cache *ac,
int node, bool free_all, struct list_head *list)
{
int tofree;
if (!ac || !ac->avail)
return;
tofree = free_all ? ac->avail : (ac->limit + 4) / 5;
if (tofree > ac->avail)
tofree = (ac->avail + 1) / 2;
free_block(cachep, ac->entry, tofree, node, list);
ac->avail -= tofree;
memmove(ac->entry, &(ac->entry[tofree]), sizeof(void *) * ac->avail);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::dispatchPendingLoadEvent()
{
if (!m_hasPendingLoadEvent)
return;
if (!m_image)
return;
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
if (element()->document()->attached())
dispatchLoadEvent();
updatedHasPendingEvent();
}
Commit Message: Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sched_ttwu_pending(void)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
struct task_struct *list = xchg(&rq->wake_list, NULL);
if (!list)
return;
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
while (list) {
struct task_struct *p = list;
list = list->wake_entry;
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, 0);
}
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool btif_av_state_opened_handler(btif_sm_event_t event, void* p_data) {
tBTA_AV* p_av = (tBTA_AV*)p_data;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: event=%s flags=0x%x", __func__,
dump_av_sm_event_name((btif_av_sm_event_t)event),
btif_av_cb.flags);
if ((event == BTA_AV_REMOTE_CMD_EVT) &&
(btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_REMOTE_SUSPEND) &&
(p_av->remote_cmd.rc_id == BTA_AV_RC_PLAY)) {
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: Resetting remote suspend flag on RC PLAY", __func__);
btif_av_cb.flags &= ~BTIF_AV_FLAG_REMOTE_SUSPEND;
}
switch (event) {
case BTIF_SM_ENTER_EVT:
btif_av_cb.flags &= ~BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_STOP;
btif_av_cb.flags &= ~BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START;
break;
case BTIF_SM_EXIT_EVT:
btif_av_cb.flags &= ~BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START;
break;
case BTIF_AV_START_STREAM_REQ_EVT:
if (btif_av_cb.peer_sep != AVDT_TSEP_SRC) btif_a2dp_source_setup_codec();
BTA_AvStart();
btif_av_cb.flags |= BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START;
break;
case BTA_AV_START_EVT: {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: BTA_AV_START_EVT status=%d suspending=%d initiator=%d "
"flags=0x%x",
__func__, p_av->start.status, p_av->start.suspending,
p_av->start.initiator, btif_av_cb.flags);
if ((p_av->start.status == BTA_SUCCESS) &&
(p_av->start.suspending == true))
return true;
/* if remote tries to start a2dp when DUT is a2dp source
* then suspend. In case a2dp is sink and call is active
* then disconnect the AVDTP channel
*/
if (!(btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START)) {
if (btif_av_cb.peer_sep == AVDT_TSEP_SNK) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s: trigger suspend as remote initiated!!",
__func__);
btif_dispatch_sm_event(BTIF_AV_SUSPEND_STREAM_REQ_EVT, NULL, 0);
}
}
/* In case peer is A2DP SRC we do not want to ack commands on UIPC*/
if (btif_av_cb.peer_sep == AVDT_TSEP_SNK) {
if (btif_a2dp_on_started(
&p_av->start,
((btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START) != 0))) {
/* only clear pending flag after acknowledgement */
btif_av_cb.flags &= ~BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START;
}
}
/* remain in open state if status failed */
if (p_av->start.status != BTA_AV_SUCCESS) return false;
if (btif_av_cb.peer_sep == AVDT_TSEP_SRC) {
btif_a2dp_sink_set_rx_flush(
false); /* remove flush state, ready for streaming*/
}
/* change state to started, send acknowledgement if start is pending */
if (btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START) {
if (btif_av_cb.peer_sep == AVDT_TSEP_SNK)
btif_a2dp_on_started(NULL, true);
/* pending start flag will be cleared when exit current state */
}
btif_sm_change_state(btif_av_cb.sm_handle, BTIF_AV_STATE_STARTED);
} break;
case BTIF_AV_SOURCE_CONFIG_REQ_EVT:
btif_update_source_codec(p_data);
break;
case BTIF_AV_SOURCE_CONFIG_UPDATED_EVT:
btif_report_source_codec_state(p_data);
break;
case BTIF_AV_DISCONNECT_REQ_EVT:
BTA_AvClose(btif_av_cb.bta_handle);
if (btif_av_cb.peer_sep == AVDT_TSEP_SRC) {
BTA_AvCloseRc(btif_av_cb.bta_handle);
}
/* inform the application that we are disconnecting */
btif_report_connection_state(BTAV_CONNECTION_STATE_DISCONNECTING,
&(btif_av_cb.peer_bda));
break;
case BTA_AV_CLOSE_EVT:
/* avdtp link is closed */
btif_a2dp_on_stopped(NULL);
/* inform the application that we are disconnected */
btif_report_connection_state(BTAV_CONNECTION_STATE_DISCONNECTED,
&(btif_av_cb.peer_bda));
/* change state to idle, send acknowledgement if start is pending */
if (btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START) {
btif_a2dp_command_ack(A2DP_CTRL_ACK_FAILURE);
/* pending start flag will be cleared when exit current state */
}
btif_sm_change_state(btif_av_cb.sm_handle, BTIF_AV_STATE_IDLE);
break;
case BTA_AV_RECONFIG_EVT:
if ((btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START) &&
(p_av->reconfig.status == BTA_AV_SUCCESS)) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("reconfig done BTA_AVstart()");
BTA_AvStart();
} else if (btif_av_cb.flags & BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START) {
btif_av_cb.flags &= ~BTIF_AV_FLAG_PENDING_START;
btif_a2dp_command_ack(A2DP_CTRL_ACK_FAILURE);
}
break;
case BTIF_AV_CONNECT_REQ_EVT: {
btif_av_connect_req_t* connect_req_p = (btif_av_connect_req_t*)p_data;
RawAddress& target_bda = *connect_req_p->target_bda;
if (btif_av_cb.peer_bda == target_bda) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: Ignore BTIF_AV_CONNECT_REQ_EVT for same device: target_bda=%s",
__func__, target_bda.ToString().c_str());
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: Moved to opened by Other incoming Connect request: "
"target_bda=%s",
__func__, target_bda.ToString().c_str());
btif_report_connection_state(BTAV_CONNECTION_STATE_DISCONNECTED,
&target_bda);
}
btif_queue_advance();
} break;
case BTIF_AV_OFFLOAD_START_REQ_EVT:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR(
"%s: BTIF_AV_OFFLOAD_START_REQ_EVT: Stream not Started Opened",
__func__);
btif_a2dp_on_offload_started(BTA_AV_FAIL);
break;
CHECK_RC_EVENT(event, (tBTA_AV*)p_data);
default:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s: unhandled event=%s", __func__,
dump_av_sm_event_name((btif_av_sm_event_t)event));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 163,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TriState StateItalic(LocalFrame& frame, Event*) {
return StateStyle(frame, CSSPropertyFontStyle, "italic");
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::GetOverlayTextureId() const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int elf_dump_thread_status(long signr, struct elf_thread_status *t)
{
int sz = 0;
struct task_struct *p = t->thread;
t->num_notes = 0;
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, p, signr);
elf_core_copy_task_regs(p, &t->prstatus.pr_reg);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS, sizeof(t->prstatus),
&(t->prstatus));
t->num_notes++;
sz += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
if ((t->prstatus.pr_fpvalid = elf_core_copy_task_fpregs(p, NULL,
&t->fpu))) {
fill_note(&t->notes[1], "CORE", NT_PRFPREG, sizeof(t->fpu),
&(t->fpu));
t->num_notes++;
sz += notesize(&t->notes[1]);
}
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
if (elf_core_copy_task_xfpregs(p, &t->xfpu)) {
fill_note(&t->notes[2], "LINUX", ELF_CORE_XFPREG_TYPE,
sizeof(t->xfpu), &t->xfpu);
t->num_notes++;
sz += notesize(&t->notes[2]);
}
#endif
return sz;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_attr_dir_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
return proc_pident_readdir(file, ctx,
attr_dir_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(attr_dir_stuff));
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_low_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<=31;i++) {
if(x&(1<<i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 1 | 168,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uid_t IPCThreadState::getCallingUid() const
{
return mCallingUid;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
long ret;
if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
return datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
u8 *data;
u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
loff_t pos = 0;
data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto error;
}
/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
ret = kernel_read(file, data, enclen, &pos);
if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
ret = -EIO;
goto err_fput;
}
ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, data, enclen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_fput;
ret = datalen;
/* copy decrypted data to user */
if (copy_to_user(buffer, data, datalen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
err_fput:
fput(file);
error:
kzfree(data);
} else {
ret = datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
datalen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVar *jsvArrayPopFirst(JsVar *arr) {
assert(jsvIsArray(arr));
if (jsvGetFirstChild(arr)) {
JsVar *child = jsvLock(jsvGetFirstChild(arr));
if (jsvGetFirstChild(arr) == jsvGetLastChild(arr))
jsvSetLastChild(arr, 0); // if 1 item in array
jsvSetFirstChild(arr, jsvGetNextSibling(child)); // unlink from end of array
jsvUnRef(child); // as no longer in array
if (jsvGetNextSibling(child)) {
JsVar *v = jsvLock(jsvGetNextSibling(child));
jsvSetPrevSibling(v, 0);
jsvUnLock(v);
}
jsvSetNextSibling(child, 0);
return child; // and return it
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SetUpEmbeddedWorkerChannelForServiceWorker(
mojom::EmbeddedWorkerInstanceClientAssociatedRequest client_request) {
EmbeddedWorkerInstanceClientImpl::Create(
blink_initialized_time_, GetIOTaskRunner(), std::move(client_request));
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_decode_verify(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_verify *verify)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
if ((status = nfsd4_decode_bitmap(argp, verify->ve_bmval)))
goto out;
/* For convenience's sake, we compare raw xdr'd attributes in
* nfsd4_proc_verify */
READ_BUF(4);
verify->ve_attrlen = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(verify->ve_attrlen);
SAVEMEM(verify->ve_attrval, verify->ve_attrlen);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
{
char *scontextp;
if (scontext)
*scontext = NULL;
*scontext_len = 0;
if (context->len) {
*scontext_len = context->len;
if (scontext) {
*scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!(*scontext))
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
/* Compute the size of the context. */
*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
if (!scontext)
return 0;
/* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!scontextp)
return -ENOMEM;
*scontext = scontextp;
/*
* Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
*/
sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) +
1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) +
1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
*scontextp = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void v9fs_attach(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
int32_t fid, afid, n_uname;
V9fsString uname, aname;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsQID qid;
ssize_t err;
v9fs_string_init(&uname);
v9fs_string_init(&aname);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddssd", &fid,
&afid, &uname, &aname, &n_uname);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_attach(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, afid, uname.data, aname.data);
fidp = alloc_fid(s, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp->uid = n_uname;
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, NULL, "/", &fidp->path);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = fid_to_qid(pdu, fidp, &qid);
if (err < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
clunk_fid(s, fid);
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_attach_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
/*
* attach could get called multiple times for the same export.
*/
if (!s->migration_blocker) {
s->root_fid = fid;
error_setg(&s->migration_blocker,
"Migration is disabled when VirtFS export path '%s' is mounted in the guest using mount_tag '%s'",
s->ctx.fs_root ? s->ctx.fs_root : "NULL", s->tag);
migrate_add_blocker(s->migration_blocker);
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&uname);
v9fs_string_free(&aname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 1 | 164,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundTriggerHwService::CallbackThread::exit()
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mCallbackLock);
requestExit();
mCallbackCond.broadcast();
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String ScheduledNavigationReasonToProtocol(ScheduledNavigation::Reason reason) {
using ReasonEnum =
protocol::Page::FrameScheduledNavigationNotification::ReasonEnum;
switch (reason) {
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kFormSubmissionGet:
return ReasonEnum::FormSubmissionGet;
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kFormSubmissionPost:
return ReasonEnum::FormSubmissionPost;
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kHttpHeaderRefresh:
return ReasonEnum::HttpHeaderRefresh;
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kFrameNavigation:
return ReasonEnum::ScriptInitiated;
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kMetaTagRefresh:
return ReasonEnum::MetaTagRefresh;
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kPageBlock:
return ReasonEnum::PageBlockInterstitial;
case ScheduledNavigation::Reason::kReload:
return ReasonEnum::Reload;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return ReasonEnum::Reload;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_DEC_TTL(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
if (*arg == '\0') {
parse_noargs_dec_ttl(ofpacts);
} else {
struct ofpact_cnt_ids *ids;
char *cntr;
ids = ofpact_put_DEC_TTL(ofpacts);
ids->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_DEC_TTL_CNT_IDS;
for (cntr = strtok_r(arg, ", ", &arg); cntr != NULL;
cntr = strtok_r(NULL, ", ", &arg)) {
uint16_t id = atoi(cntr);
ofpbuf_put(ofpacts, &id, sizeof id);
ids = ofpacts->header;
ids->n_controllers++;
}
if (!ids->n_controllers) {
return xstrdup("dec_ttl_cnt_ids: expected at least one controller "
"id.");
}
ofpact_finish_DEC_TTL(ofpacts, &ids);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainGetAutostart(virDomainPtr domain,
int *autostart)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "autostart=%p", autostart);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(autostart, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetAutostart) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetAutostart(domain, autostart);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::RequestOverlayRoutingToken(
media::RoutingTokenCallback callback) {
if (overlay_routing_token_.has_value()) {
callback.Run(overlay_routing_token_.value());
return;
}
Send(new FrameHostMsg_RequestOverlayRoutingToken(routing_id_));
pending_routing_token_callbacks_.push_back(callback);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gfs2_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct gfs2_holder i_gh;
struct gfs2_file *fp;
int error;
fp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct gfs2_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fp)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_init(&fp->f_fl_mutex);
gfs2_assert_warn(GFS2_SB(inode), !file->private_data);
file->private_data = fp;
if (S_ISREG(ip->i_inode.i_mode)) {
error = gfs2_glock_nq_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_SHARED, LM_FLAG_ANY,
&i_gh);
if (error)
goto fail;
if (!(file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE) &&
i_size_read(inode) > MAX_NON_LFS) {
error = -EOVERFLOW;
goto fail_gunlock;
}
gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&i_gh);
}
return 0;
fail_gunlock:
gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&i_gh);
fail:
file->private_data = NULL;
kfree(fp);
return error;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
char head_type)
{
const void *h;
const char *p, *endp;
struct rar *rar;
struct rar_header rar_header;
struct rar_file_header file_header;
int64_t header_size;
unsigned filename_size, end;
char *filename;
char *strp;
char packed_size[8];
char unp_size[8];
int ttime;
struct archive_string_conv *sconv, *fn_sconv;
unsigned long crc32_val;
int ret = (ARCHIVE_OK), ret2;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
/* Setup a string conversion object for non-rar-unicode filenames. */
sconv = rar->opt_sconv;
if (sconv == NULL) {
if (!rar->init_default_conversion) {
rar->sconv_default =
archive_string_default_conversion_for_read(
&(a->archive));
rar->init_default_conversion = 1;
}
sconv = rar->sconv_default;
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
memcpy(&rar_header, p, sizeof(rar_header));
rar->file_flags = archive_le16dec(rar_header.flags);
header_size = archive_le16dec(rar_header.size);
if (header_size < (int64_t)sizeof(file_header) + 7) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
crc32_val = crc32(0, (const unsigned char *)p + 2, 7 - 2);
__archive_read_consume(a, 7);
if (!(rar->file_flags & FHD_SOLID))
{
rar->compression_method = 0;
rar->packed_size = 0;
rar->unp_size = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->atime = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->mode = 0;
memset(&rar->salt, 0, sizeof(rar->salt));
rar->atime = 0;
rar->ansec = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->cnsec = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->mnsec = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->arcnsec = 0;
}
else
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR solid archive support unavailable.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* File Header CRC check. */
crc32_val = crc32(crc32_val, h, (unsigned)(header_size - 7));
if ((crc32_val & 0xffff) != archive_le16dec(rar_header.crc)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Header CRC error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* If no CRC error, Go on parsing File Header. */
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
memcpy(&file_header, p, sizeof(file_header));
p += sizeof(file_header);
rar->compression_method = file_header.method;
ttime = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_time);
rar->mtime = get_time(ttime);
rar->file_crc = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_crc);
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_PASSWORD)
{
archive_entry_set_is_data_encrypted(entry, 1);
rar->has_encrypted_entries = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR encryption support unavailable.");
/* Since it is only the data part itself that is encrypted we can at least
extract information about the currently processed entry and don't need
to return ARCHIVE_FATAL here. */
/*return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);*/
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_LARGE)
{
memcpy(packed_size, file_header.pack_size, 4);
memcpy(packed_size + 4, p, 4); /* High pack size */
p += 4;
memcpy(unp_size, file_header.unp_size, 4);
memcpy(unp_size + 4, p, 4); /* High unpack size */
p += 4;
rar->packed_size = archive_le64dec(&packed_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le64dec(&unp_size);
}
else
{
rar->packed_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.pack_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.unp_size);
}
if (rar->packed_size < 0 || rar->unp_size < 0)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid sizes specified.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_remaining = rar->packed_size;
/* TODO: RARv3 subblocks contain comments. For now the complete block is
* consumed at the end.
*/
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD) {
size_t distance = p - (const char *)h;
header_size += rar->packed_size;
/* Make sure we have the extended data. */
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
p += distance;
}
filename_size = archive_le16dec(file_header.name_size);
if (p + filename_size > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (rar->filename_allocated < filename_size * 2 + 2) {
char *newptr;
size_t newsize = filename_size * 2 + 2;
newptr = realloc(rar->filename, newsize);
if (newptr == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->filename = newptr;
rar->filename_allocated = newsize;
}
filename = rar->filename;
memcpy(filename, p, filename_size);
filename[filename_size] = '\0';
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_UNICODE)
{
if (filename_size != strlen(filename))
{
unsigned char highbyte, flagbits, flagbyte;
unsigned fn_end, offset;
end = filename_size;
fn_end = filename_size * 2;
filename_size = 0;
offset = (unsigned)strlen(filename) + 1;
highbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 0;
flagbyte = 0;
while (offset < end && filename_size < fn_end)
{
if (!flagbits)
{
flagbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 8;
}
flagbits -= 2;
switch((flagbyte >> flagbits) & 3)
{
case 0:
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 1:
filename[filename_size++] = highbyte;
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 2:
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset + 1);
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset);
offset += 2;
break;
case 3:
{
char extra, high;
uint8_t length = *(p + offset++);
if (length & 0x80) {
extra = *(p + offset++);
high = (char)highbyte;
} else
extra = high = 0;
length = (length & 0x7f) + 2;
while (length && filename_size < fn_end) {
unsigned cp = filename_size >> 1;
filename[filename_size++] = high;
filename[filename_size++] = p[cp] + extra;
length--;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (filename_size > fn_end) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
/*
* Do not increment filename_size here as the computations below
* add the space for the terminating NUL explicitly.
*/
filename[filename_size] = '\0';
/* Decoded unicode form is UTF-16BE, so we have to update a string
* conversion object for it. */
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf16be = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-16BE", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf16be;
strp = filename;
while (memcmp(strp, "\x00\x00", 2))
{
if (!memcmp(strp, "\x00\\", 2))
*(strp + 1) = '/';
strp += 2;
}
p += offset;
} else {
/*
* If FHD_UNICODE is set but no unicode data, this file name form
* is UTF-8, so we have to update a string conversion object for
* it accordingly.
*/
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf8 = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-8", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf8;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
}
else
{
fn_sconv = sconv;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
/* Split file in multivolume RAR. No more need to process header. */
if (rar->filename_save &&
filename_size == rar->filename_save_size &&
!memcmp(rar->filename, rar->filename_save, filename_size + 1))
{
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->cursor++;
if (rar->cursor >= rar->nodes)
{
rar->nodes++;
if ((rar->dbo =
realloc(rar->dbo, sizeof(*rar->dbo) * rar->nodes)) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = -1;
}
if (rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset < 0)
{
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset +
rar->packed_size;
}
return ret;
}
rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
filename_size + 1);
memcpy(rar->filename_save, rar->filename, filename_size + 1);
rar->filename_save_size = filename_size;
/* Set info for seeking */
free(rar->dbo);
if ((rar->dbo = calloc(1, sizeof(*rar->dbo))) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[0].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = -1;
rar->cursor = 0;
rar->nodes = 1;
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_SALT)
{
if (p + 8 > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(rar->salt, p, 8);
p += 8;
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_EXTTIME) {
if (read_exttime(p, rar, endp) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = rar->dbo[0].start_offset + rar->packed_size;
switch(file_header.host_os)
{
case OS_MSDOS:
case OS_OS2:
case OS_WIN32:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
if (rar->mode & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)
rar->mode = AE_IFDIR | S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH;
else
rar->mode = AE_IFREG;
rar->mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH;
break;
case OS_UNIX:
case OS_MAC_OS:
case OS_BEOS:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown file attributes from RAR file's host OS");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_uncopied = rar->bytes_unconsumed = 0;
rar->lzss.position = rar->offset = 0;
rar->offset_seek = 0;
rar->dictionary_size = 0;
rar->offset_outgoing = 0;
rar->br.cache_avail = 0;
rar->br.avail_in = 0;
rar->crc_calculated = 0;
rar->entry_eof = 0;
rar->valid = 1;
rar->is_ppmd_block = 0;
rar->start_new_table = 1;
free(rar->unp_buffer);
rar->unp_buffer = NULL;
rar->unp_offset = 0;
rar->unp_buffer_size = UNP_BUFFER_SIZE;
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context);
rar->ppmd_valid = rar->ppmd_eod = 0;
/* Don't set any archive entries for non-file header types */
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD)
return ret;
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, rar->mtime, rar->mnsec);
archive_entry_set_ctime(entry, rar->ctime, rar->cnsec);
archive_entry_set_atime(entry, rar->atime, rar->ansec);
archive_entry_set_size(entry, rar->unp_size);
archive_entry_set_mode(entry, rar->mode);
if (archive_entry_copy_pathname_l(entry, filename, filename_size, fn_sconv))
{
if (errno == ENOMEM)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Pathname cannot be converted from %s to current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(fn_sconv));
ret = (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (((rar->mode) & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK)
{
/* Make sure a symbolic-link file does not have its body. */
rar->bytes_remaining = 0;
archive_entry_set_size(entry, 0);
/* Read a symbolic-link name. */
if ((ret2 = read_symlink_stored(a, entry, sconv)) < (ARCHIVE_WARN))
return ret2;
if (ret > ret2)
ret = ret2;
}
if (rar->bytes_remaining == 0)
rar->entry_eof = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 74,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragGetOsPolicy(Packet *p)
{
int policy = -1;
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
policy = SCHInfoGetIPv4HostOSFlavour((uint8_t *)GET_IPV4_DST_ADDR_PTR(p));
}
else if (PKT_IS_IPV6(p)) {
policy = SCHInfoGetIPv6HostOSFlavour((uint8_t *)GET_IPV6_DST_ADDR(p));
}
if (policy == -1) {
return default_policy;
}
/* Map the OS policies returned from the configured host info to
* defrag specific policies. */
switch (policy) {
/* BSD. */
case OS_POLICY_BSD:
case OS_POLICY_HPUX10:
case OS_POLICY_IRIX:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_BSD;
/* BSD-Right. */
case OS_POLICY_BSD_RIGHT:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_BSD_RIGHT;
/* Linux. */
case OS_POLICY_OLD_LINUX:
case OS_POLICY_LINUX:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_LINUX;
/* First. */
case OS_POLICY_OLD_SOLARIS:
case OS_POLICY_HPUX11:
case OS_POLICY_MACOS:
case OS_POLICY_FIRST:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_FIRST;
/* Solaris. */
case OS_POLICY_SOLARIS:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_SOLARIS;
/* Windows. */
case OS_POLICY_WINDOWS:
case OS_POLICY_VISTA:
case OS_POLICY_WINDOWS2K3:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_WINDOWS;
/* Last. */
case OS_POLICY_LAST:
return DEFRAG_POLICY_LAST;
default:
return default_policy;
}
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 67,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackingStoreGtk::XShowRect(const gfx::Point &origin,
const gfx::Rect& rect, XID target) {
XCopyArea(display_, pixmap_, target, static_cast<GC>(pixmap_gc_),
rect.x(), rect.y(), rect.width(), rect.height(),
rect.x() + origin.x(), rect.y() + origin.y());
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_mmap_event(struct perf_mmap_event *mmap_event)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = mmap_event->vma;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
int maj = 0, min = 0;
u64 ino = 0, gen = 0;
u32 prot = 0, flags = 0;
unsigned int size;
char tmp[16];
char *buf = NULL;
char *name;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode;
dev_t dev;
buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
name = "//enomem";
goto cpy_name;
}
/*
* d_path() works from the end of the rb backwards, so we
* need to add enough zero bytes after the string to handle
* the 64bit alignment we do later.
*/
name = d_path(&file->f_path, buf, PATH_MAX - sizeof(u64));
if (IS_ERR(name)) {
name = "//toolong";
goto cpy_name;
}
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
ino = inode->i_ino;
gen = inode->i_generation;
maj = MAJOR(dev);
min = MINOR(dev);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
prot |= PROT_READ;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
prot |= PROT_WRITE;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
flags = MAP_SHARED;
else
flags = MAP_PRIVATE;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_DENYWRITE)
flags |= MAP_DENYWRITE;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC)
flags |= MAP_EXECUTABLE;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_HUGETLB)
flags |= MAP_HUGETLB;
goto got_name;
} else {
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->name) {
name = (char *) vma->vm_ops->name(vma);
if (name)
goto cpy_name;
}
name = (char *)arch_vma_name(vma);
if (name)
goto cpy_name;
if (vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
name = "[heap]";
goto cpy_name;
}
if (vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
name = "[stack]";
goto cpy_name;
}
name = "//anon";
goto cpy_name;
}
cpy_name:
strlcpy(tmp, name, sizeof(tmp));
name = tmp;
got_name:
/*
* Since our buffer works in 8 byte units we need to align our string
* size to a multiple of 8. However, we must guarantee the tail end is
* zero'd out to avoid leaking random bits to userspace.
*/
size = strlen(name)+1;
while (!IS_ALIGNED(size, sizeof(u64)))
name[size++] = '\0';
mmap_event->file_name = name;
mmap_event->file_size = size;
mmap_event->maj = maj;
mmap_event->min = min;
mmap_event->ino = ino;
mmap_event->ino_generation = gen;
mmap_event->prot = prot;
mmap_event->flags = flags;
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
mmap_event->event_id.header.misc |= PERF_RECORD_MISC_MMAP_DATA;
mmap_event->event_id.header.size = sizeof(mmap_event->event_id) + size;
perf_event_aux(perf_event_mmap_output,
mmap_event,
NULL);
kfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReadAt(int64_t position, int64_t howmuch = kDataSize) {
data_source_->Read(position, howmuch, buffer_,
base::Bind(&MultibufferDataSourceTest::ReadCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TextAutosizer::isAutosizingContainer(const RenderObject* renderer)
{
return renderer->isRenderBlock() && !renderer->isInline() && !renderer->isListItem();
}
Commit Message: Text Autosizing: Counteract funky window sizing on Android.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98809
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
In Chrome for Android, the window sizes provided to WebCore are
currently in physical screen pixels instead of
device-scale-adjusted units. For example window width on a
Galaxy Nexus is 720 instead of 360. Text autosizing expects
device-independent pixels. When Chrome for Android cuts over to
the new coordinate space, it will be tied to the setting
applyPageScaleFactorInCompositor.
No new tests.
* rendering/TextAutosizer.cpp:
(WebCore::TextAutosizer::processSubtree):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@130866 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int multicast_event(struct snd_seq_client *client, struct snd_seq_event *event,
int atomic, int hop)
{
pr_debug("ALSA: seq: multicast not supported yet.\n");
return 0; /* ignored */
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedMethodBMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (((info.Length() == 1))) {
overloadedMethodB1Method(info);
return;
}
if (((info.Length() == 1)) || ((info.Length() == 2))) {
overloadedMethodB2Method(info);
return;
}
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedMethodB", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
exceptionState.throwTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
unsigned int *size, const char *name,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
struct arpt_entry *de;
unsigned int origsize;
int ret, h;
ret = 0;
origsize = *size;
de = (struct arpt_entry *)*dstptr;
memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct arpt_entry));
memcpy(&de->counters, &e->counters, sizeof(e->counters));
*dstptr += sizeof(struct arpt_entry);
*size += sizeof(struct arpt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry);
de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
t = compat_arpt_get_target(e);
target = t->u.kernel.target;
xt_compat_target_from_user(t, dstptr, size);
de->next_offset = e->next_offset - (origsize - *size);
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->hook_entry[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] -= origsize - *size;
if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoMemoryBarrierByRegion(
GLbitfield barriers) {
api()->glMemoryBarrierByRegionFn(barriers);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltExtensionInstructionResultRegister(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj)
{
int i;
xmlNodePtr cur;
xmlDocPtr doc;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (obj == NULL))
return(-1);
/*
* OPTIMIZE TODO: If no local variables/params and no local tree
* fragments were created, then we don't need to analyse the XPath
* objects for tree fragments.
*/
if ((obj->type != XPATH_NODESET) && (obj->type != XPATH_XSLT_TREE))
return(0);
if ((obj->nodesetval == NULL) || (obj->nodesetval->nodeNr == 0))
return(0);
for (i = 0; i < obj->nodesetval->nodeNr; i++) {
cur = obj->nodesetval->nodeTab[i];
if (cur->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) {
/*
* The XPath module sets the owner element of a ns-node on
* the ns->next field.
*/
if ((((xmlNsPtr) cur)->next != NULL) &&
(((xmlNsPtr) cur)->next->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
{
cur = (xmlNodePtr) ((xmlNsPtr) cur)->next;
doc = cur->doc;
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, ctxt->inst,
"Internal error in "
"xsltExtensionInstructionResultRegister(): "
"Cannot retrieve the doc of a namespace node.\n");
goto error;
}
} else {
doc = cur->doc;
}
if (doc == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, ctxt->inst,
"Internal error in "
"xsltExtensionInstructionResultRegister(): "
"Cannot retrieve the doc of a node.\n");
goto error;
}
if (doc->name && (doc->name[0] == ' ')) {
/*
* This is a result tree fragment.
* We'll use the @psvi field for reference counting.
* TODO: How do we know if this is a value of a
* global variable or a doc acquired via the
* document() function?
*/
doc->psvi = (void *) ((long) 1);
}
}
return(0);
error:
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: horizontalDifference16(unsigned short *ip, int n, int stride,
unsigned short *wp, uint16 *From14)
{
register int r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
/* assumption is unsigned pixel values */
#undef CLAMP
#define CLAMP(v) From14[(v) >> 2]
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); g2 = wp[1] = CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = CLAMP(ip[2]); a2 = wp[3] = CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
ip += n - 1; /* point to last one */
wp += n - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 86,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<NodeList> Document::getItems(const String& typeNames)
{
String localTypeNames = typeNames.isNull() ? MicroDataItemList::undefinedItemType() : typeNames;
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithName<MicroDataItemList>(this, MicroDataItemListType, localTypeNames);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::queryUsageAndQuota(WebCore::ErrorString*, const WTF::String&, WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::TypeBuilder::Page::Quota>&, WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::TypeBuilder::Page::Usage>&)
{
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __rt_schedulable(struct task_group *tg, u64 period, u64 runtime)
{
int ret;
struct rt_schedulable_data data = {
.tg = tg,
.rt_period = period,
.rt_runtime = runtime,
};
rcu_read_lock();
ret = walk_tg_tree(tg_rt_schedulable, tg_nop, &data);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Textfield::HasCompositionText() const {
return model_->HasCompositionText();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
return 0;
shsigalgs += idx;
if (phash)
*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
if (psign)
*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
if (psignhash)
*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
if (rsig)
*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
if (rhash)
*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle* oldStyle)
{
RenderBox::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
RenderStyle* newStyle = style();
if (!isAnonymousBlock()) {
for (RenderBlock* currCont = blockElementContinuation(); currCont; currCont = currCont->blockElementContinuation()) {
RenderBoxModelObject* nextCont = currCont->continuation();
currCont->setContinuation(0);
currCont->setStyle(newStyle);
currCont->setContinuation(nextCont);
}
}
if (FastTextAutosizer* textAutosizer = document().fastTextAutosizer())
textAutosizer->record(this);
propagateStyleToAnonymousChildren(true);
invalidateLineHeight();
m_hasBorderOrPaddingLogicalWidthChanged = oldStyle && diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && needsLayout() && borderOrPaddingLogicalWidthChanged(oldStyle, newStyle);
Vector<ImageResource*> images;
appendImagesFromStyle(images, *newStyle);
if (images.isEmpty())
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::resourceLoadPriorityOptimizer()->removeRenderObject(this);
else
ResourceLoadPriorityOptimizer::resourceLoadPriorityOptimizer()->addRenderObject(this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::NestedUnionAtributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_nestedUnionAtribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::NestedUnionAtributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::OpenTaskManager(bool highlight_background_resources) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("TaskManager"));
if (highlight_background_resources)
window_->ShowBackgroundPages();
else
window_->ShowTaskManager();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void announce_device(struct usb_device *udev)
{
dev_info(&udev->dev, "New USB device found, idVendor=%04x, idProduct=%04x\n",
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idVendor),
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct));
dev_info(&udev->dev,
"New USB device strings: Mfr=%d, Product=%d, SerialNumber=%d\n",
udev->descriptor.iManufacturer,
udev->descriptor.iProduct,
udev->descriptor.iSerialNumber);
show_string(udev, "Product", udev->product);
show_string(udev, "Manufacturer", udev->manufacturer);
show_string(udev, "SerialNumber", udev->serial);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: close_and_restore(const struct magic_set *ms, const char *name, int fd,
const struct stat *sb)
{
if (fd == STDIN_FILENO || name == NULL)
return;
(void) close(fd);
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_PRESERVE_ATIME) != 0) {
/*
* Try to restore access, modification times if read it.
* This is really *bad* because it will modify the status
* time of the file... And of course this will affect
* backup programs
*/
#ifdef HAVE_UTIMES
struct timeval utsbuf[2];
(void)memset(utsbuf, 0, sizeof(utsbuf));
utsbuf[0].tv_sec = sb->st_atime;
utsbuf[1].tv_sec = sb->st_mtime;
(void) utimes(name, utsbuf); /* don't care if loses */
#elif defined(HAVE_UTIME_H) || defined(HAVE_SYS_UTIME_H)
struct utimbuf utbuf;
(void)memset(&utbuf, 0, sizeof(utbuf));
utbuf.actime = sb->st_atime;
utbuf.modtime = sb->st_mtime;
(void) utime(name, &utbuf); /* don't care if loses */
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 45,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithSequenceArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithSequenceArg");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(sequence<ScriptProfile>*, sequenceArg, toNativeArray<ScriptProfile>(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
imp->methodWithSequenceArg(sequenceArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char* php_pgsql_PQescapeInternal(PGconn *conn, const char *str, size_t len, int escape_literal, int safe) {
char *result, *rp, *s;
size_t tmp_len;
if (!conn) {
return NULL;
}
/* allocate enough memory */
rp = result = (char *)safe_emalloc(len, 2, 5); /* leading " E" needs extra 2 bytes + quote_chars on both end for 2 bytes + NULL */
if (escape_literal) {
size_t new_len;
if (safe) {
char *tmp = (char *)safe_emalloc(len, 2, 1);
*rp++ = '\'';
/* PQescapeString does not escape \, but it handles multibyte chars safely.
This escape is incompatible with PQescapeLiteral. */
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(conn, tmp, str, len, NULL);
strncpy(rp, tmp, new_len);
efree(tmp);
rp += new_len;
} else {
char *encoding;
/* This is compatible with PQescapeLiteral, but it cannot handle multbyte chars
such as SJIS, BIG5. Raise warning and return NULL by checking
client_encoding. */
encoding = (char *) pg_encoding_to_char(PQclientEncoding(conn));
if (!strncmp(encoding, "SJIS", sizeof("SJIS")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "SHIFT_JIS_2004", sizeof("SHIFT_JIS_2004")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "BIG5", sizeof("BIG5")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "GB18030", sizeof("GB18030")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "GBK", sizeof("GBK")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "JOHAB", sizeof("JOHAB")-1) ||
!strncmp(encoding, "UHC", sizeof("UHC")-1) ) {
TSRMLS_FETCH();
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unsafe encoding is used. Do not use '%s' encoding or use PostgreSQL 9.0 or later libpq.", encoding);
}
/* check backslashes */
tmp_len = strspn(str, "\\");
if (tmp_len != len) {
/* add " E" for escaping slashes */
*rp++ = ' ';
*rp++ = 'E';
}
*rp++ = '\'';
for (s = (char *)str; s - str < len; ++s) {
if (*s == '\'' || *s == '\\') {
*rp++ = *s;
*rp++ = *s;
} else {
*rp++ = *s;
}
}
}
*rp++ = '\'';
} else {
/* Identifier escape. */
*rp++ = '"';
for (s = (char *)str; s - str < len; ++s) {
if (*s == '"') {
*rp++ = '"';
*rp++ = '"';
} else {
*rp++ = *s;
}
}
*rp++ = '"';
}
*rp = '\0';
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *ipmi_addr_src_to_str(enum ipmi_addr_src src)
{
if (src >= SI_LAST)
src = 0; /* Invalid */
return addr_src_to_str[src];
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_pkg(nw_ses *ses, void *data, size_t max)
{
struct clt_info *info = ses->privdata;
if (!info->upgrade) {
return max;
}
if (max < 2)
return 0;
uint8_t *p = data;
size_t pkg_size = 0;
memset(&info->frame, 0, sizeof(info->frame));
info->frame.fin = p[0] & 0x80;
info->frame.opcode = p[0] & 0x0f;
if (!is_good_opcode(info->frame.opcode))
return -1;
uint8_t mask = p[1] & 0x80;
if (mask == 0)
return -1;
uint8_t len = p[1] & 0x7f;
if (len < 126) {
pkg_size = 2;
info->frame.payload_len = len;
} else if (len == 126) {
pkg_size = 2 + 2;
if (max < pkg_size)
return 0;
info->frame.payload_len = be16toh(*(uint16_t *)(p + 2));
} else if (len == 127) {
pkg_size = 2 + 8;
if (max < pkg_size)
return 0;
info->frame.payload_len = be64toh(*(uint64_t *)(p + 2));
}
uint8_t masks[4];
memcpy(masks, p + pkg_size, sizeof(masks));
pkg_size += sizeof(masks);
info->frame.payload = p + pkg_size;
pkg_size += info->frame.payload_len;
if (max < pkg_size)
return 0;
p = info->frame.payload;
for (size_t i = 0; i < info->frame.payload_len; ++i) {
p[i] = p[i] ^ masks[i & 3];
}
return pkg_size;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 76,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(const WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
const WebKit::WebNode& node) {
if (!node.isNull())
return true;
if (!frame->document().isPluginDocument())
return false;
WebKit::WebPlugin* plugin =
frame->document().to<WebKit::WebPluginDocument>().plugin();
return plugin && plugin->supportsPaginatedPrint();
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorSelectAccountSheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_SELECT_ACCOUNT);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,936 |
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