instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::TouchState::removeWindow(const sp<InputWindowHandle>& windowHandle) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < windows.size(); i++) {
if (windows.itemAt(i).windowHandle == windowHandle) {
windows.removeAt(i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(BrowserCompositorOutputSurfaceProxy, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(GpuHostMsg_UpdateVSyncParameters,
OnUpdateVSyncParameters);
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListControllerDelegateImpl::DoCreateShortcutsFlow(
Profile* profile,
const std::string& extension_id) {
DCHECK(CanDoCreateShortcutsFlow());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
DCHECK(service);
const extensions::Extension* extension = service->GetInstalledExtension(
extension_id);
DCHECK(extension);
gfx::NativeWindow parent_window = GetAppListWindow();
if (!parent_window)
return;
OnShowChildDialog();
chrome::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(
parent_window, profile, extension,
base::Bind(&AppListControllerDelegateImpl::OnCloseCreateShortcutsPrompt,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int blk_get_device_by_str(const char *ifname, const char *dev_hwpart_str,
struct blk_desc **dev_desc)
{
char *ep;
char *dup_str = NULL;
const char *dev_str, *hwpart_str;
int dev, hwpart;
hwpart_str = strchr(dev_hwpart_str, '.');
if (hwpart_str) {
dup_str = strdup(dev_hwpart_str);
dup_str[hwpart_str - dev_hwpart_str] = 0;
dev_str = dup_str;
hwpart_str++;
} else {
dev_str = dev_hwpart_str;
hwpart = 0;
}
dev = simple_strtoul(dev_str, &ep, 16);
if (*ep) {
printf("** Bad device specification %s %s **\n",
ifname, dev_str);
dev = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (hwpart_str) {
hwpart = simple_strtoul(hwpart_str, &ep, 16);
if (*ep) {
printf("** Bad HW partition specification %s %s **\n",
ifname, hwpart_str);
dev = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
}
*dev_desc = get_dev_hwpart(ifname, dev, hwpart);
if (!(*dev_desc) || ((*dev_desc)->type == DEV_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
debug("** Bad device %s %s **\n", ifname, dev_hwpart_str);
dev = -ENOENT;
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_BLOCK_DEVICE
/*
* Updates the partition table for the specified hw partition.
* Always should be done, otherwise hw partition 0 will return stale
* data after displaying a non-zero hw partition.
*/
part_init(*dev_desc);
#endif
cleanup:
free(dup_str);
return dev;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_link(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs4_change_info *cinfo)
{
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_LINK);
if (status)
return status;
return decode_change_info(xdr, cinfo);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_tdis(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
{
struct smb2_tree_disconnect_req *req; /* response is trivial */
int rc = 0;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
int flags = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Tree Disconnect\n");
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
if ((tcon->need_reconnect) || (tcon->ses->need_reconnect))
return 0;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_TREE_DISCONNECT, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
rc = SendReceiveNoRsp(xid, ses, (char *)req, flags);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
if (rc)
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_TREE_DISCONNECT_HE);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bdrv_bochs_init(void)
{
bdrv_register(&bdrv_bochs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void tm_recheckpoint_new_task(struct task_struct *new)
{
unsigned long msr;
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
return;
/* Recheckpoint the registers of the thread we're about to switch to.
*
* If the task was using FP, we non-lazily reload both the original and
* the speculative FP register states. This is because the kernel
* doesn't see if/when a TM rollback occurs, so if we take an FP
* unavoidable later, we are unable to determine which set of FP regs
* need to be restored.
*/
if (!new->thread.regs)
return;
/* The TM SPRs are restored here, so that TEXASR.FS can be set
* before the trecheckpoint and no explosion occurs.
*/
tm_restore_sprs(&new->thread);
if (!MSR_TM_ACTIVE(new->thread.regs->msr))
return;
msr = new->thread.tm_orig_msr;
/* Recheckpoint to restore original checkpointed register state. */
TM_DEBUG("*** tm_recheckpoint of pid %d "
"(new->msr 0x%lx, new->origmsr 0x%lx)\n",
new->pid, new->thread.regs->msr, msr);
/* This loads the checkpointed FP/VEC state, if used */
tm_recheckpoint(&new->thread, msr);
/* This loads the speculative FP/VEC state, if used */
if (msr & MSR_FP) {
do_load_up_transact_fpu(&new->thread);
new->thread.regs->msr |=
(MSR_FP | new->thread.fpexc_mode);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ALTIVEC
if (msr & MSR_VEC) {
do_load_up_transact_altivec(&new->thread);
new->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_VEC;
}
#endif
/* We may as well turn on VSX too since all the state is restored now */
if (msr & MSR_VSX)
new->thread.regs->msr |= MSR_VSX;
TM_DEBUG("*** tm_recheckpoint of pid %d complete "
"(kernel msr 0x%lx)\n",
new->pid, mfmsr());
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaStreamDevicesController::ShouldAlwaysAllowOrigin() const {
return profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->ShouldAllowAllContent(
request_.security_origin, request_.security_origin,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM);
}
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
R=xians@chromium.org, yzshen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InsNew( PProfileList list,
PProfile profile )
{
PProfile *old, current;
Long x;
old = list;
current = *old;
x = profile->X;
while ( current )
{
if ( x < current->X )
break;
old = ¤t->link;
current = *old;
}
profile->link = current;
*old = profile;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_find_codec_tag(AVFormatContext *s, MOVTrack *track)
{
int tag;
if (is_cover_image(track->st))
return ff_codec_get_tag(codec_cover_image_tags, track->par->codec_id);
if (track->mode == MODE_MP4 || track->mode == MODE_PSP)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else if (track->mode == MODE_ISM)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else if (track->mode == MODE_IPOD) {
if (!av_match_ext(s->url, "m4a") &&
!av_match_ext(s->url, "m4v") &&
!av_match_ext(s->url, "m4b"))
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning, extension is not .m4a nor .m4v "
"Quicktime/Ipod might not play the file\n");
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
} else if (track->mode & MODE_3GP)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else if (track->mode == MODE_F4V)
tag = track->par->codec_tag;
else
tag = mov_get_codec_tag(s, track);
return tag;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppControllerImpl::AppControllerImpl(Profile* profile)
//// static
: profile_(profile),
app_service_proxy_(apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile)),
url_prefix_(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
chromeos::switches::kKioskNextHomeUrlPrefix)) {
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().AddObserver(this);
if (profile) {
content::URLDataSource::Add(profile,
std::make_unique<apps::AppIconSource>(profile));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GaiaCookieManagerService::StartFetchingLogOut() {
DCHECK(requests_.front().request_type() == GaiaCookieRequestType::LOG_OUT);
VLOG(1) << "GaiaCookieManagerService::StartFetchingLogOut";
gaia_auth_fetcher_.reset(signin_client_->CreateGaiaAuthFetcher(
this, GetSourceForRequest(requests_.front()),
signin_client_->GetURLRequestContext()));
gaia_auth_fetcher_->StartLogOut();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 129,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_MD( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort K, L;
FT_F26Dot6 D;
K = (FT_UShort)args[1];
L = (FT_UShort)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( L, exc->zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( K, exc->zp1.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
D = 0;
}
else
{
if ( exc->opcode & 1 )
D = PROJECT( exc->zp0.cur + L, exc->zp1.cur + K );
else
{
/* XXX: UNDOCUMENTED: twilight zone special case */
if ( exc->GS.gep0 == 0 || exc->GS.gep1 == 0 )
{
FT_Vector* vec1 = exc->zp0.org + L;
FT_Vector* vec2 = exc->zp1.org + K;
D = DUALPROJ( vec1, vec2 );
}
else
{
FT_Vector* vec1 = exc->zp0.orus + L;
FT_Vector* vec2 = exc->zp1.orus + K;
if ( exc->metrics.x_scale == exc->metrics.y_scale )
{
/* this should be faster */
D = DUALPROJ( vec1, vec2 );
D = FT_MulFix( D, exc->metrics.x_scale );
}
else
{
FT_Vector vec;
vec.x = FT_MulFix( vec1->x - vec2->x, exc->metrics.x_scale );
vec.y = FT_MulFix( vec1->y - vec2->y, exc->metrics.y_scale );
D = FAST_DUALPROJ( &vec );
}
}
}
}
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
/* Disable Type 2 Vacuform Rounds - e.g. Arial Narrow */
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY &&
exc->ignore_x_mode &&
FT_ABS( D ) == 64 )
D += 1;
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
args[0] = D;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gfn_t get_mmio_spte_gfn(u64 spte)
{
u64 mask = generation_mmio_spte_mask(MMIO_MAX_GEN) | shadow_mmio_mask;
return (spte & ~mask) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attrmulti_attr_set(
struct inode *inode,
unsigned char *name,
const unsigned char __user *ubuf,
__uint32_t len,
__uint32_t flags)
{
unsigned char *kbuf;
int error = EFAULT;
if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_APPEND(inode))
return EPERM;
if (len > XATTR_SIZE_MAX)
return EINVAL;
kbuf = memdup_user(ubuf, len);
if (IS_ERR(kbuf))
return PTR_ERR(kbuf);
error = xfs_attr_set(XFS_I(inode), name, kbuf, len, flags);
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_seq2d_t *jas_seq2d_copy(jas_seq2d_t *x)
{
jas_matrix_t *y;
int i;
int j;
y = jas_seq2d_create(jas_seq2d_xstart(x), jas_seq2d_ystart(x), jas_seq2d_xend(x),
jas_seq2d_yend(x));
assert(y);
for (i = 0; i < x->numrows_; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < x->numcols_; ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(y, i, j) = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
}
}
return y;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStripModel::ContainsIndex(int index) const {
return index >= 0 && index < count();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err set_file_udta(GF_ISOFile *dest, u32 tracknum, u32 udta_type, char *src, Bool is_box_array)
{
char *data = NULL;
GF_Err res = GF_OK;
u32 size;
bin128 uuid;
memset(uuid, 0 , 16);
if (!udta_type && !is_box_array) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (!src) {
return gf_isom_remove_user_data(dest, tracknum, udta_type, uuid);
}
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_CORE_TOOLS
if (!strnicmp(src, "base64", 6)) {
src += 7;
size = (u32) strlen(src);
data = gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * size);
size = gf_base64_decode(src, size, data, size);
} else
#endif
{
FILE *t = gf_fopen(src, "rb");
if (!t) return GF_IO_ERR;
fseek(t, 0, SEEK_END);
size = ftell(t);
fseek(t, 0, SEEK_SET);
data = gf_malloc(sizeof(char)*size);
if (size != fread(data, 1, size, t) ) {
gf_free(data);
gf_fclose(t);
return GF_IO_ERR;
}
gf_fclose(t);
}
if (size && data) {
if (is_box_array) {
res = gf_isom_add_user_data_boxes(dest, tracknum, data, size);
} else {
res = gf_isom_add_user_data(dest, tracknum, udta_type, uuid, data, size);
}
gf_free(data);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendImpl::OnEntryDestroyEnd() {
DecreaseNumRefs();
if (data_->header.num_bytes > max_size_ && !read_only_ &&
(up_ticks_ > kTrimDelay || user_flags_ & kNoRandom))
eviction_.TrimCache(false);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DestroyConnectorOnIOThread() { g_io_thread_connector.Get().reset(); }
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string Browser::GetWindowPlacementKey() const {
std::string name(prefs::kBrowserWindowPlacement);
if (!app_name_.empty()) {
name.append("_");
name.append(app_name_);
}
return name;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_pages_stat(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_pages,
const void __user * __user *pages,
int __user *status)
{
#define DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR 16
const void __user *chunk_pages[DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR];
int chunk_status[DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR];
while (nr_pages) {
unsigned long chunk_nr;
chunk_nr = nr_pages;
if (chunk_nr > DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR)
chunk_nr = DO_PAGES_STAT_CHUNK_NR;
if (copy_from_user(chunk_pages, pages, chunk_nr * sizeof(*chunk_pages)))
break;
do_pages_stat_array(mm, chunk_nr, chunk_pages, chunk_status);
if (copy_to_user(status, chunk_status, chunk_nr * sizeof(*status)))
break;
pages += chunk_nr;
status += chunk_nr;
nr_pages -= chunk_nr;
}
return nr_pages ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mcryptd_ahash *mcryptd_alloc_ahash(const char *alg_name,
u32 type, u32 mask)
{
char mcryptd_alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
if (snprintf(mcryptd_alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"mcryptd(%s)", alg_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(mcryptd_alg_name, type, mask);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return ERR_CAST(tfm);
if (tfm->base.__crt_alg->cra_module != THIS_MODULE) {
crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return __mcryptd_ahash_cast(tfm);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
struct ofmonitor **monitors = NULL;
size_t allocated_monitors = 0;
size_t n_monitors = 0;
enum ofperr error;
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
for (;;) {
struct ofputil_flow_monitor_request request;
struct ofmonitor *m;
int retval;
retval = ofputil_decode_flow_monitor_request(&request, &b);
if (retval == EOF) {
break;
} else if (retval) {
error = retval;
goto error;
}
if (request.table_id != 0xff
&& request.table_id >= ofproto->n_tables) {
error = OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_TABLE_ID;
goto error;
}
error = ofmonitor_create(&request, ofconn, &m);
if (error) {
goto error;
}
if (n_monitors >= allocated_monitors) {
monitors = x2nrealloc(monitors, &allocated_monitors,
sizeof *monitors);
}
monitors[n_monitors++] = m;
}
struct rule_collection rules;
rule_collection_init(&rules);
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_monitors; i++) {
ofproto_collect_ofmonitor_initial_rules(monitors[i], &rules);
}
struct ovs_list replies;
ofpmp_init(&replies, oh);
ofmonitor_compose_refresh_updates(&rules, &replies);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
rule_collection_destroy(&rules);
ofconn_send_replies(ofconn, &replies);
free(monitors);
return 0;
error:
for (size_t i = 0; i < n_monitors; i++) {
ofmonitor_destroy(monitors[i]);
}
free(monitors);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: group_add_rule(struct ofgroup *group, struct rule *rule)
{
rule_collection_add(&group->rules, rule);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLACExtractor::FLACExtractor(
const sp<DataSource> &dataSource)
: mDataSource(dataSource),
mInitCheck(false)
{
ALOGV("FLACExtractor::FLACExtractor");
mInitCheck = init();
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: chromaticity_x(CIE_color c)
{
return c.X / (c.X + c.Y + c.Z);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_wrap_size_limit(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
OM_uint32 req_output_size,
OM_uint32 *max_input_size)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_size_limit(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
req_output_size,
max_input_size);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::LoadBody() {
DCHECK(doc_);
DCHECK(fpdf_availability_);
if (doc_loader_->IsDocumentComplete()) {
LoadForm();
} else if (FPDFAvail_IsLinearized(fpdf_availability_) == PDF_LINEARIZED &&
FPDF_GetPageCount(doc_) == 1) {
LoadForm();
if (form_status_ == PDF_FORM_NOTAVAIL)
return;
}
LoadPages();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Time OfflinePageModelTaskified::GetCurrentTime() {
CHECK(clock_);
return clock_->Now();
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void h2_session_ev_ngh2_done(h2_session *session, int arg, const char *msg)
{
switch (session->state) {
case H2_SESSION_ST_DONE:
/* nop */
break;
default:
transit(session, "nghttp2 done", H2_SESSION_ST_DONE);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: berval2tl_data(struct berval *in, krb5_tl_data **out)
{
*out = (krb5_tl_data *) malloc (sizeof (krb5_tl_data));
if (*out == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
(*out)->tl_data_length = in->bv_len - 2;
(*out)->tl_data_contents = (krb5_octet *) malloc
((*out)->tl_data_length * sizeof (krb5_octet));
if ((*out)->tl_data_contents == NULL) {
free (*out);
return ENOMEM;
}
UNSTORE16_INT (in->bv_val, (*out)->tl_data_type);
memcpy ((*out)->tl_data_contents, in->bv_val + 2, (*out)->tl_data_length);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Support keyless principals in LDAP [CVE-2014-5354]
Operations like "kadmin -q 'addprinc -nokey foo'" or
"kadmin -q 'purgekeys -all foo'" result in principal entries with
no keys present, so krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() would just return
NULL, which then got unconditionally dereferenced in
krb5_add_ber_mem_ldap_mod().
Apply some fixes to krb5_encode_krbsecretkey() to handle zero-key
principals better, correct the test for an allocation failure, and
slightly restructure the cleanup handler to be shorter and more
appropriate for the usage. Once it no longer short-circuits when
n_key_data is zero, it will produce an array of length two with both
entries NULL, which is treated as an empty list by the LDAP library,
the correct behavior for a keyless principal.
However, attributes with empty values are only handled by the LDAP
library for Modify operations, not Add operations (which only get
a sequence of Attribute, with no operation field). Therefore, only
add an empty krbprincipalkey to the modlist when we will be performing a
Modify, and not when we will be performing an Add, which is conditional
on the (misspelled) create_standalone_prinicipal boolean.
CVE-2014-5354:
In MIT krb5, when kadmind is configured to use LDAP for the KDC
database, an authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL
dereference by inserting into the database a principal entry which
contains no long-term keys.
In order for the LDAP KDC backend to translate a principal entry
from the database abstraction layer into the form expected by the
LDAP schema, the principal's keys are encoded into a
NULL-terminated array of length-value entries to be stored in the
LDAP database. However, the subroutine which produced this array
did not correctly handle the case where no keys were present,
returning NULL instead of an empty array, and the array was
unconditionally dereferenced while adding to the list of LDAP
operations to perform.
Versions of MIT krb5 prior to 1.12 did not expose a way for
principal entries to have no long-term key material, and
therefore are not vulnerable.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8041 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.13.1
subject: kadmind with ldap backend crashes when putting keyless entries
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kvm_lpage_info *lpage_info_slot(gfn_t gfn,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
int level)
{
unsigned long idx;
idx = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, level);
return &slot->arch.lpage_info[level - 2][idx];
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int resolve_symlink(char *d, apr_finfo_t *lfi, int opts, apr_pool_t *p)
{
apr_finfo_t fi;
const char *savename;
if (!(opts & (OPT_SYM_OWNER | OPT_SYM_LINKS))) {
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
/* Save the name from the valid bits. */
savename = (lfi->valid & APR_FINFO_NAME) ? lfi->name : NULL;
/* if OPT_SYM_OWNER is unset, we only need to check target accessible */
if (!(opts & OPT_SYM_OWNER)) {
if (apr_stat(&fi, d, lfi->valid & ~(APR_FINFO_NAME | APR_FINFO_LINK), p)
!= APR_SUCCESS)
{
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
/* Give back the target */
memcpy(lfi, &fi, sizeof(fi));
if (savename) {
lfi->name = savename;
lfi->valid |= APR_FINFO_NAME;
}
return OK;
}
/* OPT_SYM_OWNER only works if we can get the owner of
* both the file and symlink. First fill in a missing
* owner of the symlink, then get the info of the target.
*/
if (!(lfi->valid & APR_FINFO_OWNER)) {
if (apr_stat(lfi, d, lfi->valid | APR_FINFO_LINK | APR_FINFO_OWNER, p)
!= APR_SUCCESS)
{
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
}
if (apr_stat(&fi, d, lfi->valid & ~(APR_FINFO_NAME), p) != APR_SUCCESS) {
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
if (apr_uid_compare(fi.user, lfi->user) != APR_SUCCESS) {
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
/* Give back the target */
memcpy(lfi, &fi, sizeof(fi));
if (savename) {
lfi->name = savename;
lfi->valid |= APR_FINFO_NAME;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: i915_gem_execbuffer2(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file)
{
struct drm_i915_gem_execbuffer2 *args = data;
struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec2_list = NULL;
int ret;
if (args->buffer_count < 1) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf2 with %d buffers\n", args->buffer_count);
return -EINVAL;
}
exec2_list = kmalloc(sizeof(*exec2_list)*args->buffer_count,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
if (exec2_list == NULL)
exec2_list = drm_malloc_ab(sizeof(*exec2_list),
args->buffer_count);
if (exec2_list == NULL) {
DRM_DEBUG("Failed to allocate exec list for %d buffers\n",
args->buffer_count);
return -ENOMEM;
}
ret = copy_from_user(exec2_list,
(struct drm_i915_relocation_entry __user *)
(uintptr_t) args->buffers_ptr,
sizeof(*exec2_list) * args->buffer_count);
if (ret != 0) {
DRM_DEBUG("copy %d exec entries failed %d\n",
args->buffer_count, ret);
drm_free_large(exec2_list);
return -EFAULT;
}
ret = i915_gem_do_execbuffer(dev, data, file, args, exec2_list);
if (!ret) {
/* Copy the new buffer offsets back to the user's exec list. */
ret = copy_to_user((struct drm_i915_relocation_entry __user *)
(uintptr_t) args->buffers_ptr,
exec2_list,
sizeof(*exec2_list) * args->buffer_count);
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
DRM_DEBUG("failed to copy %d exec entries "
"back to user (%d)\n",
args->buffer_count, ret);
}
}
drm_free_large(exec2_list);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_execbuffer2()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void scale_rect(SkIRect* dst, const SkIRect& src, float scale) {
dst->fLeft = (int)::roundf(src.fLeft * scale);
dst->fTop = (int)::roundf(src.fTop * scale);
dst->fRight = (int)::roundf(src.fRight * scale);
dst->fBottom = (int)::roundf(src.fBottom * scale);
}
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMPatchSupport::DOMPatchSupport(DOMEditor* domEditor, Document* document)
: m_domEditor(domEditor)
, m_document(document)
{
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::MoveSelectedTabsTo(int index) {
int total_mini_count = IndexOfFirstNonMiniTab();
int selected_mini_count = 0;
int selected_count =
static_cast<int>(selection_model_.selected_indices().size());
for (int i = 0; i < selected_count &&
IsMiniTab(selection_model_.selected_indices()[i]); ++i) {
selected_mini_count++;
}
if (selected_mini_count > 0) {
MoveSelectedTabsToImpl(
std::min(total_mini_count - selected_mini_count, index), 0u,
selected_mini_count);
if (index > total_mini_count - selected_mini_count) {
index += selected_mini_count;
}
}
if (selected_mini_count == selected_count)
return;
MoveSelectedTabsToImpl(std::max(index, total_mini_count),
selected_mini_count,
selected_count - selected_mini_count);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResolvePromise() {
web_request_.RequestSucceeded();
web_request_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::positionDialog()
{
HTMLDialogElement* dialog = toHTMLDialogElement(node());
if (dialog->centeringMode() == HTMLDialogElement::NotCentered)
return;
bool canCenterDialog = (style()->position() == AbsolutePosition || style()->position() == FixedPosition)
&& style()->hasAutoTopAndBottom();
if (dialog->centeringMode() == HTMLDialogElement::Centered) {
if (canCenterDialog)
setY(dialog->centeredPosition());
return;
}
ASSERT(dialog->centeringMode() == HTMLDialogElement::NeedsCentering);
if (!canCenterDialog) {
dialog->setNotCentered();
return;
}
FrameView* frameView = document().view();
LayoutUnit top = (style()->position() == FixedPosition) ? 0 : frameView->scrollOffset().height();
int visibleHeight = frameView->visibleContentRect(IncludeScrollbars).height();
if (size().height() < visibleHeight)
top += (visibleHeight - size().height()) / 2;
setY(top);
dialog->setCentered(top);
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 123,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::ResetImpl() {
if (input_type_->GetValueMode() == ValueMode::kValue) {
SetNonDirtyValue(DefaultValue());
SetNeedsValidityCheck();
} else if (input_type_->GetValueMode() == ValueMode::kFilename) {
SetNonDirtyValue(String());
SetNeedsValidityCheck();
}
setChecked(hasAttribute(checkedAttr));
dirty_checkedness_ = false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::SetTabBlocked(int index, bool blocked) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
if (contents_data_[index]->blocked == blocked)
return;
contents_data_[index]->blocked = blocked;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabBlockedStateChanged(contents_data_[index]->contents,
index));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::NotifyObserversOfNavigationCommit(
bool is_new_navigation,
bool is_same_document,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
for (auto& observer : render_view_->observers_)
observer.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame_, is_new_navigation);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(is_same_document, transition);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_skip_single_frame(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
FLAC__bool got_a_frame;
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
while(1) {
switch(decoder->protected_->state) {
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_METADATA:
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_READ_METADATA:
return false; /* above function sets the status for us */
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_SEARCH_FOR_FRAME_SYNC:
if(!frame_sync_(decoder))
return true; /* above function sets the status for us */
break;
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_READ_FRAME:
if(!read_frame_(decoder, &got_a_frame, /*do_full_decode=*/false))
return false; /* above function sets the status for us */
if(got_a_frame)
return true; /* above function sets the status for us */
break;
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM:
case FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ABORTED:
return true;
default:
FLAC__ASSERT(0);
return false;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FlateStream::getHuffmanCodeWord(FlateHuffmanTab *tab) {
FlateCode *code;
int c;
while (codeSize < tab->maxLen) {
if ((c = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
break;
}
codeBuf |= (c & 0xff) << codeSize;
codeSize += 8;
}
code = &tab->codes[codeBuf & ((1 << tab->maxLen) - 1)];
if (codeSize == 0 || codeSize < code->len || code->len == 0) {
return EOF;
}
codeBuf >>= code->len;
codeSize -= code->len;
return (int)code->val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DBusHelperProxy::initHelper(const QString &name)
{
new Kf5authAdaptor(this);
if (!m_busConnection.registerService(name)) {
qCWarning(KAUTH) << "Error registering helper DBus service" << name << m_busConnection.lastError().message();
return false;
}
if (!m_busConnection.registerObject(QLatin1String("/"), this)) {
qCWarning(KAUTH) << "Error registering helper DBus object:" << m_busConnection.lastError().message();
return false;
}
m_name = name;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::unregisterNodeListWithIdNameCache(const LiveNodeListBase* list)
{
#if ENABLE(OILPAN)
ASSERT(m_nodeLists[InvalidateOnIdNameAttrChange].contains(list));
m_nodeLists[InvalidateOnIdNameAttrChange].remove(list);
#else
ASSERT(m_nodeListCounts[InvalidateOnIdNameAttrChange] > 0);
m_nodeListCounts[InvalidateOnIdNameAttrChange]--;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_packet *packet;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
__u16 sport;
__u16 dport;
__u32 vtag;
/* Get the source and destination port from the inbound packet. */
sport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->dest);
dport = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source);
/* The V-tag is going to be the same as the inbound packet if no
* association exists, otherwise, use the peer's vtag.
*/
if (asoc) {
/* Special case the INIT-ACK as there is no peer's vtag
* yet.
*/
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK:
{
sctp_initack_chunk_t *initack;
initack = (sctp_initack_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(initack->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = asoc->peer.i.init_tag;
break;
}
} else {
/* Special case the INIT and stale COOKIE_ECHO as there is no
* vtag yet.
*/
switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
case SCTP_CID_INIT:
{
sctp_init_chunk_t *init;
init = (sctp_init_chunk_t *)chunk->chunk_hdr;
vtag = ntohl(init->init_hdr.init_tag);
break;
}
default:
vtag = ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag);
break;
}
}
/* Make a transport for the bucket, Eliza... */
transport = sctp_transport_new(net, sctp_source(chunk), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!transport)
goto nomem;
/* Cache a route for the transport with the chunk's destination as
* the source address.
*/
sctp_transport_route(transport, (union sctp_addr *)&chunk->dest,
sctp_sk(net->sctp.ctl_sock));
packet = sctp_packet_init(&transport->packet, transport, sport, dport);
packet = sctp_packet_config(packet, vtag, 0);
return packet;
nomem:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PopupType AutofillExternalDelegate::GetPopupType() const {
return popup_type_;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int GetMp3HeaderSize(const uint8* buffer, int buffer_size) {
DCHECK_GE(buffer_size, 9);
int size = ((buffer[6] & 0x7f) << 21) + ((buffer[7] & 0x7f) << 14) +
((buffer[8] & 0x7f) << 7) + (buffer[9] & 0x7f) + 10;
if (buffer[5] & 0x10) // Footer added?
size += 10;
return size;
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_base_fill_cache(struct file *filp, void *dirent,
filldir_t filldir, struct task_struct *task, const struct pid_entry *p)
{
return proc_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, p->name, p->len,
proc_base_instantiate, task, p);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestHistoryWebFrameClient()
{
m_replacesCurrentHistoryItem = false;
m_frame = 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ieee80211_check_concurrent_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *nsdata;
struct net_device *dev = sdata->dev;
ASSERT_RTNL();
/* we hold the RTNL here so can safely walk the list */
list_for_each_entry(nsdata, &local->interfaces, list) {
struct net_device *ndev = nsdata->dev;
if (ndev != dev && ieee80211_sdata_running(nsdata)) {
/*
* Allow only a single IBSS interface to be up at any
* time. This is restricted because beacon distribution
* cannot work properly if both are in the same IBSS.
*
* To remove this restriction we'd have to disallow them
* from setting the same SSID on different IBSS interfaces
* belonging to the same hardware. Then, however, we're
* faced with having to adopt two different TSF timers...
*/
if (iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC &&
nsdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC)
return -EBUSY;
/*
* The remaining checks are only performed for interfaces
* with the same MAC address.
*/
if (compare_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr, ndev->dev_addr))
continue;
/*
* check whether it may have the same address
*/
if (!identical_mac_addr_allowed(iftype,
nsdata->vif.type))
return -ENOTUNIQ;
/*
* can only add VLANs to enabled APs
*/
if (iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
nsdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP)
sdata->bss = &nsdata->u.ap;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_zlib_cleanup_ob_gzhandler_mess(TSRMLS_D)
{
if (ZLIBG(ob_gzhandler)) {
deflateEnd(&(ZLIBG(ob_gzhandler)->Z));
php_zlib_output_handler_context_dtor(ZLIBG(ob_gzhandler) TSRMLS_CC);
ZLIBG(ob_gzhandler) = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int rpza_decode_end(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
RpzaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
av_frame_unref(&s->frame);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/rpza: Perform pointer advance and checks before using the pointers
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2850
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pid_from_ns_wrapper(int sock, pid_t tpid)
{
int newnsfd = -1, ret, cpipe[2];
char fnam[100];
pid_t cpid;
fd_set s;
struct timeval tv;
char v;
ret = snprintf(fnam, sizeof(fnam), "/proc/%d/ns/pid", tpid);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= sizeof(fnam))
_exit(1);
newnsfd = open(fnam, O_RDONLY);
if (newnsfd < 0)
_exit(1);
if (setns(newnsfd, 0) < 0)
_exit(1);
close(newnsfd);
if (pipe(cpipe) < 0)
_exit(1);
loop:
cpid = fork();
if (cpid < 0)
_exit(1);
if (!cpid) {
char b = '1';
close(cpipe[0]);
if (write(cpipe[1], &b, sizeof(char)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s (child): erorr on write: %s\n",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
close(cpipe[1]);
pid_from_ns(sock, tpid);
}
FD_ZERO(&s);
FD_SET(cpipe[0], &s);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
ret = select(cpipe[0]+1, &s, NULL, NULL, &tv);
if (ret <= 0)
goto again;
ret = read(cpipe[0], &v, 1);
if (ret != sizeof(char) || v != '1') {
goto again;
}
if (!wait_for_pid(cpid))
_exit(1);
_exit(0);
again:
kill(cpid, SIGKILL);
wait_for_pid(cpid);
goto loop;
}
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VerifyDidPreviewPage(bool generate_draft_pages, int page_number) {
bool msg_found = false;
size_t msg_count = render_thread_->sink().message_count();
for (size_t i = 0; i < msg_count; ++i) {
const IPC::Message* msg = render_thread_->sink().GetMessageAt(i);
if (msg->type() == PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::ID) {
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::Param page_param;
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::Read(msg, &page_param);
if (page_param.a.page_number == page_number) {
msg_found = true;
if (generate_draft_pages)
EXPECT_NE(0U, page_param.a.data_size);
else
EXPECT_EQ(0U, page_param.a.data_size);
break;
}
}
}
ASSERT_EQ(generate_draft_pages, msg_found);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::RegisterCommandCode(const char* idname, webserver_response_function ResponseFunction, bool bypassAuthentication)
{
m_webcommands.insert(std::pair<std::string, webserver_response_function >(std::string(idname), ResponseFunction));
if (bypassAuthentication)
{
m_pWebEm->RegisterWhitelistURLString(idname);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_read_finish_IDAT(png_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* We don't need any more data and the stream should have ended, however the
* LZ end code may actually not have been processed. In this case we must
* read it otherwise stray unread IDAT data or, more likely, an IDAT chunk
* may still remain to be consumed.
*/
if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_ZSTREAM_ENDED) == 0)
{
/* The NULL causes png_read_IDAT_data to swallow any remaining bytes in
* the compressed stream, but the stream may be damaged too, so even after
* this call we may need to terminate the zstream ownership.
*/
png_read_IDAT_data(png_ptr, NULL, 0);
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = NULL; /* safety */
/* Now clear everything out for safety; the following may not have been
* done.
*/
if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_ZSTREAM_ENDED) == 0)
{
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ZSTREAM_ENDED;
}
}
/* If the zstream has not been released do it now *and* terminate the reading
* of the final IDAT chunk.
*/
if (png_ptr->zowner == png_IDAT)
{
/* Always do this; the pointers otherwise point into the read buffer. */
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = NULL;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
/* Now we no longer own the zstream. */
png_ptr->zowner = 0;
/* The slightly weird semantics of the sequential IDAT reading is that we
* are always in or at the end of an IDAT chunk, so we always need to do a
* crc_finish here. If idat_size is non-zero we also need to read the
* spurious bytes at the end of the chunk now.
*/
(void)png_crc_finish(png_ptr, png_ptr->idat_size);
}
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mqs(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
unsigned char name_assign_type,
void (*setup)(struct net_device *),
unsigned int txqs, unsigned int rxqs)
{
struct net_device *dev;
size_t alloc_size;
struct net_device *p;
BUG_ON(strlen(name) >= sizeof(dev->name));
if (txqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device with zero queues\n");
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
if (rxqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device with zero RX queues\n");
return NULL;
}
#endif
alloc_size = sizeof(struct net_device);
if (sizeof_priv) {
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of private area */
alloc_size = ALIGN(alloc_size, NETDEV_ALIGN);
alloc_size += sizeof_priv;
}
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of whole construct */
alloc_size += NETDEV_ALIGN - 1;
p = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!p)
p = vzalloc(alloc_size);
if (!p)
return NULL;
dev = PTR_ALIGN(p, NETDEV_ALIGN);
dev->padded = (char *)dev - (char *)p;
dev->pcpu_refcnt = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!dev->pcpu_refcnt)
goto free_dev;
if (dev_addr_init(dev))
goto free_pcpu;
dev_mc_init(dev);
dev_uc_init(dev);
dev_net_set(dev, &init_net);
dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE;
dev->gso_max_segs = GSO_MAX_SEGS;
dev->gso_min_segs = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->close_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->adj_list.upper);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->adj_list.lower);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->all_adj_list.upper);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->all_adj_list.lower);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ptype_all);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ptype_specific);
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE | IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE_PERM;
setup(dev);
if (!dev->tx_queue_len) {
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE;
dev->tx_queue_len = 1;
}
dev->num_tx_queues = txqs;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txqs;
if (netif_alloc_netdev_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
dev->num_rx_queues = rxqs;
dev->real_num_rx_queues = rxqs;
if (netif_alloc_rx_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#endif
strcpy(dev->name, name);
dev->name_assign_type = name_assign_type;
dev->group = INIT_NETDEV_GROUP;
if (!dev->ethtool_ops)
dev->ethtool_ops = &default_ethtool_ops;
nf_hook_ingress_init(dev);
return dev;
free_all:
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
free_pcpu:
free_percpu(dev->pcpu_refcnt);
free_dev:
netdev_freemem(dev);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_read_body(request_rec *r, const char **rbuf, apr_off_t *size,
apr_off_t maxsize)
{
int rc = OK;
if ((rc = ap_setup_client_block(r, REQUEST_CHUNKED_ERROR))) {
return (rc);
}
if (ap_should_client_block(r)) {
/*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*/
char argsbuffer[HUGE_STRING_LEN];
apr_off_t rsize, len_read, rpos = 0;
apr_off_t length = r->remaining;
/*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*/
if (maxsize != 0 && length > maxsize) {
return APR_EINCOMPLETE; /* Only room for incomplete data chunk :( */
}
*rbuf = (const char *) apr_pcalloc(r->pool, (apr_size_t) (length + 1));
*size = length;
while ((len_read = ap_get_client_block(r, argsbuffer, sizeof(argsbuffer))) > 0) {
if ((rpos + len_read) > length) {
rsize = length - rpos;
}
else {
rsize = len_read;
}
memcpy((char *) *rbuf + rpos, argsbuffer, (size_t) rsize);
rpos += rsize;
}
}
return (rc);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: oxide::qt::FilePickerProxy* OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::CreateFilePicker(
oxide::qt::FilePickerProxyClient* client) {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
return new oxide::qquick::FilePicker(q, client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t PDFiumEngine::FindTextIndex::IncrementIndex() {
DCHECK(valid_);
return ++index_;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void callWithExecutionContextVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::callWithExecutionContextVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendSwapCompositorFrameAck(
int32_t route_id,
uint32_t output_surface_id,
int renderer_host_id,
const cc::CompositorFrameAck& ack) {
RenderProcessHost* host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(renderer_host_id);
if (!host)
return;
host->Send(new ViewMsg_SwapCompositorFrameAck(
route_id, output_surface_id, ack));
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath GetSubprocessPath(base::Environment* env) {
std::string override_subprocess_path =
GetEnvironmentOption("SUBPROCESS_PATH", env);
if (!override_subprocess_path.empty()) {
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
base::FilePath subprocess_path(override_subprocess_path);
#else
base::FilePath subprocess_path(base::UTF8ToUTF16(override_subprocess_path));
#endif
return base::MakeAbsoluteFilePath(subprocess_path);
}
base::FilePath subprocess_exe =
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL(OXIDE_SUBPROCESS_PATH));
if (subprocess_exe.IsAbsolute()) {
return subprocess_exe;
}
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
Dl_info info;
int rv = dladdr(reinterpret_cast<void *>(BrowserProcessMain::GetInstance),
&info);
DCHECK_NE(rv, 0) << "Failed to determine module path";
base::FilePath subprocess_rel(subprocess_exe);
subprocess_exe = base::FilePath(info.dli_fname).DirName();
std::vector<base::FilePath::StringType> components;
subprocess_rel.GetComponents(&components);
for (size_t i = 0; i < components.size(); ++i) {
subprocess_exe = subprocess_exe.Append(components[i]);
}
#else
# error "GetSubprocessPath is not implemented for this platform"
#endif
return subprocess_exe;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_defaults_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
#if FLAC__HAS_OGG
decoder->private_->is_ogg = false;
#endif
decoder->private_->read_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->seek_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->tell_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->length_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->eof_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->write_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->metadata_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->error_callback = 0;
decoder->private_->client_data = 0;
memset(decoder->private_->metadata_filter, 0, sizeof(decoder->private_->metadata_filter));
decoder->private_->metadata_filter[FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO] = true;
decoder->private_->metadata_filter_ids_count = 0;
decoder->protected_->md5_checking = false;
#if FLAC__HAS_OGG
FLAC__ogg_decoder_aspect_set_defaults(&decoder->protected_->ogg_decoder_aspect);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: consume_socket(struct mg_context *ctx, struct socket *sp, int thread_index)
{
#define QUEUE_SIZE(ctx) ((int)(ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->queue)))
(void)thread_index;
(void)pthread_mutex_lock(&ctx->thread_mutex);
DEBUG_TRACE("%s", "going idle");
/* If the queue is empty, wait. We're idle at this point. */
while ((ctx->sq_head == ctx->sq_tail) && (ctx->stop_flag == 0)) {
pthread_cond_wait(&ctx->sq_full, &ctx->thread_mutex);
}
/* If we're stopping, sq_head may be equal to sq_tail. */
if (ctx->sq_head > ctx->sq_tail) {
/* Copy socket from the queue and increment tail */
*sp = ctx->queue[ctx->sq_tail % QUEUE_SIZE(ctx)];
ctx->sq_tail++;
DEBUG_TRACE("grabbed socket %d, going busy", sp ? sp->sock : -1);
/* Wrap pointers if needed */
while (ctx->sq_tail > QUEUE_SIZE(ctx)) {
ctx->sq_tail -= QUEUE_SIZE(ctx);
ctx->sq_head -= QUEUE_SIZE(ctx);
}
}
(void)pthread_cond_signal(&ctx->sq_empty);
(void)pthread_mutex_unlock(&ctx->thread_mutex);
return !ctx->stop_flag;
#undef QUEUE_SIZE
}
Commit Message: Check length of memcmp
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 81,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMethodController::AddCompositionUnderlines(
const Vector<CompositionUnderline>& underlines,
ContainerNode* base_element,
unsigned offset_in_plain_chars) {
for (const auto& underline : underlines) {
unsigned underline_start = offset_in_plain_chars + underline.StartOffset();
unsigned underline_end = offset_in_plain_chars + underline.EndOffset();
EphemeralRange ephemeral_line_range =
PlainTextRange(underline_start, underline_end)
.CreateRange(*base_element);
if (ephemeral_line_range.IsNull())
continue;
GetDocument().Markers().AddCompositionMarker(
ephemeral_line_range, underline.GetColor(),
underline.Thick() ? StyleableMarker::Thickness::kThick
: StyleableMarker::Thickness::kThin,
underline.BackgroundColor());
}
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
int error = 0;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
if (address < mmap_min_addr)
return -EPERM;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
/* Check that both stack segments have the same anon_vma? */
if (prev && !(prev->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) &&
(prev->vm_flags & (VM_WRITE|VM_READ|VM_EXEC))) {
if (address - prev->vm_end < stack_guard_gap)
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* We must make sure the anon_vma is allocated. */
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* vma->vm_start/vm_end cannot change under us because the caller
* is required to hold the mmap_sem in read mode. We need the
* anon_vma lock to serialize against concurrent expand_stacks.
*/
anon_vma_lock_write(vma->anon_vma);
/* Somebody else might have raced and expanded it already */
if (address < vma->vm_start) {
unsigned long size, grow;
size = vma->vm_end - address;
grow = (vma->vm_start - address) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
error = -ENOMEM;
if (grow <= vma->vm_pgoff) {
error = acct_stack_growth(vma, size, grow);
if (!error) {
/*
* vma_gap_update() doesn't support concurrent
* updates, but we only hold a shared mmap_sem
* lock here, so we need to protect against
* concurrent vma expansions.
* anon_vma_lock_write() doesn't help here, as
* we don't guarantee that all growable vmas
* in a mm share the same root anon vma.
* So, we reuse mm->page_table_lock to guard
* against concurrent vma expansions.
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += grow;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, grow);
anon_vma_interval_tree_pre_update_vma(vma);
vma->vm_start = address;
vma->vm_pgoff -= grow;
anon_vma_interval_tree_post_update_vma(vma);
vma_gap_update(vma);
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
perf_event_mmap(vma);
}
}
}
anon_vma_unlock_write(vma->anon_vma);
khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma, vma->vm_flags);
validate_mm(mm);
return error;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool LayerNodeMayNeedCompositedScrolling(const PaintLayer* layer) {
if (Node* node = layer->GetLayoutObject().GetNode()) {
if (IsHTMLSelectElement(node))
return false;
if (TextControlElement* text_control = EnclosingTextControl(node)) {
if (IsHTMLInputElement(text_control)) {
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cm_compare_data(struct ib_cm_compare_data *src_data,
struct ib_cm_compare_data *dst_data)
{
u8 src[IB_CM_COMPARE_SIZE];
u8 dst[IB_CM_COMPARE_SIZE];
if (!src_data || !dst_data)
return 0;
cm_mask_copy(src, src_data->data, dst_data->mask);
cm_mask_copy(dst, dst_data->data, src_data->mask);
return memcmp(src, dst, IB_CM_COMPARE_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
int ret = 0;
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( f_rng != NULL );
ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
return( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d,
&ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 87,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int filter_pred_cpu(struct filter_pred *pred, void *event)
{
int cpu, cmp;
cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
cmp = pred->val;
switch (pred->op) {
case OP_EQ:
return cpu == cmp;
case OP_NE:
return cpu != cmp;
case OP_LT:
return cpu < cmp;
case OP_LE:
return cpu <= cmp;
case OP_GT:
return cpu > cmp;
case OP_GE:
return cpu >= cmp;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int entersafe_select_fid(sc_card_t *card,
unsigned int id_hi, unsigned int id_lo,
sc_file_t **file_out)
{
int r;
sc_file_t *file = NULL;
sc_path_t path;
memset(&path, 0, sizeof(sc_path_t));
path.type=SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID;
path.value[0]=id_hi;
path.value[1]=id_lo;
path.len=2;
r = iso_ops->select_file(card,&path,&file);
if (r < 0)
sc_file_free(file);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
/* update cache */
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
card->cache.current_path.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH;
card->cache.current_path.value[0] = 0x3f;
card->cache.current_path.value[1] = 0x00;
if (id_hi == 0x3f && id_lo == 0x00){
card->cache.current_path.len = 2;
} else {
card->cache.current_path.len = 4;
card->cache.current_path.value[2] = id_hi;
card->cache.current_path.value[3] = id_lo;
}
}
if (file_out)
*file_out = file;
else
sc_file_free(file);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_individual_addr(void)
{
return vmx_capability.vpid & VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR_BIT;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool NeedsInnerBorderRadiusClip(const LayoutObject& object) {
if (!object.StyleRef().HasBorderRadius())
return false;
if (object.IsBox() && NeedsOverflowClip(object))
return true;
if (object.IsLayoutReplaced() && !object.IsSVGRoot())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t nw_buf_size(nw_buf *buf)
{
return buf->wpos - buf->rpos;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 76,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestObserver::~TestObserver() {
predictor_->SetObserverForTesting(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_seg_map(VP9_COMMON *cm) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_PING_PONG_BUFFERS; ++i) {
vpx_free(cm->seg_map_array[i]);
cm->seg_map_array[i] = NULL;
}
cm->current_frame_seg_map = NULL;
if (!cm->frame_parallel_decode) {
cm->last_frame_seg_map = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE libvpx: Cherry-pick 8b4c315 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9_alloc_context_buffers: clear cm->mi* on failure
this fixes a crash in vp9_dec_setup_mi() via
vp9_init_context_buffers() should decoding continue and the decoder
resyncs on a smaller frame
Bug: 30593752
Change-Id: Iafbf1c4114062bf796f51a6b03be71328f7bcc69
(cherry picked from commit 737c8493693243838128788fe9c3abc51f17338e)
(cherry picked from commit 3e88ffac8c80b76e15286ef8a7b3bd8fa246c761)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 157,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validate_with_dtd(xmlDocPtr doc, gboolean to_logs, const char *dtd_file)
{
gboolean valid = TRUE;
xmlDtdPtr dtd = NULL;
xmlValidCtxtPtr cvp = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(doc != NULL, return FALSE);
CRM_CHECK(dtd_file != NULL, return FALSE);
dtd = xmlParseDTD(NULL, (const xmlChar *)dtd_file);
if(dtd == NULL) {
crm_err("Could not locate/parse DTD: %s", dtd_file);
return TRUE;
}
cvp = xmlNewValidCtxt();
if(cvp) {
if (to_logs) {
cvp->userData = (void *)LOG_ERR;
cvp->error = (xmlValidityErrorFunc) xml_log;
cvp->warning = (xmlValidityWarningFunc) xml_log;
} else {
cvp->userData = (void *)stderr;
cvp->error = (xmlValidityErrorFunc) fprintf;
cvp->warning = (xmlValidityWarningFunc) fprintf;
}
if (!xmlValidateDtd(cvp, doc, dtd)) {
valid = FALSE;
}
xmlFreeValidCtxt(cvp);
} else {
crm_err("Internal error: No valid context");
}
xmlFreeDtd(dtd);
return valid;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_bool early_find_sid_in(zval *dest, int where, php_session_rfc1867_progress *progress TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **ppid;
if (!PG(http_globals)[where]) {
return 0;
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PG(http_globals)[where]), PS(session_name), progress->sname_len+1, (void **)&ppid) == SUCCESS
&& Z_TYPE_PP(ppid) == IS_STRING) {
zval_dtor(dest);
ZVAL_ZVAL(dest, *ppid, 1, 0);
return 1;
}
return 0;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jas_icclut8_copy(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval,
jas_iccattrval_t *othattrval)
{
jas_icclut8_t *lut8 = &attrval->data.lut8;
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
attrval = 0;
othattrval = 0;
lut8 = 0;
abort();
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool set_nr_and_not_polling(struct task_struct *p)
{
set_tsk_need_resched(p);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t tty_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct tty_struct *tty = file_tty(file);
struct tty_ldisc *ld;
ssize_t ret;
if (tty_paranoia_check(tty, inode, "tty_write"))
return -EIO;
if (!tty || !tty->ops->write ||
(test_bit(TTY_IO_ERROR, &tty->flags)))
return -EIO;
/* Short term debug to catch buggy drivers */
if (tty->ops->write_room == NULL)
printk(KERN_ERR "tty driver %s lacks a write_room method.\n",
tty->driver->name);
ld = tty_ldisc_ref_wait(tty);
if (!ld->ops->write)
ret = -EIO;
else
ret = do_tty_write(ld->ops->write, tty, file, buf, count);
tty_ldisc_deref(ld);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::setMaxMarginBeforeValues(LayoutUnit pos, LayoutUnit neg)
{
if (!m_rareData) {
if (pos == RenderBlockFlowRareData::positiveMarginBeforeDefault(this) && neg == RenderBlockFlowRareData::negativeMarginBeforeDefault(this))
return;
m_rareData = adoptPtr(new RenderBlockFlowRareData(this));
}
m_rareData->m_margins.setPositiveMarginBefore(pos);
m_rareData->m_margins.setNegativeMarginBefore(neg);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
return false;
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void commit_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *shadows)
{
struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct mount *m;
LIST_HEAD(head);
struct mnt_namespace *n = parent->mnt_ns;
BUG_ON(parent == mnt);
list_add_tail(&head, &mnt->mnt_list);
list_for_each_entry(m, &head, mnt_list)
m->mnt_ns = n;
list_splice(&head, n->list.prev);
if (shadows)
hlist_add_after_rcu(&shadows->mnt_hash, &mnt->mnt_hash);
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&mnt->mnt_hash,
m_hash(&parent->mnt, mnt->mnt_mountpoint));
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_child, &parent->mnt_mounts);
touch_mnt_namespace(n);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __choose_path_in_pg(struct multipath *m, struct priority_group *pg,
size_t nr_bytes)
{
struct dm_path *path;
path = pg->ps.type->select_path(&pg->ps, &m->repeat_count, nr_bytes);
if (!path)
return -ENXIO;
m->current_pgpath = path_to_pgpath(path);
if (m->current_pg != pg)
__switch_pg(m, m->current_pgpath);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::CalculateNumberOfPages(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebNode& node,
int* number_of_pages) {
DCHECK(frame);
bool fit_to_paper_size = !(PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node));
if (!InitPrintSettings(fit_to_paper_size)) {
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_ShowInvalidPrinterSettingsError(routing_id()));
return false;
}
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params = print_pages_params_->params;
PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint prepare(params, frame, node, ignore_css_margins_);
prepare.StartPrinting();
*number_of_pages = prepare.GetExpectedPageCount();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_unused_picture(H264Context *h)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++) {
if (pic_is_unused(h, &h->DPB[i]))
break;
}
if (i == MAX_PICTURE_COUNT)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (h->DPB[i].needs_realloc) {
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 0;
unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
}
return i;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompositedLayerRasterInvalidator::FullyInvalidateOldChunk(
const PaintChunkInfo& info,
PaintInvalidationReason reason) {
String debug_name;
if (tracking_info_)
debug_name = tracking_info_->old_client_debug_names.at(&info.id.client);
AddRasterInvalidation(info.bounds_in_layer, &info.id.client, reason,
&debug_name);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 cfs_rq_last_update_time(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
return cfs_rq->avg.last_update_time;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_venc::dev_fill_buf(void *buffer, void *pmem_data_buf,unsigned index,unsigned fd)
{
return handle->venc_fill_buf(buffer, pmem_data_buf,index,fd);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_image (PopplerPage *page,
gint image_id)
{
CairoImageOutputDev *out;
cairo_surface_t *image;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), NULL);
out = poppler_page_get_image_output_dev (page,
image_draw_decide_cb,
GINT_TO_POINTER (image_id));
if (image_id >= out->getNumImages ()) {
delete out;
return NULL;
}
image = out->getImage (image_id)->getImage ();
if (!image) {
delete out;
return NULL;
}
cairo_surface_reference (image);
delete out;
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_attr_free (struct error_context *ctx, char const *str)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 2,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncManager::ReceivedExperimentalTypes(syncable::ModelTypeSet* to_add)
const {
ReadTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
ReadNode node(&trans);
if (!node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Couldn't find Nigori node.";
return false;
}
if (node.GetNigoriSpecifics().sync_tabs()) {
to_add->Put(syncable::SESSIONS);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Editor::CanDelete() const {
FrameSelection& selection = GetFrame().Selection();
return selection.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated().IsRange() &&
selection.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().RootEditableElement();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int md5_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
struct md5_state *mctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
const u32 avail = sizeof(mctx->block) - (mctx->byte_count & 0x3f);
mctx->byte_count += len;
if (avail > len) {
memcpy((char *)mctx->block + (sizeof(mctx->block) - avail),
data, len);
return 0;
}
memcpy((char *)mctx->block + (sizeof(mctx->block) - avail),
data, avail);
md5_transform_helper(mctx);
data += avail;
len -= avail;
while (len >= sizeof(mctx->block)) {
memcpy(mctx->block, data, sizeof(mctx->block));
md5_transform_helper(mctx);
data += sizeof(mctx->block);
len -= sizeof(mctx->block);
}
memcpy(mctx->block, data, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,294 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.