instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* eventTargetNodeForDocument(Document* doc)
{
if (!doc)
return 0;
Node* node = doc->focusedElement();
if (!node && doc->isPluginDocument()) {
PluginDocument* pluginDocument = toPluginDocument(doc);
node = pluginDocument->pluginNode();
}
if (!node && doc->isHTMLDocument())
node = doc->body();
if (!node)
node = doc->documentElement();
return node;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::OnDragExited() {
drop_cursor_visible_ = false;
if (ShouldBlinkCursor())
StartBlinkingCursor();
SchedulePaint();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestExtensionSystem::Shutdown() {
extension_process_manager_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ProfileInteger(Image *image,short int *hex_digits)
{
int
c,
l,
value;
register ssize_t
i;
l=0;
value=0;
for (i=0; i < 2; )
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if ((c == EOF) || ((c == '%') && (l == '%')))
{
value=(-1);
break;
}
l=c;
c&=0xff;
if (isxdigit(c) == MagickFalse)
continue;
value=(int) ((size_t) value << 4)+hex_digits[c];
i++;
}
return(value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void checkForSiblingStyleChanges(Element* e, RenderStyle* style, bool finishedParsingCallback,
Node* beforeChange, Node* afterChange, int childCountDelta)
{
checkForEmptyStyleChange(e, style);
if (!style || (e->needsStyleRecalc() && e->childrenAffectedByPositionalRules()))
return;
if (e->childrenAffectedByFirstChildRules() && afterChange) {
Node* newFirstChild = 0;
for (newFirstChild = e->firstChild(); newFirstChild && !newFirstChild->isElementNode(); newFirstChild = newFirstChild->nextSibling()) {};
Node* firstElementAfterInsertion = 0;
for (firstElementAfterInsertion = afterChange;
firstElementAfterInsertion && !firstElementAfterInsertion->isElementNode();
firstElementAfterInsertion = firstElementAfterInsertion->nextSibling()) {};
if (newFirstChild != firstElementAfterInsertion && firstElementAfterInsertion && firstElementAfterInsertion->attached() &&
firstElementAfterInsertion->renderStyle() && firstElementAfterInsertion->renderStyle()->firstChildState())
firstElementAfterInsertion->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (childCountDelta < 0 && newFirstChild == firstElementAfterInsertion && newFirstChild && (!newFirstChild->renderStyle() || !newFirstChild->renderStyle()->firstChildState()))
newFirstChild->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
if (e->childrenAffectedByLastChildRules() && beforeChange) {
Node* newLastChild = 0;
for (newLastChild = e->lastChild(); newLastChild && !newLastChild->isElementNode(); newLastChild = newLastChild->previousSibling()) {};
Node* lastElementBeforeInsertion = 0;
for (lastElementBeforeInsertion = beforeChange;
lastElementBeforeInsertion && !lastElementBeforeInsertion->isElementNode();
lastElementBeforeInsertion = lastElementBeforeInsertion->previousSibling()) {};
if (newLastChild != lastElementBeforeInsertion && lastElementBeforeInsertion && lastElementBeforeInsertion->attached() &&
lastElementBeforeInsertion->renderStyle() && lastElementBeforeInsertion->renderStyle()->lastChildState())
lastElementBeforeInsertion->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
if ((childCountDelta < 0 || finishedParsingCallback) && newLastChild == lastElementBeforeInsertion && newLastChild && (!newLastChild->renderStyle() || !newLastChild->renderStyle()->lastChildState()))
newLastChild->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
if (e->childrenAffectedByDirectAdjacentRules() && afterChange) {
Node* firstElementAfterInsertion = 0;
for (firstElementAfterInsertion = afterChange;
firstElementAfterInsertion && !firstElementAfterInsertion->isElementNode();
firstElementAfterInsertion = firstElementAfterInsertion->nextSibling()) {};
if (firstElementAfterInsertion && firstElementAfterInsertion->attached())
firstElementAfterInsertion->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
if ((e->childrenAffectedByForwardPositionalRules() && afterChange)
|| (e->childrenAffectedByBackwardPositionalRules() && beforeChange))
e->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordLegacySymantecCertUseCounter(LocalFrame* frame,
Resource::Type resource_type) {
if (resource_type == Resource::kMainResource) {
return;
}
UseCounter::Count(frame, WebFeature::kLegacySymantecCertInSubresource);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
else
to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
~FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::DispatchBeforeUnload(BeforeUnloadType type,
bool is_reload) {
bool for_navigation =
type == BeforeUnloadType::BROWSER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION ||
type == BeforeUnloadType::RENDERER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION;
DCHECK(for_navigation || !is_reload);
DCHECK(type == BeforeUnloadType::BROWSER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION ||
type == BeforeUnloadType::RENDERER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION ||
frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame());
if (!for_navigation) {
if (frame_tree_node_->navigation_request() &&
frame_tree_node_->navigation_request()->navigation_handle()) {
frame_tree_node_->navigation_request()
->navigation_handle()
->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
}
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
}
bool check_subframes_only =
type == BeforeUnloadType::RENDERER_INITIATED_NAVIGATION;
if (!ShouldDispatchBeforeUnload(check_subframes_only)) {
DCHECK(!for_navigation);
base::OnceClosure task = base::BindOnce(
[](base::WeakPtr<RenderFrameHostImpl> self) {
if (!self)
return;
self->frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->OnBeforeUnloadACK(
true, base::TimeTicks::Now());
},
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, std::move(task));
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN1("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl BeforeUnload",
this, "&RenderFrameHostImpl", (void*)this);
if (is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_) {
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_ =
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_ && for_navigation;
} else {
is_waiting_for_beforeunload_ack_ = true;
beforeunload_dialog_request_cancels_unload_ = false;
unload_ack_is_for_navigation_ = for_navigation;
send_before_unload_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (render_view_host_->GetDelegate()->IsJavaScriptDialogShowing()) {
SimulateBeforeUnloadAck(type != BeforeUnloadType::DISCARD);
} else {
if (beforeunload_timeout_)
beforeunload_timeout_->Start(beforeunload_timeout_delay_);
beforeunload_pending_replies_.clear();
beforeunload_dialog_request_cancels_unload_ =
(type == BeforeUnloadType::DISCARD);
CheckOrDispatchBeforeUnloadForSubtree(check_subframes_only,
true /* send_ipc */, is_reload);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Get_Char_Index( FT_Face face,
FT_ULong charcode )
{
FT_UInt result = 0;
if ( face && face->charmap )
{
FT_CMap cmap = FT_CMAP( face->charmap );
if ( charcode > 0xFFFFFFFFUL )
{
FT_TRACE1(( "FT_Get_Char_Index: too large charcode" ));
FT_TRACE1(( " 0x%x is truncated\n", charcode ));
}
result = cmap->clazz->char_index( cmap, (FT_UInt32)charcode );
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HFSIterator::~HFSIterator() {}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
unsigned char arg[128];
int ret = 0;
unsigned int copylen;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct netns_ipvs *ipvs = net_ipvs(net);
BUG_ON(!net);
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (*len < get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("get_ctl: len %u < %u\n",
*len, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
copylen = get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)];
if (copylen > 128)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, copylen) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Handle daemons first since it has its own locking
*/
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_GET_DAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user d[2];
memset(&d, 0, sizeof(d));
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&ipvs->sync_mutex))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (ipvs->sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_MASTER) {
d[0].state = IP_VS_STATE_MASTER;
strlcpy(d[0].mcast_ifn, ipvs->master_mcast_ifn,
sizeof(d[0].mcast_ifn));
d[0].syncid = ipvs->master_syncid;
}
if (ipvs->sync_state & IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP) {
d[1].state = IP_VS_STATE_BACKUP;
strlcpy(d[1].mcast_ifn, ipvs->backup_mcast_ifn,
sizeof(d[1].mcast_ifn));
d[1].syncid = ipvs->backup_syncid;
}
if (copy_to_user(user, &d, sizeof(d)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
mutex_unlock(&ipvs->sync_mutex);
return ret;
}
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_GET_VERSION:
{
char buf[64];
sprintf(buf, "IP Virtual Server version %d.%d.%d (size=%d)",
NVERSION(IP_VS_VERSION_CODE), ip_vs_conn_tab_size);
if (copy_to_user(user, buf, strlen(buf)+1) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
*len = strlen(buf)+1;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_INFO:
{
struct ip_vs_getinfo info;
info.version = IP_VS_VERSION_CODE;
info.size = ip_vs_conn_tab_size;
info.num_services = ipvs->num_services;
if (copy_to_user(user, &info, sizeof(info)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_SERVICES:
{
struct ip_vs_get_services *get;
int size;
get = (struct ip_vs_get_services *)arg;
size = sizeof(*get) +
sizeof(struct ip_vs_service_entry) * get->num_services;
if (*len != size) {
pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = __ip_vs_get_service_entries(net, get, user);
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_SERVICE:
{
struct ip_vs_service_entry *entry;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
union nf_inet_addr addr;
entry = (struct ip_vs_service_entry *)arg;
addr.ip = entry->addr;
if (entry->fwmark)
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_find(net, AF_INET, entry->fwmark);
else
svc = __ip_vs_service_find(net, AF_INET,
entry->protocol, &addr,
entry->port);
if (svc) {
ip_vs_copy_service(entry, svc);
if (copy_to_user(user, entry, sizeof(*entry)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
} else
ret = -ESRCH;
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_DESTS:
{
struct ip_vs_get_dests *get;
int size;
get = (struct ip_vs_get_dests *)arg;
size = sizeof(*get) +
sizeof(struct ip_vs_dest_entry) * get->num_dests;
if (*len != size) {
pr_err("length: %u != %u\n", *len, size);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = __ip_vs_get_dest_entries(net, get, user);
}
break;
case IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT:
{
struct ip_vs_timeout_user t;
__ip_vs_get_timeouts(net, &t);
if (copy_to_user(user, &t, sizeof(t)) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void save_raw_perf_callchain(struct perf_callchain_entry *entry,
unsigned long reg29)
{
unsigned long *sp = (unsigned long *)reg29;
unsigned long addr;
while (!kstack_end(sp)) {
addr = *sp++;
if (__kernel_text_address(addr)) {
perf_callchain_store(entry, addr);
if (entry->nr >= PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH)
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init seed_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&seed_alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InlineLoginUI::InlineLoginUI(content::WebUI* web_ui)
: WebDialogUI(web_ui),
auth_extension_(Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui)) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui);
content::WebUIDataSource::Add(profile, CreateWebUIDataSource());
web_ui->AddMessageHandler(new InlineLoginUIHandler(profile));
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 112,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int SyncBlob(Image *image)
{
BlobInfo
*magick_restrict blob_info;
int
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->blob != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
assert(image->blob->type != UndefinedStream);
blob_info=image->blob;
status=0;
switch (blob_info->type)
{
case UndefinedStream:
case StandardStream:
break;
case FileStream:
case PipeStream:
{
status=fflush(blob_info->file_info.file);
break;
}
case ZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
status=gzflush(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
#endif
break;
}
case BZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BZLIB_DELEGATE)
status=BZ2_bzflush(blob_info->file_info.bzfile);
#endif
break;
}
case FifoStream:
break;
case BlobStream:
break;
case CustomStream:
break;
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabStrip::SupportsMultipleSelection() {
return touch_layout_ == nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::SynthesizeRepeatingScroll(
SyntheticSmoothScrollGestureParams gesture_params,
int repeat_count,
base::TimeDelta repeat_delay,
std::string interaction_marker_name,
int id,
std::unique_ptr<SynthesizeScrollGestureCallback> callback) {
if (!interaction_marker_name.empty()) {
TRACE_EVENT_COPY_ASYNC_BEGIN0("benchmark", interaction_marker_name.c_str(),
id);
}
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->QueueSyntheticGesture(
SyntheticGesture::Create(gesture_params),
base::BindOnce(&InputHandler::OnScrollFinished,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), gesture_params, repeat_count,
repeat_delay, interaction_marker_name, id,
base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_fd_tabsize(void)
{
int m;
#if defined(HAVE_GETDTABLESIZE)
m = getdtablesize();
#elif defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rl;
getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl);
m = rl.rlim_cur;
#elif defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
m = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
#else
m = OPEN_MAX;
#endif
return m;
}
Commit Message: chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int addAggInfoColumn(sqlite3 *db, AggInfo *pInfo){
int i;
pInfo->aCol = sqlite3ArrayAllocate(
db,
pInfo->aCol,
sizeof(pInfo->aCol[0]),
&pInfo->nColumn,
&i
);
return i;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const struct ldb_val *ldb_dn_get_component_val(struct ldb_dn *dn,
unsigned int num)
{
if ( ! ldb_dn_validate(dn)) {
return NULL;
}
if (num >= dn->comp_num) return NULL;
return &dn->components[num].value;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testUriHostIpSix1() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
const char * const input = "http" "://" "[::1]" ":" "80";
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, input));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.first == input + 4 + 3 + 1);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 4);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ip4 == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ip6 != NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ipFuture.first == NULL);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostData.ipFuture.afterLast == NULL);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsmp_save (GsmClient *client,
GError **error)
{
GsmClientRestartStyle restart_style;
GKeyFile *keyfile = NULL;
char *desktop_file_path = NULL;
char *exec_program = NULL;
char *exec_discard = NULL;
char *startup_id = NULL;
GError *local_error;
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: saving client with id %s",
gsm_client_peek_id (client));
local_error = NULL;
restart_style = xsmp_get_restart_style_hint (client);
if (restart_style == GSM_CLIENT_RESTART_NEVER) {
goto out;
}
exec_program = xsmp_get_restart_command (client);
if (!exec_program) {
goto out;
}
desktop_file_path = get_desktop_file_path (GSM_XSMP_CLIENT (client));
keyfile = create_client_key_file (client,
desktop_file_path,
&local_error);
if (local_error) {
goto out;
}
g_object_get (client,
"startup-id", &startup_id,
NULL);
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
GSM_AUTOSTART_APP_STARTUP_ID_KEY,
startup_id);
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_KEY_EXEC,
exec_program);
exec_discard = xsmp_get_discard_command (client);
if (exec_discard)
g_key_file_set_string (keyfile,
G_KEY_FILE_DESKTOP_GROUP,
GSM_AUTOSTART_APP_DISCARD_KEY,
exec_discard);
out:
g_free (desktop_file_path);
g_free (exec_program);
g_free (exec_discard);
g_free (startup_id);
if (local_error != NULL) {
g_propagate_error (error, local_error);
g_key_file_free (keyfile);
return NULL;
}
return keyfile;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 63,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::SetExtraHeadersForUrl(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj,
jstring url, jstring jextra_headers) {
std::string extra_headers;
if (jextra_headers)
extra_headers = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jextra_headers);
AwResourceContext* resource_context = static_cast<AwResourceContext*>(
AwBrowserContext::FromWebContents(web_contents_.get())->
GetResourceContext());
resource_context->SetExtraHeaders(GURL(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, url)),
extra_headers);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap14_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_selectors;
if ( table + 2 + 4 + 4 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 2;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
num_selectors = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( length > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - table ) ||
/* length < 10 + 11 * num_selectors ? */
length < 10 ||
( length - 10 ) / 11 < num_selectors )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check selectors, they must be in increasing order */
{
/* we start lastVarSel at 1 because a variant selector value of 0
* isn't valid.
*/
FT_ULong n, lastVarSel = 1;
for ( n = 0; n < num_selectors; n++ )
{
FT_ULong varSel = TT_NEXT_UINT24( p );
FT_ULong defOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
FT_ULong nondefOff = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( defOff >= length || nondefOff >= length )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( varSel < lastVarSel )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastVarSel = varSel + 1;
/* check the default table (these glyphs should be reached */
/* through the normal Unicode cmap, no GIDs, just check order) */
if ( defOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* defp = table + defOff;
FT_ULong numRanges = TT_NEXT_ULONG( defp );
FT_ULong i;
FT_ULong lastBase = 0;
/* defp + numRanges * 4 > valid->limit ? */
if ( numRanges > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - defp ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
if ( base + cnt >= 0x110000UL ) /* end of Unicode */
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( base < lastBase )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
lastBase = base + cnt + 1U;
}
}
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
/* and the non-default table (these glyphs are specified here) */
if ( nondefOff != 0 )
{
FT_Byte* ndp = table + nondefOff;
FT_ULong numMappings = TT_NEXT_ULONG( ndp );
FT_ULong i, lastUni = 0;
/* numMappings * 4 > (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ? */
if ( numMappings > ( (FT_ULong)( valid->limit - ndp ) ) / 4 )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
for ( i = 0; i < numMappings; ++i )
lastUni = uni + 1U;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT &&
gid >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 165,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ipmi_init_msghandler_mod(void)
{
ipmi_init_msghandler();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DetermineDownloadTarget(
DownloadItemImpl* item, const DownloadTargetCallback& callback) {
if (!delegate_ || !delegate_->DetermineDownloadTarget(item, callback)) {
base::FilePath target_path = item->GetForcedFilePath();
callback.Run(target_path, DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
DOWNLOAD_DANGER_TYPE_NOT_DANGEROUS, target_path,
DOWNLOAD_INTERRUPT_REASON_NONE);
}
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoIsFramebuffer(GLuint client_id) {
const Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebuffer(client_id);
return framebuffer && framebuffer->IsValid() && !framebuffer->IsDeleted();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoErrorCorrection:
{
return OMX_ErrorNotImplemented;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1 ||
bitRate->eControlRate != OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mVideoBitRate = bitRate->nTargetBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(def)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (def->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (def->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (def->format.video.eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused ||
(def->format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar &&
def->format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar &&
def->format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
} else {
if ((mEncodeMode == COMBINE_MODE_WITH_ERR_RES &&
def->format.video.eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4) ||
(mEncodeMode == H263_MODE &&
def->format.video.eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263) ||
(def->format.video.eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
if (OMX_ErrorNone != err) {
return err;
}
if (def->nPortIndex == 0) {
mVideoWidth = def->format.video.nFrameWidth;
mVideoHeight = def->format.video.nFrameHeight;
mVideoFrameRate = def->format.video.xFramerate >> 16;
mVideoColorFormat = def->format.video.eColorFormat;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *portDef =
&editPortInfo(0)->mDef;
portDef->format.video.nFrameWidth = mVideoWidth;
portDef->format.video.nFrameHeight = mVideoHeight;
portDef->format.video.xFramerate = def->format.video.xFramerate;
portDef->format.video.eColorFormat =
(OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE) mVideoColorFormat;
portDef = &editPortInfo(1)->mDef;
portDef->format.video.nFrameWidth = mVideoWidth;
portDef->format.video.nFrameHeight = mVideoHeight;
} else {
mVideoBitRate = def->format.video.nBitrate;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
(mEncodeMode == H263_MODE)
? "video_encoder.h263": "video_encoder.mpeg4",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat:
{
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 2) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == 0) {
if (formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused ||
((formatParams->nIndex == 0 &&
formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar) ||
(formatParams->nIndex == 1 &&
formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) ||
(formatParams->nIndex == 2 &&
formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) )) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mVideoColorFormat = formatParams->eColorFormat;
} else {
if ((mEncodeMode == H263_MODE &&
formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingH263) ||
(mEncodeMode == COMBINE_MODE_WITH_ERR_RES &&
formatParams->eCompressionFormat != OMX_VIDEO_CodingMPEG4) ||
formatParams->eColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoH263:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *h263type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_H263TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(h263type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (h263type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (h263type->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_H263ProfileBaseline ||
h263type->eLevel != OMX_VIDEO_H263Level45 ||
(h263type->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) ||
h263type->bPLUSPTYPEAllowed != OMX_FALSE ||
h263type->bForceRoundingTypeToZero != OMX_FALSE ||
h263type->nPictureHeaderRepetition != 0 ||
h263type->nGOBHeaderInterval != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoMpeg4:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *mpeg4type =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_MPEG4TYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(mpeg4type)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mpeg4type->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (mpeg4type->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4ProfileCore ||
mpeg4type->eLevel != OMX_VIDEO_MPEG4Level2 ||
(mpeg4type->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) ||
mpeg4type->nBFrames != 0 ||
mpeg4type->nIDCVLCThreshold != 0 ||
mpeg4type->bACPred != OMX_TRUE ||
mpeg4type->nMaxPacketSize != 256 ||
mpeg4type->nTimeIncRes != 1000 ||
mpeg4type->nHeaderExtension != 0 ||
mpeg4type->bReversibleVLC != OMX_FALSE) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case kStoreMetaDataExtensionIndex:
{
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams *storeParams =
(StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams*)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(storeParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (storeParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
ALOGE("%s: StoreMetadataInBuffersParams.nPortIndex not zero!",
__FUNCTION__);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mStoreMetaDataInBuffers = storeParams->bStoreMetaData;
ALOGV("StoreMetaDataInBuffers set to: %s",
mStoreMetaDataInBuffers ? " true" : "false");
if (mStoreMetaDataInBuffers) {
mVideoColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestNetworkErrorLoggingService* network_error_logging_service() const {
return test_network_error_logging_service_;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_create_session(struct nfs_client *clp,
struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_session *session = clp->cl_session;
struct nfs41_create_session_args args = {
.client = clp,
.cb_program = NFS4_CALLBACK,
};
struct nfs41_create_session_res res = {
.client = clp,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CREATE_SESSION],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
int status;
nfs4_init_channel_attrs(&args);
args.flags = (SESSION4_PERSIST | SESSION4_BACK_CHAN);
status = rpc_call_sync(session->clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
if (!status)
/* Verify the session's negotiated channel_attrs values */
status = nfs4_verify_channel_attrs(&args, session);
if (!status) {
/* Increment the clientid slot sequence id */
clp->cl_seqid++;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs4_delegation *find_deleg_stateid(struct nfs4_client *cl, stateid_t *s)
{
struct nfs4_stid *ret;
ret = find_stateid_by_type(cl, s, NFS4_DELEG_STID);
if (!ret)
return NULL;
return delegstateid(ret);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HistoryCommitType LoadTypeToCommitType(FrameLoadType type) {
switch (type) {
case kFrameLoadTypeStandard:
return kStandardCommit;
case kFrameLoadTypeInitialInChildFrame:
case kFrameLoadTypeInitialHistoryLoad:
return kInitialCommitInChildFrame;
case kFrameLoadTypeBackForward:
return kBackForwardCommit;
default:
break;
}
return kHistoryInertCommit;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 125,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tgr192_pass(u64 * ra, u64 * rb, u64 * rc, u64 * x, int mul)
{
u64 a = *ra;
u64 b = *rb;
u64 c = *rc;
tgr192_round(&a, &b, &c, x[0], mul);
tgr192_round(&b, &c, &a, x[1], mul);
tgr192_round(&c, &a, &b, x[2], mul);
tgr192_round(&a, &b, &c, x[3], mul);
tgr192_round(&b, &c, &a, x[4], mul);
tgr192_round(&c, &a, &b, x[5], mul);
tgr192_round(&a, &b, &c, x[6], mul);
tgr192_round(&b, &c, &a, x[7], mul);
*ra = a;
*rb = b;
*rc = c;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL HTMLMediaElement::SelectNextSourceChild(
String* content_type,
InvalidURLAction action_if_invalid) {
bool should_log = action_if_invalid != kDoNothing;
if (should_log)
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "selectNextSourceChild(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (!next_child_node_to_consider_) {
if (should_log) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "selectNextSourceChild(" << (void*)this
<< ") -> 0x0000, \"\"";
}
return KURL();
}
KURL media_url;
Node* node;
HTMLSourceElement* source = nullptr;
String type;
bool looking_for_start_node = next_child_node_to_consider_;
bool can_use_source_element = false;
NodeVector potential_source_nodes;
GetChildNodes(*this, potential_source_nodes);
for (unsigned i = 0;
!can_use_source_element && i < potential_source_nodes.size(); ++i) {
node = potential_source_nodes[i].Get();
if (looking_for_start_node && next_child_node_to_consider_ != node)
continue;
looking_for_start_node = false;
if (!IsHTMLSourceElement(*node))
continue;
if (node->parentNode() != this)
continue;
source = ToHTMLSourceElement(node);
const AtomicString& src_value = source->FastGetAttribute(srcAttr);
if (should_log) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "selectNextSourceChild(" << (void*)this
<< ") - 'src' is " << UrlForLoggingMedia(media_url);
}
if (src_value.IsEmpty())
goto checkAgain;
media_url = source->GetDocument().CompleteURL(src_value);
if (!IsSafeToLoadURL(media_url, action_if_invalid))
goto checkAgain;
type = source->type();
if (type.IsEmpty() && media_url.ProtocolIsData())
type = MimeTypeFromDataURL(media_url);
if (!type.IsEmpty()) {
if (should_log) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "selectNextSourceChild(" << (void*)this
<< ") - 'type' is '" << type << "'";
}
if (!GetSupportsType(ContentType(type)))
goto checkAgain;
}
can_use_source_element = true;
checkAgain:
if (!can_use_source_element && action_if_invalid == kComplain && source)
source->ScheduleErrorEvent();
}
if (can_use_source_element) {
if (content_type)
*content_type = type;
current_source_node_ = source;
next_child_node_to_consider_ = source->nextSibling();
} else {
current_source_node_ = nullptr;
next_child_node_to_consider_ = nullptr;
}
if (should_log) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "selectNextSourceChild(" << (void*)this << ") -> "
<< current_source_node_.Get() << ", "
<< (can_use_source_element ? UrlForLoggingMedia(media_url)
: "");
}
return can_use_source_element ? media_url : KURL();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_algorithms(void)
{
int i;
const char *aname = "unknown";
const id2str_t alg_type_names[] = {
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA, "rsa" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_DSA, "dsa" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_EC, "ec" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_GOSTR3410, "gostr3410" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_DES, "des" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_3DES, "3des" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_GOST, "gost" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_MD5, "md5" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_SHA1, "sha1" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_GOSTR3411, "gostr3411" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_PBKDF2, "pbkdf2" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_PBES2, "pbes2" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const id2str_t alg_flag_names[] = {
{ SC_ALGORITHM_ONBOARD_KEY_GEN, "onboard key generation" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_NEED_USAGE, "needs usage" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const id2str_t rsa_flag_names[] = {
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PKCS1, "pkcs1" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ANSI, "ansi" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_PSS, "pss" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_ISO9796, "iso9796" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA1, "sha1" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_MD5, "MD5" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_MD5_SHA1, "md5-sha1" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_RIPEMD160, "ripemd160" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA256, "sha256" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA384, "sha384" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA512, "sha512" },
{ SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_SHA224, "sha224" },
{ 0, NULL }
};
if (verbose)
printf("Card supports %d algorithm(s)\n\n",card->algorithm_count);
for (i=0; i < card->algorithm_count; i++) {
int j;
/* find algorithm name */
for (j = 0; alg_type_names[j].str != NULL; j++) {
if (card->algorithms[i].algorithm == alg_type_names[j].id) {
aname = alg_type_names[j].str;
break;
}
}
printf("Algorithm: %s\n", aname);
printf("Key length: %d\n", card->algorithms[i].key_length);
printf("Flags:");
/* print general flags */
for (j = 0; alg_flag_names[j].str != NULL; j++)
if (card->algorithms[i].flags & alg_flag_names[j].id)
printf(" %s", alg_flag_names[j].str);
/* print RSA spcific flags */
if ( card->algorithms[i].algorithm == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA) {
int padding = card->algorithms[i].flags
& SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PADS;
int hashes = card->algorithms[i].flags
& SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASHES;
/* print RSA padding flags */
printf(" padding (");
for (j = 0; rsa_flag_names[j].str != NULL; j++)
if (padding & rsa_flag_names[j].id)
printf(" %s", rsa_flag_names[j].str);
if (padding == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_PAD_NONE)
printf(" none");
printf(" ) ");
/* print RSA hash flags */
printf("hashes (");
for (j = 0; rsa_flag_names[j].str != NULL; j++)
if (hashes & rsa_flag_names[j].id)
printf(" %s", rsa_flag_names[j].str);
if (hashes == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA_HASH_NONE)
printf(" none");
printf(" )");
}
printf("\n");
if (card->algorithms[i].algorithm == SC_ALGORITHM_RSA
&& card->algorithms[i].u._rsa.exponent) {
printf("RSA public exponent: %lu\n", (unsigned long)
card->algorithms[i].u._rsa.exponent);
}
if (i < card->algorithm_count)
printf("\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *check_dir_or_file(const char *name) {
assert(name);
struct stat s;
invalid_filename(name);
if (arg_debug)
printf("Private home: checking %s\n", name);
char *fname = expand_home(name, cfg.homedir);
if (!fname) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s not found.\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (fname[0] != '/') {
char* tmp;
if (asprintf(&tmp, "%s/%s", cfg.homedir, fname) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
free(fname);
fname = tmp;
}
char *rname = realpath(fname, NULL);
if (!rname) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file %s\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rname, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s is not in user home directory\n", name);
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(rname, cfg.homedir) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid directory %s\n", rname);
exit(1);
}
char *ptr = rname + strlen(cfg.homedir);
if (*ptr == '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file %s\n", name);
exit(1);
}
ptr++;
ptr = strchr(ptr, '/');
if (ptr) {
if (*ptr != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: only top files and directories in user home are allowed\n");
exit(1);
}
}
if (stat(fname, &s) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: file %s not found.\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
uid_t uid = getuid();
gid_t gid = getgid();
if (s.st_uid != uid || s.st_gid != gid) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: only files or directories created by the current user are allowed.\n");
exit(1);
}
if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode) || S_ISREG(s.st_mode)) {
free(fname);
return rname; // regular exit from the function
}
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid file type, %s.\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 68,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteData(SAVESTREAM* fp, cmsIT8* it8)
{
int i, j;
TABLE* t = GetTable(it8);
if (!t->Data) return;
WriteStr (fp, "BEGIN_DATA\n");
t->nPatches = atoi(cmsIT8GetProperty(it8, "NUMBER_OF_SETS"));
for (i = 0; i < t-> nPatches; i++) {
WriteStr(fp, " ");
for (j = 0; j < t->nSamples; j++) {
char *ptr = t->Data[i*t->nSamples+j];
if (ptr == NULL) WriteStr(fp, "\"\"");
else {
if (strchr(ptr, ' ') != NULL) {
WriteStr(fp, "\"");
WriteStr(fp, ptr);
WriteStr(fp, "\"");
}
else
WriteStr(fp, ptr);
}
WriteStr(fp, ((j == (t->nSamples-1)) ? "\n" : "\t"));
}
}
WriteStr (fp, "END_DATA\n");
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long vma_kernel_pagesize(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct hstate *hstate;
if (!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
return PAGE_SIZE;
hstate = hstate_vma(vma);
return 1UL << (hstate->order + PAGE_SHIFT);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_check_away (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
struct t_irc_channel *ptr_channel;
if (server->is_connected)
{
for (ptr_channel = server->channels; ptr_channel;
ptr_channel = ptr_channel->next_channel)
{
if (ptr_channel->type == IRC_CHANNEL_TYPE_CHANNEL)
irc_channel_check_away (server, ptr_channel);
}
server->last_away_check = time (NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
double buf[33];
int i;
#endif
flush_fp_to_thread(target);
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
/* copy to local buffer then write that out */
i = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, buf, 0, -1);
if (i)
return i;
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
target->thread.TS_FPR(i) = buf[i];
memcpy(&target->thread.fpscr, &buf[32], sizeof(double));
return 0;
#else
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct thread_struct, fpscr) !=
offsetof(struct thread_struct, TS_FPR(32)));
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.fpr, 0, -1);
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(Notification)
{
visitor->trace(m_asyncRunner);
RefCountedGarbageCollectedEventTargetWithInlineData<Notification>::trace(visitor);
ActiveDOMObject::trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::detach()
{
ASSERT(attached());
ASSERT(!m_inPageCache);
#if ENABLE(POINTER_LOCK)
if (page())
page()->pointerLockController()->documentDetached(this);
#endif
if (this == topDocument())
clearAXObjectCache();
stopActiveDOMObjects();
m_eventQueue->close();
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
m_fullScreenChangeEventTargetQueue.clear();
m_fullScreenErrorEventTargetQueue.clear();
#endif
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME)
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
#endif
RenderObject* render = renderer();
documentWillBecomeInactive();
#if ENABLE(SHARED_WORKERS)
SharedWorkerRepository::documentDetached(this);
#endif
if (m_frame) {
FrameView* view = m_frame->view();
if (view)
view->detachCustomScrollbars();
}
setRenderer(0);
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
if (m_fullScreenRenderer)
setFullScreenRenderer(0);
#endif
m_hoverNode = 0;
m_focusedNode = 0;
m_activeElement = 0;
ContainerNode::detach();
unscheduleStyleRecalc();
if (render)
render->destroy();
#if ENABLE(TOUCH_EVENTS)
if (m_touchEventTargets && m_touchEventTargets->size() && parentDocument())
parentDocument()->didRemoveEventTargetNode(this);
#endif
m_frame = 0;
m_renderArena.clear();
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldOpenDownload(DownloadItem* item) {
if (download_crx_util::IsExtensionDownload(*item)) {
scoped_refptr<CrxInstaller> crx_installer =
download_crx_util::OpenChromeExtension(profile_, *item);
registrar_.Add(this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_CRX_INSTALLER_DONE,
content::Source<CrxInstaller>(crx_installer.get()));
crx_installers_[crx_installer.get()] = item->GetId();
item->UpdateObservers();
return false;
}
if (ShouldOpenWithWebIntents(item)) {
OpenWithWebIntent(item);
item->DelayedDownloadOpened(true /* did_open */);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2Implementation::DeferredErrorCallback::DeferredErrorCallback(
std::string message,
int32_t id)
: message(std::move(message)), id(id) {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_NEQ( INS_ARG )
{ (void)exc;
if ( args[0] != args[1] )
args[0] = 1;
else
args[0] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct tcmur_handler *find_handler_by_subtype(gchar *subtype)
{
struct tcmur_handler **handler;
darray_foreach(handler, g_runner_handlers) {
if (strcmp((*handler)->subtype, subtype) == 0)
return *handler;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 secondary_exec_ctl = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(vcpu);
if (!rdtscp_enabled)
secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
if (nested) {
if (rdtscp_enabled)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
}
}
/* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
if (vmx_invpcid_supported() &&
(!best || !(best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) ||
!guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu))) {
secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
if (best)
best->ebx &= ~bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
}
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(secondary_exec_ctl);
if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
else
to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
~FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
int rhash, rsign;
size_t i;
if (salglen & 1)
return 0;
sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
if (sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
goto err;
*sptr++ = rhash;
*sptr++ = rsign;
}
if (client) {
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
} else {
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
}
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_verify_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
stateid_t *src_stateid, struct file **src,
stateid_t *dst_stateid, struct file **dst)
{
__be32 status;
status = nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op(rqstp, cstate, &cstate->save_fh,
src_stateid, RD_STATE, src, NULL);
if (status) {
dprintk("NFSD: %s: couldn't process src stateid!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
status = nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op(rqstp, cstate, &cstate->current_fh,
dst_stateid, WR_STATE, dst, NULL);
if (status) {
dprintk("NFSD: %s: couldn't process dst stateid!\n", __func__);
goto out_put_src;
}
/* fix up for NFS-specific error code */
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(*src)->i_mode) ||
!S_ISREG(file_inode(*dst)->i_mode)) {
status = nfserr_wrong_type;
goto out_put_dst;
}
out:
return status;
out_put_dst:
fput(*dst);
out_put_src:
fput(*src);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_stop_adapter_bgrb(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
arcmsr_hbaA_stop_bgrb(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
arcmsr_hbaB_stop_bgrb(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
arcmsr_hbaC_stop_bgrb(acb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D:
arcmsr_hbaD_stop_bgrb(acb);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NetworkActionPredictor::CommitTransaction() {
if (!initialized_)
return;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(content::BrowserThread::DB, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NetworkActionPredictorDatabase::CommitTransaction, db_));
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::SetEngagementLevel(const url::Origin& origin,
blink::mojom::EngagementLevel level) {
if (frame_ && url::Origin(frame_->GetSecurityOrigin()) == origin) {
frame_->SetEngagementLevel(level);
return;
}
engagement_level_ = std::make_pair(origin, level);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline__ void node_free(struct fib6_node * fn)
{
kmem_cache_free(fib6_node_kmem, fn);
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void r_bin_file_free(void /*RBinFile*/ *bf_) {
RBinFile *a = bf_;
RBinPlugin *plugin = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (a);
if (!a) {
return;
}
if (plugin && plugin->destroy) {
plugin->destroy (a);
}
if (a->curxtr && a->curxtr->destroy && a->xtr_obj) {
a->curxtr->free_xtr ((void *)(a->xtr_obj));
}
r_buf_free (a->buf);
if (a && a->sdb_addrinfo) {
sdb_free (a->sdb_addrinfo);
a->sdb_addrinfo = NULL;
}
free (a->file);
a->o = NULL;
r_list_free (a->objs);
r_list_free (a->xtr_data);
r_id_pool_kick_id (a->rbin->file_ids, a->id);
memset (a, 0, sizeof (RBinFile));
free (a);
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 cpu_shares_read_u64(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css,
struct cftype *cft)
{
struct task_group *tg = css_tg(css);
return (u64) scale_load_down(tg->shares);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeCoordinator::flushPendingLayerChanges()
{
if (m_waitingForUIProcess)
return false;
m_shouldSyncFrame = false;
bool didSync = m_webPage->corePage()->mainFrame()->view()->syncCompositingStateIncludingSubframes();
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->syncCompositingStateForThisLayerOnly();
if (m_pageOverlayLayer)
m_pageOverlayLayer->syncCompositingStateForThisLayerOnly();
m_rootLayer->syncCompositingStateForThisLayerOnly();
if (m_shouldSyncRootLayer) {
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeCoordinatorProxy::SetRootCompositingLayer(toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get())->id()));
m_shouldSyncRootLayer = false;
}
if (m_shouldSyncFrame) {
didSync = true;
m_webPage->send(Messages::LayerTreeCoordinatorProxy::DidRenderFrame());
m_waitingForUIProcess = true;
m_shouldSyncFrame = false;
}
if (m_forceRepaintAsyncCallbackID) {
m_webPage->send(Messages::WebPageProxy::VoidCallback(m_forceRepaintAsyncCallbackID));
m_forceRepaintAsyncCallbackID = 0;
}
return didSync;
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_download_mode(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->serial->interface->dev;
int status = 0;
int start_address;
struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor *ti_manuf_desc;
int download_cur_ver;
int download_new_ver;
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - RUNNING IN DOWNLOAD MODE\n", __func__);
status = check_i2c_image(serial);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - DOWNLOAD MODE -- BAD I2C\n", __func__);
return status;
}
/*
* Validate Hardware version number
* Read Manufacturing Descriptor from TI Based Edgeport
*/
ti_manuf_desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*ti_manuf_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ti_manuf_desc)
return -ENOMEM;
status = get_manuf_info(serial, (__u8 *)ti_manuf_desc);
if (status) {
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return status;
}
/* Check version number of ION descriptor */
if (!ignore_cpu_rev && ti_cpu_rev(ti_manuf_desc) < 2) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Wrong CPU Rev %d (Must be 2)\n",
__func__, ti_cpu_rev(ti_manuf_desc));
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
rom_desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*rom_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rom_desc) {
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Search for type 2 record (firmware record) */
start_address = get_descriptor_addr(serial,
I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BASIC, rom_desc);
if (start_address != 0) {
struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec *firmware_version;
u8 *record;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Found Type FIRMWARE (Type 2) record\n",
__func__);
firmware_version = kmalloc(sizeof(*firmware_version),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!firmware_version) {
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Validate version number
* Read the descriptor data
*/
status = read_rom(serial, start_address +
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec),
(__u8 *)firmware_version);
if (status) {
kfree(firmware_version);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return status;
}
/*
* Check version number of download with current
* version in I2c
*/
download_cur_ver = (firmware_version->Ver_Major << 8) +
(firmware_version->Ver_Minor);
download_new_ver = (fw_hdr->major_version << 8) +
(fw_hdr->minor_version);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - >> FW Versions Device %d.%d Driver %d.%d\n",
__func__, firmware_version->Ver_Major,
firmware_version->Ver_Minor,
fw_hdr->major_version, fw_hdr->minor_version);
/*
* Check if we have an old version in the I2C and
* update if necessary
*/
if (download_cur_ver < download_new_ver) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Update I2C dld from %d.%d to %d.%d\n",
__func__,
firmware_version->Ver_Major,
firmware_version->Ver_Minor,
fw_hdr->major_version,
fw_hdr->minor_version);
record = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!record) {
kfree(firmware_version);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* In order to update the I2C firmware we must
* change the type 2 record to type 0xF2. This
* will force the UMP to come up in Boot Mode.
* Then while in boot mode, the driver will
* download the latest firmware (padded to
* 15.5k) into the UMP ram. Finally when the
* device comes back up in download mode the
* driver will cause the new firmware to be
* copied from the UMP Ram to I2C and the
* firmware will update the record type from
* 0xf2 to 0x02.
*/
*record = I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BLANK;
/*
* Change the I2C Firmware record type to
* 0xf2 to trigger an update
*/
status = write_rom(serial, start_address,
sizeof(*record), record);
if (status) {
kfree(record);
kfree(firmware_version);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return status;
}
/*
* verify the write -- must do this in order
* for write to complete before we do the
* hardware reset
*/
status = read_rom(serial,
start_address,
sizeof(*record),
record);
if (status) {
kfree(record);
kfree(firmware_version);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return status;
}
if (*record != I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BLANK) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - error resetting device\n",
__func__);
kfree(record);
kfree(firmware_version);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENODEV;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - HARDWARE RESET\n", __func__);
/* Reset UMP -- Back to BOOT MODE */
status = ti_vsend_sync(serial->serial->dev,
UMPC_HARDWARE_RESET,
0, 0, NULL, 0,
TI_VSEND_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - HARDWARE RESET return %d\n",
__func__, status);
/* return an error on purpose. */
kfree(record);
kfree(firmware_version);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* Same or newer fw version is already loaded */
serial->fw_version = download_cur_ver;
kfree(firmware_version);
}
/* Search for type 0xF2 record (firmware blank record) */
else {
start_address = get_descriptor_addr(serial,
I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BLANK, rom_desc);
if (start_address != 0) {
#define HEADER_SIZE (sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc) + \
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec))
__u8 *header;
__u8 *vheader;
header = kmalloc(HEADER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!header) {
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
vheader = kmalloc(HEADER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vheader) {
kfree(header);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Found Type BLANK FIRMWARE (Type F2) record\n",
__func__);
/*
* In order to update the I2C firmware we must change
* the type 2 record to type 0xF2. This will force the
* UMP to come up in Boot Mode. Then while in boot
* mode, the driver will download the latest firmware
* (padded to 15.5k) into the UMP ram. Finally when the
* device comes back up in download mode the driver
* will cause the new firmware to be copied from the
* UMP Ram to I2C and the firmware will update the
* record type from 0xf2 to 0x02.
*/
status = build_i2c_fw_hdr(header, fw);
if (status) {
kfree(vheader);
kfree(header);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* Update I2C with type 0xf2 record with correct
* size and checksum
*/
status = write_rom(serial,
start_address,
HEADER_SIZE,
header);
if (status) {
kfree(vheader);
kfree(header);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* verify the write -- must do this in order for
* write to complete before we do the hardware reset
*/
status = read_rom(serial, start_address,
HEADER_SIZE, vheader);
if (status) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - can't read header back\n",
__func__);
kfree(vheader);
kfree(header);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return status;
}
if (memcmp(vheader, header, HEADER_SIZE)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - write download record failed\n",
__func__);
kfree(vheader);
kfree(header);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return -EINVAL;
}
kfree(vheader);
kfree(header);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Start firmware update\n", __func__);
/* Tell firmware to copy download image into I2C */
status = ti_vsend_sync(serial->serial->dev,
UMPC_COPY_DNLD_TO_I2C,
0, 0, NULL, 0,
TI_VSEND_TIMEOUT_FW_DOWNLOAD);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Update complete 0x%x\n", __func__,
status);
if (status) {
dev_err(dev,
"%s - UMPC_COPY_DNLD_TO_I2C failed\n",
__func__);
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return status;
}
}
}
/* The device is running the download code */
kfree(rom_desc);
kfree(ti_manuf_desc);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rdma_accept(struct rdma_cm_id *id, struct rdma_conn_param *conn_param)
{
struct rdma_id_private *id_priv;
int ret;
id_priv = container_of(id, struct rdma_id_private, id);
id_priv->owner = task_pid_nr(current);
if (!cma_comp(id_priv, RDMA_CM_CONNECT))
return -EINVAL;
if (!id->qp && conn_param) {
id_priv->qp_num = conn_param->qp_num;
id_priv->srq = conn_param->srq;
}
switch (rdma_node_get_transport(id->device->node_type)) {
case RDMA_TRANSPORT_IB:
if (id->qp_type == IB_QPT_UD) {
if (conn_param)
ret = cma_send_sidr_rep(id_priv, IB_SIDR_SUCCESS,
conn_param->qkey,
conn_param->private_data,
conn_param->private_data_len);
else
ret = cma_send_sidr_rep(id_priv, IB_SIDR_SUCCESS,
0, NULL, 0);
} else {
if (conn_param)
ret = cma_accept_ib(id_priv, conn_param);
else
ret = cma_rep_recv(id_priv);
}
break;
case RDMA_TRANSPORT_IWARP:
ret = cma_accept_iw(id_priv, conn_param);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOSYS;
break;
}
if (ret)
goto reject;
return 0;
reject:
cma_modify_qp_err(id_priv);
rdma_reject(id, NULL, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
struct request_values *rvp)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff * skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct in6_addr * final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int err;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
fl6.flowlabel = 0;
fl6.flowi6_oif = treq->iif;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet_rsk(req)->rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet_rsk(req)->loc_port;
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
opt = np->opt;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p, false);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto done;
}
skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req, rvp);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (skb) {
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &treq->loc_addr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, opt);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
if (opt && opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecopyresampled)
{
zval *SIM, *DIM;
long SX, SY, SW, SH, DX, DY, DW, DH;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
int srcH, srcW, dstH, dstW, srcY, srcX, dstY, dstX;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rrllllllll", &DIM, &SIM, &DX, &DY, &SX, &SY, &DW, &DH, &SW, &SH) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_dst, gdImagePtr, &DIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
srcX = SX;
srcY = SY;
srcH = SH;
srcW = SW;
dstX = DX;
dstY = DY;
dstH = DH;
dstW = DW;
gdImageCopyResampled(im_dst, im_src, dstX, dstY, srcX, srcY, dstW, dstH, srcW, srcH);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hns_rcb_common_free_cfg(struct dsaf_device *dsaf_dev,
u32 comm_index)
{
dsaf_dev->rcb_common[comm_index] = NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FeatureInfo::EnableEXTColorBufferFloat() {
if (!ext_color_buffer_float_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_color_buffer_float");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_R16F);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RG16F);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGBA16F);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_R32F);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RG32F);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGBA32F);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_R11F_G11F_B10F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R16F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG16F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_RGBA16F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R32F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG32F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_RGBA32F);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_R11F_G11F_B10F);
feature_flags_.enable_color_buffer_float = true;
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_dump_chains(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
const struct nft_af_info *afi;
const struct nft_table *table;
const struct nft_chain *chain;
unsigned int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[0];
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int family = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
rcu_read_lock();
cb->seq = net->nft.base_seq;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(afi, &net->nft.af_info, list) {
if (family != NFPROTO_UNSPEC && family != afi->family)
continue;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(table, &afi->tables, list) {
list_for_each_entry_rcu(chain, &table->chains, list) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto cont;
if (idx > s_idx)
memset(&cb->args[1], 0,
sizeof(cb->args) - sizeof(cb->args[0]));
if (nf_tables_fill_chain_info(skb, net,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN,
NLM_F_MULTI,
afi->family, table, chain) < 0)
goto done;
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlmsg_hdr(skb));
cont:
idx++;
}
}
}
done:
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int ape_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
APEContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < APE_FILTER_LEVELS; i++)
av_freep(&s->filterbuf[i]);
av_freep(&s->decoded_buffer);
av_freep(&s->data);
s->decoded_size = s->data_size = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContext* context() const { return context_getter_->GetContext(); }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HistoryQuickProvider::DeleteMatch(const AutocompleteMatch& match) {}
Commit Message: Fix icon returned for HQP matches; the two icons were reversed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9695022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126296 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabStripGtk::DropInfo::~DropInfo() {
DestroyContainer();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::NotifySwapPromiseMonitorsOfSetNeedsRedraw() {
std::set<SwapPromiseMonitor*>::iterator it = swap_promise_monitor_.begin();
for (; it != swap_promise_monitor_.end(); it++)
(*it)->OnSetNeedsRedrawOnImpl();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigatorServiceWorker& NavigatorServiceWorker::from(Navigator& navigator)
{
NavigatorServiceWorker* supplement = toNavigatorServiceWorker(navigator);
if (!supplement) {
supplement = new NavigatorServiceWorker(navigator);
provideTo(navigator, supplementName(), supplement);
if (navigator.frame() && navigator.frame()->securityContext()->securityOrigin()->canAccessServiceWorkers()) {
supplement->serviceWorker(ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
}
}
return *supplement;
}
Commit Message: Add ASSERT() to avoid accidental leaking ServiceWorkerContainer to cross origin context.
BUG=522791
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1305903007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@201889 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 126,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLImageConversion::PixelStoreParams::PixelStoreParams()
: alignment(4),
row_length(0),
image_height(0),
skip_pixels(0),
skip_rows(0),
skip_images(0) {}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SoftVPX::outputBufferSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader) {
uint32_t width = outputBufferWidth();
uint32_t height = outputBufferHeight();
uint64_t nFilledLen = width;
nFilledLen *= height;
if (nFilledLen > UINT32_MAX / 3) {
ALOGE("b/29421675, nFilledLen overflow %llu w %u h %u", nFilledLen, width, height);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29421675");
return false;
} else if (outHeader->nAllocLen < outHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("b/27597103, buffer too small");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27597103");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: fix build
Change-Id: I9bb8c659d3fc97a8e748451d82d0f3448faa242b
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VideoCaptureManager::ResumeCaptureForClient(
media::VideoCaptureSessionId session_id,
const media::VideoCaptureParams& params,
VideoCaptureController* controller,
VideoCaptureControllerID client_id,
VideoCaptureControllerEventHandler* client_handler) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(controller);
DCHECK(client_handler);
if (!IsControllerPointerValid(controller))
NOTREACHED() << "Got Null controller while resuming capture";
const bool had_active_client = controller->HasActiveClient();
controller->ResumeClient(client_id, client_handler);
if (had_active_client || !controller->HasActiveClient())
return;
if (!controller->IsDeviceAlive())
return;
controller->Resume();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cypress_serial_control(struct tty_struct *tty,
struct usb_serial_port *port, speed_t baud_rate, int data_bits,
int stop_bits, int parity_enable, int parity_type, int reset,
int cypress_request_type)
{
int new_baudrate = 0, retval = 0, tries = 0;
struct cypress_private *priv;
struct device *dev = &port->dev;
u8 *feature_buffer;
const unsigned int feature_len = 5;
unsigned long flags;
priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (!priv->comm_is_ok)
return -ENODEV;
feature_buffer = kcalloc(feature_len, sizeof(u8), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!feature_buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
switch (cypress_request_type) {
case CYPRESS_SET_CONFIG:
/* 0 means 'Hang up' so doesn't change the true bit rate */
new_baudrate = priv->baud_rate;
if (baud_rate && baud_rate != priv->baud_rate) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - baud rate is changing\n", __func__);
retval = analyze_baud_rate(port, baud_rate);
if (retval >= 0) {
new_baudrate = retval;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - New baud rate set to %d\n",
__func__, new_baudrate);
}
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - baud rate is being sent as %d\n", __func__,
new_baudrate);
/* fill the feature_buffer with new configuration */
put_unaligned_le32(new_baudrate, feature_buffer);
feature_buffer[4] |= data_bits; /* assign data bits in 2 bit space ( max 3 ) */
/* 1 bit gap */
feature_buffer[4] |= (stop_bits << 3); /* assign stop bits in 1 bit space */
feature_buffer[4] |= (parity_enable << 4); /* assign parity flag in 1 bit space */
feature_buffer[4] |= (parity_type << 5); /* assign parity type in 1 bit space */
/* 1 bit gap */
feature_buffer[4] |= (reset << 7); /* assign reset at end of byte, 1 bit space */
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - device is being sent this feature report:\n", __func__);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - %02X - %02X - %02X - %02X - %02X\n", __func__,
feature_buffer[0], feature_buffer[1],
feature_buffer[2], feature_buffer[3],
feature_buffer[4]);
do {
retval = usb_control_msg(port->serial->dev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(port->serial->dev, 0),
HID_REQ_SET_REPORT,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS,
0x0300, 0, feature_buffer,
feature_len, 500);
if (tries++ >= 3)
break;
} while (retval != feature_len &&
retval != -ENODEV);
if (retval != feature_len) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - failed sending serial line settings - %d\n",
__func__, retval);
cypress_set_dead(port);
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
priv->baud_rate = new_baudrate;
priv->current_config = feature_buffer[4];
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
/* If we asked for a speed change encode it */
if (baud_rate)
tty_encode_baud_rate(tty,
new_baudrate, new_baudrate);
}
break;
case CYPRESS_GET_CONFIG:
if (priv->get_cfg_unsafe) {
/* Not implemented for this device,
and if we try to do it we're likely
to crash the hardware. */
retval = -ENOTTY;
goto out;
}
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - retreiving serial line settings\n", __func__);
do {
retval = usb_control_msg(port->serial->dev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(port->serial->dev, 0),
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS,
0x0300, 0, feature_buffer,
feature_len, 500);
if (tries++ >= 3)
break;
} while (retval != feature_len
&& retval != -ENODEV);
if (retval != feature_len) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - failed to retrieve serial line settings - %d\n",
__func__, retval);
cypress_set_dead(port);
goto out;
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
/* store the config in one byte, and later
use bit masks to check values */
priv->current_config = feature_buffer[4];
priv->baud_rate = get_unaligned_le32(feature_buffer);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
}
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
++priv->cmd_count;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
out:
kfree(feature_buffer);
return retval;
} /* cypress_serial_control */
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGenTransformFeedbacks(
GLsizei n,
volatile GLuint* ids) {
return GenHelper(n, ids, &transform_feedback_id_map_,
[this](GLsizei n, GLuint* transform_feedbacks) {
api()->glGenTransformFeedbacksFn(n, transform_feedbacks);
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_apply_patchset(xmlNode *xml, xmlNode *patchset, bool check_version)
{
int format = 1;
int rc = pcmk_ok;
xmlNode *old = NULL;
const char *digest = crm_element_value(patchset, XML_ATTR_DIGEST);
if(patchset == NULL) {
return rc;
}
xml_log_patchset(LOG_TRACE, __FUNCTION__, patchset);
crm_element_value_int(patchset, "format", &format);
if(check_version) {
rc = xml_patch_version_check(xml, patchset, format);
if(rc != pcmk_ok) {
return rc;
}
}
if(digest) {
/* Make it available for logging if the result doesn't have the expected digest */
old = copy_xml(xml);
}
if(rc == pcmk_ok) {
switch(format) {
case 1:
rc = xml_apply_patchset_v1(xml, patchset, check_version);
break;
case 2:
rc = xml_apply_patchset_v2(xml, patchset, check_version);
break;
default:
crm_err("Unknown patch format: %d", format);
rc = -EINVAL;
}
}
if(rc == pcmk_ok && digest) {
static struct qb_log_callsite *digest_cs = NULL;
char *new_digest = NULL;
char *version = crm_element_value_copy(xml, XML_ATTR_CRM_VERSION);
if (digest_cs == NULL) {
digest_cs =
qb_log_callsite_get(__func__, __FILE__, "diff-digest", LOG_TRACE, __LINE__,
crm_trace_nonlog);
}
new_digest = calculate_xml_versioned_digest(xml, FALSE, TRUE, version);
if (safe_str_neq(new_digest, digest)) {
crm_info("v%d digest mis-match: expected %s, calculated %s", format, digest, new_digest);
rc = -pcmk_err_diff_failed;
if (digest_cs && digest_cs->targets) {
save_xml_to_file(old, "PatchDigest:input", NULL);
save_xml_to_file(xml, "PatchDigest:result", NULL);
save_xml_to_file(patchset,"PatchDigest:diff", NULL);
} else {
crm_trace("%p %0.6x", digest_cs, digest_cs ? digest_cs->targets : 0);
}
} else {
crm_trace("v%d digest matched: expected %s, calculated %s", format, digest, new_digest);
}
free(new_digest);
free(version);
}
free_xml(old);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_bin_header(conn *c, uint16_t err, uint8_t hdr_len, uint16_t key_len, uint32_t body_len) {
protocol_binary_response_header* header;
assert(c);
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
/* This should never run out of memory because iov and msg lists
* have minimum sizes big enough to hold an error response.
*/
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory adding binary header");
return;
}
header = (protocol_binary_response_header *)c->wbuf;
header->response.magic = (uint8_t)PROTOCOL_BINARY_RES;
header->response.opcode = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
header->response.keylen = (uint16_t)htons(key_len);
header->response.extlen = (uint8_t)hdr_len;
header->response.datatype = (uint8_t)PROTOCOL_BINARY_RAW_BYTES;
header->response.status = (uint16_t)htons(err);
header->response.bodylen = htonl(body_len);
header->response.opaque = c->opaque;
header->response.cas = htonll(c->cas);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, ">%d Writing bin response:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(header->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n>%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", header->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
add_iov(c, c->wbuf, sizeof(header->response));
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_lgdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
return em_lgdt_lidt(ctxt, true);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CairoImageOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref, Stream *str,
int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr,
int maskWidth, int maskHeight,
GBool maskInvert)
{
cairo_t *cr;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
double x1, y1, x2, y2;
double *ctm;
double mat[6];
CairoImage *image;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
x1 = mat[4];
y1 = mat[5];
x2 = x1 + width;
y2 = y1 + height;
image = new CairoImage (x1, y1, x2, y2);
saveImage (image);
if (imgDrawCbk && imgDrawCbk (numImages - 1, imgDrawCbkData)) {
surface = cairo_image_surface_create (CAIRO_FORMAT_ARGB32, width, height);
cr = cairo_create (surface);
setCairo (cr);
cairo_translate (cr, 0, height);
cairo_scale (cr, width, -height);
CairoOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(state, ref, str, width, height, colorMap,
maskStr, maskWidth, maskHeight, maskInvert);
image->setImage (surface);
setCairo (NULL);
cairo_surface_destroy (surface);
cairo_destroy (cr);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::addSVGRootWithRelativeLengthDescendents(SVGSVGElement* svgRoot)
{
ASSERT(!m_inRelativeLengthSVGRootsInvalidation);
m_relativeLengthSVGRoots.add(svgRoot);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readonlyDOMTimeStampAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readonlyDOMTimeStampAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_save_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int i;
if (vmx->host_state.loaded)
return;
vmx->host_state.loaded = 1;
/*
* Set host fs and gs selectors. Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
* allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
*/
vmx->host_state.ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed = vmx->host_state.ldt_sel;
savesegment(fs, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
if (!(vmx->host_state.fs_sel & 7)) {
vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed = 0;
} else {
vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed = 1;
}
savesegment(gs, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
if (!(vmx->host_state.gs_sel & 7))
vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
else {
vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed = 1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
savesegment(ds, vmx->host_state.ds_sel);
savesegment(es, vmx->host_state.es_sel);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE));
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, read_msr(MSR_GS_BASE));
#else
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, segment_base(vmx->host_state.fs_sel));
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, segment_base(vmx->host_state.gs_sel));
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < vmx->save_nmsrs; ++i)
kvm_set_shared_msr(vmx->guest_msrs[i].index,
vmx->guest_msrs[i].data,
vmx->guest_msrs[i].mask);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int try_to_free_swap(struct page *page)
{
VM_BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
if (!PageSwapCache(page))
return 0;
if (PageWriteback(page))
return 0;
if (page_swapcount(page))
return 0;
/*
* Once hibernation has begun to create its image of memory,
* there's a danger that one of the calls to try_to_free_swap()
* - most probably a call from __try_to_reclaim_swap() while
* hibernation is allocating its own swap pages for the image,
* but conceivably even a call from memory reclaim - will free
* the swap from a page which has already been recorded in the
* image as a clean swapcache page, and then reuse its swap for
* another page of the image. On waking from hibernation, the
* original page might be freed under memory pressure, then
* later read back in from swap, now with the wrong data.
*
* Hibration suspends storage while it is writing the image
* to disk so check that here.
*/
if (pm_suspended_storage())
return 0;
delete_from_swap_cache(page);
SetPageDirty(page);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldDeferReads() {
return !offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get() &&
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get() == nullptr &&
surface_->DeferDraws();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int muscle_card_extract_key(sc_card_t *card, sc_cardctl_muscle_key_info_t *info)
{
/* CURRENTLY DONT SUPPORT EXTRACTING PRIVATE KEYS... */
switch(info->keyType) {
case 1: /* RSA */
return msc_extract_rsa_public_key(card,
info->keyLocation,
&info->modLength,
&info->modValue,
&info->expLength,
&info->expValue);
default:
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::RegisterElement(ElementId element_id,
ElementListType list_type,
Layer* layer) {
if (layer->element_id()) {
element_layers_map_[layer->element_id()] = layer;
}
mutator_host_->RegisterElement(element_id, list_type);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SendGoBackJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
int browser_index,
int tab_index,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "GoBack");
dict.SetInteger("windex", browser_index);
dict.SetInteger("tab_index", tab_index);
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::pauseAnimations()
{
WillBeHeapHashSet<RawPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = m_timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapHashSet<RawPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = m_timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr)
(*itr)->pauseAnimations();
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<cc::DisplayItemList> PaintChunksToCcLayer::Convert(
const PaintChunkSubset& paint_chunks,
const PropertyTreeState& layer_state,
const gfx::Vector2dF& layer_offset,
const DisplayItemList& display_items,
cc::DisplayItemList::UsageHint hint,
RasterUnderInvalidationCheckingParams* under_invalidation_checking_params) {
auto cc_list = base::MakeRefCounted<cc::DisplayItemList>(hint);
ConvertInto(paint_chunks, layer_state, layer_offset, FloatSize(),
display_items, *cc_list);
if (under_invalidation_checking_params) {
auto& params = *under_invalidation_checking_params;
PaintRecorder recorder;
recorder.beginRecording(params.interest_rect);
auto list_clone = base::MakeRefCounted<cc::DisplayItemList>(
cc::DisplayItemList::kToBeReleasedAsPaintOpBuffer);
ConvertInto(paint_chunks, layer_state, layer_offset, FloatSize(),
display_items, *list_clone);
recorder.getRecordingCanvas()->drawPicture(list_clone->ReleaseAsRecord());
params.tracking.CheckUnderInvalidations(params.debug_name,
recorder.finishRecordingAsPicture(),
params.interest_rect);
if (auto record = params.tracking.UnderInvalidationRecord()) {
cc_list->StartPaint();
cc_list->push<cc::DrawRecordOp>(std::move(record));
cc_list->EndPaintOfUnpaired(params.interest_rect);
}
}
cc_list->Finalize();
return cc_list;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_jsonb_path_all(FunctionCallInfo fcinfo, bool as_text)
{
Jsonb *jb = PG_GETARG_JSONB(0);
ArrayType *path = PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1);
Jsonb *res;
Datum *pathtext;
bool *pathnulls;
int npath;
int i;
bool have_object = false,
have_array = false;
JsonbValue *jbvp = NULL;
JsonbValue tv;
JsonbContainer *container;
/*
* If the array contains any null elements, return NULL, on the grounds
* that you'd have gotten NULL if any RHS value were NULL in a nested
* series of applications of the -> operator. (Note: because we also
* return NULL for error cases such as no-such-field, this is true
* regardless of the contents of the rest of the array.)
*/
if (array_contains_nulls(path))
PG_RETURN_NULL();
deconstruct_array(path, TEXTOID, -1, false, 'i',
&pathtext, &pathnulls, &npath);
/* Identify whether we have object, array, or scalar at top-level */
container = &jb->root;
if (JB_ROOT_IS_OBJECT(jb))
have_object = true;
else if (JB_ROOT_IS_ARRAY(jb) && !JB_ROOT_IS_SCALAR(jb))
have_array = true;
else
{
Assert(JB_ROOT_IS_ARRAY(jb) && JB_ROOT_IS_SCALAR(jb));
/* Extract the scalar value, if it is what we'll return */
if (npath <= 0)
jbvp = getIthJsonbValueFromContainer(container, 0);
}
/*
* If the array is empty, return the entire LHS object, on the grounds
* that we should do zero field or element extractions. For the
* non-scalar case we can just hand back the object without much work. For
* the scalar case, fall through and deal with the value below the loop.
* (This inconsistency arises because there's no easy way to generate a
* JsonbValue directly for root-level containers.)
*/
if (npath <= 0 && jbvp == NULL)
{
if (as_text)
{
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(JsonbToCString(NULL,
container,
VARSIZE(jb))));
}
else
{
/* not text mode - just hand back the jsonb */
PG_RETURN_JSONB(jb);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < npath; i++)
{
if (have_object)
{
jbvp = findJsonbValueFromContainerLen(container,
JB_FOBJECT,
VARDATA_ANY(pathtext[i]),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(pathtext[i]));
}
else if (have_array)
{
long lindex;
uint32 index;
char *indextext = TextDatumGetCString(pathtext[i]);
char *endptr;
errno = 0;
lindex = strtol(indextext, &endptr, 10);
if (endptr == indextext || *endptr != '\0' || errno != 0 ||
lindex > INT_MAX || lindex < INT_MIN)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
if (lindex >= 0)
{
index = (uint32) lindex;
}
else
{
/* Handle negative subscript */
uint32 nelements;
/* Container must be array, but make sure */
if ((container->header & JB_FARRAY) == 0)
elog(ERROR, "not a jsonb array");
nelements = container->header & JB_CMASK;
if (-lindex > nelements)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
else
index = nelements + lindex;
}
jbvp = getIthJsonbValueFromContainer(container, index);
}
else
{
/* scalar, extraction yields a null */
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
if (jbvp == NULL)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
else if (i == npath - 1)
break;
if (jbvp->type == jbvBinary)
{
JsonbIterator *it = JsonbIteratorInit((JsonbContainer *) jbvp->val.binary.data);
int r;
r = JsonbIteratorNext(&it, &tv, true);
container = (JsonbContainer *) jbvp->val.binary.data;
have_object = r == WJB_BEGIN_OBJECT;
have_array = r == WJB_BEGIN_ARRAY;
}
else
{
have_object = jbvp->type == jbvObject;
have_array = jbvp->type == jbvArray;
}
}
if (as_text)
{
/* special-case outputs for string and null values */
if (jbvp->type == jbvString)
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text_with_len(jbvp->val.string.val,
jbvp->val.string.len));
if (jbvp->type == jbvNull)
PG_RETURN_NULL();
}
res = JsonbValueToJsonb(jbvp);
if (as_text)
{
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text(JsonbToCString(NULL,
&res->root,
VARSIZE(res))));
}
else
{
/* not text mode - just hand back the jsonb */
PG_RETURN_JSONB(res);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaRecorder::OnError(const WebString& message) {
DLOG(ERROR) << message.Ascii();
StopRecording();
ScheduleDispatchEvent(Event::Create(event_type_names::kError));
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crypto_cert_iteration_begin(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
pkinit_cert_iter_handle *ih_ret)
{
struct _pkinit_cert_iter_data *id;
if (id_cryptoctx == NULL || ih_ret == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL) /* No cred info available */
return ENOENT;
id = calloc(1, sizeof(*id));
if (id == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
id->magic = ITER_MAGIC;
id->plgctx = plg_cryptoctx,
id->reqctx = req_cryptoctx,
id->idctx = id_cryptoctx;
id->index = 0;
*ih_ret = (pkinit_cert_iter_handle) id;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hid_set_idle(struct usb_device *dev, int ifnum, int report, int idle)
{
return usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0),
HID_REQ_SET_IDLE, USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE, (idle << 8) | report,
ifnum, NULL, 0, USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TopSitesImpl::ResetThreadSafeCache() {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
MostVisitedURLList cached;
ApplyBlacklist(cache_->top_sites(), &cached);
thread_safe_cache_->SetTopSites(cached);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 147,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> NodeIterator::previousNode(ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> result = nullptr;
m_candidateNode = m_referenceNode;
while (m_candidateNode.moveToPrevious(root())) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> provisionalResult = m_candidateNode.node;
bool nodeWasAccepted = acceptNode(provisionalResult.get(), exceptionState) == NodeFilter::FILTER_ACCEPT;
if (exceptionState.hadException())
break;
if (nodeWasAccepted) {
m_referenceNode = m_candidateNode;
result = provisionalResult.release();
break;
}
}
m_candidateNode.clear();
return result.release();
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qemu_spice_destroy_update(SimpleSpiceDisplay *sdpy, SimpleSpiceUpdate *update)
{
g_free(update->bitmap);
g_free(update);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init sk_init(void)
{
if (totalram_pages <= 4096) {
sysctl_wmem_max = 32767;
sysctl_rmem_max = 32767;
sysctl_wmem_default = 32767;
sysctl_rmem_default = 32767;
} else if (totalram_pages >= 131072) {
sysctl_wmem_max = 131071;
sysctl_rmem_max = 131071;
}
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_write_end(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned copied,
struct page *page, void *fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
/* Zero any unwritten bytes at the end of the page */
size_t endoff = (pos + copied) & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
if (endoff)
zero_user_segment(page, endoff, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
fuse_write_update_size(inode, pos + copied);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
return copied;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionRegistry::AddBlacklisted(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
return blacklisted_extensions_.Insert(extension);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool CheckAc3(const uint8* buffer, int buffer_size) {
RCHECK(buffer_size > 6);
int offset = 0;
while (offset + 6 < buffer_size) {
BitReader reader(buffer + offset, 6);
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 16) == kAc3SyncWord);
reader.SkipBits(16);
int sample_rate_code = ReadBits(&reader, 2);
RCHECK(sample_rate_code != 3); // Reserved.
int frame_size_code = ReadBits(&reader, 6);
RCHECK(frame_size_code < 38); // Undefined.
RCHECK(ReadBits(&reader, 5) < 10); // Normally 8 or 6, 16 used by EAC3.
offset += kAc3FrameSizeTable[frame_size_code][sample_rate_code];
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ListedElement::List& HTMLFormElement::ListedElements() const {
if (!listed_elements_are_dirty_)
return listed_elements_;
HTMLFormElement* mutable_this = const_cast<HTMLFormElement*>(this);
Node* scope = mutable_this;
if (has_elements_associated_by_parser_)
scope = &NodeTraversal::HighestAncestorOrSelf(*mutable_this);
if (isConnected() && has_elements_associated_by_form_attribute_)
scope = &GetTreeScope().RootNode();
DCHECK(scope);
CollectListedElements(*scope, mutable_this->listed_elements_);
mutable_this->listed_elements_are_dirty_ = false;
return listed_elements_;
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,230 |
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