instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDeleteSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DeleteSharedIdsCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<const GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "DeleteSharedIdsCHROMIUM", "n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoDeleteSharedIdsCHROMIUM(namespace_id, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t DecodePSDPixels(const size_t number_compact_pixels,
const unsigned char *compact_pixels,const ssize_t depth,
const size_t number_pixels,unsigned char *pixels)
{
#define CheckNumberCompactPixels \
if (packets == 0) \
return(i); \
packets--
#define CheckNumberPixels(count) \
if (((ssize_t) i + count) > (ssize_t) number_pixels) \
return(i); \
i+=count
int
pixel;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
packets;
packets=(ssize_t) number_compact_pixels;
for (i=0; (packets > 1) && (i < (ssize_t) number_pixels); )
{
packets--;
length=(size_t) (*compact_pixels++);
if (length == 128)
continue;
if (length > 128)
{
length=256-length+1;
CheckNumberCompactPixels;
pixel=(*compact_pixels++);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
switch (depth)
{
case 1:
{
CheckNumberPixels(8);
*pixels++=(pixel >> 7) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 6) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 5) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 4) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 3) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 2) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 1) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(pixel >> 0) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
break;
}
case 2:
{
CheckNumberPixels(4);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 6) & 0x03);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 4) & 0x03);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 2) & 0x03);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel & 0x03) & 0x03);
break;
}
case 4:
{
CheckNumberPixels(2);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel >> 4) & 0xff);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) ((pixel & 0x0f) & 0xff);
break;
}
default:
{
CheckNumberPixels(1);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) pixel;
break;
}
}
}
continue;
}
length++;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j++)
{
switch (depth)
{
case 1:
{
CheckNumberPixels(8);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 7) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 6) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 5) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 4) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 3) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 2) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 1) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 0) & 0x01 ? 0U : 255U;
break;
}
case 2:
{
CheckNumberPixels(4);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 6) & 0x03;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 4) & 0x03;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 2) & 0x03;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels & 0x03) & 0x03;
break;
}
case 4:
{
CheckNumberPixels(2);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels >> 4) & 0xff;
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels & 0x0f) & 0xff;
break;
}
default:
{
CheckNumberPixels(1);
*pixels++=(*compact_pixels);
break;
}
}
CheckNumberCompactPixels;
compact_pixels++;
}
}
return(i);
}
Commit Message: Moved check for https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/92.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_driver_init( FT_Module ttdriver ) /* TT_Driver */
{
#ifdef TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
TT_Driver driver = (TT_Driver)ttdriver;
driver->interpreter_version = TT_INTERPRETER_VERSION_35;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
driver->interpreter_version = TT_INTERPRETER_VERSION_38;
#endif
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL
driver->interpreter_version = TT_INTERPRETER_VERSION_40;
#endif
#else /* !TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER */
FT_UNUSED( ttdriver );
#endif /* !TT_USE_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER */
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 7,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PaintPropertyTreeBuilder::ObjectTypeMightNeedPaintProperties() const {
return object_.IsBoxModelObject() || object_.IsSVG() ||
context_.painting_layer->EnclosingPaginationLayer() ||
context_.is_repeating_table_section ||
context_.is_repeating_fixed_position;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadICONImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
IconFile
icon_file;
IconInfo
icon_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bit,
byte,
bytes_per_line,
one,
scanline_pad;
ssize_t
count,
offset,
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
icon_file.reserved=(short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.resource_type=(short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.count=(short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((icon_file.reserved != 0) ||
((icon_file.resource_type != 1) && (icon_file.resource_type != 2)) ||
(icon_file.count > MaxIcons))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
for (i=0; i < icon_file.count; i++)
{
icon_file.directory[i].width=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].height=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].colors=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].reserved=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
icon_file.directory[i].planes=(unsigned short) ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.directory[i].bits_per_pixel=(unsigned short)
ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_file.directory[i].size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_file.directory[i].offset=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
}
one=1;
for (i=0; i < icon_file.count; i++)
{
/*
Verify Icon identifier.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) SeekBlob(image,(MagickOffsetType)
icon_file.directory[i].offset,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
icon_info.size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.width=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image));
icon_info.height=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobLSBLong(image)/2);
icon_info.planes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
icon_info.bits_per_pixel=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if (((icon_info.planes == 18505) && (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 21060)) ||
(icon_info.size == 0x474e5089))
{
Image
*icon_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*png;
/*
Icon image encoded as a compressed PNG image.
*/
length=icon_file.directory[i].size;
png=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+16,sizeof(*png));
if (png == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) CopyMagickMemory(png,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n\000\000\000\015",12);
png[12]=(unsigned char) icon_info.planes;
png[13]=(unsigned char) (icon_info.planes >> 8);
png[14]=(unsigned char) icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
png[15]=(unsigned char) (icon_info.bits_per_pixel >> 8);
count=ReadBlob(image,length-16,png+16);
icon_image=(Image *) NULL;
if (count > 0)
{
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->magick,"PNG",MagickPathExtent);
icon_image=BlobToImage(read_info,png,length+16,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
}
png=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(png);
if (icon_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (count != (ssize_t) (length-16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
DestroyBlob(icon_image);
icon_image->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,icon_image);
}
else
{
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel > 32)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
icon_info.compression=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.image_size=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.x_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.y_pixels=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.number_colors=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
icon_info.colors_important=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
image->columns=(size_t) icon_file.directory[i].width;
if ((ssize_t) image->columns > icon_info.width)
image->columns=(size_t) icon_info.width;
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=256;
image->rows=(size_t) icon_file.directory[i].height;
if ((ssize_t) image->rows > icon_info.height)
image->rows=(size_t) icon_info.height;
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=256;
image->depth=icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene = %.20g",(double) i);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" size = %.20g",(double) icon_info.size);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" width = %.20g",(double) icon_file.directory[i].width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" height = %.20g",(double) icon_file.directory[i].height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" colors = %.20g",(double ) icon_info.number_colors);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" planes = %.20g",(double) icon_info.planes);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" bpp = %.20g",(double) icon_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
if ((icon_info.number_colors != 0) || (icon_info.bits_per_pixel <= 16U))
{
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=icon_info.number_colors;
if (image->colors == 0)
image->colors=one << icon_info.bits_per_pixel;
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
*icon_colormap;
/*
Read Icon raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) ==
MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
icon_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
image->colors,4UL*sizeof(*icon_colormap));
if (icon_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (4*image->colors),icon_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (4*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=icon_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
p++;
}
icon_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(icon_colormap);
}
/*
Convert Icon raster image to pixel packets.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) &&
(image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
bytes_per_line=(((image->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)+31) &
~31) >> 3;
(void) bytes_per_line;
scanline_pad=((((image->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)+31) & ~31)-
(image->columns*icon_info.bits_per_pixel)) >> 3;
switch (icon_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
/*
Convert bitmap scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 :
0x00),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0 ? 0x01 :
0x00),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Read 4-bit Icon scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelIndex(image,((byte >> 4) & 0xf),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
SetPixelIndex(image,((byte) & 0xf),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelIndex(image,((byte >> 4) & 0xf),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelIndex(image,byte,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
/*
Convert PseudoColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
byte|=(size_t) (ReadBlobByte(image) << 8);
SetPixelIndex(image,byte,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectColor scanline.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)),q);
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 32)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel == 24)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) scanline_pad; x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,image->rows-y-1,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
if (icon_info.bits_per_pixel != 32)
{
/*
Read the ICON alpha mask.
*/
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,(((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0) ?
TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
byte=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,(((byte & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0) ?
TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
if ((image->columns % 32) != 0)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) ((32-(image->columns % 32))/8); x++)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (i < (ssize_t) (icon_file.count-1))
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 168,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int available_error_type_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, available_error_type_show, NULL);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable APEI error injection if securelevel is set
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.
While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-74 | 0 | 73,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameView::isInPerformLayout() const
{
ASSERT(m_inPerformLayout == (lifecycle().state() == DocumentLifecycle::InPerformLayout));
return m_inPerformLayout;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoPopGroupMarkerEXT() {
api()->glPopGroupMarkerEXTFn();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nodePop(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
xmlNodePtr ret;
if (ctxt == NULL) return(NULL);
if (ctxt->nodeNr <= 0)
return (NULL);
ctxt->nodeNr--;
if (ctxt->nodeNr > 0)
ctxt->node = ctxt->nodeTab[ctxt->nodeNr - 1];
else
ctxt->node = NULL;
ret = ctxt->nodeTab[ctxt->nodeNr];
ctxt->nodeTab[ctxt->nodeNr] = NULL;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MessageLoop::NestableTasksAllowed() const {
return nestable_tasks_allowed_;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void net_tx_pkt_rebuild_payload(struct NetTxPkt *pkt)
{
pkt->payload_len = iov_size(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags) - pkt->hdr_len;
pkt->payload_frags = iov_copy(&pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG],
pkt->max_payload_frags,
pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags,
pkt->hdr_len, pkt->payload_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 8,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnUpdateChecked(ContentOrigin initial_origin,
GDataFileError error,
GDataEntry* /* entry */) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
directory_service_->set_origin(initial_origin);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnUserGesture(RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host) {
if (render_widget_host != GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget())
return;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, DidGetUserGesture());
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl* rdh = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (rdh) // NULL in unittests.
rdh->OnUserGesture(this);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_Set_CodeRange( TT_ExecContext exec,
FT_Int range,
void* base,
FT_Long length )
{
FT_ASSERT( range >= 1 && range <= 3 );
exec->codeRangeTable[range - 1].base = (FT_Byte*)base;
exec->codeRangeTable[range - 1].size = length;
return TT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManager::EnsureLoggedInUserWallpaperLoaded() {
WallpaperInfo info;
if (GetLoggedInUserWallpaperInfo(&info)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Ash.Wallpaper.Type", info.type,
wallpaper::WALLPAPER_TYPE_COUNT);
RecordWallpaperAppType();
if (info == current_user_wallpaper_info_)
return;
}
SetUserWallpaperNow(
user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetActiveUser()->GetAccountId());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 127,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void br_mdb_notify(struct net_device *dev, struct net_bridge_port *port,
struct br_ip *group, int type)
{
struct br_mdb_entry entry;
entry.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
entry.addr.proto = group->proto;
entry.addr.u.ip4 = group->u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
entry.addr.u.ip6 = group->u.ip6;
#endif
__br_mdb_notify(dev, &entry, type);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_undump(char *tag, char *name)
{
int r = 0;
char *intname = mboxname_from_external(name, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
/* administrators only please */
if (!imapd_userisadmin)
r = IMAP_PERMISSION_DENIED;
if (!r) r = mlookup(tag, name, intname, NULL);
if (!r) r = undump_mailbox(intname, imapd_in, imapd_out, imapd_authstate);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s%s\r\n",
tag,
(r == IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT &&
mboxlist_createmailboxcheck(intname, 0, 0,
imapd_userisadmin,
imapd_userid, imapd_authstate,
NULL, NULL, 0) == 0)
? "[TRYCREATE] " : "", error_message(r));
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
free(intname);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pskb_carve_inside_header(struct sk_buff *skb, const u32 off,
const int headlen, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
int i;
int size = skb_end_offset(skb);
int new_hlen = headlen - off;
u8 *data;
size = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(size);
if (skb_pfmemalloc(skb))
gfp_mask |= __GFP_MEMALLOC;
data = kmalloc_reserve(size +
SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)),
gfp_mask, NUMA_NO_NODE, NULL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
size = SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(ksize(data));
/* Copy real data, and all frags */
skb_copy_from_linear_data_offset(skb, off, data, new_hlen);
skb->len -= off;
memcpy((struct skb_shared_info *)(data + size),
skb_shinfo(skb),
offsetof(struct skb_shared_info,
frags[skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags]));
if (skb_cloned(skb)) {
/* drop the old head gracefully */
if (skb_orphan_frags(skb, gfp_mask)) {
kfree(data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++)
skb_frag_ref(skb, i);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb))
skb_clone_fraglist(skb);
skb_release_data(skb);
} else {
/* we can reuse existing recount- all we did was
* relocate values
*/
skb_free_head(skb);
}
skb->head = data;
skb->data = data;
skb->head_frag = 0;
#ifdef NET_SKBUFF_DATA_USES_OFFSET
skb->end = size;
#else
skb->end = skb->head + size;
#endif
skb_set_tail_pointer(skb, skb_headlen(skb));
skb_headers_offset_update(skb, 0);
skb->cloned = 0;
skb->hdr_len = 0;
skb->nohdr = 0;
atomic_set(&skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_port_get_stp_status(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port,
struct ofproto_port_stp_status *s)
{
struct ofport *ofport = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (!ofport) {
VLOG_WARN_RL(&rl, "%s: cannot get STP status on nonexistent "
"port %"PRIu32, ofproto->name, ofp_port);
return ENODEV;
}
return (ofproto->ofproto_class->get_stp_port_status
? ofproto->ofproto_class->get_stp_port_status(ofport, s)
: EOPNOTSUPP);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadingDataCollector::RecordFinishNavigation(
const NavigationID& old_navigation_id,
const NavigationID& new_navigation_id,
bool is_error_page) {
if (is_error_page) {
inflight_navigations_.erase(old_navigation_id);
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<PageRequestSummary> summary;
auto nav_it = inflight_navigations_.find(old_navigation_id);
if (nav_it != inflight_navigations_.end()) {
summary = std::move(nav_it->second);
DCHECK_EQ(summary->main_frame_url, old_navigation_id.main_frame_url);
summary->main_frame_url = new_navigation_id.main_frame_url;
inflight_navigations_.erase(nav_it);
} else {
summary =
std::make_unique<PageRequestSummary>(new_navigation_id.main_frame_url);
summary->initial_url = old_navigation_id.main_frame_url;
}
inflight_navigations_.emplace(new_navigation_id, std::move(summary));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Vector<Resource*> cachedResourcesForFrame(Frame* frame)
{
Vector<Resource*> result;
Document* rootDocument = frame->document();
if (HTMLImport* rootImport = rootDocument->import()) {
for (HTMLImport* import = rootImport; import; import = traverseNext(import)) {
if (import->ownsLoader() || import->isRoot()) {
if (Document* document = import->document())
cachedResourcesForDocument(document, result);
}
}
} else {
cachedResourcesForDocument(rootDocument, result);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mgr_rmpp_debug_toggle(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_RMPP_DEBUG_TOGGLE, mgr, 0, NULL, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "sa_rmpp_debug_toggle: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("Successfully sent Rmpp Debug output control to local Manager instance\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLManager::Initialize(const GLManager::Options& options) {
GpuDriverBugWorkarounds platform_workarounds(
g_gpu_feature_info.enabled_gpu_driver_bug_workarounds);
InitializeWithWorkaroundsImpl(options, platform_workarounds);
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_data_remote(struct backend *be, char *tag,
struct listargs *listargs, strarray_t *subs)
{
if ((listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_EXTENDED) &&
!CAPA(be, CAPA_LISTEXTENDED)) {
/* client wants to use extended list command but backend doesn't
* support it */
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s NO Backend server does not support LIST-EXTENDED\r\n",
tag);
return IMAP_MAILBOX_NOTSUPPORTED;
}
/* print tag, command and list selection options */
if (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_LSUB) {
prot_printf(be->out, "%s Lsub ", tag);
} else if (listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_XLIST) {
prot_printf(be->out, "%s Xlist ", tag);
} else {
prot_printf(be->out, "%s List ", tag);
uint32_t select_mask = listargs->sel;
if (be != backend_inbox) {
/* don't send subscribed selection options to non-Inbox backend */
select_mask &= ~(LIST_SEL_SUBSCRIBED | LIST_SEL_RECURSIVEMATCH);
}
/* print list selection options */
if (select_mask) {
const char *select_opts[] = {
/* XXX MUST be in same order as LIST_SEL_* bitmask */
"subscribed", "remote", "recursivematch",
"special-use", "vendor.cmu-dav", "metadata", NULL
};
char c = '(';
int i;
for (i = 0; select_opts[i]; i++) {
unsigned opt = (1 << i);
if (!(select_mask & opt)) continue;
prot_printf(be->out, "%c%s", c, select_opts[i]);
c = ' ';
if (opt == LIST_SEL_METADATA) {
/* print metadata options */
prot_puts(be->out, " (depth ");
if (listargs->metaopts.depth < 0) {
prot_puts(be->out, "infinity");
}
else {
prot_printf(be->out, "%d",
listargs->metaopts.depth);
}
if (listargs->metaopts.maxsize) {
prot_printf(be->out, " maxsize %zu",
listargs->metaopts.maxsize);
}
(void)prot_putc(')', be->out);
}
}
prot_puts(be->out, ") ");
}
}
/* print reference argument */
prot_printf(be->out,
"{%tu+}\r\n%s ", strlen(listargs->ref), listargs->ref);
/* print mailbox pattern(s) */
if (listargs->pat.count > 1) {
char **p;
char c = '(';
for (p = listargs->pat.data ; *p ; p++) {
prot_printf(be->out,
"%c{%tu+}\r\n%s", c, strlen(*p), *p);
c = ' ';
}
(void)prot_putc(')', be->out);
} else {
prot_printf(be->out, "{%tu+}\r\n%s",
strlen(listargs->pat.data[0]), listargs->pat.data[0]);
}
/* print list return options */
if (listargs->ret && listargs->cmd == LIST_CMD_EXTENDED) {
const char *return_opts[] = {
/* XXX MUST be in same order as LIST_RET_* bitmask */
"subscribed", "children", "special-use",
"status ", "myrights", "metadata ", NULL
};
char c = '(';
int i, j;
prot_puts(be->out, " return ");
for (i = 0; return_opts[i]; i++) {
unsigned opt = (1 << i);
if (!(listargs->ret & opt)) continue;
prot_printf(be->out, "%c%s", c, return_opts[i]);
c = ' ';
if (opt == LIST_RET_STATUS) {
/* print status items */
const char *status_items[] = {
/* XXX MUST be in same order as STATUS_* bitmask */
"messages", "recent", "uidnext", "uidvalidity", "unseen",
"highestmodseq", "xconvexists", "xconvunseen",
"xconvmodseq", NULL
};
c = '(';
for (j = 0; status_items[j]; j++) {
if (!(listargs->statusitems & (1 << j))) continue;
prot_printf(be->out, "%c%s", c, status_items[j]);
c = ' ';
}
(void)prot_putc(')', be->out);
}
else if (opt == LIST_RET_METADATA) {
/* print metadata items */
int n = strarray_size(&listargs->metaitems);
c = '(';
for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
prot_printf(be->out, "%c\"%s\"", c,
strarray_nth(&listargs->metaitems, j));
c = ' ';
}
(void)prot_putc(')', be->out);
}
}
(void)prot_putc(')', be->out);
}
prot_printf(be->out, "\r\n");
pipe_lsub(be, imapd_userid, tag, 0, listargs, subs);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_format_7zip_has_encrypted_entries(struct archive_read *_a)
{
if (_a && _a->format) {
struct _7zip * zip = (struct _7zip *)_a->format->data;
if (zip) {
return zip->has_encrypted_entries;
}
}
return ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_ENCRYPTION_DONT_KNOW;
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 53,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void event_acl_stream_has_bytes(UNUSED_ATTR eager_reader_t *reader, UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
callbacks->data_ready(DATA_TYPE_ACL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::RemoveAutocompleteEntry(const base::string16& name,
const base::string16& value) {
autocomplete_history_manager_->OnRemoveAutocompleteEntry(name, value);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Texture::Texture(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder)
: decoder_(decoder),
id_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsTagTypeSignature DecideTextDescType(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
if (ICCVersion >= 4.0)
return cmsSigMultiLocalizedUnicodeType;
return cmsSigTextDescriptionType;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(Data);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_peer_mdep_id(UINT8 app_id, BD_ADDR bd_addr,
tBTA_HL_MDEP_ROLE local_mdep_role,
UINT16 data_type,
tBTA_HL_MDEP_ID *p_peer_mdep_id){
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx;
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
tBTA_HL_SDP_REC *p_rec;
UINT8 i, num_mdeps;
BOOLEAN found = FALSE;
tBTA_HL_MDEP_ROLE peer_mdep_role;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s app_id=%d local_mdep_role=%d, data_type=%d",
__FUNCTION__, app_id, local_mdep_role, data_type);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("DB [%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x]",
bd_addr[0], bd_addr[1],
bd_addr[2], bd_addr[3],
bd_addr[4], bd_addr[5]);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("local_mdep_role=%d", local_mdep_role);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("data_type=%d", data_type);
if (local_mdep_role == BTA_HL_MDEP_ROLE_SINK)
peer_mdep_role = BTA_HL_MDEP_ROLE_SOURCE;
else
peer_mdep_role = BTA_HL_MDEP_ROLE_SINK;
if (btif_hl_find_app_idx(app_id, &app_idx) )
{
BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(app_idx);
if (btif_hl_find_mcl_idx(app_idx, bd_addr, &mcl_idx))
{
p_mcb =BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_idx=%d",app_idx, mcl_idx);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("valid_spd_idx=%d sdp_idx=%d",p_mcb->valid_sdp_idx, p_mcb->sdp_idx);
if (p_mcb->valid_sdp_idx)
{
p_rec = &p_mcb->sdp.sdp_rec[p_mcb->sdp_idx];
num_mdeps = p_rec->num_mdeps;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("num_mdeps=%d", num_mdeps);
for (i=0; i< num_mdeps; i++)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("p_rec->mdep_cfg[%d].mdep_role=%d",i, p_rec->mdep_cfg[i].mdep_role);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("p_rec->mdep_cfg[%d].data_type =%d",i, p_rec->mdep_cfg[i].data_type );
if ((p_rec->mdep_cfg[i].mdep_role == peer_mdep_role) &&
(p_rec->mdep_cfg[i].data_type == data_type))
{
found = TRUE;
*p_peer_mdep_id = p_rec->mdep_cfg[i].mdep_id;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("found =%d *p_peer_mdep_id=%d", found, *p_peer_mdep_id);
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4iv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleInt32ArrayView& v,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Int32Array>("uniform4iv", location, v, 4,
src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform4iv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (v.length() - src_offset)) >> 2,
v.DataMaybeOnStack() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hns_ppe_set_indir_table(struct hns_ppe_cb *ppe_cb,
const u32 rss_tab[HNS_PPEV2_RSS_IND_TBL_SIZE])
{
int i;
int reg_value;
for (i = 0; i < (HNS_PPEV2_RSS_IND_TBL_SIZE / 4); i++) {
reg_value = dsaf_read_dev(ppe_cb,
PPEV2_INDRECTION_TBL_REG + i * 0x4);
dsaf_set_field(reg_value, PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N0_M,
PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N0_S,
rss_tab[i * 4 + 0] & 0x1F);
dsaf_set_field(reg_value, PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N1_M,
PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N1_S,
rss_tab[i * 4 + 1] & 0x1F);
dsaf_set_field(reg_value, PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N2_M,
PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N2_S,
rss_tab[i * 4 + 2] & 0x1F);
dsaf_set_field(reg_value, PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N3_M,
PPEV2_CFG_RSS_TBL_4N3_S,
rss_tab[i * 4 + 3] & 0x1F);
dsaf_write_dev(
ppe_cb, PPEV2_INDRECTION_TBL_REG + i * 0x4, reg_value);
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EXPORTED void mboxlist_entry_free(mbentry_t **mbentryptr)
{
mbentry_t *mbentry = *mbentryptr;
/* idempotent */
if (!mbentry) return;
free(mbentry->name);
free(mbentry->ext_name);
free(mbentry->partition);
free(mbentry->server);
free(mbentry->acl);
free(mbentry->uniqueid);
free(mbentry->legacy_specialuse);
free(mbentry);
*mbentryptr = NULL;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jswrap_graphics_scroll(JsVar *parent, int xdir, int ydir) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
graphicsScroll(&gfx, xdir, ydir);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::dispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(Chrome& chrome, Document* navigatingDocument)
{
if (!m_domWindow)
return true;
if (!body())
return true;
RefPtr<Document> protect(this);
RefPtr<BeforeUnloadEvent> beforeUnloadEvent = BeforeUnloadEvent::create();
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventInProgress;
dispatchWindowEvent(beforeUnloadEvent.get(), this);
m_loadEventProgress = BeforeUnloadEventCompleted;
if (!beforeUnloadEvent->defaultPrevented())
defaultEventHandler(beforeUnloadEvent.get());
if (beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue().isNull())
return true;
if (navigatingDocument->m_didAllowNavigationViaBeforeUnloadConfirmationPanel) {
addConsoleMessage(JSMessageSource, ErrorMessageLevel, "Blocked attempt to show multiple 'beforeunload' confirmation panels for a single navigation.");
return true;
}
String text = beforeUnloadEvent->returnValue();
if (chrome.runBeforeUnloadConfirmPanel(text, m_frame)) {
navigatingDocument->m_didAllowNavigationViaBeforeUnloadConfirmationPanel = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int au1200fb_fb_mmap(struct fb_info *info, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned long start=0, off;
struct au1200fb_device *fbdev = info->par;
if (vma->vm_pgoff > (~0UL >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
start = fbdev->fb_phys & PAGE_MASK;
len = PAGE_ALIGN((start & ~PAGE_MASK) + fbdev->fb_len);
off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start + off) > len) {
return -EINVAL;
}
off += start;
vma->vm_pgoff = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
pgprot_val(vma->vm_page_prot) |= _CACHE_MASK; /* CCA=7 */
return io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, off >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetWebScreenInfo(WebKit::WebScreenInfo* result) {
#if defined(OS_POSIX) || defined(USE_AURA)
if (GetView()) {
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewPort*>(GetView())->GetScreenInfo(result);
} else {
RenderWidgetHostViewPort::GetDefaultScreenInfo(result);
}
#else
*result = WebKit::WebScreenInfoFactory::screenInfo(
gfx::NativeViewFromId(GetNativeViewId()));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem(
PdfMetafileSkia* metafile,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* shared_mem_handle) {
uint32 buf_size = metafile->GetDataSize();
scoped_ptr<base::SharedMemory> shared_buf(
content::RenderThread::Get()
->HostAllocateSharedMemoryBuffer(buf_size)
.release());
if (shared_buf) {
if (shared_buf->Map(buf_size)) {
metafile->GetData(shared_buf->memory(), buf_size);
return shared_buf->GiveToProcess(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
shared_mem_handle);
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SetSSLCipherSuite(int connection_status, int cipher_suite) {
connection_status &= ~net::SSL_CONNECTION_CIPHERSUITE_MASK;
return cipher_suite | connection_status;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vhost_log_access_ok(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
return memory_access_ok(dev, dev->memory, 1);
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderBox* FrameView::embeddedContentBox() const
{
RenderView* renderView = this->renderView();
if (!renderView)
return 0;
RenderObject* firstChild = renderView->firstChild();
if (!firstChild || !firstChild->isBox())
return 0;
if (firstChild->isSVGRoot())
return toRenderBox(firstChild);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<NodeIterator> Document::createNodeIterator(Node* root, unsigned whatToShow, PassRefPtr<NodeFilter> filter, bool expandEntityReferences, ExceptionState& es)
{
if (!root) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NotSupportedError);
return 0;
}
UNUSED_PARAM(expandEntityReferences);
return NodeIterator::create(root, whatToShow, filter);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int AppLayerProtoDetectTest08(void)
{
AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxBackup();
AppLayerProtoDetectSetup();
uint8_t l7data[] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0xff, 0x53, 0x4d, 0x42,
0x72, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x53, 0xc8,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xfe,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x62, 0x00, 0x02,
0x50, 0x43, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x45, 0x54, 0x57, 0x4f,
0x52, 0x4b, 0x20, 0x50, 0x52, 0x4f, 0x47, 0x52,
0x41, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, 0x30, 0x00, 0x02,
0x4c, 0x41, 0x4e, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x4e, 0x31, 0x2e,
0x30, 0x00, 0x02, 0x57, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x6f,
0x77, 0x73, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x57,
0x6f, 0x72, 0x6b, 0x67, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x70,
0x73, 0x20, 0x33, 0x2e, 0x31, 0x61, 0x00, 0x02,
0x4c, 0x4d, 0x31, 0x2e, 0x32, 0x58, 0x30, 0x30,
0x32, 0x00, 0x02, 0x4c, 0x41, 0x4e, 0x4d, 0x41,
0x4e, 0x32, 0x2e, 0x31, 0x00, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x54,
0x20, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x20, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x31, 0x32,
0x00
};
const char *buf;
int r = 0;
Flow f;
AppProto pm_results[ALPROTO_MAX];
AppLayerProtoDetectThreadCtx *alpd_tctx;
memset(&f, 0x00, sizeof(f));
f.protomap = FlowGetProtoMapping(IPPROTO_TCP);
memset(pm_results, 0, sizeof(pm_results));
buf = "|ff|SMB";
AppLayerProtoDetectPMRegisterPatternCS(IPPROTO_TCP, ALPROTO_SMB, buf, 8, 4, STREAM_TOCLIENT);
AppLayerProtoDetectPrepareState();
/* AppLayerProtoDetectGetCtxThread() should be called post AppLayerProtoDetectPrepareState(), since
* it sets internal structures which depends on the above function. */
alpd_tctx = AppLayerProtoDetectGetCtxThread();
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].max_pat_id != 0) {
printf("alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].max_pat_id != 0\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].max_pat_id != 1) {
printf("alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].max_pat_id != 2\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map != NULL) {
printf("alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map != NULL\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].map == NULL) {
printf("alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].map != NULL\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].map[0]->alproto != ALPROTO_SMB) {
printf("alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].map[0].alproto != ALPROTO_SMB\n");
goto end;
}
uint32_t cnt = AppLayerProtoDetectPMGetProto(alpd_tctx,
&f,
l7data, sizeof(l7data),
STREAM_TOCLIENT,
IPPROTO_TCP,
pm_results);
if (cnt != 1 && pm_results[0] != ALPROTO_SMB) {
printf("cnt != 1 && pm_results[0] != AlPROTO_SMB\n");
goto end;
}
r = 1;
end:
if (alpd_tctx != NULL)
AppLayerProtoDetectDestroyCtxThread(alpd_tctx);
AppLayerProtoDetectDeSetup();
AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxRestore();
return r;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageInfo(ImageInfo *image_info,
const unsigned int frames,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
component[MagickPathExtent],
magic[MagickPathExtent],
*q;
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
const MagickInfo
*magick_info;
ExceptionInfo
*sans_exception;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const char
*p;
ssize_t
count;
/*
Look for 'image.format' in filename.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
*component='\0';
GetPathComponent(image_info->filename,SubimagePath,component);
if (*component != '\0')
{
/*
Look for scene specification (e.g. img0001.pcd[4]).
*/
if (IsSceneGeometry(component,MagickFalse) == MagickFalse)
{
if (IsGeometry(component) != MagickFalse)
(void) CloneString(&image_info->extract,component);
}
else
{
size_t
first,
last;
(void) CloneString(&image_info->scenes,component);
image_info->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(image_info->scenes);
image_info->number_scenes=image_info->scene;
p=image_info->scenes;
for (q=(char *) image_info->scenes; *q != '\0'; p++)
{
while ((isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *p)) != 0) || (*p == ','))
p++;
first=(size_t) strtol(p,&q,10);
last=first;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) *q)) != 0)
q++;
if (*q == '-')
last=(size_t) strtol(q+1,&q,10);
if (first > last)
Swap(first,last);
if (first < image_info->scene)
image_info->scene=first;
if (last > image_info->number_scenes)
image_info->number_scenes=last;
p=q;
}
image_info->number_scenes-=image_info->scene-1;
}
}
*component='\0';
if (*image_info->magick == '\0')
GetPathComponent(image_info->filename,ExtensionPath,component);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (*component != '\0')
if ((LocaleCompare(component,"gz") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(component,"Z") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(component,"svgz") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(component,"wmz") == 0))
{
char
path[MagickPathExtent];
(void) CopyMagickString(path,image_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
path[strlen(path)-strlen(component)-1]='\0';
GetPathComponent(path,ExtensionPath,component);
}
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BZLIB_DELEGATE)
if (*component != '\0')
if (LocaleCompare(component,"bz2") == 0)
{
char
path[MagickPathExtent];
(void) CopyMagickString(path,image_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
path[strlen(path)-strlen(component)-1]='\0';
GetPathComponent(path,ExtensionPath,component);
}
#endif
image_info->affirm=MagickFalse;
sans_exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
if (*component != '\0')
{
MagickFormatType
format_type;
register ssize_t
i;
static const char
*format_type_formats[] =
{
"AUTOTRACE",
"BROWSE",
"DCRAW",
"EDIT",
"LAUNCH",
"MPEG:DECODE",
"MPEG:ENCODE",
"PRINT",
"PS:ALPHA",
"PS:CMYK",
"PS:COLOR",
"PS:GRAY",
"PS:MONO",
"SCAN",
"SHOW",
"WIN",
(char *) NULL
};
/*
User specified image format.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(magic,component,MagickPathExtent);
LocaleUpper(magic);
/*
Look for explicit image formats.
*/
format_type=UndefinedFormatType;
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(magic,sans_exception);
if ((magick_info != (const MagickInfo *) NULL) &&
(magick_info->format_type != UndefinedFormatType))
format_type=magick_info->format_type;
i=0;
while ((format_type == UndefinedFormatType) &&
(format_type_formats[i] != (char *) NULL))
{
if ((*magic == *format_type_formats[i]) &&
(LocaleCompare(magic,format_type_formats[i]) == 0))
format_type=ExplicitFormatType;
i++;
}
if (format_type == UndefinedFormatType)
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->magick,magic,MagickPathExtent);
else
if (format_type == ExplicitFormatType)
{
image_info->affirm=MagickTrue;
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->magick,magic,MagickPathExtent);
}
if (LocaleCompare(magic,"RGB") == 0)
image_info->affirm=MagickFalse; /* maybe SGI disguised as RGB */
}
/*
Look for explicit 'format:image' in filename.
*/
*magic='\0';
GetPathComponent(image_info->filename,MagickPath,magic);
if (*magic == '\0')
(void) CopyMagickString(magic,image_info->magick,MagickPathExtent);
else
{
/*
User specified image format.
*/
LocaleUpper(magic);
if (IsMagickConflict(magic) == MagickFalse)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->magick,magic,MagickPathExtent);
image_info->affirm=MagickTrue;
}
}
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(magic,sans_exception);
sans_exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans_exception);
if ((magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL) ||
(GetMagickEndianSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse))
image_info->endian=UndefinedEndian;
GetPathComponent(image_info->filename,CanonicalPath,component);
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,component,MagickPathExtent);
if ((image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) && (frames > 1))
{
/*
Test for multiple image support (e.g. image%02d.png).
*/
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,
image_info->filename,(int) image_info->scene,component,exception);
if ((LocaleCompare(component,image_info->filename) != 0) &&
(strchr(component,'%') == (char *) NULL))
image_info->adjoin=MagickFalse;
}
if ((image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) && (frames > 0))
{
/*
Some image formats do not support multiple frames per file.
*/
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(magic,exception);
if (magick_info != (const MagickInfo *) NULL)
if (GetMagickAdjoin(magick_info) == MagickFalse)
image_info->adjoin=MagickFalse;
}
if (image_info->affirm != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (frames == 0)
{
unsigned char
*magick;
size_t
magick_size;
/*
Determine the image format from the first few bytes of the file.
*/
magick_size=GetMagicPatternExtent(exception);
if (magick_size == 0)
return(MagickFalse);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if ((IsBlobSeekable(image) == MagickFalse) ||
(IsBlobExempt(image) != MagickFalse))
{
/*
Copy standard input or pipe to temporary file.
*/
*component='\0';
status=ImageToFile(image,component,exception);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
SetImageInfoFile(image_info,(FILE *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,component,MagickPathExtent);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,component,
MagickPathExtent);
image_info->temporary=MagickTrue;
}
magick=(unsigned char *) AcquireMagickMemory(magick_size);
if (magick == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(magick,0,magick_size);
count=ReadBlob(image,magick_size,magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,-((MagickOffsetType) count),SEEK_CUR);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/*
Check magic.xml configuration file.
*/
sans_exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,(size_t) count,sans_exception);
magick=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(magick);
if ((magic_info != (const MagicInfo *) NULL) &&
(GetMagicName(magic_info) != (char *) NULL))
{
/*
Try to use magick_info that was determined earlier by the extension
*/
if ((magick_info != (const MagickInfo *) NULL) &&
(GetMagickUseExtension(magick_info) != MagickFalse) &&
(LocaleCompare(magick_info->module,GetMagicName(
magic_info)) == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->magick,magick_info->name,
MagickPathExtent);
else
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->magick,GetMagicName(
magic_info),MagickPathExtent);
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(image_info->magick,sans_exception);
}
if ((magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL) ||
(GetMagickEndianSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse))
image_info->endian=UndefinedEndian;
sans_exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans_exception);
return(MagickTrue);
}
magick_info=GetMagickInfo(image_info->magick,sans_exception);
if ((magick_info == (const MagickInfo *) NULL) ||
(GetMagickEndianSupport(magick_info) == MagickFalse))
image_info->endian=UndefinedEndian;
sans_exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans_exception);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic* BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::create(
ExecutionContext* context,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristicPtr characteristic,
BluetoothRemoteGATTService* service,
BluetoothDevice* device) {
return new BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic(
context, std::move(characteristic), service, device);
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 129,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_remove(struct inode *dir, struct qstr *name)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs_removeargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(dir),
.name.len = name->len,
.name.name = name->name,
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
};
struct nfs_removeres res = {
.server = server,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_REMOVE],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
res.dir_attr = nfs_alloc_fattr();
if (res.dir_attr == NULL)
goto out;
status = nfs4_call_sync(server->client, server, &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 1);
if (status == 0) {
update_changeattr(dir, &res.cinfo);
nfs_post_op_update_inode(dir, res.dir_attr);
}
nfs_free_fattr(res.dir_attr);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CardUnmaskPromptViews::DisableAndWaitForVerification() {
SetInputsEnabled(false);
progress_overlay_->SetOpacity(0.0);
progress_overlay_->SetVisible(true);
progress_throbber_->Start();
overlay_animation_.Show();
GetDialogClientView()->UpdateDialogButtons();
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void blk_pm_put_request(struct request *rq) {}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dev_unicast_flush(struct net_device *dev)
{
netif_addr_lock_bh(dev);
__hw_addr_flush(&dev->uc);
netif_addr_unlock_bh(dev);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipa_flood_interior(wmfAPI * API, wmfFlood_t * flood)
{
/* Save graphic wand */
(void) PushDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
draw_fill_color_rgb(API,&(flood->color));
DrawColor(WmfDrawingWand,XC(flood->pt.x), YC(flood->pt.y),
FillToBorderMethod);
/* Restore graphic wand */
(void) PopDrawingWand(WmfDrawingWand);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pidfile_rm(const char *pid_file)
{
unlink(pid_file);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_setdefaultgrayicc(const gs_gstate * pgs, gs_param_string * pval)
{
int code;
char *pname;
int namelen = (pval->size)+1;
gs_memory_t *mem = pgs->memory;
bool not_initialized;
/* Detect if this is our first time in here. If so, then we need to
reset up the default gray color spaces that are in the graphic state
to be ICC based. It was not possible to do it until after we get
the profile */
not_initialized = (pgs->icc_manager->default_gray == NULL);
pname = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(mem, namelen,
"set_default_gray_icc");
if (pname == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memcpy(pname,pval->data,namelen-1);
pname[namelen-1] = 0;
code = gsicc_set_profile(pgs->icc_manager,
(const char*) pname, namelen, DEFAULT_GRAY);
gs_free_object(mem, pname,
"set_default_gray_icc");
if (code < 0)
return gs_throw(code, "cannot find default gray icc profile");
/* if this is our first time in here then we need to properly install the
color spaces that were initialized in the graphic state at this time */
if (not_initialized) {
code = gsicc_init_gs_colors((gs_gstate*) pgs);
}
if (code < 0)
return gs_throw(code, "error initializing gstate color spaces to icc");
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mincore_hugetlb(pte_t *pte, unsigned long hmask, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, struct mm_walk *walk)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
unsigned char present;
unsigned char *vec = walk->private;
/*
* Hugepages under user process are always in RAM and never
* swapped out, but theoretically it needs to be checked.
*/
present = pte && !huge_pte_none(huge_ptep_get(pte));
for (; addr != end; vec++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)
*vec = present;
walk->private = vec;
#else
BUG();
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
{
loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
return -ENOMEM;
loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs);
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
goto out_vmcs;
memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
(ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) {
struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs =
(struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
}
}
return 0;
out_vmcs:
free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool setsockopt_needs_rtnl(int optname)
{
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_DROP_MEMBERSHIP:
case IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST:
case IPV6_LEAVE_ANYCAST:
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 53,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void delete_item(GtkTreeView *treeview)
{
GtkTreeSelection *selection = gtk_tree_view_get_selection(treeview);
if (selection)
{
GtkTreeIter iter;
GtkTreeModel *store = gtk_tree_view_get_model(treeview);
if (gtk_tree_selection_get_selected(selection, &store, &iter) == TRUE)
{
GValue d_item_name = { 0 };
gtk_tree_model_get_value(store, &iter, DETAIL_COLUMN_NAME, &d_item_name);
const char *item_name = g_value_get_string(&d_item_name);
if (item_name)
{
struct problem_item *item = problem_data_get_item_or_NULL(g_cd, item_name);
if (item->flags & CD_FLAG_ISEDITABLE)
{
struct dump_dir *dd = wizard_open_directory_for_writing(g_dump_dir_name);
if (dd)
{
char *filename = concat_path_file(g_dump_dir_name, item_name);
unlink(filename);
free(filename);
dd_close(dd);
g_hash_table_remove(g_cd, item_name);
gtk_list_store_remove(g_ls_details, &iter);
}
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::NonClientTopBorderHeight(
bool force_restored) const {
if (frame()->widget_delegate() &&
frame()->widget_delegate()->ShouldShowWindowTitle()) {
return close_button_->bounds().bottom();
}
if (!frame()->IsMaximized() || force_restored)
return kTabstripTopSpacingRestored;
return kTabstripTopSpacingMaximized;
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetAndroidVp8Params(
const OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE* vp8AndroidParams) {
if (vp8AndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
if (vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern != OMX_VIDEO_VPXTemporalLayerPatternNone &&
vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern != OMX_VIDEO_VPXTemporalLayerPatternWebRTC) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerCount > OMX_VIDEO_ANDROID_MAXVP8TEMPORALLAYERS) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8AndroidParams->nMinQuantizer > vp8AndroidParams->nMaxQuantizer) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mTemporalPatternType = vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern;
if (vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern == OMX_VIDEO_VPXTemporalLayerPatternWebRTC) {
mTemporalLayers = vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerCount;
} else if (vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern == OMX_VIDEO_VPXTemporalLayerPatternNone) {
mTemporalLayers = 0;
}
if (mTemporalLayers > 1) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTemporalLayers - 1; i++) {
if (vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio[i + 1] <=
vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio[i]) {
ALOGE("Wrong bitrate ratio - should be in increasing order.");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
}
mKeyFrameInterval = vp8AndroidParams->nKeyFrameInterval;
mMinQuantizer = vp8AndroidParams->nMinQuantizer;
mMaxQuantizer = vp8AndroidParams->nMaxQuantizer;
memcpy(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio, vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio,
sizeof(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio));
ALOGD("VP8: internalSetAndroidVp8Params. BRMode: %u. TS: %zu. KF: %u."
" QP: %u - %u BR0: %u. BR1: %u. BR2: %u",
(uint32_t)mBitrateControlMode, mTemporalLayers, mKeyFrameInterval,
mMinQuantizer, mMaxQuantizer, mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio[0],
mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio[1], mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio[2]);
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in VP8 encoder.
Bug: 27569635
Change-Id: I469573f40e21dc9f4c200749d4f220e3a2d31761
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeFileList(const FileList& fileList)
{
append(FileListTag);
uint32_t length = fileList.length();
doWriteUint32(length);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i)
doWriteFile(*fileList.item(i));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_thread_init(AVCodecContext *s)
{
return -1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 67,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_dm_cb_remove_bond(bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
/*special handling for HID devices */
/* VUP needs to be sent if its a HID Device. The HID HOST module will check if there
is a valid hid connection with this bd_addr. If yes VUP will be issued.*/
#if (defined(BTA_HH_INCLUDED) && (BTA_HH_INCLUDED == TRUE))
if (btif_hh_virtual_unplug(bd_addr) != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
#endif
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Removing HH device", __func__);
BTA_DmRemoveDevice((UINT8 *)bd_addr->address);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ctx->refcount)) {
if (ctx->parent_ctx)
put_ctx(ctx->parent_ctx);
if (ctx->task && ctx->task != TASK_TOMBSTONE)
put_task_struct(ctx->task);
call_rcu(&ctx->rcu_head, free_ctx);
}
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _snd_ctl_unregister_ioctl(snd_kctl_ioctl_func_t fcn,
struct list_head *lists)
{
struct snd_kctl_ioctl *p;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!fcn))
return -EINVAL;
down_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
list_for_each_entry(p, lists, list) {
if (p->fioctl == fcn) {
list_del(&p->list);
up_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
kfree(p);
return 0;
}
}
up_write(&snd_ioctl_rwsem);
snd_BUG();
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 36,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadExtension(const char* extension_name) {
base::FilePath path = test_extensions_dir_.AppendASCII(extension_name);
ASSERT_TRUE(LoadExtensionFromPath(path)) << "Failed to load extension.";
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hub_disconnect_children(struct usb_device *udev)
{
struct usb_hub *hub = usb_hub_to_struct_hub(udev);
int i;
/* Free up all the children before we remove this device */
for (i = 0; i < udev->maxchild; i++) {
if (hub->ports[i]->child)
usb_disconnect(&hub->ports[i]->child);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OutStream::~OutStream ()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MSLError(void *context,const char *format,...)
{
char
reason[MagickPathExtent];
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
va_list
operands;
/*
Display and format a error formats, gives file, line, position and
extra parameters.
*/
va_start(operands,format);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.error: ");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),format,operands);
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
(void) msl_info;
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
(void) vsprintf(reason,format,operands);
#else
(void) vsnprintf(reason,MagickPathExtent,format,operands);
#endif
ThrowMSLException(DelegateFatalError,reason,"SAX error");
va_end(operands);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perWorldMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::perWorldMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int crypto_shash_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
if ((unsigned long)data & alignmask)
return shash_update_unaligned(desc, data, len);
return shash->update(desc, data, len);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::ContextLostReason GLES2DecoderImpl::GetContextLostReason() {
switch (reset_status_) {
case GL_NO_ERROR:
return error::kUnknown;
case GL_GUILTY_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB:
return error::kGuilty;
case GL_INNOCENT_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB:
return error::kInnocent;
case GL_UNKNOWN_CONTEXT_RESET_ARB:
return error::kUnknown;
}
NOTREACHED();
return error::kUnknown;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cirrus_invalidate_region(CirrusVGAState * s, int off_begin,
int off_pitch, int bytesperline,
int lines)
{
int y;
int off_cur;
int off_cur_end;
for (y = 0; y < lines; y++) {
off_cur = off_begin;
off_cur_end = (off_cur + bytesperline) & s->cirrus_addr_mask;
memory_region_set_dirty(&s->vga.vram, off_cur, off_cur_end - off_cur);
off_begin += off_pitch;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static byte cdecrypt(byte cipher, unsigned short *cr)
{
const byte plain = (byte) (cipher ^ (*cr >> 8));
*cr = (unsigned short) ((cipher + *cr) * t1_c1 + t1_c2);
return plain;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLSelectElement::scrollToSelection()
{
if (usesMenuList())
return;
if (RenderObject* renderer = this->renderer())
toRenderListBox(renderer)->selectionChanged();
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long BlockGroup::GetPrevTimeCode() const
{
return m_prev;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t uvesafb_show_product_rev(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct fb_info *info = platform_get_drvdata(to_platform_device(dev));
struct uvesafb_par *par = info->par;
if (par->vbe_ib.oem_product_rev_ptr)
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", (char *)
(&par->vbe_ib) + par->vbe_ib.oem_product_rev_ptr);
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, int rw)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct page *page, *page_head;
int err, ro = 0;
/*
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
*/
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(rw, uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
*/
if (!fshared) {
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
get_futex_key_refs(key); /* implies MB (B) */
return 0;
}
again:
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 1, &page);
/*
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
* and get read-only access.
*/
if (err == -EFAULT && rw == VERIFY_READ) {
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
ro = 1;
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
else
err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
page_head = page;
if (unlikely(PageTail(page))) {
put_page(page);
/* serialize against __split_huge_page_splitting() */
local_irq_disable();
if (likely(__get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, !ro, &page) == 1)) {
page_head = compound_head(page);
/*
* page_head is valid pointer but we must pin
* it before taking the PG_lock and/or
* PG_compound_lock. The moment we re-enable
* irqs __split_huge_page_splitting() can
* return and the head page can be freed from
* under us. We can't take the PG_lock and/or
* PG_compound_lock on a page that could be
* freed from under us.
*/
if (page != page_head) {
get_page(page_head);
put_page(page);
}
local_irq_enable();
} else {
local_irq_enable();
goto again;
}
}
#else
page_head = compound_head(page);
if (page != page_head) {
get_page(page_head);
put_page(page);
}
#endif
lock_page(page_head);
/*
* If page_head->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
* so refcount care in invalidate_complete_page's remove_mapping
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
*
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page_head->mapping.
*/
if (!page_head->mapping) {
int shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page_head);
unlock_page(page_head);
put_page(page_head);
if (shmem_swizzled)
goto again;
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
*
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
* the object not the particular process.
*/
if (PageAnon(page_head)) {
/*
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
* sense for futex operations.
*/
if (ro) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
} else {
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
key->shared.inode = page_head->mapping->host;
key->shared.pgoff = basepage_index(page);
}
get_futex_key_refs(key); /* implies MB (B) */
out:
unlock_page(page_head);
put_page(page_head);
return err;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 38,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: md5_state_final (struct md5_state *s, struct md5_digest *out)
{
md_ctx_final(&s->ctx, out->digest);
md_ctx_cleanup(&s->ctx);
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_play_sound(rdpContext* context,
const PLAY_SOUND_UPDATE* play_sound)
{
wStream* s;
rdpRdp* rdp = context->rdp;
if (!rdp->settings->ReceivedCapabilities[CAPSET_TYPE_SOUND])
{
return TRUE;
}
s = rdp_data_pdu_init(rdp);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, play_sound->duration);
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, play_sound->frequency);
return rdp_send_data_pdu(rdp, s, DATA_PDU_TYPE_PLAY_SOUND, rdp->mcs->userId);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetBoundsInPixels(
const gfx::Rect& requested_bounds_in_pixel,
const viz::LocalSurfaceIdAllocation& local_surface_id_allocation) {
DCHECK(!local_surface_id_allocation.IsValid());
gfx::Rect bounds_in_pixels(requested_bounds_in_pixel.origin(),
AdjustSize(requested_bounds_in_pixel.size()));
bool origin_changed = bounds_in_pixels_.origin() != bounds_in_pixels.origin();
bool size_changed = bounds_in_pixels_.size() != bounds_in_pixels.size();
XWindowChanges changes = {0};
unsigned value_mask = 0;
if (size_changed) {
delayed_resize_task_.Cancel();
UpdateMinAndMaxSize();
if (bounds_in_pixels.width() < min_size_in_pixels_.width() ||
bounds_in_pixels.height() < min_size_in_pixels_.height() ||
(!max_size_in_pixels_.IsEmpty() &&
(bounds_in_pixels.width() > max_size_in_pixels_.width() ||
bounds_in_pixels.height() > max_size_in_pixels_.height()))) {
gfx::Size size_in_pixels = bounds_in_pixels.size();
if (!max_size_in_pixels_.IsEmpty())
size_in_pixels.SetToMin(max_size_in_pixels_);
size_in_pixels.SetToMax(min_size_in_pixels_);
bounds_in_pixels.set_size(size_in_pixels);
}
changes.width = bounds_in_pixels.width();
changes.height = bounds_in_pixels.height();
value_mask |= CWHeight | CWWidth;
}
if (origin_changed) {
changes.x = bounds_in_pixels.x();
changes.y = bounds_in_pixels.y();
value_mask |= CWX | CWY;
}
if (value_mask)
XConfigureWindow(xdisplay_, xwindow_, value_mask, &changes);
bounds_in_pixels_ = bounds_in_pixels;
if (origin_changed)
native_widget_delegate_->AsWidget()->OnNativeWidgetMove();
if (size_changed) {
OnHostResizedInPixels(bounds_in_pixels.size(), local_surface_id_allocation);
ResetWindowRegion();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_send_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
int retval = 0;
/* If there is an outstanding ASCONF chunk, queue it for later
* transmission.
*/
if (asoc->addip_last_asconf) {
list_add_tail(&chunk->list, &asoc->addip_chunk_list);
goto out;
}
/* Hold the chunk until an ASCONF_ACK is received. */
sctp_chunk_hold(chunk);
retval = sctp_primitive_ASCONF(net, asoc, chunk);
if (retval)
sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
else
asoc->addip_last_asconf = chunk;
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL IsVolumeClassFilterRegistered ()
{
UNICODE_STRING name;
NTSTATUS status;
BOOL registered = FALSE;
PKEY_VALUE_PARTIAL_INFORMATION data;
RtlInitUnicodeString (&name, L"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Class\\{71A27CDD-812A-11D0-BEC7-08002BE2092F}");
status = TCReadRegistryKey (&name, L"UpperFilters", &data);
if (NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
if (data->Type == REG_MULTI_SZ && data->DataLength >= 9 * sizeof (wchar_t))
{
ULONG i;
for (i = 0; i <= data->DataLength - 9 * sizeof (wchar_t); ++i)
{
if (memcmp (data->Data + i, L"veracrypt", 9 * sizeof (wchar_t)) == 0)
{
Dump ("Volume class filter active\n");
registered = TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
TCfree (data);
}
return registered;
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn, bool atomic,
bool *async, bool write_fault, bool *writable)
{
unsigned long addr = __gfn_to_hva_many(slot, gfn, NULL, write_fault);
if (addr == KVM_HVA_ERR_RO_BAD)
return KVM_PFN_ERR_RO_FAULT;
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return KVM_PFN_NOSLOT;
/* Do not map writable pfn in the readonly memslot. */
if (writable && memslot_is_readonly(slot)) {
*writable = false;
writable = NULL;
}
return hva_to_pfn(addr, atomic, async, write_fault,
writable);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StyleResolver* Document::GetStyleResolver() const {
return style_engine_->Resolver();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceTracker::~ResourceTracker() {
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothAllowedDevices& WebBluetoothServiceImpl::allowed_devices() {
StoragePartitionImpl* partition = static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(
BrowserContext::GetDefaultStoragePartition(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()));
scoped_refptr<BluetoothAllowedDevicesMap> allowed_devices_map =
partition->GetBluetoothAllowedDevicesMap();
return allowed_devices_map->GetOrCreateAllowedDevices(GetOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isValidValue(const String& value) const
{
if (!m_inputType->canSetStringValue()) {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return false;
}
return !m_inputType->typeMismatchFor(value)
&& !m_inputType->stepMismatch(value)
&& !m_inputType->rangeUnderflow(value)
&& !m_inputType->rangeOverflow(value)
&& !tooLong(value, IgnoreDirtyFlag)
&& !m_inputType->patternMismatch(value)
&& !m_inputType->valueMissing(value);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::isLoadCompleted()
{
return m_readyState == Complete;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_tp_trap(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int instr)
{
int reg = (instr >> 12) & 15;
if (reg == 15)
return 1;
regs->uregs[reg] = current_thread_info()->tp_value;
regs->ARM_pc += 4;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 167,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_monotonic_boot(s64 *t, cycle_t *cycle_now)
{
struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
unsigned long seq;
int mode;
u64 ns;
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(>od->seq);
mode = gtod->clock.vclock_mode;
ns = gtod->nsec_base;
ns += vgettsc(cycle_now);
ns >>= gtod->clock.shift;
ns += gtod->boot_ns;
} while (unlikely(read_seqcount_retry(>od->seq, seq)));
*t = ns;
return mode;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NOINLINE int send_decline(/*uint32_t xid,*/ uint32_t server, uint32_t requested)
{
struct dhcp_packet packet;
/* Fill in: op, htype, hlen, cookie, chaddr, random xid fields,
* client-id option (unless -C), message type option:
*/
init_packet(&packet, DHCPDECLINE);
#if 0
/* RFC 2131 says DHCPDECLINE's xid is randomly selected by client,
* but in case the server is buggy and wants DHCPDECLINE's xid
* to match the xid which started entire handshake,
* we use the same xid we used in initial DHCPDISCOVER:
*/
packet.xid = xid;
#endif
/* DHCPDECLINE uses "requested ip", not ciaddr, to store offered IP */
udhcp_add_simple_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP, requested);
udhcp_add_simple_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID, server);
bb_error_msg("sending %s", "decline");
return raw_bcast_from_client_config_ifindex(&packet, INADDR_ANY);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::GetFeedbackPrivateDelegate() {
if (!feedback_private_delegate_) {
feedback_private_delegate_ =
base::MakeUnique<ChromeFeedbackPrivateDelegate>();
}
return feedback_private_delegate_.get();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::SetIsLikelyToRequireADraw(
bool is_likely_to_require_a_draw) {
is_likely_to_require_a_draw_ = is_likely_to_require_a_draw;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_S45ROUND( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
SetSuperRound( exc, 0x2D41, args[0] );
exc->GS.round_state = TT_Round_Super_45;
exc->func_round = (TT_Round_Func)Round_Super_45;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *newext, int at)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *fidx;
int i = at, k, m, a;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, oldblock;
__le32 border;
ext4_fsblk_t *ablocks = NULL; /* array of allocated blocks */
int err = 0;
/* make decision: where to split? */
/* FIXME: now decision is simplest: at current extent */
/* if current leaf will be split, then we should use
* border from split point */
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT!");
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
if (path[depth].p_ext != EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
border = path[depth].p_ext[1].ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be split."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
} else {
border = newext->ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be added."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
}
/*
* If error occurs, then we break processing
* and mark filesystem read-only. index won't
* be inserted and tree will be in consistent
* state. Next mount will repair buffers too.
*/
/*
* Get array to track all allocated blocks.
* We need this to handle errors and free blocks
* upon them.
*/
ablocks = kzalloc(sizeof(ext4_fsblk_t) * depth, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ablocks)
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate all needed blocks */
ext_debug("allocate %d blocks for indexes/leaf\n", depth - at);
for (a = 0; a < depth - at; a++) {
newblock = ext4_ext_new_meta_block(handle, inode, path,
newext, &err, flags);
if (newblock == 0)
goto cleanup;
ablocks[a] = newblock;
}
/* initialize new leaf */
newblock = ablocks[--a];
if (unlikely(newblock == 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "newblock == 0!");
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = 0;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_depth = 0;
/* move remainder of path[depth] to the new leaf */
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries !=
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "eh_entries %d != eh_max %d!",
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries,
path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* start copy from next extent */
m = EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr) - path[depth].p_ext++;
ext4_ext_show_move(inode, path, newblock, depth);
if (m) {
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh);
memmove(ex, path[depth].p_ext, sizeof(struct ext4_extent) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old leaf */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
/* create intermediate indexes */
k = depth - at - 1;
if (unlikely(k < 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "k %d < 0!", k);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
if (k)
ext_debug("create %d intermediate indices\n", k);
/* insert new index into current index block */
/* current depth stored in i var */
i = depth - 1;
while (k--) {
oldblock = newblock;
newblock = ablocks[--a];
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (unlikely(!bh)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
neh->eh_depth = cpu_to_le16(depth - i);
fidx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh);
fidx->ei_block = border;
ext4_idx_store_pblock(fidx, oldblock);
ext_debug("int.index at %d (block %llu): %u -> %llu\n",
i, newblock, le32_to_cpu(border), oldblock);
/* move remainder of path[i] to the new index block */
if (unlikely(EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) !=
EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr))) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
"EXT_MAX_INDEX != EXT_LAST_INDEX ee_block %d!",
le32_to_cpu(path[i].p_ext->ee_block));
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* start copy indexes */
m = EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) - path[i].p_idx++;
ext_debug("cur 0x%p, last 0x%p\n", path[i].p_idx,
EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
ext4_ext_show_move(inode, path, newblock, i);
if (m) {
memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old index */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[i].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
i--;
}
/* insert new index */
err = ext4_ext_insert_index(handle, inode, path + at,
le32_to_cpu(border), newblock);
cleanup:
if (bh) {
if (buffer_locked(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
if (err) {
/* free all allocated blocks in error case */
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if (!ablocks[i])
continue;
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, ablocks[i], 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA);
}
}
kfree(ablocks);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannel(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,LayerInfo* layer_info,
const size_t channel,const PSDCompressionType compression,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*channel_image,
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
channel_image=image;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
if (layer_info->channel_info[channel].type < -1)
{
const char
*option;
/*
Ignore mask that is not a user supplied layer mask, if the mask is
disabled or if the flags have unsupported values.
*/
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:preserve-opacity-mask");
if ((layer_info->channel_info[channel].type != -2) ||
(layer_info->mask.flags > 2) || ((layer_info->mask.flags & 0x02) &&
(IsStringTrue(option) == MagickFalse)))
{
SeekBlob(image,layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_CUR);
return(MagickTrue);
}
mask=CloneImage(image,layer_info->mask.page.width,
layer_info->mask.page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
SetImageType(mask,GrayscaleType,exception);
channel_image=mask;
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
status=MagickTrue;
switch(compression)
{
case Raw:
status=ReadPSDChannelRaw(channel_image,psd_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,exception);
break;
case RLE:
{
MagickOffsetType
*sizes;
sizes=ReadPSDRLESizes(channel_image,psd_info,channel_image->rows);
if (sizes == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
status=ReadPSDChannelRLE(channel_image,psd_info,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,sizes,exception);
sizes=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sizes);
}
break;
case ZipWithPrediction:
case ZipWithoutPrediction:
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
status=ReadPSDChannelZip(channel_image,layer_info->channels,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].type,compression,
layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,exception);
#else
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
MissingDelegateWarning,"DelegateLibrarySupportNotBuiltIn",
"'%s' (ZLIB)",image->filename);
#endif
break;
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),TypeWarning,
"CompressionNotSupported","'%.20g'",(double) compression);
break;
}
SeekBlob(image,offset+layer_info->channel_info[channel].size-2,SEEK_SET);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
DestroyImage(mask);
ThrowBinaryException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage",
image->filename);
}
layer_info->mask.image=mask;
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
base::CStringTokenizer category_group_tokens(
category_group_name, category_group_name + strlen(category_group_name),
",");
while (category_group_tokens.GetNext()) {
const std::string& category_group_token = category_group_tokens.token();
for (int i = 0; kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0] != NULL; ++i) {
DCHECK(kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1]);
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_token.c_str(),
kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0]) &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1])) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int http_sync_req_state(struct session *s)
{
struct channel *chn = s->req;
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
unsigned int old_flags = chn->flags;
unsigned int old_state = txn->req.msg_state;
if (unlikely(txn->req.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
return 0;
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
/* No need to read anymore, the request was completely parsed.
* We can shut the read side unless we want to abort_on_close,
* or we have a POST request. The issue with POST requests is
* that some browsers still send a CRLF after the request, and
* this CRLF must be read so that it does not remain in the kernel
* buffers, otherwise a close could cause an RST on some systems
* (eg: Linux).
* Note that if we're using keep-alive on the client side, we'd
* rather poll now and keep the polling enabled for the whole
* session's life than enabling/disabling it between each
* response and next request.
*/
if (((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_SCL) &&
((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) &&
!(s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE) &&
txn->meth != HTTP_METH_POST)
channel_dont_read(chn);
/* if the server closes the connection, we want to immediately react
* and close the socket to save packets and syscalls.
*/
chn->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOHALF;
if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
goto wait_other_side;
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_DONE) {
/* The server has not finished to respond, so we
* don't want to move in order not to upset it.
*/
goto wait_other_side;
}
if (txn->rsp.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL) {
/* if any side switches to tunnel mode, the other one does too */
channel_auto_read(chn);
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
goto wait_other_side;
}
/* When we get here, it means that both the request and the
* response have finished receiving. Depending on the connection
* mode, we'll have to wait for the last bytes to leave in either
* direction, and sometimes for a close to be effective.
*/
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL) {
/* Server-close mode : queue a connection close to the server */
if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW)))
channel_shutw_now(chn);
}
else if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_CLO) {
/* Option forceclose is set, or either side wants to close,
* let's enforce it now that we're not expecting any new
* data to come. The caller knows the session is complete
* once both states are CLOSED.
*/
if (!(chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW))) {
channel_shutr_now(chn);
channel_shutw_now(chn);
}
}
else {
/* The last possible modes are keep-alive and tunnel. Tunnel mode
* will not have any analyser so it needs to poll for reads.
*/
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_TUN) {
channel_auto_read(chn);
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_TUNNEL;
chn->flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
}
}
if (chn->flags & (CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW)) {
/* if we've just closed an output, let's switch */
chn->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER; /* we want to close ASAP */
if (!channel_is_empty(chn)) {
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CLOSING;
goto http_msg_closing;
}
else {
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CLOSED;
goto http_msg_closed;
}
}
goto wait_other_side;
}
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSING) {
http_msg_closing:
/* nothing else to forward, just waiting for the output buffer
* to be empty and for the shutw_now to take effect.
*/
if (channel_is_empty(chn)) {
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CLOSED;
goto http_msg_closed;
}
else if (chn->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
goto wait_other_side;
}
}
if (txn->req.msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CLOSED) {
http_msg_closed:
/* see above in MSG_DONE why we only do this in these states */
if (((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_SCL) &&
((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) &&
!(s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE))
channel_dont_read(chn);
goto wait_other_side;
}
wait_other_side:
return txn->req.msg_state != old_state || chn->flags != old_flags;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: test_sync_sh (void) {
parse_cmd_line("sync_sh 'echo Test echo.'", NULL);
g_assert_cmpstr("Test echo.\n", ==, uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
/* clean up after ourselves */
uzbl.comm.sync_stdout = strfree(uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::HasBeenPasswordField() const {
return has_been_password_field_;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_init_creds_get_creds(krb5_context context,
krb5_init_creds_context ctx,
krb5_creds *cred)
{
return krb5_copy_creds_contents(context, &ctx->cred, cred);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,921 |
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