instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_msndmidi_input_drop(struct snd_msndmidi *mpu)
{
u16 tail;
tail = readw(mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wTail);
writew(tail, mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wHead);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: filter_report_error(stream_state * st, const char *str)
{
if_debug1m('s', st->memory, "[s]stream error: %s\n", str);
strncpy(st->error_string, str, STREAM_MAX_ERROR_STRING);
/* Ensure null termination. */
st->error_string[STREAM_MAX_ERROR_STRING] = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
#ifdef OS_MACOSX
FilePath browser_directory;
PathService::Get(base::DIR_MODULE, &browser_directory);
command_line->AppendSwitchPath(switches::kExtraPluginDir,
browser_directory.AppendASCII("plugins"));
#endif
command_line->AppendSwitch("always-authorize-plugins");
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mailimf_colon_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
return mailimf_unstrict_char_parse(message, length, indx, ':');
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int recv_byte(int sockd)
{
char c;
if (recv(sockd, &c, 1, 0) != -1)
return c;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FullscreenWebContentsObserver(WebContents* web_contents,
RenderFrameHost* wanted_rfh)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents), wanted_rfh_(wanted_rfh) {}
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netjoin_remove(NETJOIN_SERVER_REC *server, NETJOIN_REC *rec)
{
server->netjoins = g_slist_remove(server->netjoins, rec);
g_slist_foreach(rec->old_channels, (GFunc) g_free, NULL);
g_slist_foreach(rec->now_channels, (GFunc) g_free, NULL);
g_slist_free(rec->old_channels);
g_slist_free(rec->now_channels);
g_free(rec->nick);
g_free(rec);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mfc6_cache *ip6mr_cache_find(struct mr6_table *mrt,
const struct in6_addr *origin,
const struct in6_addr *mcastgrp)
{
int line = MFC6_HASH(mcastgrp, origin);
struct mfc6_cache *c;
list_for_each_entry(c, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[line], list) {
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_origin, origin) &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_mcastgrp, mcastgrp))
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessImpl::UseInProcessPlugins() const {
return in_process_plugins_;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::set<base::CommandLine::StringType> ExtractFlagsFromCommandLine(
const base::CommandLine& cmdline) {
std::set<base::CommandLine::StringType> flags;
base::CommandLine::StringVector::const_iterator first =
std::find(cmdline.argv().begin(), cmdline.argv().end(),
GetSwitchString(switches::kFlagSwitchesBegin));
base::CommandLine::StringVector::const_iterator last =
std::find(cmdline.argv().begin(), cmdline.argv().end(),
GetSwitchString(switches::kFlagSwitchesEnd));
if (first != cmdline.argv().end() && last != cmdline.argv().end())
flags.insert(first + 1, last);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
first = std::find(cmdline.argv().begin(), cmdline.argv().end(),
GetSwitchString(chromeos::switches::kPolicySwitchesBegin));
last = std::find(cmdline.argv().begin(), cmdline.argv().end(),
GetSwitchString(chromeos::switches::kPolicySwitchesEnd));
if (first != cmdline.argv().end() && last != cmdline.argv().end())
flags.insert(first + 1, last);
#endif
return flags;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *re_yyget_text (yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
return yytext;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::cleanup()
{
m_loader = 0;
if (m_errorCode) {
m_rawData = 0;
m_stringResult = "";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_queue_set_addr(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n, hwaddr addr)
{
vdev->vq[n].pa = addr;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[n]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpu::GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::GetGpuChannel() {
if (!gpu_channel_)
return nullptr;
if (gpu_channel_->IsLost())
return nullptr;
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int32_t coroutine_fn get_iounit(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsPath *path)
{
struct statfs stbuf;
int32_t iounit = 0;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
/*
* iounit should be multiples of f_bsize (host filesystem block size
* and as well as less than (client msize - P9_IOHDRSZ))
*/
if (!v9fs_co_statfs(pdu, path, &stbuf)) {
iounit = stbuf.f_bsize;
iounit *= (s->msize - P9_IOHDRSZ)/stbuf.f_bsize;
}
if (!iounit) {
iounit = s->msize - P9_IOHDRSZ;
}
return iounit;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& HTMLDocument::vlinkColor() const
{
return bodyAttributeValue(vlinkAttr);
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AdjustWaitForDelay (pointer waitTime, unsigned long newdelay)
{
static struct timeval delay_val;
struct timeval **wt = (struct timeval **) waitTime;
unsigned long olddelay;
if (*wt == NULL)
{
delay_val.tv_sec = newdelay / 1000;
delay_val.tv_usec = 1000 * (newdelay % 1000);
*wt = &delay_val;
}
else
{
olddelay = (*wt)->tv_sec * 1000 + (*wt)->tv_usec / 1000;
if (newdelay < olddelay)
{
(*wt)->tv_sec = newdelay / 1000;
(*wt)->tv_usec = 1000 * (newdelay % 1000);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void InsertComplexFloatRow(Image *image,float *p,int y,double MinVal,
double MaxVal,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
double f;
int x;
register Quantum *q;
if (MinVal >= 0)
MinVal = -1;
if (MaxVal <= 0)
MaxVal = 1;
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, image->columns, 1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (*p > 0)
{
f=(*p/MaxVal)*(Quantum) (QuantumRange-GetPixelRed(image,q));
if ((f+GetPixelRed(image,q)) < QuantumRange)
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,q)+ClampToQuantum(f),q);
else
SetPixelRed(image,QuantumRange,q);
f/=2.0;
if (f < GetPixelGreen(image,q))
{
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,q)-ClampToQuantum(f),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelBlue(image,q),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,0,q);
}
}
if (*p < 0)
{
f=(*p/MaxVal)*(Quantum) (QuantumRange-GetPixelBlue(image,q));
if ((f+GetPixelBlue(image,q)) < QuantumRange)
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,q)+ClampToQuantum(f),q);
else
SetPixelBlue(image,QuantumRange,q);
f/=2.0;
if (f < GetPixelGreen(image,q))
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,q)-ClampToQuantum(f),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelRed(image,q),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelGreen(image,0,q);
SetPixelRed(image,0,q);
}
}
p++;
q++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
return;
return;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1554
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int deny_write_access(struct file * file)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) {
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return -ETXTBSY;
}
atomic_dec(&inode->i_writecount);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_block_getter(uint8_t *p, uint32_t s, Gif_Reader *grr)
{
size_t nread = fread(p, 1, s, grr->f);
if (nread < s)
memset(p + nread, 0, s - nread);
grr->pos += nread;
return nread;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *jspeClassDefinition(bool parseNamedClass) {
JsVar *classFunction = 0;
JsVar *classPrototype = 0;
JsVar *classInternalName = 0;
bool actuallyCreateClass = JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE;
if (actuallyCreateClass)
classFunction = jsvNewWithFlags(JSV_FUNCTION);
if (parseNamedClass && lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
if (classFunction)
classInternalName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
}
if (classFunction) {
JsVar *prototypeName = jsvFindChildFromString(classFunction, JSPARSE_PROTOTYPE_VAR, true);
jspEnsureIsPrototype(classFunction, prototypeName); // make sure it's an object
classPrototype = jsvSkipName(prototypeName);
jsvUnLock(prototypeName);
}
if (lex->tk==LEX_R_EXTENDS) {
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_EXTENDS);
JsVar *extendsFrom = actuallyCreateClass ? jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(jspGetNamedVariable(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex))) : 0;
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID,jsvUnLock4(extendsFrom,classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
if (classPrototype) {
if (jsvIsFunction(extendsFrom)) {
jsvObjectSetChild(classPrototype, JSPARSE_INHERITS_VAR, extendsFrom);
jsvObjectSetChildAndUnLock(classFunction, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_CODE_NAME, jsvNewFromString("if(this.__proto__.__proto__)this.__proto__.__proto__.apply(this,arguments)"));
} else
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "'extends' argument should be a function, got %t", extendsFrom);
}
jsvUnLock(extendsFrom);
}
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('{',jsvUnLock3(classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
while ((lex->tk==LEX_ID || lex->tk==LEX_R_STATIC) && !jspIsInterrupted()) {
bool isStatic = lex->tk==LEX_R_STATIC;
if (isStatic) JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_STATIC);
JsVar *funcName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN(LEX_ID,jsvUnLock4(funcName,classFunction,classInternalName,classPrototype),0);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
bool isGetter, isSetter;
if (lex->tk==LEX_ID) {
isGetter = jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "get");
isSetter = jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "set");
if (isGetter || isSetter) {
jsvUnLock(funcName);
funcName = jslGetTokenValueAsVar(lex);
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_ID);
}
}
#endif
JsVar *method = jspeFunctionDefinition(false);
if (classFunction && classPrototype) {
JsVar *obj = isStatic ? classFunction : classPrototype;
if (jsvIsStringEqual(funcName, "constructor")) {
jswrap_function_replaceWith(classFunction, method);
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
} else if (isGetter || isSetter) {
jsvAddGetterOrSetter(obj, funcName, isGetter, method);
#endif
} else {
funcName = jsvMakeIntoVariableName(funcName, 0);
jsvSetValueOfName(funcName, method);
jsvAddName(obj, funcName);
}
}
jsvUnLock2(method,funcName);
}
jsvUnLock(classPrototype);
if (classInternalName)
jsvObjectSetChildAndUnLock(classFunction, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_NAME_NAME, classInternalName);
JSP_MATCH_WITH_CLEANUP_AND_RETURN('}',jsvUnLock(classFunction),0);
return classFunction;
}
Commit Message: Fix stack overflow if interpreting a file full of '{' (fix #1448)
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 82,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetURLRowForAutocompleteMatch(Profile* profile,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
history::URLRow* url_row) {
DCHECK(url_row);
HistoryService* history_service =
profile->GetHistoryService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (!history_service)
return false;
history::URLDatabase* url_db = history_service->InMemoryDatabase();
return url_db && (url_db->GetRowForURL(match.destination_url, url_row) != 0);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbClaimInterfaceFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::ClaimInterface::Params> parameters =
ClaimInterface::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
scoped_refptr<UsbDeviceHandle> device_handle =
GetDeviceHandle(parameters->handle);
if (!device_handle.get()) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorNoConnection));
}
device_handle->ClaimInterface(
parameters->interface_number,
base::Bind(&UsbClaimInterfaceFunction::OnComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void efx_fini_napi(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
struct efx_channel *channel;
efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx)
efx_fini_napi_channel(channel);
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB16F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply,
float,
uint16_t>(const float* source,
uint16_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] ? 1.0f / source[3] : 1.0f;
destination[0] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[0] * scale_factor);
destination[1] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[1] * scale_factor);
destination[2] = ConvertFloatToHalfFloat(source[2] * scale_factor);
source += 4;
destination += 3;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct kex *kex;
int r;
debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
/* Update with new address */
if (options.compression) {
ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
(ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
(ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
}
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: remap_event_helper(entry_connection_t *conn, const tor_addr_t *new_addr)
{
tor_addr_to_str(conn->socks_request->address, new_addr,
sizeof(conn->socks_request->address),
1);
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_REMAP,
REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_EXIT);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_io_bar1_write(void *opaque,
hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val,
unsigned size)
{
VMXNET3State *s = opaque;
switch (addr) {
/* Vmxnet3 Revision Report Selection */
case VMXNET3_REG_VRRS:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_VRRS] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
break;
/* UPT Version Report Selection */
case VMXNET3_REG_UVRS:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_UVRS] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
break;
/* Driver Shared Address Low */
case VMXNET3_REG_DSAL:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_DSAL] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
/*
* Guest driver will first write the low part of the shared
* memory address. We save it to temp variable and set the
* shared address only after we get the high part
*/
if (val == 0) {
vmxnet3_deactivate_device(s);
}
s->temp_shared_guest_driver_memory = val;
s->drv_shmem = 0;
break;
/* Driver Shared Address High */
case VMXNET3_REG_DSAH:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_DSAH] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
/*
* Set the shared memory between guest driver and device.
* We already should have low address part.
*/
s->drv_shmem = s->temp_shared_guest_driver_memory | (val << 32);
break;
/* Command */
case VMXNET3_REG_CMD:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_CMD] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
vmxnet3_handle_command(s, val);
break;
/* MAC Address Low */
case VMXNET3_REG_MACL:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_MACL] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
s->temp_mac = val;
break;
/* MAC Address High */
case VMXNET3_REG_MACH:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_MACH] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
vmxnet3_set_variable_mac(s, val, s->temp_mac);
break;
/* Interrupt Cause Register */
case VMXNET3_REG_ICR:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_ICR] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
g_assert_not_reached();
break;
/* Event Cause Register */
case VMXNET3_REG_ECR:
VMW_CBPRN("Write BAR1 [VMXNET3_REG_ECR] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
val, size);
vmxnet3_ack_events(s, val);
break;
default:
VMW_CBPRN("Unknown Write to BAR1 [%" PRIx64 "] = %" PRIx64 ", size %d",
addr, val, size);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 9,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_callchain_buffers_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct callchain_cpus_entries *entries;
int cpu;
entries = container_of(head, struct callchain_cpus_entries, rcu_head);
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
kfree(entries->cpu_entries[cpu]);
kfree(entries);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_post_notify(int options, const char *op, xmlNode * update,
int result, xmlNode * new_obj)
{
gboolean needed = FALSE;
g_hash_table_foreach(client_list, need_post_notify, &needed);
if (needed == FALSE) {
return;
}
do_cib_notify(options, op, update, result, new_obj, T_CIB_UPDATE_CONFIRM);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: http_res_get_intercept_rule(struct proxy *px, struct list *rules, struct session *s, struct http_txn *txn)
{
struct connection *cli_conn;
struct http_res_rule *rule;
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
list_for_each_entry(rule, rules, list) {
if (rule->action >= HTTP_RES_ACT_MAX)
continue;
/* check optional condition */
if (rule->cond) {
int ret;
ret = acl_exec_cond(rule->cond, px, s, txn, SMP_OPT_DIR_RES|SMP_OPT_FINAL);
ret = acl_pass(ret);
if (rule->cond->pol == ACL_COND_UNLESS)
ret = !ret;
if (!ret) /* condition not matched */
continue;
}
switch (rule->action) {
case HTTP_RES_ACT_ALLOW:
return NULL; /* "allow" rules are OK */
case HTTP_RES_ACT_DENY:
txn->flags |= TX_SVDENY;
return rule;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_SET_NICE:
s->task->nice = rule->arg.nice;
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_SET_TOS:
if ((cli_conn = objt_conn(s->req->prod->end)) && conn_ctrl_ready(cli_conn))
inet_set_tos(cli_conn->t.sock.fd, cli_conn->addr.from, rule->arg.tos);
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_SET_MARK:
#ifdef SO_MARK
if ((cli_conn = objt_conn(s->req->prod->end)) && conn_ctrl_ready(cli_conn))
setsockopt(cli_conn->t.sock.fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_MARK, &rule->arg.mark, sizeof(rule->arg.mark));
#endif
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_SET_LOGL:
s->logs.level = rule->arg.loglevel;
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_REPLACE_HDR:
case HTTP_RES_ACT_REPLACE_VAL:
if (http_transform_header(s, &txn->rsp, rule->arg.hdr_add.name, rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len,
txn->rsp.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt,
&rule->arg.hdr_add.re, &ctx, rule->action))
return NULL; /* note: we should report an error here */
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_DEL_HDR:
case HTTP_RES_ACT_SET_HDR:
ctx.idx = 0;
/* remove all occurrences of the header */
while (http_find_header2(rule->arg.hdr_add.name, rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len,
txn->rsp.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
http_remove_header2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
}
if (rule->action == HTTP_RES_ACT_DEL_HDR)
break;
/* now fall through to header addition */
case HTTP_RES_ACT_ADD_HDR:
chunk_printf(&trash, "%s: ", rule->arg.hdr_add.name);
memcpy(trash.str, rule->arg.hdr_add.name, rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len);
trash.len = rule->arg.hdr_add.name_len;
trash.str[trash.len++] = ':';
trash.str[trash.len++] = ' ';
trash.len += build_logline(s, trash.str + trash.len, trash.size - trash.len, &rule->arg.hdr_add.fmt);
http_header_add_tail2(&txn->rsp, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, trash.len);
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_DEL_ACL:
case HTTP_RES_ACT_DEL_MAP: {
struct pat_ref *ref;
char *key;
int len;
/* collect reference */
ref = pat_ref_lookup(rule->arg.map.ref);
if (!ref)
continue;
/* collect key */
len = build_logline(s, trash.str, trash.size, &rule->arg.map.key);
key = trash.str;
key[len] = '\0';
/* perform update */
/* returned code: 1=ok, 0=ko */
pat_ref_delete(ref, key);
break;
}
case HTTP_RES_ACT_ADD_ACL: {
struct pat_ref *ref;
char *key;
struct chunk *trash_key;
int len;
trash_key = get_trash_chunk();
/* collect reference */
ref = pat_ref_lookup(rule->arg.map.ref);
if (!ref)
continue;
/* collect key */
len = build_logline(s, trash_key->str, trash_key->size, &rule->arg.map.key);
key = trash_key->str;
key[len] = '\0';
/* perform update */
/* check if the entry already exists */
if (pat_ref_find_elt(ref, key) == NULL)
pat_ref_add(ref, key, NULL, NULL);
break;
}
case HTTP_RES_ACT_SET_MAP: {
struct pat_ref *ref;
char *key, *value;
struct chunk *trash_key, *trash_value;
int len;
trash_key = get_trash_chunk();
trash_value = get_trash_chunk();
/* collect reference */
ref = pat_ref_lookup(rule->arg.map.ref);
if (!ref)
continue;
/* collect key */
len = build_logline(s, trash_key->str, trash_key->size, &rule->arg.map.key);
key = trash_key->str;
key[len] = '\0';
/* collect value */
len = build_logline(s, trash_value->str, trash_value->size, &rule->arg.map.value);
value = trash_value->str;
value[len] = '\0';
/* perform update */
if (pat_ref_find_elt(ref, key) != NULL)
/* update entry if it exists */
pat_ref_set(ref, key, value, NULL);
else
/* insert a new entry */
pat_ref_add(ref, key, value, NULL);
break;
}
case HTTP_RES_ACT_CUSTOM_CONT:
rule->action_ptr(rule, px, s, txn);
break;
case HTTP_RES_ACT_CUSTOM_STOP:
rule->action_ptr(rule, px, s, txn);
return rule;
}
}
/* we reached the end of the rules, nothing to report */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void preview_obmc(MpegEncContext *s){
GetBitContext gb= s->gb;
int cbpc, i, pred_x, pred_y, mx, my;
int16_t *mot_val;
const int xy= s->mb_x + 1 + s->mb_y * s->mb_stride;
const int stride= s->b8_stride*2;
for(i=0; i<4; i++)
s->block_index[i]+= 2;
for(i=4; i<6; i++)
s->block_index[i]+= 1;
s->mb_x++;
assert(s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_P);
do{
if (get_bits1(&s->gb)) {
/* skip mb */
mot_val = s->current_picture.motion_val[0][s->block_index[0]];
mot_val[0 ]= mot_val[2 ]=
mot_val[0+stride]= mot_val[2+stride]= 0;
mot_val[1 ]= mot_val[3 ]=
mot_val[1+stride]= mot_val[3+stride]= 0;
s->current_picture.mb_type[xy] = MB_TYPE_SKIP | MB_TYPE_16x16 | MB_TYPE_L0;
goto end;
}
cbpc = get_vlc2(&s->gb, ff_h263_inter_MCBPC_vlc.table, INTER_MCBPC_VLC_BITS, 2);
}while(cbpc == 20);
if(cbpc & 4){
s->current_picture.mb_type[xy] = MB_TYPE_INTRA;
}else{
get_vlc2(&s->gb, ff_h263_cbpy_vlc.table, CBPY_VLC_BITS, 1);
if (cbpc & 8) {
if(s->modified_quant){
if(get_bits1(&s->gb)) skip_bits(&s->gb, 1);
else skip_bits(&s->gb, 5);
}else
skip_bits(&s->gb, 2);
}
if ((cbpc & 16) == 0) {
s->current_picture.mb_type[xy] = MB_TYPE_16x16 | MB_TYPE_L0;
/* 16x16 motion prediction */
mot_val= ff_h263_pred_motion(s, 0, 0, &pred_x, &pred_y);
if (s->umvplus)
mx = h263p_decode_umotion(s, pred_x);
else
mx = ff_h263_decode_motion(s, pred_x, 1);
if (s->umvplus)
my = h263p_decode_umotion(s, pred_y);
else
my = ff_h263_decode_motion(s, pred_y, 1);
mot_val[0 ]= mot_val[2 ]=
mot_val[0+stride]= mot_val[2+stride]= mx;
mot_val[1 ]= mot_val[3 ]=
mot_val[1+stride]= mot_val[3+stride]= my;
} else {
s->current_picture.mb_type[xy] = MB_TYPE_8x8 | MB_TYPE_L0;
for(i=0;i<4;i++) {
mot_val = ff_h263_pred_motion(s, i, 0, &pred_x, &pred_y);
if (s->umvplus)
mx = h263p_decode_umotion(s, pred_x);
else
mx = ff_h263_decode_motion(s, pred_x, 1);
if (s->umvplus)
my = h263p_decode_umotion(s, pred_y);
else
my = ff_h263_decode_motion(s, pred_y, 1);
if (s->umvplus && (mx - pred_x) == 1 && (my - pred_y) == 1)
skip_bits1(&s->gb); /* Bit stuffing to prevent PSC */
mot_val[0] = mx;
mot_val[1] = my;
}
}
}
end:
for(i=0; i<4; i++)
s->block_index[i]-= 2;
for(i=4; i<6; i++)
s->block_index[i]-= 1;
s->mb_x--;
s->gb= gb;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 14,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg_nop(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_slice(struct AVCodecContext *avctx, void *arg)
{
H264Context *h = *(void **)arg;
int lf_x_start = h->mb_x;
h->mb_skip_run = -1;
av_assert0(h->block_offset[15] == (4 * ((scan8[15] - scan8[0]) & 7) << h->pixel_shift) + 4 * h->linesize * ((scan8[15] - scan8[0]) >> 3));
h->is_complex = FRAME_MBAFF(h) || h->picture_structure != PICT_FRAME ||
avctx->codec_id != AV_CODEC_ID_H264 ||
(CONFIG_GRAY && (h->flags & CODEC_FLAG_GRAY));
if (!(h->avctx->active_thread_type & FF_THREAD_SLICE) && h->picture_structure == PICT_FRAME && h->er.error_status_table) {
const int start_i = av_clip(h->resync_mb_x + h->resync_mb_y * h->mb_width, 0, h->mb_num - 1);
if (start_i) {
int prev_status = h->er.error_status_table[h->er.mb_index2xy[start_i - 1]];
prev_status &= ~ VP_START;
if (prev_status != (ER_MV_END | ER_DC_END | ER_AC_END))
h->er.error_occurred = 1;
}
}
if (h->pps.cabac) {
/* realign */
align_get_bits(&h->gb);
/* init cabac */
ff_init_cabac_decoder(&h->cabac,
h->gb.buffer + get_bits_count(&h->gb) / 8,
(get_bits_left(&h->gb) + 7) / 8);
ff_h264_init_cabac_states(h);
for (;;) {
int ret = ff_h264_decode_mb_cabac(h);
int eos;
if (ret >= 0)
ff_h264_hl_decode_mb(h);
if (ret >= 0 && FRAME_MBAFF(h)) {
h->mb_y++;
ret = ff_h264_decode_mb_cabac(h);
if (ret >= 0)
ff_h264_hl_decode_mb(h);
h->mb_y--;
}
eos = get_cabac_terminate(&h->cabac);
if ((h->workaround_bugs & FF_BUG_TRUNCATED) &&
h->cabac.bytestream > h->cabac.bytestream_end + 2) {
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y, h->mb_x - 1,
h->mb_y, ER_MB_END);
if (h->mb_x >= lf_x_start)
loop_filter(h, lf_x_start, h->mb_x + 1);
return 0;
}
if (h->cabac.bytestream > h->cabac.bytestream_end + 2 )
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "bytestream overread %td\n", h->cabac.bytestream_end - h->cabac.bytestream);
if (ret < 0 || h->cabac.bytestream > h->cabac.bytestream_end + 4) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"error while decoding MB %d %d, bytestream (%td)\n",
h->mb_x, h->mb_y,
h->cabac.bytestream_end - h->cabac.bytestream);
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y, h->mb_x,
h->mb_y, ER_MB_ERROR);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (++h->mb_x >= h->mb_width) {
loop_filter(h, lf_x_start, h->mb_x);
h->mb_x = lf_x_start = 0;
decode_finish_row(h);
++h->mb_y;
if (FIELD_OR_MBAFF_PICTURE(h)) {
++h->mb_y;
if (FRAME_MBAFF(h) && h->mb_y < h->mb_height)
predict_field_decoding_flag(h);
}
}
if (eos || h->mb_y >= h->mb_height) {
tprintf(h->avctx, "slice end %d %d\n",
get_bits_count(&h->gb), h->gb.size_in_bits);
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y, h->mb_x - 1,
h->mb_y, ER_MB_END);
if (h->mb_x > lf_x_start)
loop_filter(h, lf_x_start, h->mb_x);
return 0;
}
}
} else {
for (;;) {
int ret = ff_h264_decode_mb_cavlc(h);
if (ret >= 0)
ff_h264_hl_decode_mb(h);
if (ret >= 0 && FRAME_MBAFF(h)) {
h->mb_y++;
ret = ff_h264_decode_mb_cavlc(h);
if (ret >= 0)
ff_h264_hl_decode_mb(h);
h->mb_y--;
}
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(h->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"error while decoding MB %d %d\n", h->mb_x, h->mb_y);
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y, h->mb_x,
h->mb_y, ER_MB_ERROR);
return ret;
}
if (++h->mb_x >= h->mb_width) {
loop_filter(h, lf_x_start, h->mb_x);
h->mb_x = lf_x_start = 0;
decode_finish_row(h);
++h->mb_y;
if (FIELD_OR_MBAFF_PICTURE(h)) {
++h->mb_y;
if (FRAME_MBAFF(h) && h->mb_y < h->mb_height)
predict_field_decoding_flag(h);
}
if (h->mb_y >= h->mb_height) {
tprintf(h->avctx, "slice end %d %d\n",
get_bits_count(&h->gb), h->gb.size_in_bits);
if ( get_bits_left(&h->gb) == 0
|| get_bits_left(&h->gb) > 0 && !(h->avctx->err_recognition & AV_EF_AGGRESSIVE)) {
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y,
h->mb_x - 1, h->mb_y,
ER_MB_END);
return 0;
} else {
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y,
h->mb_x, h->mb_y,
ER_MB_END);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
if (get_bits_left(&h->gb) <= 0 && h->mb_skip_run <= 0) {
tprintf(h->avctx, "slice end %d %d\n",
get_bits_count(&h->gb), h->gb.size_in_bits);
if (get_bits_left(&h->gb) == 0) {
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y,
h->mb_x - 1, h->mb_y,
ER_MB_END);
if (h->mb_x > lf_x_start)
loop_filter(h, lf_x_start, h->mb_x);
return 0;
} else {
er_add_slice(h, h->resync_mb_x, h->resync_mb_y, h->mb_x,
h->mb_y, ER_MB_ERROR);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: do not trust last_pic_droppable when marking pictures as done
This simplifies the code and fixes a deadlock
Fixes Ticket2927
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::InstallCreateHook(
CreateRenderFrameImplFunction create_render_frame_impl) {
CHECK(!g_create_render_frame_impl);
g_create_render_frame_impl = create_render_frame_impl;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hls_slice_data(HEVCContext *s)
{
int arg[2];
int ret[2];
arg[0] = 0;
arg[1] = 1;
s->avctx->execute(s->avctx, hls_decode_entry, arg, ret , 1, sizeof(int));
return ret[0];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int msPostGISLayerIsOpen(layerObj *layer)
{
#ifdef USE_POSTGIS
if (layer->debug) {
msDebug("msPostGISLayerIsOpen called.\n");
}
if (layer->layerinfo)
return MS_TRUE;
else
return MS_FALSE;
#else
msSetError( MS_MISCERR,
"PostGIS support is not available.",
"msPostGISLayerIsOpen()");
return MS_FAILURE;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 40,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototype*>(cell);
return getStaticFunctionSlot<JSObject>(exec, &JSTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeTable, thisObject, propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_send_pair_public_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_PUBLIC_KEY, p_cb);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int afpUnlock(sqlite3_file *id, int eFileLock) {
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
unixFile *pFile = (unixFile*)id;
unixInodeInfo *pInode;
afpLockingContext *context = (afpLockingContext *) pFile->lockingContext;
int skipShared = 0;
#ifdef SQLITE_TEST
int h = pFile->h;
#endif
assert( pFile );
OSTRACE(("UNLOCK %d %d was %d(%d,%d) pid=%d (afp)\n", pFile->h, eFileLock,
pFile->eFileLock, pFile->pInode->eFileLock, pFile->pInode->nShared,
osGetpid(0)));
assert( eFileLock<=SHARED_LOCK );
if( pFile->eFileLock<=eFileLock ){
return SQLITE_OK;
}
pInode = pFile->pInode;
sqlite3_mutex_enter(pInode->pLockMutex);
assert( pInode->nShared!=0 );
if( pFile->eFileLock>SHARED_LOCK ){
assert( pInode->eFileLock==pFile->eFileLock );
SimulateIOErrorBenign(1);
SimulateIOError( h=(-1) )
SimulateIOErrorBenign(0);
#ifdef SQLITE_DEBUG
/* When reducing a lock such that other processes can start
** reading the database file again, make sure that the
** transaction counter was updated if any part of the database
** file changed. If the transaction counter is not updated,
** other connections to the same file might not realize that
** the file has changed and hence might not know to flush their
** cache. The use of a stale cache can lead to database corruption.
*/
assert( pFile->inNormalWrite==0
|| pFile->dbUpdate==0
|| pFile->transCntrChng==1 );
pFile->inNormalWrite = 0;
#endif
if( pFile->eFileLock==EXCLUSIVE_LOCK ){
rc = afpSetLock(context->dbPath, pFile, SHARED_FIRST, SHARED_SIZE, 0);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && (eFileLock==SHARED_LOCK || pInode->nShared>1) ){
/* only re-establish the shared lock if necessary */
int sharedLockByte = SHARED_FIRST+pInode->sharedByte;
rc = afpSetLock(context->dbPath, pFile, sharedLockByte, 1, 1);
} else {
skipShared = 1;
}
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && pFile->eFileLock>=PENDING_LOCK ){
rc = afpSetLock(context->dbPath, pFile, PENDING_BYTE, 1, 0);
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && pFile->eFileLock>=RESERVED_LOCK && context->reserved ){
rc = afpSetLock(context->dbPath, pFile, RESERVED_BYTE, 1, 0);
if( !rc ){
context->reserved = 0;
}
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && (eFileLock==SHARED_LOCK || pInode->nShared>1)){
pInode->eFileLock = SHARED_LOCK;
}
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK && eFileLock==NO_LOCK ){
/* Decrement the shared lock counter. Release the lock using an
** OS call only when all threads in this same process have released
** the lock.
*/
unsigned long long sharedLockByte = SHARED_FIRST+pInode->sharedByte;
pInode->nShared--;
if( pInode->nShared==0 ){
SimulateIOErrorBenign(1);
SimulateIOError( h=(-1) )
SimulateIOErrorBenign(0);
if( !skipShared ){
rc = afpSetLock(context->dbPath, pFile, sharedLockByte, 1, 0);
}
if( !rc ){
pInode->eFileLock = NO_LOCK;
pFile->eFileLock = NO_LOCK;
}
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
pInode->nLock--;
assert( pInode->nLock>=0 );
if( pInode->nLock==0 ) closePendingFds(pFile);
}
}
sqlite3_mutex_leave(pInode->pLockMutex);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
pFile->eFileLock = eFileLock;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IndexedDBTransaction::Operation IndexedDBTransaction::TaskQueue::pop() {
DCHECK(!queue_.empty());
Operation task = std::move(queue_.front());
queue_.pop();
return task;
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetBoundDrawFrameBufferInternalFormat() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
if (framebuffer != NULL) {
return framebuffer->GetColorAttachmentFormat();
} else if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_color_format_;
} else {
return back_buffer_color_format_;
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::string16& MediaControlsProgressView::progress_time_for_testing()
const {
return progress_time_->GetText();
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i, idx, r, ret;
pfn_t identity_map_pfn;
u32 tmp;
if (!enable_ept)
return 1;
if (unlikely(!kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "EPT: identity-mapping pagetable "
"haven't been allocated!\n");
return 0;
}
if (likely(kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done))
return 1;
ret = 0;
identity_map_pfn = kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
/* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
for (i = 0; i < PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn,
&tmp, i * sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
if (r < 0)
goto out;
}
kvm->arch.ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
ret = 1;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hwsim_mon_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
dev->netdev_ops = &hwsim_netdev_ops;
dev->needs_free_netdev = true;
ether_setup(dev);
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE;
dev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211_RADIOTAP;
eth_zero_addr(dev->dev_addr);
dev->dev_addr[0] = 0x12;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_as_int64 (const bson_iter_t *iter) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
switch ((int) ITER_TYPE (iter)) {
case BSON_TYPE_BOOL:
return (int64_t) bson_iter_bool (iter);
case BSON_TYPE_DOUBLE:
return (int64_t) bson_iter_double (iter);
case BSON_TYPE_INT64:
return bson_iter_int64 (iter);
case BSON_TYPE_INT32:
return (int64_t) bson_iter_int32 (iter);
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp8_lossy_decode_alpha(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *p,
uint8_t *data_start,
unsigned int data_size)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int x, y, ret;
if (s->alpha_compression == ALPHA_COMPRESSION_NONE) {
GetByteContext gb;
bytestream2_init(&gb, data_start, data_size);
for (y = 0; y < s->height; y++)
bytestream2_get_buffer(&gb, p->data[3] + p->linesize[3] * y,
s->width);
} else if (s->alpha_compression == ALPHA_COMPRESSION_VP8L) {
uint8_t *ap, *pp;
int alpha_got_frame = 0;
s->alpha_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!s->alpha_frame)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = vp8_lossless_decode_frame(avctx, s->alpha_frame, &alpha_got_frame,
data_start, data_size, 1);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&s->alpha_frame);
return ret;
}
if (!alpha_got_frame) {
av_frame_free(&s->alpha_frame);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* copy green component of alpha image to alpha plane of primary image */
for (y = 0; y < s->height; y++) {
ap = GET_PIXEL(s->alpha_frame, 0, y) + 2;
pp = p->data[3] + p->linesize[3] * y;
for (x = 0; x < s->width; x++) {
*pp = *ap;
pp++;
ap += 4;
}
}
av_frame_free(&s->alpha_frame);
}
/* apply alpha filtering */
if (s->alpha_filter)
alpha_inverse_prediction(p, s->alpha_filter);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void aesni_ctr_enc_avx_tfm(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv)
{
/*
* based on key length, override with the by8 version
* of ctr mode encryption/decryption for improved performance
* aes_set_key_common() ensures that key length is one of
* {128,192,256}
*/
if (ctx->key_length == AES_KEYSIZE_128)
aes_ctr_enc_128_avx_by8(in, iv, (void *)ctx, out, len);
else if (ctx->key_length == AES_KEYSIZE_192)
aes_ctr_enc_192_avx_by8(in, iv, (void *)ctx, out, len);
else
aes_ctr_enc_256_avx_by8(in, iv, (void *)ctx, out, len);
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::URLFetcher::OnReadCompleted(
net::URLRequest* request, int bytes_read) {
DCHECK(request_ == request);
bool data_consumed = true;
if (request->status().is_success() && bytes_read > 0) {
job_->MadeProgress();
data_consumed = ConsumeResponseData(bytes_read);
if (data_consumed) {
bytes_read = 0;
while (request->Read(buffer_.get(), kBufferSize, &bytes_read)) {
if (bytes_read > 0) {
data_consumed = ConsumeResponseData(bytes_read);
if (!data_consumed)
break; // wait for async data processing, then read more
} else {
break;
}
}
}
}
if (data_consumed && !request->status().is_io_pending()) {
DCHECK_EQ(UPDATE_OK, result_);
OnResponseCompleted();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int zfs_print(const char *entry, const struct zfs_dirhook_info *data)
{
printf("%s %s\n",
data->dir ? "<DIR> " : " ",
entry);
return 0; /* 0 continue, 1 stop */
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::hoverLeaveEvent(QHoverEvent* event) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
QQuickItem::hoverLeaveEvent(event);
d->contents_view_->handleHoverLeaveEvent(event);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::WillReleaseScriptContext(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const v8::Local<v8::Context>& v8_context,
int world_id) {
ScriptContext* context = script_context_set_->GetByV8Context(v8_context);
if (!context)
return;
request_sender_->InvalidateSource(context);
script_context_set_->Remove(context);
VLOG(1) << "Num tracked contexts: " << script_context_set_->size();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t Parcel::readInt64() const
{
return readAligned<int64_t>();
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AppProto AppLayerProtoDetectPEGetProto(Flow *f, uint8_t ipproto,
uint8_t direction)
{
AppProto alproto = ALPROTO_UNKNOWN;
SCLogDebug("expectation check for %p (dir %d)", f, direction);
FLOW_SET_PE_DONE(f, direction);
alproto = AppLayerExpectationHandle(f, direction);
return alproto;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadUserLogFileState::isInitialized( void ) const
{
if ( NULL == m_ro_state ) {
return false;
}
if ( strcmp( m_ro_state->internal.m_signature, FileStateSignature ) ) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PdfCompositorClient::Composite(
service_manager::Connector* connector,
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle,
size_t data_size,
mojom::PdfCompositor::CompositePdfCallback callback,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> callback_task_runner) {
DCHECK(data_size);
if (!compositor_)
Connect(connector);
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle buffer_handle =
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, data_size, true);
compositor_->CompositePdf(
std::move(buffer_handle),
base::BindOnce(&OnCompositePdf, base::Passed(&compositor_),
std::move(callback), callback_task_runner));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string_strncasecmp_range (const char *string1, const char *string2, int max,
int range)
{
int count, diff;
if (!string1 || !string2)
return (string1) ? 1 : ((string2) ? -1 : 0);
count = 0;
while ((count < max) && string1[0] && string2[0])
{
diff = utf8_charcasecmp_range (string1, string2, range);
if (diff != 0)
return diff;
string1 = utf8_next_char (string1);
string2 = utf8_next_char (string2);
count++;
}
if (count >= max)
return 0;
else
return (string1[0]) ? 1 : ((string2[0]) ? -1 : 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::clipOut(const Path&)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::notifyPageForeground()
{
FOR_EACH_PLUGINVIEW(d->m_pluginViews)
(*it)->handleForegroundEvent();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nft_trans *nft_trans_elem_alloc(struct nft_ctx *ctx,
int msg_type,
struct nft_set *set)
{
struct nft_trans *trans;
trans = nft_trans_alloc(ctx, msg_type, sizeof(struct nft_trans_elem));
if (trans == NULL)
return NULL;
nft_trans_elem_set(trans) = set;
return trans;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 58,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kprojid_t make_kprojid(struct user_namespace *ns, projid_t projid)
{
/* Map the uid to a global kernel uid */
return KPROJIDT_INIT(map_id_down(&ns->projid_map, projid));
}
Commit Message: userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CNBL::ParseBuffers()
{
m_MaxDataLength = 0;
for (auto NB = NET_BUFFER_LIST_FIRST_NB(m_NBL); NB != nullptr; NB = NET_BUFFER_NEXT_NB(NB))
{
CNB *NBHolder = new (m_Context->MiniportHandle) CNB(NB, this, m_Context);
if(!NBHolder || !NBHolder->IsValid())
{
return false;
}
RegisterNB(NBHolder);
m_MaxDataLength = max(m_MaxDataLength, NBHolder->GetDataLength());
}
if(m_MaxDataLength == 0)
{
DPrintf(0, ("Empty NBL (%p) dropped\n", __FUNCTION__, m_NBL));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid, const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm, unsigned long flags,
struct key_restriction *restrict_link)
{
struct key_user *user = NULL;
struct key *key;
size_t desclen, quotalen;
int ret;
key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (!desc || !*desc)
goto error;
if (type->vet_description) {
ret = type->vet_description(desc);
if (ret < 0) {
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
}
desclen = strlen(desc);
quotalen = desclen + 1 + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
user = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
/* check that the user's quota permits allocation of another key and
* its description */
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&user->lock);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN)) {
if (user->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen >= maxbytes ||
user->qnbytes + quotalen < user->qnbytes)
goto no_quota;
}
user->qnkeys++;
user->qnbytes += quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
/* allocate and initialise the key and its description */
key = kmem_cache_zalloc(key_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
goto no_memory_2;
key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
refcount_set(&key->usage, 1);
init_rwsem(&key->sem);
lockdep_set_class(&key->sem, &type->lock_class);
key->index_key.type = type;
key->user = user;
key->quotalen = quotalen;
key->datalen = type->def_datalen;
key->uid = uid;
key->gid = gid;
key->perm = perm;
key->restrict_link = restrict_link;
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA))
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA;
if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN)
key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
#ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
#endif
/* let the security module know about the key */
ret = security_key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto security_error;
/* publish the key by giving it a serial number */
atomic_inc(&user->nkeys);
key_alloc_serial(key);
error:
return key;
security_error:
kfree(key->description);
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
no_memory_3:
kmem_cache_free(key_jar, key);
no_memory_2:
if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA)) {
spin_lock(&user->lock);
user->qnkeys--;
user->qnbytes -= quotalen;
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
}
key_user_put(user);
no_memory_1:
key = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto error;
no_quota:
spin_unlock(&user->lock);
key_user_put(user);
key = ERR_PTR(-EDQUOT);
goto error;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 169,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_always_inline uint32_t zend_array_dup_elements(HashTable *source, HashTable *target, int static_keys, int with_holes)
{
uint32_t idx = 0;
Bucket *p = source->arData;
Bucket *q = target->arData;
Bucket *end = p + source->nNumUsed;
do {
if (!zend_array_dup_element(source, target, idx, p, q, 0, static_keys, with_holes)) {
uint32_t target_idx = idx;
idx++; p++;
while (p != end) {
if (zend_array_dup_element(source, target, target_idx, p, q, 0, static_keys, with_holes)) {
if (source->nInternalPointer == idx) {
target->nInternalPointer = target_idx;
}
target_idx++; q++;
}
idx++; p++;
}
return target_idx;
}
idx++; p++; q++;
} while (p != end);
return idx;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfsd_buffered_readdir(struct file *file, nfsd_filldir_t func,
struct readdir_cd *cdp, loff_t *offsetp)
{
struct buffered_dirent *de;
int host_err;
int size;
loff_t offset;
struct readdir_data buf = {
.ctx.actor = nfsd_buffered_filldir,
.dirent = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL)
};
if (!buf.dirent)
return nfserrno(-ENOMEM);
offset = *offsetp;
while (1) {
unsigned int reclen;
cdp->err = nfserr_eof; /* will be cleared on successful read */
buf.used = 0;
buf.full = 0;
host_err = iterate_dir(file, &buf.ctx);
if (buf.full)
host_err = 0;
if (host_err < 0)
break;
size = buf.used;
if (!size)
break;
de = (struct buffered_dirent *)buf.dirent;
while (size > 0) {
offset = de->offset;
if (func(cdp, de->name, de->namlen, de->offset,
de->ino, de->d_type))
break;
if (cdp->err != nfs_ok)
break;
reclen = ALIGN(sizeof(*de) + de->namlen,
sizeof(u64));
size -= reclen;
de = (struct buffered_dirent *)((char *)de + reclen);
}
if (size > 0) /* We bailed out early */
break;
offset = vfs_llseek(file, 0, SEEK_CUR);
}
free_page((unsigned long)(buf.dirent));
if (host_err)
return nfserrno(host_err);
*offsetp = offset;
return cdp->err;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PepperRendererConnection::OnMsgDidDeleteInProcessInstance(
PP_Instance instance) {
in_process_host_->DeleteInstance(instance);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void entropy_decode_stereo_3900(APEContext *ctx, int blockstodecode)
{
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
int32_t *decoded1 = ctx->decoded[1];
int blocks = blockstodecode;
while (blockstodecode--)
*decoded0++ = ape_decode_value_3900(ctx, &ctx->riceY);
range_dec_normalize(ctx);
ctx->ptr -= 1;
range_start_decoding(ctx);
while (blocks--)
*decoded1++ = ape_decode_value_3900(ctx, &ctx->riceX);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 63,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qcow2_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
unsigned int len, i;
int ret = 0;
QCowHeader header;
QemuOpts *opts;
Error *local_err = NULL;
uint64_t ext_end;
uint64_t l1_vm_state_index;
const char *opt_overlap_check;
int overlap_check_template = 0;
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 0, &header, sizeof(header));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read qcow2 header");
goto fail;
}
be32_to_cpus(&header.magic);
be32_to_cpus(&header.version);
be64_to_cpus(&header.backing_file_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.backing_file_size);
be64_to_cpus(&header.size);
be32_to_cpus(&header.cluster_bits);
be32_to_cpus(&header.crypt_method);
be64_to_cpus(&header.l1_table_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.l1_size);
be64_to_cpus(&header.refcount_table_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.refcount_table_clusters);
be64_to_cpus(&header.snapshots_offset);
be32_to_cpus(&header.nb_snapshots);
if (header.magic != QCOW_MAGIC) {
error_setg(errp, "Image is not in qcow2 format");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.version < 2 || header.version > 3) {
report_unsupported(bs, errp, "QCOW version %d", header.version);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto fail;
}
s->qcow_version = header.version;
/* Initialise cluster size */
if (header.cluster_bits < MIN_CLUSTER_BITS ||
header.cluster_bits > MAX_CLUSTER_BITS) {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported cluster size: 2^%i", header.cluster_bits);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->cluster_bits = header.cluster_bits;
s->cluster_size = 1 << s->cluster_bits;
s->cluster_sectors = 1 << (s->cluster_bits - 9);
/* Initialise version 3 header fields */
if (header.version == 2) {
header.incompatible_features = 0;
header.compatible_features = 0;
header.autoclear_features = 0;
header.refcount_order = 4;
header.header_length = 72;
} else {
be64_to_cpus(&header.incompatible_features);
be64_to_cpus(&header.compatible_features);
be64_to_cpus(&header.autoclear_features);
be32_to_cpus(&header.refcount_order);
be32_to_cpus(&header.header_length);
if (header.header_length < 104) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2 header too short");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
}
if (header.header_length > s->cluster_size) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2 header exceeds cluster size");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.header_length > sizeof(header)) {
s->unknown_header_fields_size = header.header_length - sizeof(header);
s->unknown_header_fields = g_malloc(s->unknown_header_fields_size);
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sizeof(header), s->unknown_header_fields,
s->unknown_header_fields_size);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read unknown qcow2 header "
"fields");
goto fail;
}
}
if (header.backing_file_offset > s->cluster_size) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid backing file offset");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
if (header.backing_file_offset) {
ext_end = header.backing_file_offset;
} else {
ext_end = 1 << header.cluster_bits;
}
/* Handle feature bits */
s->incompatible_features = header.incompatible_features;
s->compatible_features = header.compatible_features;
s->autoclear_features = header.autoclear_features;
if (s->incompatible_features & ~QCOW2_INCOMPAT_MASK) {
void *feature_table = NULL;
qcow2_read_extensions(bs, header.header_length, ext_end,
&feature_table, NULL);
report_unsupported_feature(bs, errp, feature_table,
s->incompatible_features &
~QCOW2_INCOMPAT_MASK);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
g_free(feature_table);
goto fail;
}
if (s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_CORRUPT) {
/* Corrupt images may not be written to unless they are being repaired
*/
if ((flags & BDRV_O_RDWR) && !(flags & BDRV_O_CHECK)) {
error_setg(errp, "qcow2: Image is corrupt; cannot be opened "
"read/write");
ret = -EACCES;
goto fail;
}
}
/* Check support for various header values */
if (header.refcount_order != 4) {
report_unsupported(bs, errp, "%d bit reference counts",
1 << header.refcount_order);
ret = -ENOTSUP;
goto fail;
}
s->refcount_order = header.refcount_order;
if (header.crypt_method > QCOW_CRYPT_AES) {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported encryption method: %i",
header.crypt_method);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->crypt_method_header = header.crypt_method;
if (s->crypt_method_header) {
bs->encrypted = 1;
}
s->l2_bits = s->cluster_bits - 3; /* L2 is always one cluster */
s->l2_size = 1 << s->l2_bits;
bs->total_sectors = header.size / 512;
s->csize_shift = (62 - (s->cluster_bits - 8));
s->csize_mask = (1 << (s->cluster_bits - 8)) - 1;
s->cluster_offset_mask = (1LL << s->csize_shift) - 1;
s->refcount_table_offset = header.refcount_table_offset;
s->refcount_table_size =
header.refcount_table_clusters << (s->cluster_bits - 3);
if (header.refcount_table_clusters > qcow2_max_refcount_clusters(s)) {
error_setg(errp, "Reference count table too large");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = validate_table_offset(bs, s->refcount_table_offset,
s->refcount_table_size, sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid reference count table offset");
goto fail;
}
/* Snapshot table offset/length */
if (header.nb_snapshots > QCOW_MAX_SNAPSHOTS) {
error_setg(errp, "Too many snapshots");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = validate_table_offset(bs, header.snapshots_offset,
header.nb_snapshots,
sizeof(QCowSnapshotHeader));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid snapshot table offset");
goto fail;
}
/* read the level 1 table */
if (header.l1_size > 0x2000000) {
/* 32 MB L1 table is enough for 2 PB images at 64k cluster size
* (128 GB for 512 byte clusters, 2 EB for 2 MB clusters) */
error_setg(errp, "Active L1 table too large");
ret = -EFBIG;
goto fail;
ret = -EFBIG;
goto fail;
}
s->l1_size = header.l1_size;
l1_vm_state_index = size_to_l1(s, header.size);
if (l1_vm_state_index > INT_MAX) {
error_setg(errp, "Image is too big");
ret = -EFBIG;
goto fail;
}
s->l1_vm_state_index = l1_vm_state_index;
/* the L1 table must contain at least enough entries to put
header.size bytes */
if (s->l1_size < s->l1_vm_state_index) {
error_setg(errp, "L1 table is too small");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = validate_table_offset(bs, header.l1_table_offset,
header.l1_size, sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Invalid L1 table offset");
goto fail;
}
s->l1_table_offset = header.l1_table_offset;
if (s->l1_size > 0) {
s->l1_table = g_malloc0(
align_offset(s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t), 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, s->l1_table_offset, s->l1_table,
s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t));
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read L1 table");
goto fail;
}
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
}
/* alloc L2 table/refcount block cache */
s->l2_table_cache = qcow2_cache_create(bs, L2_CACHE_SIZE);
s->refcount_block_cache = qcow2_cache_create(bs, REFCOUNT_CACHE_SIZE);
s->cluster_cache = g_malloc(s->cluster_size);
/* one more sector for decompressed data alignment */
s->cluster_data = qemu_blockalign(bs, QCOW_MAX_CRYPT_CLUSTERS * s->cluster_size
+ 512);
s->cluster_cache_offset = -1;
s->flags = flags;
ret = qcow2_refcount_init(bs);
if (ret != 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not initialize refcount handling");
goto fail;
}
QLIST_INIT(&s->cluster_allocs);
QTAILQ_INIT(&s->discards);
/* read qcow2 extensions */
if (qcow2_read_extensions(bs, header.header_length, ext_end, NULL,
&local_err)) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
/* read the backing file name */
if (header.backing_file_offset != 0) {
len = header.backing_file_size;
if (len > MIN(1023, s->cluster_size - header.backing_file_offset)) {
error_setg(errp, "Backing file name too long");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, header.backing_file_offset,
bs->backing_file, len);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read backing file name");
goto fail;
}
bs->backing_file[len] = '\0';
}
/* Internal snapshots */
s->snapshots_offset = header.snapshots_offset;
s->nb_snapshots = header.nb_snapshots;
ret = qcow2_read_snapshots(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not read snapshots");
goto fail;
}
/* Clear unknown autoclear feature bits */
if (!bs->read_only && !(flags & BDRV_O_INCOMING) && s->autoclear_features) {
s->autoclear_features = 0;
ret = qcow2_update_header(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not update qcow2 header");
goto fail;
}
}
/* Initialise locks */
qemu_co_mutex_init(&s->lock);
/* Repair image if dirty */
if (!(flags & (BDRV_O_CHECK | BDRV_O_INCOMING)) && !bs->read_only &&
(s->incompatible_features & QCOW2_INCOMPAT_DIRTY)) {
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
ret = qcow2_check(bs, &result, BDRV_FIX_ERRORS);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not repair dirty image");
goto fail;
}
}
/* Enable lazy_refcounts according to image and command line options */
opts = qemu_opts_create(&qcow2_runtime_opts, NULL, 0, &error_abort);
qemu_opts_absorb_qdict(opts, options, &local_err);
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->use_lazy_refcounts = qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_LAZY_REFCOUNTS,
(s->compatible_features & QCOW2_COMPAT_LAZY_REFCOUNTS));
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_NEVER] = false;
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_ALWAYS] = true;
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_REQUEST] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_REQUEST,
flags & BDRV_O_UNMAP);
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT, true);
s->discard_passthrough[QCOW2_DISCARD_OTHER] =
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, QCOW2_OPT_DISCARD_OTHER, false);
opt_overlap_check = qemu_opt_get(opts, "overlap-check") ?: "cached";
if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "none")) {
overlap_check_template = 0;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "constant")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_CONSTANT;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "cached")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_CACHED;
} else if (!strcmp(opt_overlap_check, "all")) {
overlap_check_template = QCOW2_OL_ALL;
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Unsupported value '%s' for qcow2 option "
"'overlap-check'. Allowed are either of the following: "
"none, constant, cached, all", opt_overlap_check);
qemu_opts_del(opts);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
s->overlap_check = 0;
for (i = 0; i < QCOW2_OL_MAX_BITNR; i++) {
/* overlap-check defines a template bitmask, but every flag may be
* overwritten through the associated boolean option */
s->overlap_check |=
qemu_opt_get_bool(opts, overlap_bool_option_names[i],
overlap_check_template & (1 << i)) << i;
}
qemu_opts_del(opts);
if (s->use_lazy_refcounts && s->qcow_version < 3) {
error_setg(errp, "Lazy refcounts require a qcow2 image with at least "
"qemu 1.1 compatibility level");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto fail;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC
{
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
qcow2_check_refcounts(bs, &result, 0);
}
#endif
return ret;
fail:
g_free(s->unknown_header_fields);
cleanup_unknown_header_ext(bs);
qcow2_free_snapshots(bs);
qcow2_refcount_close(bs);
g_free(s->l1_table);
/* else pre-write overlap checks in cache_destroy may crash */
s->l1_table = NULL;
if (s->l2_table_cache) {
qcow2_cache_destroy(bs, s->l2_table_cache);
}
if (s->refcount_block_cache) {
qcow2_cache_destroy(bs, s->refcount_block_cache);
}
g_free(s->cluster_cache);
qemu_vfree(s->cluster_data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 165,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
ret = check_subprogs(env);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
kfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
cur_stack = 1;
peek_stack:
if (cur_stack == 0)
goto check_state;
t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
goto mark_explored;
} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) {
env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
* after every call and jump
*/
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
} else {
/* conditional jump with two edges */
env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else {
/* all other non-branch instructions with single
* fall-through edge
*/
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
mark_explored:
insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_free;
}
goto peek_stack;
check_state:
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
kfree(insn_state);
kfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *rose_dev_first(void)
{
struct net_device *dev, *first = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_netdev_rcu(&init_net, dev) {
if ((dev->flags & IFF_UP) && dev->type == ARPHRD_ROSE)
if (first == NULL || strncmp(dev->name, first->name, 3) < 0)
first = dev;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return first;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __tree_mod_log_rewind(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct extent_buffer *eb,
u64 time_seq, struct tree_mod_elem *first_tm)
{
u32 n;
struct rb_node *next;
struct tree_mod_elem *tm = first_tm;
unsigned long o_dst;
unsigned long o_src;
unsigned long p_size = sizeof(struct btrfs_key_ptr);
n = btrfs_header_nritems(eb);
tree_mod_log_read_lock(fs_info);
while (tm && tm->seq >= time_seq) {
/*
* all the operations are recorded with the operator used for
* the modification. as we're going backwards, we do the
* opposite of each operation here.
*/
switch (tm->op) {
case MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING:
BUG_ON(tm->slot < n);
/* Fallthrough */
case MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_MOVING:
case MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE:
btrfs_set_node_key(eb, &tm->key, tm->slot);
btrfs_set_node_blockptr(eb, tm->slot, tm->blockptr);
btrfs_set_node_ptr_generation(eb, tm->slot,
tm->generation);
n++;
break;
case MOD_LOG_KEY_REPLACE:
BUG_ON(tm->slot >= n);
btrfs_set_node_key(eb, &tm->key, tm->slot);
btrfs_set_node_blockptr(eb, tm->slot, tm->blockptr);
btrfs_set_node_ptr_generation(eb, tm->slot,
tm->generation);
break;
case MOD_LOG_KEY_ADD:
/* if a move operation is needed it's in the log */
n--;
break;
case MOD_LOG_MOVE_KEYS:
o_dst = btrfs_node_key_ptr_offset(tm->slot);
o_src = btrfs_node_key_ptr_offset(tm->move.dst_slot);
memmove_extent_buffer(eb, o_dst, o_src,
tm->move.nr_items * p_size);
break;
case MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE:
/*
* this operation is special. for roots, this must be
* handled explicitly before rewinding.
* for non-roots, this operation may exist if the node
* was a root: root A -> child B; then A gets empty and
* B is promoted to the new root. in the mod log, we'll
* have a root-replace operation for B, a tree block
* that is no root. we simply ignore that operation.
*/
break;
}
next = rb_next(&tm->node);
if (!next)
break;
tm = container_of(next, struct tree_mod_elem, node);
if (tm->index != first_tm->index)
break;
}
tree_mod_log_read_unlock(fs_info);
btrfs_set_header_nritems(eb, n);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppendEntryToBuffer(Buffer *buffer, Entry *entry)
{
AppendToBuffer(buffer, entry->tag, strlen(entry->tag));
AppendToBuffer(buffer, ":\t", 2);
AppendToBuffer(buffer, entry->value, strlen(entry->value));
AppendToBuffer(buffer, "\n", 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetContentLanguage(const AtomicString& language) {
if (content_language_ == language)
return;
content_language_ = language;
SetNeedsStyleRecalc(kSubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::Create(
StyleChangeReason::kLanguage));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool netlink_dump_space(struct netlink_sock *nlk)
{
struct netlink_ring *ring = &nlk->rx_ring;
struct nl_mmap_hdr *hdr;
unsigned int n;
hdr = netlink_current_frame(ring, NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED);
if (hdr == NULL)
return false;
n = ring->head + ring->frame_max / 2;
if (n > ring->frame_max)
n -= ring->frame_max;
hdr = __netlink_lookup_frame(ring, n);
return hdr->nm_status == NL_MMAP_STATUS_UNUSED;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iscsi_co_writev_flags(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num, int nb_sectors,
QEMUIOVector *iov, int flags)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = bs->opaque;
struct IscsiTask iTask;
uint64_t lba;
uint32_t num_sectors;
bool fua = flags & BDRV_REQ_FUA;
if (fua) {
assert(iscsilun->dpofua);
}
if (!is_request_lun_aligned(sector_num, nb_sectors, iscsilun)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (bs->bl.max_transfer_length && nb_sectors > bs->bl.max_transfer_length) {
error_report("iSCSI Error: Write of %d sectors exceeds max_xfer_len "
"of %d sectors", nb_sectors, bs->bl.max_transfer_length);
return -EINVAL;
}
lba = sector_qemu2lun(sector_num, iscsilun);
num_sectors = sector_qemu2lun(nb_sectors, iscsilun);
iscsi_co_init_iscsitask(iscsilun, &iTask);
retry:
if (iscsilun->use_16_for_rw) {
iTask.task = iscsi_write16_task(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, lba,
NULL, num_sectors * iscsilun->block_size,
iscsilun->block_size, 0, 0, fua, 0, 0,
iscsi_co_generic_cb, &iTask);
} else {
iTask.task = iscsi_write10_task(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, lba,
NULL, num_sectors * iscsilun->block_size,
iscsilun->block_size, 0, 0, fua, 0, 0,
iscsi_co_generic_cb, &iTask);
}
if (iTask.task == NULL) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
scsi_task_set_iov_out(iTask.task, (struct scsi_iovec *) iov->iov,
iov->niov);
while (!iTask.complete) {
iscsi_set_events(iscsilun);
qemu_coroutine_yield();
}
if (iTask.task != NULL) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(iTask.task);
iTask.task = NULL;
}
if (iTask.do_retry) {
iTask.complete = 0;
goto retry;
}
if (iTask.status != SCSI_STATUS_GOOD) {
return iTask.err_code;
}
iscsi_allocationmap_set(iscsilun, sector_num, nb_sectors);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_station_flags(struct genl_info *info,
struct station_parameters *params)
{
struct nlattr *flags[NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *nla;
int flag;
/*
* Try parsing the new attribute first so userspace
* can specify both for older kernels.
*/
nla = info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_STA_FLAGS2];
if (nla) {
struct nl80211_sta_flag_update *sta_flags;
sta_flags = nla_data(nla);
params->sta_flags_mask = sta_flags->mask;
params->sta_flags_set = sta_flags->set;
if ((params->sta_flags_mask |
params->sta_flags_set) & BIT(__NL80211_STA_FLAG_INVALID))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
/* if present, parse the old attribute */
nla = info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_STA_FLAGS];
if (!nla)
return 0;
if (nla_parse_nested(flags, NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX,
nla, sta_flags_policy))
return -EINVAL;
params->sta_flags_mask = (1 << __NL80211_STA_FLAG_AFTER_LAST) - 1;
params->sta_flags_mask &= ~1;
for (flag = 1; flag <= NL80211_STA_FLAG_MAX; flag++)
if (flags[flag])
params->sta_flags_set |= (1<<flag);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HDC WINAPI BeginPaintIntercept(HWND hWnd, LPPAINTSTRUCT lpPaint) {
if (!edit_hwnd || (hWnd != edit_hwnd))
return ::BeginPaint(hWnd, lpPaint);
*lpPaint = paint_struct;
return paint_struct.hdc;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cleanup_bmc_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct bmc_device *bmc = container_of(work, struct bmc_device,
remove_work);
int id = bmc->pdev.id; /* Unregister overwrites id */
platform_device_unregister(&bmc->pdev);
ida_simple_remove(&ipmi_bmc_ida, id);
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport ssize_t WriteBlobLongLong(Image *image,const MagickSizeType value)
{
unsigned char
buffer[8];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
{
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) value;
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
buffer[4]=(unsigned char) (value >> 32);
buffer[5]=(unsigned char) (value >> 40);
buffer[6]=(unsigned char) (value >> 48);
buffer[7]=(unsigned char) (value >> 56);
return(WriteBlobStream(image,8,buffer));
}
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) (value >> 56);
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 48);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 40);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) (value >> 32);
buffer[4]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
buffer[5]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[6]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[7]=(unsigned char) value;
return(WriteBlobStream(image,8,buffer));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned name_to_int(struct dentry *dentry)
{
const char *name = dentry->d_name.name;
int len = dentry->d_name.len;
unsigned n = 0;
if (len > 1 && *name == '0')
goto out;
while (len-- > 0) {
unsigned c = *name++ - '0';
if (c > 9)
goto out;
if (n >= (~0U-9)/10)
goto out;
n *= 10;
n += c;
}
return n;
out:
return ~0U;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PAM_EXTERN int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv)
{
int r;
PKCS11_CTX *ctx;
unsigned int nslots;
PKCS11_KEY *authkey;
PKCS11_SLOT *slots, *authslot;
const char *user;
const char *pin_regex;
r = module_refresh(pamh, flags, argc, argv,
&user, &ctx, &slots, &nslots, &pin_regex);
if (PAM_SUCCESS != r) {
goto err;
}
if (1 != key_find(pamh, flags, user, ctx, slots, nslots,
&authslot, &authkey)) {
r = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto err;
}
if (1 != key_login(pamh, flags, authslot, pin_regex)
|| 1 != key_verify(pamh, flags, authkey)) {
if (authslot->token->userPinLocked) {
r = PAM_MAXTRIES;
} else {
r = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
}
goto err;
}
r = PAM_SUCCESS;
err:
#ifdef TEST
module_data_cleanup(pamh, global_module_data, r);
#endif
return r;
}
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 87,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CheckClientDownloadRequest::UploadBinary(
DownloadCheckResult result,
DownloadCheckResultReason reason) {
saved_result_ = result;
saved_reason_ = reason;
bool upload_for_dlp = ShouldUploadForDlpScan();
bool upload_for_malware = ShouldUploadForMalwareScan(reason);
auto request = std::make_unique<DownloadItemRequest>(
item_, /*read_immediately=*/true,
base::BindOnce(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::OnDeepScanningComplete,
weakptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(GetBrowserContext());
if (upload_for_dlp) {
DlpDeepScanningClientRequest dlp_request;
dlp_request.set_content_source(DlpDeepScanningClientRequest::FILE_DOWNLOAD);
request->set_request_dlp_scan(std::move(dlp_request));
}
if (upload_for_malware) {
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest malware_request;
malware_request.set_population(
MalwareDeepScanningClientRequest::POPULATION_ENTERPRISE);
malware_request.set_download_token(
DownloadProtectionService::GetDownloadPingToken(item_));
request->set_request_malware_scan(std::move(malware_request));
}
request->set_dm_token(
policy::BrowserDMTokenStorage::Get()->RetrieveDMToken());
service()->UploadForDeepScanning(profile, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOL update_recv_pointer(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
BOOL rc = FALSE;
UINT16 messageType;
rdpContext* context = update->context;
rdpPointerUpdate* pointer = update->pointer;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 2 + 2)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, messageType); /* messageType (2 bytes) */
Stream_Seek_UINT16(s); /* pad2Octets (2 bytes) */
switch (messageType)
{
case PTR_MSG_TYPE_POSITION:
{
POINTER_POSITION_UPDATE* pointer_position = update_read_pointer_position(update, s);
if (pointer_position)
{
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, pointer->PointerPosition, context, pointer_position);
free_pointer_position_update(context, pointer_position);
}
}
break;
case PTR_MSG_TYPE_SYSTEM:
{
POINTER_SYSTEM_UPDATE* pointer_system = update_read_pointer_system(update, s);
if (pointer_system)
{
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, pointer->PointerSystem, context, pointer_system);
free_pointer_system_update(context, pointer_system);
}
}
break;
case PTR_MSG_TYPE_COLOR:
{
POINTER_COLOR_UPDATE* pointer_color = update_read_pointer_color(update, s, 24);
if (pointer_color)
{
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, pointer->PointerColor, context, pointer_color);
free_pointer_color_update(context, pointer_color);
}
}
break;
case PTR_MSG_TYPE_POINTER:
{
POINTER_NEW_UPDATE* pointer_new = update_read_pointer_new(update, s);
if (pointer_new)
{
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, pointer->PointerNew, context, pointer_new);
free_pointer_new_update(context, pointer_new);
}
}
break;
case PTR_MSG_TYPE_CACHED:
{
POINTER_CACHED_UPDATE* pointer_cached = update_read_pointer_cached(update, s);
if (pointer_cached)
{
rc = IFCALLRESULT(FALSE, pointer->PointerCached, context, pointer_cached);
free_pointer_cached_update(context, pointer_cached);
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Buffer::Buffer(const HostResource& resource,
const base::SharedMemoryHandle& shm_handle,
uint32_t size)
: Resource(OBJECT_IS_PROXY, resource),
shm_(shm_handle, false),
size_(size),
map_count_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Add permission checks for PPB_Buffer.
BUG=116317
TEST=browser_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11446075
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171951 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tsk_conn_cong(struct tipc_sock *tsk)
{
return tsk->snt_unacked >= tsk->snd_win;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init isolated_cpu_setup(char *str)
{
alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_isolated_map);
cpulist_parse(str, cpu_isolated_map);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err leva_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_LevelAssignmentBox *p = (GF_LevelAssignmentBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "LevelAssignmentBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "level_count=\"%d\" >\n", p->level_count);
for (i = 0; i < p->level_count; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<Assignement track_id=\"%d\" padding_flag=\"%d\" assignement_type=\"%d\" grouping_type=\"%s\" grouping_type_parameter=\"%d\" sub_track_id=\"%d\" />\n", p->levels[i].track_id, p->levels[i].padding_flag, p->levels[i].type, gf_4cc_to_str(p->levels[i].grouping_type) , p->levels[i].grouping_type_parameter, p->levels[i].sub_track_id);
}
if (!p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<Assignement track_id=\"\" padding_flag=\"\" assignement_type=\"\" grouping_type=\"\" grouping_type_parameter=\"\" sub_track_id=\"\" />\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("LevelAssignmentBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_open_fhandle(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_open *open)
{
struct svc_fh *current_fh = &cstate->current_fh;
__be32 status;
int accmode = 0;
/* We don't know the target directory, and therefore can not
* set the change info
*/
memset(&open->op_cinfo, 0, sizeof(struct nfsd4_change_info));
nfsd4_set_open_owner_reply_cache(cstate, open, current_fh);
open->op_truncate = (open->op_iattr.ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
(open->op_iattr.ia_size == 0);
/*
* In the delegation case, the client is telling us about an
* open that it *already* performed locally, some time ago. We
* should let it succeed now if possible.
*
* In the case of a CLAIM_FH open, on the other hand, the client
* may be counting on us to enforce permissions (the Linux 4.1
* client uses this for normal opens, for example).
*/
if (open->op_claim_type == NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_DELEG_CUR_FH)
accmode = NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE;
status = do_open_permission(rqstp, current_fh, open, accmode);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessHostPrivilege GetProcessPrivilege(
content::RenderProcessHost* process_host,
ProcessMap* process_map,
ExtensionRegistry* registry) {
std::set<std::string> extension_ids =
process_map->GetExtensionsInProcess(process_host->GetID());
if (extension_ids.empty())
return PRIV_NORMAL;
for (const std::string& extension_id : extension_ids) {
const Extension* extension =
registry->enabled_extensions().GetByID(extension_id);
if (extension && AppIsolationInfo::HasIsolatedStorage(extension))
return PRIV_ISOLATED;
if (extension && extension->is_hosted_app())
return PRIV_HOSTED;
}
return PRIV_EXTENSION;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 150,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nullableStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
bool isNull = false;
String jsValue = imp->nullableStringAttribute(isNull);
if (isNull) {
v8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueString(info, jsValue, info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool check_client_passwd(PgSocket *client, const char *passwd)
{
char md5[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
const char *correct;
PgUser *user = client->auth_user;
/* disallow empty passwords */
if (!*passwd || !*user->passwd)
return false;
switch (cf_auth_type) {
case AUTH_PLAIN:
return strcmp(user->passwd, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_CRYPT:
correct = crypt(user->passwd, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt);
return correct && strcmp(correct, passwd) == 0;
case AUTH_MD5:
if (strlen(passwd) != MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return false;
if (!isMD5(user->passwd))
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd, user->name, strlen(user->name), user->passwd);
pg_md5_encrypt(user->passwd + 3, (char *)client->tmp_login_salt, 4, md5);
return strcmp(md5, passwd) == 0;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 74,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_abort_conn(struct fuse_conn *fc, bool is_abort)
{
struct fuse_iqueue *fiq = &fc->iq;
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
if (fc->connected) {
struct fuse_dev *fud;
struct fuse_req *req, *next;
LIST_HEAD(to_end);
unsigned int i;
/* Background queuing checks fc->connected under bg_lock */
spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock);
fc->connected = 0;
spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock);
fc->aborted = is_abort;
fuse_set_initialized(fc);
list_for_each_entry(fud, &fc->devices, entry) {
struct fuse_pqueue *fpq = &fud->pq;
spin_lock(&fpq->lock);
fpq->connected = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, next, &fpq->io, list) {
req->out.h.error = -ECONNABORTED;
spin_lock(&req->waitq.lock);
set_bit(FR_ABORTED, &req->flags);
if (!test_bit(FR_LOCKED, &req->flags)) {
set_bit(FR_PRIVATE, &req->flags);
__fuse_get_request(req);
list_move(&req->list, &to_end);
}
spin_unlock(&req->waitq.lock);
}
for (i = 0; i < FUSE_PQ_HASH_SIZE; i++)
list_splice_tail_init(&fpq->processing[i],
&to_end);
spin_unlock(&fpq->lock);
}
spin_lock(&fc->bg_lock);
fc->blocked = 0;
fc->max_background = UINT_MAX;
flush_bg_queue(fc);
spin_unlock(&fc->bg_lock);
spin_lock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
fiq->connected = 0;
list_for_each_entry(req, &fiq->pending, list)
clear_bit(FR_PENDING, &req->flags);
list_splice_tail_init(&fiq->pending, &to_end);
while (forget_pending(fiq))
kfree(dequeue_forget(fiq, 1, NULL));
wake_up_all_locked(&fiq->waitq);
spin_unlock(&fiq->waitq.lock);
kill_fasync(&fiq->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
end_polls(fc);
wake_up_all(&fc->blocked_waitq);
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
end_requests(fc, &to_end);
} else {
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 97,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DispatchDidChangeManifest() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->DidChangeManifest();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int serdes_init_s1g(struct regmap *regmap, u8 serdes)
{
int ret;
ret = serdes_update_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_LANE |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_ELOOP |
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_FLOOP,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_ENA_LANE);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_ENA |
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_CTRL_DATA_M,
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_CTRL_DATA(200) |
HSIO_S1G_PLL_CFG_PLL_FSM_ENA);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_DES_100FX_CPMD_ENA |
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST);
ret = serdes_commit_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST,
HSIO_S1G_COMMON_CFG_SYS_RST);
regmap_update_bits(regmap, HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG,
HSIO_S1G_MISC_CFG_LANE_RST, 0);
ret = serdes_commit_mcb_s1g(regmap, serdes);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: phy: ocelot-serdes: fix out-of-bounds read
Currently, there is an out-of-bounds read on array ctrl->phys,
once variable i reaches the maximum array size of SERDES_MAX
in the for loop.
Fix this by changing the condition in the for loop from
i <= SERDES_MAX to i < SERDES_MAX.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473966 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1473959 ("Out-of-bounds read")
Fixes: 51f6b410fc22 ("phy: add driver for Microsemi Ocelot SerDes muxing")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 92,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PpapiPluginProcessHost::~PpapiPluginProcessHost() {
DVLOG(1) << "PpapiPluginProcessHost" << (is_broker_ ? "[broker]" : "")
<< "~PpapiPluginProcessHost()";
CancelRequests();
}
Commit Message: Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opfbstp(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_TBYTE ) {
data[l++] = 0xdf;
data[l++] = 0x30 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ConnectionFilterImpl(int gpu_process_id) {
auto task_runner = BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::UI);
registry_.AddInterface(base::Bind(&FieldTrialRecorder::Create),
task_runner);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&BindJavaInterface<media::mojom::AndroidOverlayProvider>),
task_runner);
#endif
registry_.AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&CreateMemoryCoordinatorHandleForGpuProcess,
gpu_process_id),
task_runner);
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltPatPushState(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xsltStepStates *states,
int step, xmlNodePtr node) {
if ((states->states == NULL) || (states->maxstates <= 0)) {
states->maxstates = 4;
states->nbstates = 0;
states->states = xmlMalloc(4 * sizeof(xsltStepState));
}
else if (states->maxstates <= states->nbstates) {
xsltStepState *tmp;
tmp = (xsltStepStatePtr) xmlRealloc(states->states,
2 * states->maxstates * sizeof(xsltStepState));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsltPatPushState: memory re-allocation failure.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
return(-1);
}
states->states = tmp;
states->maxstates *= 2;
}
states->states[states->nbstates].step = step;
states->states[states->nbstates++].node = node;
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Push: %d, %s\n", step, node->name);
#endif
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *bpf_any_get(void *raw, enum bpf_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case BPF_TYPE_PROG:
atomic_inc(&((struct bpf_prog *)raw)->aux->refcnt);
break;
case BPF_TYPE_MAP:
bpf_map_inc(raw, true);
break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
break;
}
return raw;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult GetWebResult() const {
switch (outcome) {
case CacheQueryOutcome::SUCCESS:
case CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER:
NOTREACHED();
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::DEVICE_NO_LONGER_IN_RANGE;
case CacheQueryOutcome::NO_DEVICE:
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::DEVICE_NO_LONGER_IN_RANGE;
case CacheQueryOutcome::NO_SERVICE:
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SERVICE_NO_LONGER_EXISTS;
case CacheQueryOutcome::NO_CHARACTERISTIC:
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::
CHARACTERISTIC_NO_LONGER_EXISTS;
case CacheQueryOutcome::NO_DESCRIPTOR:
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::DESCRIPTOR_NO_LONGER_EXISTS;
}
NOTREACHED();
return blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::DEVICE_NO_LONGER_IN_RANGE;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,106 |
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