instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputEngine::GetRulebasedKeypressCountForTesting(
GetRulebasedKeypressCountForTestingCallback callback) {
auto& context = channel_receivers_.current_context();
auto& engine = context.get()->engine;
std::move(callback).Run(engine ? engine->process_key_count() : -1);
}
Commit Message: ime-service: Delete InputEngine.ProcessText.
It is deprecated and no longer used.
Bug: 1009903
Change-Id: I6774a4506bd0bb41a5d1a5909a40a2a781564b16
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1833029
Auto-Submit: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keith Lee <keithlee@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Darren Shen <shend@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#705445}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_openssl_is_private_key(EVP_PKEY* pkey)
{
assert(pkey != NULL);
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey)) {
#ifndef NO_RSA
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
{
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
if (rsa != NULL) {
const BIGNUM *p, *q;
RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
if (p == NULL || q == NULL) {
return 0;
}
}
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DSA
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA1:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
{
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
if (dsa != NULL) {
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
if (p == NULL || q == NULL) {
return 0;
}
DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
}
}
break;
#endif
#ifndef NO_DH
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
{
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
if (dh != NULL) {
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *pub_key, *priv_key;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
if (p == NULL) {
return 0;
}
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
return 0;
}
}
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
{
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
if (ec != NULL && NULL == EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ec)) {
return 0;
}
}
break;
#endif
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "key type not supported in this PHP build!");
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::DoUpdateFromElement(BypassMainWorldBehavior bypass_behavior,
UpdateFromElementBehavior update_behavior,
const KURL& url,
ReferrerPolicy referrer_policy,
UpdateType update_type) {
pending_task_.reset();
std::unique_ptr<IncrementLoadEventDelayCount> load_delay_counter;
load_delay_counter.swap(delay_until_do_update_from_element_);
Document& document = element_->GetDocument();
if (!document.IsActive())
return;
AtomicString image_source_url = element_->ImageSourceURL();
ImageResourceContent* new_image_content = nullptr;
if (!url.IsNull() && !url.IsEmpty()) {
ResourceLoaderOptions resource_loader_options;
resource_loader_options.initiator_info.name = GetElement()->localName();
ResourceRequest resource_request(url);
if (update_behavior == kUpdateForcedReload) {
resource_request.SetCacheMode(mojom::FetchCacheMode::kBypassCache);
resource_request.SetPreviewsState(WebURLRequest::kPreviewsNoTransform);
}
if (referrer_policy != kReferrerPolicyDefault) {
resource_request.SetHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
referrer_policy, url, document.OutgoingReferrer()));
}
if (IsHTMLPictureElement(GetElement()->parentNode()) ||
!GetElement()->FastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::srcsetAttr).IsNull()) {
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
WebURLRequest::kRequestContextImageSet);
} else if (IsHTMLObjectElement(GetElement())) {
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextObject);
} else if (IsHTMLEmbedElement(GetElement())) {
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextEmbed);
}
bool page_is_being_dismissed =
document.PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() != Document::kNoDismissal;
if (page_is_being_dismissed) {
resource_request.SetHTTPHeaderField(HTTPNames::Cache_Control,
"max-age=0");
resource_request.SetKeepalive(true);
resource_request.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextPing);
}
FetchParameters params(resource_request, resource_loader_options);
ConfigureRequest(params, bypass_behavior, *element_,
document.GetClientHintsPreferences());
if (update_behavior != kUpdateForcedReload && document.GetFrame())
document.GetFrame()->MaybeAllowImagePlaceholder(params);
new_image_content = ImageResourceContent::Fetch(params, document.Fetcher());
if (page_is_being_dismissed)
new_image_content = nullptr;
ClearFailedLoadURL();
} else {
if (!image_source_url.IsNull()) {
DispatchErrorEvent();
}
NoImageResourceToLoad();
}
ImageResourceContent* old_image_content = image_content_.Get();
if (old_image_content != new_image_content)
RejectPendingDecodes(update_type);
if (update_behavior == kUpdateSizeChanged && element_->GetLayoutObject() &&
element_->GetLayoutObject()->IsImage() &&
new_image_content == old_image_content) {
ToLayoutImage(element_->GetLayoutObject())->IntrinsicSizeChanged();
} else {
if (pending_load_event_.IsActive())
pending_load_event_.Cancel();
if (pending_error_event_.IsActive() && new_image_content)
pending_error_event_.Cancel();
UpdateImageState(new_image_content);
UpdateLayoutObject();
if (new_image_content) {
new_image_content->AddObserver(this);
}
if (old_image_content) {
old_image_content->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
if (LayoutImageResource* image_resource = GetLayoutImageResource())
image_resource->ResetAnimation();
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_header(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MXFContext *mxf = s->priv_data;
KLVPacket klv;
int64_t essence_offset = 0;
int ret;
mxf->last_forward_tell = INT64_MAX;
mxf->edit_units_per_packet = 1;
if (!mxf_read_sync(s->pb, mxf_header_partition_pack_key, 14)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not find header partition pack key\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avio_seek(s->pb, -14, SEEK_CUR);
mxf->fc = s;
mxf->run_in = avio_tell(s->pb);
mxf_read_random_index_pack(s);
while (!avio_feof(s->pb)) {
const MXFMetadataReadTableEntry *metadata;
if (klv_read_packet(&klv, s->pb) < 0) {
/* EOF - seek to previous partition or stop */
if(mxf_parse_handle_partition_or_eof(mxf) <= 0)
break;
else
continue;
}
PRINT_KEY(s, "read header", klv.key);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_TRACE, "size %"PRIu64" offset %#"PRIx64"\n", klv.length, klv.offset);
if (IS_KLV_KEY(klv.key, mxf_encrypted_triplet_key) ||
IS_KLV_KEY(klv.key, mxf_essence_element_key) ||
IS_KLV_KEY(klv.key, mxf_avid_essence_element_key) ||
IS_KLV_KEY(klv.key, mxf_system_item_key)) {
if (!mxf->current_partition) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "found essence prior to first PartitionPack\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (!mxf->current_partition->essence_offset) {
/* for OP1a we compute essence_offset
* for OPAtom we point essence_offset after the KL (usually op1a_essence_offset + 20 or 25)
* TODO: for OP1a we could eliminate this entire if statement, always stopping parsing at op1a_essence_offset
* for OPAtom we still need the actual essence_offset though (the KL's length can vary)
*/
int64_t op1a_essence_offset =
round_to_kag(mxf->current_partition->this_partition +
mxf->current_partition->pack_length, mxf->current_partition->kag_size) +
round_to_kag(mxf->current_partition->header_byte_count, mxf->current_partition->kag_size) +
round_to_kag(mxf->current_partition->index_byte_count, mxf->current_partition->kag_size);
if (mxf->op == OPAtom) {
/* point essence_offset to the actual data
* OPAtom has all the essence in one big KLV
*/
mxf->current_partition->essence_offset = avio_tell(s->pb);
mxf->current_partition->essence_length = klv.length;
} else {
/* NOTE: op1a_essence_offset may be less than to klv.offset (C0023S01.mxf) */
mxf->current_partition->essence_offset = op1a_essence_offset;
}
}
if (!essence_offset)
essence_offset = klv.offset;
/* seek to footer, previous partition or stop */
if (mxf_parse_handle_essence(mxf) <= 0)
break;
continue;
} else if (mxf_is_partition_pack_key(klv.key) && mxf->current_partition) {
/* next partition pack - keep going, seek to previous partition or stop */
if(mxf_parse_handle_partition_or_eof(mxf) <= 0)
break;
else if (mxf->parsing_backward)
continue;
/* we're still parsing forward. proceed to parsing this partition pack */
}
for (metadata = mxf_metadata_read_table; metadata->read; metadata++) {
if (IS_KLV_KEY(klv.key, metadata->key)) {
if ((ret = mxf_parse_klv(mxf, klv, metadata->read, metadata->ctx_size, metadata->type)) < 0)
goto fail;
break;
}
}
if (!metadata->read) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Dark key " PRIxUID "\n",
UID_ARG(klv.key));
avio_skip(s->pb, klv.length);
}
}
/* FIXME avoid seek */
if (!essence_offset) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "no essence\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
avio_seek(s->pb, essence_offset, SEEK_SET);
mxf_compute_essence_containers(mxf);
/* we need to do this before computing the index tables
* to be able to fill in zero IndexDurations with st->duration */
if ((ret = mxf_parse_structural_metadata(mxf)) < 0)
goto fail;
mxf_handle_missing_index_segment(mxf);
if ((ret = mxf_compute_index_tables(mxf)) < 0)
goto fail;
if (mxf->nb_index_tables > 1) {
/* TODO: look up which IndexSID to use via EssenceContainerData */
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_INFO, "got %i index tables - only the first one (IndexSID %i) will be used\n",
mxf->nb_index_tables, mxf->index_tables[0].index_sid);
} else if (mxf->nb_index_tables == 0 && mxf->op == OPAtom) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cannot demux OPAtom without an index\n");
ret = AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
goto fail;
}
mxf_handle_small_eubc(s);
return 0;
fail:
mxf_read_close(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit vmac_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&vmac_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM(
GLuint y_texture_id,
GLuint uv_texture_id,
GLint z_order,
GLint content_x,
GLint content_y,
GLint content_width,
GLint content_height,
GLint quad_x,
GLint quad_y,
GLint quad_width,
GLint quad_height,
GLfloat transform_c1r1,
GLfloat transform_c2r1,
GLfloat transform_c1r2,
GLfloat transform_c2r2,
GLfloat transform_tx,
GLfloat transform_ty,
GLboolean is_clipped,
GLint clip_x,
GLint clip_y,
GLint clip_width,
GLint clip_height,
GLuint protected_video_type) {
if (protected_video_type >
static_cast<GLuint>(ui::ProtectedVideoType::kMaxValue)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "invalid protected video type");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint texture_ids[] = {y_texture_id, uv_texture_id};
scoped_refptr<gl::GLImage> images[2];
size_t i = 0;
for (GLuint texture_id : texture_ids) {
if (!texture_id) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "invalid texture");
return error::kNoError;
}
scoped_refptr<TexturePassthrough> passthrough_texture;
if (!resources_->texture_object_map.GetServiceID(texture_id,
&passthrough_texture)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "unknown texture");
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK(passthrough_texture);
gl::GLImage* image =
passthrough_texture->GetLevelImage(passthrough_texture->target(), 0);
if (!image) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "unsupported texture format");
return error::kNoError;
}
images[i++] = scoped_refptr<gl::GLImage>(image);
}
ui::DCRendererLayerParams params;
params.y_image = std::move(images[0]);
params.uv_image = std::move(images[1]);
params.z_order = z_order;
params.content_rect =
gfx::Rect(content_x, content_y, content_width, content_height);
params.quad_rect = gfx::Rect(quad_x, quad_y, quad_width, quad_height);
params.transform =
gfx::Transform(transform_c1r1, transform_c2r1, transform_c1r2,
transform_c2r2, transform_tx, transform_ty);
params.is_clipped = is_clipped;
params.clip_rect = gfx::Rect(clip_x, clip_y, clip_width, clip_height);
params.protected_video_type =
static_cast<ui::ProtectedVideoType>(protected_video_type);
if (!surface_->ScheduleDCLayer(params))
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "failed to schedule DCLayer");
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::RouteFunction(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& feature_name,
const HandlerFunction& handler_function) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context_->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = v8::Object::New(isolate);
SetPrivate(data, kHandlerFunction,
v8::External::New(isolate, new HandlerFunction(handler_function)));
DCHECK(feature_name.empty() ||
ExtensionAPI::GetSharedInstance()->GetFeatureDependency(feature_name))
<< feature_name;
SetPrivate(data, kFeatureName,
v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, feature_name));
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> function_template =
v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, Router, data);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate>::New(isolate, object_template_)
->Set(isolate, name.c_str(), function_template);
router_data_.Append(data);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetSystemNetworkContext() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(g_browser_process->system_network_context_manager());
return g_browser_process->system_network_context_manager()->GetContext();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key )
{
if( key == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &key->grp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &key->d );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &key->Q );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnRedo() {
if (!webview())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8("Redo"));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::OnEnforceInsecureRequestPolicy(
blink::WebInsecureRequestPolicy policy) {
for (const auto& pair : proxy_hosts_) {
pair.second->Send(new FrameMsg_EnforceInsecureRequestPolicy(
pair.second->GetRoutingID(), policy));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_dfs_path(int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *pSesInfo, const char *old_path,
const struct nls_table *nls_codepage, unsigned int *pnum_referrals,
struct dfs_info3_param **preferrals, int remap)
{
char *temp_unc;
int rc = 0;
*pnum_referrals = 0;
*preferrals = NULL;
if (pSesInfo->ipc_tid == 0) {
temp_unc = kmalloc(2 /* for slashes */ +
strnlen(pSesInfo->serverName,
SERVER_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL * 2)
+ 1 + 4 /* slash IPC$ */ + 2,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (temp_unc == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
temp_unc[0] = '\\';
temp_unc[1] = '\\';
strcpy(temp_unc + 2, pSesInfo->serverName);
strcpy(temp_unc + 2 + strlen(pSesInfo->serverName), "\\IPC$");
rc = CIFSTCon(xid, pSesInfo, temp_unc, NULL, nls_codepage);
cFYI(1, "CIFS Tcon rc = %d ipc_tid = %d", rc, pSesInfo->ipc_tid);
kfree(temp_unc);
}
if (rc == 0)
rc = CIFSGetDFSRefer(xid, pSesInfo, old_path, preferrals,
pnum_referrals, nls_codepage, remap);
/* BB map targetUNCs to dfs_info3 structures, here or
in CIFSGetDFSRefer BB */
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FLTInsertElementInNode(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode,
CPLXMLNode *psXMLNode)
{
int nStrLength = 0;
char *pszTmp = NULL;
FilterEncodingNode *psCurFilNode= NULL;
CPLXMLNode *psCurXMLNode = NULL;
CPLXMLNode *psTmpNode = NULL;
CPLXMLNode *psFeatureIdNode = NULL;
const char *pszFeatureId=NULL;
char *pszFeatureIdList=NULL;
if (psFilterNode && psXMLNode && psXMLNode->pszValue) {
psFilterNode->pszValue = msStrdup(psXMLNode->pszValue);
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = NULL;
psFilterNode->psRightNode = NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Logical filter. AND, OR and NOT are supported. Example of */
/* filer using logical filters : */
/* <Filter> */
/* <And> */
/* <PropertyIsGreaterThan> */
/* <PropertyName>Person/Age</PropertyName> */
/* <Literal>50</Literal> */
/* </PropertyIsGreaterThan> */
/* <PropertyIsEqualTo> */
/* <PropertyName>Person/Address/City</PropertyName> */
/* <Literal>Toronto</Literal> */
/* </PropertyIsEqualTo> */
/* </And> */
/* </Filter> */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if (FLTIsLogicalFilterType(psXMLNode->pszValue)) {
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_LOGICAL;
if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "AND") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "OR") == 0) {
CPLXMLNode* psFirstNode = FLTGetFirstChildNode(psXMLNode);
CPLXMLNode* psSecondNode = FLTGetNextSibblingNode(psFirstNode);
if (psFirstNode && psSecondNode) {
/*2 operators */
CPLXMLNode* psNextNode = FLTGetNextSibblingNode(psSecondNode);
if (psNextNode == NULL) {
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
FLTInsertElementInNode(psFilterNode->psLeftNode, psFirstNode);
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
FLTInsertElementInNode(psFilterNode->psRightNode, psSecondNode);
} else {
psCurXMLNode = psFirstNode;
psCurFilNode = psFilterNode;
while(psCurXMLNode) {
psNextNode = FLTGetNextSibblingNode(psCurXMLNode);
if (FLTGetNextSibblingNode(psNextNode)) {
psCurFilNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
FLTInsertElementInNode(psCurFilNode->psLeftNode, psCurXMLNode);
psCurFilNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psCurFilNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_LOGICAL;
psCurFilNode->psRightNode->pszValue = msStrdup(psFilterNode->pszValue);
psCurFilNode = psCurFilNode->psRightNode;
psCurXMLNode = psNextNode;
} else { /*last 2 operators*/
psCurFilNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
FLTInsertElementInNode(psCurFilNode->psLeftNode, psCurXMLNode);
psCurFilNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
FLTInsertElementInNode(psCurFilNode->psRightNode, psNextNode);
break;
}
}
}
}
else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
} else if (strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "NOT") == 0) {
CPLXMLNode* psFirstNode = FLTGetFirstChildNode(psXMLNode);
if (psFirstNode) {
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
FLTInsertElementInNode(psFilterNode->psLeftNode,
psFirstNode);
}
else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}/* end if is logical */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Spatial Filter. */
/* BBOX : */
/* <Filter> */
/* <BBOX> */
/* <PropertyName>Geometry</PropertyName> */
/* <gml:Box srsName="http://www.opengis.net/gml/srs/epsg.xml#4326">*/
/* <gml:coordinates>13.0983,31.5899 35.5472,42.8143</gml:coordinates>*/
/* </gml:Box> */
/* </BBOX> */
/* </Filter> */
/* */
/* DWithin */
/* */
/* <xsd:element name="DWithin" */
/* type="ogc:DistanceBufferType" */
/* substitutionGroup="ogc:spatialOps"/> */
/* */
/* <xsd:complexType name="DistanceBufferType"> */
/* <xsd:complexContent> */
/* <xsd:extension base="ogc:SpatialOpsType"> */
/* <xsd:sequence> */
/* <xsd:element ref="ogc:PropertyName"/> */
/* <xsd:element ref="gml:_Geometry"/> */
/* <xsd:element name="Distance" type="ogc:DistanceType"/>*/
/* </xsd:sequence> */
/* </xsd:extension> */
/* </xsd:complexContent> */
/* </xsd:complexType> */
/* */
/* */
/* <Filter> */
/* <DWithin> */
/* <PropertyName>Geometry</PropertyName> */
/* <gml:Point> */
/* <gml:coordinates>13.0983,31.5899</gml:coordinates> */
/* </gml:Point> */
/* <Distance units="url#m">10</Distance> */
/* </DWithin> */
/* </Filter> */
/* */
/* Intersect */
/* */
/* type="ogc:BinarySpatialOpType" substitutionGroup="ogc:spatialOps"/>*/
/* <xsd:element name="Intersects" */
/* type="ogc:BinarySpatialOpType" */
/* substitutionGroup="ogc:spatialOps"/> */
/* */
/* <xsd:complexType name="BinarySpatialOpType"> */
/* <xsd:complexContent> */
/* <xsd:extension base="ogc:SpatialOpsType"> */
/* <xsd:sequence> */
/* <xsd:element ref="ogc:PropertyName"/> */
/* <xsd:choice> */
/* <xsd:element ref="gml:_Geometry"/> */
/* <xsd:element ref="gml:Box"/> */
/* </xsd:sequence> */
/* </xsd:extension> */
/* </xsd:complexContent> */
/* </xsd:complexType> */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
else if (FLTIsSpatialFilterType(psXMLNode->pszValue)) {
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_SPATIAL;
if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "BBOX") == 0) {
char *pszSRS = NULL;
const char* pszPropertyName = NULL;
CPLXMLNode *psBox = NULL, *psEnvelope=NULL;
rectObj sBox;
int bCoordinatesValid = 0;
pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
psBox = CPLGetXMLNode(psXMLNode, "Box");
if (!psBox)
psBox = CPLGetXMLNode(psXMLNode, "BoxType");
/*FE 1.0 used box FE1.1 uses envelop*/
if (psBox)
bCoordinatesValid = FLTParseGMLBox(psBox, &sBox, &pszSRS);
else if ((psEnvelope = CPLGetXMLNode(psXMLNode, "Envelope")))
bCoordinatesValid = FLTParseGMLEnvelope(psEnvelope, &sBox, &pszSRS);
if (bCoordinatesValid) {
/*set the srs if available*/
if (pszSRS)
psFilterNode->pszSRS = pszSRS;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
/* PropertyName is optional since FE 1.1.0, in which case */
/* the BBOX must apply to all geometry fields. As we support */
/* currently only one geometry field, this doesn't make much */
/* difference to further processing. */
if( pszPropertyName != NULL ) {
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
}
/* coordinates */
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_BBOX;
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther =
(rectObj *)msSmallMalloc(sizeof(rectObj));
((rectObj *)psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther)->minx = sBox.minx;
((rectObj *)psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther)->miny = sBox.miny;
((rectObj *)psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther)->maxx = sBox.maxx;
((rectObj *)psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther)->maxy = sBox.maxy;
} else {
msFree(pszSRS);
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "DWithin") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Beyond") == 0)
{
shapeObj *psShape = NULL;
int bPoint = 0, bLine = 0, bPolygon = 0;
const char *pszUnits = NULL;
const char* pszDistance = NULL;
const char* pszPropertyName;
char *pszSRS = NULL;
CPLXMLNode *psGMLElement = NULL, *psDistance=NULL;
pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
psGMLElement = FLTFindGeometryNode(psXMLNode, &bPoint, &bLine, &bPolygon);
psDistance = CPLGetXMLNode(psXMLNode, "Distance");
if( psDistance != NULL )
pszDistance = CPLGetXMLValue(psDistance, NULL, NULL );
if (pszPropertyName != NULL && psGMLElement && psDistance != NULL ) {
pszUnits = CPLGetXMLValue(psDistance, "units", NULL);
if( pszUnits == NULL ) /* FE 2.0 */
pszUnits = CPLGetXMLValue(psDistance, "uom", NULL);
psShape = (shapeObj *)msSmallMalloc(sizeof(shapeObj));
msInitShape(psShape);
if (FLTShapeFromGMLTree(psGMLElement, psShape, &pszSRS))
{
/*set the srs if available*/
if (pszSRS)
psFilterNode->pszSRS = pszSRS;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
if (bPoint)
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_POINT;
else if (bLine)
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_LINE;
else if (bPolygon)
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_POLYGON;
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther = (shapeObj *)psShape;
/*the value will be distance;units*/
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszDistance);
if (pszUnits) {
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue= msStringConcatenate(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, ";");
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue= msStringConcatenate(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, pszUnits);
}
}
else
{
free(psShape);
msFree(pszSRS);
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
} else if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Intersect") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Intersects") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Equals") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Disjoint") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Touches") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Crosses") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Within") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Contains") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "Overlaps") == 0) {
shapeObj *psShape = NULL;
int bLine = 0, bPolygon = 0, bPoint=0;
char *pszSRS = NULL;
const char* pszPropertyName;
CPLXMLNode *psGMLElement = NULL;
pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
psGMLElement = FLTFindGeometryNode(psXMLNode, &bPoint, &bLine, &bPolygon);
if (pszPropertyName != NULL && psGMLElement) {
psShape = (shapeObj *)msSmallMalloc(sizeof(shapeObj));
msInitShape(psShape);
if (FLTShapeFromGMLTree(psGMLElement, psShape, &pszSRS))
{
/*set the srs if available*/
if (pszSRS)
psFilterNode->pszSRS = pszSRS;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
if (bPoint)
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_POINT;
else if (bLine)
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_LINE;
else if (bPolygon)
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_GEOMETRY_POLYGON;
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther = (shapeObj *)psShape;
}
else
{
free(psShape);
msFree(pszSRS);
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
}/* end of is spatial */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Comparison Filter */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
else if (FLTIsComparisonFilterType(psXMLNode->pszValue)) {
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_COMPARISON;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* binary comaparison types. Example : */
/* */
/* <Filter> */
/* <PropertyIsEqualTo> */
/* <PropertyName>SomeProperty</PropertyName> */
/* <Literal>100</Literal> */
/* </PropertyIsEqualTo> */
/* </Filter> */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if (FLTIsBinaryComparisonFilterType(psXMLNode->pszValue)) {
const char* pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
if (pszPropertyName != NULL ) {
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psTmpNode = CPLSearchXMLNode(psXMLNode, "Literal");
if (psTmpNode) {
const char* pszLiteral = CPLGetXMLValue(psTmpNode, NULL, NULL);
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateBinaryCompFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_LITERAL;
if (pszLiteral != NULL) {
const char* pszMatchCase;
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszLiteral);
pszMatchCase = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "matchCase", NULL);
/*check if the matchCase attribute is set*/
if( pszMatchCase != NULL && strcasecmp( pszMatchCase, "false") == 0) {
(*(int *)psFilterNode->psRightNode->pOther) = 1;
}
}
/* special case where the user puts an empty value */
/* for the Literal so it can end up as an empty */
/* string query in the expression */
else
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue = NULL;
}
}
if (psFilterNode->psLeftNode == NULL || psFilterNode->psRightNode == NULL)
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* PropertyIsBetween filter : extract property name and boudary */
/* values. The boundary values are stored in the right */
/* node. The values are separated by a semi-column (;) */
/* Eg of Filter : */
/* <PropertyIsBetween> */
/* <PropertyName>DEPTH</PropertyName> */
/* <LowerBoundary><Literal>400</Literal></LowerBoundary> */
/* <UpperBoundary><Literal>800</Literal></UpperBoundary> */
/* </PropertyIsBetween> */
/* */
/* Or */
/* <PropertyIsBetween> */
/* <PropertyName>DEPTH</PropertyName> */
/* <LowerBoundary>400</LowerBoundary> */
/* <UpperBoundary>800</UpperBoundary> */
/* </PropertyIsBetween> */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
else if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "PropertyIsBetween") == 0) {
const char* pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
CPLXMLNode* psLowerBoundary = CPLGetXMLNode(psXMLNode, "LowerBoundary");
CPLXMLNode* psUpperBoundary = CPLGetXMLNode(psXMLNode, "UpperBoundary");
const char* pszLowerNode = NULL;
const char* pszUpperNode = NULL;
if( psLowerBoundary != NULL )
{
/* check if the <Literal> is there */
if (CPLGetXMLNode(psLowerBoundary, "Literal") != NULL)
pszLowerNode = CPLGetXMLValue(psLowerBoundary, "Literal", NULL);
else
pszLowerNode = CPLGetXMLValue(psLowerBoundary, NULL, NULL);
}
if( psUpperBoundary != NULL )
{
if (CPLGetXMLNode(psUpperBoundary, "Literal") != NULL)
pszUpperNode = CPLGetXMLValue(psUpperBoundary, "Literal", NULL);
else
pszUpperNode = CPLGetXMLValue(psUpperBoundary, NULL, NULL);
}
if (pszPropertyName != NULL && pszLowerNode != NULL && pszUpperNode != NULL) {
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_BOUNDARY;
/* adding a ; between bounary values */
nStrLength = strlen(pszLowerNode) + strlen(pszUpperNode) + 2;
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue =
(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(nStrLength));
strcpy( psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, pszLowerNode);
strlcat(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, ";", nStrLength);
strlcat(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, pszUpperNode, nStrLength);
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}/* end of PropertyIsBetween */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* PropertyIsLike */
/* */
/* <Filter> */
/* <PropertyIsLike wildCard="*" singleChar="#" escape="!"> */
/* <PropertyName>LAST_NAME</PropertyName> */
/* <Literal>JOHN*</Literal> */
/* </PropertyIsLike> */
/* </Filter> */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
else if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "PropertyIsLike") == 0) {
const char* pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
const char* pszLiteral = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "Literal", NULL);
const char* pszWildCard = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "wildCard", NULL);
const char* pszSingleChar = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "singleChar", NULL);
const char* pszEscapeChar = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "escape", NULL);
if( pszEscapeChar == NULL )
pszEscapeChar = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "escapeChar", NULL);
if (pszPropertyName != NULL && pszLiteral != NULL &&
pszWildCard != NULL && pszSingleChar != NULL && pszEscapeChar != NULL)
{
FEPropertyIsLike* propIsLike;
propIsLike = (FEPropertyIsLike *)malloc(sizeof(FEPropertyIsLike));
psFilterNode->pOther = propIsLike;
propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive = 0;
propIsLike->pszWildCard = msStrdup(pszWildCard);
propIsLike->pszSingleChar = msStrdup(pszSingleChar);
propIsLike->pszEscapeChar = msStrdup(pszEscapeChar);
pszTmp = (char *)CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "matchCase", NULL);
if (pszTmp && strcasecmp(pszTmp, "false") == 0) {
propIsLike->bCaseInsensitive =1;
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Create left and right node for the attribute and the value. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszLiteral);
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_LITERAL;
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
else if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "PropertyIsNull") == 0) {
const char* pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
if( pszPropertyName != NULL )
{
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
else if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "PropertyIsNil") == 0) {
const char* pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
if( pszPropertyName != NULL )
{
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* FeatureId Filter */
/* */
/* <ogc:Filter> */
/* <ogc:FeatureId fid="INWATERA_1M.1013"/> */
/* <ogc:FeatureId fid="INWATERA_1M.10"/> */
/* <ogc:FeatureId fid="INWATERA_1M.13"/> */
/* <ogc:FeatureId fid="INWATERA_1M.140"/> */
/* <ogc:FeatureId fid="INWATERA_1M.5001"/> */
/* <ogc:FeatureId fid="INWATERA_1M.2001"/> */
/* </ogc:Filter> */
/* */
/* */
/* Note that for FES1.1.0 the featureid has been depricated in */
/* favor of GmlObjectId */
/* <GmlObjectId gml:id="TREESA_1M.1234"/> */
/* */
/* And in FES 2.0, in favor of <fes:ResourceId rid="foo.1234"/> */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
else if (FLTIsFeatureIdFilterType(psXMLNode->pszValue)) {
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_FEATUREID;
pszFeatureId = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "fid", NULL);
/*for FE 1.1.0 GmlObjectId */
if (pszFeatureId == NULL)
pszFeatureId = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "id", NULL);
/*for FE 2.0 ResourceId */
if (pszFeatureId == NULL)
pszFeatureId = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "rid", NULL);
pszFeatureIdList = NULL;
psFeatureIdNode = psXMLNode;
while (psFeatureIdNode) {
pszFeatureId = CPLGetXMLValue(psFeatureIdNode, "fid", NULL);
if (!pszFeatureId)
pszFeatureId = CPLGetXMLValue(psFeatureIdNode, "id", NULL);
if (!pszFeatureId)
pszFeatureId = CPLGetXMLValue(psFeatureIdNode, "rid", NULL);
if (pszFeatureId) {
if (pszFeatureIdList)
pszFeatureIdList = msStringConcatenate(pszFeatureIdList, ",");
pszFeatureIdList = msStringConcatenate(pszFeatureIdList, pszFeatureId);
}
psFeatureIdNode = psFeatureIdNode->psNext;
}
if (pszFeatureIdList) {
msFree(psFilterNode->pszValue);
psFilterNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszFeatureIdList);
msFree(pszFeatureIdList);
} else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Temporal Filter. */
/*
<fes:During>
<fes:ValueReference>gml:TimeInstant</fes:ValueReference>
<gml:TimePeriod gml:id="TP1">
<gml:begin>
<gml:TimeInstant gml:id="TI1">
<gml:timePosition>2005-05-17T00:00:00Z</gml:timePosition>
</gml:TimeInstant>
</gml:begin>
<gml:end>
<gml:TimeInstant gml:id="TI2">
<gml:timePosition>2005-05-23T00:00:00Z</gml:timePosition>
</gml:TimeInstant>
</gml:end>
</gml:TimePeriod>
</fes:During>
*/
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
else if (FLTIsTemporalFilterType(psXMLNode->pszValue)) {
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_TEMPORAL;
if (strcasecmp(psXMLNode->pszValue, "During") == 0) {
const char* pszPropertyName = NULL;
const char* pszBeginTime;
const char* pszEndTime;
pszPropertyName = FLTGetPropertyName(psXMLNode);
pszBeginTime = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "TimePeriod.begin.TimeInstant.timePosition", NULL);
if( pszBeginTime == NULL )
pszBeginTime = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "TimePeriod.beginPosition", NULL);
pszEndTime = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "TimePeriod.end.TimeInstant.timePosition", NULL);
if( pszEndTime == NULL )
pszEndTime = CPLGetXMLValue(psXMLNode, "TimePeriod.endPosition", NULL);
if (pszPropertyName && pszBeginTime && pszEndTime &&
strchr(pszBeginTime, '\'') == NULL && strchr(pszBeginTime, '\\') == NULL &&
strchr(pszEndTime, '\'') == NULL && strchr(pszEndTime, '\\') == NULL &&
msTimeGetResolution(pszBeginTime) >= 0 &&
msTimeGetResolution(pszEndTime) >= 0) {
psFilterNode->psLeftNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_PROPERTYNAME;
psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue = msStrdup(pszPropertyName);
psFilterNode->psRightNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
psFilterNode->psRightNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_TIME_PERIOD;
psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue = msSmallMalloc( strlen(pszBeginTime) + strlen(pszEndTime) + 2 );
sprintf(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, "%s/%s", pszBeginTime, pszEndTime);
}
else
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
} else {
psFilterNode->eType = FILTER_NODE_TYPE_UNDEFINED;
}
}/* end of is temporal */
}
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ctr_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_sparc64_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ctx->ops->load_encrypt_keys(&ctx->key[0]);
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
unsigned int block_len = nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK;
if (likely(block_len)) {
ctx->ops->ctr_crypt(&ctx->key[0],
(const u64 *)walk.src.virt.addr,
(u64 *) walk.dst.virt.addr,
block_len, (u64 *) walk.iv);
}
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
ctr_crypt_final(ctx, &walk);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
fprs_write(0);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_hsignal_send (const char *signal, struct t_hashtable *hashtable)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_HSIGNAL];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (string_match (signal, HOOK_HSIGNAL(ptr_hook, signal), 0)))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
(void) (HOOK_HSIGNAL(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, signal, hashtable);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
if( end < p || (size_t)( end - p ) < 4 + tlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) );
return;
}
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF );
*olen = 4;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
{
return;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "sending session ticket of length %d", tlen ) );
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
*olen += tlen;
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jspAppendStackTrace(JsVar *stackTrace) {
JsvStringIterator it;
jsvStringIteratorNew(&it, stackTrace, 0);
jsvStringIteratorGotoEnd(&it);
jslPrintPosition((vcbprintf_callback)jsvStringIteratorPrintfCallback, &it, lex->tokenLastStart);
jslPrintTokenLineMarker((vcbprintf_callback)jsvStringIteratorPrintfCallback, &it, lex->tokenLastStart, 0);
jsvStringIteratorFree(&it);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadingPredictor::StartInitialization() {
if (shutdown_)
return;
resource_prefetch_predictor_->StartInitialization();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnSetRendererPrefs(const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs) {
renderer_preferences_ = renderer_prefs;
UpdateFontRenderingFromRendererPrefs();
#if defined(TOOLKIT_USES_GTK)
WebColorName name = WebKit::WebColorWebkitFocusRingColor;
WebKit::setNamedColors(&name, &renderer_prefs.focus_ring_color, 1);
WebKit::setCaretBlinkInterval(renderer_prefs.caret_blink_interval);
gfx::NativeTheme::instance()->SetScrollbarColors(
renderer_prefs.thumb_inactive_color,
renderer_prefs.thumb_active_color,
renderer_prefs.track_color);
if (webview()) {
webview()->setScrollbarColors(
renderer_prefs.thumb_inactive_color,
renderer_prefs.thumb_active_color,
renderer_prefs.track_color);
webview()->setSelectionColors(
renderer_prefs.active_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.active_selection_fg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_bg_color,
renderer_prefs.inactive_selection_fg_color);
webview()->themeChanged();
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
OMX_U32 omxLevel = AVC_LEVEL2;
if (OMX_ErrorNone !=
ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(mAVCEncLevel, &omxLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE) omxLevel;
avcParams->nRefFrames = 1;
avcParams->nBFrames = 0;
avcParams->bUseHadamard = OMX_TRUE;
avcParams->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
avcParams->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->bWeightedPPrediction = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bEntropyCodingCABAC = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bconstIpred = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirect8x8Inference = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirectSpatialTemporal = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->nCabacInitIdc = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int migrate_degrades_locality(struct task_struct *p,
struct lb_env *env)
{
return -1;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vorbis_decode_packet_rest(vorb *f, int *len, Mode *m, int left_start, int left_end, int right_start, int right_end, int *p_left)
{
Mapping *map;
int i,j,k,n,n2;
int zero_channel[256];
int really_zero_channel[256];
n = f->blocksize[m->blockflag];
map = &f->mapping[m->mapping];
n2 = n >> 1;
CHECK(f);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
int s = map->chan[i].mux, floor;
zero_channel[i] = FALSE;
floor = map->submap_floor[s];
if (f->floor_types[floor] == 0) {
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_stream);
} else {
Floor1 *g = &f->floor_config[floor].floor1;
if (get_bits(f, 1)) {
short *finalY;
uint8 step2_flag[256];
static int range_list[4] = { 256, 128, 86, 64 };
int range = range_list[g->floor1_multiplier-1];
int offset = 2;
finalY = f->finalY[i];
finalY[0] = get_bits(f, ilog(range)-1);
finalY[1] = get_bits(f, ilog(range)-1);
for (j=0; j < g->partitions; ++j) {
int pclass = g->partition_class_list[j];
int cdim = g->class_dimensions[pclass];
int cbits = g->class_subclasses[pclass];
int csub = (1 << cbits)-1;
int cval = 0;
if (cbits) {
Codebook *c = f->codebooks + g->class_masterbooks[pclass];
DECODE(cval,f,c);
}
for (k=0; k < cdim; ++k) {
int book = g->subclass_books[pclass][cval & csub];
cval = cval >> cbits;
if (book >= 0) {
int temp;
Codebook *c = f->codebooks + book;
DECODE(temp,f,c);
finalY[offset++] = temp;
} else
finalY[offset++] = 0;
}
}
if (f->valid_bits == INVALID_BITS) goto error; // behavior according to spec
step2_flag[0] = step2_flag[1] = 1;
for (j=2; j < g->values; ++j) {
int low, high, pred, highroom, lowroom, room, val;
low = g->neighbors[j][0];
high = g->neighbors[j][1];
pred = predict_point(g->Xlist[j], g->Xlist[low], g->Xlist[high], finalY[low], finalY[high]);
val = finalY[j];
highroom = range - pred;
lowroom = pred;
if (highroom < lowroom)
room = highroom * 2;
else
room = lowroom * 2;
if (val) {
step2_flag[low] = step2_flag[high] = 1;
step2_flag[j] = 1;
if (val >= room)
if (highroom > lowroom)
finalY[j] = val - lowroom + pred;
else
finalY[j] = pred - val + highroom - 1;
else
if (val & 1)
finalY[j] = pred - ((val+1)>>1);
else
finalY[j] = pred + (val>>1);
} else {
step2_flag[j] = 0;
finalY[j] = pred;
}
}
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_NO_DEFER_FLOOR
do_floor(f, map, i, n, f->floor_buffers[i], finalY, step2_flag);
#else
for (j=0; j < g->values; ++j) {
if (!step2_flag[j])
finalY[j] = -1;
}
#endif
} else {
error:
zero_channel[i] = TRUE;
}
}
}
CHECK(f);
if (f->alloc.alloc_buffer)
assert(f->alloc.alloc_buffer_length_in_bytes == f->temp_offset);
memcpy(really_zero_channel, zero_channel, sizeof(really_zero_channel[0]) * f->channels);
for (i=0; i < map->coupling_steps; ++i)
if (!zero_channel[map->chan[i].magnitude] || !zero_channel[map->chan[i].angle]) {
zero_channel[map->chan[i].magnitude] = zero_channel[map->chan[i].angle] = FALSE;
}
CHECK(f);
for (i=0; i < map->submaps; ++i) {
float *residue_buffers[STB_VORBIS_MAX_CHANNELS];
int r;
uint8 do_not_decode[256];
int ch = 0;
for (j=0; j < f->channels; ++j) {
if (map->chan[j].mux == i) {
if (zero_channel[j]) {
do_not_decode[ch] = TRUE;
residue_buffers[ch] = NULL;
} else {
do_not_decode[ch] = FALSE;
residue_buffers[ch] = f->channel_buffers[j];
}
++ch;
}
}
r = map->submap_residue[i];
decode_residue(f, residue_buffers, ch, n2, r, do_not_decode);
}
if (f->alloc.alloc_buffer)
assert(f->alloc.alloc_buffer_length_in_bytes == f->temp_offset);
CHECK(f);
for (i = map->coupling_steps-1; i >= 0; --i) {
int n2 = n >> 1;
float *m = f->channel_buffers[map->chan[i].magnitude];
float *a = f->channel_buffers[map->chan[i].angle ];
for (j=0; j < n2; ++j) {
float a2,m2;
if (m[j] > 0)
if (a[j] > 0)
m2 = m[j], a2 = m[j] - a[j];
else
a2 = m[j], m2 = m[j] + a[j];
else
if (a[j] > 0)
m2 = m[j], a2 = m[j] + a[j];
else
a2 = m[j], m2 = m[j] - a[j];
m[j] = m2;
a[j] = a2;
}
}
CHECK(f);
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_NO_DEFER_FLOOR
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
if (really_zero_channel[i]) {
memset(f->channel_buffers[i], 0, sizeof(*f->channel_buffers[i]) * n2);
} else {
do_floor(f, map, i, n, f->channel_buffers[i], f->finalY[i], NULL);
}
}
#else
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
if (really_zero_channel[i]) {
memset(f->channel_buffers[i], 0, sizeof(*f->channel_buffers[i]) * n2);
} else {
for (j=0; j < n2; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][j] *= f->floor_buffers[i][j];
}
}
#endif
CHECK(f);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
inverse_mdct(f->channel_buffers[i], n, f, m->blockflag);
CHECK(f);
flush_packet(f);
if (f->first_decode) {
f->current_loc = -n2; // start of first frame is positioned for discard
f->discard_samples_deferred = n - right_end;
f->current_loc_valid = TRUE;
f->first_decode = FALSE;
} else if (f->discard_samples_deferred) {
if (f->discard_samples_deferred >= right_start - left_start) {
f->discard_samples_deferred -= (right_start - left_start);
left_start = right_start;
*p_left = left_start;
} else {
left_start += f->discard_samples_deferred;
*p_left = left_start;
f->discard_samples_deferred = 0;
}
} else if (f->previous_length == 0 && f->current_loc_valid) {
}
if (f->last_seg_which == f->end_seg_with_known_loc) {
if (f->current_loc_valid && (f->page_flag & PAGEFLAG_last_page)) {
uint32 current_end = f->known_loc_for_packet;
if (current_end < f->current_loc + (right_end-left_start)) {
if (current_end < f->current_loc) {
*len = 0;
} else {
*len = current_end - f->current_loc;
}
*len += left_start; // this doesn't seem right, but has no ill effect on my test files
if (*len > right_end) *len = right_end; // this should never happen
f->current_loc += *len;
return TRUE;
}
}
f->current_loc = f->known_loc_for_packet - (n2-left_start);
f->current_loc_valid = TRUE;
}
if (f->current_loc_valid)
f->current_loc += (right_start - left_start);
if (f->alloc.alloc_buffer)
assert(f->alloc.alloc_buffer_length_in_bytes == f->temp_offset);
*len = right_end; // ignore samples after the window goes to 0
CHECK(f);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 89,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gcry_mpi_point_snatch_get (gcry_mpi_t x, gcry_mpi_t y, gcry_mpi_t z,
mpi_point_t point)
{
mpi_snatch (x, point->x);
mpi_snatch (y, point->y);
mpi_snatch (z, point->z);
xfree (point);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
const char* fixed_data;
int fixed_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&fixed_data, &fixed_data_size) ||
(fixed_data_size <= 0)) {
return false;
}
if (fixed_data_size != sizeof(SkBitmap_Data))
return false; // Message is malformed.
const char* variable_data;
int variable_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&variable_data, &variable_data_size) ||
(variable_data_size < 0)) {
return false;
}
const SkBitmap_Data* bmp_data =
reinterpret_cast<const SkBitmap_Data*>(fixed_data);
return bmp_data->InitSkBitmapFromData(r, variable_data, variable_data_size);
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 172,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::dragMoveEvent(QDragMoveEvent* event)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
d->pageView->eventHandler()->handleDragMoveEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Histogram::Histogram(const std::string& name,
Sample minimum,
Sample maximum,
const BucketRanges* ranges,
HistogramBase::AtomicCount* counts,
HistogramBase::AtomicCount* logged_counts,
uint32_t counts_size,
HistogramSamples::Metadata* meta,
HistogramSamples::Metadata* logged_meta)
: HistogramBase(name),
bucket_ranges_(ranges),
declared_min_(minimum),
declared_max_(maximum) {
if (ranges) {
samples_.reset(new SampleVector(HashMetricName(name),
counts, counts_size, meta, ranges));
logged_samples_.reset(new SampleVector(samples_->id(), logged_counts,
counts_size, logged_meta, ranges));
}
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<MetaData> MyOggExtractor::getFormat() const {
return mMeta;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 162,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long sock_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sock *sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int pid, err;
struct net *net;
sock = file->private_data;
sk = sock->sk;
net = sock_net(sk);
if (cmd >= SIOCDEVPRIVATE && cmd <= (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15)) {
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
} else
#ifdef CONFIG_WEXT_CORE
if (cmd >= SIOCIWFIRST && cmd <= SIOCIWLAST) {
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
} else
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case FIOSETOWN:
case SIOCSPGRP:
err = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(pid, (int __user *)argp))
break;
f_setown(sock->file, pid, 1);
err = 0;
break;
case FIOGETOWN:
case SIOCGPGRP:
err = put_user(f_getown(sock->file),
(int __user *)argp);
break;
case SIOCGIFBR:
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!br_ioctl_hook)
request_module("bridge");
mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
if (br_ioctl_hook)
err = br_ioctl_hook(net, cmd, argp);
mutex_unlock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!vlan_ioctl_hook)
request_module("8021q");
mutex_lock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
if (vlan_ioctl_hook)
err = vlan_ioctl_hook(net, argp);
mutex_unlock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCADDDLCI:
case SIOCDELDLCI:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!dlci_ioctl_hook)
request_module("dlci");
mutex_lock(&dlci_ioctl_mutex);
if (dlci_ioctl_hook)
err = dlci_ioctl_hook(cmd, argp);
mutex_unlock(&dlci_ioctl_mutex);
break;
default:
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, arg);
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 50,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *sockfs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
return mount_pseudo(fs_type, "socket:", &sockfs_ops,
&sockfs_dentry_operations, SOCKFS_MAGIC);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatA32F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing,
float,
float>(const float* source,
float* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[0] = source[3];
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tiocswinsz(struct tty_struct *tty, struct winsize __user *arg)
{
struct winsize tmp_ws;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp_ws, arg, sizeof(*arg)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tty->ops->resize)
return tty->ops->resize(tty, &tmp_ws);
else
return tty_do_resize(tty, &tmp_ws);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedAttrGetter1AttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggedAttrGetter1", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggedAttrGetter1(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoSetEncryptionPassphrase(
const std::string& passphrase,
bool is_explicit) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->SetEncryptionPassphrase(passphrase, is_explicit);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipip_tunnel_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
dev->netdev_ops = &ipip_netdev_ops;
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
dev->type = ARPHRD_TUNNEL;
dev->hard_header_len = LL_MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct iphdr);
dev->mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN - sizeof(struct iphdr);
dev->flags = IFF_NOARP;
dev->iflink = 0;
dev->addr_len = 4;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rx_data(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb, void *ctx)
{
struct iwch_ep *ep = ctx;
struct cpl_rx_data *hdr = cplhdr(skb);
unsigned int dlen = ntohs(hdr->len);
PDBG("%s ep %p dlen %u\n", __func__, ep, dlen);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*hdr));
skb_trim(skb, dlen);
ep->rcv_seq += dlen;
BUG_ON(ep->rcv_seq != (ntohl(hdr->seq) + dlen));
switch (state_read(&ep->com)) {
case MPA_REQ_SENT:
process_mpa_reply(ep, skb);
break;
case MPA_REQ_WAIT:
process_mpa_request(ep, skb);
break;
case MPA_REP_SENT:
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR MOD "%s Unexpected streaming data."
" ep %p state %d tid %d\n",
__func__, ep, state_read(&ep->com), ep->hwtid);
/*
* The ep will timeout and inform the ULP of the failure.
* See ep_timeout().
*/
break;
}
/* update RX credits */
update_rx_credits(ep, dlen);
return CPL_RET_BUF_DONE;
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rawprint(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint8_t *loc, size_t len)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*loc, len);
hexprint(ndo, loc, len);
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_invept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 vmx_instruction_info, types;
unsigned long type;
gva_t gva;
struct x86_exception e;
struct {
u64 eptp, gpa;
} operand;
if (!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &
SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) ||
!(vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps & VMX_EPT_INVEPT_BIT)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (!kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PE)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf);
types = (vmx->nested.nested_vmx_ept_caps >> VMX_EPT_EXTENT_SHIFT) & 6;
if (type >= 32 || !(types & (1 << type))) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
/* According to the Intel VMX instruction reference, the memory
* operand is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==global)
*/
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx_instruction_info, false, &gva))
return 1;
if (kvm_read_guest_virt(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva, &operand,
sizeof(operand), &e)) {
kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
return 1;
}
switch (type) {
case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_GLOBAL:
/*
* TODO: track mappings and invalidate
* single context requests appropriately
*/
case VMX_EPT_EXTENT_CONTEXT:
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
break;
default:
BUG_ON(1);
break;
}
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mark_parents_uninteresting(struct commit *commit)
{
struct commit_list *parents = NULL, *l;
for (l = commit->parents; l; l = l->next)
commit_list_insert(l->item, &parents);
while (parents) {
struct commit *commit = parents->item;
l = parents;
parents = parents->next;
free(l);
while (commit) {
/*
* A missing commit is ok iff its parent is marked
* uninteresting.
*
* We just mark such a thing parsed, so that when
* it is popped next time around, we won't be trying
* to parse it and get an error.
*/
if (!has_sha1_file(commit->object.sha1))
commit->object.parsed = 1;
if (commit->object.flags & UNINTERESTING)
break;
commit->object.flags |= UNINTERESTING;
/*
* Normally we haven't parsed the parent
* yet, so we won't have a parent of a parent
* here. However, it may turn out that we've
* reached this commit some other way (where it
* wasn't uninteresting), in which case we need
* to mark its parents recursively too..
*/
if (!commit->parents)
break;
for (l = commit->parents->next; l; l = l->next)
commit_list_insert(l->item, &parents);
commit = commit->parents->item;
}
}
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_decodepkt(jpc_dec_t *dec, jas_stream_t *pkthdrstream, jas_stream_t *in, int compno, int rlvlno,
int prcno, int lyrno)
{
jpc_bitstream_t *inb;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int n;
int m;
int i;
jpc_tagtreenode_t *leaf;
int included;
int ret;
int numnewpasses;
jpc_dec_seg_t *seg;
int len;
int present;
int savenumnewpasses;
int mycounter;
jpc_ms_t *ms;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int usedcblkcnt;
int cblkno;
uint_fast32_t bodylen;
bool discard;
int passno;
int maxpasses;
int hdrlen;
int hdroffstart;
int hdroffend;
/* Avoid compiler warning about possible use of uninitialized
variable. */
bodylen = 0;
discard = (lyrno >= dec->maxlyrs);
tile = dec->curtile;
cp = tile->cp;
ccp = &cp->ccps[compno];
/*
* Decode the packet header.
*/
/* Decode the SOP marker segment if present. */
if (cp->csty & JPC_COD_SOP) {
if (jpc_dec_lookahead(in) == JPC_MS_SOP) {
if (!(ms = jpc_getms(in, dec->cstate))) {
return -1;
}
if (jpc_ms_gettype(ms) != JPC_MS_SOP) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
jas_eprintf("missing SOP marker segment\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
}
}
hdroffstart = jas_stream_getrwcount(pkthdrstream);
if (!(inb = jpc_bitstream_sopen(pkthdrstream, "r"))) {
return -1;
}
if ((present = jpc_bitstream_getbit(inb)) < 0) {
return 1;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("\n", present));
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("present=%d ", present));
/* Is the packet non-empty? */
if (present) {
/* The packet is non-empty. */
tcomp = &tile->tcomps[compno];
rlvl = &tcomp->rlvls[rlvlno];
bodylen = 0;
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands; bandno < rlvl->numbands;
++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
prc = &band->prcs[prcno];
if (!prc->cblks) {
continue;
}
usedcblkcnt = 0;
for (cblkno = 0, cblk = prc->cblks; cblkno < prc->numcblks;
++cblkno, ++cblk) {
++usedcblkcnt;
if (!cblk->numpasses) {
leaf = jpc_tagtree_getleaf(prc->incltagtree, usedcblkcnt - 1);
if ((included = jpc_tagtree_decode(prc->incltagtree, leaf, lyrno + 1, inb)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
} else {
if ((included = jpc_bitstream_getbit(inb)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("\n"));
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("included=%d ", included));
if (!included) {
continue;
}
if (!cblk->numpasses) {
i = 1;
leaf = jpc_tagtree_getleaf(prc->numimsbstagtree, usedcblkcnt - 1);
for (;;) {
if ((ret = jpc_tagtree_decode(prc->numimsbstagtree, leaf, i, inb)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (ret) {
break;
}
++i;
}
cblk->numimsbs = i - 1;
cblk->firstpassno = cblk->numimsbs * 3;
}
if ((numnewpasses = jpc_getnumnewpasses(inb)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numnewpasses=%d ", numnewpasses));
seg = cblk->curseg;
savenumnewpasses = numnewpasses;
mycounter = 0;
if (numnewpasses > 0) {
if ((m = jpc_getcommacode(inb)) < 0) {
return -1;
}
cblk->numlenbits += m;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("increment=%d ", m));
while (numnewpasses > 0) {
passno = cblk->firstpassno + cblk->numpasses + mycounter;
/* XXX - the maxpasses is not set precisely but this doesn't matter... */
maxpasses = JPC_SEGPASSCNT(passno, cblk->firstpassno, 10000, (ccp->cblkctx & JPC_COX_LAZY) != 0, (ccp->cblkctx & JPC_COX_TERMALL) != 0);
if (!discard && !seg) {
if (!(seg = jpc_seg_alloc())) {
return -1;
}
jpc_seglist_insert(&cblk->segs, cblk->segs.tail, seg);
if (!cblk->curseg) {
cblk->curseg = seg;
}
seg->passno = passno;
seg->type = JPC_SEGTYPE(seg->passno, cblk->firstpassno, (ccp->cblkctx & JPC_COX_LAZY) != 0);
seg->maxpasses = maxpasses;
}
n = JAS_MIN(numnewpasses, maxpasses);
mycounter += n;
numnewpasses -= n;
if ((len = jpc_bitstream_getbits(inb, cblk->numlenbits + jpc_floorlog2(n))) < 0) {
return -1;
}
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("len=%d ", len));
if (!discard) {
seg->lyrno = lyrno;
seg->numpasses += n;
seg->cnt = len;
seg = seg->next;
}
bodylen += len;
}
}
cblk->numpasses += savenumnewpasses;
}
}
jpc_bitstream_inalign(inb, 0, 0);
} else {
if (jpc_bitstream_inalign(inb, 0x7f, 0)) {
jas_eprintf("alignment failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
jpc_bitstream_close(inb);
hdroffend = jas_stream_getrwcount(pkthdrstream);
hdrlen = hdroffend - hdroffstart;
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 5) {
jas_eprintf("hdrlen=%lu bodylen=%lu \n", (unsigned long) hdrlen,
(unsigned long) bodylen);
}
if (cp->csty & JPC_COD_EPH) {
if (jpc_dec_lookahead(pkthdrstream) == JPC_MS_EPH) {
if (!(ms = jpc_getms(pkthdrstream, dec->cstate))) {
jas_eprintf("cannot get (EPH) marker segment\n");
return -1;
}
if (jpc_ms_gettype(ms) != JPC_MS_EPH) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
jas_eprintf("missing EPH marker segment\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
}
}
/* decode the packet body. */
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jas_eprintf("packet body offset=%06ld\n", (long) jas_stream_getrwcount(in));
}
if (!discard) {
tcomp = &tile->tcomps[compno];
rlvl = &tcomp->rlvls[rlvlno];
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands; bandno < rlvl->numbands;
++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
prc = &band->prcs[prcno];
if (!prc->cblks) {
continue;
}
for (cblkno = 0, cblk = prc->cblks; cblkno < prc->numcblks;
++cblkno, ++cblk) {
seg = cblk->curseg;
while (seg) {
if (!seg->stream) {
if (!(seg->stream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
}
#if 0
jas_eprintf("lyrno=%02d, compno=%02d, lvlno=%02d, prcno=%02d, bandno=%02d, cblkno=%02d, passno=%02d numpasses=%02d cnt=%d numbps=%d, numimsbs=%d\n", lyrno, compno, rlvlno, prcno, band - rlvl->bands, cblk - prc->cblks, seg->passno, seg->numpasses, seg->cnt, band->numbps, cblk->numimsbs);
#endif
if (seg->cnt > 0) {
if (jpc_getdata(in, seg->stream, seg->cnt) < 0) {
return -1;
}
seg->cnt = 0;
}
if (seg->numpasses >= seg->maxpasses) {
cblk->curseg = seg->next;
}
seg = seg->next;
}
}
}
} else {
if (jas_stream_gobble(in, bodylen) != JAS_CAST(int, bodylen)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 86,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceFetcher::canRequest(Resource::Type type, const KURL& url, const ResourceLoaderOptions& options, bool forPreload, FetchRequest::OriginRestriction originRestriction) const
{
SecurityOrigin* securityOrigin = options.securityOrigin.get();
if (!securityOrigin && document())
securityOrigin = document()->securityOrigin();
if (securityOrigin && !securityOrigin->canDisplay(url)) {
if (!forPreload)
context().reportLocalLoadFailed(url);
WTF_LOG(ResourceLoading, "ResourceFetcher::requestResource URL was not allowed by SecurityOrigin::canDisplay");
return 0;
}
bool shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy = (frame() && frame()->script().shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy()) || (options.contentSecurityPolicyOption == DoNotCheckContentSecurityPolicy);
switch (type) {
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Image:
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::Font:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
case Resource::TextTrack:
case Resource::ImportResource:
case Resource::Media:
if (originRestriction == FetchRequest::RestrictToSameOrigin && !securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return false;
}
break;
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
case Resource::SVGDocument:
if (!securityOrigin->canRequest(url)) {
printAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return false;
}
break;
}
ContentSecurityPolicy::ReportingStatus cspReporting = forPreload ?
ContentSecurityPolicy::SuppressReport : ContentSecurityPolicy::SendReport;
switch (type) {
case Resource::XSLStyleSheet:
ASSERT(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::xsltEnabled());
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::Script:
case Resource::ImportResource:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowScriptFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
if (frame()) {
Settings* settings = frame()->settings();
if (!frame()->loader().client()->allowScriptFromSource(!settings || settings->scriptEnabled(), url)) {
frame()->loader().client()->didNotAllowScript();
return false;
}
}
break;
case Resource::CSSStyleSheet:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowStyleFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::SVGDocument:
case Resource::Image:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowImageFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
case Resource::Font: {
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowFontFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
}
case Resource::MainResource:
case Resource::Raw:
case Resource::LinkPrefetch:
case Resource::LinkSubresource:
break;
case Resource::Media:
case Resource::TextTrack:
if (!shouldBypassMainWorldContentSecurityPolicy && !m_document->contentSecurityPolicy()->allowMediaFromSource(url, cspReporting))
return false;
break;
}
if (!checkInsecureContent(type, url, options.mixedContentBlockingTreatment))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: name_is_valid (char const *name)
{
int i;
bool is_valid = true;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE (invalid_names); i++)
{
if (! invalid_names[i])
break;
if (! strcmp (invalid_names[i], name))
return false;
}
is_valid = filename_is_safe (name);
/* Allow any filename if we are in the filesystem root. */
if (! is_valid && cwd_is_root (name))
is_valid = true;
if (! is_valid)
{
say ("Ignoring potentially dangerous file name %s\n", quotearg (name));
if (i < ARRAY_SIZE (invalid_names))
invalid_names[i] = name;
}
return is_valid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void labeljumps(JF, js_JumpList *jump, int baddr, int caddr)
{
while (jump) {
if (jump->type == STM_BREAK)
labelto(J, F, jump->inst, baddr);
if (jump->type == STM_CONTINUE)
labelto(J, F, jump->inst, caddr);
jump = jump->next;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int nonblock,
int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int copied = 0;
u32 peek_seq;
u32 *seq;
unsigned long used;
int err;
int target; /* Read at least this many bytes */
long timeo;
struct task_struct *user_recv = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb, *last;
u32 urg_hole = 0;
if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
return inet_recv_error(sk, msg, len, addr_len);
if (sk_can_busy_loop(sk) && skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) &&
(sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED))
sk_busy_loop(sk, nonblock);
lock_sock(sk);
err = -ENOTCONN;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
goto out;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
/* Urgent data needs to be handled specially. */
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto recv_urg;
if (unlikely(tp->repair)) {
err = -EPERM;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
goto out;
if (tp->repair_queue == TCP_SEND_QUEUE)
goto recv_sndq;
err = -EINVAL;
if (tp->repair_queue == TCP_NO_QUEUE)
goto out;
/* 'common' recv queue MSG_PEEK-ing */
}
seq = &tp->copied_seq;
if (flags & MSG_PEEK) {
peek_seq = tp->copied_seq;
seq = &peek_seq;
}
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
do {
u32 offset;
/* Are we at urgent data? Stop if we have read anything or have SIGURG pending. */
if (tp->urg_data && tp->urg_seq == *seq) {
if (copied)
break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
copied = timeo ? sock_intr_errno(timeo) : -EAGAIN;
break;
}
}
/* Next get a buffer. */
last = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
skb_queue_walk(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb) {
last = skb;
/* Now that we have two receive queues this
* shouldn't happen.
*/
if (WARN(before(*seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq),
"recvmsg bug: copied %X seq %X rcvnxt %X fl %X\n",
*seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt,
flags))
break;
offset = *seq - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (unlikely(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN)) {
pr_err_once("%s: found a SYN, please report !\n", __func__);
offset--;
}
if (offset < skb->len)
goto found_ok_skb;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN)
goto found_fin_ok;
WARN(!(flags & MSG_PEEK),
"recvmsg bug 2: copied %X seq %X rcvnxt %X fl %X\n",
*seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt, flags);
}
/* Well, if we have backlog, try to process it now yet. */
if (copied >= target && !sk->sk_backlog.tail)
break;
if (copied) {
if (sk->sk_err ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN) ||
!timeo ||
signal_pending(current))
break;
} else {
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
break;
if (sk->sk_err) {
copied = sock_error(sk);
break;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE)) {
/* This occurs when user tries to read
* from never connected socket.
*/
copied = -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
break;
}
if (!timeo) {
copied = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
copied = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
break;
}
}
tcp_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
if (!sysctl_tcp_low_latency && tp->ucopy.task == user_recv) {
/* Install new reader */
if (!user_recv && !(flags & (MSG_TRUNC | MSG_PEEK))) {
user_recv = current;
tp->ucopy.task = user_recv;
tp->ucopy.msg = msg;
}
tp->ucopy.len = len;
WARN_ON(tp->copied_seq != tp->rcv_nxt &&
!(flags & (MSG_PEEK | MSG_TRUNC)));
/* Ugly... If prequeue is not empty, we have to
* process it before releasing socket, otherwise
* order will be broken at second iteration.
* More elegant solution is required!!!
*
* Look: we have the following (pseudo)queues:
*
* 1. packets in flight
* 2. backlog
* 3. prequeue
* 4. receive_queue
*
* Each queue can be processed only if the next ones
* are empty. At this point we have empty receive_queue.
* But prequeue _can_ be not empty after 2nd iteration,
* when we jumped to start of loop because backlog
* processing added something to receive_queue.
* We cannot release_sock(), because backlog contains
* packets arrived _after_ prequeued ones.
*
* Shortly, algorithm is clear --- to process all
* the queues in order. We could make it more directly,
* requeueing packets from backlog to prequeue, if
* is not empty. It is more elegant, but eats cycles,
* unfortunately.
*/
if (!skb_queue_empty(&tp->ucopy.prequeue))
goto do_prequeue;
/* __ Set realtime policy in scheduler __ */
}
if (copied >= target) {
/* Do not sleep, just process backlog. */
release_sock(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
} else {
sk_wait_data(sk, &timeo, last);
}
if (user_recv) {
int chunk;
/* __ Restore normal policy in scheduler __ */
chunk = len - tp->ucopy.len;
if (chunk != 0) {
NET_ADD_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPDIRECTCOPYFROMBACKLOG, chunk);
len -= chunk;
copied += chunk;
}
if (tp->rcv_nxt == tp->copied_seq &&
!skb_queue_empty(&tp->ucopy.prequeue)) {
do_prequeue:
tcp_prequeue_process(sk);
chunk = len - tp->ucopy.len;
if (chunk != 0) {
NET_ADD_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPDIRECTCOPYFROMPREQUEUE, chunk);
len -= chunk;
copied += chunk;
}
}
}
if ((flags & MSG_PEEK) &&
(peek_seq - copied - urg_hole != tp->copied_seq)) {
net_dbg_ratelimited("TCP(%s:%d): Application bug, race in MSG_PEEK\n",
current->comm,
task_pid_nr(current));
peek_seq = tp->copied_seq;
}
continue;
found_ok_skb:
/* Ok so how much can we use? */
used = skb->len - offset;
if (len < used)
used = len;
/* Do we have urgent data here? */
if (tp->urg_data) {
u32 urg_offset = tp->urg_seq - *seq;
if (urg_offset < used) {
if (!urg_offset) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_URGINLINE)) {
++*seq;
urg_hole++;
offset++;
used--;
if (!used)
goto skip_copy;
}
} else
used = urg_offset;
}
}
if (!(flags & MSG_TRUNC)) {
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, offset, msg, used);
if (err) {
/* Exception. Bailout! */
if (!copied)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
*seq += used;
copied += used;
len -= used;
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
skip_copy:
if (tp->urg_data && after(tp->copied_seq, tp->urg_seq)) {
tp->urg_data = 0;
tcp_fast_path_check(sk);
}
if (used + offset < skb->len)
continue;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_FIN)
goto found_fin_ok;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb);
continue;
found_fin_ok:
/* Process the FIN. */
++*seq;
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
sk_eat_skb(sk, skb);
break;
} while (len > 0);
if (user_recv) {
if (!skb_queue_empty(&tp->ucopy.prequeue)) {
int chunk;
tp->ucopy.len = copied > 0 ? len : 0;
tcp_prequeue_process(sk);
if (copied > 0 && (chunk = len - tp->ucopy.len) != 0) {
NET_ADD_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPDIRECTCOPYFROMPREQUEUE, chunk);
len -= chunk;
copied += chunk;
}
}
tp->ucopy.task = NULL;
tp->ucopy.len = 0;
}
/* According to UNIX98, msg_name/msg_namelen are ignored
* on connected socket. I was just happy when found this 8) --ANK
*/
/* Clean up data we have read: This will do ACK frames. */
tcp_cleanup_rbuf(sk, copied);
release_sock(sk);
return copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
recv_urg:
err = tcp_recv_urg(sk, msg, len, flags);
goto out;
recv_sndq:
err = tcp_peek_sndq(sk, msg, len);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 61,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* ConvertTransferStatusToApi(const UsbTransferStatus status) {
switch (status) {
case device::USB_TRANSFER_COMPLETED:
return "";
case device::USB_TRANSFER_ERROR:
return kErrorGeneric;
case device::USB_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT:
return kErrorTimeout;
case device::USB_TRANSFER_CANCELLED:
return kErrorCancelled;
case device::USB_TRANSFER_STALLED:
return kErrorStalled;
case device::USB_TRANSFER_DISCONNECT:
return kErrorDisconnect;
case device::USB_TRANSFER_OVERFLOW:
return kErrorOverflow;
case device::USB_TRANSFER_LENGTH_SHORT:
return kErrorTransferLength;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_read_finish_row(png_structrp png_ptr)
{
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
static PNG_CONST png_byte png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
png_debug(1, "in png_read_finish_row");
png_ptr->row_number++;
if (png_ptr->row_number < png_ptr->num_rows)
return;
if (png_ptr->interlaced != 0)
{
png_ptr->row_number = 0;
/* TO DO: don't do this if prev_row isn't needed (requires
* read-ahead of the next row's filter byte.
*/
memset(png_ptr->prev_row, 0, png_ptr->rowbytes + 1);
do
{
png_ptr->pass++;
if (png_ptr->pass >= 7)
break;
png_ptr->iwidth = (png_ptr->width +
png_pass_inc[png_ptr->pass] - 1 -
png_pass_start[png_ptr->pass]) /
png_pass_inc[png_ptr->pass];
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE) == 0)
{
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height +
png_pass_yinc[png_ptr->pass] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[png_ptr->pass]) /
png_pass_yinc[png_ptr->pass];
}
else /* if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE) */
break; /* libpng deinterlacing sees every row */
} while (png_ptr->num_rows == 0 || png_ptr->iwidth == 0);
if (png_ptr->pass < 7)
return;
}
/* Here after at the end of the last row of the last pass. */
png_read_finish_IDAT(png_ptr);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGStyleElement::FinishParsingChildren() {
StyleElement::ProcessingResult result =
StyleElement::FinishParsingChildren(*this);
SVGElement::FinishParsingChildren();
if (result == StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError)
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
R=futhark@chromium.org, hayato@chromium.org
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: need_pre_notify(gpointer key, gpointer value, gpointer user_data)
{
cib_client_t *client = value;
if (client->pre_notify) {
gboolean *needed = user_data;
*needed = TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unlock_rename(struct dentry *p1, struct dentry *p2)
{
inode_unlock(p1->d_inode);
if (p1 != p2) {
inode_unlock(p2->d_inode);
mutex_unlock(&p1->d_inode->i_sb->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
}
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
write_lock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
if (sa->rc_channel && __rfcomm_get_sock_by_addr(sa->rc_channel, &sa->rc_bdaddr)) {
err = -EADDRINUSE;
} else {
/* Save source address */
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->src, &sa->rc_bdaddr);
rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel = sa->rc_channel;
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
}
write_unlock(&rfcomm_sk_list.lock);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selftest_basic_256 (void)
{
RIJNDAEL_context *ctx;
unsigned char *ctxmem;
unsigned char scratch[16];
static unsigned char plaintext_256[16] =
{
0x06,0x9A,0x00,0x7F,0xC7,0x6A,0x45,0x9F,
0x98,0xBA,0xF9,0x17,0xFE,0xDF,0x95,0x21
};
static unsigned char key_256[32] =
{
0x08,0x09,0x0A,0x0B,0x0D,0x0E,0x0F,0x10,
0x12,0x13,0x14,0x15,0x17,0x18,0x19,0x1A,
0x1C,0x1D,0x1E,0x1F,0x21,0x22,0x23,0x24,
0x26,0x27,0x28,0x29,0x2B,0x2C,0x2D,0x2E
};
static const unsigned char ciphertext_256[16] =
{
0x08,0x0E,0x95,0x17,0xEB,0x16,0x77,0x71,
0x9A,0xCF,0x72,0x80,0x86,0x04,0x0A,0xE3
};
ctx = _gcry_cipher_selftest_alloc_ctx (sizeof *ctx, &ctxmem);
if (!ctx)
return "failed to allocate memory";
rijndael_setkey (ctx, key_256, sizeof(key_256), NULL);
rijndael_encrypt (ctx, scratch, plaintext_256);
if (memcmp (scratch, ciphertext_256, sizeof (ciphertext_256)))
{
xfree (ctxmem);
return "AES-256 test encryption failed.";
}
rijndael_decrypt (ctx, scratch, scratch);
xfree (ctxmem);
if (memcmp (scratch, plaintext_256, sizeof (plaintext_256)))
return "AES-256 test decryption failed.";
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 96,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_ldap_connection (cherokee_validator_ldap_t *ldap, cherokee_validator_ldap_props_t *props)
{
int re;
int val;
/* Connect
*/
ldap->conn = ldap_init (props->server.buf, props->port);
if (ldap->conn == NULL) {
LOG_ERRNO (errno, cherokee_err_critical,
CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_CONNECT,
props->server.buf, props->port);
return ret_error;
}
TRACE (ENTRIES, "Connected to %s:%d\n", props->server.buf, props->port);
/* Set LDAP protocol version
*/
val = LDAP_VERSION3;
re = ldap_set_option (ldap->conn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &val);
if (re != LDAP_OPT_SUCCESS) {
LOG_ERROR (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_V3, ldap_err2string(re));
return ret_error;
}
TRACE (ENTRIES, "LDAP protocol version %d set\n", LDAP_VERSION3);
/* Secure connections
*/
if (props->tls) {
#ifdef LDAP_OPT_X_TLS
if (! cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&props->ca_file)) {
re = ldap_set_option (NULL, LDAP_OPT_X_TLS_CACERTFILE, props->ca_file.buf);
if (re != LDAP_OPT_SUCCESS) {
LOG_CRITICAL (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_CA,
props->ca_file.buf, ldap_err2string (re));
return ret_error;
}
}
#else
LOG_ERROR_S (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_STARTTLS);
#endif
}
/* Bind
*/
if (cherokee_buffer_is_empty (&props->binddn)) {
TRACE (ENTRIES, "anonymous bind %s", "\n");
re = ldap_simple_bind_s (ldap->conn, NULL, NULL);
} else {
TRACE (ENTRIES, "bind user=%s password=%s\n",
props->binddn.buf, props->bindpw.buf);
re = ldap_simple_bind_s (ldap->conn, props->binddn.buf, props->bindpw.buf);
}
if (re != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
LOG_CRITICAL (CHEROKEE_ERROR_VALIDATOR_LDAP_BIND,
props->server.buf, props->port, props->binddn.buf,
props->bindpw.buf, ldap_err2string(re));
return ret_error;
}
return ret_ok;
}
Commit Message: Prevent the LDAP validator from accepting an empty password.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 36,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::RequestDecode(LocalFrame* frame,
const PaintImage& image,
base::OnceCallback<void(bool)> callback) {
WebLocalFrameImpl* web_frame = WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(frame);
web_frame->LocalRoot()->FrameWidget()->RequestDecode(image,
std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbReleaseInterfaceFunction::~UsbReleaseInterfaceFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::ScheduleIdleHandler(int64 initial_delay_ms) {
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ = initial_delay_ms;
idle_timer_.Stop();
idle_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(initial_delay_ms),
this, &RenderThreadImpl::IdleHandler);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateGroupInEmptyOrigin() {
storage()->LoadOrCreateGroup(kManifestUrl, delegate());
Verify_CreateGroup();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfssvc_decode_readlinkargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfsd_readlinkargs *args)
{
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
args->buffer = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 168,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* domObject = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
return JSTestObj::getConstructor(exec, domObject->globalObject());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btrfs_invalidatepage(struct page *page, unsigned int offset,
unsigned int length)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct extent_io_tree *tree;
struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered;
struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL;
u64 page_start = page_offset(page);
u64 page_end = page_start + PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1;
int inode_evicting = inode->i_state & I_FREEING;
/*
* we have the page locked, so new writeback can't start,
* and the dirty bit won't be cleared while we are here.
*
* Wait for IO on this page so that we can safely clear
* the PagePrivate2 bit and do ordered accounting
*/
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree;
if (offset) {
btrfs_releasepage(page, GFP_NOFS);
return;
}
if (!inode_evicting)
lock_extent_bits(tree, page_start, page_end, 0, &cached_state);
ordered = btrfs_lookup_ordered_extent(inode, page_start);
if (ordered) {
/*
* IO on this page will never be started, so we need
* to account for any ordered extents now
*/
if (!inode_evicting)
clear_extent_bit(tree, page_start, page_end,
EXTENT_DIRTY | EXTENT_DELALLOC |
EXTENT_LOCKED | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING |
EXTENT_DEFRAG, 1, 0, &cached_state,
GFP_NOFS);
/*
* whoever cleared the private bit is responsible
* for the finish_ordered_io
*/
if (TestClearPagePrivate2(page)) {
struct btrfs_ordered_inode_tree *tree;
u64 new_len;
tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->ordered_tree;
spin_lock_irq(&tree->lock);
set_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_TRUNCATED, &ordered->flags);
new_len = page_start - ordered->file_offset;
if (new_len < ordered->truncated_len)
ordered->truncated_len = new_len;
spin_unlock_irq(&tree->lock);
if (btrfs_dec_test_ordered_pending(inode, &ordered,
page_start,
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, 1))
btrfs_finish_ordered_io(ordered);
}
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered);
if (!inode_evicting) {
cached_state = NULL;
lock_extent_bits(tree, page_start, page_end, 0,
&cached_state);
}
}
if (!inode_evicting) {
clear_extent_bit(tree, page_start, page_end,
EXTENT_LOCKED | EXTENT_DIRTY |
EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING |
EXTENT_DEFRAG, 1, 1,
&cached_state, GFP_NOFS);
__btrfs_releasepage(page, GFP_NOFS);
}
ClearPageChecked(page);
if (PagePrivate(page)) {
ClearPagePrivate(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
page_cache_release(page);
}
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mailimf_in_reply_to_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_in_reply_to ** result)
{
struct mailimf_in_reply_to * in_reply_to;
size_t cur_token;
clist * msg_id_list;
int res;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token, "In-Reply-To");
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_msg_id_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &msg_id_list);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_list;
}
in_reply_to = mailimf_in_reply_to_new(msg_id_list);
if (in_reply_to == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_list;
}
* result = in_reply_to;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_list:
clist_foreach(msg_id_list, (clist_func) mailimf_msg_id_free, NULL);
clist_free(msg_id_list);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void task_fork_fair(struct task_struct *p)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq;
struct sched_entity *se = &p->se, *curr;
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
struct rq_flags rf;
rq_lock(rq, &rf);
update_rq_clock(rq);
cfs_rq = task_cfs_rq(current);
curr = cfs_rq->curr;
if (curr) {
update_curr(cfs_rq);
se->vruntime = curr->vruntime;
}
place_entity(cfs_rq, se, 1);
if (sysctl_sched_child_runs_first && curr && entity_before(curr, se)) {
/*
* Upon rescheduling, sched_class::put_prev_task() will place
* 'current' within the tree based on its new key value.
*/
swap(curr->vruntime, se->vruntime);
resched_curr(rq);
}
se->vruntime -= cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
rq_unlock(rq, &rf);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tiffSizeProc(thandle_t fd)
{
ULARGE_INTEGER m;
m.LowPart=GetFileSize(fd,&m.HighPart);
return(m.QuadPart);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 86,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfc_genl_target_lost(struct nfc_dev *dev, u32 target_idx)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(msg, 0, 0, &nfc_genl_family, 0,
NFC_EVENT_TARGET_LOST);
if (!hdr)
goto free_msg;
if (nla_put_string(msg, NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_NAME, nfc_device_name(dev)) ||
nla_put_u32(msg, NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX, target_idx))
goto nla_put_failure;
genlmsg_end(msg, hdr);
genlmsg_multicast(&nfc_genl_family, msg, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
free_msg:
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void promiseAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, imp->promiseAttribute().v8Value());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Maybe<bool> CollectValuesOrEntriesImpl(
Isolate* isolate, Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<FixedArray> values_or_entries, bool get_entries, int* nof_items,
PropertyFilter filter) {
int count = 0;
if ((filter & ONLY_CONFIGURABLE) == 0) {
Handle<FixedArrayBase> elements(object->elements());
uint32_t length = AccessorClass::GetCapacityImpl(*object, *elements);
for (uint32_t index = 0; index < length; ++index) {
Handle<Object> value =
AccessorClass::GetImpl(isolate, *elements, index);
if (get_entries) {
value = MakeEntryPair(isolate, index, value);
}
values_or_entries->set(count++, *value);
}
}
*nof_items = count;
return Just(true);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<base::TimeTicks>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
ParamTraits<int64>::Write(m, p.ToInternalValue());
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t default_file_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct kvec *vec, __vec[PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS];
struct iov_iter to;
struct page **pages;
unsigned int nr_pages;
size_t offset, base, copied = 0;
ssize_t res;
int i;
if (pipe->nrbufs == pipe->buffers)
return -EAGAIN;
/*
* Try to keep page boundaries matching to source pagecache ones -
* it probably won't be much help, but...
*/
offset = *ppos & ~PAGE_MASK;
iov_iter_pipe(&to, READ, pipe, len + offset);
res = iov_iter_get_pages_alloc(&to, &pages, len + offset, &base);
if (res <= 0)
return -ENOMEM;
nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(res + base, PAGE_SIZE);
vec = __vec;
if (nr_pages > PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS) {
vec = kmalloc_array(nr_pages, sizeof(struct kvec), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!vec)) {
res = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
pipe->bufs[to.idx].offset = offset;
pipe->bufs[to.idx].len -= offset;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
size_t this_len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
vec[i].iov_base = page_address(pages[i]) + offset;
vec[i].iov_len = this_len;
len -= this_len;
offset = 0;
}
res = kernel_readv(in, vec, nr_pages, *ppos);
if (res > 0) {
copied = res;
*ppos += res;
}
if (vec != __vec)
kfree(vec);
out:
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++)
put_page(pages[i]);
kvfree(pages);
iov_iter_advance(&to, copied); /* truncates and discards */
return res;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_help( void )
{
grEvent dummy_event;
FTDemo_Display_Clear( display );
grGotoxy( 0, 0 );
grSetMargin( 2, 1 );
grGotobitmap( display->bitmap );
grWriteln( "FreeType Glyph Viewer - part of the FreeType test suite" );
grLn();
grWriteln( "This program is used to display all glyphs from one or" );
grWriteln( "several font files, with the FreeType library." );
grLn();
grWriteln( "Use the following keys:" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " F1 or ? : display this help screen" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " a : toggle anti-aliasing" );
grWriteln( " left/right : decrement/increment glyph index" );
grWriteln( " up/down : change character size" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " F7 : decrement index by 10" );
grWriteln( " F8 : increment index by 10" );
grWriteln( " F9 : decrement index by 100" );
grWriteln( " F10 : increment index by 100" );
grWriteln( " F11 : decrement index by 1000" );
grWriteln( " F12 : increment index by 1000" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " i : move grid up" );
grWriteln( " j : move grid left" );
grWriteln( " k : move grid down" );
grWriteln( " l : move grid right" );
grWriteln( " Page up/dn : zoom in/out grid" );
grWriteln( " RETURN : reset zoom and position" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " H : toggle horizontal hinting" );
grWriteln( " V : toggle vertical hinting" );
grWriteln( " B : toggle blue zone hinting" );
grWriteln( " d : toggle dots display" );
grWriteln( " o : toggle outline display" );
grWriteln( " g : increase gamma by 0.1" );
grWriteln( " v : decrease gamma by 0.1" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " n : next font" );
grWriteln( " p : previous font" );
grWriteln( " q / ESC : exit program" );
grLn();
grWriteln( " 1 : dump edge hints" );
grWriteln( " 2 : dump segment hints" );
grWriteln( " 3 : dump point hints" );
grLn();
grWriteln( "press any key to exit this help screen" );
grRefreshSurface( display->surface );
grListenSurface( display->surface, gr_event_key, &dummy_event );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void make_tx_response(struct xenvif *vif,
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp,
s8 st)
{
RING_IDX i = vif->tx.rsp_prod_pvt;
struct xen_netif_tx_response *resp;
int notify;
resp = RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->tx, i);
resp->id = txp->id;
resp->status = st;
if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_extra_info)
RING_GET_RESPONSE(&vif->tx, ++i)->status = XEN_NETIF_RSP_NULL;
vif->tx.rsp_prod_pvt = ++i;
RING_PUSH_RESPONSES_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY(&vif->tx, notify);
if (notify)
notify_remote_via_irq(vif->irq);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spannable_string_t* WebPage::selectedText(int32_t flags)
{
return d->m_inputHandler->selectedText(flags);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void trace_default_header(struct seq_file *m)
{
struct trace_iterator *iter = m->private;
struct trace_array *tr = iter->tr;
unsigned long trace_flags = tr->trace_flags;
if (!(trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_CONTEXT_INFO))
return;
if (iter->iter_flags & TRACE_FILE_LAT_FMT) {
/* print nothing if the buffers are empty */
if (trace_empty(iter))
return;
print_trace_header(m, iter);
if (!(trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_VERBOSE))
print_lat_help_header(m);
} else {
if (!(trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_VERBOSE)) {
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_IRQ_INFO)
print_func_help_header_irq(iter->trace_buffer,
m, trace_flags);
else
print_func_help_header(iter->trace_buffer, m,
trace_flags);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bshift (unsigned long *b)
{
unsigned long c;
int i;
c = b[3] & 1;
for (i = 3; i > 0; i--)
{
b[i] = (b[i] >> 1) | (b[i - 1] << 31);
}
b[i] >>= 1;
return c;
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 89,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Launcher::DelegateView::DelegateView(Launcher* launcher)
: launcher_(launcher),
focus_cycler_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int digi_read_oob_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct tty_struct *tty;
struct digi_port *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
int opcode, line, status, val;
int i;
unsigned int rts;
/* handle each oob command */
for (i = 0; i < urb->actual_length - 3;) {
opcode = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[i++];
line = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[i++];
status = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[i++];
val = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[i++];
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "digi_read_oob_callback: opcode=%d, line=%d, status=%d, val=%d\n",
opcode, line, status, val);
if (status != 0 || line >= serial->type->num_ports)
continue;
port = serial->port[line];
priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (priv == NULL)
return -1;
tty = tty_port_tty_get(&port->port);
rts = 0;
if (tty)
rts = C_CRTSCTS(tty);
if (tty && opcode == DIGI_CMD_READ_INPUT_SIGNALS) {
spin_lock(&priv->dp_port_lock);
/* convert from digi flags to termiox flags */
if (val & DIGI_READ_INPUT_SIGNALS_CTS) {
priv->dp_modem_signals |= TIOCM_CTS;
/* port must be open to use tty struct */
if (rts)
tty_port_tty_wakeup(&port->port);
} else {
priv->dp_modem_signals &= ~TIOCM_CTS;
/* port must be open to use tty struct */
}
if (val & DIGI_READ_INPUT_SIGNALS_DSR)
priv->dp_modem_signals |= TIOCM_DSR;
else
priv->dp_modem_signals &= ~TIOCM_DSR;
if (val & DIGI_READ_INPUT_SIGNALS_RI)
priv->dp_modem_signals |= TIOCM_RI;
else
priv->dp_modem_signals &= ~TIOCM_RI;
if (val & DIGI_READ_INPUT_SIGNALS_DCD)
priv->dp_modem_signals |= TIOCM_CD;
else
priv->dp_modem_signals &= ~TIOCM_CD;
spin_unlock(&priv->dp_port_lock);
} else if (opcode == DIGI_CMD_TRANSMIT_IDLE) {
spin_lock(&priv->dp_port_lock);
priv->dp_transmit_idle = 1;
wake_up_interruptible(&priv->dp_transmit_idle_wait);
spin_unlock(&priv->dp_port_lock);
} else if (opcode == DIGI_CMD_IFLUSH_FIFO) {
wake_up_interruptible(&priv->dp_flush_wait);
}
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnDisplayMetricsChanged(
const display::Display& new_display,
uint32_t changed_metrics) {
if (!widget_ || !widget_->IsActive() ||
!WMHelper::GetInstance()->IsTabletModeWindowManagerEnabled()) {
return;
}
const display::Screen* screen = display::Screen::GetScreen();
display::Display current_display =
screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
if (current_display.id() != new_display.id() ||
!(changed_metrics & display::DisplayObserver::DISPLAY_METRIC_ROTATION)) {
return;
}
Orientation target_orientation = SizeToOrientation(new_display.size());
if (orientation_ == target_orientation)
return;
expected_orientation_ = target_orientation;
EnsureCompositorIsLockedForOrientationChange();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_vip_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
alloc_value_block(alloc_vrrp_vip, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DBusHelperProxy::hasToStopAction()
{
QEventLoop loop;
loop.processEvents(QEventLoop::AllEvents);
return m_stopRequest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::IsConnected() const {
BluetoothDeviceClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
DCHECK(properties);
return properties->connected.value();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool mem_cgroup_wait_acct_move(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
{
if (mc.moving_task && current != mc.moving_task) {
if (mem_cgroup_under_move(memcg)) {
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
prepare_to_wait(&mc.waitq, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
/* moving charge context might have finished. */
if (mc.moving_task)
schedule();
finish_wait(&mc.waitq, &wait);
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateObjExceptionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateObjException");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EmptyScriptState state;
ScriptExecutionContext* scriptContext = getScriptExecutionContext();
if (!scriptContext)
return v8::Undefined();
RefPtr<TestObj> result = imp->withScriptExecutionContextAndScriptStateObjException(&state, scriptContext, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
if (state.hadException())
return throwError(state.exception(), args.GetIsolate());
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> withScriptStateObjExceptionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.withScriptStateObjException");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
EmptyScriptState state;
RefPtr<TestObj> result = imp->withScriptStateObjException(&state, ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
if (state.hadException())
return throwError(state.exception(), args.GetIsolate());
return toV8(result.release(), args.GetIsolate());
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsSession::MojoConnectionDestroyed() {
binding_.Close();
session_ptr_.reset();
io_session_ptr_.reset();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(SSL *s, int read_sock)
{
s->statem.in_sctp_read_sock = read_sock;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 9,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XFixesCursorInit(void)
{
int i;
if (party_like_its_1989)
CursorVisible = EnableCursor;
else
CursorVisible = FALSE;
if (!dixRegisterPrivateKey(&CursorScreenPrivateKeyRec, PRIVATE_SCREEN, 0))
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++) {
ScreenPtr pScreen = screenInfo.screens[i];
CursorScreenPtr cs;
cs = (CursorScreenPtr) calloc(1, sizeof(CursorScreenRec));
if (!cs)
return FALSE;
Wrap(cs, pScreen, CloseScreen, CursorCloseScreen);
Wrap(cs, pScreen, DisplayCursor, CursorDisplayCursor);
cs->pCursorHideCounts = NULL;
SetCursorScreen(pScreen, cs);
}
CursorClientType = CreateNewResourceType(CursorFreeClient,
"XFixesCursorClient");
CursorHideCountType = CreateNewResourceType(CursorFreeHideCount,
"XFixesCursorHideCount");
CursorWindowType = CreateNewResourceType(CursorFreeWindow,
"XFixesCursorWindow");
return CursorClientType && CursorHideCountType && CursorWindowType;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2DecoderManualInitTest() { }
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_inline_image(fz_context *ctx, pdf_csi *csi, fz_stream *stm)
{
pdf_document *doc = csi->doc;
pdf_obj *rdb = csi->rdb;
pdf_obj *obj = NULL;
fz_image *img = NULL;
int ch, found;
fz_var(obj);
fz_var(img);
fz_try(ctx)
{
obj = pdf_parse_dict(ctx, doc, stm, &doc->lexbuf.base);
/* read whitespace after ID keyword */
ch = fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (ch == '\r')
if (fz_peek_byte(ctx, stm) == '\n')
fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
img = pdf_load_inline_image(ctx, doc, rdb, obj, stm);
/* find EI */
found = 0;
ch = fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
do
{
while (ch != 'E' && ch != EOF)
ch = fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (ch == 'E')
{
ch = fz_read_byte(ctx, stm);
if (ch == 'I')
{
ch = fz_peek_byte(ctx, stm);
if (ch == ' ' || ch <= 32 || ch == EOF || ch == '<' || ch == '/')
{
found = 1;
break;
}
}
}
} while (ch != EOF);
if (!found)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_SYNTAX, "syntax error after inline image");
}
fz_always(ctx)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, obj);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
fz_drop_image(ctx, img);
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
return img;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetchPixel_a1b1g1r1 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
CARD32 pixel = Fetch4(bits, offset);
CARD32 a,r,g,b;
a = ((pixel & 0x8) * 0xff) << 21;
r = ((pixel & 0x4) * 0xff) >> 3;
g = ((pixel & 0x2) * 0xff) << 7;
b = ((pixel & 0x1) * 0xff) << 16;
return a|r|g|b;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_PUSH_VLAN(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
uint16_t ethertype;
char *error;
*usable_protocols &= OFPUTIL_P_OF11_UP;
error = str_to_u16(arg, "ethertype", ðertype);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (ethertype != ETH_TYPE_VLAN_8021Q) {
/* XXX ETH_TYPE_VLAN_8021AD case isn't supported */
return xasprintf("%s: not a valid VLAN ethertype", arg);
}
ofpact_put_PUSH_VLAN(ofpacts);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err tfra_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_RandomAccessEntry *p = 0;
GF_TrackFragmentRandomAccessBox *ptr = (GF_TrackFragmentRandomAccessBox *)s;
if (ptr->size<12) return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
ptr->track_id = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
if (gf_bs_read_int(bs, 26) !=0) return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
ptr->traf_bits = (gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2)+1)*8;
ptr->trun_bits = (gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2)+1)*8;
ptr->sample_bits = (gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2)+1)*8;
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
ptr->nb_entries = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
if (ptr->version==1) {
if (ptr->nb_entries > ptr->size / (16+(ptr->traf_bits+ptr->trun_bits+ptr->sample_bits)/8)) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid number of entries %d in traf\n", ptr->nb_entries));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
} else {
if (ptr->nb_entries > ptr->size / (8+(ptr->traf_bits+ptr->trun_bits+ptr->sample_bits)/8)) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid number of entries %d in traf\n", ptr->nb_entries));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
}
if (ptr->nb_entries)
{
p = (GF_RandomAccessEntry *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_RandomAccessEntry) * ptr->nb_entries);
if (!p) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
ptr->entries = p;
for (i=0; i<ptr->nb_entries; i++) {
memset(p, 0, sizeof(GF_RandomAccessEntry));
if (ptr->version==1) {
p->time = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
p->moof_offset = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
}
else
{
p->time = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
p->moof_offset = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
p->traf_number = gf_bs_read_int(bs, ptr->traf_bits);
p->trun_number = gf_bs_read_int(bs, ptr->trun_bits);
p->sample_number = gf_bs_read_int(bs, ptr->sample_bits);
++p;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::navigate(ErrorString*, const String& url)
{
UserGestureIndicator indicator(DefinitelyProcessingNewUserGesture);
Frame* frame = m_page->mainFrame();
FrameLoadRequest request(frame->document(), ResourceRequest(frame->document()->completeURL(url)));
frame->loader().load(request);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xen_vbd_resize(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
struct xen_vbd *vbd = &blkif->vbd;
struct xenbus_transaction xbt;
int err;
struct xenbus_device *dev = xen_blkbk_xenbus(blkif->be);
unsigned long long new_size = vbd_sz(vbd);
pr_info("VBD Resize: Domid: %d, Device: (%d, %d)\n",
blkif->domid, MAJOR(vbd->pdevice), MINOR(vbd->pdevice));
pr_info("VBD Resize: new size %llu\n", new_size);
vbd->size = new_size;
again:
err = xenbus_transaction_start(&xbt);
if (err) {
pr_warn("Error starting transaction\n");
return;
}
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename, "sectors", "%llu",
(unsigned long long)vbd_sz(vbd));
if (err) {
pr_warn("Error writing new size\n");
goto abort;
}
/*
* Write the current state; we will use this to synchronize
* the front-end. If the current state is "connected" the
* front-end will get the new size information online.
*/
err = xenbus_printf(xbt, dev->nodename, "state", "%d", dev->state);
if (err) {
pr_warn("Error writing the state\n");
goto abort;
}
err = xenbus_transaction_end(xbt, 0);
if (err == -EAGAIN)
goto again;
if (err)
pr_warn("Error ending transaction\n");
return;
abort:
xenbus_transaction_end(xbt, 1);
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct icmphdr user_icmph;
struct pingfakehdr pfh;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
int free = 0;
__be32 saddr, daddr, faddr;
u8 tos;
int err;
pr_debug("ping_v4_sendmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", inet, inet->inet_num);
err = ping_common_sendmsg(AF_INET, msg, len, &user_icmph,
sizeof(user_icmph));
if (err)
return err;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_name) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in *, usin, msg->msg_name);
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
/* no remote port */
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
/* no remote port */
}
ipc.sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.ttl = 0;
ipc.tos = -1;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sk, msg, &ipc, false);
if (unlikely(err)) {
kfree(ipc.opt);
return err;
}
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
}
if (!ipc.opt) {
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt) {
memcpy(&opt_copy, inet_opt,
sizeof(*inet_opt) + inet_opt->opt.optlen);
ipc.opt = &opt_copy.opt;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, ipc.sockc.tsflags, &ipc.tx_flags);
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
}
tos = get_rttos(&ipc, inet);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE) ||
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE) ||
(ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.is_strictroute)) {
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
}
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
} else if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->uc_index;
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk), faddr, saddr, 0, 0,
sk->sk_uid);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
goto out;
}
err = -EACCES;
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST) &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto out;
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (!ipc.addr)
ipc.addr = fl4.daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
pfh.icmph.type = user_icmph.type; /* already checked */
pfh.icmph.code = user_icmph.code; /* ditto */
pfh.icmph.checksum = 0;
pfh.icmph.un.echo.id = inet->inet_sport;
pfh.icmph.un.echo.sequence = user_icmph.un.echo.sequence;
pfh.msg = msg;
pfh.wcheck = 0;
pfh.family = AF_INET;
err = ip_append_data(sk, &fl4, ping_getfrag, &pfh, len,
0, &ipc, &rt, msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
ip_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else
err = ping_v4_push_pending_frames(sk, &pfh, &fl4);
release_sock(sk);
out:
ip_rt_put(rt);
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
if (!err) {
icmp_out_count(sock_net(sk), user_icmph.type);
return len;
}
return err;
do_confirm:
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE)
dst_confirm_neigh(&rt->dst, &fl4.daddr);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ping: implement proper locking
We got a report of yet another bug in ping
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/03/24/6
->disconnect() is not called with socket lock held.
Fix this by acquiring ping rwlock earlier.
Thanks to Daniel, Alexander and Andrey for letting us know this problem.
Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Jiang <danieljiang0415@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned short readushort(FILE * f, int bigendian)
{
unsigned char c1, c2;
if (!fread(&c1, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return 0;
}
if (!fread(&c2, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
return 0;
}
if (bigendian) {
return (unsigned short)((c1 << 8) + c2);
} else {
return (unsigned short)((c2 << 8) + c1);
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 61,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FakeCentral::IsDiscovering() const {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __put_ioctx(struct kioctx *ctx)
{
BUG_ON(ctx->reqs_active);
cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->wq);
cancel_work_sync(&ctx->wq.work);
aio_free_ring(ctx);
mmdrop(ctx->mm);
ctx->mm = NULL;
pr_debug("__put_ioctx: freeing %p\n", ctx);
call_rcu(&ctx->rcu_head, ctx_rcu_free);
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int bsg_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct bsg_device *bd = file->private_data;
unsigned int mask = 0;
poll_wait(file, &bd->wq_done, wait);
poll_wait(file, &bd->wq_free, wait);
spin_lock_irq(&bd->lock);
if (!list_empty(&bd->done_list))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (bd->queued_cmds < bd->max_queue)
mask |= POLLOUT;
spin_unlock_irq(&bd->lock);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs_old(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos;
int cnt = 0;
struct sctp_getaddrs_old getaddrs;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr;
void __user *to;
union sctp_addr temp;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
int addrlen;
rwlock_t *addr_lock;
int err = 0;
if (len != sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs_old))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&getaddrs, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs_old)))
return -EFAULT;
if (getaddrs.addr_num <= 0) return -EINVAL;
/*
* For UDP-style sockets, id specifies the association to query.
* If the id field is set to the value '0' then the locally bound
* addresses are returned without regard to any particular
* association.
*/
if (0 == getaddrs.assoc_id) {
bp = &sctp_sk(sk)->ep->base.bind_addr;
addr_lock = &sctp_sk(sk)->ep->base.addr_lock;
} else {
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, getaddrs.assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
addr_lock = &asoc->base.addr_lock;
}
to = getaddrs.addrs;
sctp_read_lock(addr_lock);
/* If the endpoint is bound to 0.0.0.0 or ::0, get the valid
* addresses from the global local address list.
*/
if (sctp_list_single_entry(&bp->address_list)) {
addr = list_entry(bp->address_list.next,
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
if (sctp_is_any(&addr->a)) {
cnt = sctp_copy_laddrs_to_user_old(sk, bp->port,
getaddrs.addr_num,
to);
if (cnt < 0) {
err = cnt;
goto unlock;
}
goto copy_getaddrs;
}
}
list_for_each(pos, &bp->address_list) {
addr = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
memcpy(&temp, &addr->a, sizeof(temp));
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_v4map(sp, &temp);
addrlen = sctp_get_af_specific(temp.sa.sa_family)->sockaddr_len;
if (copy_to_user(to, &temp, addrlen)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto unlock;
}
to += addrlen;
cnt ++;
if (cnt >= getaddrs.addr_num) break;
}
copy_getaddrs:
getaddrs.addr_num = cnt;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &getaddrs, sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs_old)))
err = -EFAULT;
unlock:
sctp_read_unlock(addr_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_create_principal_3(void *server_handle,
kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
int n_ks_tuple, krb5_key_salt_tuple *ks_tuple,
char *password)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec polent;
krb5_boolean have_polent = FALSE;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_tl_data *tl_data_tail;
unsigned int ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
krb5_kvno act_kvno;
int new_n_ks_tuple = 0;
krb5_key_salt_tuple *new_ks_tuple = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
check_1_6_dummy(entry, mask, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple, &password);
/*
* Argument sanity checking, and opening up the DB
*/
if (entry == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if(!(mask & KADM5_PRINCIPAL) || (mask & KADM5_MOD_NAME) ||
(mask & KADM5_MOD_TIME) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_PWD_CHANGE) ||
(mask & KADM5_MKVNO) || (mask & KADM5_AUX_ATTRIBUTES) ||
(mask & KADM5_LAST_SUCCESS) || (mask & KADM5_LAST_FAILED) ||
(mask & KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if ((mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) && entry->n_key_data != 0)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && entry->policy == NULL)
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & KADM5_POLICY) && (mask & KADM5_POLICY_CLR))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
if((mask & ~ALL_PRINC_MASK))
return KADM5_BAD_MASK;
/*
* Check to see if the principal exists
*/
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, entry->principal, &kdb, &adb);
switch(ret) {
case KADM5_UNK_PRINC:
break;
case 0:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return KADM5_DUP;
default:
return ret;
}
kdb = calloc(1, sizeof(*kdb));
if (kdb == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
memset(&adb, 0, sizeof(osa_princ_ent_rec));
/*
* If a policy was specified, load it.
* If we can not find the one specified return an error
*/
if ((mask & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, entry->policy, &polent, &have_polent);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
if (password) {
ret = passwd_check(handle, password, have_polent ? &polent : NULL,
entry->principal);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Start populating the various DB fields, using the
* "defaults" for fields that were not specified by the
* mask.
*/
if ((ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now)))
goto cleanup;
kdb->magic = KRB5_KDB_MAGIC_NUMBER;
kdb->len = KRB5_KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH; /* gag me with a chainsaw */
if ((mask & KADM5_ATTRIBUTES))
kdb->attributes = entry->attributes;
else
kdb->attributes = handle->params.flags;
if ((mask & KADM5_MAX_LIFE))
kdb->max_life = entry->max_life;
else
kdb->max_life = handle->params.max_life;
if (mask & KADM5_MAX_RLIFE)
kdb->max_renewable_life = entry->max_renewable_life;
else
kdb->max_renewable_life = handle->params.max_rlife;
if ((mask & KADM5_PRINC_EXPIRE_TIME))
kdb->expiration = entry->princ_expire_time;
else
kdb->expiration = handle->params.expiration;
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
if (have_polent) {
if(polent.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = ts_incr(now, polent.pw_max_life);
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
if ((mask & KADM5_PW_EXPIRATION))
kdb->pw_expiration = entry->pw_expiration;
kdb->last_success = 0;
kdb->last_failed = 0;
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* this is kind of gross, but in order to free the tl data, I need
to free the entire kdb entry, and that will try to free the
principal. */
ret = krb5_copy_principal(handle->context, entry->principal, &kdb->princ);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if ((ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now)))
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_TL_DATA) {
/* splice entry->tl_data onto the front of kdb->tl_data */
for (tl_data_tail = entry->tl_data; tl_data_tail;
tl_data_tail = tl_data_tail->tl_data_next)
{
ret = krb5_dbe_update_tl_data(handle->context, kdb, tl_data_tail);
if( ret )
goto cleanup;
}
}
/*
* We need to have setup the TL data, so we have strings, so we can
* check enctype policy, which is why we check/initialize ks_tuple
* this late.
*/
ret = apply_keysalt_policy(handle, entry->policy, n_ks_tuple, ks_tuple,
&new_n_ks_tuple, &new_ks_tuple);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* initialize the keys */
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, &act_kvno, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
if (mask & KADM5_KEY_DATA) {
/* The client requested no keys for this principal. */
assert(entry->n_key_data == 0);
} else if (password) {
ret = krb5_dbe_cpw(handle->context, act_mkey, new_ks_tuple,
new_n_ks_tuple, password,
(mask & KADM5_KVNO)?entry->kvno:1,
FALSE, kdb);
} else {
/* Null password means create with random key (new in 1.8). */
ret = krb5_dbe_crk(handle->context, &master_keyblock,
new_ks_tuple, new_n_ks_tuple, FALSE, kdb);
}
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* Record the master key VNO used to encrypt this entry's keys */
ret = krb5_dbe_update_mkvno(handle->context, kdb, act_kvno);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_PRECOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
/* populate the admin-server-specific fields. In the OV server,
this used to be in a separate database. Since there's already
marshalling code for the admin fields, to keep things simple,
I'm going to keep it, and make all the admin stuff occupy a
single tl_data record, */
adb.admin_history_kvno = INITIAL_HIST_KVNO;
if (mask & KADM5_POLICY) {
adb.aux_attributes = KADM5_POLICY;
/* this does *not* need to be strdup'ed, because adb is xdr */
/* encoded in osa_adb_create_princ, and not ever freed */
adb.policy = entry->policy;
}
/* In all cases key and the principal data is set, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = mask | KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_PRINCIPAL ;
/* store the new db entry */
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
(void) k5_kadm5_hook_create(handle->context, handle->hook_handles,
KADM5_HOOK_STAGE_POSTCOMMIT, entry, mask,
new_n_ks_tuple, new_ks_tuple, password);
cleanup:
free(new_ks_tuple);
krb5_db_free_principal(handle->context, kdb);
if (have_polent)
(void) kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &polent);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90 | 1 | 169,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::recalcStyle(StyleChange change)
{
ASSERT(!view() || !view()->isPainting());
if (view() && view()->isPainting())
return;
if (m_inStyleRecalc)
return; // Guard against re-entrancy. -dwh
#if PLATFORM(CHROMIUM)
TRACE_EVENT0("webkit", "Document::recalcStyle");
#endif
if (m_styleSheetCollection->needsUpdateActiveStylesheetsOnStyleRecalc())
m_styleSheetCollection->updateActiveStyleSheets(DocumentStyleSheetCollection::FullUpdate);
InspectorInstrumentationCookie cookie = InspectorInstrumentation::willRecalculateStyle(this);
if (m_elemSheet && m_elemSheet->contents()->usesRemUnits())
m_styleSheetCollection->setUsesRemUnit(true);
m_inStyleRecalc = true;
{
PostAttachCallbackDisabler disabler(this);
WidgetHierarchyUpdatesSuspensionScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
RefPtr<FrameView> frameView = view();
if (frameView) {
frameView->pauseScheduledEvents();
frameView->beginDeferredRepaints();
}
ASSERT(!renderer() || renderArena());
if (!renderer() || !renderArena())
goto bailOut;
if (m_pendingStyleRecalcShouldForce)
change = Force;
if ((change == Force) || (shouldDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent() && (change >= Inherit))) {
m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle = false;
RefPtr<RenderStyle> documentStyle = StyleResolver::styleForDocument(this, m_styleResolver ? m_styleResolver->fontSelector() : 0);
StyleChange ch = Node::diff(documentStyle.get(), renderer()->style(), this);
if (ch != NoChange)
renderer()->setStyle(documentStyle.release());
}
for (Node* n = firstChild(); n; n = n->nextSibling()) {
if (!n->isElementNode())
continue;
Element* element = toElement(n);
if (change >= Inherit || element->childNeedsStyleRecalc() || element->needsStyleRecalc())
element->recalcStyle(change);
}
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (view())
view()->updateCompositingLayersAfterStyleChange();
#endif
bailOut:
clearNeedsStyleRecalc();
clearChildNeedsStyleRecalc();
unscheduleStyleRecalc();
m_inStyleRecalc = false;
if (m_styleResolver)
m_styleSheetCollection->resetCSSFeatureFlags();
if (frameView) {
frameView->resumeScheduledEvents();
frameView->endDeferredRepaints();
}
}
if (m_closeAfterStyleRecalc) {
m_closeAfterStyleRecalc = false;
implicitClose();
}
InspectorInstrumentation::didRecalculateStyle(cookie);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionService::SessionService(Profile* profile)
: BaseSessionService(SESSION_RESTORE, profile, FilePath()),
has_open_trackable_browsers_(false),
move_on_new_browser_(false),
save_delay_in_millis_(base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(2500)),
save_delay_in_mins_(base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(10)),
save_delay_in_hrs_(base::TimeDelta::FromHours(8)) {
Init();
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,834 |
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