instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void semaphore_free(semaphore_t *semaphore) {
if (!semaphore)
return;
if (semaphore->fd != INVALID_FD)
close(semaphore->fd);
osi_free(semaphore);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<infobars::InfoBar> InfoBarService::CreateConfirmInfoBar(
std::unique_ptr<ConfirmInfoBarDelegate> delegate) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (views_mode_controller::IsViewsBrowserCocoa())
return InfoBarService::CreateConfirmInfoBarCocoa(std::move(delegate));
#endif
return std::make_unique<ConfirmInfoBar>(std::move(delegate));
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conditionalLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::conditionalLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* DupMatShaper(cmsContext ContextID, const void* Data)
{
return _cmsDupMem(ContextID, Data, sizeof(MatShaper8Data));
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jref_idct_put(uint8_t *dest, int line_size, int16_t *block)
{
ff_j_rev_dct (block);
put_pixels_clamped_c(block, dest, line_size);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gf_prompt_set_echo_off(Bool echo_off)
{
DWORD flags;
HANDLE hStdin = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
BOOL ret = GetConsoleMode(hStdin, &flags);
if (!ret) {
DWORD err = GetLastError();
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONSOLE, ("[Console] GetConsoleMode() return with the following error code: %d\n", err));
}
if (echo_off) flags &= ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
else flags |= ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT;
SetConsoleMode(hStdin, flags);
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int veth_change_mtu(struct net_device *dev, int new_mtu)
{
if (!is_valid_veth_mtu(new_mtu))
return -EINVAL;
dev->mtu = new_mtu;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedAttr2AttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger())
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObject.activityLoggedAttr2", 0, 0, "Getter");
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedAttr2AttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_adjust_tsc_offset_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 adjustment)
{
u64 offset = vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET);
vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset + adjustment);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
/* Even when running L2, the adjustment needs to apply to L1 */
to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset += adjustment;
} else
trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id, offset,
offset + adjustment);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SuggestionState::~SuggestionState() {}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 109,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: remove_component_data_new (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *slave,
char **options)
{
RemoveComponentData *data;
data = g_new0 (RemoveComponentData, 1);
data->refcount = 1;
data->context = context;
data->slave = g_object_ref (slave);
data->options = g_strdupv (options);
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_nvram_exec_cmd(struct tg3 *tp, u32 nvram_cmd)
{
int i;
tw32(NVRAM_CMD, nvram_cmd);
for (i = 0; i < NVRAM_CMD_TIMEOUT; i++) {
udelay(10);
if (tr32(NVRAM_CMD) & NVRAM_CMD_DONE) {
udelay(10);
break;
}
}
if (i == NVRAM_CMD_TIMEOUT)
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Run() { message_loop_runner_->Run(); }
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_init(VirtIODevice *vdev, const char *name,
uint16_t device_id, size_t config_size)
{
int i;
vdev->device_id = device_id;
vdev->status = 0;
vdev->isr = 0;
vdev->queue_sel = 0;
vdev->config_vector = VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR;
vdev->vq = g_malloc0(sizeof(VirtQueue) * VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX);
vdev->vm_running = runstate_is_running();
for (i = 0; i < VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vector = VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR;
vdev->vq[i].vdev = vdev;
vdev->vq[i].queue_index = i;
}
vdev->name = name;
vdev->config_len = config_size;
if (vdev->config_len) {
vdev->config = g_malloc0(config_size);
} else {
vdev->config = NULL;
}
vdev->vmstate = qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(virtio_vmstate_change,
vdev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* V8Proxy::retrieveWindowForCallingContext()
{
v8::Handle<v8::Context> context = v8::Context::GetCalling();
if (context.IsEmpty())
return 0;
return retrieveWindow(context);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_spnego_tokenTarg_msg(OM_uint32 status, gss_OID mech_wanted,
gss_buffer_t data, gss_buffer_t mechListMIC,
send_token_flag sendtoken,
gss_buffer_t outbuf)
{
unsigned int tlen = 0;
unsigned int ret = 0;
unsigned int NegTokenTargSize = 0;
unsigned int NegTokenSize = 0;
unsigned int rspTokenSize = 0;
unsigned int micTokenSize = 0;
unsigned int dataLen = 0;
unsigned char *t;
unsigned char *ptr;
if (outbuf == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
if (sendtoken == INIT_TOKEN_SEND && mech_wanted == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN);
outbuf->length = 0;
outbuf->value = NULL;
/*
* ASN.1 encoding of the negResult
* ENUMERATED type is 3 bytes
* ENUMERATED TAG, Length, Value,
* Plus 2 bytes for the CONTEXT id and length.
*/
dataLen = 5;
/*
* calculate data length
*
* If this is the initial token, include length of
* mech_type and the negotiation result fields.
*/
if (sendtoken == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
int mechlistTokenSize;
/*
* 1 byte for the CONTEXT ID(0xa0),
* 1 byte for the OID ID(0x06)
* 1 byte for OID Length field
* Plus the rest... (OID Length, OID value)
*/
mechlistTokenSize = 3 + mech_wanted->length +
gssint_der_length_size(mech_wanted->length);
dataLen += mechlistTokenSize;
}
if (data != NULL && data->length > 0) {
/* Length of the inner token */
rspTokenSize = 1 + gssint_der_length_size(data->length) +
data->length;
dataLen += rspTokenSize;
/* Length of the outer token */
dataLen += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(rspTokenSize);
}
if (mechListMIC != NULL) {
/* Length of the inner token */
micTokenSize = 1 + gssint_der_length_size(mechListMIC->length) +
mechListMIC->length;
dataLen += micTokenSize;
/* Length of the outer token */
dataLen += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(micTokenSize);
}
/*
* Add size of DER encoded:
* NegTokenTarg [ SEQUENCE ] of
* NegResult[0] ENUMERATED {
* accept_completed(0),
* accept_incomplete(1),
* reject(2) }
* supportedMech [1] MechType OPTIONAL,
* responseToken [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
* mechListMIC [3] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL
*
* size = data->length + MechListMic + SupportedMech len +
* Result Length + ASN.1 overhead
*/
NegTokenTargSize = dataLen;
dataLen += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(NegTokenTargSize);
/*
* NegotiationToken [ CHOICE ]{
* negTokenInit [0] NegTokenInit,
* negTokenTarg [1] NegTokenTarg }
*/
NegTokenSize = dataLen;
dataLen += 1 + gssint_der_length_size(NegTokenSize);
tlen = dataLen;
t = (unsigned char *) gssalloc_malloc(tlen);
if (t == NULL) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
ptr = t;
/*
* Indicate that we are sending CHOICE 1
* (NegTokenTarg)
*/
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x01;
if (gssint_put_der_length(NegTokenSize, &ptr, dataLen) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
*ptr++ = SEQUENCE;
if (gssint_put_der_length(NegTokenTargSize, &ptr,
tlen - (int)(ptr-t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
/*
* First field of the NegTokenTarg SEQUENCE
* is the ENUMERATED NegResult.
*/
*ptr++ = CONTEXT;
if (gssint_put_der_length(3, &ptr,
tlen - (int)(ptr-t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
if (put_negResult(&ptr, status, tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
if (sendtoken == INIT_TOKEN_SEND) {
/*
* Next, is the Supported MechType
*/
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x01;
if (gssint_put_der_length(mech_wanted->length + 2,
&ptr,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
if (put_mech_oid(&ptr, mech_wanted,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
}
if (data != NULL && data->length > 0) {
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x02;
if (gssint_put_der_length(rspTokenSize, &ptr,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
if (put_input_token(&ptr, data,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
}
if (mechListMIC != NULL) {
*ptr++ = CONTEXT | 0x03;
if (gssint_put_der_length(micTokenSize, &ptr,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
if (put_input_token(&ptr, mechListMIC,
tlen - (int)(ptr - t)) < 0) {
ret = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto errout;
}
}
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
errout:
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
if (t)
free(t);
} else {
outbuf->length = ptr - t;
outbuf->value = (void *) t;
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 36,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* hashbin_remove_this( hashbin_t* hashbin, irda_queue_t* entry)
{
unsigned long flags = 0;
int bin;
long hashv;
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin != NULL, return NULL;);
IRDA_ASSERT( hashbin->magic == HB_MAGIC, return NULL;);
IRDA_ASSERT( entry != NULL, return NULL;);
/* Synchronize */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
} /* Default is no-lock */
/* Check if valid and not already removed... */
if((entry->q_next == NULL) || (entry->q_prev == NULL)) {
entry = NULL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Locate hashbin
*/
hashv = entry->q_hash;
bin = GET_HASHBIN( hashv );
/*
* Dequeue the entry...
*/
dequeue_general( (irda_queue_t**) &hashbin->hb_queue[ bin ],
entry);
hashbin->hb_size--;
entry->q_next = NULL;
entry->q_prev = NULL;
/*
* Check if this item is the currently selected item, and in
* that case we must reset hb_current
*/
if ( entry == hashbin->hb_current)
hashbin->hb_current = NULL;
out:
/* Release lock */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hashbin->hb_spinlock, flags);
} /* Default is no-lock */
return entry;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CopyCompatToKeymap(struct xkb_keymap *keymap, CompatInfo *info)
{
keymap->compat_section_name = strdup_safe(info->name);
XkbEscapeMapName(keymap->compat_section_name);
keymap->mods = info->mods;
if (!darray_empty(info->interps)) {
struct collect collect;
darray_init(collect.sym_interprets);
/* Most specific to least specific. */
CopyInterps(info, true, MATCH_EXACTLY, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, true, MATCH_ALL, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, true, MATCH_NONE, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, true, MATCH_ANY, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, true, MATCH_ANY_OR_NONE, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, false, MATCH_EXACTLY, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, false, MATCH_ALL, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, false, MATCH_NONE, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, false, MATCH_ANY, &collect);
CopyInterps(info, false, MATCH_ANY_OR_NONE, &collect);
darray_steal(collect.sym_interprets,
&keymap->sym_interprets, &keymap->num_sym_interprets);
}
CopyLedMapDefsToKeymap(keymap, info);
return true;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 78,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_pcm_hw_constraint_ratdens(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime,
unsigned int cond,
snd_pcm_hw_param_t var,
const struct snd_pcm_hw_constraint_ratdens *r)
{
return snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, cond, var,
snd_pcm_hw_rule_ratdens, (void *)r,
var, -1);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::~GahpServer()
{
if ( my_id != NULL ) {
GahpServersById.remove( HashKey( my_id ) );
}
if ( m_deleteMeTid != TIMER_UNSET ) {
daemonCore->Cancel_Timer( m_deleteMeTid );
}
free( m_buffer );
delete m_commands_supported;
if ( globus_gass_server_url != NULL ) {
free( globus_gass_server_url );
}
if ( globus_gt2_gram_callback_contact != NULL ) {
free( globus_gt2_gram_callback_contact );
}
if ( globus_gt4_gram_callback_contact != NULL ) {
free( globus_gt4_gram_callback_contact );
}
if ( my_id != NULL ) {
free(my_id);
}
if ( binary_path != NULL ) {
free(binary_path);
}
if ( m_gahp_readfd != -1 ) {
daemonCore->Close_Pipe( m_gahp_readfd );
}
if ( m_gahp_writefd != -1 ) {
daemonCore->Close_Pipe( m_gahp_writefd );
}
if ( m_gahp_errorfd != -1 ) {
daemonCore->Close_Pipe( m_gahp_errorfd );
}
if ( poll_tid != -1 ) {
daemonCore->Cancel_Timer( poll_tid );
}
if ( master_proxy != NULL ) {
ReleaseProxy( master_proxy->proxy, (TimerHandlercpp)&GahpServer::ProxyCallback,
this );
delete master_proxy;
}
if ( proxy_check_tid != TIMER_UNSET ) {
daemonCore->Cancel_Timer( proxy_check_tid );
}
if ( ProxiesByFilename != NULL ) {
GahpProxyInfo *gahp_proxy;
ProxiesByFilename->startIterations();
while ( ProxiesByFilename->iterate( gahp_proxy ) != 0 ) {
ReleaseProxy( gahp_proxy->proxy,
(TimerHandlercpp)&GahpServer::ProxyCallback, this );
delete gahp_proxy;
}
delete ProxiesByFilename;
}
if ( requestTable != NULL ) {
delete requestTable;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequestState::OnAddressNormalized(
bool success,
const autofill::AutofillProfile& normalized_profile) {
delegate_->OnShippingAddressSelected(
data_util::GetPaymentAddressFromAutofillProfile(normalized_profile,
app_locale_));
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_illinois_init(struct sock *sk)
{
struct illinois *ca = inet_csk_ca(sk);
ca->alpha = ALPHA_MAX;
ca->beta = BETA_BASE;
ca->base_rtt = 0x7fffffff;
ca->max_rtt = 0;
ca->acked = 0;
ca->rtt_low = 0;
ca->rtt_above = 0;
rtt_reset(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline int mmc_ioctl_dvd_read_struct(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
void __user *arg,
struct packet_command *cgc)
{
int ret;
dvd_struct *s;
int size = sizeof(dvd_struct);
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_DVD))
return -ENOSYS;
s = memdup_user(arg, size);
if (IS_ERR(s))
return PTR_ERR(s);
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering DVD_READ_STRUCT\n");
ret = dvd_read_struct(cdi, s, cgc);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user(arg, s, size))
ret = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int add_recent_packed(const unsigned char *sha1,
struct packed_git *p, uint32_t pos,
void *data)
{
struct object *obj = lookup_object(sha1);
if (obj && obj->flags & SEEN)
return 0;
add_recent_object(sha1, p->mtime, data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AirPDcapGetSa(
PAIRPDCAP_CONTEXT ctx,
AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID *id)
{
INT sa_index;
if (ctx->sa_index!=-1) {
/* at least one association was stored */
/* search for the association from sa_index to 0 (most recent added) */
for (sa_index=ctx->sa_index; sa_index>=0; sa_index--) {
if (ctx->sa[sa_index].used) {
if (memcmp(id, &(ctx->sa[sa_index].saId), sizeof(AIRPDCAP_SEC_ASSOCIATION_ID))==0) {
ctx->index=sa_index;
return sa_index;
}
}
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 51,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
}
kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation
big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the
key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to
register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because
there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type.
However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not,
big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code
neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type.
Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is
theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the
crypto is set up, leading to the same effect.
Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling
the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we
shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the
encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the
crypto initialisation.
The fix also includes message printing on failure.
If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s
ought to cause an oops.
Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted')
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com>
cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 48,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
int err;
if ((BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) ||
insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
if (is_ctx_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
is_pkt_reg(env, insn->dst_reg) ||
is_flow_key_reg(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_XADD stores into R%d %s is not allowed\n",
insn->dst_reg,
reg_type_str[reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg)->type]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1, true);
if (err)
return err;
/* check whether atomic_add can write into the same memory */
return check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE, -1, true);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 91,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline const unsigned char *PushQuantumPixel(QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const unsigned char *magick_restrict pixels,unsigned int *quantum)
{
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
quantum_bits;
*quantum=(QuantumAny) 0;
for (i=(ssize_t) quantum_info->depth; i > 0L; )
{
if (quantum_info->state.bits == 0UL)
{
quantum_info->state.pixel=(*pixels++);
quantum_info->state.bits=8UL;
}
quantum_bits=(size_t) i;
if (quantum_bits > quantum_info->state.bits)
quantum_bits=quantum_info->state.bits;
i-=(ssize_t) quantum_bits;
quantum_info->state.bits-=quantum_bits;
*quantum=(unsigned int) ((*quantum << quantum_bits) |
((quantum_info->state.pixel >> quantum_info->state.bits) &~ ((~0UL) <<
quantum_bits)));
}
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_default_root(pool *p, int allow_symlinks, char **root) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
char *dir = NULL;
int res;
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
while (c) {
pr_signals_handle();
/* Check the groups acl */
if (c->argc < 2) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
res = pr_expr_eval_group_and(((char **) c->argv)+1);
if (res) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
c = find_config_next(c, c->next, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
}
if (dir) {
char *new_dir;
/* Check for any expandable variables. */
new_dir = path_subst_uservar(p, &dir);
if (new_dir != NULL) {
dir = new_dir;
}
if (strncmp(dir, "/", 2) == 0) {
dir = NULL;
} else {
char *realdir;
int xerrno = 0;
if (allow_symlinks == FALSE) {
char *path, target_path[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
struct stat st;
size_t pathlen;
/* First, deal with any possible interpolation. dir_realpath() will
* do this for us, but dir_realpath() ALSO automatically follows
* symlinks, which is what we do NOT want to do here.
*/
path = dir;
if (*path != '/') {
if (*path == '~') {
if (pr_fs_interpolate(dir, target_path,
sizeof(target_path)-1) < 0) {
return -1;
}
path = target_path;
}
}
/* Note: lstat(2) is sensitive to the presence of a trailing slash on
* the path, particularly in the case of a symlink to a directory.
* Thus to get the correct test, we need to remove any trailing slash
* that might be present. Subtle.
*/
pathlen = strlen(path);
if (pathlen > 1 &&
path[pathlen-1] == '/') {
path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
}
pr_fs_clear_cache();
res = pr_fsio_lstat(path, &st);
if (res < 0) {
xerrno = errno;
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, "error: unable to check %s: %s", path,
strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
return -1;
}
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING,
"error: DefaultRoot %s is a symlink (denied by AllowChrootSymlinks "
"config)", path);
errno = EPERM;
return -1;
}
}
/* We need to be the final user here so that if the user has their home
* directory with a mode the user proftpd is running (i.e. the User
* directive) as can not traverse down, we can still have the default
* root.
*/
PRIVS_USER
realdir = dir_realpath(p, dir);
xerrno = errno;
PRIVS_RELINQUISH
if (realdir) {
dir = realdir;
} else {
/* Try to provide a more informative message. */
char interp_dir[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
memset(interp_dir, '\0', sizeof(interp_dir));
(void) pr_fs_interpolate(dir, interp_dir, sizeof(interp_dir)-1);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"notice: unable to use DefaultRoot '%s' [resolved to '%s']: %s",
dir, interp_dir, strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
}
}
}
*root = dir;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 1 | 170,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RecordMemoryUsageAfterBackgroundedMB(const char* basename,
const char* suffix,
int memory_usage) {
std::string histogram_name = base::StringPrintf("%s.%s", basename, suffix);
base::UmaHistogramMemoryLargeMB(histogram_name, memory_usage);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::ProcessHandle StartProcessWithAccess(CommandLine* cmd_line,
const FilePath& exposed_dir) {
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
content::ProcessType type;
std::string type_str = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
if (type_str == switches::kRendererProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kPluginProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN;
} else if (type_str == switches::kWorkerProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kNaClLoaderProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kUtilityProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_UTILITY;
} else if (type_str == switches::kNaClBrokerProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER;
} else if (type_str == switches::kGpuProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU;
} else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN;
} else if (type_str == switches::kPpapiBrokerProcess) {
type = content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess", 0, type_str);
bool in_sandbox =
(type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_BROKER) &&
(type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) &&
(type != content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER);
if ((type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) &&
(cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox))) {
in_sandbox = false;
DVLOG(1) << "GPU sandbox is disabled";
}
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox)) {
in_sandbox = false;
}
#if !defined (GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessPlugins)) {
in_sandbox = false;
}
#endif
if (!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) &&
!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL) &&
browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) {
in_sandbox = false;
}
if (browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) {
if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame)) {
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kChromeFrame);
}
}
bool child_needs_help =
DebugFlags::ProcessDebugFlags(cmd_line, type, in_sandbox);
cmd_line->AppendArg(base::StringPrintf("/prefetch:%d", type));
sandbox::ResultCode result;
base::win::ScopedProcessInformation target;
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy = g_broker_services->CreatePolicy();
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN &&
!browser_command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoSandbox) &&
content::GetContentClient()->SandboxPlugin(cmd_line, policy)) {
in_sandbox = true;
}
#endif
if (!in_sandbox) {
policy->Release();
base::ProcessHandle process = 0;
base::LaunchProcess(*cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), &process);
g_broker_services->AddTargetPeer(process);
return process;
}
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PLUGIN) {
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
AddPluginDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
} else if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU) {
if (!AddPolicyForGPU(cmd_line, policy))
return 0;
} else {
if (!AddPolicyForRenderer(policy))
return 0;
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER ||
type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_WORKER) {
AddBaseHandleClosePolicy(policy);
} else if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_PPAPI_PLUGIN) {
if (!AddPolicyForPepperPlugin(policy))
return 0;
}
if (type_str != switches::kRendererProcess) {
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII("ignored", " --type=renderer ");
}
}
if (!exposed_dir.empty()) {
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
exposed_dir.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return 0;
FilePath exposed_files = exposed_dir.AppendASCII("*");
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_FILES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::FILES_ALLOW_ANY,
exposed_files.value().c_str());
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return 0;
}
if (!AddGenericPolicy(policy)) {
NOTREACHED();
return 0;
}
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
result = g_broker_services->SpawnTarget(
cmd_line->GetProgram().value().c_str(),
cmd_line->GetCommandLineString().c_str(),
policy, target.Receive());
policy->Release();
TRACE_EVENT_END_ETW("StartProcessWithAccess::LAUNCHPROCESS", 0, 0);
if (sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK != result) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to launch process. Error: " << result;
return 0;
}
if (type == content::PROCESS_TYPE_NACL_LOADER &&
(base::win::OSInfo::GetInstance()->wow64_status() ==
base::win::OSInfo::WOW64_DISABLED)) {
const SIZE_T kOneGigabyte = 1 << 30;
void* nacl_mem = VirtualAllocEx(target.process_handle(),
NULL,
kOneGigabyte,
MEM_RESERVE,
PAGE_NOACCESS);
if (!nacl_mem) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to reserve address space for Native Client";
}
}
ResumeThread(target.thread_handle());
if (child_needs_help)
base::debug::SpawnDebuggerOnProcess(target.process_id());
return target.TakeProcessHandle();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int csnmp_oid_suffix(oid_t *dst, oid_t const *src, oid_t const *root) {
/* Make sure "src" is in "root"s subtree. */
if (src->oid_len <= root->oid_len)
return (EINVAL);
if (snmp_oid_ncompare(root->oid, root->oid_len, src->oid, src->oid_len,
/* n = */ root->oid_len) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst));
dst->oid_len = src->oid_len - root->oid_len;
memcpy(dst->oid, &src->oid[root->oid_len],
dst->oid_len * sizeof(dst->oid[0]));
return (0);
}
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 59,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = pci_get_drvdata(to_pci_dev(dev));
efx->state = STATE_FINI;
netif_device_detach(efx->net_dev);
efx_stop_all(efx);
efx_fini_channels(efx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_do_readpage(struct file *file, struct page *page)
{
struct fuse_io_priv io = { .async = 0, .file = file };
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_req *req;
size_t num_read;
loff_t pos = page_offset(page);
size_t count = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
u64 attr_ver;
int err;
/*
* Page writeback can extend beyond the lifetime of the
* page-cache page, so make sure we read a properly synced
* page.
*/
fuse_wait_on_page_writeback(inode, page->index);
req = fuse_get_req(fc, 1);
if (IS_ERR(req))
return PTR_ERR(req);
attr_ver = fuse_get_attr_version(fc);
req->out.page_zeroing = 1;
req->out.argpages = 1;
req->num_pages = 1;
req->pages[0] = page;
req->page_descs[0].length = count;
num_read = fuse_send_read(req, &io, pos, count, NULL);
err = req->out.h.error;
if (!err) {
/*
* Short read means EOF. If file size is larger, truncate it
*/
if (num_read < count)
fuse_short_read(req, inode, attr_ver);
SetPageUptodate(page);
}
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qeth_notify_skbs(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *q,
struct qeth_qdio_out_buffer *buf,
enum iucv_tx_notify notification)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (skb_queue_empty(&buf->skb_list))
goto out;
skb = skb_peek(&buf->skb_list);
while (skb) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 5, "skbn%d", notification);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(q->card, 5, "%lx", (long) skb);
if (skb->protocol == ETH_P_AF_IUCV) {
if (skb->sk) {
struct iucv_sock *iucv = iucv_sk(skb->sk);
iucv->sk_txnotify(skb, notification);
}
}
if (skb_queue_is_last(&buf->skb_list, skb))
skb = NULL;
else
skb = skb_queue_next(&buf->skb_list, skb);
}
out:
return;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: testing::AssertionResult CheckStyleInjection(Browser* browser,
const GURL& url,
bool expected_injection) {
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser, url);
bool css_injected = false;
if (!content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(
browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
"window.domAutomationController.send("
" document.defaultView.getComputedStyle(document.body, null)."
" getPropertyValue('display') == 'none');",
&css_injected)) {
return testing::AssertionFailure()
<< "Failed to execute script and extract bool for injection status.";
}
if (css_injected != expected_injection) {
std::string message;
if (css_injected)
message = "CSS injected when no injection was expected.";
else
message = "CSS not injected when injection was expected.";
return testing::AssertionFailure() << message;
}
bool css_doesnt_add_to_list = false;
if (!content::ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(
browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(),
"window.domAutomationController.send("
" document.styleSheets.length == 0);",
&css_doesnt_add_to_list)) {
return testing::AssertionFailure()
<< "Failed to execute script and extract bool for stylesheets length.";
}
if (!css_doesnt_add_to_list) {
return testing::AssertionFailure()
<< "CSS injection added to number of stylesheets.";
}
return testing::AssertionSuccess();
}
Commit Message: Extensions: Prevent content script injection in the New tab Page.
r487664 disallowed content script injection in the New Tab Page. However, the
check in RendererPermissionsPolicyDelegate::IsRestrictedUrl for the same, might
not work due to the following reasons:
- There might be a race between checking if the extension can inject the
script and setting the new tab url in the renderer (SearchBouncer).
- The New Tab page url in the SearchBouncer might be set incorrectly due to
incorrect handling of multiple profiles by InstantService.
Fix this by checking if the current renderer process is an Instant (NTP)
renderer. This should work since the NTP renderer process should not be shared
with other sites.
BUG=844428, 662610
Change-Id: I45f6b27fb2680d3b8df6e1da223452ffee09b0d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1068607
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563031}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 155,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_open(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_openres *res)
{
__be32 *p;
uint32_t savewords, bmlen, i;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_OPEN);
if (status != -EIO)
nfs_increment_open_seqid(status, res->seqid);
if (!status)
status = decode_stateid(xdr, &res->stateid);
if (unlikely(status))
return status;
decode_change_info(xdr, &res->cinfo);
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
res->rflags = be32_to_cpup(p++);
bmlen = be32_to_cpup(p);
if (bmlen > 10)
goto xdr_error;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, bmlen << 2);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
savewords = min_t(uint32_t, bmlen, NFS4_BITMAP_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < savewords; ++i)
res->attrset[i] = be32_to_cpup(p++);
for (; i < NFS4_BITMAP_SIZE; i++)
res->attrset[i] = 0;
return decode_delegation(xdr, res);
xdr_error:
dprintk("%s: Bitmap too large! Length = %u\n", __func__, bmlen);
return -EIO;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jpc_putdata(jas_stream_t *out, jas_stream_t *in, long len)
{
return jas_stream_copy(out, in, len);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void si_conn_send_cb(struct connection *conn)
{
struct stream_interface *si = conn->owner;
struct channel *chn = si->ob;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
return;
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_HANDSHAKE)
/* a handshake was requested */
return;
/* we might have been called just after an asynchronous shutw */
if (chn->flags & CF_SHUTW)
return;
/* OK there are data waiting to be sent */
si_conn_send(conn);
/* OK all done */
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void br_multicast_init(struct net_bridge *br)
{
br->hash_elasticity = 4;
br->hash_max = 512;
br->multicast_router = 1;
br->multicast_last_member_count = 2;
br->multicast_startup_query_count = 2;
br->multicast_last_member_interval = HZ;
br->multicast_query_response_interval = 10 * HZ;
br->multicast_startup_query_interval = 125 * HZ / 4;
br->multicast_query_interval = 125 * HZ;
br->multicast_querier_interval = 255 * HZ;
br->multicast_membership_interval = 260 * HZ;
spin_lock_init(&br->multicast_lock);
setup_timer(&br->multicast_router_timer,
br_multicast_local_router_expired, 0);
setup_timer(&br->multicast_querier_timer,
br_multicast_local_router_expired, 0);
setup_timer(&br->multicast_query_timer, br_multicast_query_expired,
(unsigned long)br);
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags)
{
return _do_fork(flags|CLONE_VM|CLONE_UNTRACED, (unsigned long)fn,
(unsigned long)arg, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_aes_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = blk_aes_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
int ts_state;
padlock_reset_key(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, &walk);
ts_state = irq_ts_save();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes)) {
padlock_xcrypt_ecb(walk.src.virt.addr, walk.dst.virt.addr,
ctx->E, &ctx->cword.encrypt,
nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
irq_ts_restore(ts_state);
padlock_store_cword(&ctx->cword.encrypt);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_time (char const *file_name, struct timespec t)
{
if (t.tv_sec < 0)
WARNOPT (WARN_TIMESTAMP,
(0, 0, _("%s: implausibly old time stamp %s"),
file_name, tartime (t, true)));
else if (timespec_cmp (volume_start_time, t) < 0)
{
struct timespec now;
gettime (&now);
if (timespec_cmp (now, t) < 0)
{
char buf[TIMESPEC_STRSIZE_BOUND];
struct timespec diff;
diff.tv_sec = t.tv_sec - now.tv_sec;
diff.tv_nsec = t.tv_nsec - now.tv_nsec;
if (diff.tv_nsec < 0)
{
diff.tv_nsec += BILLION;
diff.tv_sec--;
}
WARNOPT (WARN_TIMESTAMP,
(0, 0, _("%s: time stamp %s is %s s in the future"),
file_name, tartime (t, true), code_timespec (diff, buf)));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 9,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_drive_inhibit_polling (Device *device,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
if (!device->priv->device_is_drive)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not a drive");
goto out;
}
if (!device->priv->device_is_media_change_detection_inhibitable)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Media detection cannot be inhibited");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.inhibit-polling",
"DriveInhibitPolling",
TRUE,
device_drive_inhibit_polling_authorized_cb,
context,
1,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
out:
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int udf_load_sequence(struct super_block *sb, struct buffer_head *bh,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct anchorVolDescPtr *anchor;
long main_s, main_e, reserve_s, reserve_e;
anchor = (struct anchorVolDescPtr *)bh->b_data;
/* Locate the main sequence */
main_s = le32_to_cpu(anchor->mainVolDescSeqExt.extLocation);
main_e = le32_to_cpu(anchor->mainVolDescSeqExt.extLength);
main_e = main_e >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
main_e += main_s;
/* Locate the reserve sequence */
reserve_s = le32_to_cpu(anchor->reserveVolDescSeqExt.extLocation);
reserve_e = le32_to_cpu(anchor->reserveVolDescSeqExt.extLength);
reserve_e = reserve_e >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
reserve_e += reserve_s;
/* Process the main & reserve sequences */
/* responsible for finding the PartitionDesc(s) */
if (!udf_process_sequence(sb, main_s, main_e, fileset))
return 1;
return !udf_process_sequence(sb, reserve_s, reserve_e, fileset);
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cms_copy_content(BIO *out, BIO *in, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned char buf[4096];
int r = 0, i;
BIO *tmpout;
tmpout = cms_get_text_bio(out, flags);
if (tmpout == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Read all content through chain to process digest, decrypt etc */
for (;;) {
i = BIO_read(in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i <= 0) {
if (BIO_method_type(in) == BIO_TYPE_CIPHER) {
if (!BIO_get_cipher_status(in))
goto err;
}
if (i < 0)
goto err;
break;
}
if (tmpout && (BIO_write(tmpout, buf, i) != i))
goto err;
}
if (flags & CMS_TEXT) {
if (!SMIME_text(tmpout, out)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_COPY_CONTENT, CMS_R_SMIME_TEXT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
r = 1;
err:
if (tmpout != out)
BIO_free(tmpout);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheBackendImpl::GetResourceList(
int host_id, std::vector<AppCacheResourceInfo>* resource_infos) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return;
host->GetResourceList(resource_infos);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setVlinkColor(const AtomicString& value) {
if (!IsFrameSet())
SetBodyAttribute(vlinkAttr, value);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MemStream::moveStart(int delta) {
start += delta;
length -= delta;
bufPtr = buf + start;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean prpl_xfer_write(struct file_transfer *ft, char *buffer, unsigned int len)
{
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = ft->data;
if (write(px->fd, buffer, len) != len) {
imcb_file_canceled(px->ic, ft, "Error while writing temporary file");
return FALSE;
}
if (lseek(px->fd, 0, SEEK_CUR) >= ft->file_size) {
close(px->fd);
px->fd = -1;
purple_transfer_forward(ft);
imcb_file_finished(px->ic, ft);
px->ft = NULL;
} else {
px->timeout = b_timeout_add(0, purple_transfer_request_cb, ft);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_reader_unlock(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, bool locked)
{
if (likely(locked))
raw_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
return;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool tcp_can_repair_sock(const struct sock *sk)
{
return ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) &&
(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN);
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 61,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath ContentBrowserClient::GetHyphenDictionaryDirectory() {
return base::FilePath();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: externalEntityInitProcessor2(XML_Parser parser, const char *start,
const char *end, const char **endPtr) {
const char *next = start; /* XmlContentTok doesn't always set the last arg */
int tok = XmlContentTok(parser->m_encoding, start, end, &next);
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_BOM:
/* If we are at the end of the buffer, this would cause the next stage,
i.e. externalEntityInitProcessor3, to pass control directly to
doContent (by detecting XML_TOK_NONE) without processing any xml text
declaration - causing the error XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI in doContent.
*/
if (next == end && ! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer) {
*endPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
start = next;
break;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer) {
*endPtr = start;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
parser->m_eventPtr = start;
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
if (! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer) {
*endPtr = start;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
parser->m_eventPtr = start;
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
}
parser->m_processor = externalEntityInitProcessor3;
return externalEntityInitProcessor3(parser, start, end, endPtr);
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLint GLES2DecoderImpl::ComputeMaxSamples() {
GLint max_samples = 0;
DoGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_SAMPLES, &max_samples, 1);
if (feature_info_->IsWebGLContext() &&
feature_info_->feature_flags().nv_internalformat_sample_query) {
std::vector<GLint> temp;
auto minWithSamplesForFormat = [&](GLenum internalformat) {
temp.clear();
InternalFormatSampleCountsHelper(GL_RENDERBUFFER, internalformat, &temp);
max_samples = std::min(max_samples, temp[0]);
};
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RGBA8);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RGB10_A2);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RGBA4);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RGB5_A1);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RGB8);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RGB565);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_RG8);
minWithSamplesForFormat(GL_R8);
}
return max_samples;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame,
bool is_new_navigation) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->dataSource());
NavigationState* navigation_state = document_state->navigation_state();
if (document_state->commit_load_time().is_null())
document_state->set_commit_load_time(Time::Now());
if (is_new_navigation) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = next_page_id_++;
if (GetLoadingUrl(frame) != GURL("about:swappedout")) {
history_list_offset_++;
if (history_list_offset_ >= content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries)
history_list_offset_ = content::kMaxSessionHistoryEntries - 1;
history_list_length_ = history_list_offset_ + 1;
history_page_ids_.resize(history_list_length_, -1);
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] = page_id_;
}
} else {
if (navigation_state->pending_page_id() != -1 &&
navigation_state->pending_page_id() != page_id_ &&
!navigation_state->request_committed()) {
UpdateSessionHistory(frame);
page_id_ = navigation_state->pending_page_id();
history_list_offset_ = navigation_state->pending_history_list_offset();
DCHECK(history_list_length_ <= 0 ||
history_list_offset_ < 0 ||
history_list_offset_ >= history_list_length_ ||
history_page_ids_[history_list_offset_] == page_id_);
}
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoad(frame, is_new_navigation));
navigation_state->set_request_committed(true);
UpdateURL(frame);
completed_client_redirect_src_ = Referrer();
UpdateEncoding(frame, frame->view()->pageEncoding().utf8());
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkipCode( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
exc->IP += exc->length;
if ( exc->IP < exc->codeSize )
{
exc->opcode = exc->code[exc->IP];
exc->length = opcode_length[exc->opcode];
if ( exc->length < 0 )
{
if ( exc->IP + 1 >= exc->codeSize )
goto Fail_Overflow;
exc->length = 2 - exc->length * exc->code[exc->IP + 1];
}
if ( exc->IP + exc->length <= exc->codeSize )
return SUCCESS;
}
Fail_Overflow:
exc->error = FT_THROW( Code_Overflow );
return FAILURE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int FAST_FUNC read_u32(const char *line, void *arg)
{
*(uint32_t*)arg = bb_strtou32(line, NULL, 10);
return errno == 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: simple_signal (void)
{
DBusMessage *message;
message = dbus_message_new_signal ("/f/b",
"o.b.Z",
"Fro");
if (message == NULL)
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("oom");
return message;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 7,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::continueIconLoadWithDecision(IconLoadDecision decision)
{
ASSERT(m_iconLoadDecisionCallback);
m_iconLoadDecisionCallback = 0;
if (m_frame)
m_frame->loader()->icon()->continueLoadWithDecision(decision);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usbhid_raw_request(struct hid_device *hid, unsigned char reportnum,
__u8 *buf, size_t len, unsigned char rtype,
int reqtype)
{
switch (reqtype) {
case HID_REQ_GET_REPORT:
return usbhid_get_raw_report(hid, reportnum, buf, len, rtype);
case HID_REQ_SET_REPORT:
return usbhid_set_raw_report(hid, reportnum, buf, len, rtype);
default:
return -EIO;
}
}
Commit Message: HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug
The hid descriptor identifies the length and type of subordinate
descriptors for a device. If the received hid descriptor is smaller than
the size of the struct hid_descriptor, it is possible to cause
out-of-bounds.
In addition, if bNumDescriptors of the hid descriptor have an incorrect
value, this can also cause out-of-bounds while approaching hdesc->desc[n].
So check the size of hid descriptor and bNumDescriptors.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88006c5f8edf by task kworker/1:2/1261
CPU: 1 PID: 1261 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted
4.14.0-rc1-42251-gebb2c2437d80 #169
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x22f/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
usbhid_parse+0x9b1/0xa20 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1004
hid_add_device+0x16b/0xb30 drivers/hid/hid-core.c:2944
usbhid_probe+0xc28/0x1100 drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c:1369
usb_probe_interface+0x35d/0x8e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_set_configuration+0x104e/0x1870 drivers/usb/core/message.c:1932
generic_probe+0x73/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:174
usb_probe_device+0xaf/0xe0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:266
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x610/0xa00 drivers/base/dd.c:557
__device_attach_driver+0x230/0x290 drivers/base/dd.c:653
bus_for_each_drv+0x161/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:463
__device_attach+0x26e/0x3d0 drivers/base/dd.c:710
device_initial_probe+0x1f/0x30 drivers/base/dd.c:757
bus_probe_device+0x1eb/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:523
device_add+0xd0b/0x1660 drivers/base/core.c:1835
usb_new_device+0x7b8/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2457
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaejoong Kim <climbbb.kim@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: icmp6_type_code_match(u_int8_t test_type, u_int8_t min_code, u_int8_t max_code,
u_int8_t type, u_int8_t code,
bool invert)
{
return (type == test_type && code >= min_code && code <= max_code)
^ invert;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static s32 atl2_get_speed_and_duplex(struct atl2_hw *hw, u16 *speed,
u16 *duplex)
{
s32 ret_val;
u16 phy_data;
/* Read PHY Specific Status Register (17) */
ret_val = atl2_read_phy_reg(hw, MII_ATLX_PSSR, &phy_data);
if (ret_val)
return ret_val;
if (!(phy_data & MII_ATLX_PSSR_SPD_DPLX_RESOLVED))
return ATLX_ERR_PHY_RES;
switch (phy_data & MII_ATLX_PSSR_SPEED) {
case MII_ATLX_PSSR_100MBS:
*speed = SPEED_100;
break;
case MII_ATLX_PSSR_10MBS:
*speed = SPEED_10;
break;
default:
return ATLX_ERR_PHY_SPEED;
}
if (phy_data & MII_ATLX_PSSR_DPLX)
*duplex = FULL_DUPLEX;
else
*duplex = HALF_DUPLEX;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputHandler::ScrollStatus LayerTreeHostImpl::ScrollAnimatedBegin(
const gfx::Point& viewport_point) {
InputHandler::ScrollStatus scroll_status;
scroll_status.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
MainThreadScrollingReason::kNotScrollingOnMain;
ScrollTree& scroll_tree = active_tree_->property_trees()->scroll_tree;
ScrollNode* scroll_node = scroll_tree.CurrentlyScrollingNode();
if (scroll_node) {
gfx::Vector2dF delta;
if (ScrollAnimationUpdateTarget(scroll_node, delta, base::TimeDelta())) {
scroll_status.thread = SCROLL_ON_IMPL_THREAD;
} else {
scroll_status.thread = SCROLL_IGNORED;
scroll_status.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
MainThreadScrollingReason::kNotScrollable;
}
return scroll_status;
}
ScrollStateData scroll_state_data;
scroll_state_data.position_x = viewport_point.x();
scroll_state_data.position_y = viewport_point.y();
ScrollState scroll_state(scroll_state_data);
scroll_status = ScrollBegin(&scroll_state, WHEEL);
scroll_node = scroll_tree.CurrentlyScrollingNode();
if (scroll_status.thread == SCROLL_ON_IMPL_THREAD) {
ScrollStateData scroll_state_end_data;
scroll_state_end_data.is_ending = true;
ScrollState scroll_state_end(scroll_state_end_data);
ScrollEnd(&scroll_state_end);
}
return scroll_status;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prep_new_huge_page(struct hstate *h, struct page *page, int nid)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
set_compound_page_dtor(page, HUGETLB_PAGE_DTOR);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
set_hugetlb_cgroup(page, NULL);
h->nr_huge_pages++;
h->nr_huge_pages_node[nid]++;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
put_page(page); /* free it into the hugepage allocator */
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::FullscreenStateChanged(RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool is_fullscreen) {
int frame_tree_node_id = rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId();
auto it = fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.find(frame_tree_node_id);
bool changed = false;
if (is_fullscreen) {
if (it == fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.end()) {
fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.insert(frame_tree_node_id);
changed = true;
}
} else {
FrameTreeNode* ancestor =
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(rfh)->frame_tree_node();
DCHECK(ancestor);
for (it = fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.begin();
it != fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.end();) {
FrameTreeNode* node = FrameTreeNode::GloballyFindByID(*it);
if (!node || frame_tree_node_id == *it ||
node->IsDescendantOf(ancestor)) {
it = fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.erase(it);
changed = true;
} else {
++it;
}
}
}
if (changed && fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.size() > 0) {
unsigned int max_depth = 0;
RenderFrameHost* max_depth_rfh = nullptr;
for (auto node_id : fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_) {
FrameTreeNode* fullscreen_node = FrameTreeNode::GloballyFindByID(node_id);
DCHECK(fullscreen_node);
if (max_depth_rfh == nullptr || fullscreen_node->depth() > max_depth) {
max_depth = fullscreen_node->depth();
max_depth_rfh = fullscreen_node->current_frame_host();
}
}
DCHECK(max_depth_rfh);
if (max_depth_rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId() ==
current_fullscreen_frame_tree_node_id_)
return;
current_fullscreen_frame_tree_node_id_ =
max_depth_rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidAcquireFullscreen(max_depth_rfh);
if (display_cutout_host_impl_)
display_cutout_host_impl_->DidAcquireFullscreen(max_depth_rfh);
} else if (fullscreen_frame_tree_nodes_.size() == 0) {
current_fullscreen_frame_tree_node_id_ =
RenderFrameHost::kNoFrameTreeNodeId;
}
}
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t supply_map_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *buf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
ssize_t len, ret = 0;
struct regulator_map *map;
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
list_for_each_entry(map, ®ulator_map_list, list) {
len = snprintf(buf + ret, PAGE_SIZE - ret,
"%s -> %s.%s\n",
rdev_get_name(map->regulator), map->dev_name,
map->supply);
if (len >= 0)
ret += len;
if (ret > PAGE_SIZE) {
ret = PAGE_SIZE;
break;
}
}
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, ret);
kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoadProgressDelegateAndObserver(Shell* shell)
: WebContentsObserver(shell->web_contents()),
did_start_loading(false),
did_stop_loading(false) {
web_contents()->SetDelegate(this);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fmov_reg_reg(struct sh_fpu_soft_struct *fregs, struct pt_regs *regs, int m,
int n)
{
if (FPSCR_SZ) {
FMOV_EXT(m);
FMOV_EXT(n);
DRn = DRm;
} else {
FRn = FRm;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_set_sBIT(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr,
png_color_8p sig_bit)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", "sBIT");
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL)
return;
png_memcpy(&(info_ptr->sig_bit), sig_bit, png_sizeof(png_color_8));
info_ptr->valid |= PNG_INFO_sBIT;
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Verify decoded kadmin C strings [CVE-2015-8629]
In xdr_nullstring(), check that the decoded string is terminated with
a zero byte and does not contain any internal zero bytes.
CVE-2015-8629:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to read beyond the end of allocated memory by sending a string
without a terminating zero byte. Information leakage may be possible
for an attacker with permission to modify the database.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8341 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlFatalErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error, const char *info)
{
const char *errmsg;
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
switch (error) {
case XML_ERR_INVALID_HEX_CHARREF:
errmsg = "CharRef: invalid hexadecimal value";
break;
case XML_ERR_INVALID_DEC_CHARREF:
errmsg = "CharRef: invalid decimal value";
break;
case XML_ERR_INVALID_CHARREF:
errmsg = "CharRef: invalid value";
break;
case XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
errmsg = "internal error";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_AT_EOF:
errmsg = "PEReference at end of document";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_IN_PROLOG:
errmsg = "PEReference in prolog";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_IN_EPILOG:
errmsg = "PEReference in epilog";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_NO_NAME:
errmsg = "PEReference: no name";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_SEMICOL_MISSING:
errmsg = "PEReference: expecting ';'";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP:
errmsg = "Detected an entity reference loop";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "EntityValue: \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL:
errmsg = "PEReferences forbidden in internal subset";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "EntityValue: \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "AttValue: \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE:
errmsg = "Unescaped '<' not allowed in attributes values";
break;
case XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "SystemLiteral \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "Unfinished System or Public ID \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_MISPLACED_CDATA_END:
errmsg = "Sequence ']]>' not allowed in content";
break;
case XML_ERR_URI_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "SYSTEM or PUBLIC, the URI is missing";
break;
case XML_ERR_PUBID_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "PUBLIC, the Public Identifier is missing";
break;
case XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT:
errmsg = "Comment must not contain '--' (double-hyphen)";
break;
case XML_ERR_PI_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "xmlParsePI : no target name";
break;
case XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME:
errmsg = "Invalid PI name";
break;
case XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "NOTATION: Name expected here";
break;
case XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "'>' required to close NOTATION declaration";
break;
case XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "Entity value required";
break;
case XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT:
errmsg = "Fragment not allowed";
break;
case XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "'(' required to start ATTLIST enumeration";
break;
case XML_ERR_NMTOKEN_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "NmToken expected in ATTLIST enumeration";
break;
case XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "')' required to finish ATTLIST enumeration";
break;
case XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "MixedContentDecl : '|' or ')*' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "MixedContentDecl : '#PCDATA' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "ContentDecl : Name or '(' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "ContentDecl : ',' '|' or ')' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_IN_INT_SUBSET:
errmsg =
"PEReference: forbidden within markup decl in internal subset";
break;
case XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "expected '>'";
break;
case XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID:
errmsg = "XML conditional section '[' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_EXT_SUBSET_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "Content error in the external subset";
break;
case XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID_KEYWORD:
errmsg =
"conditional section INCLUDE or IGNORE keyword expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_CONDSEC_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "XML conditional section not closed";
break;
case XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "Text declaration '<?xml' required";
break;
case XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "parsing XML declaration: '?>' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_EXT_ENTITY_STANDALONE:
errmsg = "external parsed entities cannot be standalone";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING:
errmsg = "EntityRef: expecting ';'";
break;
case XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "DOCTYPE improperly terminated";
break;
case XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "EndTag: '</' not found";
break;
case XML_ERR_EQUAL_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "expected '='";
break;
case XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED:
errmsg = "String not closed expecting \" or '";
break;
case XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "String not started expecting ' or \"";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENCODING_NAME:
errmsg = "Invalid XML encoding name";
break;
case XML_ERR_STANDALONE_VALUE:
errmsg = "standalone accepts only 'yes' or 'no'";
break;
case XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY:
errmsg = "Document is empty";
break;
case XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END:
errmsg = "Extra content at the end of the document";
break;
case XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED:
errmsg = "chunk is not well balanced";
break;
case XML_ERR_EXTRA_CONTENT:
errmsg = "extra content at the end of well balanced chunk";
break;
case XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING:
errmsg = "Malformed declaration expecting version";
break;
case XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG:
errmsg = "Name too long use XML_PARSE_HUGE option";
break;
#if 0
case:
errmsg = "";
break;
#endif
default:
errmsg = "Unregistered error message";
}
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
if (info == NULL) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER, error,
XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0, info, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, "%s\n",
errmsg);
} else {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER, error,
XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0, info, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, "%s: %s\n",
errmsg, info);
}
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDispatchLoad() {
CHECK(SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible());
if (!is_active())
return;
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy =
frame_tree_node()->render_manager()->GetProxyToParent();
if (!proxy) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(GetProcess(),
bad_message::RFH_NO_PROXY_TO_PARENT);
return;
}
proxy->Send(new FrameMsg_DispatchLoad(proxy->GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: php_apache_sapi_send_headers(sapi_headers_struct *sapi_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_struct *ctx = SG(server_context);
const char *sline = SG(sapi_headers).http_status_line;
ctx->r->status = SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code;
/* httpd requires that r->status_line is set to the first digit of
* the status-code: */
if (sline && strlen(sline) > 12 && strncmp(sline, "HTTP/1.", 7) == 0 && sline[8] == ' ') {
ctx->r->status_line = apr_pstrdup(ctx->r->pool, sline + 9);
ctx->r->proto_num = 1000 + (sline[7]-'0');
if ((sline[7]-'0') == 0) {
apr_table_set(ctx->r->subprocess_env, "force-response-1.0", "true");
}
}
/* call ap_set_content_type only once, else each time we call it,
configured output filters for that content type will be added */
if (!ctx->content_type) {
ctx->content_type = sapi_get_default_content_type(TSRMLS_C);
}
ap_set_content_type(ctx->r, apr_pstrdup(ctx->r->pool, ctx->content_type));
efree(ctx->content_type);
ctx->content_type = NULL;
return SAPI_HEADER_SENT_SUCCESSFULLY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* WinPKIErrorString(void)
{
static char error_string[64];
DWORD error_code = GetLastError();
if ((error_code >> 16) != 0x8009)
return WindowsErrorString();
switch (error_code) {
case NTE_BAD_UID:
return "Bad UID.";
case CRYPT_E_MSG_ERROR:
return "An error occurred while performing an operation on a cryptographic message.";
case CRYPT_E_UNKNOWN_ALGO:
return "Unknown cryptographic algorithm.";
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_MSG_TYPE:
return "Invalid cryptographic message type.";
case CRYPT_E_HASH_VALUE:
return "The hash value is not correct";
case CRYPT_E_ISSUER_SERIALNUMBER:
return "Invalid issuer and/or serial number.";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_LEN:
return "The length specified for the output data was insufficient.";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_ENCODE:
return "An error occurred during encode or decode operation.";
case CRYPT_E_FILE_ERROR:
return "An error occurred while reading or writing to a file.";
case CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND:
return "Cannot find object or property.";
case CRYPT_E_EXISTS:
return "The object or property already exists.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_PROVIDER:
return "No provider was specified for the store or object.";
case CRYPT_E_DELETED_PREV:
return "The previous certificate or CRL context was deleted.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_MATCH:
return "Cannot find the requested object.";
case CRYPT_E_UNEXPECTED_MSG_TYPE:
case CRYPT_E_NO_KEY_PROPERTY:
case CRYPT_E_NO_DECRYPT_CERT:
return "Private key or certificate issue";
case CRYPT_E_BAD_MSG:
return "Not a cryptographic message.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_SIGNER:
return "The signed cryptographic message does not have a signer for the specified signer index.";
case CRYPT_E_REVOKED:
return "The certificate is revoked.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_DLL:
case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_IN_REVOCATION_DATABASE:
return "Cannot check certificate revocation.";
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_NUMERIC_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_PRINTABLE_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_IA5_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_INVALID_X500_STRING:
case CRYPT_E_NOT_CHAR_STRING:
return "Invalid string.";
case CRYPT_E_SECURITY_SETTINGS:
return "The cryptographic operation failed due to a local security option setting.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_VERIFY_USAGE_CHECK:
case CRYPT_E_VERIFY_USAGE_OFFLINE:
return "Cannot complete usage check.";
case CRYPT_E_NO_TRUSTED_SIGNER:
return "None of the signers of the cryptographic message or certificate trust list is trusted.";
default:
static_sprintf(error_string, "Unknown PKI error 0x%08lX", error_code);
return error_string;
}
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | 1 | 167,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ims_pcu_buffers_alloc(struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
int error;
pcu->urb_in_buf = usb_alloc_coherent(pcu->udev, pcu->max_in_size,
GFP_KERNEL, &pcu->read_dma);
if (!pcu->urb_in_buf) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Failed to allocate memory for read buffer\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
pcu->urb_in = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pcu->urb_in) {
dev_err(pcu->dev, "Failed to allocate input URB\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_urb_in_buf;
}
pcu->urb_in->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
pcu->urb_in->transfer_dma = pcu->read_dma;
usb_fill_bulk_urb(pcu->urb_in, pcu->udev,
usb_rcvbulkpipe(pcu->udev,
pcu->ep_in->bEndpointAddress),
pcu->urb_in_buf, pcu->max_in_size,
ims_pcu_irq, pcu);
/*
* We are using usb_bulk_msg() for sending so there is no point
* in allocating memory with usb_alloc_coherent().
*/
pcu->urb_out_buf = kmalloc(pcu->max_out_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pcu->urb_out_buf) {
dev_err(pcu->dev, "Failed to allocate memory for write buffer\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_in_urb;
}
pcu->urb_ctrl_buf = usb_alloc_coherent(pcu->udev, pcu->max_ctrl_size,
GFP_KERNEL, &pcu->ctrl_dma);
if (!pcu->urb_ctrl_buf) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Failed to allocate memory for read buffer\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_urb_out_buf;
}
pcu->urb_ctrl = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pcu->urb_ctrl) {
dev_err(pcu->dev, "Failed to allocate input URB\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_urb_ctrl_buf;
}
pcu->urb_ctrl->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
pcu->urb_ctrl->transfer_dma = pcu->ctrl_dma;
usb_fill_int_urb(pcu->urb_ctrl, pcu->udev,
usb_rcvintpipe(pcu->udev,
pcu->ep_ctrl->bEndpointAddress),
pcu->urb_ctrl_buf, pcu->max_ctrl_size,
ims_pcu_irq, pcu, pcu->ep_ctrl->bInterval);
return 0;
err_free_urb_ctrl_buf:
usb_free_coherent(pcu->udev, pcu->max_ctrl_size,
pcu->urb_ctrl_buf, pcu->ctrl_dma);
err_free_urb_out_buf:
kfree(pcu->urb_out_buf);
err_free_in_urb:
usb_free_urb(pcu->urb_in);
err_free_urb_in_buf:
usb_free_coherent(pcu->udev, pcu->max_in_size,
pcu->urb_in_buf, pcu->read_dma);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __svc_rpcb_register4(struct net *net, const u32 program,
const u32 version,
const unsigned short protocol,
const unsigned short port)
{
const struct sockaddr_in sin = {
.sin_family = AF_INET,
.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY),
.sin_port = htons(port),
};
const char *netid;
int error;
switch (protocol) {
case IPPROTO_UDP:
netid = RPCBIND_NETID_UDP;
break;
case IPPROTO_TCP:
netid = RPCBIND_NETID_TCP;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
error = rpcb_v4_register(net, program, version,
(const struct sockaddr *)&sin, netid);
/*
* User space didn't support rpcbind v4, so retry this
* registration request with the legacy rpcbind v2 protocol.
*/
if (error == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
error = rpcb_register(net, program, version, protocol, port);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean Region_op0(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong dstHandle, jint left, jint top, jint right, jint bottom, jint op) {
SkRegion* dst = reinterpret_cast<SkRegion*>(dstHandle);
SkIRect ir;
ir.set(left, top, right, bottom);
bool result = dst->op(ir, (SkRegion::Op)op);
return boolTojboolean(result);
}
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_session_destroy(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
int retval = SUCCESS;
if (PS(session_status) != php_session_active) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to destroy uninitialized session");
return FAILURE;
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (PS(mod)->s_destroy(&PS(mod_data), PS(id) TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
retval = FAILURE;
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Session object destruction failed");
}
php_rinit_session_globals(TSRMLS_C);
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI void php_add_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **sym_track = NULL;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen + 1, (void *) &sym_track);
} else {
return;
}
if (sym_track == NULL) {
zval *empty_var;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(empty_var);
ZEND_SET_SYMBOL_WITH_LENGTH(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen+1, empty_var, 1, 0);
}
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI void php_set_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval *state_val, php_unserialize_data_t *var_hash TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_set_hash_symbol(state_val, name, namelen, PZVAL_IS_REF(state_val), 1, Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)));
}
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI int php_get_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval ***state_var TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = FAILURE;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
ret = zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen + 1, (void **) state_var);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_session_track_init(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
zval *session_vars = NULL;
/* Unconditionally destroy existing array -- possible dirty data */
zend_delete_global_variable("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION")-1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(session_vars);
array_init(session_vars);
PS(http_session_vars) = session_vars;
ZEND_SET_GLOBAL_VAR_WITH_LENGTH("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION"), PS(http_session_vars), 2, 1);
}
/* }}} */
static char *php_session_encode(int *newlen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *ret = NULL;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown session.serialize_handler. Failed to encode session object");
ret = NULL;
} else if (PS(serializer)->encode(&ret, newlen TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
ret = NULL;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot encode non-existent session");
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_session_decode(const char *val, int vallen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown session.serialize_handler. Failed to decode session object");
return;
}
if (PS(serializer)->decode(val, vallen TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
php_session_destroy(TSRMLS_C);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to decode session object. Session has been destroyed");
}
}
/* }}} */
/*
* Note that we cannot use the BASE64 alphabet here, because
* it contains "/" and "+": both are unacceptable for simple inclusion
* into URLs.
*/
static char hexconvtab[] = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ,-";
enum {
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 164,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_mountpoint(struct mountpoint *mp)
{
if (!--mp->m_count) {
struct dentry *dentry = mp->m_dentry;
BUG_ON(!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list));
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
dentry->d_flags &= ~DCACHE_MOUNTED;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
hlist_del(&mp->m_hash);
kfree(mp);
}
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int decode_access_size(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned int insn)
{
unsigned int tmp;
tmp = ((insn >> 19) & 0xf);
if (tmp == 11 || tmp == 14) /* ldx/stx */
return 8;
tmp &= 3;
if (!tmp)
return 4;
else if (tmp == 3)
return 16; /* ldd/std - Although it is actually 8 */
else if (tmp == 2)
return 2;
else {
printk("Impossible unaligned trap. insn=%08x\n", insn);
die_if_kernel("Byte sized unaligned access?!?!", regs);
/* GCC should never warn that control reaches the end
* of this function without returning a value because
* die_if_kernel() is marked with attribute 'noreturn'.
* Alas, some versions do...
*/
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsLex *jslSetLex(JsLex *l) {
JsLex *old = lex;
lex = l;
return old;
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_getdevice(int index)
{
const gx_device *const *list;
int count = gs_lib_device_list(&list, NULL);
if (index < 0 || index >= count)
return 0; /* index out of range */
return list[index];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authentic_manage_sdo(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_authentic_sdo *sdo, unsigned long cmd)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char *data = NULL;
size_t data_len = 0, save_max_send = card->max_send_size;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "SDO(cmd:%lX,mech:%X,id:%X)", cmd, sdo->docp.mech, sdo->docp.id);
rv = authentic_manage_sdo_encode(card, sdo, cmd, &data, &data_len);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot encode SDO data");
sc_log(ctx, "encoded SDO length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u", data_len);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0xDB, 0x3F, 0xFF);
apdu.data = data;
apdu.datalen = data_len;
apdu.lc = data_len;
apdu.flags |= SC_APDU_FLAGS_CHAINING;
if (card->max_send_size > 255)
card->max_send_size = 255;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
card->max_send_size = save_max_send;
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "authentic_sdo_create() SDO put data error");
free(data);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fill_block8_c(uint8_t *block, uint8_t value, int line_size, int h)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
memset(block, value, 8);
block += line_size;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_sahf(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u32 flags;
flags = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF | X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF |
X86_EFLAGS_SF;
flags &= *reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) >> 8;
ctxt->eflags &= ~0xffUL;
ctxt->eflags |= flags | X86_EFLAGS_FIXED;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 47,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readOnlyLongAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->readOnlyLongAttr());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGLRenderingContextBase::getParameter(ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost())
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
const int kIntZero = 0;
switch (pname) {
case GL_ACTIVE_TEXTURE:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_ALIASED_LINE_WIDTH_RANGE:
return GetWebGLFloatArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_ALIASED_POINT_SIZE_RANGE:
return GetWebGLFloatArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_ALPHA_BITS:
if (drawing_buffer_->RequiresAlphaChannelToBePreserved())
return WebGLAny(script_state, 0);
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_ARRAY_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_array_buffer_.Get());
case GL_BLEND:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_COLOR:
return GetWebGLFloatArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_DST_ALPHA:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_DST_RGB:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_EQUATION_ALPHA:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_EQUATION_RGB:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_SRC_ALPHA:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLEND_SRC_RGB:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_BLUE_BITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_COLOR_CLEAR_VALUE:
return GetWebGLFloatArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_COLOR_WRITEMASK:
return GetBooleanArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_COMPRESSED_TEXTURE_FORMATS:
return WebGLAny(script_state, DOMUint32Array::Create(
compressed_texture_formats_.data(),
compressed_texture_formats_.size()));
case GL_CULL_FACE:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_CULL_FACE_MODE:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_CURRENT_PROGRAM:
return WebGLAny(script_state, current_program_.Get());
case GL_DEPTH_BITS:
if (!framebuffer_binding_ && !CreationAttributes().depth())
return WebGLAny(script_state, kIntZero);
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_DEPTH_CLEAR_VALUE:
return GetFloatParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_DEPTH_FUNC:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_DEPTH_RANGE:
return GetWebGLFloatArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_DEPTH_TEST:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_DEPTH_WRITEMASK:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_DITHER:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_ELEMENT_ARRAY_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state,
bound_vertex_array_object_->BoundElementArrayBuffer());
case GL_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, framebuffer_binding_.Get());
case GL_FRONT_FACE:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_GENERATE_MIPMAP_HINT:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_GREEN_BITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_FORMAT:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_IMPLEMENTATION_COLOR_READ_TYPE:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_LINE_WIDTH:
return GetFloatParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_COMBINED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_CUBE_MAP_TEXTURE_SIZE:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_VECTORS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_RENDERBUFFER_SIZE:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_TEXTURE_SIZE:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VARYING_VECTORS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VERTEX_ATTRIBS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VERTEX_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_VECTORS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VIEWPORT_DIMS:
return GetWebGLIntArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_NUM_SHADER_BINARY_FORMATS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_PACK_ALIGNMENT:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_POLYGON_OFFSET_FACTOR:
return GetFloatParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_POLYGON_OFFSET_FILL:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_POLYGON_OFFSET_UNITS:
return GetFloatParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_RED_BITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_RENDERBUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, renderbuffer_binding_.Get());
case GL_RENDERER:
return WebGLAny(script_state, String("WebKit WebGL"));
case GL_SAMPLE_ALPHA_TO_COVERAGE:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SAMPLE_BUFFERS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SAMPLE_COVERAGE:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SAMPLE_COVERAGE_INVERT:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SAMPLE_COVERAGE_VALUE:
return GetFloatParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SAMPLES:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SCISSOR_BOX:
return GetWebGLIntArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SCISSOR_TEST:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
"WebGL GLSL ES 1.0 (" +
String(ContextGL()->GetString(GL_SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION)) +
")");
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_FAIL:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_FUNC:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_PASS_DEPTH_FAIL:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_PASS_DEPTH_PASS:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_REF:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_VALUE_MASK:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BACK_WRITEMASK:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_BITS:
if (!framebuffer_binding_ && !CreationAttributes().stencil())
return WebGLAny(script_state, kIntZero);
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_CLEAR_VALUE:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_FAIL:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_FUNC:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_PASS_DEPTH_FAIL:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_PASS_DEPTH_PASS:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_REF:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_TEST:
return WebGLAny(script_state, stencil_enabled_);
case GL_STENCIL_VALUE_MASK:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_STENCIL_WRITEMASK:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_SUBPIXEL_BITS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_2D:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture2d_binding_.Get());
case GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_CUBE_MAP:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture_cube_map_binding_.Get());
case GL_UNPACK_ALIGNMENT:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GC3D_UNPACK_FLIP_Y_WEBGL:
return WebGLAny(script_state, unpack_flip_y_);
case GC3D_UNPACK_PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA_WEBGL:
return WebGLAny(script_state, unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
case GC3D_UNPACK_COLORSPACE_CONVERSION_WEBGL:
return WebGLAny(script_state, unpack_colorspace_conversion_);
case GL_VENDOR:
return WebGLAny(script_state, String("WebKit"));
case GL_VERSION:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
"WebGL 1.0 (" + String(ContextGL()->GetString(GL_VERSION)) + ")");
case GL_VIEWPORT:
return GetWebGLIntArrayParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES: // OES_standard_derivatives
if (ExtensionEnabled(kOESStandardDerivativesName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher())
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state,
GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, OES_standard_derivatives not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case WebGLDebugRendererInfo::kUnmaskedRendererWebgl:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kWebGLDebugRendererInfoName))
return WebGLAny(script_state,
String(ContextGL()->GetString(GL_RENDERER)));
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, WEBGL_debug_renderer_info not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case WebGLDebugRendererInfo::kUnmaskedVendorWebgl:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kWebGLDebugRendererInfoName))
return WebGLAny(script_state,
String(ContextGL()->GetString(GL_VENDOR)));
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, WEBGL_debug_renderer_info not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_VERTEX_ARRAY_BINDING_OES: // OES_vertex_array_object
if (ExtensionEnabled(kOESVertexArrayObjectName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
if (!bound_vertex_array_object_->IsDefaultObject())
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_vertex_array_object_.Get());
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, OES_vertex_array_object not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT: // EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTTextureFilterAnisotropicName))
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state,
GL_MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT: // EXT_draw_buffers BEGIN
if (ExtensionEnabled(kWebGLDrawBuffersName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher())
return WebGLAny(script_state, MaxColorAttachments());
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, WEBGL_draw_buffers not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_EXT:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kWebGLDrawBuffersName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher())
return WebGLAny(script_state, MaxDrawBuffers());
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, WEBGL_draw_buffers not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_TIMESTAMP_EXT:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTDisjointTimerQueryName))
return WebGLAny(script_state, 0);
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, EXT_disjoint_timer_query not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_GPU_DISJOINT_EXT:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTDisjointTimerQueryName))
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, GL_GPU_DISJOINT_EXT);
SynthesizeGLError(
GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, EXT_disjoint_timer_query not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
default:
if ((ExtensionEnabled(kWebGLDrawBuffersName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher()) &&
pname >= GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_EXT &&
pname < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_EXT + MaxDrawBuffers())) {
GLint value = GL_NONE;
if (framebuffer_binding_)
value = framebuffer_binding_->GetDrawBuffer(pname);
else // emulated backbuffer
value = back_draw_buffer_;
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: t1_parse_font_matrix( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
FT_Int result;
result = T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 0 )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
root->units_per_EM = (FT_UShort)FT_DivFix( 1000, temp_scale );
/* we need to scale the values by 1.0/temp_scale */
if ( temp_scale != 0x10000L )
{
temp[0] = FT_DivFix( temp[0], temp_scale );
temp[1] = FT_DivFix( temp[1], temp_scale );
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_gs_UseBlackPtComp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, pdf_obj *obj)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pdf_flush_text(ctx, pr);
int on = pdf_name_eq(ctx, obj, PDF_NAME_ON);
/* The spec says that "ON" means on, "OFF" means "Off", and
* "Default" or anything else means "Meh, do what you want." */
gstate->stroke.color_params.bp = on;
gstate->fill.color_params.bp = on;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_queue_tm_rsp(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
srpt_queue_response(cmd);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::IsFullscreen() const {
return is_fullscreen_;
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int add_property_stringl_ex(zval *arg, const char *key, uint key_len, const char *str, uint length, int duplicate TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
zval *z_key;
if (UNEXPECTED(length > INT_MAX)) {
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "String overflow, max size is %d", INT_MAX);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
ZVAL_STRINGL(tmp, str, length, duplicate);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(z_key);
ZVAL_STRINGL(z_key, key, key_len-1, 1);
Z_OBJ_HANDLER_P(arg, write_property)(arg, z_key, tmp, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&tmp); /* write_property will add 1 to refcount */
zval_ptr_dtor(&z_key);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_get_closestateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_close *close)
{
get_stateid(cstate, &close->cl_stateid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int CL_WalkDemoExt(char *arg, char *name, int *demofile)
{
int i = 0;
*demofile = 0;
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(com_legacyprotocol->integer > 0)
{
Com_sprintf(name, MAX_OSPATH, "demos/%s.%s%d", arg, DEMOEXT, com_legacyprotocol->integer);
FS_FOpenFileRead(name, demofile, qtrue);
if (*demofile)
{
Com_Printf("Demo file: %s\n", name);
return com_legacyprotocol->integer;
}
}
if(com_protocol->integer != com_legacyprotocol->integer)
#endif
{
Com_sprintf(name, MAX_OSPATH, "demos/%s.%s%d", arg, DEMOEXT, com_protocol->integer);
FS_FOpenFileRead(name, demofile, qtrue);
if (*demofile)
{
Com_Printf("Demo file: %s\n", name);
return com_protocol->integer;
}
}
Com_Printf("Not found: %s\n", name);
while(demo_protocols[i])
{
#ifdef LEGACY_PROTOCOL
if(demo_protocols[i] == com_legacyprotocol->integer)
continue;
#endif
if(demo_protocols[i] == com_protocol->integer)
continue;
Com_sprintf (name, MAX_OSPATH, "demos/%s.%s%d", arg, DEMOEXT, demo_protocols[i]);
FS_FOpenFileRead( name, demofile, qtrue );
if (*demofile)
{
Com_Printf("Demo file: %s\n", name);
return demo_protocols[i];
}
else
Com_Printf("Not found: %s\n", name);
i++;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScrollbarsTest() : ScopedRootLayerScrollingForTest(GetParam()) {}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <alexclarke@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_is_server_mouse(SpiceServer *s)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
return reds->mouse_mode == SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_SERVER;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void worker_process(int fd, debugger_request_t& request) {
std::string tombstone_path;
int tombstone_fd = -1;
switch (request.action) {
case DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_TOMBSTONE:
case DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH:
tombstone_fd = open_tombstone(&tombstone_path);
if (tombstone_fd == -1) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to open tombstone file: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
break;
case DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_BACKTRACE:
break;
default:
ALOGE("debuggerd: unexpected request action: %d", request.action);
exit(1);
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, request.tid, 0, 0) != 0) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace attach failed: %s", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
bool attach_gdb = should_attach_gdb(request);
if (attach_gdb) {
if (init_getevent() != 0) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to initialize input device, not waiting for gdb");
attach_gdb = false;
}
}
std::set<pid_t> siblings;
if (!attach_gdb) {
ptrace_siblings(request.pid, request.tid, siblings);
}
std::unique_ptr<BacktraceMap> backtrace_map(BacktraceMap::Create(request.pid));
int amfd = -1;
std::unique_ptr<std::string> amfd_data;
if (request.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) {
amfd = activity_manager_connect();
amfd_data.reset(new std::string);
}
bool succeeded = false;
if (!drop_privileges()) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to drop privileges, exiting");
_exit(1);
}
int crash_signal = SIGKILL;
succeeded = perform_dump(request, fd, tombstone_fd, backtrace_map.get(), siblings,
&crash_signal, amfd_data.get());
if (succeeded) {
if (request.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_TOMBSTONE) {
if (!tombstone_path.empty()) {
android::base::WriteFully(fd, tombstone_path.c_str(), tombstone_path.length());
}
}
}
if (attach_gdb) {
if (!send_signal(request.pid, 0, SIGSTOP)) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to stop process for gdb attach: %s", strerror(errno));
attach_gdb = false;
}
}
if (!attach_gdb) {
activity_manager_write(request.pid, crash_signal, amfd, *amfd_data.get());
}
if (ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, request.tid, 0, 0) != 0) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: ptrace detach from %d failed: %s", request.tid, strerror(errno));
}
for (pid_t sibling : siblings) {
ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, sibling, 0, 0);
}
if (!attach_gdb && request.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) {
if (!send_signal(request.pid, request.tid, crash_signal)) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to kill process %d: %s", request.pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (attach_gdb) {
wait_for_user_action(request);
activity_manager_write(request.pid, crash_signal, amfd, *amfd_data.get());
if (!send_signal(request.pid, 0, SIGCONT)) {
ALOGE("debuggerd: failed to resume process %d: %s", request.pid, strerror(errno));
}
uninit_getevent();
}
close(amfd);
exit(!succeeded);
}
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void trimFragment(DocumentFragment* fragment, Node* nodeBeforeContext, Node* nodeAfterContext)
{
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
RefPtr<Node> next;
for (RefPtr<Node> node = fragment->firstChild(); node; node = next) {
if (nodeBeforeContext->isDescendantOf(node.get())) {
next = node->traverseNextNode();
continue;
}
next = node->traverseNextSibling();
ASSERT(!node->contains(nodeAfterContext));
node->parentNode()->removeChild(node.get(), ec);
if (nodeBeforeContext == node)
break;
}
ASSERT(nodeAfterContext->parentNode());
for (RefPtr<Node> node = nodeAfterContext; node; node = next) {
next = node->traverseNextSibling();
node->parentNode()->removeChild(node.get(), ec);
ASSERT(!ec);
}
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pseudo_get_user_info(ClassAd *&ad)
{
static ClassAd* user_ad = NULL;
if( ! user_ad ) {
user_ad = new ClassAd;
#ifndef WIN32
char buf[1024];
sprintf( buf, "%s = %d", ATTR_UID, (int)get_user_uid() );
user_ad->Insert( buf );
sprintf( buf, "%s = %d", ATTR_GID, (int)get_user_gid() );
user_ad->Insert( buf );
#endif
}
ad = user_ad;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,370 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.