instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setJSTestObjUnsignedLongSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedLongSequenceAttr(toNativeArray<unsigned long>(exec, value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::Cancel() {
SetContentSetting(CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK);
bool throttled = NotifyCallbacks(false);
SetDownloadStatusAndNotify(throttled ? PROMPT_BEFORE_DOWNLOAD
: DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED);
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_apic_nmi_wd_deliver(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
if (apic)
kvm_apic_local_deliver(apic, APIC_LVT0);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_annot_mapping_copy (PopplerAnnotMapping *mapping)
{
PopplerAnnotMapping *new_mapping;
new_mapping = poppler_annot_mapping_new ();
*new_mapping = *mapping;
if (mapping->annot)
new_mapping->annot = (PopplerAnnot *) g_object_ref (mapping->annot);
return new_mapping;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int drm_mode_detachmode(struct drm_device *dev,
struct drm_connector *connector,
struct drm_display_mode *mode)
{
int found = 0;
int ret = 0;
struct drm_display_mode *match_mode, *t;
list_for_each_entry_safe(match_mode, t, &connector->user_modes, head) {
if (drm_mode_equal(match_mode, mode)) {
list_del(&match_mode->head);
drm_mode_destroy(dev, match_mode);
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
ret = -EINVAL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static audio_format_t in_get_format(const struct audio_stream *stream)
{
UNUSED(stream);
FNLOG();
return AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_make_gamma_csdescr(struct iw_csdescr *cs, double gamma)
{
cs->cstype = IW_CSTYPE_GAMMA;
cs->gamma = gamma;
if(cs->gamma<0.1) cs->gamma=0.1;
if(cs->gamma>10.0) cs->gamma=10.0;
cs->srgb_intent = 0;
optimize_csdescr(cs);
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv) {
struct passwd *pw = NULL, pw_s;
const char *user = NULL;
cfg_t cfg_st;
cfg_t *cfg = &cfg_st;
char buffer[BUFSIZE];
char *buf = NULL;
char *authfile_dir;
size_t authfile_dir_len;
int pgu_ret, gpn_ret;
int retval = PAM_IGNORE;
device_t *devices = NULL;
unsigned n_devices = 0;
int openasuser;
int should_free_origin = 0;
int should_free_appid = 0;
int should_free_auth_file = 0;
int should_free_authpending_file = 0;
parse_cfg(flags, argc, argv, cfg);
if (!cfg->origin) {
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX);
if (gethostname(buffer + strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX),
BUFSIZE - strlen(DEFAULT_ORIGIN_PREFIX)) == -1) {
DBG("Unable to get host name");
goto done;
}
DBG("Origin not specified, using \"%s\"", buffer);
cfg->origin = strdup(buffer);
if (!cfg->origin) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
goto done;
} else {
should_free_origin = 1;
}
}
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Appid not specified, using the same value of origin (%s)",
cfg->origin);
cfg->appid = strdup(cfg->origin);
if (!cfg->appid) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory")
goto done;
} else {
should_free_appid = 1;
}
}
if (cfg->max_devs == 0) {
DBG("Maximum devices number not set. Using default (%d)", MAX_DEVS);
cfg->max_devs = MAX_DEVS;
}
devices = malloc(sizeof(device_t) * cfg->max_devs);
if (!devices) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
pgu_ret = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
if (pgu_ret != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
DBG("Unable to access user %s", user);
retval = PAM_CONV_ERR;
goto done;
}
DBG("Requesting authentication for user %s", user);
gpn_ret = getpwnam_r(user, &pw_s, buffer, sizeof(buffer), &pw);
if (gpn_ret != 0 || pw == NULL || pw->pw_dir == NULL ||
pw->pw_dir[0] != '/') {
DBG("Unable to retrieve credentials for user %s, (%s)", user,
strerror(errno));
retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
goto done;
}
DBG("Found user %s", user);
DBG("Home directory for %s is %s", user, pw->pw_dir);
if (!cfg->auth_file) {
buf = NULL;
authfile_dir = secure_getenv(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
if (!authfile_dir) {
DBG("Variable %s is not set. Using default value ($HOME/.config/)",
DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR);
authfile_dir_len =
strlen(pw->pw_dir) + strlen("/.config") + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s/.config%s", pw->pw_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
} else {
DBG("Variable %s set to %s", DEFAULT_AUTHFILE_DIR_VAR, authfile_dir);
authfile_dir_len = strlen(authfile_dir) + strlen(DEFAULT_AUTHFILE) + 1;
buf = malloc(sizeof(char) * (authfile_dir_len));
if (!buf) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
snprintf(buf, authfile_dir_len,
"%s%s", authfile_dir, DEFAULT_AUTHFILE);
}
DBG("Using default authentication file %s", buf);
cfg->auth_file = buf; /* cfg takes ownership */
should_free_auth_file = 1;
buf = NULL;
} else {
DBG("Using authentication file %s", cfg->auth_file);
}
openasuser = geteuid() == 0 && cfg->openasuser;
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(pw_s.pw_uid)) {
DBG("Unable to switch user to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched to uid %i", pw_s.pw_uid);
}
retval = get_devices_from_authfile(cfg->auth_file, user, cfg->max_devs,
cfg->debug, cfg->debug_file,
devices, &n_devices);
if (openasuser) {
if (seteuid(0)) {
DBG("Unable to switch back to uid 0");
retval = PAM_IGNORE;
goto done;
}
DBG("Switched back to uid 0");
}
if (retval != 1) {
n_devices = 0;
}
if (n_devices == 0) {
if (cfg->nouserok) {
DBG("Found no devices but nouserok specified. Skipping authentication");
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
goto done;
} else if (retval != 1) {
DBG("Unable to get devices from file %s", cfg->auth_file);
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
} else {
DBG("Found no devices. Aborting.");
retval = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
}
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
int actual_size = snprintf(buffer, BUFSIZE, DEFAULT_AUTHPENDING_FILE_PATH, getuid());
if (actual_size >= 0 && actual_size < BUFSIZE) {
cfg->authpending_file = strdup(buffer);
}
if (!cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Unable to allocate memory for the authpending_file, touch request notifications will not be emitted");
} else {
should_free_authpending_file = 1;
}
} else {
if (strlen(cfg->authpending_file) == 0) {
DBG("authpending_file is set to an empty value, touch request notifications will be disabled");
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
}
int authpending_file_descriptor = -1;
if (cfg->authpending_file) {
DBG("Using file '%s' for emitting touch request notifications", cfg->authpending_file);
authpending_file_descriptor = open(cfg->authpending_file, O_RDONLY | O_CREAT, 0664);
if (authpending_file_descriptor < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication started' notification by opening the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (cfg->manual == 0) {
if (cfg->interactive) {
converse(pamh, PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON,
cfg->prompt != NULL ? cfg->prompt : DEFAULT_PROMPT);
}
retval = do_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
} else {
retval = do_manual_authentication(cfg, devices, n_devices, pamh);
}
if (authpending_file_descriptor >= 0) {
if (close(authpending_file_descriptor) < 0) {
DBG("Unable to emit 'authentication stopped' notification by closing the file '%s', (%s)",
cfg->authpending_file, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (retval != 1) {
DBG("do_authentication returned %d", retval);
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
goto done;
}
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
done:
free_devices(devices, n_devices);
if (buf) {
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
if (should_free_origin) {
free((char *) cfg->origin);
cfg->origin = NULL;
}
if (should_free_appid) {
free((char *) cfg->appid);
cfg->appid = NULL;
}
if (should_free_auth_file) {
free((char *) cfg->auth_file);
cfg->auth_file = NULL;
}
if (should_free_authpending_file) {
free((char *) cfg->authpending_file);
cfg->authpending_file = NULL;
}
if (cfg->alwaysok && retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
DBG("alwaysok needed (otherwise return with %d)", retval);
retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
}
DBG("done. [%s]", pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Do not leak file descriptor when doing exec
When opening a custom debug file, the descriptor would stay
open when calling exec and leak to the child process.
Make sure all files are opened with close-on-exec.
This fixes CVE-2019-12210.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 169,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int iswhite(int ch)
{
return
ch == '\000' || ch == '\011' || ch == '\012' ||
ch == '\014' || ch == '\015' || ch == '\040';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void encode_attrs(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const struct iattr *iap, const struct nfs_server *server)
{
char owner_name[IDMAP_NAMESZ];
char owner_group[IDMAP_NAMESZ];
int owner_namelen = 0;
int owner_grouplen = 0;
__be32 *p;
__be32 *q;
int len;
uint32_t bmval0 = 0;
uint32_t bmval1 = 0;
/*
* We reserve enough space to write the entire attribute buffer at once.
* In the worst-case, this would be
* 12(bitmap) + 4(attrlen) + 8(size) + 4(mode) + 4(atime) + 4(mtime)
* = 36 bytes, plus any contribution from variable-length fields
* such as owner/group.
*/
len = 16;
/* Sigh */
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
len += 8;
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
len += 4;
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_UID) {
owner_namelen = nfs_map_uid_to_name(server, iap->ia_uid, owner_name, IDMAP_NAMESZ);
if (owner_namelen < 0) {
dprintk("nfs: couldn't resolve uid %d to string\n",
iap->ia_uid);
/* XXX */
strcpy(owner_name, "nobody");
owner_namelen = sizeof("nobody") - 1;
/* goto out; */
}
len += 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(owner_namelen) << 2);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_GID) {
owner_grouplen = nfs_map_gid_to_group(server, iap->ia_gid, owner_group, IDMAP_NAMESZ);
if (owner_grouplen < 0) {
dprintk("nfs: couldn't resolve gid %d to string\n",
iap->ia_gid);
strcpy(owner_group, "nobody");
owner_grouplen = sizeof("nobody") - 1;
/* goto out; */
}
len += 4 + (XDR_QUADLEN(owner_grouplen) << 2);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET)
len += 16;
else if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME)
len += 4;
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET)
len += 16;
else if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME)
len += 4;
p = reserve_space(xdr, len);
/*
* We write the bitmap length now, but leave the bitmap and the attribute
* buffer length to be backfilled at the end of this routine.
*/
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(2);
q = p;
p += 3;
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
bmval0 |= FATTR4_WORD0_SIZE;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, iap->ia_size);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_MODE;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_mode & S_IALLUGO);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_UID) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER;
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, owner_name, owner_namelen);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_GID) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_OWNER_GROUP;
p = xdr_encode_opaque(p, owner_group, owner_grouplen);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME_SET) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS_SET;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_atime.tv_sec);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_atime.tv_nsec);
}
else if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_ATIME) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_ACCESS_SET;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME);
}
if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME_SET) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY_SET;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_SET_TO_CLIENT_TIME);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_mtime.tv_sec);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(iap->ia_mtime.tv_nsec);
}
else if (iap->ia_valid & ATTR_MTIME) {
bmval1 |= FATTR4_WORD1_TIME_MODIFY_SET;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(NFS4_SET_TO_SERVER_TIME);
}
/*
* Now we backfill the bitmap and the attribute buffer length.
*/
if (len != ((char *)p - (char *)q) + 4) {
printk(KERN_ERR "nfs: Attr length error, %u != %Zu\n",
len, ((char *)p - (char *)q) + 4);
BUG();
}
len = (char *)p - (char *)q - 12;
*q++ = htonl(bmval0);
*q++ = htonl(bmval1);
*q = htonl(len);
/* out: */
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftGSM::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nChannels != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nSamplingRate != 8000) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.gsm",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::StopFetchingInternal(StopFetchingTarget target) {
HeapVector<Member<ResourceLoader>> loaders_to_cancel;
for (const auto& loader : non_blocking_loaders_) {
if (target == StopFetchingTarget::kIncludingKeepaliveLoaders ||
!loader->GetKeepalive()) {
loaders_to_cancel.push_back(loader);
}
}
for (const auto& loader : loaders_) {
if (target == StopFetchingTarget::kIncludingKeepaliveLoaders ||
!loader->GetKeepalive()) {
loaders_to_cancel.push_back(loader);
}
}
for (const auto& loader : loaders_to_cancel) {
if (loaders_.Contains(loader) || non_blocking_loaders_.Contains(loader))
loader->Cancel();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fuse_do_truncate(struct file *file)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_mapping->host;
struct iattr attr;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_SIZE;
attr.ia_size = i_size_read(inode);
attr.ia_file = file;
attr.ia_valid |= ATTR_FILE;
fuse_do_setattr(inode, &attr, file);
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params, bool replace_entry) {
NavigationEntryImpl* new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url;
if (pending_entry_ &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == web_contents_->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = new NavigationEntryImpl(*pending_entry_);
new_entry->set_page_type(PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
} else {
new_entry = new NavigationEntryImpl;
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
}
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry, params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetPageID(params.page_id);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(web_contents_->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetHasPostData(params.is_post);
new_entry->SetPostID(params.post_id);
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(new_entry, replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void math_state_restore(void)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
if (!tsk_used_math(tsk)) {
local_irq_enable();
/*
* does a slab alloc which can sleep
*/
if (init_fpu(tsk)) {
/*
* ran out of memory!
*/
do_group_exit(SIGKILL);
return;
}
local_irq_disable();
}
__thread_fpu_begin(tsk);
/*
* Paranoid restore. send a SIGSEGV if we fail to restore the state.
*/
if (unlikely(restore_fpu_checking(tsk))) {
drop_init_fpu(tsk);
force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, SEND_SIG_PRIV, tsk);
return;
}
tsk->thread.fpu_counter++;
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_zlib_output_handler_ex(php_zlib_context *ctx, php_output_context *output_context)
{
int flags = Z_SYNC_FLUSH;
PHP_OUTPUT_TSRMLS(output_context);
if (output_context->op & PHP_OUTPUT_HANDLER_START) {
/* start up */
if (Z_OK != deflateInit2(&ctx->Z, ZLIBG(output_compression_level), Z_DEFLATED, ZLIBG(compression_coding), MAX_MEM_LEVEL, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY)) {
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (output_context->op & PHP_OUTPUT_HANDLER_CLEAN) {
/* free buffers */
deflateEnd(&ctx->Z);
if (output_context->op & PHP_OUTPUT_HANDLER_FINAL) {
/* discard */
return SUCCESS;
} else {
/* restart */
if (Z_OK != deflateInit2(&ctx->Z, ZLIBG(output_compression_level), Z_DEFLATED, ZLIBG(compression_coding), MAX_MEM_LEVEL, Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY)) {
return FAILURE;
}
ctx->buffer.used = 0;
}
} else {
if (output_context->in.used) {
/* append input */
if (ctx->buffer.free < output_context->in.used) {
if (!(ctx->buffer.aptr = erealloc_recoverable(ctx->buffer.data, ctx->buffer.used + ctx->buffer.free + output_context->in.used))) {
deflateEnd(&ctx->Z);
return FAILURE;
}
ctx->buffer.data = ctx->buffer.aptr;
ctx->buffer.free += output_context->in.used;
}
memcpy(ctx->buffer.data + ctx->buffer.used, output_context->in.data, output_context->in.used);
ctx->buffer.free -= output_context->in.used;
ctx->buffer.used += output_context->in.used;
}
output_context->out.size = PHP_ZLIB_BUFFER_SIZE_GUESS(output_context->in.used);
output_context->out.data = emalloc(output_context->out.size);
output_context->out.free = 1;
output_context->out.used = 0;
ctx->Z.avail_in = ctx->buffer.used;
ctx->Z.next_in = (Bytef *) ctx->buffer.data;
ctx->Z.avail_out = output_context->out.size;
ctx->Z.next_out = (Bytef *) output_context->out.data;
if (output_context->op & PHP_OUTPUT_HANDLER_FINAL) {
flags = Z_FINISH;
} else if (output_context->op & PHP_OUTPUT_HANDLER_FLUSH) {
flags = Z_FULL_FLUSH;
}
switch (deflate(&ctx->Z, flags)) {
case Z_OK:
if (flags == Z_FINISH) {
deflateEnd(&ctx->Z);
return FAILURE;
}
case Z_STREAM_END:
if (ctx->Z.avail_in) {
memmove(ctx->buffer.data, ctx->buffer.data + ctx->buffer.used - ctx->Z.avail_in, ctx->Z.avail_in);
}
ctx->buffer.free += ctx->buffer.used - ctx->Z.avail_in;
ctx->buffer.used = ctx->Z.avail_in;
output_context->out.used = output_context->out.size - ctx->Z.avail_out;
break;
default:
deflateEnd(&ctx->Z);
return FAILURE;
}
if (output_context->op & PHP_OUTPUT_HANDLER_FINAL) {
deflateEnd(&ctx->Z);
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostCreatedObserver(WebContents* web_contents,
int expected_frame_count)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
expected_frame_count_(expected_frame_count),
frames_created_(0) {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcs_connect_start(char *server, char *username, char *domain, char *password,
RD_BOOL reconnect, uint32 * selected_protocol)
{
logger(Protocol, Debug, "%s()", __func__);
return iso_connect(server, username, domain, password, reconnect, selected_protocol);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_sigpending(void __user *set, unsigned long sigsetsize)
{
long error = -EINVAL;
sigset_t pending;
if (sigsetsize > sizeof(sigset_t))
goto out;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
sigorsets(&pending, ¤t->pending.signal,
¤t->signal->shared_pending.signal);
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/* Outside the lock because only this thread touches it. */
sigandsets(&pending, ¤t->blocked, &pending);
error = -EFAULT;
if (!copy_to_user(set, &pending, sigsetsize))
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void arm_iommu_release_mapping(struct dma_iommu_mapping *mapping)
{
if (mapping)
kref_put(&mapping->kref, release_iommu_mapping);
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLSelectElement::setSize(int size)
{
setAttribute(sizeAttr, String::number(size));
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void update_memslots(struct kvm_memslots *slots, struct kvm_memory_slot *new,
u64 last_generation)
{
if (new) {
int id = new->id;
struct kvm_memory_slot *old = id_to_memslot(slots, id);
unsigned long npages = old->npages;
*old = *new;
if (new->npages != npages)
sort_memslots(slots);
}
slots->generation = last_generation + 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::RecordPageRequestSummary(
std::unique_ptr<PageRequestSummary> summary) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (initialization_state_ == NOT_INITIALIZED) {
StartInitialization();
return;
} else if (initialization_state_ == INITIALIZING) {
return;
} else if (initialization_state_ != INITIALIZED) {
NOTREACHED() << "Unexpected initialization_state_: "
<< initialization_state_;
return;
}
LearnRedirect(summary->initial_url.host(), summary->main_frame_url,
host_redirect_data_.get());
LearnOrigins(summary->main_frame_url.host(),
summary->main_frame_url.GetOrigin(), summary->origins);
if (observer_)
observer_->OnNavigationLearned(*summary);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserTabStripController::IsNewTabPage(int model_index) const {
return model_->ContainsIndex(model_index) &&
model_->GetTabContentsAt(model_index)->web_contents()->GetURL() ==
GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseDrmSINF(off64_t *offset, off64_t data_offset) {
uint8_t updateIdTag;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &updateIdTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x01/*OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR_UPDATE_ID_TAG*/ != updateIdTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t numOfBytes;
int32_t size = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (size < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
int32_t classSize = size;
data_offset += numOfBytes;
while(size >= 11 ) {
uint8_t descriptorTag;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &descriptorTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x11/*OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR_ID_TAG*/ != descriptorTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer, 2) < 2) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += 2;
if ((buffer[1] >> 5) & 0x0001) { //url flag is set
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += 8;
if ((0x0F/*ES_ID_REF_TAG*/ != buffer[1])
|| ( 0x0A/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_POINTER_ID_TAG*/ != buffer[5])) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
SINF *sinf = new SINF;
sinf->trackID = U16_AT(&buffer[3]);
sinf->IPMPDescriptorID = buffer[7];
sinf->next = mFirstSINF;
mFirstSINF = sinf;
size -= (8 + 2 + 1);
}
if (size != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &updateIdTag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if(0x05/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_UPDATE_ID_TAG*/ != updateIdTag) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
size = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (size < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
classSize = size;
data_offset += numOfBytes;
while (size > 0) {
uint8_t tag;
int32_t dataLen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &tag, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
if (0x0B/*IPMP_DESCRIPTOR_ID_TAG*/ == tag) {
uint8_t id;
dataLen = readSize(data_offset, mDataSource, &numOfBytes);
if (dataLen < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
} else if (dataLen < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
data_offset += numOfBytes;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &id, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset ++;
SINF *sinf = mFirstSINF;
while (sinf && (sinf->IPMPDescriptorID != id)) {
sinf = sinf->next;
}
if (sinf == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sinf->len = dataLen - 3;
sinf->IPMPData = new (std::nothrow) char[sinf->len];
if (sinf->IPMPData == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
data_offset += 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 2, sinf->IPMPData, sinf->len) < sinf->len) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
data_offset += sinf->len;
size -= (dataLen + numOfBytes + 1);
}
}
if (size != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 161,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void n_tty_receive_parity_error(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned char c)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
if (I_INPCK(tty)) {
if (I_IGNPAR(tty))
return;
if (I_PARMRK(tty)) {
put_tty_queue('\377', ldata);
put_tty_queue('\0', ldata);
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
} else
put_tty_queue('\0', ldata);
} else
put_tty_queue(c, ldata);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 76,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: display_rc(const display *d, int strict)
{
return d->error_count + (strict ? d->warning_count : 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SecurityContext::SecurityContext()
: m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent(false)
, m_haveInitializedSecurityOrigin(false)
, m_sandboxFlags(SandboxNone)
{
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unix_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open_net(inode, file, &unix_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct seq_net_private));
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8WindowShell::namedItemRemoved(HTMLDocument* document, const AtomicString& name)
{
ASSERT(m_world->isMainWorld());
if (m_context.isEmpty())
return;
if (document->hasNamedItem(name.impl()) || document->hasExtraNamedItem(name.impl()))
return;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(m_context.newLocal(m_isolate));
ASSERT(!m_document.isEmpty());
v8::Handle<v8::Object> documentHandle = m_document.newLocal(m_isolate);
checkDocumentWrapper(documentHandle, document);
documentHandle->Delete(v8String(name, m_isolate));
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::cream_job_cancel(const char *service, const char *job_id)
{
static const char* command = "CREAM_JOB_CANCEL";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!service) service=NULLSTRING;
if (!job_id) job_id=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(job_id) );
int job_number = 1; // Just query 1 job for now
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d %s", esc1, job_number, esc2);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy,medium_prio);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc;
if (strcmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) == 0) {
rc = 0;
} else {
rc = 1;
error_string = result->argv[1];
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_try_keep_open(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int state = TCP_CA_Open;
if (tcp_left_out(tp) || tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
state = TCP_CA_Disorder;
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != state) {
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, state);
tp->high_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP8Accelerator::~VaapiVP8Accelerator() {}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 148,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t setGenerationNumber(uint32_t generationNumber) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferProducer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeUint32(generationNumber);
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_GENERATION_NUMBER, data, &reply);
if (result == NO_ERROR) {
result = reply.readInt32();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 160,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean CL_CheckTranslationString( char *original, char *translated ) {
char format_org[128], format_trans[128];
int len, i;
memset( format_org, 0, 128 );
memset( format_trans, 0, 128 );
len = strlen( original );
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
if ( original[i] != '%' ) {
continue;
}
strcat( format_org, va( "%c%c ", '%', original[i + 1] ) );
}
len = strlen( translated );
if ( !len ) {
return qtrue;
}
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
if ( translated[i] != '%' ) {
continue;
}
strcat( format_trans, va( "%c%c ", '%', translated[i + 1] ) );
}
len = strlen( format_org );
if ( len != strlen( format_trans ) ) {
return qfalse;
}
for ( i = 0; i < len; i++ ) {
if ( format_org[i] != format_trans[i] ) {
return qfalse;
}
}
return qtrue;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendImpl::OnExternalCacheHit(const std::string& key) {
background_queue_.OnExternalCacheHit(key);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String getSerializedData(const char* url, const char* mimeType = 0)
{
const SerializedResource* resource = getResource(url, mimeType);
if (resource)
return String(resource->data->data(), resource->data->size());
return String();
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(apache_request_headers) /* {{{ */
{
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 0) {
WRONG_PARAM_COUNT;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (fcgi_is_fastcgi()) {
fcgi_request *request = (fcgi_request*) SG(server_context);
fcgi_loadenv(request, add_request_header, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
char buf[128];
char **env, *p, *q, *var, *val, *t = buf;
size_t alloc_size = sizeof(buf);
unsigned long var_len;
for (env = environ; env != NULL && *env != NULL; env++) {
val = strchr(*env, '=');
if (!val) { /* malformed entry? */
continue;
}
var_len = val - *env;
if (var_len >= alloc_size) {
alloc_size = var_len + 64;
t = (t == buf ? emalloc(alloc_size): erealloc(t, alloc_size));
}
var = *env;
if (var_len > 5 &&
var[0] == 'H' &&
var[1] == 'T' &&
var[2] == 'T' &&
var[3] == 'P' &&
var[4] == '_') {
var_len -= 5;
if (var_len >= alloc_size) {
alloc_size = var_len + 64;
t = (t == buf ? emalloc(alloc_size): erealloc(t, alloc_size));
}
p = var + 5;
var = q = t;
/* First char keep uppercase */
*q++ = *p++;
while (*p) {
if (*p == '=') {
/* End of name */
break;
} else if (*p == '_') {
*q++ = '-';
p++;
/* First char after - keep uppercase */
if (*p && *p!='=') {
*q++ = *p++;
}
} else if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'Z') {
/* lowercase */
*q++ = (*p++ - 'A' + 'a');
} else {
*q++ = *p++;
}
}
*q = 0;
} else if (var_len == sizeof("CONTENT_TYPE")-1 &&
memcmp(var, "CONTENT_TYPE", sizeof("CONTENT_TYPE")-1) == 0) {
var = "Content-Type";
} else if (var_len == sizeof("CONTENT_LENGTH")-1 &&
memcmp(var, "CONTENT_LENGTH", sizeof("CONTENT_LENGTH")-1) == 0) {
var = "Content-Length";
} else {
continue;
}
val++;
add_assoc_string_ex(return_value, var, var_len+1, val, 1);
}
if (t != buf && t != NULL) {
efree(t);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
unsigned int data_was_unread;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, timeout:%ld\n", __func__, sk, timeout);
lock_sock_nested(sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_CLOSING;
ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
/* Clean up any skbs sitting on the receive queue. */
data_was_unread = sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
data_was_unread += sctp_queue_purge_ulpevents(&sctp_sk(sk)->pd_lobby);
/* Walk all associations on an endpoint. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &ep->asocs) {
asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
/* A closed association can still be in the list if
* it belongs to a TCP-style listening socket that is
* not yet accepted. If so, free it. If not, send an
* ABORT or SHUTDOWN based on the linger options.
*/
if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) {
sctp_association_free(asoc);
continue;
}
}
if (data_was_unread || !skb_queue_empty(&asoc->ulpq.lobby) ||
!skb_queue_empty(&asoc->ulpq.reasm) ||
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER) && !sk->sk_lingertime)) {
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
chunk = sctp_make_abort_user(asoc, NULL, 0);
sctp_primitive_ABORT(net, asoc, chunk);
} else
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
}
/* On a TCP-style socket, block for at most linger_time if set. */
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && timeout)
sctp_wait_for_close(sk, timeout);
/* This will run the backlog queue. */
release_sock(sk);
/* Supposedly, no process has access to the socket, but
* the net layers still may.
* Also, sctp_destroy_sock() needs to be called with addr_wq_lock
* held and that should be grabbed before socket lock.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
/* Hold the sock, since sk_common_release() will put sock_put()
* and we have just a little more cleanup.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
sk_common_release(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock);
sock_put(sk);
SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT_DEC(sock);
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateTrueColor (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (int *), sy)) {
return 0;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdMalloc (sizeof (gdImage));
if (!im) {
return 0;
}
memset (im, 0, sizeof (gdImage));
im->tpixels = (int **) gdMalloc (sizeof (int *) * sy);
if (!im->tpixels) {
gdFree(im);
return 0;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
im->tpixels[i] = (int *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (int));
if (!im->tpixels[i]) {
/* 2.0.34 */
i--;
while (i >= 0) {
gdFree(im->tpixels[i]);
i--;
}
gdFree(im->tpixels);
gdFree(im);
return 0;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->trueColor = 1;
/* 2.0.2: alpha blending is now on by default, and saving of alpha is
off by default. This allows font antialiasing to work as expected
on the first try in JPEGs -- quite important -- and also allows
for smaller PNGs when saving of alpha channel is not really
desired, which it usually isn't! */
im->saveAlphaFlag = 0;
im->alphaBlendingFlag = 1;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Commit Message: fix #215 gdImageFillToBorder stack-overflow when invalid color is used
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 96,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TreeView::IsExpanded(TreeModelNode* node) {
TreeModelNode* parent = model_->GetParent(node);
if (!parent)
return true;
if (!IsExpanded(parent))
return false;
NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetails(node);
return (TreeView_GetItemState(tree_view_, details->tree_item, TVIS_EXPANDED) &
TVIS_EXPANDED) != 0;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::IsAutoplayingMuted() {
return autoplay_policy_->IsAutoplayingMuted();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ComparePixels(const ImageLayerMethod method,
const MagickPixelPacket *p,const MagickPixelPacket *q)
{
MagickRealType
o1,
o2;
/*
Any change in pixel values
*/
if (method == CompareAnyLayer)
return((MagickBooleanType)(IsMagickColorSimilar(p,q) == MagickFalse));
o1 = (p->matte != MagickFalse) ? GetPixelOpacity(p) : OpaqueOpacity;
o2 = (q->matte != MagickFalse) ? q->opacity : OpaqueOpacity;
/*
Pixel goes from opaque to transprency
*/
if (method == CompareClearLayer)
return((MagickBooleanType) ( (o1 <= ((MagickRealType) QuantumRange/2.0)) &&
(o2 > ((MagickRealType) QuantumRange/2.0)) ) );
/*
overlay would change first pixel by second
*/
if (method == CompareOverlayLayer)
{
if (o2 > ((MagickRealType) QuantumRange/2.0))
return MagickFalse;
return((MagickBooleanType) (IsMagickColorSimilar(p,q) == MagickFalse));
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 88,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ptaRead(const char *filename)
{
FILE *fp;
PTA *pta;
PROCNAME("ptaRead");
if (!filename)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("filename not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((fp = fopenReadStream(filename)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("stream not opened", procName, NULL);
pta = ptaReadStream(fp);
fclose(fp);
if (!pta)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not read", procName, NULL);
return pta;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JsVarInt jswrap_graphics_getColorX(JsVar *parent, bool isForeground) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return 0;
return (JsVarInt)((isForeground ? gfx.data.fgColor : gfx.data.bgColor) & ((1UL<<gfx.data.bpp)-1));
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_vs_genl_parse_service(struct ip_vs_service_user_kern *usvc,
struct nlattr *nla, int full_entry)
{
struct nlattr *attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *nla_af, *nla_port, *nla_fwmark, *nla_protocol, *nla_addr;
/* Parse mandatory identifying service fields first */
if (nla == NULL ||
nla_parse_nested(attrs, IPVS_SVC_ATTR_MAX, nla, ip_vs_svc_policy))
return -EINVAL;
nla_af = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_AF];
nla_protocol = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PROTOCOL];
nla_addr = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_ADDR];
nla_port = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_PORT];
nla_fwmark = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FWMARK];
if (!(nla_af && (nla_fwmark || (nla_port && nla_protocol && nla_addr))))
return -EINVAL;
memset(usvc, 0, sizeof(*usvc));
usvc->af = nla_get_u16(nla_af);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6
if (usvc->af != AF_INET && usvc->af != AF_INET6)
#else
if (usvc->af != AF_INET)
#endif
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (nla_fwmark) {
usvc->protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
usvc->fwmark = nla_get_u32(nla_fwmark);
} else {
usvc->protocol = nla_get_u16(nla_protocol);
nla_memcpy(&usvc->addr, nla_addr, sizeof(usvc->addr));
usvc->port = nla_get_u16(nla_port);
usvc->fwmark = 0;
}
/* If a full entry was requested, check for the additional fields */
if (full_entry) {
struct nlattr *nla_sched, *nla_flags, *nla_timeout,
*nla_netmask;
struct ip_vs_flags flags;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
nla_sched = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_SCHED_NAME];
nla_flags = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_FLAGS];
nla_timeout = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_TIMEOUT];
nla_netmask = attrs[IPVS_SVC_ATTR_NETMASK];
if (!(nla_sched && nla_flags && nla_timeout && nla_netmask))
return -EINVAL;
nla_memcpy(&flags, nla_flags, sizeof(flags));
/* prefill flags from service if it already exists */
if (usvc->fwmark)
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(usvc->af, usvc->fwmark);
else
svc = __ip_vs_service_get(usvc->af, usvc->protocol,
&usvc->addr, usvc->port);
if (svc) {
usvc->flags = svc->flags;
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
} else
usvc->flags = 0;
/* set new flags from userland */
usvc->flags = (usvc->flags & ~flags.mask) |
(flags.flags & flags.mask);
usvc->sched_name = nla_data(nla_sched);
usvc->timeout = nla_get_u32(nla_timeout);
usvc->netmask = nla_get_u32(nla_netmask);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexParameterf(GLenum target,
GLenum pname,
GLfloat param) {
api()->glTexParameterfFn(target, pname, param);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *sizes,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < sizes[y])
length=(size_t) sizes[y];
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) sizes[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* AutofillPopupItemView::CreateSubtextLabel() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static diy_fp_t double2diy_fp(double d)
{
uint64_t d64 = double_to_uint64(d);
int biased_e = (d64 & DP_EXPONENT_MASK) >> DP_SIGNIFICAND_SIZE;
uint64_t significand = (d64 & DP_SIGNIFICAND_MASK);
diy_fp_t res;
if (biased_e != 0) {
res.f = significand + DP_HIDDEN_BIT;
res.e = biased_e - DP_EXPONENT_BIAS;
} else {
res.f = significand;
res.e = DP_MIN_EXPONENT + 1;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 11,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void megasas_set_dynamic_target_properties(struct scsi_device *sdev,
bool is_target_prop)
{
u16 pd_index = 0, ld;
u32 device_id;
struct megasas_instance *instance;
struct fusion_context *fusion;
struct MR_PRIV_DEVICE *mr_device_priv_data;
struct MR_PD_CFG_SEQ_NUM_SYNC *pd_sync;
struct MR_LD_RAID *raid;
struct MR_DRV_RAID_MAP_ALL *local_map_ptr;
instance = megasas_lookup_instance(sdev->host->host_no);
fusion = instance->ctrl_context;
mr_device_priv_data = sdev->hostdata;
if (!fusion || !mr_device_priv_data)
return;
if (MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL(sdev)) {
device_id = ((sdev->channel % 2) * MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL)
+ sdev->id;
local_map_ptr = fusion->ld_drv_map[(instance->map_id & 1)];
ld = MR_TargetIdToLdGet(device_id, local_map_ptr);
if (ld >= instance->fw_supported_vd_count)
return;
raid = MR_LdRaidGet(ld, local_map_ptr);
if (raid->capability.ldPiMode == MR_PROT_INFO_TYPE_CONTROLLER)
blk_queue_update_dma_alignment(sdev->request_queue, 0x7);
mr_device_priv_data->is_tm_capable =
raid->capability.tmCapable;
} else if (instance->use_seqnum_jbod_fp) {
pd_index = (sdev->channel * MEGASAS_MAX_DEV_PER_CHANNEL) +
sdev->id;
pd_sync = (void *)fusion->pd_seq_sync
[(instance->pd_seq_map_id - 1) & 1];
mr_device_priv_data->is_tm_capable =
pd_sync->seq[pd_index].capability.tmCapable;
}
if (is_target_prop && instance->tgt_prop->reset_tmo) {
/*
* If FW provides a target reset timeout value, driver will use
* it. If not set, fallback to default values.
*/
mr_device_priv_data->target_reset_tmo =
min_t(u8, instance->max_reset_tmo,
instance->tgt_prop->reset_tmo);
mr_device_priv_data->task_abort_tmo = instance->task_abort_tmo;
} else {
mr_device_priv_data->target_reset_tmo =
MEGASAS_DEFAULT_TM_TIMEOUT;
mr_device_priv_data->task_abort_tmo =
MEGASAS_DEFAULT_TM_TIMEOUT;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_delegreturn(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p, struct nfs4_delegreturnres *res)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &rqstp->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(&xdr);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
status = decode_delegreturn(&xdr);
decode_getfattr(&xdr, res->fattr, res->server);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDFiumEngine::~PDFiumEngine() {
for (auto& page : pages_)
page->Unload();
if (doc_) {
FORM_DoDocumentAAction(form_, FPDFDOC_AACTION_WC);
#if defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc_);
FPDFDOC_ExitFormFillEnvironment(form_);
#else
FPDFDOC_ExitFormFillEnvironment(form_);
FPDF_CloseDocument(doc_);
#endif
}
FPDFAvail_Destroy(fpdf_availability_);
base::STLDeleteElements(&pages_);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ParsedIsEqual(const Parsed& a, const Parsed& b) {
return a.scheme.begin == b.scheme.begin && a.scheme.len == b.scheme.len &&
a.username.begin == b.username.begin && a.username.len == b.username.len &&
a.password.begin == b.password.begin && a.password.len == b.password.len &&
a.host.begin == b.host.begin && a.host.len == b.host.len &&
a.port.begin == b.port.begin && a.port.len == b.port.len &&
a.path.begin == b.path.begin && a.path.len == b.path.len &&
a.query.begin == b.query.begin && a.query.len == b.query.len &&
a.ref.begin == b.ref.begin && a.ref.len == b.ref.len;
}
Commit Message: Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 149,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedSubstFont::~ScopedSubstFont() {
g_engine_for_fontmapper = old_engine_;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *media;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
media = nla_nest_start(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA);
if (!media)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
prop = nla_nest_start(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_PROP);
if (!prop)
return -EMSGSIZE;
__tipc_add_link_prop(skb, msg, lc);
nla_nest_end(skb, prop);
nla_nest_end(skb, media);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix an infoleak in tipc_nl_compat_link_dump
link_info.str is a char array of size 60. Memory after the NULL
byte is not initialized. Sending the whole object out can cause
a leak.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: request_find_from_trans_id(struct evdns_base *base, u16 trans_id) {
struct request *req = REQ_HEAD(base, trans_id);
struct request *const started_at = req;
ASSERT_LOCKED(base);
if (req) {
do {
if (req->trans_id == trans_id) return req;
req = req->next;
} while (req != started_at);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebMediaPlayer* RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer(
WebFrame* frame, WebMediaPlayerClient* client) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver, observers_, WillCreateMediaPlayer(frame, client));
media::MessageLoopFactory* message_loop_factory =
new media::MessageLoopFactory();
media::FilterCollection* collection = new media::FilterCollection();
RenderMediaLog* render_media_log = new RenderMediaLog();
RenderAudioSourceProvider* audio_source_provider = NULL;
const CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (!cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAudio)) {
audio_source_provider = new RenderAudioSourceProvider();
AudioRendererImpl* audio_renderer =
new AudioRendererImpl(audio_source_provider);
collection->AddAudioRenderer(audio_renderer);
}
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl* context3d =
static_cast<WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl*>(
webview()->graphicsContext3D());
if (context_is_web_graphics_context_3d_command_buffer_impl_ && context3d) {
MessageLoop* factories_loop =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->compositor_thread() ?
RenderThreadImpl::current()->compositor_thread()->GetWebThread()
->message_loop() :
MessageLoop::current();
GpuChannelHost* gpu_channel_host =
RenderThreadImpl::current()->EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CAUSE_FOR_GPU_LAUNCH_VIDEODECODEACCELERATOR_INITIALIZE);
collection->AddVideoDecoder(new media::GpuVideoDecoder(
message_loop_factory->GetMessageLoop("GpuVideoDecoder"),
factories_loop,
new RendererGpuVideoDecoderFactories(
gpu_channel_host, factories_loop, context3d)));
}
#endif
webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerImpl* media_player =
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->OverrideCreateWebMediaPlayer(
this, frame, client, AsWeakPtr(), collection, audio_source_provider,
message_loop_factory, media_stream_impl_.get(), render_media_log);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
#else
if (!media_player) {
media_player = new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerImpl(
frame, client, AsWeakPtr(), collection, audio_source_provider,
message_loop_factory, media_stream_impl_.get(), render_media_log);
}
#endif
return media_player;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void irqfd_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry entries[KVM_NR_IRQCHIPS];
int n_entries;
n_entries = kvm_irq_map_gsi(kvm, entries, irqfd->gsi);
write_seqcount_begin(&irqfd->irq_entry_sc);
e = entries;
if (n_entries == 1)
irqfd->irq_entry = *e;
else
irqfd->irq_entry.type = 0;
write_seqcount_end(&irqfd->irq_entry_sc);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smaps_account(struct mem_size_stats *mss, struct page *page,
bool compound, bool young, bool dirty, bool locked)
{
int i, nr = compound ? 1 << compound_order(page) : 1;
unsigned long size = nr * PAGE_SIZE;
if (PageAnon(page)) {
mss->anonymous += size;
if (!PageSwapBacked(page) && !dirty && !PageDirty(page))
mss->lazyfree += size;
}
mss->resident += size;
/* Accumulate the size in pages that have been accessed. */
if (young || page_is_young(page) || PageReferenced(page))
mss->referenced += size;
/*
* page_count(page) == 1 guarantees the page is mapped exactly once.
* If any subpage of the compound page mapped with PTE it would elevate
* page_count().
*/
if (page_count(page) == 1) {
if (dirty || PageDirty(page))
mss->private_dirty += size;
else
mss->private_clean += size;
mss->pss += (u64)size << PSS_SHIFT;
if (locked)
mss->pss_locked += (u64)size << PSS_SHIFT;
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++, page++) {
int mapcount = page_mapcount(page);
unsigned long pss = (PAGE_SIZE << PSS_SHIFT);
if (mapcount >= 2) {
if (dirty || PageDirty(page))
mss->shared_dirty += PAGE_SIZE;
else
mss->shared_clean += PAGE_SIZE;
mss->pss += pss / mapcount;
if (locked)
mss->pss_locked += pss / mapcount;
} else {
if (dirty || PageDirty(page))
mss->private_dirty += PAGE_SIZE;
else
mss->private_clean += PAGE_SIZE;
mss->pss += pss;
if (locked)
mss->pss_locked += pss;
}
}
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TIFF_MetaHandler::WriteTempFile ( XMP_IO* tempRef )
{
XMP_IO* origRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
XMP_Int64 fileLen = origRef->Length();
if ( fileLen > 0xFFFFFFFFLL ) { // Check before making a copy of the file.
XMP_Throw ( "TIFF fles can't exceed 4GB", kXMPErr_BadTIFF );
}
XMP_ProgressTracker* progressTracker = this->parent->progressTracker;
if ( progressTracker != 0 ) progressTracker->BeginWork ( (float)fileLen );
origRef->Rewind ( );
tempRef->Truncate ( 0 );
XIO::Copy ( origRef, tempRef, fileLen, abortProc, abortArg );
try {
this->parent->ioRef = tempRef; // ! Make UpdateFile update the temp.
this->UpdateFile ( false );
this->parent->ioRef = origRef;
} catch ( ... ) {
this->parent->ioRef = origRef;
throw;
}
if ( progressTracker != 0 ) progressTracker->WorkComplete();
} // TIFF_MetaHandler::WriteTempFile
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lzh_emit_window(struct lzh_stream *strm, size_t s)
{
strm->ref_ptr = strm->ds->w_buff;
strm->avail_out = (int)s;
strm->total_out += s;
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int socket_check_fd(int fd, fd_mode fdm, unsigned int timeout)
{
fd_set fds;
int sret;
int eagain;
struct timeval to;
struct timeval *pto;
if (fd < 0) {
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: invalid fd in check_fd %d\n", fd);
return -1;
}
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
if (timeout > 0) {
to.tv_sec = (time_t) (timeout / 1000);
to.tv_usec = (time_t) ((timeout - (to.tv_sec * 1000)) * 1000);
pto = &to;
} else {
pto = NULL;
}
sret = -1;
do {
eagain = 0;
switch (fdm) {
case FDM_READ:
sret = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, pto);
break;
case FDM_WRITE:
sret = select(fd + 1, NULL, &fds, NULL, pto);
break;
case FDM_EXCEPT:
sret = select(fd + 1, NULL, NULL, &fds, pto);
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (sret < 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EINTR:
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: EINTR\n", __func__);
eagain = 1;
break;
case EAGAIN:
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: EAGAIN\n", __func__);
break;
default:
if (verbose >= 2)
fprintf(stderr, "%s: select failed: %s\n", __func__,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
} while (eagain);
return sret;
}
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 94,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct pgpath *alloc_pgpath(void)
{
struct pgpath *pgpath = kzalloc(sizeof(*pgpath), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pgpath) {
pgpath->is_active = 1;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&pgpath->activate_path, activate_path);
}
return pgpath;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal_t *journal)
{
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
++journal->j_barrier_count;
/* Wait until there are no running updates */
while (1) {
transaction_t *transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
if (!transaction)
break;
spin_lock(&transaction->t_handle_lock);
prepare_to_wait(&journal->j_wait_updates, &wait,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!atomic_read(&transaction->t_updates)) {
spin_unlock(&transaction->t_handle_lock);
finish_wait(&journal->j_wait_updates, &wait);
break;
}
spin_unlock(&transaction->t_handle_lock);
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
schedule();
finish_wait(&journal->j_wait_updates, &wait);
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
}
write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
/*
* We have now established a barrier against other normal updates, but
* we also need to barrier against other jbd2_journal_lock_updates() calls
* to make sure that we serialise special journal-locked operations
* too.
*/
mutex_lock(&journal->j_barrier);
}
Commit Message: jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fib_disable_ip(struct net_device *dev, unsigned long event,
bool force)
{
if (fib_sync_down_dev(dev, event, force))
fib_flush(dev_net(dev));
rt_cache_flush(dev_net(dev));
arp_ifdown(dev);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, mapPhar)
{
char *alias = NULL, *error;
size_t alias_len = 0;
zend_long dataoffset = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|s!l", &alias, &alias_len, &dataoffset) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize();
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_executed_filename(alias, alias_len, &error) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed Phar::loadPhar(string filename [, string alias])
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostImpl::CreateLatencyInfoSwapPromiseMonitor(
ui::LatencyInfo* latency) {
return base::WrapUnique(
new LatencyInfoSwapPromiseMonitor(latency, NULL, this));
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int blk_verify_command(unsigned char *cmd, fmode_t has_write_perm)
{
struct blk_cmd_filter *filter = &blk_default_cmd_filter;
/* root can do any command. */
if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return 0;
/* if there's no filter set, assume we're filtering everything out */
if (!filter)
return -EPERM;
/* Anybody who can open the device can do a read-safe command */
if (test_bit(cmd[0], filter->read_ok))
return 0;
/* Write-safe commands require a writable open */
if (test_bit(cmd[0], filter->write_ok) && has_write_perm)
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DefaultTabHandler::LargeIconsPermitted() const {
return delegate_->AsBrowser()->LargeIconsPermitted();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType IsBlobExempt(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
return(image->blob->exempt);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExprCreateMultiKeysymList(ExprDef *expr)
{
unsigned nLevels = darray_size(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex);
darray_resize(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex, 1);
darray_resize(expr->keysym_list.symsNumEntries, 1);
darray_item(expr->keysym_list.symsMapIndex, 0) = 0;
darray_item(expr->keysym_list.symsNumEntries, 0) = nLevels;
return expr;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 78,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void wake_q_add(struct wake_q_head *head, struct task_struct *task)
{
struct wake_q_node *node = &task->wake_q;
/*
* Atomically grab the task, if ->wake_q is !nil already it means
* its already queued (either by us or someone else) and will get the
* wakeup due to that.
*
* This cmpxchg() implies a full barrier, which pairs with the write
* barrier implied by the wakeup in wake_up_q().
*/
if (cmpxchg(&node->next, NULL, WAKE_Q_TAIL))
return;
get_task_struct(task);
/*
* The head is context local, there can be no concurrency.
*/
*head->lastp = node;
head->lastp = &node->next;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void removeEventListenerMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::removeEventListenerMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltFreeDocumentKeys(xsltDocumentPtr idoc) {
if (idoc != NULL)
xsltFreeKeyTableList(idoc->keys);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dispatchNVWriteItem(Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
RIL_NV_WriteItem nvwi;
int32_t t;
status_t status;
memset(&nvwi, 0, sizeof(nvwi));
status = p.readInt32(&t);
nvwi.itemID = (RIL_NV_Item) t;
nvwi.value = strdupReadString(p);
if (status != NO_ERROR || nvwi.value == NULL) {
goto invalid;
}
startRequest;
appendPrintBuf("%snvwi.itemID=%d, value=%s, ", printBuf, nvwi.itemID,
nvwi.value);
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, &nvwi, sizeof(nvwi), pRI, pRI->socket_id);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memsetString(nvwi.value);
#endif
free(nvwi.value);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memset(&nvwi, 0, sizeof(nvwi));
#endif
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_insnlist_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_insnlist __user *arg, void *file)
{
struct comedi_insnlist insnlist;
struct comedi_insn *insns = NULL;
unsigned int *data = NULL;
int i = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&insnlist, arg, sizeof(struct comedi_insnlist)))
return -EFAULT;
data = kmalloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * MAX_SAMPLES, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data) {
DPRINTK("kmalloc failed\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
insns =
kmalloc(sizeof(struct comedi_insn) * insnlist.n_insns, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insns) {
DPRINTK("kmalloc failed\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
if (copy_from_user(insns, insnlist.insns,
sizeof(struct comedi_insn) * insnlist.n_insns)) {
DPRINTK("copy_from_user failed\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
for (i = 0; i < insnlist.n_insns; i++) {
if (insns[i].n > MAX_SAMPLES) {
DPRINTK("number of samples too large\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if (insns[i].insn & INSN_MASK_WRITE) {
if (copy_from_user(data, insns[i].data,
insns[i].n * sizeof(unsigned int))) {
DPRINTK("copy_from_user failed\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
}
ret = parse_insn(dev, insns + i, data, file);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (insns[i].insn & INSN_MASK_READ) {
if (copy_to_user(insns[i].data, data,
insns[i].n * sizeof(unsigned int))) {
DPRINTK("copy_to_user failed\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
}
if (need_resched())
schedule();
}
error:
kfree(insns);
kfree(data);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
return i;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Promise> GetPromise() { return builder_.GetPromise(); }
Commit Message: [wasm] Use correct bindings APIs
Use ScriptState::ForCurrentRealm in static methods, instead of
ForRelevantRealm().
Bug: chromium:788453
Change-Id: I63bd25e3f5a4e8d7cbaff945da8df0d71aa65527
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/795096
Commit-Queue: Mircea Trofin <mtrofin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#520174}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,653 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gs_cmd_reset(struct gs_usb *gsusb, struct gs_can *gsdev)
{
struct gs_device_mode *dm;
struct usb_interface *intf = gsdev->iface;
int rc;
dm = kzalloc(sizeof(*dm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dm)
return -ENOMEM;
dm->mode = GS_CAN_MODE_RESET;
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_MODE,
USB_DIR_OUT|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
gsdev->channel,
0,
dm,
sizeof(*dm),
1000);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for the transfer buffers.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zonca <e@ethanzonca.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v4.8
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListSyncableService::UpdateSyncItem(AppListItem* app_item) {
SyncItem* sync_item = FindSyncItem(app_item->id());
if (!sync_item) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdateItem: no sync item: " << app_item->id();
return;
}
bool changed = UpdateSyncItemFromAppItem(app_item, sync_item);
if (!changed) {
DVLOG(2) << this << " - Update: SYNC NO CHANGE: " << sync_item->ToString();
return;
}
SendSyncChange(sync_item, SyncChange::ACTION_UPDATE);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::NotifyDevicesChanged(
MediaDeviceType device_type,
const MediaDeviceInfoArray& devices) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
MediaObserver* media_observer =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetMediaObserver();
MediaStreamType stream_type = ConvertToMediaStreamType(device_type);
MediaStreamDevices new_devices =
ConvertToMediaStreamDevices(stream_type, devices);
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(stream_type)) {
MediaCaptureDevicesImpl::GetInstance()->OnAudioCaptureDevicesChanged(
new_devices);
if (media_observer)
media_observer->OnAudioCaptureDevicesChanged();
} else if (IsVideoInputMediaType(stream_type)) {
MediaCaptureDevicesImpl::GetInstance()->OnVideoCaptureDevicesChanged(
new_devices);
if (media_observer)
media_observer->OnVideoCaptureDevicesChanged();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CachedFileStream::reset()
{
savePos = (Guint)cc->tell();
cc->seek(start, SEEK_SET);
saved = gTrue;
bufPtr = bufEnd = buf;
bufPos = start;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteUintHelper(T value)
{
while (true) {
uint8_t b = (value & varIntMask);
value >>= varIntShift;
if (!value) {
append(b);
break;
}
append(b | (1 << varIntShift));
}
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::NotifyPassphraseAccepted() {
if (!frontend_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), frontend_loop_);
cached_pending_keys_.clear_blob();
frontend_->OnPassphraseAccepted();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulate_de(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
return emulate_exception(ctxt, DE_VECTOR, 0, false);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::setShadowColor(const String& color_string) {
Color color;
if (!ParseColorOrCurrentColor(color, color_string))
return;
if (GetState().ShadowColor() == color)
return;
ModifiableState().SetShadowColor(color.Rgb());
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
unsigned long timeout)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct listen_sock *lopt = icsk->icsk_accept_queue.listen_opt;
const u32 h = inet_synq_hash(inet_rsk(req)->rmt_addr, inet_rsk(req)->rmt_port,
lopt->hash_rnd, lopt->nr_table_entries);
reqsk_queue_hash_req(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue, h, req, timeout);
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_added(sk, timeout);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const FeatureInfo::Workarounds& workarounds() const {
return feature_info_->workarounds();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_vscript_rise_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_script_t *vscript = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_script);
unsigned rise;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &rise, 1, INT_MAX, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): vrrp script rise value '%s' invalid, defaulting to 1", vscript->sname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
vscript->rise = 1;
}
else
vscript->rise = rise;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t ACodec::setupAACCodec(
bool encoder, int32_t numChannels, int32_t sampleRate,
int32_t bitRate, int32_t aacProfile, bool isADTS, int32_t sbrMode,
int32_t maxOutputChannelCount, const drcParams_t& drc,
int32_t pcmLimiterEnable) {
if (encoder && isADTS) {
return -EINVAL;
}
status_t err = setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
sampleRate,
numChannels);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (encoder) {
err = selectAudioPortFormat(kPortIndexOutput, OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.format.audio.bFlagErrorConcealment = OMX_TRUE;
def.format.audio.eEncoding = OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.eChannelMode =
(numChannels == 1)
? OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeMono: OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.nBitRate = bitRate;
profile.nAudioBandWidth = 0;
profile.nFrameLength = 0;
profile.nAACtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAll;
profile.nAACERtools = OMX_AUDIO_AACERNone;
profile.eAACProfile = (OMX_AUDIO_AACPROFILETYPE) aacProfile;
profile.eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
switch (sbrMode) {
case 0:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case 2:
profile.nAACtools &= ~OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
case -1:
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR;
profile.nAACtools |= OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR;
break;
default:
return BAD_VALUE;
}
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
return err;
}
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE profile;
InitOMXParams(&profile);
profile.nPortIndex = kPortIndexInput;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
profile.nChannels = numChannels;
profile.nSampleRate = sampleRate;
profile.eAACStreamFormat =
isADTS
? OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS
: OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE presentation;
presentation.nMaxOutputChannels = maxOutputChannelCount;
presentation.nDrcCut = drc.drcCut;
presentation.nDrcBoost = drc.drcBoost;
presentation.nHeavyCompression = drc.heavyCompression;
presentation.nTargetReferenceLevel = drc.targetRefLevel;
presentation.nEncodedTargetLevel = drc.encodedTargetLevel;
presentation.nPCMLimiterEnable = pcmLimiterEnable;
status_t res = mOMX->setParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAac, &profile, sizeof(profile));
if (res == OK) {
mOMX->setParameter(mNode, (OMX_INDEXTYPE)OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation,
&presentation, sizeof(presentation));
} else {
ALOGW("did not set AudioAndroidAacPresentation due to error %d when setting AudioAac", res);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_NULL;
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DocumentLoader::RedirectReceived(
Resource* resource,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response) {
DCHECK(frame_);
DCHECK_EQ(resource, GetResource());
DCHECK(!redirect_response.IsNull());
request_ = request;
const KURL& request_url = request_.Url();
scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin> redirecting_origin =
SecurityOrigin::Create(redirect_response.Url());
if (!redirecting_origin->CanDisplay(request_url)) {
frame_->Console().AddMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kSecurityMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Not allowed to load local resource: " + request_url.GetString()));
fetcher_->StopFetching();
return false;
}
DCHECK(!GetTiming().FetchStart().is_null());
AppendRedirect(request_url);
GetTiming().AddRedirect(redirect_response.Url(), request_url);
history_item_.Clear();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_set_acl(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid,
struct cifs_ntsd *pnntsd, int pacllen, int aclflag)
{
return send_set_info(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
current->tgid, 0, SMB2_O_INFO_SECURITY, aclflag,
1, (void **)&pnntsd, &pacllen);
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsVoiceInteractionFlagsEnabled() {
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
return !IsAssistantFlagsEnabled() &&
(command_line->HasSwitch(kEnableVoiceInteraction) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kVoiceInteractionFeature));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void megasas_set_dma_settings(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct megasas_dcmd_frame *dcmd,
dma_addr_t dma_addr, u32 dma_len)
{
if (instance->consistent_mask_64bit) {
dcmd->sgl.sge64[0].phys_addr = cpu_to_le64(dma_addr);
dcmd->sgl.sge64[0].length = cpu_to_le32(dma_len);
dcmd->flags = cpu_to_le16(dcmd->flags | MFI_FRAME_SGL64);
} else {
dcmd->sgl.sge32[0].phys_addr =
cpu_to_le32(lower_32_bits(dma_addr));
dcmd->sgl.sge32[0].length = cpu_to_le32(dma_len);
dcmd->flags = cpu_to_le16(dcmd->flags);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct vfsmount *kern_mount_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *data)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt;
mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, MS_KERNMOUNT, type->name, data);
if (!IS_ERR(mnt)) {
/*
* it is a longterm mount, don't release mnt until
* we unmount before file sys is unregistered
*/
real_mount(mnt)->mnt_ns = MNT_NS_INTERNAL;
}
return mnt;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLImageConversion::PackPixels(const uint8_t* source_data,
DataFormat source_data_format,
unsigned pixels_per_row,
uint8_t* destination_data) {
switch (source_data_format) {
case kDataFormatRA8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatR8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatR8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA4444: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA5551: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA5551>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA5551,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGB565: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB565>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB565,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerVersionDoomed() {
version_doomed_time_ = base::Time::Now();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,723 |
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