instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_shared_secret(ecc_key* private_key, ecc_key* public_key, byte* out,
word32* outlen)
{
int err;
if (private_key == NULL || public_key == NULL || out == NULL ||
outlen == NULL) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
#ifdef WOLF_CRYPTO_DEV
if (private_key->devId != INVALID_DEVID) {
err = wc_CryptoDev_Ecdh(private_key, public_key, out, outlen);
if (err != NOT_COMPILED_IN)
return err;
}
#endif
/* type valid? */
if (private_key->type != ECC_PRIVATEKEY &&
private_key->type != ECC_PRIVATEKEY_ONLY) {
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
}
/* Verify domain params supplied */
if (wc_ecc_is_valid_idx(private_key->idx) == 0 ||
wc_ecc_is_valid_idx(public_key->idx) == 0) {
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
}
/* Verify curve id matches */
if (private_key->dp->id != public_key->dp->id) {
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
}
#ifdef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A
err = atcatls_ecdh(private_key->slot, public_key->pubkey_raw, out);
if (err != ATCA_SUCCESS) {
err = BAD_COND_E;
}
*outlen = private_key->dp->size;
#else
err = wc_ecc_shared_secret_ex(private_key, &public_key->pubkey, out, outlen);
#endif /* WOLFSSL_ATECC508A */
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_copy_from)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL, *pg_rows;
zval *tmp;
char *table_name, *pg_delim = NULL, *pg_null_as = NULL;
size_t table_name_len, pg_delim_len, pg_null_as_len;
int pg_null_as_free = 0;
char *query;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
ExecStatusType status;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc, "rsa|ss",
&pgsql_link, &table_name, &table_name_len, &pg_rows,
&pg_delim, &pg_delim_len, &pg_null_as, &pg_null_as_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!pg_delim) {
pg_delim = "\t";
}
if (!pg_null_as) {
pg_null_as = estrdup("\\\\N");
pg_null_as_free = 1;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
spprintf(&query, 0, "COPY %s FROM STDIN DELIMITERS E'%c' WITH NULL AS E'%s'", table_name, *pg_delim, pg_null_as);
while ((pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql))) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
}
pgsql_result = PQexec(pgsql, query);
if (pg_null_as_free) {
efree(pg_null_as);
}
efree(query);
if (pgsql_result) {
status = PQresultStatus(pgsql_result);
} else {
status = (ExecStatusType) PQstatus(pgsql);
}
switch (status) {
case PGRES_COPY_IN:
if (pgsql_result) {
int command_failed = 0;
PQclear(pgsql_result);
#if HAVE_PQPUTCOPYDATA
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(pg_rows), tmp) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp);
query = (char *)emalloc(Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) + 2);
strlcpy(query, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) + 2);
if(Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) > 0 && *(query + Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) - 1) != '\n') {
strlcat(query, "\n", Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) + 2);
}
if (PQputCopyData(pgsql, query, (int)strlen(query)) != 1) {
efree(query);
PHP_PQ_ERROR("copy failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
efree(query);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
if (PQputCopyEnd(pgsql, NULL) != 1) {
PHP_PQ_ERROR("putcopyend failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#else
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(pg_rows), tmp) {
convert_to_string_ex(tmp);
query = (char *)emalloc(Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) + 2);
strlcpy(query, Z_STRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) + 2);
if(Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) > 0 && *(query + Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) - 1) != '\n') {
strlcat(query, "\n", Z_STRLEN_P(tmp) + 2);
}
if (PQputline(pgsql, query)==EOF) {
efree(query);
PHP_PQ_ERROR("copy failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
efree(query);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
if (PQputline(pgsql, "\\.\n") == EOF) {
PHP_PQ_ERROR("putline failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (PQendcopy(pgsql)) {
PHP_PQ_ERROR("endcopy failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
#endif
while ((pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql))) {
if (PGRES_COMMAND_OK != PQresultStatus(pgsql_result)) {
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Copy command failed: %s", pgsql);
command_failed = 1;
}
PQclear(pgsql_result);
}
if (command_failed) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
break;
default:
PQclear(pgsql_result);
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Copy command failed: %s", pgsql);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_dx_csum_set(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent)
{
struct dx_countlimit *c;
struct dx_tail *t;
int count_offset, limit, count;
if (!EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
return;
c = get_dx_countlimit(inode, dirent, &count_offset);
if (!c) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D.");
return;
}
limit = le16_to_cpu(c->limit);
count = le16_to_cpu(c->count);
if (count_offset + (limit * sizeof(struct dx_entry)) >
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - sizeof(struct dx_tail)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "metadata_csum set but no space for "
"tree checksum. Run e2fsck -D.");
return;
}
t = (struct dx_tail *)(((struct dx_entry *)c) + limit);
t->dt_checksum = ext4_dx_csum(inode, dirent, count_offset, count, t);
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CSoundFile::LoopPattern(int nPat, int nRow)
{
if ((nPat < 0) || (nPat >= MAX_PATTERNS) || (!Patterns[nPat]))
{
m_dwSongFlags &= ~SONG_PATTERNLOOP;
} else
{
if ((nRow < 0) || (nRow >= PatternSize[nPat])) nRow = 0;
m_nPattern = nPat;
m_nRow = m_nNextRow = nRow;
m_nTickCount = m_nMusicSpeed;
m_nPatternDelay = 0;
m_nFrameDelay = 0;
m_nBufferCount = 0;
m_dwSongFlags |= SONG_PATTERNLOOP;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 8,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
unsigned int v, emask;
/* User data may have out-of-bound event index */
v = p4_config_unpack_event(event->attr.config);
if (v >= ARRAY_SIZE(p4_event_bind_map))
return -EINVAL;
/* It may be unsupported: */
if (!p4_event_match_cpu_model(v))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* NOTE: P4_CCCR_THREAD_ANY has not the same meaning as
* in Architectural Performance Monitoring, it means not
* on _which_ logical cpu to count but rather _when_, ie it
* depends on logical cpu state -- count event if one cpu active,
* none, both or any, so we just allow user to pass any value
* desired.
*
* In turn we always set Tx_OS/Tx_USR bits bound to logical
* cpu without their propagation to another cpu
*/
/*
* if an event is shared across the logical threads
* the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
*/
if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
}
/* ESCR EventMask bits may be invalid */
emask = p4_config_unpack_escr(event->attr.config) & P4_ESCR_EVENTMASK_MASK;
if (emask & ~p4_event_bind_map[v].escr_emask)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* it may have some invalid PEBS bits
*/
if (p4_config_pebs_has(event->attr.config, P4_PEBS_CONFIG_ENABLE))
return -EINVAL;
v = p4_config_unpack_metric(event->attr.config);
if (v >= ARRAY_SIZE(p4_pebs_bind_map))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_huffman_free(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2HuffmanState *hs)
{
if (hs != NULL)
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, hs);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_handle_pHYs(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte buf[9];
png_uint_32 res_x, res_y;
int unit_type;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_pHYs");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
else if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_pHYs) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
if (length != 9)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 9);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
res_x = png_get_uint_32(buf);
res_y = png_get_uint_32(buf + 4);
unit_type = buf[8];
png_set_pHYs(png_ptr, info_ptr, res_x, res_y, unit_type);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBeginRasterCHROMIUM(
GLuint texture_id,
GLuint sk_color,
GLuint msaa_sample_count,
GLboolean can_use_lcd_text,
GLint color_type) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_create(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
codec_t *ps_codec;
ps_create_op = (ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_static_bufs(&ps_codec_obj, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if((IV_FAIL == ret) && (NULL != ps_codec_obj))
{
ihevcd_free_static_bufs(ps_codec_obj);
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ret = ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
TRACE_INIT(NULL);
STATS_INIT();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 1 | 174,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
WARN_ON(!tsk->exit_state);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
WARN_ON(tsk == current);
exit_creds(tsk);
delayacct_tsk_free(tsk);
if (!profile_handoff_task(tsk))
free_task(tsk);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_if_modified(
cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
struct stat *filestats) /* I - File information */
{
const char *ptr; /* Pointer into field */
time_t date; /* Time/date value */
off_t size; /* Size/length value */
size = 0;
date = 0;
ptr = httpGetField(con->http, HTTP_FIELD_IF_MODIFIED_SINCE);
if (*ptr == '\0')
return (1);
cupsdLogClient(con, CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2, "check_if_modified: filestats=%p(" CUPS_LLFMT ", %d)) If-Modified-Since=\"%s\"", filestats, CUPS_LLCAST filestats->st_size, (int)filestats->st_mtime, ptr);
while (*ptr != '\0')
{
while (isspace(*ptr) || *ptr == ';')
ptr ++;
if (_cups_strncasecmp(ptr, "length=", 7) == 0)
{
ptr += 7;
size = strtoll(ptr, NULL, 10);
while (isdigit(*ptr))
ptr ++;
}
else if (isalpha(*ptr))
{
date = httpGetDateTime(ptr);
while (*ptr != '\0' && *ptr != ';')
ptr ++;
}
else
ptr ++;
}
return ((size != filestats->st_size && size != 0) ||
(date < filestats->st_mtime && date != 0) ||
(size == 0 && date == 0));
}
Commit Message: Don't treat "localhost.localdomain" as an allowed replacement for localhost, since it isn't.
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 86,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ASessionDescription::getFormatType(
size_t index, unsigned long *PT,
AString *desc, AString *params) const {
AString format;
getFormat(index, &format);
const char *lastSpacePos = strrchr(format.c_str(), ' ');
CHECK(lastSpacePos != NULL);
char *end;
unsigned long x = strtoul(lastSpacePos + 1, &end, 10);
CHECK_GT(end, lastSpacePos + 1);
CHECK_EQ(*end, '\0');
*PT = x;
char key[20];
sprintf(key, "a=rtpmap:%lu", x);
CHECK(findAttribute(index, key, desc));
sprintf(key, "a=fmtp:%lu", x);
if (!findAttribute(index, key, params)) {
params->clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::GenerateStream(
int32_t page_request_id,
const blink::StreamControls& controls,
bool user_gesture,
GenerateStreamCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
base::PostTaskAndReplyWithResult(
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::UI}).get(),
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(salt_and_origin_callback_, render_process_id_,
render_frame_id_),
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::DoGenerateStream,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), page_request_id, controls,
user_gesture, std::move(callback)));
}
Commit Message: [MediaStream] Pass request ID parameters in the right order for OpenDevice()
Prior to this CL, requester_id and page_request_id parameters were
passed in incorrect order from MediaStreamDispatcherHost to
MediaStreamManager for the OpenDevice() operation, which could lead to
errors.
Bug: 948564
Change-Id: Iadcf3fe26adaac50564102138ce212269cf32d62
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1569113
Reviewed-by: Marina Ciocea <marinaciocea@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651255}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 151,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordResourceCompletionUMA(bool image_complete,
bool css_complete,
bool xhr_complete) {
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Image",
image_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Css",
css_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Xhr",
xhr_complete);
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *atalk_search_socket(struct sockaddr_at *to,
struct atalk_iface *atif)
{
struct sock *s;
read_lock_bh(&atalk_sockets_lock);
sk_for_each(s, &atalk_sockets) {
struct atalk_sock *at = at_sk(s);
if (to->sat_port != at->src_port)
continue;
if (to->sat_addr.s_net == ATADDR_ANYNET &&
to->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_BCAST)
goto found;
if (to->sat_addr.s_net == at->src_net &&
(to->sat_addr.s_node == at->src_node ||
to->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_BCAST ||
to->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_ANYNODE))
goto found;
/* XXXX.0 -- we got a request for this router. make sure
* that the node is appropriately set. */
if (to->sat_addr.s_node == ATADDR_ANYNODE &&
to->sat_addr.s_net != ATADDR_ANYNET &&
atif->address.s_node == at->src_node) {
to->sat_addr.s_node = atif->address.s_node;
goto found;
}
}
s = NULL;
found:
read_unlock_bh(&atalk_sockets_lock);
return s;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,322 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(aacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionsQuotaServiceTest()
: extension_a_("a"),
extension_b_("b"),
extension_c_("c"),
loop_(),
ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &loop_) {
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::IsTextEditCommandEnabled(
ui::TextEditCommand command) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void finish_lock_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* After ->oncpu is cleared, the task can be moved to a different CPU.
* We must ensure this doesn't happen until the switch is completely
* finished.
*/
smp_wmb();
prev->oncpu = 0;
#endif
#ifndef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
local_irq_enable();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tower_interrupt_out_callback (struct urb *urb)
{
struct lego_usb_tower *dev = urb->context;
int status = urb->status;
lego_usb_tower_debug_data(&dev->udev->dev, __func__,
urb->actual_length, urb->transfer_buffer);
/* sync/async unlink faults aren't errors */
if (status && !(status == -ENOENT ||
status == -ECONNRESET ||
status == -ESHUTDOWN)) {
dev_dbg(&dev->udev->dev,
"%s: nonzero write bulk status received: %d\n", __func__,
status);
}
dev->interrupt_out_busy = 0;
wake_up_interruptible(&dev->write_wait);
}
Commit Message: usb: misc: legousbtower: Fix NULL pointer deference
This patch fixes a NULL pointer dereference caused by a race codition in
the probe function of the legousbtower driver. It re-structures the
probe function to only register the interface after successfully reading
the board's firmware ID.
The probe function does not deregister the usb interface after an error
receiving the devices firmware ID. The device file registered
(/dev/usb/legousbtower%d) may be read/written globally before the probe
function returns. When tower_delete is called in the probe function
(after an r/w has been initiated), core dev structures are deleted while
the file operation functions are still running. If the 0 address is
mappable on the machine, this vulnerability can be used to create a
Local Priviege Escalation exploit via a write-what-where condition by
remapping dev->interrupt_out_buffer in tower_write. A forged USB device
and local program execution would be required for LPE. The USB device
would have to delay the control message in tower_probe and accept
the control urb in tower_open whilst guest code initiated a write to the
device file as tower_delete is called from the error in tower_probe.
This bug has existed since 2003. Patch tested by emulated device.
Reported-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Tested-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <james@jmp-e.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_timewait4_sock(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
struct seq_file *f, int i, int *len)
{
__be32 dest, src;
__u16 destp, srcp;
int ttd = tw->tw_ttd - jiffies;
if (ttd < 0)
ttd = 0;
dest = tw->tw_daddr;
src = tw->tw_rcv_saddr;
destp = ntohs(tw->tw_dport);
srcp = ntohs(tw->tw_sport);
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %d %d %p%n",
i, src, srcp, dest, destp, tw->tw_substate, 0, 0,
3, jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd), 0, 0, 0, 0,
atomic_read(&tw->tw_refcnt), tw, len);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ShowBookmarkBubble(const GURL& url, bool already_bookmarked) {
chrome::ShowBookmarkBubbleView(GetToolbarView()->GetBookmarkBubbleAnchor(),
browser_->profile(), url, !already_bookmarked);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickPrivate void ResetQuantumState(QuantumInfo *quantum_info)
{
static const unsigned int mask[32] =
{
0x00000000U, 0x00000001U, 0x00000003U, 0x00000007U, 0x0000000fU,
0x0000001fU, 0x0000003fU, 0x0000007fU, 0x000000ffU, 0x000001ffU,
0x000003ffU, 0x000007ffU, 0x00000fffU, 0x00001fffU, 0x00003fffU,
0x00007fffU, 0x0000ffffU, 0x0001ffffU, 0x0003ffffU, 0x0007ffffU,
0x000fffffU, 0x001fffffU, 0x003fffffU, 0x007fffffU, 0x00ffffffU,
0x01ffffffU, 0x03ffffffU, 0x07ffffffU, 0x0fffffffU, 0x1fffffffU,
0x3fffffffU, 0x7fffffffU
};
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->state.inverse_scale=1.0;
if (fabs(quantum_info->scale) >= MagickEpsilon)
quantum_info->state.inverse_scale/=quantum_info->scale;
quantum_info->state.pixel=0U;
quantum_info->state.bits=0U;
quantum_info->state.mask=mask;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_file(cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Connection to client */
cupsd_job_t *job, /* I - Job to add to */
mime_type_t *filetype, /* I - Type of file */
int compression) /* I - Compression */
{
mime_type_t **filetypes; /* New filetypes array... */
int *compressions; /* New compressions array... */
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG2,
"add_file(con=%p[%d], job=%d, filetype=%s/%s, "
"compression=%d)", con, con ? con->number : -1, job->id,
filetype->super, filetype->type, compression);
/*
* Add the file to the job...
*/
if (job->num_files == 0)
{
compressions = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int));
filetypes = (mime_type_t **)malloc(sizeof(mime_type_t *));
}
else
{
compressions = (int *)realloc(job->compressions,
(size_t)(job->num_files + 1) * sizeof(int));
filetypes = (mime_type_t **)realloc(job->filetypes,
(size_t)(job->num_files + 1) *
sizeof(mime_type_t *));
}
if (compressions)
job->compressions = compressions;
if (filetypes)
job->filetypes = filetypes;
if (!compressions || !filetypes)
{
cupsdSetJobState(job, IPP_JOB_ABORTED, CUPSD_JOB_PURGE,
"Job aborted because the scheduler ran out of memory.");
if (con)
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_INTERNAL_ERROR,
_("Unable to allocate memory for file types."));
return (-1);
}
job->compressions[job->num_files] = compression;
job->filetypes[job->num_files] = filetype;
job->num_files ++;
job->dirty = 1;
cupsdMarkDirty(CUPSD_DIRTY_JOBS);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 85,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::vertexAttribI4uiv(GLuint index,
const Vector<GLuint>& v) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (v.size() < 4) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "vertexAttribI4uiv", "invalid array");
return;
}
ContextGL()->VertexAttribI4uiv(index, v.data());
SetVertexAttribType(index, kUint32ArrayType);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnUpdateTargetURLAck() {
if (target_url_status_ == TARGET_PENDING)
Send(new ViewHostMsg_UpdateTargetURL(GetRoutingID(), pending_target_url_));
target_url_status_ = TARGET_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_uuidprof_tag(AVIOContext *pb, AVFormatContext *s)
{
AVStream *video_st = s->streams[0];
AVCodecParameters *video_par = s->streams[0]->codecpar;
AVCodecParameters *audio_par = s->streams[1]->codecpar;
int audio_rate = audio_par->sample_rate;
int64_t frame_rate = video_st->avg_frame_rate.den ?
(video_st->avg_frame_rate.num * 0x10000LL) / video_st->avg_frame_rate.den :
0;
int audio_kbitrate = audio_par->bit_rate / 1000;
int video_kbitrate = FFMIN(video_par->bit_rate / 1000, 800 - audio_kbitrate);
if (frame_rate < 0 || frame_rate > INT32_MAX) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Frame rate %f outside supported range\n", frame_rate / (double)0x10000);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0x94); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "uuid");
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "PROF");
avio_wb32(pb, 0x21d24fce); /* 96 bit UUID */
avio_wb32(pb, 0xbb88695c);
avio_wb32(pb, 0xfac9c740);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0); /* ? */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x3); /* 3 sections ? */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x14); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "FPRF");
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0); /* ? */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0); /* ? */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0); /* ? */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x2c); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "APRF"); /* audio */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x2); /* TrackID */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mp4a");
avio_wb32(pb, 0x20f);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0);
avio_wb32(pb, audio_kbitrate);
avio_wb32(pb, audio_kbitrate);
avio_wb32(pb, audio_rate);
avio_wb32(pb, audio_par->channels);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x34); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "VPRF"); /* video */
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x1); /* TrackID */
if (video_par->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264) {
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "avc1");
avio_wb16(pb, 0x014D);
avio_wb16(pb, 0x0015);
} else {
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mp4v");
avio_wb16(pb, 0x0000);
avio_wb16(pb, 0x0103);
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0);
avio_wb32(pb, video_kbitrate);
avio_wb32(pb, video_kbitrate);
avio_wb32(pb, frame_rate);
avio_wb32(pb, frame_rate);
avio_wb16(pb, video_par->width);
avio_wb16(pb, video_par->height);
avio_wb32(pb, 0x010001); /* ? */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INST_HANDLER (cpi) { // CPI Rd, K
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) + 16;
int k = (buf[0] & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0xf) << 4);
ESIL_A ("%d,r%d,-,", k, d); // Rd - k
__generic_sub_update_flags_rk (op, d, k, 0); // FLAGS (carry)
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long ssl2_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
{
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vga_invalidate_display(void *opaque)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
s->last_width = -1;
s->last_height = -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 3,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::MarkAsTransferredNavigation(
net::URLRequest* transferred_request) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info =
ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(transferred_request);
GlobalRequestID transferred_request_id(info->GetChildID(),
info->GetRequestID());
transferred_navigations_[transferred_request_id] = transferred_request;
scoped_refptr<ResourceHandler> transferred_resource_handler(
new DoomedResourceHandler(info->resource_handler()));
info->set_resource_handler(transferred_resource_handler.get());
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_process_pairing_commitment(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)p_data;
uint8_t reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb)) {
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_COMM;
if (p != NULL) {
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->remote_commitment, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FillFirstShaper(cmsS1Fixed14Number* Table, cmsToneCurve* Curve)
{
int i;
cmsFloat32Number R, y;
for (i=0; i < 256; i++) {
R = (cmsFloat32Number) (i / 255.0);
y = cmsEvalToneCurveFloat(Curve, R);
Table[i] = DOUBLE_TO_1FIXED14(y);
}
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buffer_percent_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct trace_array *tr = filp->private_data;
unsigned long val;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 10, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (val > 100)
return -EINVAL;
if (!val)
val = 1;
tr->buffer_percent = val;
(*ppos)++;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContentSecurityPolicy::DirectiveType ContentSecurityPolicy::getDirectiveType(
const String& name) {
if (name == "base-uri")
return DirectiveType::BaseURI;
if (name == "block-all-mixed-content")
return DirectiveType::BlockAllMixedContent;
if (name == "child-src")
return DirectiveType::ChildSrc;
if (name == "connect-src")
return DirectiveType::ConnectSrc;
if (name == "default-src")
return DirectiveType::DefaultSrc;
if (name == "frame-ancestors")
return DirectiveType::FrameAncestors;
if (name == "frame-src")
return DirectiveType::FrameSrc;
if (name == "font-src")
return DirectiveType::FontSrc;
if (name == "form-action")
return DirectiveType::FormAction;
if (name == "img-src")
return DirectiveType::ImgSrc;
if (name == "manifest-src")
return DirectiveType::ManifestSrc;
if (name == "media-src")
return DirectiveType::MediaSrc;
if (name == "object-src")
return DirectiveType::ObjectSrc;
if (name == "plugin-types")
return DirectiveType::PluginTypes;
if (name == "report-uri")
return DirectiveType::ReportURI;
if (name == "require-sri-for")
return DirectiveType::RequireSRIFor;
if (name == "sandbox")
return DirectiveType::Sandbox;
if (name == "script-src")
return DirectiveType::ScriptSrc;
if (name == "style-src")
return DirectiveType::StyleSrc;
if (name == "treat-as-public-address")
return DirectiveType::TreatAsPublicAddress;
if (name == "upgrade-insecure-requests")
return DirectiveType::UpgradeInsecureRequests;
if (name == "worker-src")
return DirectiveType::WorkerSrc;
return DirectiveType::Undefined;
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::getMetadata(
bool update_only, bool /*apply_filter*/, Parcel *reply)
{
sp<MediaPlayerBase> player = getPlayer();
if (player == 0) return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
status_t status;
reply->writeInt32(-1);
media::Metadata::Filter ids;
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (update_only) {
ids = mMetadataUpdated;
}
mMetadataUpdated.clear();
}
media::Metadata metadata(reply);
metadata.appendHeader();
status = player->getMetadata(ids, reply);
if (status != OK) {
metadata.resetParcel();
ALOGE("getMetadata failed %d", status);
return status;
}
metadata.updateLength();
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void js_call(js_State *J, int n)
{
js_Object *obj;
int savebot;
if (!js_iscallable(J, -n-2))
js_typeerror(J, "called object is not a function");
obj = js_toobject(J, -n-2);
savebot = BOT;
BOT = TOP - n - 1;
if (obj->type == JS_CFUNCTION) {
jsR_pushtrace(J, obj->u.f.function->name, obj->u.f.function->filename, obj->u.f.function->line);
if (obj->u.f.function->lightweight)
jsR_calllwfunction(J, n, obj->u.f.function, obj->u.f.scope);
else
jsR_callfunction(J, n, obj->u.f.function, obj->u.f.scope);
--J->tracetop;
} else if (obj->type == JS_CSCRIPT) {
jsR_pushtrace(J, obj->u.f.function->name, obj->u.f.function->filename, obj->u.f.function->line);
jsR_callscript(J, n, obj->u.f.function, obj->u.f.scope);
--J->tracetop;
} else if (obj->type == JS_CCFUNCTION) {
jsR_pushtrace(J, obj->u.c.name, "native", 0);
jsR_callcfunction(J, n, obj->u.c.length, obj->u.c.function);
--J->tracetop;
}
BOT = savebot;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_pattern2_get_pattern(const gs_pattern_instance_t *pinst)
{
return (const gs_pattern_template_t *)
&((const gs_pattern2_instance_t *)pinst)->templat;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CIFSTCon(unsigned int xid, struct cifsSesInfo *ses,
const char *tree, struct cifsTconInfo *tcon,
const struct nls_table *nls_codepage)
{
struct smb_hdr *smb_buffer;
struct smb_hdr *smb_buffer_response;
TCONX_REQ *pSMB;
TCONX_RSP *pSMBr;
unsigned char *bcc_ptr;
int rc = 0;
int length, bytes_left;
__u16 count;
if (ses == NULL)
return -EIO;
smb_buffer = cifs_buf_get();
if (smb_buffer == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
smb_buffer_response = smb_buffer;
header_assemble(smb_buffer, SMB_COM_TREE_CONNECT_ANDX,
NULL /*no tid */ , 4 /*wct */ );
smb_buffer->Mid = GetNextMid(ses->server);
smb_buffer->Uid = ses->Suid;
pSMB = (TCONX_REQ *) smb_buffer;
pSMBr = (TCONX_RSP *) smb_buffer_response;
pSMB->AndXCommand = 0xFF;
pSMB->Flags = cpu_to_le16(TCON_EXTENDED_SECINFO);
bcc_ptr = &pSMB->Password[0];
if ((ses->server->secMode) & SECMODE_USER) {
pSMB->PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(1); /* minimum */
*bcc_ptr = 0; /* password is null byte */
bcc_ptr++; /* skip password */
/* already aligned so no need to do it below */
} else {
pSMB->PasswordLength = cpu_to_le16(CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE);
/* BB FIXME add code to fail this if NTLMv2 or Kerberos
specified as required (when that support is added to
the vfs in the future) as only NTLM or the much
weaker LANMAN (which we do not send by default) is accepted
by Samba (not sure whether other servers allow
NTLMv2 password here) */
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH
if ((global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_LANMAN) &&
(ses->server->secType == LANMAN))
calc_lanman_hash(tcon->password, ses->server->cryptKey,
ses->server->secMode &
SECMODE_PW_ENCRYPT ? true : false,
bcc_ptr);
else
#endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */
SMBNTencrypt(tcon->password, ses->server->cryptKey,
bcc_ptr);
bcc_ptr += CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
/* must align unicode strings */
*bcc_ptr = 0; /* null byte password */
bcc_ptr++;
}
}
if (ses->server->secMode &
(SECMODE_SIGN_REQUIRED | SECMODE_SIGN_ENABLED))
smb_buffer->Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE;
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_STATUS32) {
smb_buffer->Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_ERR_STATUS;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_DFS) {
smb_buffer->Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_DFS;
}
if (ses->capabilities & CAP_UNICODE) {
smb_buffer->Flags2 |= SMBFLG2_UNICODE;
length =
cifs_strtoUCS((__le16 *) bcc_ptr, tree,
6 /* max utf8 char length in bytes */ *
(/* server len*/ + 256 /* share len */), nls_codepage);
bcc_ptr += 2 * length; /* convert num 16 bit words to bytes */
bcc_ptr += 2; /* skip trailing null */
} else { /* ASCII */
strcpy(bcc_ptr, tree);
bcc_ptr += strlen(tree) + 1;
}
strcpy(bcc_ptr, "?????");
bcc_ptr += strlen("?????");
bcc_ptr += 1;
count = bcc_ptr - &pSMB->Password[0];
pSMB->hdr.smb_buf_length += count;
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(count);
rc = SendReceive(xid, ses, smb_buffer, smb_buffer_response, &length,
CIFS_STD_OP);
/* above now done in SendReceive */
if ((rc == 0) && (tcon != NULL)) {
bool is_unicode;
tcon->tidStatus = CifsGood;
tcon->need_reconnect = false;
tcon->tid = smb_buffer_response->Tid;
bcc_ptr = pByteArea(smb_buffer_response);
bytes_left = BCC(smb_buffer_response);
length = strnlen(bcc_ptr, bytes_left - 2);
if (smb_buffer->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_UNICODE)
is_unicode = true;
else
is_unicode = false;
/* skip service field (NB: this field is always ASCII) */
if (length == 3) {
if ((bcc_ptr[0] == 'I') && (bcc_ptr[1] == 'P') &&
(bcc_ptr[2] == 'C')) {
cFYI(1, "IPC connection");
tcon->ipc = 1;
}
} else if (length == 2) {
if ((bcc_ptr[0] == 'A') && (bcc_ptr[1] == ':')) {
/* the most common case */
cFYI(1, "disk share connection");
}
}
bcc_ptr += length + 1;
bytes_left -= (length + 1);
strncpy(tcon->treeName, tree, MAX_TREE_SIZE);
/* mostly informational -- no need to fail on error here */
kfree(tcon->nativeFileSystem);
tcon->nativeFileSystem = cifs_strndup_from_ucs(bcc_ptr,
bytes_left, is_unicode,
nls_codepage);
cFYI(1, "nativeFileSystem=%s", tcon->nativeFileSystem);
if ((smb_buffer_response->WordCount == 3) ||
(smb_buffer_response->WordCount == 7))
/* field is in same location */
tcon->Flags = le16_to_cpu(pSMBr->OptionalSupport);
else
tcon->Flags = 0;
cFYI(1, "Tcon flags: 0x%x ", tcon->Flags);
} else if ((rc == 0) && tcon == NULL) {
/* all we need to save for IPC$ connection */
ses->ipc_tid = smb_buffer_response->Tid;
}
cifs_buf_release(smb_buffer);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::addOverlay(WebOverlay* overlay)
{
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
if (overlay->d->graphicsLayer()) {
overlay->d->setPage(d);
d->overlayLayer()->addChild(overlay->d->graphicsLayer());
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit exit_vfat_fs(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&vfat_fs_type);
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: P2PQuicTransportImpl* quic_transport() { return quic_transport_.get(); }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFFdOpen(int fd, const char* name, const char* mode)
{
TIFF* tif;
tif = TIFFClientOpen(name, mode,
(thandle_t) fd,
_tiffReadProc, _tiffWriteProc,
_tiffSeekProc, _tiffCloseProc, _tiffSizeProc,
_tiffMapProc, _tiffUnmapProc);
if (tif)
tif->tif_fd = fd;
return (tif);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 86,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeHostQt::layerTreeTileUpdatesAllowed() const
{
return !m_isSuspended && !m_waitingForUIProcess;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::NeedURLRequestContext() {
return false;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_internal(char *action, char *data)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; internal_action[i].action; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(internal_action[i].action, action) == 0) {
if (internal_action[i].rout)
internal_action[i].rout(cgistr2tagarg(data));
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent invalid columnPos() call in formUpdateBuffer()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/89
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HttpProxyClientSocket::DoGenerateAuthTokenComplete(int result) {
DCHECK_NE(ERR_IO_PENDING, result);
if (result == OK)
next_state_ = STATE_SEND_REQUEST;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eval_number(uschar **sptr, BOOL decimal, uschar **error)
{
register int c;
int_eximarith_t n;
uschar *s = *sptr;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
c = *s;
if (isdigit(c))
{
int count;
(void)sscanf(CS s, (decimal? SC_EXIM_DEC "%n" : SC_EXIM_ARITH "%n"), &n, &count);
s += count;
switch (tolower(*s))
{
default: break;
case 'k': n *= 1024; s++; break;
case 'm': n *= 1024*1024; s++; break;
case 'g': n *= 1024*1024*1024; s++; break;
}
while (isspace (*s)) s++;
}
else if (c == '(')
{
s++;
n = eval_expr(&s, decimal, error, 1);
}
else
{
*error = US"expecting number or opening parenthesis";
n = 0;
}
*sptr = s;
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState RenderFrameImpl::GetVisibilityState() const {
return VisibilityState();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BaseAudioContext::IsAllowedToStart() const {
if (!user_gesture_required_)
return true;
Document* document = ToDocument(GetExecutionContext());
DCHECK(document);
switch (GetAutoplayPolicy()) {
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kNoUserGestureRequired:
NOTREACHED();
break;
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kUserGestureRequired:
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kUserGestureRequiredForCrossOrigin:
DCHECK(document->GetFrame() &&
document->GetFrame()->IsCrossOriginSubframe());
document->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kOtherMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
"The AudioContext was not allowed to start. It must be resumed (or "
"created) from a user gesture event handler."));
break;
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kDocumentUserActivationRequired:
document->AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kOtherMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel,
"The AudioContext was not allowed to start. It must be resume (or "
"created) after a user gesture on the page. https://goo.gl/7K7WLu"));
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RootWindowHostLinux::SetCursor(gfx::NativeCursor cursor) {
if (cursor == current_cursor_)
return;
current_cursor_ = cursor;
if (cursor_shown_)
SetCursorInternal(cursor);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WebContentsTreeNode::DetachInnerWebContents(
WebContentsImpl* inner_web_contents) {
DCHECK(std::find(inner_web_contents_.begin(), inner_web_contents_.end(),
inner_web_contents) != inner_web_contents_.end());
inner_web_contents_.erase(
std::remove(inner_web_contents_.begin(), inner_web_contents_.end(),
inner_web_contents),
inner_web_contents_.end());
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr)
{
__raise_softirq_irqoff(nr);
/*
* If we're in an interrupt or softirq, we're done
* (this also catches softirq-disabled code). We will
* actually run the softirq once we return from
* the irq or softirq.
*
* Otherwise we wake up ksoftirqd to make sure we
* schedule the softirq soon.
*/
if (!in_interrupt())
wakeup_softirqd();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sched_group_set_rt_period(struct task_group *tg, u64 rt_period_us)
{
u64 rt_runtime, rt_period;
rt_period = rt_period_us * NSEC_PER_USEC;
rt_runtime = tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
return tg_set_rt_bandwidth(tg, rt_period, rt_runtime);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TcpStateQueue *StreamTcp3whsFindSynAckBySynAck(TcpSession *ssn, Packet *p)
{
TcpStateQueue *q = ssn->queue;
TcpStateQueue search;
StreamTcp3whsSynAckToStateQueue(p, &search);
while (q != NULL) {
if (search.flags == q->flags &&
search.wscale == q->wscale &&
search.win == q->win &&
search.seq == q->seq &&
search.ack == q->ack &&
search.ts == q->ts) {
return q;
}
q = q->next;
}
return q;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ospf6_print_lshdr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp, const u_char *dataend)
{
if ((const u_char *)(lshp + 1) > dataend)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_type);
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s, seq 0x%08x, age %us, length %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lshp->ls_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lshp->ls_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_age),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_length)-(u_int)sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_type), &lshp->ls_stateid);
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14880/OSPFv3: Fix a bounds check
Need to test bounds check for the last field of the structure lsa6_hdr.
No need to test other fields.
Include Security working under the Mozilla SOS program had independently
identified this vulnerability in 2018 by means of code audit.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, createDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *stub, *error;
int index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
size_t stub_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|ss", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &stub_len, &error TSRMLS_CC);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "%s", error);
efree(error);
return;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(stub, stub_len, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *exif_get_sectionname(int section)
{
switch(section) {
case SECTION_FILE: return "FILE";
case SECTION_COMPUTED: return "COMPUTED";
case SECTION_ANY_TAG: return "ANY_TAG";
case SECTION_IFD0: return "IFD0";
case SECTION_THUMBNAIL: return "THUMBNAIL";
case SECTION_COMMENT: return "COMMENT";
case SECTION_APP0: return "APP0";
case SECTION_EXIF: return "EXIF";
case SECTION_FPIX: return "FPIX";
case SECTION_GPS: return "GPS";
case SECTION_INTEROP: return "INTEROP";
case SECTION_APP12: return "APP12";
case SECTION_WINXP: return "WINXP";
case SECTION_MAKERNOTE: return "MAKERNOTE";
}
return "";
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T impeg2d_api_set_params(iv_obj_t *ps_dechdl,void *pv_api_ip,void *pv_api_op)
{
dec_state_t *ps_dec_state;
dec_state_multi_core_t *ps_dec_state_multi_core;
impeg2d_ctl_set_config_ip_t *ps_ctl_dec_ip = (impeg2d_ctl_set_config_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
impeg2d_ctl_set_config_op_t *ps_ctl_dec_op = (impeg2d_ctl_set_config_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_dec_state_multi_core = (dec_state_multi_core_t *) (ps_dechdl->pv_codec_handle);
ps_dec_state = ps_dec_state_multi_core->ps_dec_state[0];
if((ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_vid_dec_mode != IVD_DECODE_HEADER) && (ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_vid_dec_mode != IVD_DECODE_FRAME))
{
ps_ctl_dec_op->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_FAIL;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if((ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_frm_out_mode != IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT) && (ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_frm_out_mode != IVD_DECODE_FRAME_OUT))
{
ps_ctl_dec_op->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_FAIL;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if( (WORD32) ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_frm_skip_mode < IVD_SKIP_NONE)
{
ps_ctl_dec_op->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_FAIL;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
if(ps_dec_state->u2_header_done == 1)
{
if(((WORD32)ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd < 0) ||
((ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd != 0) && (ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd < ps_dec_state->u2_frame_width)))
{
ps_ctl_dec_op->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_FAIL;
return(IV_FAIL);
}
}
ps_dec_state->u2_decode_header = (UWORD8)ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_vid_dec_mode;
if(ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd != 0)
{
if(ps_dec_state->u2_header_done == 1)
{
if (ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd > ps_dec_state->u2_frame_width)
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd;
}
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.u4_disp_wd;
}
}
else
{
if(ps_dec_state->u2_header_done == 1)
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = ps_dec_state->u2_frame_width;
}
else
{
ps_dec_state->u4_frm_buf_stride = 0;
}
}
if(ps_ctl_dec_ip->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t.e_vid_dec_mode == IVD_DECODE_FRAME)
{
ps_dec_state->u1_flushfrm = 0;
}
ps_ctl_dec_op->s_ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t.u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
return(IV_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetAspectRatio(const gfx::SizeF& aspect_ratio) {
XSizeHints size_hints;
size_hints.flags = 0;
long supplied_return;
XGetWMNormalHints(xdisplay_, xwindow_, &size_hints, &supplied_return);
size_hints.flags |= PAspect;
size_hints.min_aspect.x = size_hints.max_aspect.x = aspect_ratio.width();
size_hints.min_aspect.y = size_hints.max_aspect.y = aspect_ratio.height();
XSetWMNormalHints(xdisplay_, xwindow_, &size_hints);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CSSRuleList* CSSStyleSheet::cssRules(ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!CanAccessRules()) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError("Cannot access rules");
return nullptr;
}
if (!rule_list_cssom_wrapper_)
rule_list_cssom_wrapper_ = StyleSheetCSSRuleList::Create(this);
return rule_list_cssom_wrapper_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline ElementRareData* Element::ensureElementRareData()
{
return static_cast<ElementRareData*>(ensureRareData());
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *zend_parse_arg_impl(int arg_num, zval **arg, va_list *va, const char **spec, char **error, int *severity TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *spec_walk = *spec;
char c = *spec_walk++;
int check_null = 0;
/* scan through modifiers */
while (1) {
if (*spec_walk == '/') {
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(arg);
} else if (*spec_walk == '!') {
check_null = 1;
} else {
break;
}
spec_walk++;
}
switch (c) {
case 'l':
case 'L':
{
long *p = va_arg(*va, long *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
double d;
int type;
if ((type = is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), p, &d, -1)) == 0) {
return "long";
} else if (type == IS_DOUBLE) {
if (c == 'L') {
if (d > LONG_MAX) {
*p = LONG_MAX;
break;
} else if (d < LONG_MIN) {
*p = LONG_MIN;
break;
}
}
*p = zend_dval_to_lval(d);
}
}
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
if (c == 'L') {
if (Z_DVAL_PP(arg) > LONG_MAX) {
*p = LONG_MAX;
break;
} else if (Z_DVAL_PP(arg) < LONG_MIN) {
*p = LONG_MIN;
break;
}
}
case IS_NULL:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_long_ex(arg);
*p = Z_LVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "long";
}
}
break;
case 'd':
{
double *p = va_arg(*va, double *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_STRING:
{
long l;
int type;
if ((type = is_numeric_string(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), &l, p, -1)) == 0) {
return "double";
} else if (type == IS_LONG) {
*p = (double) l;
}
}
break;
case IS_NULL:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_double_ex(arg);
*p = Z_DVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "double";
}
}
break;
case 'p':
case 's':
{
char **p = va_arg(*va, char **);
int *pl = va_arg(*va, int *);
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_NULL:
if (check_null) {
*p = NULL;
*pl = 0;
break;
}
/* break omitted intentionally */
case IS_STRING:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_string_ex(arg);
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISREF_PP(arg) != 0)) {
/* it's dangerous to return pointers to string
buffer of referenced variable, because it can
be clobbered throug magic callbacks */
SEPARATE_ZVAL(arg);
}
*p = Z_STRVAL_PP(arg);
*pl = Z_STRLEN_PP(arg);
if (c == 'p' && CHECK_ZVAL_NULL_PATH(*arg)) {
return "a valid path";
}
break;
case IS_OBJECT:
if (parse_arg_object_to_string(arg, p, pl, IS_STRING TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (c == 'p' && CHECK_ZVAL_NULL_PATH(*arg)) {
return "a valid path";
}
break;
}
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return c == 's' ? "string" : "a valid path";
}
}
break;
case 'b':
{
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
if (check_null) {
zend_bool *p = va_arg(*va, zend_bool *);
*p = (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL);
}
switch (Z_TYPE_PP(arg)) {
case IS_NULL:
case IS_STRING:
case IS_LONG:
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
convert_to_boolean_ex(arg);
*p = Z_BVAL_PP(arg);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
case IS_OBJECT:
case IS_RESOURCE:
default:
return "boolean";
}
}
break;
case 'r':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_RESOURCE) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "resource";
}
}
break;
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_ARRAY || (c == 'A' && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT)) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "array";
}
}
break;
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
HashTable **p = va_arg(*va, HashTable **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_ARRAY) {
*p = Z_ARRVAL_PP(arg);
} else if(c == 'H' && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT) {
*p = HASH_OF(*arg);
if(*p == NULL) {
return "array";
}
} else {
return "array";
}
}
break;
case 'o':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
return "object";
}
}
break;
case 'O':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
zend_class_entry *ce = va_arg(*va, zend_class_entry *);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
break;
}
if (Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_OBJECT &&
(!ce || instanceof_function(Z_OBJCE_PP(arg), ce TSRMLS_CC))) {
*p = *arg;
} else {
if (ce) {
return ce->name;
} else {
return "object";
}
}
}
break;
case 'C':
{
zend_class_entry **lookup, **pce = va_arg(*va, zend_class_entry **);
zend_class_entry *ce_base = *pce;
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*pce = NULL;
break;
}
convert_to_string_ex(arg);
if (zend_lookup_class(Z_STRVAL_PP(arg), Z_STRLEN_PP(arg), &lookup TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
*pce = NULL;
} else {
*pce = *lookup;
}
if (ce_base) {
if ((!*pce || !instanceof_function(*pce, ce_base TSRMLS_CC))) {
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a class name derived from %s, '%s' given",
ce_base->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(arg));
*pce = NULL;
return "";
}
}
if (!*pce) {
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid class name, '%s' given",
Z_STRVAL_PP(arg));
return "";
}
break;
}
break;
case 'f':
{
zend_fcall_info *fci = va_arg(*va, zend_fcall_info *);
zend_fcall_info_cache *fcc = va_arg(*va, zend_fcall_info_cache *);
char *is_callable_error = NULL;
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
fci->size = 0;
fcc->initialized = 0;
break;
}
if (zend_fcall_info_init(*arg, 0, fci, fcc, NULL, &is_callable_error TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
if (is_callable_error) {
*severity = E_STRICT;
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid callback, %s", is_callable_error);
efree(is_callable_error);
*spec = spec_walk;
return "";
}
break;
} else {
if (is_callable_error) {
*severity = E_WARNING;
zend_spprintf(error, 0, "to be a valid callback, %s", is_callable_error);
efree(is_callable_error);
return "";
} else {
return "valid callback";
}
}
}
case 'z':
{
zval **p = va_arg(*va, zval **);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
} else {
*p = *arg;
}
}
break;
case 'Z':
{
zval ***p = va_arg(*va, zval ***);
if (check_null && Z_TYPE_PP(arg) == IS_NULL) {
*p = NULL;
} else {
*p = arg;
}
}
break;
default:
return "unknown";
}
*spec = spec_walk;
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ring_buffer_free_read_page(struct ring_buffer *buffer, void *data)
{
free_page((unsigned long)data);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limit_to_ancestry(struct commit_list *bottom, struct commit_list *list)
{
struct commit_list *p;
struct commit_list *rlist = NULL;
int made_progress;
/*
* Reverse the list so that it will be likely that we would
* process parents before children.
*/
for (p = list; p; p = p->next)
commit_list_insert(p->item, &rlist);
for (p = bottom; p; p = p->next)
p->item->object.flags |= TMP_MARK;
/*
* Mark the ones that can reach bottom commits in "list",
* in a bottom-up fashion.
*/
do {
made_progress = 0;
for (p = rlist; p; p = p->next) {
struct commit *c = p->item;
struct commit_list *parents;
if (c->object.flags & (TMP_MARK | UNINTERESTING))
continue;
for (parents = c->parents;
parents;
parents = parents->next) {
if (!(parents->item->object.flags & TMP_MARK))
continue;
c->object.flags |= TMP_MARK;
made_progress = 1;
break;
}
}
} while (made_progress);
/*
* NEEDSWORK: decide if we want to remove parents that are
* not marked with TMP_MARK from commit->parents for commits
* in the resulting list. We may not want to do that, though.
*/
/*
* The ones that are not marked with TMP_MARK are uninteresting
*/
for (p = list; p; p = p->next) {
struct commit *c = p->item;
if (c->object.flags & TMP_MARK)
continue;
c->object.flags |= UNINTERESTING;
}
/* We are done with the TMP_MARK */
for (p = list; p; p = p->next)
p->item->object.flags &= ~TMP_MARK;
for (p = bottom; p; p = p->next)
p->item->object.flags &= ~TMP_MARK;
free_commit_list(rlist);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int DevToolsEventForwarder::CombineKeyCodeAndModifiers(int key_code,
int modifiers) {
return key_code | (modifiers << 16);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintHeaderFooterText(
const string16& text,
WebKit::WebCanvas* canvas,
HeaderFooterPaint paint,
float webkit_scale_factor,
const PageSizeMargins& page_layout,
printing::HorizontalHeaderFooterPosition horizontal_position,
printing::VerticalHeaderFooterPosition vertical_position,
double offset_to_baseline) {
#if defined(USE_RENDER_TEXT)
paint->SetText(text);
paint->SetFontSize(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterFontSize);
double text_width_in_points = paint->GetStringSize().width();
SkPoint point = GetHeaderFooterPosition(webkit_scale_factor, page_layout,
horizontal_position,
vertical_position, offset_to_baseline,
text_width_in_points);
gfx::FontList font_list(
gfx::Font(printing::kSettingHeaderFooterFontFamilyName,
printing::kSettingHeaderFooterFontSize / webkit_scale_factor));
paint->SetFontList(font_list);
gfx::Size size(paint->GetStringSize());
gfx::Rect rect(point.x(), point.y() - paint->GetBaseline(),
size.width(), size.height());
paint->SetDisplayRect(rect);
{
SkMatrix m = canvas->getTotalMatrix();
ui::ScaleFactor device_scale_factor = ui::GetScaleFactorFromScale(
SkScalarAbs(m.getScaleX()));
scoped_ptr<gfx::Canvas> gfx_canvas(gfx::Canvas::CreateCanvasWithoutScaling(
canvas, device_scale_factor));
paint->Draw(gfx_canvas.get());
}
#else
size_t text_byte_length = text.length() * sizeof(char16);
double text_width_in_points = SkScalarToDouble(paint.measureText(
text.c_str(), text_byte_length));
SkPoint point = GetHeaderFooterPosition(webkit_scale_factor, page_layout,
horizontal_position,
vertical_position, offset_to_baseline,
text_width_in_points);
paint.setTextSize(SkDoubleToScalar(
paint.getTextSize() / webkit_scale_factor));
canvas->drawText(text.c_str(), text_byte_length, point.x(), point.y(),
paint);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_QFS_attr(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, int level)
{
struct smb2_query_info_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype, max_len, min_len;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
unsigned int rsp_len, offset;
if (level == FS_DEVICE_INFORMATION) {
max_len = sizeof(FILE_SYSTEM_DEVICE_INFO);
min_len = sizeof(FILE_SYSTEM_DEVICE_INFO);
} else if (level == FS_ATTRIBUTE_INFORMATION) {
max_len = sizeof(FILE_SYSTEM_ATTRIBUTE_INFO);
min_len = MIN_FS_ATTR_INFO_SIZE;
} else if (level == FS_SECTOR_SIZE_INFORMATION) {
max_len = sizeof(struct smb3_fs_ss_info);
min_len = sizeof(struct smb3_fs_ss_info);
} else {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Invalid qfsinfo level %d\n", level);
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = build_qfs_info_req(&iov, tcon, level, max_len,
persistent_fid, volatile_fid);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, &iov, 1, &resp_buftype, 0);
if (rc) {
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_QUERY_INFO_HE);
goto qfsattr_exit;
}
rsp = (struct smb2_query_info_rsp *)iov.iov_base;
rsp_len = le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferLength);
offset = le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset);
rc = validate_buf(offset, rsp_len, &rsp->hdr, min_len);
if (rc)
goto qfsattr_exit;
if (level == FS_ATTRIBUTE_INFORMATION)
memcpy(&tcon->fsAttrInfo, 4 /* RFC1001 len */ + offset
+ (char *)&rsp->hdr, min_t(unsigned int,
rsp_len, max_len));
else if (level == FS_DEVICE_INFORMATION)
memcpy(&tcon->fsDevInfo, 4 /* RFC1001 len */ + offset
+ (char *)&rsp->hdr, sizeof(FILE_SYSTEM_DEVICE_INFO));
else if (level == FS_SECTOR_SIZE_INFORMATION) {
struct smb3_fs_ss_info *ss_info = (struct smb3_fs_ss_info *)
(4 /* RFC1001 len */ + offset + (char *)&rsp->hdr);
tcon->ss_flags = le32_to_cpu(ss_info->Flags);
tcon->perf_sector_size =
le32_to_cpu(ss_info->PhysicalBytesPerSectorForPerf);
}
qfsattr_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, iov.iov_base);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int64_t luma_abs_diff(const AVFrame *f1, const AVFrame *f2)
{
int x, y;
const uint8_t *srcp1 = f1->data[0];
const uint8_t *srcp2 = f2->data[0];
const int src1_linesize = f1->linesize[0];
const int src2_linesize = f2->linesize[0];
const int width = f1->width;
const int height = f1->height;
int64_t acc = 0;
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < width; x++)
acc += abs(srcp1[x] - srcp2[x]);
srcp1 += src1_linesize;
srcp2 += src2_linesize;
}
return acc;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int corsair_usage_to_gkey(unsigned int usage)
{
/* G1 (0xd0) to G16 (0xdf) */
if (usage >= 0xd0 && usage <= 0xdf)
return usage - 0xd0 + 1;
/* G17 (0xe8) to G18 (0xe9) */
if (usage >= 0xe8 && usage <= 0xe9)
return usage - 0xe8 + 17;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
if (url_len >= sizeof(url_address))
{
applog(LOG_WARNING, "%s: Truncating overflowed address '%.*s'",
__func__, url_len, url_begin);
url_len = sizeof(url_address) - 1;
}
sprintf(url_address, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb_state *mrb)
{
return mrb->gc.arena_idx;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_sigaltstack (const stack_t *ss, stack_t *oss, unsigned long sp)
{
struct task_struct *t = current;
if (oss) {
memset(oss, 0, sizeof(stack_t));
oss->ss_sp = (void __user *) t->sas_ss_sp;
oss->ss_size = t->sas_ss_size;
oss->ss_flags = sas_ss_flags(sp) |
(current->sas_ss_flags & SS_FLAG_BITS);
}
if (ss) {
void __user *ss_sp = ss->ss_sp;
size_t ss_size = ss->ss_size;
unsigned ss_flags = ss->ss_flags;
int ss_mode;
if (unlikely(on_sig_stack(sp)))
return -EPERM;
ss_mode = ss_flags & ~SS_FLAG_BITS;
if (unlikely(ss_mode != SS_DISABLE && ss_mode != SS_ONSTACK &&
ss_mode != 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (ss_mode == SS_DISABLE) {
ss_size = 0;
ss_sp = NULL;
} else {
if (unlikely(ss_size < MINSIGSTKSZ))
return -ENOMEM;
}
t->sas_ss_sp = (unsigned long) ss_sp;
t->sas_ss_size = ss_size;
t->sas_ss_flags = ss_flags;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebInputElement FindUsernameElementPrecedingPasswordElement(
WebLocalFrame* frame,
const WebInputElement& password_element) {
DCHECK(!password_element.IsNull());
std::vector<WebFormControlElement> elements;
if (password_element.Form().IsNull()) {
elements = form_util::GetUnownedAutofillableFormFieldElements(
frame->GetDocument().All(), nullptr);
} else {
WebVector<WebFormControlElement> web_control_elements;
password_element.Form().GetFormControlElements(web_control_elements);
elements.assign(web_control_elements.begin(), web_control_elements.end());
}
auto iter = std::find(elements.begin(), elements.end(), password_element);
if (iter == elements.end())
return WebInputElement();
for (auto begin = elements.begin(); iter != begin;) {
--iter;
const WebInputElement* input = ToWebInputElement(&*iter);
if (input && input->IsTextField() && !input->IsPasswordFieldForAutofill() &&
IsElementEditable(*input) && form_util::IsWebElementVisible(*input)) {
return *input;
}
}
return WebInputElement();
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SecurityHandler::DidChangeVisibleSecurityState() {
DCHECK(enabled_);
SecurityStyleExplanations security_style_explanations;
blink::WebSecurityStyle security_style =
web_contents()->GetDelegate()->GetSecurityStyle(
web_contents(), &security_style_explanations);
const std::string security_state =
SecurityStyleToProtocolSecurityState(security_style);
std::unique_ptr<Explanations> explanations = Explanations::create();
AddExplanations(Security::SecurityStateEnum::Insecure,
security_style_explanations.insecure_explanations,
explanations.get());
AddExplanations(Security::SecurityStateEnum::Neutral,
security_style_explanations.neutral_explanations,
explanations.get());
AddExplanations(Security::SecurityStateEnum::Secure,
security_style_explanations.secure_explanations,
explanations.get());
AddExplanations(Security::SecurityStateEnum::Info,
security_style_explanations.info_explanations,
explanations.get());
std::unique_ptr<Security::InsecureContentStatus> insecure_status =
Security::InsecureContentStatus::Create()
.SetRanMixedContent(security_style_explanations.ran_mixed_content)
.SetDisplayedMixedContent(
security_style_explanations.displayed_mixed_content)
.SetContainedMixedForm(
security_style_explanations.contained_mixed_form)
.SetRanContentWithCertErrors(
security_style_explanations.ran_content_with_cert_errors)
.SetDisplayedContentWithCertErrors(
security_style_explanations.displayed_content_with_cert_errors)
.SetRanInsecureContentStyle(SecurityStyleToProtocolSecurityState(
security_style_explanations.ran_insecure_content_style))
.SetDisplayedInsecureContentStyle(
SecurityStyleToProtocolSecurityState(
security_style_explanations.displayed_insecure_content_style))
.Build();
frontend_->SecurityStateChanged(
security_state,
security_style_explanations.scheme_is_cryptographic,
std::move(explanations),
std::move(insecure_status),
Maybe<std::string>(security_style_explanations.summary));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Part::slotOpenEntry(int mode)
{
qCDebug(ARK) << "Opening with mode" << mode;
QModelIndex index = m_view->selectionModel()->currentIndex();
Archive::Entry *entry = m_model->entryForIndex(index);
if (entry->isDir()) {
return;
}
if (!entry->property("link").toString().isEmpty()) {
displayMsgWidget(KMessageWidget::Information, i18n("Ark cannot open symlinks."));
return;
}
if (!entry->fullPath().isEmpty()) {
m_openFileMode = static_cast<OpenFileMode>(mode);
KJob *job = Q_NULLPTR;
if (m_openFileMode == Preview) {
job = m_model->preview(entry);
connect(job, &KJob::result, this, &Part::slotPreviewExtractedEntry);
} else {
job = (m_openFileMode == OpenFile) ? m_model->open(entry) : m_model->openWith(entry);
connect(job, &KJob::result, this, &Part::slotOpenExtractedEntry);
}
registerJob(job);
job->start();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 9,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nr_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int addr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nr_sock *nr = nr_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_ax25 *addr = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)uaddr;
ax25_address *source = NULL;
ax25_uid_assoc *user;
struct net_device *dev;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED && sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
goto out_release; /* Connect completed during a ERESTARTSYS event */
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE && sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto out_release;
}
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -EISCONN; /* No reconnect on a seqpacket socket */
goto out_release;
}
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_ax25) && addr_len != sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_release;
}
if (addr->sax25_family != AF_NETROM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_release;
}
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED)) { /* Must bind first - autobinding in this may or may not work */
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
if ((dev = nr_dev_first()) == NULL) {
err = -ENETUNREACH;
goto out_release;
}
source = (ax25_address *)dev->dev_addr;
user = ax25_findbyuid(current_euid());
if (user) {
nr->user_addr = user->call;
ax25_uid_put(user);
} else {
if (ax25_uid_policy && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
dev_put(dev);
err = -EPERM;
goto out_release;
}
nr->user_addr = *source;
}
nr->source_addr = *source;
nr->device = dev;
dev_put(dev);
nr_insert_socket(sk); /* Finish the bind */
}
nr->dest_addr = addr->sax25_call;
release_sock(sk);
circuit = nr_find_next_circuit();
lock_sock(sk);
nr->my_index = circuit / 256;
nr->my_id = circuit % 256;
circuit++;
/* Move to connecting socket, start sending Connect Requests */
sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;
sk->sk_state = TCP_SYN_SENT;
nr_establish_data_link(sk);
nr->state = NR_STATE_1;
nr_start_heartbeat(sk);
/* Now the loop */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED && (flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
err = -EINPROGRESS;
goto out_release;
}
/*
* A Connect Ack with Choke or timeout or failed routing will go to
* closed.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT) {
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_SYN_SENT)
break;
if (!signal_pending(current)) {
release_sock(sk);
schedule();
lock_sock(sk);
continue;
}
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
if (err)
goto out_release;
}
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
err = sock_error(sk); /* Always set at this point */
goto out_release;
}
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
out_release:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ring_buffer_page_len(void *page)
{
return local_read(&((struct buffer_data_page *)page)->commit)
+ BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: View* LauncherView::GetFocusTraversableParentView() {
return this;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::RecordStartupState(
ProxyStartupState state) const {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMAProxyStartupStateHistogram,
state,
PROXY_STARTUP_STATE_COUNT);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_tls_signon(cib_t * cib, struct remote_connection_s *connection)
{
int sock;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
int rc = 0;
char *server = private->server;
int ret_ga;
struct addrinfo *res;
struct addrinfo hints;
xmlNode *answer = NULL;
xmlNode *login = NULL;
static struct mainloop_fd_callbacks cib_fd_callbacks =
{
.dispatch = cib_remote_dispatch,
.destroy = cib_remote_connection_destroy,
};
connection->socket = 0;
connection->session = NULL;
/* create socket */
sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (sock == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Socket creation failed");
return -1;
}
/* getaddrinfo */
bzero(&hints, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_RAW;
if (hints.ai_family == AF_INET6) {
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_ICMPV6;
} else {
hints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_ICMP;
}
crm_debug("Looking up %s", server);
ret_ga = getaddrinfo(server, NULL, &hints, &res);
if (ret_ga) {
crm_err("getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(ret_ga));
close(sock);
return -1;
}
if (res->ai_canonname) {
server = res->ai_canonname;
}
crm_debug("Got address %s for %s", server, private->server);
if (!res->ai_addr) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed");
crm_exit(1);
}
#if 1
memcpy(&addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
#else
/* connect to server */
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(server);
#endif
addr.sin_port = htons(private->port);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Connection to %s:%d failed", server, private->port);
close(sock);
return -1;
}
if (connection->encrypted) {
/* initialize GnuTls lib */
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
gnutls_global_init();
gnutls_anon_allocate_client_credentials(&anon_cred_c);
/* bind the socket to GnuTls lib */
connection->session = create_tls_session(sock, GNUTLS_CLIENT);
if (connection->session == NULL) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Session creation for %s:%d failed", server, private->port);
close(sock);
cib_tls_close(cib);
return -1;
}
#else
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
#endif
} else {
connection->session = GUINT_TO_POINTER(sock);
}
/* login to server */
login = create_xml_node(NULL, "cib_command");
crm_xml_add(login, "op", "authenticate");
crm_xml_add(login, "user", private->user);
crm_xml_add(login, "password", private->passwd);
crm_xml_add(login, "hidden", "password");
crm_send_remote_msg(connection->session, login, connection->encrypted);
free_xml(login);
answer = crm_recv_remote_msg(connection->session, connection->encrypted);
crm_log_xml_trace(answer, "Reply");
if (answer == NULL) {
rc = -EPROTO;
} else {
/* grab the token */
const char *msg_type = crm_element_value(answer, F_CIB_OPERATION);
const char *tmp_ticket = crm_element_value(answer, F_CIB_CLIENTID);
if (safe_str_neq(msg_type, CRM_OP_REGISTER)) {
crm_err("Invalid registration message: %s", msg_type);
rc = -EPROTO;
} else if (tmp_ticket == NULL) {
rc = -EPROTO;
} else {
connection->token = strdup(tmp_ticket);
}
}
if (rc != 0) {
cib_tls_close(cib);
}
connection->socket = sock;
connection->source = mainloop_add_fd("cib-remote", G_PRIORITY_HIGH, connection->socket, cib, &cib_fd_callbacks);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QList<QObject*>& OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::messageHandlers() {
if (!proxy_) {
return construct_props_->message_handlers;
}
return proxy_->messageHandlers();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
if (sock->ops) {
struct module *owner = sock->ops->owner;
sock->ops->release(sock);
sock->ops = NULL;
module_put(owner);
}
if (rcu_dereference_protected(sock->wq, 1)->fasync_list)
pr_err("%s: fasync list not empty!\n", __func__);
if (!sock->file) {
iput(SOCK_INODE(sock));
return;
}
sock->file = NULL;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 169,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netdev_bonding_info_change(struct net_device *dev,
struct netdev_bonding_info *bonding_info)
{
struct netdev_notifier_bonding_info info;
memcpy(&info.bonding_info, bonding_info,
sizeof(struct netdev_bonding_info));
call_netdevice_notifiers_info(NETDEV_BONDING_INFO, dev,
&info.info);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *dn_socket_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
return *pos ? dn_socket_get_idx(seq, *pos - 1) : SEQ_START_TOKEN;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void lodepng_info_init(LodePNGInfo* info)
{
lodepng_color_mode_init(&info->color);
info->interlace_method = 0;
info->compression_method = 0;
info->filter_method = 0;
#ifdef LODEPNG_COMPILE_ANCILLARY_CHUNKS
info->background_defined = 0;
info->background_r = info->background_g = info->background_b = 0;
LodePNGText_init(info);
LodePNGIText_init(info);
info->time_defined = 0;
info->phys_defined = 0;
LodePNGUnknownChunks_init(info);
#endif /*LODEPNG_COMPILE_ANCILLARY_CHUNKS*/
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedToOnlyOtherAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::OtherAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssd0323_update_display(void *opaque)
{
ssd0323_state *s = (ssd0323_state *)opaque;
DisplaySurface *surface = qemu_console_surface(s->con);
uint8_t *dest;
uint8_t *src;
int x;
int y;
int i;
int line;
char *colors[16];
char colortab[MAGNIFY * 64];
char *p;
int dest_width;
if (!s->redraw)
return;
switch (surface_bits_per_pixel(surface)) {
case 0:
return;
case 15:
dest_width = 2;
break;
case 16:
dest_width = 2;
break;
case 24:
dest_width = 3;
break;
case 32:
dest_width = 4;
break;
default:
BADF("Bad color depth\n");
return;
}
p = colortab;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
int n;
colors[i] = p;
switch (surface_bits_per_pixel(surface)) {
case 15:
n = i * 2 + (i >> 3);
p[0] = n | (n << 5);
p[1] = (n << 2) | (n >> 3);
break;
case 16:
n = i * 2 + (i >> 3);
p[0] = n | (n << 6) | ((n << 1) & 0x20);
p[1] = (n << 3) | (n >> 2);
break;
case 24:
case 32:
n = (i << 4) | i;
p[0] = p[1] = p[2] = n;
break;
default:
BADF("Bad color depth\n");
return;
}
p += dest_width;
}
/* TODO: Implement row/column remapping. */
dest = surface_data(surface);
for (y = 0; y < 64; y++) {
line = y;
src = s->framebuffer + 64 * line;
for (x = 0; x < 64; x++) {
int val;
val = *src >> 4;
for (i = 0; i < MAGNIFY; i++) {
memcpy(dest, colors[val], dest_width);
dest += dest_width;
}
val = *src & 0xf;
for (i = 0; i < MAGNIFY; i++) {
memcpy(dest, colors[val], dest_width);
dest += dest_width;
}
src++;
}
for (i = 1; i < MAGNIFY; i++) {
memcpy(dest, dest - dest_width * MAGNIFY * 128,
dest_width * 128 * MAGNIFY);
dest += dest_width * 128 * MAGNIFY;
}
}
s->redraw = 0;
dpy_gfx_update(s->con, 0, 0, 128 * MAGNIFY, 64 * MAGNIFY);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyToLastSlash(const char* spec,
int begin,
int end,
CanonOutput* output) {
int last_slash = -1;
for (int i = end - 1; i >= begin; i--) {
if (spec[i] == '/') {
last_slash = i;
break;
}
}
if (last_slash < 0)
return; // No slash.
for (int i = begin; i <= last_slash; i++)
output->push_back(spec[i]);
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 111,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Downmix_Configure(downmix_module_t *pDwmModule, effect_config_t *pConfig, bool init) {
downmix_object_t *pDownmixer = &pDwmModule->context;
if (pConfig->inputCfg.samplingRate != pConfig->outputCfg.samplingRate
|| pConfig->outputCfg.channels != DOWNMIX_OUTPUT_CHANNELS
|| pConfig->inputCfg.format != AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT
|| pConfig->outputCfg.format != AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT) {
ALOGE("Downmix_Configure error: invalid config");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (&pDwmModule->config != pConfig) {
memcpy(&pDwmModule->config, pConfig, sizeof(effect_config_t));
}
if (init) {
pDownmixer->type = DOWNMIX_TYPE_FOLD;
pDownmixer->apply_volume_correction = false;
pDownmixer->input_channel_count = 8; // matches default input of AUDIO_CHANNEL_OUT_7POINT1
} else {
if (!Downmix_validChannelMask(pConfig->inputCfg.channels)) {
ALOGE("Downmix_Configure error: input channel mask(0x%x) not supported",
pConfig->inputCfg.channels);
return -EINVAL;
}
pDownmixer->input_channel_count =
audio_channel_count_from_out_mask(pConfig->inputCfg.channels);
}
Downmix_Reset(pDownmixer, init);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking to Downmix and Reverb
Bug: 63662938
Bug: 63526567
Test: Added CTS tests
Change-Id: I8ed398cd62a9f461b0590e37f593daa3d8e4dbc4
(cherry picked from commit 804632afcdda6e80945bf27c384757bda50560cb)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_set_empty(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
size_t numblks)
{
if (bp->b_pages)
_xfs_buf_free_pages(bp);
bp->b_pages = NULL;
bp->b_page_count = 0;
bp->b_addr = NULL;
bp->b_length = numblks;
bp->b_io_length = numblks;
ASSERT(bp->b_map_count == 1);
bp->b_bn = XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL;
bp->b_maps[0].bm_bn = XFS_BUF_DADDR_NULL;
bp->b_maps[0].bm_len = bp->b_length;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::getElementByAccessKey(const String& key)
{
if (key.isEmpty())
return 0;
if (!m_accessKeyMapValid) {
buildAccessKeyMap(this);
m_accessKeyMapValid = true;
}
return m_elementsByAccessKey.get(key.impl());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Element* Document::createElementNS(const AtomicString& namespace_uri,
const AtomicString& qualified_name,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
QualifiedName q_name(
CreateQualifiedName(namespace_uri, qualified_name, exception_state));
if (q_name == QualifiedName::Null())
return nullptr;
if (CustomElement::ShouldCreateCustomElement(q_name))
return CustomElement::CreateCustomElementSync(*this, q_name);
return createElement(q_name, kCreatedByCreateElement);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::HandleWheelEvent(
const blink::WebMouseWheelEvent& event) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (delegate_ && event.wheel_ticks_y &&
!ui::WebInputEventTraits::CanCauseScroll(event)) {
zoom_scroll_remainder_ += event.wheel_ticks_y;
int whole_zoom_scroll_remainder_ = std::lround(zoom_scroll_remainder_);
zoom_scroll_remainder_ -= whole_zoom_scroll_remainder_;
if (whole_zoom_scroll_remainder_ != 0) {
delegate_->ContentsZoomChange(whole_zoom_scroll_remainder_ > 0);
}
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_rx_fix_l4_csum(E1000ECore *core, struct NetRxPkt *pkt)
{
if (net_rx_pkt_has_virt_hdr(pkt)) {
struct virtio_net_hdr *vhdr = net_rx_pkt_get_vhdr(pkt);
if (vhdr->flags & VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM) {
net_rx_pkt_fix_l4_csum(pkt);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::ReloadFrame() {
Send(new ViewMsg_ReloadFrame(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorController::didCommitLoadForMainFrame()
{
Vector<InspectorAgent*> agents = m_moduleAgents;
for (size_t i = 0; i < agents.size(); i++)
agents[i]->didCommitLoadForMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qeth_configure_blkt_default(struct qeth_card *card, char *prcd)
{
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "cfgblkt");
if (prcd[74] == 0xF0 && prcd[75] == 0xF0 &&
prcd[76] >= 0xF1 && prcd[76] <= 0xF4) {
card->info.blkt.time_total = 0;
card->info.blkt.inter_packet = 0;
card->info.blkt.inter_packet_jumbo = 0;
} else {
card->info.blkt.time_total = 250;
card->info.blkt.inter_packet = 5;
card->info.blkt.inter_packet_jumbo = 15;
}
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btu_exec_tap_fd_read(void *p_param) {
struct pollfd ufd;
int fd = (int)p_param;
if (fd == INVALID_FD || fd != btpan_cb.tap_fd)
return;
for (int i = 0; i < PAN_POOL_MAX && btif_is_enabled() && btpan_cb.flow; i++) {
BT_HDR *buffer = (BT_HDR *)GKI_getpoolbuf(PAN_POOL_ID);
if (!buffer) {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s unable to allocate buffer for packet.", __func__);
break;
}
buffer->offset = PAN_MINIMUM_OFFSET;
buffer->len = GKI_get_buf_size(buffer) - sizeof(BT_HDR) - buffer->offset;
UINT8 *packet = (UINT8 *)buffer + sizeof(BT_HDR) + buffer->offset;
if (!btpan_cb.congest_packet_size) {
ssize_t ret = read(fd, btpan_cb.congest_packet, sizeof(btpan_cb.congest_packet));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s unable to read from driver: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
case 0:
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s end of file reached.", __func__);
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
return;
default:
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = ret;
break;
}
}
memcpy(packet, btpan_cb.congest_packet, MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len));
buffer->len = MIN(btpan_cb.congest_packet_size, buffer->len);
if (buffer->len > sizeof(tETH_HDR) && should_forward((tETH_HDR *)packet)) {
tETH_HDR hdr;
memcpy(&hdr, packet, sizeof(tETH_HDR));
buffer->len -= sizeof(tETH_HDR);
buffer->offset += sizeof(tETH_HDR);
if (forward_bnep(&hdr, buffer) != FORWARD_CONGEST)
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
} else {
BTIF_TRACE_WARNING("%s dropping packet of length %d", __func__, buffer->len);
btpan_cb.congest_packet_size = 0;
GKI_freebuf(buffer);
}
ufd.fd = fd;
ufd.events = POLLIN;
ufd.revents = 0;
if (poll(&ufd, 1, 0) <= 0 || IS_EXCEPTION(ufd.revents))
break;
}
btsock_thread_add_fd(pan_pth, fd, 0, SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void udp6_proc_exit(struct net *net) {
udp_proc_unregister(net, &udp6_seq_afinfo);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,755 |
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