instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit sha1_s390_fini(void)
{
crypto_unregister_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media::mojom::VideoFrameDataPtr MakeVideoFrameData(
const scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame>& input) {
if (input->metadata()->IsTrue(media::VideoFrameMetadata::END_OF_STREAM)) {
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewEosData(
media::mojom::EosVideoFrameData::New());
}
if (input->storage_type() == media::VideoFrame::STORAGE_MOJO_SHARED_BUFFER) {
media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame* mojo_frame =
static_cast<media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame*>(input.get());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle dup = mojo_frame->Handle().Clone(
mojo::SharedBufferHandle::AccessMode::READ_ONLY);
DCHECK(dup.is_valid());
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewSharedBufferData(
media::mojom::SharedBufferVideoFrameData::New(
std::move(dup), mojo_frame->MappedSize(),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane)));
}
if (input->HasTextures()) {
std::vector<gpu::MailboxHolder> mailbox_holder(
media::VideoFrame::kMaxPlanes);
size_t num_planes = media::VideoFrame::NumPlanes(input->format());
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; i++)
mailbox_holder[i] = input->mailbox_holder(i);
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewMailboxData(
media::mojom::MailboxVideoFrameData::New(std::move(mailbox_holder)));
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported VideoFrame conversion";
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_update_irq_status(PVSCSIState *s)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
bool should_raise = s->reg_interrupt_enabled & s->reg_interrupt_status;
trace_pvscsi_update_irq_level(should_raise, s->reg_interrupt_enabled,
s->reg_interrupt_status);
if (msi_enabled(d)) {
if (should_raise) {
trace_pvscsi_update_irq_msi();
msi_notify(d, PVSCSI_VECTOR_COMPLETION);
}
return;
}
pci_set_irq(d, !!should_raise);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_write_cookie(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_bus bus_idx,
gpa_t addr, int len, const void *val, long cookie)
{
struct kvm_io_bus *bus;
struct kvm_io_range range;
range = (struct kvm_io_range) {
.addr = addr,
.len = len,
};
bus = srcu_dereference(vcpu->kvm->buses[bus_idx], &vcpu->kvm->srcu);
/* First try the device referenced by cookie. */
if ((cookie >= 0) && (cookie < bus->dev_count) &&
(kvm_io_bus_cmp(&range, &bus->range[cookie]) == 0))
if (!kvm_iodevice_write(vcpu, bus->range[cookie].dev, addr, len,
val))
return cookie;
/*
* cookie contained garbage; fall back to search and return the
* correct cookie value.
*/
return __kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, bus, &range, val);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppModalDialog::ActivateModalDialog() {
DCHECK(native_dialog_);
native_dialog_->ActivateAppModalDialog();
}
Commit Message: Fix a Windows crash bug with javascript alerts from extension popups.
BUG=137707
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10828423
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152716 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 103,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::IsPartialDownload() const {
return (state_ == IN_PROGRESS);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImagePtr gdImageScaleTwoPass(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int src_width, const unsigned int src_height, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr tmp_im;
gdImagePtr dst;
tmp_im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, src_height);
if (tmp_im == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageSetInterpolationMethod(tmp_im, src->interpolation_id);
_gdScaleHoriz(src, src_width, src_height, tmp_im, new_width, src_height);
dst = gdImageCreateTrueColor(new_width, new_height);
if (dst == NULL) {
gdFree(tmp_im);
return NULL;
}
_gdScaleVert(tmp_im, new_width, src_height, dst, new_width, new_height);
gdFree(tmp_im);
return dst;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 58,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_user_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *ucontrol)
{
int change;
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
mutex_lock(&ue->card->user_ctl_lock);
change = memcmp(&ucontrol->value, ue->elem_data, ue->elem_data_size) != 0;
if (change)
memcpy(ue->elem_data, &ucontrol->value, ue->elem_data_size);
mutex_unlock(&ue->card->user_ctl_lock);
return change;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 36,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsNameOfInlineEventHandler(const Vector<UChar, 32>& name) {
const size_t kLengthOfShortestInlineEventHandlerName = 5; // To wit: oncut.
if (name.size() < kLengthOfShortestInlineEventHandlerName)
return false;
return name[0] == 'o' && name[1] == 'n';
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceValue(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(thisObject);
TestSerializedScriptValueInterface* impl = static_cast<TestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setValue(SerializedScriptValue::create(exec, value));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_set_report(struct usb_interface *intf, unsigned char type,
unsigned char id, void *buf, int size)
{
return usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
USB_REQ_SET_REPORT,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
(type << 8) + id,
intf->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber, buf,
size, HZ);
}
Commit Message: USB: iowarrior: fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The iowarrior driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given
malicious descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints,
it will crash in the probe function. Ensure there is at least
one endpoint on the interface before using it.
The full report of this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/87
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 tss_selector, int reason,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code)
{
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
int ret;
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ret = emulator_task_switch(ctxt, tss_selector, reason,
has_error_code, error_code);
if (ret)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
memcpy(vcpu->arch.regs, ctxt->regs, sizeof ctxt->regs);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int div_down(unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
if (b == 0)
return UINT_MAX;
return a / b;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __prog_put_common(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct bpf_prog_aux *aux = container_of(rcu, struct bpf_prog_aux, rcu);
free_used_maps(aux);
bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock(aux->prog);
bpf_prog_free(aux->prog);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ParseJSONDictionary(const std::string& json, DictionaryValue** dict,
std::string* error) {
int error_code = 0;
Value* params =
base::JSONReader::ReadAndReturnError(json, true, &error_code, error);
if (error_code != 0) {
VLOG(1) << "Could not parse JSON object, " << *error;
if (params)
delete params;
return false;
}
if (!params || params->GetType() != Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY) {
*error = "Data passed in URL must be of type dictionary.";
VLOG(1) << "Invalid type to parse";
if (params)
delete params;
return false;
}
*dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(params);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioFlinger::EffectChain::setThread(const sp<ThreadBase>& thread)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
mThread = thread;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mEffects.size(); i++) {
mEffects[i]->setThread(thread);
}
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GDataEntry::FromProto(const GDataEntryProto& proto) {
ConvertProtoToPlatformFileInfo(proto.file_info(), &file_info_);
title_ = proto.title();
resource_id_ = proto.resource_id();
parent_resource_id_ = proto.parent_resource_id();
edit_url_ = GURL(proto.edit_url());
content_url_ = GURL(proto.content_url());
upload_url_ = GURL(proto.upload_url());
SetBaseNameFromTitle();
if (!proto.has_upload_url()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Incompatible proto detected (no upload URL): "
<< proto.title();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::getSupportedExtensions() {
if (isContextLost())
return base::nullopt;
Vector<String> result;
for (ExtensionTracker* tracker : extensions_) {
if (ExtensionSupportedAndAllowed(tracker)) {
const char* const* prefixes = tracker->Prefixes();
for (; *prefixes; ++prefixes) {
String prefixed_name = String(*prefixes) + tracker->ExtensionName();
result.push_back(prefixed_name);
}
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_remote_dispatch(gpointer user_data)
{
cib_t *cib = user_data;
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
xmlNode *msg = NULL;
const char *type = NULL;
crm_info("Message on callback channel");
msg = crm_recv_remote_msg(private->callback.session, private->callback.encrypted);
type = crm_element_value(msg, F_TYPE);
crm_trace("Activating %s callbacks...", type);
if (safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB)) {
cib_native_callback(cib, msg, 0, 0);
} else if (safe_str_eq(type, T_CIB_NOTIFY)) {
g_list_foreach(cib->notify_list, cib_native_notify, msg);
} else {
crm_err("Unknown message type: %s", type);
}
if (msg != NULL) {
free_xml(msg);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI void php_var_export_ex(zval *struc, int level, smart_str *buf) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *myht;
char *tmp_str;
size_t tmp_len;
zend_string *ztmp, *ztmp2;
zend_ulong index;
zend_string *key;
zval *val;
again:
switch (Z_TYPE_P(struc)) {
case IS_FALSE:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "false", 5);
break;
case IS_TRUE:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "true", 4);
break;
case IS_NULL:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
break;
case IS_LONG:
smart_str_append_long(buf, Z_LVAL_P(struc));
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
tmp_len = spprintf(&tmp_str, 0,"%.*H", PG(serialize_precision), Z_DVAL_P(struc));
smart_str_appendl(buf, tmp_str, tmp_len);
/* Without a decimal point, PHP treats a number literal as an int.
* This check even works for scientific notation, because the
* mantissa always contains a decimal point.
* We need to check for finiteness, because INF, -INF and NAN
* must not have a decimal point added.
*/
if (zend_finite(Z_DVAL_P(struc)) && NULL == strchr(tmp_str, '.')) {
smart_str_appendl(buf, ".0", 2);
}
efree(tmp_str);
break;
case IS_STRING:
ztmp = php_addcslashes(Z_STR_P(struc), 0, "'\\", 2);
ztmp2 = php_str_to_str(ZSTR_VAL(ztmp), ZSTR_LEN(ztmp), "\0", 1, "' . \"\\0\" . '", 12);
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\'');
smart_str_append(buf, ztmp2);
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\'');
zend_string_free(ztmp);
zend_string_free(ztmp2);
break;
case IS_ARRAY:
myht = Z_ARRVAL_P(struc);
if (ZEND_HASH_APPLY_PROTECTION(myht) && myht->u.v.nApplyCount++ > 0) {
myht->u.v.nApplyCount--;
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
zend_error(E_WARNING, "var_export does not handle circular references");
return;
}
if (level > 1) {
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\n');
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_appendl(buf, "array (\n", 8);
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_KEY_VAL_IND(myht, index, key, val) {
php_array_element_export(val, index, key, level, buf);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
if (ZEND_HASH_APPLY_PROTECTION(myht)) {
myht->u.v.nApplyCount--;
}
if (level > 1) {
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_appendc(buf, ')');
break;
case IS_OBJECT:
myht = Z_OBJPROP_P(struc);
if (myht) {
if (myht->u.v.nApplyCount > 0) {
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
zend_error(E_WARNING, "var_export does not handle circular references");
return;
} else {
myht->u.v.nApplyCount++;
}
}
if (level > 1) {
smart_str_appendc(buf, '\n');
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_append(buf, Z_OBJCE_P(struc)->name);
smart_str_appendl(buf, "::__set_state(array(\n", 21);
if (myht) {
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_KEY_VAL_IND(myht, index, key, val) {
php_object_element_export(val, index, key, level, buf);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
myht->u.v.nApplyCount--;
}
if (level > 1) {
buffer_append_spaces(buf, level - 1);
}
smart_str_appendl(buf, "))", 2);
break;
case IS_REFERENCE:
struc = Z_REFVAL_P(struc);
goto again;
break;
default:
smart_str_appendl(buf, "NULL", 4);
break;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Complete the fix of bug #70172 for PHP 7
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 72,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ebt_cleanup_match(struct ebt_entry_match *m, struct net *net, unsigned int *i)
{
struct xt_mtdtor_param par;
if (i && (*i)-- == 0)
return 1;
par.net = net;
par.match = m->u.match;
par.matchinfo = m->data;
par.family = NFPROTO_BRIDGE;
if (par.match->destroy != NULL)
par.match->destroy(&par);
module_put(par.match->me);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionScriptAndCaptureVisibleTest()
: http_url("http://www.google.com"),
http_url_with_path("http://www.google.com/index.html"),
https_url("https://www.google.com"),
example_com("https://example.com"),
test_example_com("https://test.example.com"),
sample_example_com("https://sample.example.com"),
file_url("file:///foo/bar"),
favicon_url("chrome://favicon/http://www.google.com"),
extension_url("chrome-extension://" +
crx_file::id_util::GenerateIdForPath(
base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("foo")))),
settings_url("chrome://settings"),
about_url("about:flags") {
urls_.insert(http_url);
urls_.insert(http_url_with_path);
urls_.insert(https_url);
urls_.insert(example_com);
urls_.insert(test_example_com);
urls_.insert(sample_example_com);
urls_.insert(file_url);
urls_.insert(favicon_url);
urls_.insert(extension_url);
urls_.insert(settings_url);
urls_.insert(about_url);
PermissionsData::SetPolicyDelegate(NULL);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
if (vmx->vcpu.arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu)) {
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
#endif
}
if (!enable_ept)
exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING;
if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING;
return exec_control;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __netlink_sendskb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int len = skb->len;
netlink_deliver_tap(skb);
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
if (netlink_skb_is_mmaped(skb))
netlink_queue_mmaped_skb(sk, skb);
else if (netlink_rx_is_mmaped(sk))
netlink_ring_set_copied(sk, skb);
else
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP */
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: httpd_initialize(
char* hostname, httpd_sockaddr* sa4P, httpd_sockaddr* sa6P,
unsigned short port, char* cgi_pattern, int cgi_limit, char* charset,
char* p3p, int max_age, char* cwd, int no_log, FILE* logfp,
int no_symlink_check, int vhost, int global_passwd, char* url_pattern,
char* local_pattern, int no_empty_referers )
{
httpd_server* hs;
static char ghnbuf[256];
char* cp;
check_options();
hs = NEW( httpd_server, 1 );
if ( hs == (httpd_server*) 0 )
{
syslog( LOG_CRIT, "out of memory allocating an httpd_server" );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
if ( hostname != (char*) 0 )
{
hs->binding_hostname = strdup( hostname );
if ( hs->binding_hostname == (char*) 0 )
{
syslog( LOG_CRIT, "out of memory copying hostname" );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
hs->server_hostname = hs->binding_hostname;
}
else
{
hs->binding_hostname = (char*) 0;
hs->server_hostname = (char*) 0;
if ( gethostname( ghnbuf, sizeof(ghnbuf) ) < 0 )
ghnbuf[0] = '\0';
#ifdef SERVER_NAME_LIST
if ( ghnbuf[0] != '\0' )
hs->server_hostname = hostname_map( ghnbuf );
#endif /* SERVER_NAME_LIST */
if ( hs->server_hostname == (char*) 0 )
{
#ifdef SERVER_NAME
hs->server_hostname = SERVER_NAME;
#else /* SERVER_NAME */
if ( ghnbuf[0] != '\0' )
hs->server_hostname = ghnbuf;
#endif /* SERVER_NAME */
}
}
hs->port = port;
if ( cgi_pattern == (char*) 0 )
hs->cgi_pattern = (char*) 0;
else
{
/* Nuke any leading slashes. */
if ( cgi_pattern[0] == '/' )
++cgi_pattern;
hs->cgi_pattern = strdup( cgi_pattern );
if ( hs->cgi_pattern == (char*) 0 )
{
syslog( LOG_CRIT, "out of memory copying cgi_pattern" );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
/* Nuke any leading slashes in the cgi pattern. */
while ( ( cp = strstr( hs->cgi_pattern, "|/" ) ) != (char*) 0 )
/* -2 for the offset, +1 for the '\0' */
(void) memmove( cp + 1, cp + 2, strlen( cp ) - 1 );
}
hs->cgi_limit = cgi_limit;
hs->cgi_count = 0;
hs->charset = strdup( charset );
hs->p3p = strdup( p3p );
hs->max_age = max_age;
hs->cwd = strdup( cwd );
if ( hs->cwd == (char*) 0 )
{
syslog( LOG_CRIT, "out of memory copying cwd" );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
if ( url_pattern == (char*) 0 )
hs->url_pattern = (char*) 0;
else
{
hs->url_pattern = strdup( url_pattern );
if ( hs->url_pattern == (char*) 0 )
{
syslog( LOG_CRIT, "out of memory copying url_pattern" );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
}
if ( local_pattern == (char*) 0 )
hs->local_pattern = (char*) 0;
else
{
hs->local_pattern = strdup( local_pattern );
if ( hs->local_pattern == (char*) 0 )
{
syslog( LOG_CRIT, "out of memory copying local_pattern" );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
}
hs->no_log = no_log;
hs->logfp = (FILE*) 0;
httpd_set_logfp( hs, logfp );
hs->no_symlink_check = no_symlink_check;
hs->vhost = vhost;
hs->global_passwd = global_passwd;
hs->no_empty_referers = no_empty_referers;
/* Initialize listen sockets. Try v6 first because of a Linux peculiarity;
** like some other systems, it has magical v6 sockets that also listen for
** v4, but in Linux if you bind a v4 socket first then the v6 bind fails.
*/
if ( sa6P == (httpd_sockaddr*) 0 )
hs->listen6_fd = -1;
else
hs->listen6_fd = initialize_listen_socket( sa6P );
if ( sa4P == (httpd_sockaddr*) 0 )
hs->listen4_fd = -1;
else
hs->listen4_fd = initialize_listen_socket( sa4P );
/* If we didn't get any valid sockets, fail. */
if ( hs->listen4_fd == -1 && hs->listen6_fd == -1 )
{
free_httpd_server( hs );
return (httpd_server*) 0;
}
init_mime();
/* Done initializing. */
if ( hs->binding_hostname == (char*) 0 )
syslog(
LOG_NOTICE, "%.80s starting on port %d", SERVER_SOFTWARE,
(int) hs->port );
else
syslog(
LOG_NOTICE, "%.80s starting on %.80s, port %d", SERVER_SOFTWARE,
httpd_ntoa( hs->listen4_fd != -1 ? sa4P : sa6P ),
(int) hs->port );
return hs;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadUIAdapterDelegate::OpenItem(const OfflineItem& item,
int64_t offline_id) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
Java_OfflinePageDownloadBridge_openItem(
env, ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, item.page_url.spec()), offline_id);
}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* command_line) {
GpuFeatureTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL);
}
Commit Message: Revert 124346 - Add basic threaded compositor test to gpu_feature_browsertest.cc
BUG=113159
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9509001
TBR=jbates@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9561011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@124356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromotingInstance::InjectClipboardEvent(
const protocol::ClipboardEvent& event) {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> data(new base::DictionaryValue());
data->SetString("mimeType", event.mime_type());
data->SetString("item", event.data());
PostChromotingMessage("injectClipboardItem", data.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Restrict the Chromoting client plugin to use by extensions & apps.
BUG=160456
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365276
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int whiteheat_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct whiteheat_private *info;
info = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
kfree(info);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_secinfo(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_secinfo_arg *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->dir_fh, &hdr);
encode_secinfo(xdr, args->name, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_set_log_fn(evdns_debug_log_fn_type fn)
{
evdns_log_fn = fn;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unix_gc(void)
{
struct unix_sock *u;
struct unix_sock *next;
struct sk_buff_head hitlist;
struct list_head cursor;
LIST_HEAD(not_cycle_list);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
/* Avoid a recursive GC. */
if (gc_in_progress)
goto out;
gc_in_progress = true;
/* First, select candidates for garbage collection. Only
* in-flight sockets are considered, and from those only ones
* which don't have any external reference.
*
* Holding unix_gc_lock will protect these candidates from
* being detached, and hence from gaining an external
* reference. Since there are no possible receivers, all
* buffers currently on the candidates' queues stay there
* during the garbage collection.
*
* We also know that no new candidate can be added onto the
* receive queues. Other, non candidate sockets _can_ be
* added to queue, so we must make sure only to touch
* candidates.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(u, next, &gc_inflight_list, link) {
long total_refs;
long inflight_refs;
total_refs = file_count(u->sk.sk_socket->file);
inflight_refs = atomic_long_read(&u->inflight);
BUG_ON(inflight_refs < 1);
BUG_ON(total_refs < inflight_refs);
if (total_refs == inflight_refs) {
list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_candidates);
__set_bit(UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE, &u->gc_flags);
__set_bit(UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE, &u->gc_flags);
}
}
/* Now remove all internal in-flight reference to children of
* the candidates.
*/
list_for_each_entry(u, &gc_candidates, link)
scan_children(&u->sk, dec_inflight, NULL);
/* Restore the references for children of all candidates,
* which have remaining references. Do this recursively, so
* only those remain, which form cyclic references.
*
* Use a "cursor" link, to make the list traversal safe, even
* though elements might be moved about.
*/
list_add(&cursor, &gc_candidates);
while (cursor.next != &gc_candidates) {
u = list_entry(cursor.next, struct unix_sock, link);
/* Move cursor to after the current position. */
list_move(&cursor, &u->link);
if (atomic_long_read(&u->inflight) > 0) {
list_move_tail(&u->link, ¬_cycle_list);
__clear_bit(UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE, &u->gc_flags);
scan_children(&u->sk, inc_inflight_move_tail, NULL);
}
}
list_del(&cursor);
/* not_cycle_list contains those sockets which do not make up a
* cycle. Restore these to the inflight list.
*/
while (!list_empty(¬_cycle_list)) {
u = list_entry(not_cycle_list.next, struct unix_sock, link);
__clear_bit(UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE, &u->gc_flags);
list_move_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
}
/* Now gc_candidates contains only garbage. Restore original
* inflight counters for these as well, and remove the skbuffs
* which are creating the cycle(s).
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&hitlist);
list_for_each_entry(u, &gc_candidates, link)
scan_children(&u->sk, inc_inflight, &hitlist);
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
/* Here we are. Hitlist is filled. Die. */
__skb_queue_purge(&hitlist);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
/* All candidates should have been detached by now. */
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gc_candidates));
gc_in_progress = false;
wake_up(&unix_gc_wait);
out:
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CachedShapingResults::~CachedShapingResults()
{
hb_buffer_destroy(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rds_ib_init(void)
{
int ret;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ib_devices);
ret = ib_register_client(&rds_ib_client);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = rds_ib_sysctl_init();
if (ret)
goto out_ibreg;
ret = rds_ib_recv_init();
if (ret)
goto out_sysctl;
ret = rds_trans_register(&rds_ib_transport);
if (ret)
goto out_recv;
rds_info_register_func(RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS, rds_ib_ic_info);
goto out;
out_recv:
rds_ib_recv_exit();
out_sysctl:
rds_ib_sysctl_exit();
out_ibreg:
rds_ib_unregister_client();
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 40,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: new_node(struct huffman_code *code)
{
void *new_tree;
if (code->numallocatedentries == code->numentries) {
int new_num_entries = 256;
if (code->numentries > 0) {
new_num_entries = code->numentries * 2;
}
new_tree = realloc(code->tree, new_num_entries * sizeof(*code->tree));
if (new_tree == NULL)
return (-1);
code->tree = (struct huffman_tree_node *)new_tree;
code->numallocatedentries = new_num_entries;
}
code->tree[code->numentries].branches[0] = -1;
code->tree[code->numentries].branches[1] = -2;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long snd_compr_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_compr_file *data = f->private_data;
struct snd_compr_stream *stream;
int retval = -ENOTTY;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!data))
return -EFAULT;
stream = &data->stream;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!stream))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&stream->device->lock);
switch (_IOC_NR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_IOCTL_VERSION):
put_user(SNDRV_COMPRESS_VERSION,
(int __user *)arg) ? -EFAULT : 0;
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CAPS):
retval = snd_compr_get_caps(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_CODEC_CAPS):
retval = snd_compr_get_codec_caps(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS):
retval = snd_compr_set_params(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_GET_PARAMS):
retval = snd_compr_get_params(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_TSTAMP):
retval = snd_compr_tstamp(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_AVAIL):
retval = snd_compr_ioctl_avail(stream, arg);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_PAUSE):
retval = snd_compr_pause(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_RESUME):
retval = snd_compr_resume(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_START):
retval = snd_compr_start(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_STOP):
retval = snd_compr_stop(stream);
break;
case _IOC_NR(SNDRV_COMPRESS_DRAIN):
retval = snd_compr_drain(stream);
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&stream->device->lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gssint_unwrap_aead (gss_mechanism mech,
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t input_assoc_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_payload_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 status;
assert(mech != NULL);
assert(ctx != NULL);
/* EXPORT DELETE START */
if (mech->gss_unwrap_aead) {
status = mech->gss_unwrap_aead(minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
input_message_buffer,
input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else if (mech->gss_unwrap_iov) {
status = gssint_unwrap_aead_iov_shim(mech,
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
input_message_buffer,
input_assoc_buffer,
output_payload_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
/* EXPORT DELETE END */
return (status);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 63,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FitToPageEnabled(const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
bool fit_to_paper_size = false;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(kSettingFitToPageEnabled, &fit_to_paper_size)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
return fit_to_paper_size;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MSLEndDocument(void *context)
{
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
/*
Called when the document end has been detected.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.endDocument()");
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
if (msl_info->content != (char *) NULL)
msl_info->content=DestroyString(msl_info->content);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct extent_tree *__grab_extent_tree(struct inode *inode)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et;
nid_t ino = inode->i_ino;
mutex_lock(&sbi->extent_tree_lock);
et = radix_tree_lookup(&sbi->extent_tree_root, ino);
if (!et) {
et = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(extent_tree_slab, GFP_NOFS);
f2fs_radix_tree_insert(&sbi->extent_tree_root, ino, et);
memset(et, 0, sizeof(struct extent_tree));
et->ino = ino;
et->root = RB_ROOT;
et->cached_en = NULL;
rwlock_init(&et->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&et->list);
atomic_set(&et->node_cnt, 0);
atomic_inc(&sbi->total_ext_tree);
} else {
atomic_dec(&sbi->total_zombie_tree);
list_del_init(&et->list);
}
mutex_unlock(&sbi->extent_tree_lock);
/* never died until evict_inode */
F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree = et;
return et;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool fuse_page_is_writeback(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index)
{
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
struct fuse_req *req;
bool found = false;
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
list_for_each_entry(req, &fi->writepages, writepages_entry) {
pgoff_t curr_index;
BUG_ON(req->inode != inode);
curr_index = req->misc.write.in.offset >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
if (curr_index == index) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
return found;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init fib_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int error;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID
net->ipv4.fib_num_tclassid_users = 0;
#endif
error = ip_fib_net_init(net);
if (error < 0)
goto out;
error = nl_fib_lookup_init(net);
if (error < 0)
goto out_nlfl;
error = fib_proc_init(net);
if (error < 0)
goto out_proc;
out:
return error;
out_proc:
nl_fib_lookup_exit(net);
out_nlfl:
ip_fib_net_exit(net);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Smb4KGlobal::Smb4KEvent::~Smb4KEvent()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init bsg_init(void)
{
int ret, i;
dev_t devid;
bsg_cmd_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bsg_cmd",
sizeof(struct bsg_command), 0, 0, NULL);
if (!bsg_cmd_cachep) {
printk(KERN_ERR "bsg: failed creating slab cache\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
for (i = 0; i < BSG_LIST_ARRAY_SIZE; i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&bsg_device_list[i]);
bsg_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "bsg");
if (IS_ERR(bsg_class)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(bsg_class);
goto destroy_kmemcache;
}
bsg_class->devnode = bsg_devnode;
ret = alloc_chrdev_region(&devid, 0, BSG_MAX_DEVS, "bsg");
if (ret)
goto destroy_bsg_class;
bsg_major = MAJOR(devid);
cdev_init(&bsg_cdev, &bsg_fops);
ret = cdev_add(&bsg_cdev, MKDEV(bsg_major, 0), BSG_MAX_DEVS);
if (ret)
goto unregister_chrdev;
printk(KERN_INFO BSG_DESCRIPTION " version " BSG_VERSION
" loaded (major %d)\n", bsg_major);
return 0;
unregister_chrdev:
unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(bsg_major, 0), BSG_MAX_DEVS);
destroy_bsg_class:
class_destroy(bsg_class);
destroy_kmemcache:
kmem_cache_destroy(bsg_cmd_cachep);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::command_use_cached_proxy( GahpProxyInfo *new_proxy )
{
static const char *command = "USE_CACHED_PROXY";
if (m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return false;
}
if ( new_proxy == NULL ) {
return false;
}
std::string buf;
int x = sprintf(buf,"%s %d",command,new_proxy->proxy->id);
ASSERT( x > 0 );
write_line(buf.c_str());
Gahp_Args result;
read_argv(result);
if ( result.argc == 0 || result.argv[0][0] != 'S' ) {
char *reason;
if ( result.argc > 1 ) {
reason = result.argv[1];
} else {
reason = "Unspecified error";
}
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"GAHP command '%s' failed: %s\n",command,reason);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_restart(IDEDMA *dma)
{
AHCIDevice *ad = DO_UPCAST(AHCIDevice, dma, dma);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < AHCI_MAX_CMDS; i++) {
NCQTransferState *ncq_tfs = &ad->ncq_tfs[i];
if (ncq_tfs->halt) {
execute_ncq_command(ncq_tfs);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLBindTexture(GLenum target, GLuint texture) {
glBindTexture(target, texture);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: message_send_chat_pgp(const char *const barejid, const char *const msg, gboolean request_receipt)
{
xmpp_ctx_t * const ctx = connection_get_ctx();
char *state = chat_session_get_state(barejid);
char *jid = chat_session_get_jid(barejid);
char *id = create_unique_id("msg");
xmpp_stanza_t *message = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGPGME
char *account_name = session_get_account_name();
ProfAccount *account = accounts_get_account(account_name);
if (account->pgp_keyid) {
Jid *jidp = jid_create(jid);
char *encrypted = p_gpg_encrypt(jidp->barejid, msg, account->pgp_keyid);
if (encrypted) {
message = xmpp_message_new(ctx, STANZA_TYPE_CHAT, jid, id);
xmpp_message_set_body(message, "This message is encrypted.");
xmpp_stanza_t *x = xmpp_stanza_new(ctx);
xmpp_stanza_set_name(x, STANZA_NAME_X);
xmpp_stanza_set_ns(x, STANZA_NS_ENCRYPTED);
xmpp_stanza_t *enc_st = xmpp_stanza_new(ctx);
xmpp_stanza_set_text(enc_st, encrypted);
xmpp_stanza_add_child(x, enc_st);
xmpp_stanza_release(enc_st);
xmpp_stanza_add_child(message, x);
xmpp_stanza_release(x);
free(encrypted);
} else {
message = xmpp_message_new(ctx, STANZA_TYPE_CHAT, jid, id);
xmpp_message_set_body(message, msg);
}
jid_destroy(jidp);
} else {
message = xmpp_message_new(ctx, STANZA_TYPE_CHAT, jid, id);
xmpp_message_set_body(message, msg);
}
account_free(account);
#else
message = xmpp_message_new(ctx, STANZA_TYPE_CHAT, jid, id);
xmpp_message_set_body(message, msg);
#endif
free(jid);
if (state) {
stanza_attach_state(ctx, message, state);
}
if (request_receipt) {
stanza_attach_receipt_request(ctx, message);
}
_send_message_stanza(message);
xmpp_stanza_release(message);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 68,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tun_chr_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int on)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = tun_get(file);
int ret;
if (!tun)
return -EBADFD;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_fasync %d\n", on);
if ((ret = fasync_helper(fd, file, on, &tun->fasync)) < 0)
goto out;
if (on) {
ret = __f_setown(file, task_pid(current), PIDTYPE_PID, 0);
if (ret)
goto out;
tun->flags |= TUN_FASYNC;
} else
tun->flags &= ~TUN_FASYNC;
ret = 0;
out:
tun_put(tun);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_hand_shake_reply(nw_ses *ses, char *protocol, const char *key)
{
unsigned char hash[20];
sds data = sdsnew(key);
data = sdscat(data, "258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11");
SHA1((const unsigned char *)data, sdslen(data), hash);
sdsfree(data);
sds b4message;
base64_encode(hash, sizeof(hash), &b4message);
http_response_t *response = http_response_new();
http_response_set_header(response, "Upgrade", "websocket");
http_response_set_header(response, "Connection", "Upgrade");
http_response_set_header(response, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept", b4message);
if (protocol) {
http_response_set_header(response, "Sec-WebSocket-Protocol", protocol);
}
response->status = 101;
sds message = http_response_encode(response);
nw_ses_send(ses, message, sdslen(message));
sdsfree(message);
sdsfree(b4message);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 76,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_pid_auxv(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);
if (mm && !IS_ERR(mm)) {
unsigned int nwords = 0;
do {
nwords += 2;
} while (mm->saved_auxv[nwords - 2] != 0); /* AT_NULL */
seq_write(m, mm->saved_auxv, nwords * sizeof(mm->saved_auxv[0]));
mmput(mm);
return 0;
} else
return PTR_ERR(mm);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void *GetPixelCachePixels(Image *image,MagickSizeType *length,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
assert(length != (MagickSizeType *) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
(void) exception;
*length=0;
if ((cache_info->type != MemoryCache) && (cache_info->type != MapCache))
return((void *) NULL);
*length=cache_info->length;
return((void *) cache_info->pixels);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int prepend_name(char **buffer, int *buflen, struct qstr *name)
{
const char *dname = ACCESS_ONCE(name->name);
u32 dlen = ACCESS_ONCE(name->len);
char *p;
smp_read_barrier_depends();
*buflen -= dlen + 1;
if (*buflen < 0)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
p = *buffer -= dlen + 1;
*p++ = '/';
while (dlen--) {
char c = *dname++;
if (!c)
break;
*p++ = c;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 94,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WarmupURLFetcher::~WarmupURLFetcher() {}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void php_gd_error_ex(int type, const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(NULL, "", type, format, args TSRMLS_CC);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_gen_update_masterclock(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
int i;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
spin_lock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
kvm_make_mclock_inprogress_request(kvm);
/* no guest entries from this point */
pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(kvm);
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
set_bit(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, &vcpu->requests);
/* guest entries allowed */
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_MCLOCK_INPROGRESS, &vcpu->requests);
spin_unlock(&ka->pvclock_gtod_sync_lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetCountry() const { return m_country; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrame* Document::ExecutingFrame() {
LocalDOMWindow* window = ExecutingWindow();
if (!window)
return 0;
return window->GetFrame();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_tx_pkt_init(struct NetTxPkt **pkt, PCIDevice *pci_dev,
uint32_t max_frags, bool has_virt_hdr)
{
struct NetTxPkt *p = g_malloc0(sizeof *p);
p->pci_dev = pci_dev;
p->vec = g_malloc((sizeof *p->vec) *
(max_frags + NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG));
p->raw = g_malloc((sizeof *p->raw) * max_frags);
p->max_payload_frags = max_frags;
p->max_raw_frags = max_frags;
p->has_virt_hdr = has_virt_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_VHDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->virt_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_VHDR_FRAG].iov_len =
p->has_virt_hdr ? sizeof p->virt_hdr : 0;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->l2_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->l3_hdr;
*pkt = p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport ssize_t ReadBlob(Image *image,const size_t length,void *data)
{
BlobInfo
*magick_restrict blob_info;
int
c;
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
count;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->blob != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
assert(image->blob->type != UndefinedStream);
if (length == 0)
return(0);
assert(data != (void *) NULL);
blob_info=image->blob;
count=0;
q=(unsigned char *) data;
switch (blob_info->type)
{
case UndefinedStream:
break;
case StandardStream:
case FileStream:
case PipeStream:
{
switch (length)
{
default:
{
count=(ssize_t) fread(q,1,length,blob_info->file_info.file);
break;
}
case 4:
{
c=getc(blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 3:
{
c=getc(blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 2:
{
c=getc(blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 1:
{
c=getc(blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 0:
break;
}
break;
}
case ZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
switch (length)
{
default:
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) gzread(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,q+i,
(unsigned int) MagickMin(length-i,MagickMaxBufferExtent));
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
}
count=i;
break;
}
case 4:
{
c=gzgetc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 3:
{
c=gzgetc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 2:
{
c=gzgetc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 1:
{
c=gzgetc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*q++=(unsigned char) c;
count++;
}
case 0:
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
case BZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BZLIB_DELEGATE)
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) BZ2_bzread(blob_info->file_info.bzfile,q+i,
(unsigned int) MagickMin(length-i,MagickMaxBufferExtent));
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
}
count=i;
#endif
break;
}
case FifoStream:
break;
case BlobStream:
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
if (blob_info->offset >= (MagickOffsetType) blob_info->length)
{
blob_info->eof=MagickTrue;
break;
}
p=blob_info->data+blob_info->offset;
count=(ssize_t) MagickMin((MagickOffsetType) length,(MagickOffsetType)
blob_info->length-blob_info->offset);
blob_info->offset+=count;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
blob_info->eof=MagickTrue;
(void) memcpy(q,p,(size_t) count);
break;
}
case CustomStream:
{
if (blob_info->custom_stream->reader != (CustomStreamHandler) NULL)
count=blob_info->custom_stream->reader(q,length,
blob_info->custom_stream->data);
break;
}
}
return(count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::didFail(WebURLLoader* loader,
const WebURLError& error) {
int32_t pp_error = PP_ERROR_FAILED;
if (error.domain.equals(WebString::fromUTF8(net::kErrorDomain))) {
switch (error.reason) {
case net::ERR_ACCESS_DENIED:
case net::ERR_NETWORK_ACCESS_DENIED:
pp_error = PP_ERROR_NOACCESS;
break;
}
} else {
pp_error = PP_ERROR_NOACCESS;
}
FinishLoading(pp_error);
}
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextAutosizer* Document::GetTextAutosizer() {
if (!text_autosizer_)
text_autosizer_ = TextAutosizer::Create(this);
return text_autosizer_.Get();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::now_pending(const char *command,const char *buf,
GahpProxyInfo *cmd_proxy, PrioLevel prio_level )
{
if ( command ) {
clear_pending();
pending_command = strdup( command );
pending_reqid = server->new_reqid();
if (buf) {
pending_args = strdup(buf);
}
if (m_timeout) {
pending_timeout = m_timeout;
}
pending_proxy = cmd_proxy;
server->requestTable->insert(pending_reqid,this);
}
ASSERT( pending_command != NULL );
if ( server->num_pending_requests >= server->max_pending_requests ) {
switch ( prio_level ) {
case high_prio:
server->waitingHighPrio.push( pending_reqid );
break;
case medium_prio:
server->waitingMediumPrio.push( pending_reqid );
break;
case low_prio:
server->waitingLowPrio.push( pending_reqid );
break;
}
return;
}
if ( server->is_initialized == true && server->can_cache_proxies == true ) {
if ( server->useCachedProxy( pending_proxy ) != true ) {
EXCEPT( "useCachedProxy() failed!" );
}
}
server->write_line(pending_command,pending_reqid,pending_args);
Gahp_Args return_line;
server->read_argv(return_line);
if ( return_line.argc == 0 || return_line.argv[0][0] != 'S' ) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Request: %s",pending_command, return_line.argc?return_line.argv[0]:"Empty response");
}
pending_submitted_to_gahp = true;
server->num_pending_requests++;
if (pending_timeout) {
pending_timeout_tid = daemonCore->Register_Timer(pending_timeout + 1,
(TimerHandlercpp)&GahpClient::reset_user_timer_alarm,
"GahpClient::reset_user_timer_alarm",this);
pending_timeout += time(NULL);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType PersistPixelCache(Image *image,
const char *filename,const MagickBooleanType attach,MagickOffsetType *offset,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info,
*restrict clone_info;
Image
clone_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
page_size;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->cache != (void *) NULL);
assert(filename != (const char *) NULL);
assert(offset != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL);
page_size=GetMagickPageSize();
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (attach != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Attach existing persistent pixel cache.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"attach persistent cache");
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_info->cache_filename,filename,
MaxTextExtent);
cache_info->type=DiskCache;
cache_info->offset=(*offset);
if (OpenPixelCache(image,ReadMode,exception) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
*offset+=cache_info->length+page_size-(cache_info->length % page_size);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if ((cache_info->mode != ReadMode) && (cache_info->type != MemoryCache) &&
(cache_info->reference_count == 1))
{
LockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
if ((cache_info->mode != ReadMode) && (cache_info->type != MemoryCache) &&
(cache_info->reference_count == 1))
{
int
status;
/*
Usurp existing persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=rename_utf8(cache_info->cache_filename,filename);
if (status == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_info->cache_filename,filename,
MaxTextExtent);
*offset+=cache_info->length+page_size-(cache_info->length %
page_size);
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) ReferencePixelCache(cache_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CacheEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Usurp resident persistent cache");
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(cache_info->semaphore);
}
/*
Clone persistent pixel cache.
*/
clone_image=(*image);
clone_info=(CacheInfo *) clone_image.cache;
image->cache=ClonePixelCache(cache_info);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) ReferencePixelCache(image->cache);
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_info->cache_filename,filename,MaxTextExtent);
cache_info->type=DiskCache;
cache_info->offset=(*offset);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
status=OpenPixelCache(image,IOMode,exception);
if (status != MagickFalse)
status=ClonePixelCacheRepository(cache_info,clone_info,&image->exception);
*offset+=cache_info->length+page_size-(cache_info->length % page_size);
clone_info=(CacheInfo *) DestroyPixelCache(clone_info);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionTtsController::IsSpeaking() const {
return current_utterance_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionReadyNotificationObserver::Observe(
int type, const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
switch (type) {
case content::NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP:
if (!extension_ || !DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(manager_))
return;
break;
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOADED: {
const extensions::Extension* loaded_extension =
content::Details<const extensions::Extension>(details).ptr();
extensions::Extension::Location location = loaded_extension->location();
if (location != extensions::Extension::INTERNAL &&
location != extensions::Extension::LOAD)
return;
extension_ = loaded_extension;
if (!DidExtensionViewsStopLoading(manager_))
return;
if (!service_->IsBackgroundPageReady(extension_))
return;
break;
}
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALL_ERROR:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOAD_ERROR:
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UPDATE_DISABLED:
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
AutomationJSONReply reply(automation_, reply_message_.release());
if (extension_) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("id", extension_->id());
reply.SendSuccess(&dict);
} else {
reply.SendError("Extension could not be installed");
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::removeSubresourceLoader(ResourceLoader* loader)
{
if (!m_subresourceLoaders.contains(loader))
return;
m_subresourceLoaders.remove(loader);
checkLoadComplete();
if (Frame* frame = m_frame)
frame->loader()->checkLoadComplete();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __br_ip6_hash(struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb,
const struct in6_addr *ip,
__u16 vid)
{
return jhash_2words(ipv6_addr_hash(ip), vid,
mdb->secret) & (mdb->max - 1);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsWEBPImageLossless(const unsigned char *stream,
const size_t length)
{
#define VP8_CHUNK_INDEX 15
#define LOSSLESS_FLAG 'L'
#define EXTENDED_HEADER 'X'
#define VP8_CHUNK_HEADER "VP8"
#define VP8_CHUNK_HEADER_SIZE 3
#define RIFF_HEADER_SIZE 12
#define VP8X_CHUNK_SIZE 10
#define TAG_SIZE 4
#define CHUNK_SIZE_BYTES 4
#define CHUNK_HEADER_SIZE 8
#define MAX_CHUNK_PAYLOAD (~0U-CHUNK_HEADER_SIZE-1)
ssize_t
offset;
/*
Read simple header.
*/
if (stream[VP8_CHUNK_INDEX] != EXTENDED_HEADER)
return(stream[VP8_CHUNK_INDEX] == LOSSLESS_FLAG ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
/*
Read extended header.
*/
offset=RIFF_HEADER_SIZE+TAG_SIZE+CHUNK_SIZE_BYTES+VP8X_CHUNK_SIZE;
while (offset <= (ssize_t) length)
{
uint32_t
chunk_size,
chunk_size_pad;
chunk_size=ReadWebPLSBWord(stream+offset+TAG_SIZE);
if (chunk_size > MAX_CHUNK_PAYLOAD)
break;
chunk_size_pad=(CHUNK_HEADER_SIZE+chunk_size+1) & ~1;
if (memcmp(stream+offset,VP8_CHUNK_HEADER,VP8_CHUNK_HEADER_SIZE) == 0)
return(*(stream+offset+VP8_CHUNK_HEADER_SIZE) == LOSSLESS_FLAG ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
offset+=chunk_size_pad;
}
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Fixed fd leak for webp coder (patch from #382)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 67,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WallpaperManagerBase::CustomizedWallpaperRescaledFiles::AllSizesExist()
const {
return rescaled_small_exists_ && rescaled_large_exists_;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void stdp_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_DegradationPriorityBox *ptr = (GF_DegradationPriorityBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL ) return;
if (ptr->priorities) gf_free(ptr->priorities);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static netdev_features_t tun_net_fix_features(struct net_device *dev,
netdev_features_t features)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
return (features & tun->set_features) | (features & ~TUN_USER_FEATURES);
}
Commit Message: net/tun: fix ioctl() based info leaks
The tun module leaks up to 36 bytes of memory by not fully initializing
a structure located on the stack that gets copied to user memory by the
TUNGETIFF and SIOCGIFHWADDR ioctl()s.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_key_release_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventKey* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
WebKit::EditorClient* client = static_cast<WebKit::EditorClient*>(core(webView)->editorClient());
if (gtk_im_context_filter_keypress(webView->priv->imContext.get(), event) && !client->hasPendingComposition())
return TRUE;
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
if (!frame->view())
return FALSE;
PlatformKeyboardEvent keyboardEvent(event);
if (frame->eventHandler()->keyEvent(keyboardEvent))
return TRUE;
/* Chain up to our parent class for binding activation */
return GTK_WIDGET_CLASS(webkit_web_view_parent_class)->key_release_event(widget, event);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned lodepng_inflatev(ucvector* out,
const unsigned char* in, size_t insize,
const LodePNGDecompressSettings* settings)
{
/*bit pointer in the "in" data, current byte is bp >> 3, current bit is bp & 0x7 (from lsb to msb of the byte)*/
size_t bp = 0;
unsigned BFINAL = 0;
size_t pos = 0; /*byte position in the out buffer*/
unsigned error = 0;
(void)settings;
while(!BFINAL)
{
unsigned BTYPE;
if(bp + 2 >= insize * 8) return 52; /*error, bit pointer will jump past memory*/
BFINAL = readBitFromStream(&bp, in);
BTYPE = 1u * readBitFromStream(&bp, in);
BTYPE += 2u * readBitFromStream(&bp, in);
if(BTYPE == 3) return 20; /*error: invalid BTYPE*/
else if(BTYPE == 0) error = inflateNoCompression(out, in, &bp, &pos, insize); /*no compression*/
else error = inflateHuffmanBlock(out, in, &bp, &pos, insize, BTYPE); /*compression, BTYPE 01 or 10*/
if(error) return error;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sh_get_home_dir ()
{
if (current_user.home_dir == 0)
get_current_user_info ();
return current_user.home_dir;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float GetVisualViewportScale(FrameTreeNode* node) {
double scale;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractDouble(
node, "window.domAutomationController.send(visualViewport.scale);",
&scale));
return static_cast<float>(scale);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_uint32(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
uint32_t *v = pv;
qemu_get_be32s(f, v);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BufferSizeStatus GetBufferStatus(const char* data, size_t len) {
if (len < sizeof(NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader))
return MESSAGE_IS_TRUNCATED;
const NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<const NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader*>(data);
uint32 message_size =
sizeof(NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader) + header->payload_size;
if (len == message_size)
return MESSAGE_IS_COMPLETE;
if (len > message_size)
return MESSAGE_HAS_EXTRA_DATA;
return MESSAGE_IS_TRUNCATED;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: yy_reduce_print (yytype_int16 *yyssp, YYSTYPE *yyvsp, int yyrule, void *yyscanner, YR_COMPILER* compiler)
{
unsigned long int yylno = yyrline[yyrule];
int yynrhs = yyr2[yyrule];
int yyi;
YYFPRINTF (stderr, "Reducing stack by rule %d (line %lu):\n",
yyrule - 1, yylno);
/* The symbols being reduced. */
for (yyi = 0; yyi < yynrhs; yyi++)
{
YYFPRINTF (stderr, " $%d = ", yyi + 1);
yy_symbol_print (stderr,
yystos[yyssp[yyi + 1 - yynrhs]],
&(yyvsp[(yyi + 1) - (yynrhs)])
, yyscanner, compiler);
YYFPRINTF (stderr, "\n");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #597
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> RenderFrameHostManager::ConvertToSiteInstance(
const SiteInstanceDescriptor& descriptor,
SiteInstance* candidate_instance) {
SiteInstanceImpl* current_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
if (descriptor.existing_site_instance)
return descriptor.existing_site_instance;
if (descriptor.relation == SiteInstanceRelation::RELATED)
return current_instance->GetRelatedSiteInstance(descriptor.new_site_url);
if (descriptor.relation == SiteInstanceRelation::RELATED_DEFAULT_SUBFRAME)
return current_instance->GetDefaultSubframeSiteInstance();
if (candidate_instance &&
!current_instance->IsRelatedSiteInstance(candidate_instance) &&
candidate_instance->GetSiteURL() == descriptor.new_site_url) {
return candidate_instance;
}
return SiteInstance::CreateForURL(
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext(),
descriptor.new_site_url);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline const unsigned char *PushQuantumLongPixel(
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const unsigned char *magick_restrict pixels,
unsigned int *quantum)
{
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
quantum_bits;
*quantum=0UL;
for (i=(ssize_t) quantum_info->depth; i > 0; )
{
if (quantum_info->state.bits == 0)
{
pixels=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,pixels,
&quantum_info->state.pixel);
quantum_info->state.bits=32U;
}
quantum_bits=(size_t) i;
if (quantum_bits > quantum_info->state.bits)
quantum_bits=quantum_info->state.bits;
*quantum|=(((quantum_info->state.pixel >> (32U-quantum_info->state.bits)) &
quantum_info->state.mask[quantum_bits]) << (quantum_info->depth-i));
i-=(ssize_t) quantum_bits;
quantum_info->state.bits-=quantum_bits;
}
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode smtp_parse_custom_request(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
const char *custom = data->set.str[STRING_CUSTOMREQUEST];
/* URL decode the custom request */
if(custom)
result = Curl_urldecode(data, custom, 0, &smtp->custom, NULL, TRUE);
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static req_table_t* req_err_headers_out(request_rec *r)
{
req_table_t* t = apr_palloc(r->pool, sizeof(req_table_t));
t->r = r;
t->t = r->err_headers_out;
t->n = "err_headers_out";
return t;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __clear_all_pkt_pointers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_func_state *state)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *reg;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(®s[i]))
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, i);
bpf_for_each_spilled_reg(i, state, reg) {
if (!reg)
continue;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer_any(reg))
__mark_reg_unknown(reg);
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 91,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Histogram::InspectConstructionArguments(const std::string& name,
Sample* minimum,
Sample* maximum,
uint32_t* bucket_count) {
if (*minimum < 1) {
DVLOG(1) << "Histogram: " << name << " has bad minimum: " << *minimum;
*minimum = 1;
}
if (*maximum >= kSampleType_MAX) {
DVLOG(1) << "Histogram: " << name << " has bad maximum: " << *maximum;
*maximum = kSampleType_MAX - 1;
}
if (*bucket_count >= kBucketCount_MAX) {
DVLOG(1) << "Histogram: " << name << " has bad bucket_count: "
<< *bucket_count;
*bucket_count = kBucketCount_MAX - 1;
}
if (*minimum >= *maximum)
return false;
if (*bucket_count < 3)
return false;
if (*bucket_count > static_cast<uint32_t>(*maximum - *minimum + 2))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int label_boot(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_label *label)
{
char *bootm_argv[] = { "bootm", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
char initrd_str[28];
char mac_str[29] = "";
char ip_str[68] = "";
char *fit_addr = NULL;
int bootm_argc = 2;
int len = 0;
ulong kernel_addr;
void *buf;
label_print(label);
label->attempted = 1;
if (label->localboot) {
if (label->localboot_val >= 0)
label_localboot(label);
return 0;
}
if (!label->kernel) {
printf("No kernel given, skipping %s\n",
label->name);
return 1;
}
if (label->initrd) {
if (get_relfile_envaddr(cmdtp, label->initrd, "ramdisk_addr_r") < 0) {
printf("Skipping %s for failure retrieving initrd\n",
label->name);
return 1;
}
bootm_argv[2] = initrd_str;
strncpy(bootm_argv[2], env_get("ramdisk_addr_r"), 18);
strcat(bootm_argv[2], ":");
strncat(bootm_argv[2], env_get("filesize"), 9);
bootm_argc = 3;
}
if (get_relfile_envaddr(cmdtp, label->kernel, "kernel_addr_r") < 0) {
printf("Skipping %s for failure retrieving kernel\n",
label->name);
return 1;
}
if (label->ipappend & 0x1) {
sprintf(ip_str, " ip=%s:%s:%s:%s",
env_get("ipaddr"), env_get("serverip"),
env_get("gatewayip"), env_get("netmask"));
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_NET
if (label->ipappend & 0x2) {
int err;
strcpy(mac_str, " BOOTIF=");
err = format_mac_pxe(mac_str + 8, sizeof(mac_str) - 8);
if (err < 0)
mac_str[0] = '\0';
}
#endif
if ((label->ipappend & 0x3) || label->append) {
char bootargs[CONFIG_SYS_CBSIZE] = "";
char finalbootargs[CONFIG_SYS_CBSIZE];
if (strlen(label->append ?: "") +
strlen(ip_str) + strlen(mac_str) + 1 > sizeof(bootargs)) {
printf("bootarg overflow %zd+%zd+%zd+1 > %zd\n",
strlen(label->append ?: ""),
strlen(ip_str), strlen(mac_str),
sizeof(bootargs));
return 1;
}
if (label->append)
strncpy(bootargs, label->append, sizeof(bootargs));
strcat(bootargs, ip_str);
strcat(bootargs, mac_str);
cli_simple_process_macros(bootargs, finalbootargs);
env_set("bootargs", finalbootargs);
printf("append: %s\n", finalbootargs);
}
bootm_argv[1] = env_get("kernel_addr_r");
/* for FIT, append the configuration identifier */
if (label->config) {
int len = strlen(bootm_argv[1]) + strlen(label->config) + 1;
fit_addr = malloc(len);
if (!fit_addr) {
printf("malloc fail (FIT address)\n");
return 1;
}
snprintf(fit_addr, len, "%s%s", bootm_argv[1], label->config);
bootm_argv[1] = fit_addr;
}
/*
* fdt usage is optional:
* It handles the following scenarios. All scenarios are exclusive
*
* Scenario 1: If fdt_addr_r specified and "fdt" label is defined in
* pxe file, retrieve fdt blob from server. Pass fdt_addr_r to bootm,
* and adjust argc appropriately.
*
* Scenario 2: If there is an fdt_addr specified, pass it along to
* bootm, and adjust argc appropriately.
*
* Scenario 3: fdt blob is not available.
*/
bootm_argv[3] = env_get("fdt_addr_r");
/* if fdt label is defined then get fdt from server */
if (bootm_argv[3]) {
char *fdtfile = NULL;
char *fdtfilefree = NULL;
if (label->fdt) {
fdtfile = label->fdt;
} else if (label->fdtdir) {
char *f1, *f2, *f3, *f4, *slash;
f1 = env_get("fdtfile");
if (f1) {
f2 = "";
f3 = "";
f4 = "";
} else {
/*
* For complex cases where this code doesn't
* generate the correct filename, the board
* code should set $fdtfile during early boot,
* or the boot scripts should set $fdtfile
* before invoking "pxe" or "sysboot".
*/
f1 = env_get("soc");
f2 = "-";
f3 = env_get("board");
f4 = ".dtb";
}
len = strlen(label->fdtdir);
if (!len)
slash = "./";
else if (label->fdtdir[len - 1] != '/')
slash = "/";
else
slash = "";
len = strlen(label->fdtdir) + strlen(slash) +
strlen(f1) + strlen(f2) + strlen(f3) +
strlen(f4) + 1;
fdtfilefree = malloc(len);
if (!fdtfilefree) {
printf("malloc fail (FDT filename)\n");
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(fdtfilefree, len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s",
label->fdtdir, slash, f1, f2, f3, f4);
fdtfile = fdtfilefree;
}
if (fdtfile) {
int err = get_relfile_envaddr(cmdtp, fdtfile,
"fdt_addr_r");
free(fdtfilefree);
if (err < 0) {
printf("Skipping %s for failure retrieving fdt\n",
label->name);
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
bootm_argv[3] = NULL;
}
}
if (!bootm_argv[3])
bootm_argv[3] = env_get("fdt_addr");
if (bootm_argv[3]) {
if (!bootm_argv[2])
bootm_argv[2] = "-";
bootm_argc = 4;
}
kernel_addr = genimg_get_kernel_addr(bootm_argv[1]);
buf = map_sysmem(kernel_addr, 0);
/* Try bootm for legacy and FIT format image */
if (genimg_get_format(buf) != IMAGE_FORMAT_INVALID)
do_bootm(cmdtp, 0, bootm_argc, bootm_argv);
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BOOTI
/* Try booting an AArch64 Linux kernel image */
else
do_booti(cmdtp, 0, bootm_argc, bootm_argv);
#elif defined(CONFIG_CMD_BOOTZ)
/* Try booting a Image */
else
do_bootz(cmdtp, 0, bootm_argc, bootm_argv);
#endif
unmap_sysmem(buf);
cleanup:
if (fit_addr)
free(fit_addr);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_event_index(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)event;
return (addr & ~PAGE_MASK) - BUF_PAGE_HDR_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContextMenuFilter::~ContextMenuFilter() {}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ResetToolbarTabState(content::WebContents* contents) {
if (toolbar_)
toolbar_->ResetTabState(contents);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_remove(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const struct nfs_removeargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_remove(xdr, &args->name, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
client_ = std::move(client);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_put_tcon(struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
{
unsigned int xid;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: tc_count=%d\n", __func__, tcon->tc_count);
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
if (--tcon->tc_count > 0) {
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return;
}
list_del_init(&tcon->tcon_list);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
xid = get_xid();
if (ses->server->ops->tree_disconnect)
ses->server->ops->tree_disconnect(xid, tcon);
_free_xid(xid);
cifs_fscache_release_super_cookie(tcon);
tconInfoFree(tcon);
cifs_put_smb_ses(ses);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_above(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPgt((circle1->center.y - circle1->radius),
(circle2->center.y + circle2->radius)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xen_blkbk_unmap(struct xen_blkif *blkif,
struct grant_page *pages[],
int num)
{
struct gnttab_unmap_grant_ref unmap[BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST];
struct page *unmap_pages[BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST];
unsigned int i, invcount = 0;
int ret;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (pages[i]->persistent_gnt != NULL) {
put_persistent_gnt(blkif, pages[i]->persistent_gnt);
continue;
}
if (pages[i]->handle == BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE)
continue;
unmap_pages[invcount] = pages[i]->page;
gnttab_set_unmap_op(&unmap[invcount], vaddr(pages[i]->page),
GNTMAP_host_map, pages[i]->handle);
pages[i]->handle = BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE;
if (++invcount == BLKIF_MAX_SEGMENTS_PER_REQUEST) {
ret = gnttab_unmap_refs(unmap, NULL, unmap_pages,
invcount);
BUG_ON(ret);
put_free_pages(blkif, unmap_pages, invcount);
invcount = 0;
}
}
if (invcount) {
ret = gnttab_unmap_refs(unmap, NULL, unmap_pages, invcount);
BUG_ON(ret);
put_free_pages(blkif, unmap_pages, invcount);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::Close() {
WebView* doomed = webview();
RenderWidget::Close();
g_view_map.Get().erase(doomed);
g_routing_id_view_map.Get().erase(routing_id_);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_callchain_buffers(void)
{
int err = 0;
int count;
mutex_lock(&callchain_mutex);
count = atomic_inc_return(&nr_callchain_events);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(count < 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
if (count > 1) {
/* If the allocation failed, give up */
if (!callchain_cpus_entries)
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
err = alloc_callchain_buffers();
if (err)
release_callchain_buffers();
exit:
mutex_unlock(&callchain_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err tols_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TargetOLSPropertyBox *ptr = (GF_TargetOLSPropertyBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TargetOLSPropertyBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "target_ols_index=\"%d\">\n", ptr->target_ols_index);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TargetOLSPropertyBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellWindowViews::DeleteDelegate() {
OnNativeClose();
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 103,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
{
int flags;
int32_t fid;
int64_t size;
ssize_t err = 0;
V9fsString name;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *file_fidp;
V9fsFidState *xattr_fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsqd", &fid, &name, &size, &flags);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrcreate(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, size, flags);
file_fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (file_fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
/* Make the file fid point to xattr */
xattr_fidp = file_fidp;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = 0;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
g_free(xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value);
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc0(size);
err = offset;
put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,193 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.