instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::flattenCurve(SplashCoord x0, SplashCoord y0,
SplashCoord x1, SplashCoord y1,
SplashCoord x2, SplashCoord y2,
SplashCoord x3, SplashCoord y3,
SplashCoord *matrix, SplashCoord flatness2,
SplashPath *fPath) {
SplashCoord cx[splashMaxCurveSplits + 1][3];
SplashCoord cy[splashMaxCurveSplits + 1][3];
int cNext[splashMaxCurveSplits + 1];
SplashCoord xl0, xl1, xl2, xr0, xr1, xr2, xr3, xx1, xx2, xh;
SplashCoord yl0, yl1, yl2, yr0, yr1, yr2, yr3, yy1, yy2, yh;
SplashCoord dx, dy, mx, my, tx, ty, d1, d2;
int p1, p2, p3;
p1 = 0;
p2 = splashMaxCurveSplits;
cx[p1][0] = x0; cy[p1][0] = y0;
cx[p1][1] = x1; cy[p1][1] = y1;
cx[p1][2] = x2; cy[p1][2] = y2;
cx[p2][0] = x3; cy[p2][0] = y3;
cNext[p1] = p2;
while (p1 < splashMaxCurveSplits) {
xl0 = cx[p1][0]; yl0 = cy[p1][0];
xx1 = cx[p1][1]; yy1 = cy[p1][1];
xx2 = cx[p1][2]; yy2 = cy[p1][2];
p2 = cNext[p1];
xr3 = cx[p2][0]; yr3 = cy[p2][0];
transform(matrix, (xl0 + xr3) * 0.5, (yl0 + yr3) * 0.5, &mx, &my);
transform(matrix, xx1, yy1, &tx, &ty);
#if USE_FIXEDPOINT
d1 = splashDist(tx, ty, mx, my);
#else
dx = tx - mx;
dy = ty - my;
d1 = dx*dx + dy*dy;
#endif
transform(matrix, xx2, yy2, &tx, &ty);
#if USE_FIXEDPOINT
d2 = splashDist(tx, ty, mx, my);
#else
dx = tx - mx;
dy = ty - my;
d2 = dx*dx + dy*dy;
#endif
if (p2 - p1 == 1 || (d1 <= flatness2 && d2 <= flatness2)) {
fPath->lineTo(xr3, yr3);
p1 = p2;
} else {
xl1 = splashAvg(xl0, xx1);
yl1 = splashAvg(yl0, yy1);
xh = splashAvg(xx1, xx2);
yh = splashAvg(yy1, yy2);
xl2 = splashAvg(xl1, xh);
yl2 = splashAvg(yl1, yh);
xr2 = splashAvg(xx2, xr3);
yr2 = splashAvg(yy2, yr3);
xr1 = splashAvg(xh, xr2);
yr1 = splashAvg(yh, yr2);
xr0 = splashAvg(xl2, xr1);
yr0 = splashAvg(yl2, yr1);
p3 = (p1 + p2) / 2;
cx[p1][1] = xl1; cy[p1][1] = yl1;
cx[p1][2] = xl2; cy[p1][2] = yl2;
cNext[p1] = p3;
cx[p3][0] = xr0; cy[p3][0] = yr0;
cx[p3][1] = xr1; cy[p3][1] = yr1;
cx[p3][2] = xr2; cy[p3][2] = yr2;
cNext[p3] = p2;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void report_duplication(const char *full_path) {
char *fname = strrchr(full_path, '/');
if (fname && *(++fname) != '\0') {
int i = 0;
while (default_lib_paths[i]) {
char *p;
if (asprintf(&p, "%s/%s", default_lib_paths[i], fname) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
fs_logger2("clone", p);
free(p);
i++;
}
}
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 89,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExportTIFF_GPSTimeStamp ( const SXMPMeta & xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp, TIFF_Manager * tiff )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_DateTime binXMP;
bool foundXMP = xmp.GetProperty_Date ( xmpNS, xmpProp, &binXMP, 0 );
if ( ! foundXMP ) {
tiff->DeleteTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, kTIFF_GPSTimeStamp );
tiff->DeleteTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, kTIFF_GPSDateStamp );
return;
}
SXMPUtils::ConvertToUTCTime ( &binXMP );
XMP_Uns32 exifTime[6];
tiff->PutUns32 ( binXMP.hour, &exifTime[0] );
tiff->PutUns32 ( 1, &exifTime[1] );
tiff->PutUns32 ( binXMP.minute, &exifTime[2] );
tiff->PutUns32 ( 1, &exifTime[3] );
if ( binXMP.nanoSecond == 0 ) {
tiff->PutUns32 ( binXMP.second, &exifTime[4] );
tiff->PutUns32 ( 1, &exifTime[5] );
} else {
double fSec = (double)binXMP.second + ((double)binXMP.nanoSecond / kBillion );
XMP_Uns32 denom = 1000*1000; // Choose microsecond resolution by default.
TIFF_Manager::TagInfo oldInfo;
bool hadExif = tiff->GetTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, kTIFF_GPSTimeStamp, &oldInfo );
if ( hadExif && (oldInfo.type == kTIFF_RationalType) && (oldInfo.count == 3) ) {
XMP_Uns32 oldDenom = tiff->GetUns32 ( &(((XMP_Uns32*)oldInfo.dataPtr)[5]) );
if ( oldDenom != 1 ) denom = oldDenom;
}
fSec *= denom;
while ( fSec > mMaxSec ) { fSec /= 10; denom /= 10; }
tiff->PutUns32 ( (XMP_Uns32)fSec, &exifTime[4] );
tiff->PutUns32 ( denom, &exifTime[5] );
}
tiff->SetTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, kTIFF_GPSTimeStamp, kTIFF_RationalType, 3, &exifTime[0] );
char exifDate[16]; // AUDIT: Long enough, only need 11.
snprintf ( exifDate, 12, "%04d:%02d:%02d", binXMP.year, binXMP.month, binXMP.day );
if ( exifDate[10] == 0 ) { // Make sure there is no value overflow.
tiff->SetTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, kTIFF_GPSDateStamp, kTIFF_ASCIIType, 11, exifDate );
}
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ExportTIFF_GPSTimeStamp
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: okeys_array_start(void *state)
{
OkeysState *_state = (OkeysState *) state;
/* top level must be a json object */
if (_state->lex->lex_level == 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot call %s on an array",
"json_object_keys")));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iscsi_change_param_value(
char *keyvalue,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list,
int check_key)
{
char *key = NULL, *value = NULL;
struct iscsi_param *param;
int sender = 0;
if (iscsi_extract_key_value(keyvalue, &key, &value) < 0)
return -1;
if (!check_key) {
param = __iscsi_check_key(keyvalue, sender, param_list);
if (!param)
return -1;
} else {
param = iscsi_check_key(keyvalue, 0, sender, param_list);
if (!param)
return -1;
param->set_param = 1;
if (iscsi_check_value(param, value) < 0) {
param->set_param = 0;
return -1;
}
param->set_param = 0;
}
if (iscsi_update_param_value(param, value) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 30,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr * uaddr,
int addr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (addr_len < sizeof(uaddr->sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
if (uaddr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
return sk->sk_prot->disconnect(sk, flags);
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num && inet_autobind(sk))
return -EAGAIN;
return sk->sk_prot->connect(sk, (struct sockaddr *)uaddr, addr_len);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Resource PrintPages(const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev* page_ranges,
uint32_t page_range_count) {
if (ppp_printing_ != NULL) {
PP_Resource image_data = ppp_printing_->PrintPages(plugin_->pp_instance(),
page_ranges,
page_range_count);
return pp::ImageData(pp::PASS_REF, image_data);
}
return pp::Resource();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pmcraid_init_tasklets(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pinstance->num_hrrq; i++)
tasklet_init(&pinstance->isr_tasklet[i],
pmcraid_tasklet_function,
(unsigned long)&pinstance->hrrq_vector[i]);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
{
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
struct ext4_inode *raw_inode;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei;
struct inode *inode;
journal_t *journal = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal;
long ret;
int block;
uid_t i_uid;
gid_t i_gid;
projid_t i_projid;
inode = iget_locked(sb, ino);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (!(inode->i_state & I_NEW))
return inode;
ei = EXT4_I(inode);
iloc.bh = NULL;
ret = __ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto bad_inode;
raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
ei->i_extra_isize = le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_extra_isize);
if (EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize >
EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad extra_isize (%u != %u)",
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE + ei->i_extra_isize,
EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb));
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto bad_inode;
}
} else
ei->i_extra_isize = 0;
/* Precompute checksum seed for inode metadata */
if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) {
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
__u32 csum;
__le32 inum = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
__le32 gen = raw_inode->i_generation;
csum = ext4_chksum(sbi, sbi->s_csum_seed, (__u8 *)&inum,
sizeof(inum));
ei->i_csum_seed = ext4_chksum(sbi, csum, (__u8 *)&gen,
sizeof(gen));
}
if (!ext4_inode_csum_verify(inode, raw_inode, ei)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "checksum invalid");
ret = -EFSBADCRC;
goto bad_inode;
}
inode->i_mode = le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_mode);
i_uid = (uid_t)le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_uid_low);
i_gid = (gid_t)le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_gid_low);
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_PROJECT) &&
EXT4_INODE_SIZE(sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw_inode, ei, i_projid))
i_projid = (projid_t)le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_projid);
else
i_projid = EXT4_DEF_PROJID;
if (!(test_opt(inode->i_sb, NO_UID32))) {
i_uid |= le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_uid_high) << 16;
i_gid |= le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_gid_high) << 16;
}
i_uid_write(inode, i_uid);
i_gid_write(inode, i_gid);
ei->i_projid = make_kprojid(&init_user_ns, i_projid);
set_nlink(inode, le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_links_count));
ext4_clear_state_flags(ei); /* Only relevant on 32-bit archs */
ei->i_inline_off = 0;
ei->i_dir_start_lookup = 0;
ei->i_dtime = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_dtime);
/* We now have enough fields to check if the inode was active or not.
* This is needed because nfsd might try to access dead inodes
* the test is that same one that e2fsck uses
* NeilBrown 1999oct15
*/
if (inode->i_nlink == 0) {
if ((inode->i_mode == 0 ||
!(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_mount_state & EXT4_ORPHAN_FS)) &&
ino != EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO) {
/* this inode is deleted */
ret = -ESTALE;
goto bad_inode;
}
/* The only unlinked inodes we let through here have
* valid i_mode and are being read by the orphan
* recovery code: that's fine, we're about to complete
* the process of deleting those.
* OR it is the EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO which is
* not initialized on a new filesystem. */
}
ei->i_flags = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_flags);
inode->i_blocks = ext4_inode_blocks(raw_inode, ei);
ei->i_file_acl = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_file_acl_lo);
if (ext4_has_feature_64bit(sb))
ei->i_file_acl |=
((__u64)le16_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_file_acl_high)) << 32;
inode->i_size = ext4_isize(raw_inode);
ei->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
#endif
inode->i_generation = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_generation);
ei->i_block_group = iloc.block_group;
ei->i_last_alloc_group = ~0;
/*
* NOTE! The in-memory inode i_data array is in little-endian order
* even on big-endian machines: we do NOT byteswap the block numbers!
*/
for (block = 0; block < EXT4_N_BLOCKS; block++)
ei->i_data[block] = raw_inode->i_block[block];
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->i_orphan);
/*
* Set transaction id's of transactions that have to be committed
* to finish f[data]sync. We set them to currently running transaction
* as we cannot be sure that the inode or some of its metadata isn't
* part of the transaction - the inode could have been reclaimed and
* now it is reread from disk.
*/
if (journal) {
transaction_t *transaction;
tid_t tid;
read_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
if (journal->j_running_transaction)
transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
else
transaction = journal->j_committing_transaction;
if (transaction)
tid = transaction->t_tid;
else
tid = journal->j_commit_sequence;
read_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
ei->i_sync_tid = tid;
ei->i_datasync_tid = tid;
}
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
if (ei->i_extra_isize == 0) {
/* The extra space is currently unused. Use it. */
ei->i_extra_isize = sizeof(struct ext4_inode) -
EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE;
} else {
ext4_iget_extra_inode(inode, raw_inode, ei);
}
}
EXT4_INODE_GET_XTIME(i_ctime, inode, raw_inode);
EXT4_INODE_GET_XTIME(i_mtime, inode, raw_inode);
EXT4_INODE_GET_XTIME(i_atime, inode, raw_inode);
EXT4_EINODE_GET_XTIME(i_crtime, ei, raw_inode);
if (likely(!test_opt2(inode->i_sb, HURD_COMPAT))) {
inode->i_version = le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_disk_version);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) {
if (EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw_inode, ei, i_version_hi))
inode->i_version |=
(__u64)(le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_version_hi)) << 32;
}
}
ret = 0;
if (ei->i_file_acl &&
!ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(sb), ei->i_file_acl, 1)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad extended attribute block %llu",
ei->i_file_acl);
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto bad_inode;
} else if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)) {
if ((S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||
(S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
!ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(inode))))
/* Validate extent which is part of inode */
ret = ext4_ext_check_inode(inode);
} else if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||
(S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) &&
!ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(inode))) {
/* Validate block references which are part of inode */
ret = ext4_ind_check_inode(inode);
}
}
if (ret)
goto bad_inode;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
inode->i_op = &ext4_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &ext4_file_operations;
ext4_set_aops(inode);
} else if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
inode->i_op = &ext4_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &ext4_dir_operations;
} else if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (ext4_encrypted_inode(inode)) {
inode->i_op = &ext4_encrypted_symlink_inode_operations;
ext4_set_aops(inode);
} else if (ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink(inode)) {
inode->i_link = (char *)ei->i_data;
inode->i_op = &ext4_fast_symlink_inode_operations;
nd_terminate_link(ei->i_data, inode->i_size,
sizeof(ei->i_data) - 1);
} else {
inode->i_op = &ext4_symlink_inode_operations;
ext4_set_aops(inode);
}
inode_nohighmem(inode);
} else if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) ||
S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode) || S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
inode->i_op = &ext4_special_inode_operations;
if (raw_inode->i_block[0])
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
old_decode_dev(le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_block[0])));
else
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
new_decode_dev(le32_to_cpu(raw_inode->i_block[1])));
} else if (ino == EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO) {
make_bad_inode(inode);
} else {
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bogus i_mode (%o)", inode->i_mode);
goto bad_inode;
}
brelse(iloc.bh);
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
return inode;
bad_inode:
brelse(iloc.bh);
iget_failed(inode);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rd_execute_rw(struct se_cmd *cmd, struct scatterlist *sgl, u32 sgl_nents,
enum dma_data_direction data_direction)
{
struct se_device *se_dev = cmd->se_dev;
struct rd_dev *dev = RD_DEV(se_dev);
struct rd_dev_sg_table *table;
struct scatterlist *rd_sg;
struct sg_mapping_iter m;
u32 rd_offset;
u32 rd_size;
u32 rd_page;
u32 src_len;
u64 tmp;
if (dev->rd_flags & RDF_NULLIO) {
target_complete_cmd(cmd, SAM_STAT_GOOD);
return 0;
}
tmp = cmd->t_task_lba * se_dev->dev_attrib.block_size;
rd_offset = do_div(tmp, PAGE_SIZE);
rd_page = tmp;
rd_size = cmd->data_length;
table = rd_get_sg_table(dev, rd_page);
if (!table)
return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
rd_sg = &table->sg_table[rd_page - table->page_start_offset];
pr_debug("RD[%u]: %s LBA: %llu, Size: %u Page: %u, Offset: %u\n",
dev->rd_dev_id,
data_direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE ? "Read" : "Write",
cmd->t_task_lba, rd_size, rd_page, rd_offset);
src_len = PAGE_SIZE - rd_offset;
sg_miter_start(&m, sgl, sgl_nents,
data_direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE ?
SG_MITER_TO_SG : SG_MITER_FROM_SG);
while (rd_size) {
u32 len;
void *rd_addr;
sg_miter_next(&m);
if (!(u32)m.length) {
pr_debug("RD[%u]: invalid sgl %p len %zu\n",
dev->rd_dev_id, m.addr, m.length);
sg_miter_stop(&m);
return TCM_INCORRECT_AMOUNT_OF_DATA;
}
len = min((u32)m.length, src_len);
if (len > rd_size) {
pr_debug("RD[%u]: size underrun page %d offset %d "
"size %d\n", dev->rd_dev_id,
rd_page, rd_offset, rd_size);
len = rd_size;
}
m.consumed = len;
rd_addr = sg_virt(rd_sg) + rd_offset;
if (data_direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE)
memcpy(m.addr, rd_addr, len);
else
memcpy(rd_addr, m.addr, len);
rd_size -= len;
if (!rd_size)
continue;
src_len -= len;
if (src_len) {
rd_offset += len;
continue;
}
/* rd page completed, next one please */
rd_page++;
rd_offset = 0;
src_len = PAGE_SIZE;
if (rd_page <= table->page_end_offset) {
rd_sg++;
continue;
}
table = rd_get_sg_table(dev, rd_page);
if (!table) {
sg_miter_stop(&m);
return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
}
/* since we increment, the first sg entry is correct */
rd_sg = table->sg_table;
}
sg_miter_stop(&m);
target_complete_cmd(cmd, SAM_STAT_GOOD);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: target/rd: Refactor rd_build_device_space + rd_release_device_space
This patch refactors rd_build_device_space() + rd_release_device_space()
into rd_allocate_sgl_table() + rd_release_device_space() so that they
may be used seperatly for setup + release of protection information
scatterlists.
Also add explicit memset of pages within rd_allocate_sgl_table() based
upon passed 'init_payload' value.
v2 changes:
- Drop unused sg_table from rd_release_device_space (Wei)
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t fuse_dev_do_read(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct file *file,
struct fuse_copy_state *cs, size_t nbytes)
{
int err;
struct fuse_req *req;
struct fuse_in *in;
unsigned reqsize;
restart:
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
err = -EAGAIN;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && fc->connected &&
!request_pending(fc))
goto err_unlock;
request_wait(fc);
err = -ENODEV;
if (!fc->connected)
goto err_unlock;
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!request_pending(fc))
goto err_unlock;
if (!list_empty(&fc->interrupts)) {
req = list_entry(fc->interrupts.next, struct fuse_req,
intr_entry);
return fuse_read_interrupt(fc, cs, nbytes, req);
}
if (forget_pending(fc)) {
if (list_empty(&fc->pending) || fc->forget_batch-- > 0)
return fuse_read_forget(fc, cs, nbytes);
if (fc->forget_batch <= -8)
fc->forget_batch = 16;
}
req = list_entry(fc->pending.next, struct fuse_req, list);
req->state = FUSE_REQ_READING;
list_move(&req->list, &fc->io);
in = &req->in;
reqsize = in->h.len;
/* If request is too large, reply with an error and restart the read */
if (nbytes < reqsize) {
req->out.h.error = -EIO;
/* SETXATTR is special, since it may contain too large data */
if (in->h.opcode == FUSE_SETXATTR)
req->out.h.error = -E2BIG;
request_end(fc, req);
goto restart;
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
cs->req = req;
err = fuse_copy_one(cs, &in->h, sizeof(in->h));
if (!err)
err = fuse_copy_args(cs, in->numargs, in->argpages,
(struct fuse_arg *) in->args, 0);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
req->locked = 0;
if (req->aborted) {
request_end(fc, req);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (err) {
req->out.h.error = -EIO;
request_end(fc, req);
return err;
}
if (!req->isreply)
request_end(fc, req);
else {
req->state = FUSE_REQ_SENT;
list_move_tail(&req->list, &fc->processing);
if (req->interrupted)
queue_interrupt(fc, req);
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
}
return reqsize;
err_unlock:
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: filesystem_mount_data_free (MountData *data)
{
g_free (data->mount_point);
g_free (data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_files_avail(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint64_t *res)
{
__be32 *p;
int status = 0;
*res = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_AVAIL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_AVAIL)) {
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 8);
if (unlikely(!p))
goto out_overflow;
xdr_decode_hyper(p, res);
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_FILES_AVAIL;
}
dprintk("%s: files avail=%Lu\n", __func__, (unsigned long long)*res);
return status;
out_overflow:
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::RecordNavigationMetrics(
const LoadCommittedDetails& details,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
SiteInstance* site_instance) {
DCHECK(site_instance->HasProcess());
if (!details.is_main_frame || !navigation_data_ ||
navigation_data_->url_job_start_time_.is_null() ||
navigation_data_->url_ != params.original_request_url) {
return;
}
base::TimeDelta time_to_commit =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - navigation_data_->start_time_;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("Navigation.TimeToCommit", time_to_commit);
time_to_commit -= navigation_data_->before_unload_delay_;
base::TimeDelta time_to_network = navigation_data_->url_job_start_time_ -
navigation_data_->start_time_ -
navigation_data_->before_unload_delay_;
if (navigation_data_->is_restoring_from_last_session_) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.TimeToCommit_SessionRestored_BeforeUnloadDiscounted",
time_to_commit);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.TimeToURLJobStart_SessionRestored_BeforeUnloadDiscounted",
time_to_network);
navigation_data_.reset();
return;
}
bool navigation_created_new_renderer_process =
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetInitTimeForNavigationMetrics() >
navigation_data_->start_time_;
if (navigation_created_new_renderer_process) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.TimeToCommit_NewRenderer_BeforeUnloadDiscounted",
time_to_commit);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.TimeToURLJobStart_NewRenderer_BeforeUnloadDiscounted",
time_to_network);
} else {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.TimeToCommit_ExistingRenderer_BeforeUnloadDiscounted",
time_to_commit);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES(
"Navigation.TimeToURLJobStart_ExistingRenderer_BeforeUnloadDiscounted",
time_to_network);
}
navigation_data_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapter::Shutdown() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StripComments(const String& str)
: parse_state_(kBeginningOfLine),
source_string_(str),
length_(str.length()),
position_(0) {
Parse();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_proc_unlink_rpc_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, struct nfs_unlinkdata *data)
{
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(NFS_SERVER(data->dir),
&data->args.seq_args,
&data->res.seq_res,
task))
return;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: subtlvs_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *cp, const u_char *ep, const uint8_t tlv_type)
{
uint8_t subtype, sublen;
const char *sep;
uint32_t t1, t2;
while (cp < ep) {
subtype = *cp++;
if(subtype == MESSAGE_SUB_PAD1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sub-pad1"));
continue;
}
if(cp == ep)
goto invalid;
sublen = *cp++;
if(cp + sublen > ep)
goto invalid;
switch(subtype) {
case MESSAGE_SUB_PADN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sub-padn"));
cp += sublen;
break;
case MESSAGE_SUB_DIVERSITY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sub-diversity"));
if (sublen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " empty"));
break;
}
sep = " ";
while(sublen--) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s", sep, tok2str(diversity_str, "%u", *cp++)));
sep = "-";
}
if(tlv_type != MESSAGE_UPDATE &&
tlv_type != MESSAGE_UPDATE_SRC_SPECIFIC)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (bogus)"));
break;
case MESSAGE_SUB_TIMESTAMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sub-timestamp"));
if(tlv_type == MESSAGE_HELLO) {
if(sublen < 4)
goto invalid;
t1 = EXTRACT_32BITS(cp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", format_timestamp(t1)));
} else if(tlv_type == MESSAGE_IHU) {
if(sublen < 8)
goto invalid;
t1 = EXTRACT_32BITS(cp);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", format_timestamp(t1)));
t2 = EXTRACT_32BITS(cp + 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|%s", format_timestamp(t2)));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (bogus)"));
cp += sublen;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " sub-unknown-0x%02x", subtype));
cp += sublen;
} /* switch */
} /* while */
return;
invalid:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", istr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14470/Babel: fix an existing length check
In babel_print_v2() the non-verbose branch for an Update TLV compared
the TLV Length against 1 instead of 10 (probably a typo), put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AdapterCallback(scoped_refptr<BluetoothAdapter> adapter) {
adapter_ = adapter;
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_dysymtab(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin, ut64 off) {
int len, i;
ut32 size_tab;
ut8 dysym[sizeof (struct dysymtab_command)] = {0};
ut8 dytoc[sizeof (struct dylib_table_of_contents)] = {0};
ut8 dymod[sizeof (struct MACH0_(dylib_module))] = {0};
ut8 idsyms[sizeof (ut32)] = {0};
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof (struct dysymtab_command) > bin->size) {
return false;
}
len = r_buf_read_at(bin->b, off, dysym, sizeof (struct dysymtab_command));
if (len != sizeof (struct dysymtab_command)) {
bprintf ("Error: read (dysymtab)\n");
return false;
}
bin->dysymtab.cmd = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[0], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.cmdsize = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[4], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.ilocalsym = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[8], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nlocalsym = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[12], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.iextdefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[16], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nextdefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[20], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.iundefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[24], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nundefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[28], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.tocoff = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[32], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.ntoc = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[36], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.modtaboff = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[40], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nmodtab = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[44], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.extrefsymoff = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[48], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nextrefsyms = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[52], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.indirectsymoff = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[56], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nindirectsyms = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[60], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.extreloff = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[64], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nextrel = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[68], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.locreloff = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[72], bin->big_endian);
bin->dysymtab.nlocrel = r_read_ble32 (&dysym[76], bin->big_endian);
bin->ntoc = bin->dysymtab.ntoc;
if (bin->ntoc > 0) {
if (!(bin->toc = calloc (bin->ntoc, sizeof(struct dylib_table_of_contents)))) {
perror ("calloc (toc)");
return false;
}
if (!UT32_MUL (&size_tab, bin->ntoc, sizeof (struct dylib_table_of_contents))){
R_FREE (bin->toc);
return false;
}
if (!size_tab){
R_FREE (bin->toc);
return false;
}
if (bin->dysymtab.tocoff > bin->size || bin->dysymtab.tocoff + size_tab > bin->size){
R_FREE (bin->toc);
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->ntoc; i++) {
len = r_buf_read_at(bin->b, bin->dysymtab.tocoff +
i * sizeof (struct dylib_table_of_contents),
dytoc, sizeof (struct dylib_table_of_contents));
if (len != sizeof (struct dylib_table_of_contents)) {
bprintf ("Error: read (toc)\n");
R_FREE (bin->toc);
return false;
}
bin->toc[i].symbol_index = r_read_ble32 (&dytoc[0], bin->big_endian);
bin->toc[i].module_index = r_read_ble32 (&dytoc[4], bin->big_endian);
}
}
bin->nmodtab = bin->dysymtab.nmodtab;
if (bin->nmodtab > 0) {
if (!(bin->modtab = calloc (bin->nmodtab, sizeof(struct MACH0_(dylib_module))))) {
perror ("calloc (modtab)");
return false;
}
if (!UT32_MUL (&size_tab, bin->nmodtab, sizeof (struct MACH0_(dylib_module)))){
R_FREE (bin->modtab);
return false;
}
if (!size_tab){
R_FREE (bin->modtab);
return false;
}
if (bin->dysymtab.modtaboff > bin->size || \
bin->dysymtab.modtaboff + size_tab > bin->size){
R_FREE (bin->modtab);
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nmodtab; i++) {
len = r_buf_read_at(bin->b, bin->dysymtab.modtaboff +
i * sizeof (struct MACH0_(dylib_module)),
dymod, sizeof (struct MACH0_(dylib_module)));
if (len == -1) {
bprintf ("Error: read (modtab)\n");
R_FREE (bin->modtab);
return false;
}
bin->modtab[i].module_name = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[0], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].iextdefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[4], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].nextdefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[8], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].irefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[12], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].nrefsym = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[16], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].ilocalsym = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[20], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].nlocalsym = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[24], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].iextrel = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[28], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].nextrel = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[32], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].iinit_iterm = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[36], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].ninit_nterm = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[40], bin->big_endian);
#if R_BIN_MACH064
bin->modtab[i].objc_module_info_size = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[44], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].objc_module_info_addr = r_read_ble64 (&dymod[48], bin->big_endian);
#else
bin->modtab[i].objc_module_info_addr = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[44], bin->big_endian);
bin->modtab[i].objc_module_info_size = r_read_ble32 (&dymod[48], bin->big_endian);
#endif
}
}
bin->nindirectsyms = bin->dysymtab.nindirectsyms;
if (bin->nindirectsyms > 0) {
if (!(bin->indirectsyms = calloc (bin->nindirectsyms, sizeof(ut32)))) {
perror ("calloc (indirectsyms)");
return false;
}
if (!UT32_MUL (&size_tab, bin->nindirectsyms, sizeof (ut32))){
R_FREE (bin->indirectsyms);
return false;
}
if (!size_tab){
R_FREE (bin->indirectsyms);
return false;
}
if (bin->dysymtab.indirectsymoff > bin->size || \
bin->dysymtab.indirectsymoff + size_tab > bin->size){
R_FREE (bin->indirectsyms);
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->nindirectsyms; i++) {
len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, bin->dysymtab.indirectsymoff + i * sizeof (ut32), idsyms, 4);
if (len == -1) {
bprintf ("Error: read (indirect syms)\n");
R_FREE (bin->indirectsyms);
return false;
}
bin->indirectsyms[i] = r_read_ble32 (&idsyms[0], bin->big_endian);
}
}
/* TODO extrefsyms, extrel, locrel */
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 66,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_x509_export)
{
X509 * cert;
zval * zcert, *zout;
zend_bool notext = 1;
BIO * bio_out;
zend_resource *certresource;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "zz/|b", &zcert, &zout, ¬ext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!notext) {
X509_print(bio_out, cert);
}
if (PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, cert)) {
BUF_MEM *bio_buf;
zval_dtor(zout);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &bio_buf);
ZVAL_STRINGL(zout, bio_buf->data, bio_buf->length);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
if (certresource == NULL && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readContigTilesIntoBuffer (TIFF* in, uint8* buf,
uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth,
uint32 tw, uint32 tl,
tsample_t spp, uint16 bps)
{
int status = 1;
tsample_t sample = 0;
tsample_t count = spp;
uint32 row, col, trow;
uint32 nrow, ncol;
uint32 dst_rowsize, shift_width;
uint32 bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel;
uint32 trailing_bits, prev_trailing_bits;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(in);
uint32 src_offset, dst_offset;
uint32 row_offset, col_offset;
uint8 *bufp = (uint8*) buf;
unsigned char *src = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
tsize_t tbytes = 0, tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(in);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
shift_width = 0;
else
{
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0)
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Tile size or tile rowsize is zero");
exit(-1);
}
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != (tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
}
/* Add 3 padding bytes for extractContigSamplesShifted32bits */
if( (size_t) tile_buffsize > 0xFFFFFFFFU - 3U )
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size.");
exit(-1);
}
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize + 3);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 0;
tilebuf[tile_buffsize] = 0;
tilebuf[tile_buffsize+1] = 0;
tilebuf[tile_buffsize+2] = 0;
dst_rowsize = ((imagewidth * bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
tbytes = TIFFReadTile(in, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0);
if (tbytes < tilesize && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read tile at row %lu col %lu, Read %lu bytes of %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)tbytes,
(unsigned long)tilesize);
status = 0;
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
row_offset = row * dst_rowsize;
col_offset = ((col * bps * spp) + 7)/ 8;
bufp = buf + row_offset + col_offset;
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
/* Each tile scanline will start on a byte boundary but it
* has to be merged into the scanline for the entire
* image buffer and the previous segment may not have
* ended on a byte boundary
*/
/* Optimization for common bit depths, all samples */
if (((bps % 8) == 0) && (count == spp))
{
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
_TIFFmemcpy (bufp, tilebuf + src_offset, (ncol * spp * bps) / 8);
bufp += (imagewidth * bps * spp) / 8;
}
}
else
{
/* Bit depths not a multiple of 8 and/or extract fewer than spp samples */
prev_trailing_bits = trailing_bits = 0;
trailing_bits = (ncol * bps * spp) % 8;
/* for (trow = 0; tl < nrow; trow++) */
for (trow = 0; trow < nrow; trow++)
{
src_offset = trow * tile_rowsize;
src = tilebuf + src_offset;
dst_offset = (row + trow) * dst_rowsize;
dst = buf + dst_offset + col_offset;
switch (shift_width)
{
case 0: if (extractContigSamplesBytes (src, dst, ncol, sample,
spp, bps, count, 0, ncol))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 1: if (bps == 1)
{
if (extractContigSamplesShifted8bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
}
else
if (extractContigSamplesShifted16bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 2: if (extractContigSamplesShifted24bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
case 3:
case 4:
case 5: if (extractContigSamplesShifted32bits (src, dst, ncol,
sample, spp,
bps, count,
0, ncol,
prev_trailing_bits))
{
TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer",
"Unable to extract row %d from tile %lu",
row, (unsigned long)TIFFCurrentTile(in));
return 1;
}
break;
default: TIFFError("readContigTilesIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth %d", bps);
return 1;
}
}
prev_trailing_bits += trailing_bits;
/* if (prev_trailing_bits > 7) */
/* prev_trailing_bits-= 8; */
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix readContigStripsIntoBuffer() in -i (ignore) mode so
that the output buffer is correctly incremented to avoid write outside bounds.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA32_S,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply,
int32_t,
int32_t>(const int32_t* source,
int32_t* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
destination[3] = ClampMin(source[3]);
double scale_factor = static_cast<double>(destination[3]) / kMaxInt32Value;
destination[0] = static_cast<int32_t>(
static_cast<double>(ClampMin(source[0])) * scale_factor);
destination[1] = static_cast<int32_t>(
static_cast<double>(ClampMin(source[1])) * scale_factor);
destination[2] = static_cast<int32_t>(
static_cast<double>(ClampMin(source[2])) * scale_factor);
source += 4;
destination += 4;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(faccessat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, int, mode)
{
const struct cred *old_cred;
struct cred *override_cred;
struct path path;
struct inode *inode;
int res;
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (mode & ~S_IRWXO) /* where's F_OK, X_OK, W_OK, R_OK? */
return -EINVAL;
override_cred = prepare_creds();
if (!override_cred)
return -ENOMEM;
override_cred->fsuid = override_cred->uid;
override_cred->fsgid = override_cred->gid;
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
/* Clear the capabilities if we switch to a non-root user */
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(override_cred->user_ns, 0);
if (!uid_eq(override_cred->uid, root_uid))
cap_clear(override_cred->cap_effective);
else
override_cred->cap_effective =
override_cred->cap_permitted;
}
old_cred = override_creds(override_cred);
retry:
res = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (res)
goto out;
inode = path.dentry->d_inode;
if ((mode & MAY_EXEC) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* MAY_EXEC on regular files is denied if the fs is mounted
* with the "noexec" flag.
*/
res = -EACCES;
if (path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)
goto out_path_release;
}
res = inode_permission(inode, mode | MAY_ACCESS);
/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */
if (res || !(mode & S_IWOTH) || special_file(inode->i_mode))
goto out_path_release;
/*
* This is a rare case where using __mnt_is_readonly()
* is OK without a mnt_want/drop_write() pair. Since
* no actual write to the fs is performed here, we do
* not need to telegraph to that to anyone.
*
* By doing this, we accept that this access is
* inherently racy and know that the fs may change
* state before we even see this result.
*/
if (__mnt_is_readonly(path.mnt))
res = -EROFS;
out_path_release:
path_put(&path);
if (retry_estale(res, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
out:
revert_creds(old_cred);
put_cred(override_cred);
return res;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_res_in_use(Sg_fd * sfp)
{
const Sg_request *srp;
unsigned long iflags;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
for (srp = sfp->headrp; srp; srp = srp->nextrp)
if (srp->res_used)
break;
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return srp ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 42,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mwifiex_cmd_uap_sys_config(struct host_cmd_ds_command *cmd, u16 cmd_action,
u32 type, void *cmd_buf)
{
u8 *tlv;
u16 cmd_size, param_size, ie_size;
struct host_cmd_ds_sys_config *sys_cfg;
cmd->command = cpu_to_le16(HostCmd_CMD_UAP_SYS_CONFIG);
cmd_size = (u16)(sizeof(struct host_cmd_ds_sys_config) + S_DS_GEN);
sys_cfg = (struct host_cmd_ds_sys_config *)&cmd->params.uap_sys_config;
sys_cfg->action = cpu_to_le16(cmd_action);
tlv = sys_cfg->tlv;
switch (type) {
case UAP_BSS_PARAMS_I:
param_size = cmd_size;
if (mwifiex_uap_bss_param_prepare(tlv, cmd_buf, ¶m_size))
return -1;
cmd->size = cpu_to_le16(param_size);
break;
case UAP_CUSTOM_IE_I:
ie_size = cmd_size;
if (mwifiex_uap_custom_ie_prepare(tlv, cmd_buf, &ie_size))
return -1;
cmd->size = cpu_to_le16(ie_size);
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 88,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_uncompress(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
unsigned int flags)
{
BIO *cont;
int r;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_UNCOMPRESS, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_COMPRESSED_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
if (!cont)
return 0;
r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool venc_dev::venc_loaded_stop()
{
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int yr_re_match(
RE* re,
const char* target)
{
return yr_re_exec(
re->code,
(uint8_t*) target,
strlen(target),
re->flags | RE_FLAGS_SCAN,
NULL,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #646 (#648)
* Fix issue #646 and some edge cases with wide regexps using \b and \B
* Rename function IS_WORD_CHAR to _yr_re_is_word_char
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_AddPlan(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string name = request::findValue(&req, "name");
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "AddPlan";
m_sql.safe_query(
"INSERT INTO Plans (Name) VALUES ('%q')",
name.c_str()
);
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT MAX(ID) FROM Plans");
if (!result.empty())
{
std::vector<std::string> sd = result[0];
int ID = atoi(sd[0].c_str());
root["idx"] = sd[0].c_str(); // OTO output the created ID for easier management on the caller side (if automated)
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 90,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: build_model(XML_Parser parser) {
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
XML_Content *ret;
XML_Content *cpos;
XML_Char *str;
int allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
+ (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
ret = (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, allocsize);
if (! ret)
return NULL;
str = (XML_Char *)(&ret[dtd->scaffCount]);
cpos = &ret[1];
build_node(parser, 0, ret, &cpos, &str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void force_user_fault(unsigned long address, int write)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
int code;
code = SEGV_MAPERR;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma(mm, address);
if(!vma)
goto bad_area;
if(vma->vm_start <= address)
goto good_area;
if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
goto bad_area;
if(expand_stack(vma, address))
goto bad_area;
good_area:
code = SEGV_ACCERR;
if(write) {
if(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
goto bad_area;
} else {
if(!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_EXEC)))
goto bad_area;
}
switch (handle_mm_fault(mm, vma, address, write ? FAULT_FLAG_WRITE : 0)) {
case VM_FAULT_SIGBUS:
case VM_FAULT_OOM:
goto do_sigbus;
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return;
bad_area:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
__do_fault_siginfo(code, SIGSEGV, tsk->thread.kregs, address);
return;
do_sigbus:
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
__do_fault_siginfo(BUS_ADRERR, SIGBUS, tsk->thread.kregs, address);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char uprcase( char c )
{
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
return c + 'A' - 'a';
return c;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_highest_prio_tid(unsigned long tids)
{
/* lower 3 TIDs aren't ordered perfectly */
if (tids & 0xF8)
return fls(tids) - 1;
/* TID 0 is BE just like TID 3 */
if (tids & BIT(0))
return 0;
return fls(tids) - 1;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SkIcoCodec::onDimensionsSupported(const SkISize& dim) {
return this->chooseCodec(dim, 0) >= 0;
}
Commit Message: RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <reed@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <robertphillips@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <stephana@google.com>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 162,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PP_Var GetDocumentURL(PP_Instance instance, PP_URLComponents_Dev* components) {
PluginInstance* plugin_instance = host_globals->GetInstance(instance);
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_MakeUndefined();
return plugin_instance->GetDocumentURL(instance, components);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipt_register_table(struct net *net, const struct xt_table *table,
const struct ipt_replace *repl,
const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, struct xt_table **res)
{
int ret;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
struct xt_table_info bootstrap = {0};
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct xt_table *new_table;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(repl->size);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries;
memcpy(loc_cpu_entry, repl->entries, repl->size);
ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, loc_cpu_entry, repl);
if (ret != 0)
goto out_free;
new_table = xt_register_table(net, table, &bootstrap, newinfo);
if (IS_ERR(new_table)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_table);
goto out_free;
}
/* set res now, will see skbs right after nf_register_net_hooks */
WRITE_ONCE(*res, new_table);
ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ops, hweight32(table->valid_hooks));
if (ret != 0) {
__ipt_unregister_table(net, new_table);
*res = NULL;
}
return ret;
out_free:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_fragment(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int (*output)(struct net *, struct sock *, struct sk_buff *))
{
struct sk_buff *frag;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk && !dev_recursion_level() ?
inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *tmp_hdr;
struct frag_hdr *fh;
unsigned int mtu, hlen, left, len;
int hroom, troom;
__be32 frag_id;
int ptr, offset = 0, err = 0;
u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0;
err = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
if (err < 0)
goto fail;
hlen = err;
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb);
/* We must not fragment if the socket is set to force MTU discovery
* or if the skb it not generated by a local socket.
*/
if (unlikely(!skb->ignore_df && skb->len > mtu))
goto fail_toobig;
if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size) {
if (IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size > mtu)
goto fail_toobig;
/* don't send fragments larger than what we received */
mtu = IP6CB(skb)->frag_max_size;
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
}
if (np && np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
if (mtu < hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) + 8)
goto fail_toobig;
mtu -= hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
frag_id = ipv6_select_ident(net, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr);
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL &&
(err = skb_checksum_help(skb)))
goto fail;
hroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb)) {
unsigned int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag2;
if (first_len - hlen > mtu ||
((first_len - hlen) & 7) ||
skb_cloned(skb) ||
skb_headroom(skb) < (hroom + sizeof(struct frag_hdr)))
goto slow_path;
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag) {
/* Correct geometry. */
if (frag->len > mtu ||
((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) ||
skb_headroom(frag) < (hlen + hroom + sizeof(struct frag_hdr)))
goto slow_path_clean;
/* Partially cloned skb? */
if (skb_shared(frag))
goto slow_path_clean;
BUG_ON(frag->sk);
if (skb->sk) {
frag->sk = skb->sk;
frag->destructor = sock_wfree;
}
skb->truesize -= frag->truesize;
}
err = 0;
offset = 0;
/* BUILD HEADER */
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb_network_header(skb), hlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_hdr) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(skb);
__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
memcpy(skb_network_header(skb), tmp_hdr, hlen);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb);
skb->len = first_len;
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(first_len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
for (;;) {
/* Prepare header of the next frame,
* before previous one went down. */
if (frag) {
frag->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_reset_transport_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)__skb_push(frag, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(frag, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
memcpy(skb_network_header(frag), tmp_hdr,
hlen);
offset += skb->len - hlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (frag->next)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len =
htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
}
err = output(net, sk, skb);
if (!err)
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
if (err || !frag)
break;
skb = frag;
frag = skb->next;
skb->next = NULL;
}
kfree(tmp_hdr);
if (err == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
ip6_rt_put(rt);
return 0;
}
kfree_skb_list(frag);
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
ip6_rt_put(rt);
return err;
slow_path_clean:
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) {
if (frag2 == frag)
break;
frag2->sk = NULL;
frag2->destructor = NULL;
skb->truesize += frag2->truesize;
}
}
slow_path:
left = skb->len - hlen; /* Space per frame */
ptr = hlen; /* Where to start from */
/*
* Fragment the datagram.
*/
troom = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
/*
* Keep copying data until we run out.
*/
while (left > 0) {
u8 *fragnexthdr_offset;
len = left;
/* IF: it doesn't fit, use 'mtu' - the data space left */
if (len > mtu)
len = mtu;
/* IF: we are not sending up to and including the packet end
then align the next start on an eight byte boundary */
if (len < left) {
len &= ~7;
}
/* Allocate buffer */
frag = alloc_skb(len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
hroom + troom, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!frag) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/*
* Set up data on packet
*/
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
skb_reserve(frag, hroom);
skb_put(frag, len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(frag) + hlen);
frag->transport_header = (frag->network_header + hlen +
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
/*
* Charge the memory for the fragment to any owner
* it might possess
*/
if (skb->sk)
skb_set_owner_w(frag, skb->sk);
/*
* Copy the packet header into the new buffer.
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_network_header(frag), hlen);
fragnexthdr_offset = skb_network_header(frag);
fragnexthdr_offset += prevhdr - skb_network_header(skb);
*fragnexthdr_offset = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
/*
* Build fragment header.
*/
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->identification = frag_id;
/*
* Copy a block of the IP datagram.
*/
BUG_ON(skb_copy_bits(skb, ptr, skb_transport_header(frag),
len));
left -= len;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (left > 0)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len = htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ptr += len;
offset += len;
/*
* Put this fragment into the sending queue.
*/
err = output(net, sk, frag);
if (err)
goto fail;
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
consume_skb(skb);
return err;
fail_toobig:
if (skb->sk && dst_allfrag(skb_dst(skb)))
sk_nocaps_add(skb->sk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
fail:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __devinet_sysctl_register(struct net *net, char *dev_name,
struct ipv4_devconf *p)
{
int i;
struct devinet_sysctl_table *t;
char path[sizeof("net/ipv4/conf/") + IFNAMSIZ];
t = kmemdup(&devinet_sysctl, sizeof(*t), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!t)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(t->devinet_vars) - 1; i++) {
t->devinet_vars[i].data += (char *)p - (char *)&ipv4_devconf;
t->devinet_vars[i].extra1 = p;
t->devinet_vars[i].extra2 = net;
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "net/ipv4/conf/%s", dev_name);
t->sysctl_header = register_net_sysctl(net, path, t->devinet_vars);
if (!t->sysctl_header)
goto free;
p->sysctl = t;
return 0;
free:
kfree(t);
out:
return -ENOBUFS;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_feature_set_ok(struct super_block *sb, int readonly)
{
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SUPP)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Couldn't mount because of "
"unsupported optional features (%x)",
(le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_incompat) &
~EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SUPP));
return 0;
}
if (readonly)
return 1;
/* Check that feature set is OK for a read-write mount */
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, ~EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount RDWR because of "
"unsupported optional features (%x)",
(le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_ro_compat) &
~EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP));
return 0;
}
/*
* Large file size enabled file system can only be mounted
* read-write on 32-bit systems if kernel is built with CONFIG_LBDAF
*/
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_HUGE_FILE)) {
if (sizeof(blkcnt_t) < sizeof(u64)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Filesystem with huge files "
"cannot be mounted RDWR without "
"CONFIG_LBDAF");
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CheckPassiveGrabsOnWindow(WindowPtr pWin,
DeviceIntPtr device,
InternalEvent *event, BOOL checkCore, BOOL activate)
{
GrabPtr grab = wPassiveGrabs(pWin);
GrabPtr tempGrab;
if (!grab)
return NULL;
tempGrab = AllocGrab(NULL);
if (tempGrab == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Fill out the grab details, but leave the type for later before
* comparing */
switch (event->any.type) {
case ET_KeyPress:
case ET_KeyRelease:
tempGrab->detail.exact = event->device_event.detail.key;
break;
case ET_ButtonPress:
case ET_ButtonRelease:
case ET_TouchBegin:
case ET_TouchEnd:
tempGrab->detail.exact = event->device_event.detail.button;
break;
default:
tempGrab->detail.exact = 0;
break;
}
tempGrab->window = pWin;
tempGrab->device = device;
tempGrab->detail.pMask = NULL;
tempGrab->modifiersDetail.pMask = NULL;
tempGrab->next = NULL;
for (; grab; grab = grab->next) {
if (!CheckPassiveGrab(device, grab, event, checkCore, tempGrab))
continue;
if (activate && !ActivatePassiveGrab(device, grab, event, event))
continue;
break;
}
FreeGrab(tempGrab);
return grab;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ResourceRequest& DocumentLoader::OriginalRequest() const {
return original_request_;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 125,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rawv6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) uaddr;
__be32 v4addr = 0;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
/* Raw sockets are IPv6 only */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
lock_sock(sk);
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
addr->sin6_scope_id) {
/* Override any existing binding, if another
* one is supplied by user.
*/
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Binding to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto out_unlock;
err = -ENODEV;
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev)
goto out_unlock;
}
/* ipv4 addr of the socket is invalid. Only the
* unspecified and mapped address have a v4 equivalent.
*/
v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) &&
!sock_net(sk)->ipv6.sysctl.ip_nonlocal_bind) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipv6_chk_addr(sock_net(sk), &addr->sin6_addr,
dev, 0)) {
goto out_unlock;
}
}
}
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = v4addr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
err = 0;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 53,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API RList *r_bin_get_libs(RBin *bin) {
RBinObject *o = r_bin_cur_object (bin);
return o? o->libs: NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostTestActivateOnInvisible()
: activation_count_(0), visible_(true) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_releasepage(struct page *page, gfp_t wait)
{
if (!page_has_buffers(page))
return 0;
return try_to_free_buffers(page);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompositorSwapClient::OnLostContext() {
factory_->OnLostContext(compositor_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListController::EnsureHaveKeepAliveForView() {
if (!keep_alive_)
keep_alive_.reset(new ScopedKeepAlive());
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_task_blockstep(struct task_struct *task, bool on)
{
unsigned long debugctl;
/*
* Ensure irq/preemption can't change debugctl in between.
* Note also that both TIF_BLOCKSTEP and debugctl should
* be changed atomically wrt preemption.
* FIXME: this means that set/clear TIF_BLOCKSTEP is simply
* wrong if task != current, SIGKILL can wakeup the stopped
* tracee and set/clear can play with the running task, this
* can confuse the next __switch_to_xtra().
*/
local_irq_disable();
debugctl = get_debugctlmsr();
if (on) {
debugctl |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
} else {
debugctl &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF;
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_BLOCKSTEP);
}
if (task == current)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctl);
local_irq_enable();
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 166,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SettingLevelBubble::ShowBubble(double percent, bool enabled) {
hide_timer_.Stop();
const double old_target_percent = target_percent_;
UpdateTargetPercent(percent);
SkBitmap* current_icon = increase_icon_;
if (!enabled || target_percent_ == 0)
current_icon = disabled_icon_;
else if (old_target_percent >= 0 && target_percent_ < old_target_percent)
current_icon = decrease_icon_;
if (!view_) {
view_ = CreateView();
view_->Init(current_icon, percent, enabled);
} else {
SettingLevelBubbleDelegateView* delegate =
static_cast<SettingLevelBubbleDelegateView*>
(view_->GetWidget()->widget_delegate());
delegate->ResetFade();
view_->SetIcon(current_icon);
view_->SetEnabled(enabled);
}
view_->GetWidget()->Show();
hide_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kBubbleShowTimeoutMs),
this, &SettingLevelBubble::OnHideTimeout);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SetAwDrawGLFunctionTable(JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jclass>&,
jlong function_table) {}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvlan_vlan_rx_add_vid(struct net_device *dev,
unsigned short vid)
{
struct macvlan_dev *vlan = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_device *lowerdev = vlan->lowerdev;
const struct net_device_ops *ops = lowerdev->netdev_ops;
if (ops->ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid)
ops->ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid(lowerdev, vid);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_eligible_guards(const or_options_t *options,
guard_selection_t *gs,
int *n_guards_out)
{
/* Construct eligible_guards as GUARDS - SAMPLED_GUARDS */
smartlist_t *eligible_guards = smartlist_new();
int n_guards = 0; // total size of "GUARDS"
if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) {
const smartlist_t *bridges = bridge_list_get();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridges, bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
++n_guards;
if (NULL != get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(gs, bridge)) {
continue;
}
smartlist_add(eligible_guards, bridge);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
} else {
const smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
const int n_sampled = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
/* Build a bloom filter of our current guards: let's keep this O(N). */
digestset_t *sampled_guard_ids = digestset_new(n_sampled);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, const entry_guard_t *,
guard) {
digestset_add(sampled_guard_ids, guard->identity);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) {
if (! node_is_possible_guard(node))
continue;
if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED) {
/* In restricted mode, we apply the filter BEFORE sampling, so
* that we are sampling from the nodes that we might actually
* select. If we sampled first, we might wind up with a sample
* that didn't include any EntryNodes at all. */
if (! node_passes_guard_filter(options, node))
continue;
}
++n_guards;
if (digestset_contains(sampled_guard_ids, node->identity))
continue;
smartlist_add(eligible_guards, (node_t*)node);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* Now we can free that bloom filter. */
digestset_free(sampled_guard_ids);
}
*n_guards_out = n_guards;
return eligible_guards;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindFramebuffer(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* info = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
info = GetFramebufferInfo(client_id);
if (!info) {
if (!group_->bind_generates_resource()) {
LOG(ERROR)
<< "glBindFramebuffer: id not generated by glGenFramebuffers";
current_decoder_error_ = error::kGenericError;
return;
}
glGenFramebuffersEXT(1, &service_id);
CreateFramebufferInfo(client_id, service_id);
info = GetFramebufferInfo(client_id);
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kFramebuffers);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
} else {
service_id = info->service_id();
}
info->MarkAsValid();
}
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
bound_draw_framebuffer_ = info;
}
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
bound_read_framebuffer_ = info;
}
state_dirty_ = true;
if (info == NULL) {
service_id = GetBackbufferServiceId();
}
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, service_id);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntSize WebPagePrivate::fixedLayoutSize(bool snapToIncrement) const
{
if (hasVirtualViewport())
return m_virtualViewportSize;
const int defaultLayoutWidth = m_defaultLayoutSize.width();
const int defaultLayoutHeight = m_defaultLayoutSize.height();
int minWidth = defaultLayoutWidth;
int maxWidth = DEFAULT_MAX_LAYOUT_WIDTH;
int maxHeight = DEFAULT_MAX_LAYOUT_HEIGHT;
if (m_loadState == None)
return IntSize(defaultLayoutWidth, defaultLayoutHeight);
if (m_viewMode == FixedDesktop) {
int width = maxWidth;
int height;
if (defaultLayoutHeight <= minimumLayoutSize.height())
height = maxHeight;
else
height = ceilf(static_cast<float>(width) / static_cast<float>(defaultLayoutWidth) * static_cast<float>(defaultLayoutHeight));
return IntSize(width, height);
}
if (m_viewMode == Desktop) {
int width = std::max(absoluteVisibleOverflowSize().width(), contentsSize().width());
if (m_pendingOrientation != -1 && !m_nestedLayoutFinishedCount)
width = 0;
if (snapToIncrement) {
float factor = static_cast<float>(width) / (defaultLayoutWidth / 2.0);
factor = ceilf(factor);
width = (defaultLayoutWidth / 2.0) * factor;
}
if (width < minWidth)
width = minWidth;
if (width > maxWidth)
width = maxWidth;
int height = ceilf(static_cast<float>(width) / static_cast<float>(defaultLayoutWidth) * static_cast<float>(defaultLayoutHeight));
return IntSize(width, height);
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return IntSize(defaultLayoutWidth, defaultLayoutHeight);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaPlayerService::Client::Client(
const sp<MediaPlayerService>& service, pid_t pid,
int32_t connId, const sp<IMediaPlayerClient>& client,
audio_session_t audioSessionId, uid_t uid)
{
ALOGV("Client(%d) constructor", connId);
mPid = pid;
mConnId = connId;
mService = service;
mClient = client;
mLoop = false;
mStatus = NO_INIT;
mAudioSessionId = audioSessionId;
mUID = uid;
mRetransmitEndpointValid = false;
mAudioAttributes = NULL;
#if CALLBACK_ANTAGONIZER
ALOGD("create Antagonizer");
mAntagonizer = new Antagonizer(notify, this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_card_set_id_no_lock(struct snd_card *card, const char *src,
const char *nid)
{
int len, loops;
bool is_default = false;
char *id;
copy_valid_id_string(card, src, nid);
id = card->id;
again:
/* use "Default" for obviously invalid strings
* ("card" conflicts with proc directories)
*/
if (!*id || !strncmp(id, "card", 4)) {
strcpy(id, "Default");
is_default = true;
}
len = strlen(id);
for (loops = 0; loops < SNDRV_CARDS; loops++) {
char *spos;
char sfxstr[5]; /* "_012" */
int sfxlen;
if (card_id_ok(card, id))
return; /* OK */
/* Add _XYZ suffix */
sprintf(sfxstr, "_%X", loops + 1);
sfxlen = strlen(sfxstr);
if (len + sfxlen >= sizeof(card->id))
spos = id + sizeof(card->id) - sfxlen - 1;
else
spos = id + len;
strcpy(spos, sfxstr);
}
/* fallback to the default id */
if (!is_default) {
*id = 0;
goto again;
}
/* last resort... */
dev_err(card->dev, "unable to set card id (%s)\n", id);
if (card->proc_root->name)
strlcpy(card->id, card->proc_root->name, sizeof(card->id));
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 36,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _zip_u2d_time(time_t time, unsigned short *dtime, unsigned short *ddate)
{
struct tm *tm;
tm = localtime(&time);
*ddate = ((tm->tm_year+1900-1980)<<9) + ((tm->tm_mon+1)<<5)
+ tm->tm_mday;
*dtime = ((tm->tm_hour)<<11) + ((tm->tm_min)<<5)
+ ((tm->tm_sec)>>1);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void flush_busy_ctxs(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct list_head *list)
{
struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < hctx->ctx_map.size; i++) {
struct blk_align_bitmap *bm = &hctx->ctx_map.map[i];
unsigned int off, bit;
if (!bm->word)
continue;
bit = 0;
off = i * hctx->ctx_map.bits_per_word;
do {
bit = find_next_bit(&bm->word, bm->depth, bit);
if (bit >= bm->depth)
break;
ctx = hctx->ctxs[bit + off];
clear_bit(bit, &bm->word);
spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
list_splice_tail_init(&ctx->rq_list, list);
spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
bit++;
} while (1);
}
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::Failed(FileError::ErrorCode error_code) {
if (error_code_ != FileError::kOK)
return;
error_code_ = error_code;
Cleanup();
if (client_)
client_->DidFail(error_code_);
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 155,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Vector2d LayerTreeHost::DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
const gfx::Vector2d offset,
Layer* layer) {
DCHECK(layer);
if (layer != outer_viewport_scroll_layer_.get())
return offset;
gfx::Vector2d inner_viewport_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2d outer_viewport_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
if (offset == inner_viewport_offset + outer_viewport_offset) {
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
gfx::Vector2d max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
gfx::Vector2d max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
outer_viewport_offset = offset - inner_viewport_offset;
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset);
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_offset = offset - outer_viewport_offset;
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset);
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->SetScrollOffset(inner_viewport_offset);
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::NotifyAllFinalProgress() {
DCHECK(url_file_list_.size() == url_fetches_completed_);
NotifyAllProgress(GURL());
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tcp_try_undo_recovery(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (tcp_may_undo(tp)) {
int mib_idx;
/* Happy end! We did not retransmit anything
* or our original transmission succeeded.
*/
DBGUNDO(sk, inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state == TCP_CA_Loss ? "loss" : "retrans");
tcp_undo_cwnd_reduction(sk, false);
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state == TCP_CA_Loss)
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPLOSSUNDO;
else
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPFULLUNDO;
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), mib_idx);
}
if (tp->snd_una == tp->high_seq && tcp_is_reno(tp)) {
/* Hold old state until something *above* high_seq
* is ACKed. For Reno it is MUST to prevent false
* fast retransmits (RFC2582). SACK TCP is safe. */
tcp_moderate_cwnd(tp);
if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
return true;
}
tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
return false;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 55,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mkdirat, int, dfd, const char __user *, pathname, int, mode)
{
int error = 0;
char * tmp;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct nameidata nd;
error = user_path_parent(dfd, pathname, &nd, &tmp);
if (error)
goto out_err;
dentry = lookup_create(&nd, 1);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
goto out_unlock;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(nd.path.dentry->d_inode))
mode &= ~current_umask();
error = mnt_want_write(nd.path.mnt);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
error = security_path_mkdir(&nd.path, dentry, mode);
if (error)
goto out_drop_write;
error = vfs_mkdir(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
out_drop_write:
mnt_drop_write(nd.path.mnt);
out_dput:
dput(dentry);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&nd.path.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
path_put(&nd.path);
putname(tmp);
out_err:
return error;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out)
{
int ret = 0;
ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = ec_asn1_group2pkparameters(a, NULL);
if (tmp == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
return 0;
}
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int write_entries(git_index *index, git_filebuf *file)
{
int error = 0;
size_t i;
git_vector case_sorted, *entries;
git_index_entry *entry;
const char *last = NULL;
/* If index->entries is sorted case-insensitively, then we need
* to re-sort it case-sensitively before writing */
if (index->ignore_case) {
git_vector_dup(&case_sorted, &index->entries, git_index_entry_cmp);
git_vector_sort(&case_sorted);
entries = &case_sorted;
} else {
entries = &index->entries;
}
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = "";
git_vector_foreach(entries, i, entry) {
if ((error = write_disk_entry(file, entry, last)) < 0)
break;
if (index->version >= INDEX_VERSION_NUMBER_COMP)
last = entry->path;
}
if (index->ignore_case)
git_vector_free(&case_sorted);
return error;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderChangePicture (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderChangePictureReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->picture, n);
swapl(&stuff->mask, n);
SwapRestL(stuff);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct eppoll_entry *ep_pwq_from_wait(wait_queue_t *p)
{
return container_of(p, struct eppoll_entry, wait);
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ProcessPendingTabs() {
if (!is_attempting_to_close_browser_) {
return;
}
if (HasCompletedUnloadProcessing()) {
OnWindowClosing();
return;
}
if (!tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_.empty()) {
TabContents* tab = *(tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_.begin());
if (tab->render_view_host()) {
tab->render_view_host()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
} else {
ClearUnloadState(tab, true);
}
} else if (!tabs_needing_unload_fired_.empty()) {
TabContents* tab = *(tabs_needing_unload_fired_.begin());
if (tab->render_view_host()) {
tab->render_view_host()->ClosePage();
} else {
ClearUnloadState(tab, true);
}
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_GetModDescription( const char *modDir, char *description, int descriptionLen ) {
fileHandle_t descHandle;
char descPath[MAX_QPATH];
int nDescLen;
FILE *file;
Com_sprintf( descPath, sizeof ( descPath ), "%s/description.txt", modDir );
nDescLen = FS_SV_FOpenFileRead( descPath, &descHandle );
if ( nDescLen > 0 && descHandle ) {
file = FS_FileForHandle(descHandle);
Com_Memset( description, 0, descriptionLen );
nDescLen = fread(description, 1, descriptionLen, file);
if (nDescLen >= 0) {
description[nDescLen] = '\0';
}
FS_FCloseFile(descHandle);
} else {
Q_strncpyz( description, modDir, descriptionLen );
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len)
{
struct kvm_memslots *slots = kvm_memslots(kvm);
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
gfn_t start_gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
gfn_t end_gfn = (gpa + len - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
gfn_t nr_pages_needed = end_gfn - start_gfn + 1;
gfn_t nr_pages_avail;
ghc->gpa = gpa;
ghc->generation = slots->generation;
ghc->len = len;
ghc->memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn);
ghc->hva = gfn_to_hva_many(ghc->memslot, start_gfn, &nr_pages_avail);
if (!kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva) && nr_pages_avail >= nr_pages_needed) {
ghc->hva += offset;
} else {
/*
* If the requested region crosses two memslots, we still
* verify that the entire region is valid here.
*/
while (start_gfn <= end_gfn) {
ghc->memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn);
ghc->hva = gfn_to_hva_many(ghc->memslot, start_gfn,
&nr_pages_avail);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(ghc->hva))
return -EFAULT;
start_gfn += nr_pages_avail;
}
/* Use the slow path for cross page reads and writes. */
ghc->memslot = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int validation_ascii_to_fp(int count, int argc, char **argv)
{
int showall = 0;
double max_error=2; /* As a percentage error-in-last-digit/.5 */
double max_error_abs=17; /* Used when precision is DBL_DIG */
double max = 0;
double max_abs = 0;
double test = 0; /* Important to test this. */
int precision = 5;
int nonfinite = 0;
int finite = 0;
int ok = 0;
int failcount = 0;
int minorarith = 0;
while (--argc > 0)
if (strcmp(*++argv, "-a") == 0)
showall = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-e") == 0 && argc > 0)
{
--argc;
max_error = atof(*++argv);
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-E") == 0 && argc > 0)
{
--argc;
max_error_abs = atof(*++argv);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "unknown argument %s\n", *argv);
return 1;
}
do
{
png_size_t index;
int state, failed = 0;
char buffer[64];
if (isfinite(test))
++finite;
else
++nonfinite;
if (verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "%.*g %d\n", DBL_DIG, test, precision);
/* Check for overflow in the buffer by setting a marker. */
memset(buffer, 71, sizeof buffer);
png_ascii_from_fp(0, buffer, precision+10, test, precision);
/* Allow for a three digit exponent, this stuff will fail if
* the exponent is bigger than this!
*/
if (buffer[precision+7] != 71)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%g[%d] -> '%s'[%lu] buffer overflow\n", test,
precision, buffer, (unsigned long)strlen(buffer));
failed = 1;
}
/* Following are used for the number parser below and must be
* initialized to zero.
*/
state = 0;
index = 0;
if (!isfinite(test))
{
/* Expect 'inf' */
if (test >= 0 && strcmp(buffer, "inf") ||
test < 0 && strcmp(buffer, "-inf"))
{
fprintf(stderr, "%g[%d] -> '%s' but expected 'inf'\n", test,
precision, buffer);
failed = 1;
}
}
else if (!png_check_fp_number(buffer, precision+10, &state, &index) ||
buffer[index] != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%g[%d] -> '%s' but has bad format ('%c')\n", test,
precision, buffer, buffer[index]);
failed = 1;
}
else if (PNG_FP_IS_NEGATIVE(state) && !(test < 0))
{
fprintf(stderr, "%g[%d] -> '%s' but negative value not so reported\n",
test, precision, buffer);
failed = 1;
assert(!PNG_FP_IS_ZERO(state));
assert(!PNG_FP_IS_POSITIVE(state));
}
else if (PNG_FP_IS_ZERO(state) && !(test == 0))
{
fprintf(stderr, "%g[%d] -> '%s' but zero value not so reported\n",
test, precision, buffer);
failed = 1;
assert(!PNG_FP_IS_NEGATIVE(state));
assert(!PNG_FP_IS_POSITIVE(state));
}
else if (PNG_FP_IS_POSITIVE(state) && !(test > 0))
{
fprintf(stderr, "%g[%d] -> '%s' but postive value not so reported\n",
test, precision, buffer);
failed = 1;
assert(!PNG_FP_IS_NEGATIVE(state));
assert(!PNG_FP_IS_ZERO(state));
}
else
{
/* Check the result against the original. */
double out = atof(buffer);
double change = fabs((out - test)/test);
double allow = .5/pow(10,
(precision >= DBL_DIG) ? DBL_DIG-1 : precision-1);
/* NOTE: if you hit this error case are you compiling with gcc
* and -O0? Try -O2 - the errors can accumulate if the FP
* code above is not optimized and may drift outside the .5 in
* DBL_DIG allowed. In any case a small number of errors may
* occur (very small ones - 1 or 2%) because of rounding in the
* calculations, either in the conversion API or in atof.
*/
if (change >= allow && (isfinite(out) ||
fabs(test/DBL_MAX) <= 1-allow))
{
double percent = (precision >= DBL_DIG) ? max_error_abs : max_error;
double allowp = (change-allow)*100/allow;
if (precision >= DBL_DIG)
{
if (max_abs < allowp) max_abs = allowp;
}
else
{
if (max < allowp) max = allowp;
}
if (showall || allowp >= percent)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"%.*g[%d] -> '%s' -> %.*g number changed (%g > %g (%d%%))\n",
DBL_DIG, test, precision, buffer, DBL_DIG, out, change, allow,
(int)round(allowp));
failed = 1;
}
else
++minorarith;
}
}
if (failed)
++failcount;
else
++ok;
skip:
/* Generate a new number and precision. */
precision = rand();
if (precision & 1) test = -test;
precision >>= 1;
/* Generate random numbers. */
if (test == 0 || !isfinite(test))
test = precision+1;
else
{
/* Derive the exponent from the previous rand() value. */
int exponent = precision % (DBL_MAX_EXP - DBL_MIN_EXP) + DBL_MIN_EXP;
int tmp;
test = frexp(test * rand(), &tmp);
test = ldexp(test, exponent);
precision >>= 8; /* arbitrary */
}
/* This limits the precision to 32 digits, enough for standard
* IEEE implementations which have at most 15 digits.
*/
precision = (precision & 0x1f) + 1;
}
while (--count);
printf("Tested %d finite values, %d non-finite, %d OK (%d failed) %d minor "
"arithmetic errors\n", finite, nonfinite, ok, failcount, minorarith);
printf(" Error with >=%d digit precision %.2f%%\n", DBL_DIG, max_abs);
printf(" Error with < %d digit precision %.2f%%\n", DBL_DIG, max);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static lua_Number getinteger (const char *buff, int endian,
int issigned, int size) {
Uinttype l = 0;
int i;
if (endian == BIG) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
l <<= 8;
l |= (Uinttype)(unsigned char)buff[i];
}
}
else {
for (i = size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
l <<= 8;
l |= (Uinttype)(unsigned char)buff[i];
}
}
if (!issigned)
return (lua_Number)l;
else { /* signed format */
Uinttype mask = (Uinttype)(~((Uinttype)0)) << (size*8 - 1);
if (l & mask) /* negative value? */
l |= mask; /* signal extension */
return (lua_Number)(Inttype)l;
}
}
Commit Message: Security: fix Lua struct package offset handling.
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar
problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by
running the following script:
return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3)
The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf(
V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator* parent)
: parent_(parent),
input_streamon_(false),
output_streamon_(false),
input_buffer_pixelformat_(0),
input_buffer_num_planes_(0),
output_buffer_pixelformat_(0) {}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
{
mode_t mode = dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
int kill = 0;
/* suid always must be killed */
if (unlikely(mode & S_ISUID))
kill = ATTR_KILL_SUID;
/*
* sgid without any exec bits is just a mandatory locking mark; leave
* it alone. If some exec bits are set, it's a real sgid; kill it.
*/
if (unlikely((mode & S_ISGID) && (mode & S_IXGRP)))
kill |= ATTR_KILL_SGID;
if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID)))
return kill;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebKitTestController::PrepareForLayoutTest(
const GURL& test_url,
const base::FilePath& current_working_directory,
bool enable_pixel_dumping,
const std::string& expected_pixel_hash) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
test_phase_ = DURING_TEST;
current_working_directory_ = current_working_directory;
enable_pixel_dumping_ = enable_pixel_dumping;
expected_pixel_hash_ = expected_pixel_hash;
test_url_ = test_url;
printer_->reset();
ShellBrowserContext* browser_context =
ShellContentBrowserClient::Get()->browser_context();
if (test_url.spec().find("compositing/") != std::string::npos)
is_compositing_test_ = true;
initial_size_ = Shell::GetShellDefaultSize();
if (test_url.spec().find("W3C-SVG-1.1") != std::string::npos)
initial_size_ = gfx::Size(kTestSVGWindowWidthDip, kTestSVGWindowHeightDip);
if (!main_window_) {
main_window_ = content::Shell::CreateNewWindow(
browser_context,
GURL(),
NULL,
initial_size_);
WebContentsObserver::Observe(main_window_->web_contents());
send_configuration_to_next_host_ = true;
current_pid_ = base::kNullProcessId;
main_window_->LoadURL(test_url);
} else {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
main_window_->SizeTo(initial_size_);
#endif
main_window_->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetView()
->SetSize(initial_size_);
main_window_->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->WasResized();
RenderViewHost* render_view_host =
main_window_->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost();
WebPreferences prefs = render_view_host->GetWebkitPreferences();
OverrideWebkitPrefs(&prefs);
render_view_host->UpdateWebkitPreferences(prefs);
SendTestConfiguration();
NavigationController::LoadURLParams params(test_url);
params.transition_type = ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FROM_ADDRESS_BAR);
params.should_clear_history_list = true;
main_window_->web_contents()->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(params);
main_window_->web_contents()->Focus();
}
main_window_->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->SetActive(true);
main_window_->web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->Focus();
return true;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WillSendRequestInternal(
blink::WebURLRequest& request,
ResourceType resource_type,
DocumentState* document_state,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
if (render_view_->renderer_preferences_.enable_do_not_track)
request.SetHttpHeaderField(blink::WebString::FromUTF8(kDoNotTrackHeader),
"1");
InternalDocumentStateData* internal_data =
InternalDocumentStateData::FromDocumentState(document_state);
NavigationState* navigation_state = internal_data->navigation_state();
ApplyFilePathAlias(&request);
GURL new_url;
bool attach_same_site_cookies = false;
base::Optional<url::Origin> initiator_origin =
request.RequestorOrigin().IsNull()
? base::Optional<url::Origin>()
: base::Optional<url::Origin>(request.RequestorOrigin());
GetContentClient()->renderer()->WillSendRequest(
frame_, transition_type, request.Url(),
base::OptionalOrNullptr(initiator_origin), &new_url,
&attach_same_site_cookies);
if (!new_url.is_empty())
request.SetUrl(WebURL(new_url));
if (internal_data->is_cache_policy_override_set())
request.SetCacheMode(internal_data->cache_policy_override());
WebString custom_user_agent;
std::unique_ptr<NavigationResponseOverrideParameters> response_override;
if (request.GetExtraData()) {
RequestExtraData* old_extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
custom_user_agent = old_extra_data->custom_user_agent();
if (!custom_user_agent.IsNull()) {
if (custom_user_agent.IsEmpty())
request.ClearHttpHeaderField("User-Agent");
else
request.SetHttpHeaderField("User-Agent", custom_user_agent);
}
response_override =
old_extra_data->TakeNavigationResponseOverrideOwnership();
}
request.SetHttpOriginIfNeeded(WebSecurityOrigin::CreateUnique());
WebDocument frame_document = frame_->GetDocument();
if (!request.GetExtraData())
request.SetExtraData(std::make_unique<RequestExtraData>());
auto* extra_data = static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(request.GetExtraData());
extra_data->set_is_preprerendering(
GetContentClient()->renderer()->IsPrerenderingFrame(this));
extra_data->set_custom_user_agent(custom_user_agent);
extra_data->set_render_frame_id(routing_id_);
extra_data->set_is_main_frame(IsMainFrame());
extra_data->set_allow_download(
navigation_state->common_params().download_policy.IsDownloadAllowed());
extra_data->set_transition_type(transition_type);
extra_data->set_navigation_response_override(std::move(response_override));
bool is_for_no_state_prefetch =
GetContentClient()->renderer()->IsPrefetchOnly(this, request);
extra_data->set_is_for_no_state_prefetch(is_for_no_state_prefetch);
extra_data->set_initiated_in_secure_context(frame_document.IsSecureContext());
extra_data->set_attach_same_site_cookies(attach_same_site_cookies);
extra_data->set_frame_request_blocker(frame_request_blocker_);
request.SetDownloadToNetworkCacheOnly(
is_for_no_state_prefetch && resource_type != ResourceType::kMainFrame);
RenderThreadImpl* render_thread = RenderThreadImpl::current();
if (render_thread && render_thread->url_loader_throttle_provider()) {
extra_data->set_url_loader_throttles(
render_thread->url_loader_throttle_provider()->CreateThrottles(
routing_id_, request, resource_type));
}
if (request.GetPreviewsState() == WebURLRequest::kPreviewsUnspecified) {
if (is_main_frame_ && !navigation_state->request_committed()) {
request.SetPreviewsState(static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(
navigation_state->common_params().previews_state));
} else {
WebURLRequest::PreviewsState request_previews_state =
static_cast<WebURLRequest::PreviewsState>(previews_state_);
request_previews_state &= ~(WebURLRequest::kClientLoFiOn);
request_previews_state &= ~(WebURLRequest::kLazyImageLoadDeferred);
if (request_previews_state == WebURLRequest::kPreviewsUnspecified)
request_previews_state = WebURLRequest::kPreviewsOff;
request.SetPreviewsState(request_previews_state);
}
}
request.SetRequestorID(render_view_->GetRoutingID());
request.SetHasUserGesture(
WebUserGestureIndicator::IsProcessingUserGesture(frame_));
if (!render_view_->renderer_preferences_.enable_referrers)
request.SetHttpReferrer(WebString(),
network::mojom::ReferrerPolicy::kDefault);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShelfLayoutManager::OnWindowAddedToLayout(aura::Window* child) {
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha224_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
sctx->state[0] = SHA224_H0;
sctx->state[1] = SHA224_H1;
sctx->state[2] = SHA224_H2;
sctx->state[3] = SHA224_H3;
sctx->state[4] = SHA224_H4;
sctx->state[5] = SHA224_H5;
sctx->state[6] = SHA224_H6;
sctx->state[7] = SHA224_H7;
sctx->count = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nts_to_str(int nts)
{
switch(nts)
{
case NTS_SSDP_ALIVE:
return "ssdp:alive";
case NTS_SSDP_BYEBYE:
return "ssdp:byebye";
case NTS_SSDP_UPDATE:
return "ssdp:update";
}
return "unknown";
}
Commit Message: minissdpd.c: Initialize pointers to NULL (fix)
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 73,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rb_advance_iter(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
unsigned length;
cpu_buffer = iter->cpu_buffer;
/*
* Check if we are at the end of the buffer.
*/
if (iter->head >= rb_page_size(iter->head_page)) {
/* discarded commits can make the page empty */
if (iter->head_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page)
return;
rb_inc_iter(iter);
return;
}
event = rb_iter_head_event(iter);
length = rb_event_length(event);
/*
* This should not be called to advance the header if we are
* at the tail of the buffer.
*/
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
(iter->head_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page) &&
(iter->head + length > rb_commit_index(cpu_buffer))))
return;
rb_update_iter_read_stamp(iter, event);
iter->head += length;
/* check for end of page padding */
if ((iter->head >= rb_page_size(iter->head_page)) &&
(iter->head_page != cpu_buffer->commit_page))
rb_inc_iter(iter);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeHostImpl::IsUIResourceOpaque(UIResourceId uid) const {
UIResourceMap::const_iterator iter = ui_resource_map_.find(uid);
DCHECK(iter != ui_resource_map_.end());
return iter->second.opaque;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::dropEvent(QDropEvent* e)
{
if (e->mimeData() && e->mimeData()->hasUrls())
emit urlsDropped(KUrl::List::fromMimeData(e->mimeData(), KUrl::List::PreferLocalUrls));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void umount_mnt(struct mount *mnt)
{
/* old mountpoint will be dropped when we can do that */
mnt->mnt_ex_mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
unhash_mnt(mnt);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AviaryScheddPlugin::update(int cmd, const ClassAd *ad)
{
MyString hashKey;
switch (cmd) {
case UPDATE_SCHEDD_AD:
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Received UPDATE_SCHEDD_AD\n");
schedulerObj->update(*ad);
break;
default:
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Unsupported command: %s\n",
getCollectorCommandString(cmd));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gf_sys_set_args(s32 argc, const char **argv)
{
#if !defined(__DARWIN__) && !defined(__APPLE__)
if (!gpac_argc && (argc>=0) )
#endif
{
gpac_argc = (u32) argc;
gpac_argv = argv;
}
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: acpi_os_write_pci_configuration(struct acpi_pci_id * pci_id, u32 reg,
u64 value, u32 width)
{
int result, size;
switch (width) {
case 8:
size = 1;
break;
case 16:
size = 2;
break;
case 32:
size = 4;
break;
default:
return AE_ERROR;
}
result = raw_pci_write(pci_id->segment, pci_id->bus,
PCI_DEVFN(pci_id->device, pci_id->function),
reg, size, value);
return (result ? AE_ERROR : AE_OK);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetObserverCounts() {
token_available_count_ = 0;
token_revoked_count_ = 0;
tokens_loaded_count_ = 0;
start_batch_changes_ = 0;
end_batch_changes_ = 0;
auth_error_changed_count_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_abort(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
unsigned int len;
__be16 error = SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify_either(chunk, asoc))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ABORT chunk has a valid length.
* Since this is an ABORT chunk, we have to discard it
* because of the following text:
* RFC 2960, Section 3.3.7
* If an endpoint receives an ABORT with a format error or for an
* association that doesn't exist, it MUST silently discard it.
* Because the length is "invalid", we can't really discard just
* as we do not know its true length. So, to be safe, discard the
* packet.
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_abort_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* See if we have an error cause code in the chunk. */
len = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
if (len >= sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr))
error = ((sctp_errhdr_t *)chunk->skb->data)->cause;
return sctp_stop_t1_and_abort(net, commands, error, ECONNREFUSED, asoc,
chunk->transport);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TreeView::StartEditing(TreeModelNode* node) {
DCHECK(node && tree_view_);
CancelEdit();
if (model_->GetParent(node))
Expand(model_->GetParent(node));
const NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetails(node);
SetFocus(tree_view_);
SetSelectedNode(node);
TreeView_EditLabel(tree_view_, details->tree_item);
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int burl_normalize_basic_required_fix (buffer *b, buffer *t, int i, int qs)
{
int j = i;
const int used = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const unsigned char * const s = (unsigned char *)b->ptr;
unsigned char * const p =
(unsigned char *)buffer_string_prepare_copy(t,i+(used-i)*3+1);
unsigned int n1, n2;
memcpy(p, s, (size_t)i);
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
if (!encoded_chars_http_uri_reqd[s[i]]) {
if (s[i] == '?' && -1 == qs) qs = j;
p[j] = s[i];
}
else if (s[i]=='%' && li_cton(s[i+1], n1) && li_cton(s[i+2], n2)) {
const unsigned int x = (n1 << 4) | n2;
if (!encoded_chars_http_uri_reqd[x]
&& (qs < 0 ? (x!='/'&&x!='?') : (x!='&'&&x!='='&&x!=';'))) {
p[j] = x;
}
else {
p[j] = '%';
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[n1]; /*(s[i+1] & 0xdf)*/
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[n2]; /*(s[i+2] & 0xdf)*/
if (li_utf8_invalid_byte(x)) qs = -2;
}
i+=2;
}
else if (s[i] == '#') break; /* ignore fragment */
else {
p[j] = '%';
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
p[++j] = hex_chars_uc[s[i] & 0xF];
if (li_utf8_invalid_byte(s[i])) qs = -2;
}
}
buffer_commit(t, (size_t)j);
buffer_copy_buffer(b, t);
return qs;
}
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 90,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs_init_cinfo(struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo,
struct inode *inode,
struct nfs_direct_req *dreq)
{
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __do_notify(struct mqueue_inode_info *info)
{
/* notification
* invoked when there is registered process and there isn't process
* waiting synchronously for message AND state of queue changed from
* empty to not empty. Here we are sure that no one is waiting
* synchronously. */
if (info->notify_owner &&
info->attr.mq_curmsgs == 1) {
struct siginfo sig_i;
switch (info->notify.sigev_notify) {
case SIGEV_NONE:
break;
case SIGEV_SIGNAL:
/* sends signal */
sig_i.si_signo = info->notify.sigev_signo;
sig_i.si_errno = 0;
sig_i.si_code = SI_MESGQ;
sig_i.si_value = info->notify.sigev_value;
/* map current pid/uid into info->owner's namespaces */
rcu_read_lock();
sig_i.si_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current,
ns_of_pid(info->notify_owner));
sig_i.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(info->notify_user_ns, current_uid());
rcu_read_unlock();
kill_pid_info(info->notify.sigev_signo,
&sig_i, info->notify_owner);
break;
case SIGEV_THREAD:
set_cookie(info->notify_cookie, NOTIFY_WOKENUP);
netlink_sendskb(info->notify_sock, info->notify_cookie);
break;
}
/* after notification unregisters process */
put_pid(info->notify_owner);
put_user_ns(info->notify_user_ns);
info->notify_owner = NULL;
info->notify_user_ns = NULL;
}
wake_up(&info->wait_q);
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupBaseView::OnMouseReleased(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() && HitTestPoint(event.location()))
AcceptSelection(event.location());
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: append_cert_policy (char **policies, const char *oid, int crit)
{
char *p;
if (!*policies)
{
*policies = xtrymalloc (strlen (oid) + 4);
if (!*policies)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
p = *policies;
}
else
{
char *tmp = xtryrealloc (*policies,
strlen(*policies) + 1 + strlen (oid) + 4);
if (!tmp)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
*policies = tmp;
p = stpcpy (tmp+strlen (tmp), "\n");;
}
strcpy (stpcpy (p, oid), crit? ":C:": ":N:");
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ext4_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type,
const char *data, size_t len, loff_t off)
{
struct inode *inode = sb_dqopt(sb)->files[type];
ext4_lblk_t blk = off >> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
int err, offset = off & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
int retries = 0;
struct buffer_head *bh;
handle_t *handle = journal_current_handle();
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal && !handle) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Quota write (off=%llu, len=%llu)"
" cancelled because transaction is not started",
(unsigned long long)off, (unsigned long long)len);
return -EIO;
}
/*
* Since we account only one data block in transaction credits,
* then it is impossible to cross a block boundary.
*/
if (sb->s_blocksize - offset < len) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "Quota write (off=%llu, len=%llu)"
" cancelled because not block aligned",
(unsigned long long)off, (unsigned long long)len);
return -EIO;
}
do {
bh = ext4_bread(handle, inode, blk,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL);
} while (IS_ERR(bh) && (PTR_ERR(bh) == -ENOSPC) &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries));
if (IS_ERR(bh))
return PTR_ERR(bh);
if (!bh)
goto out;
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get write access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
brelse(bh);
return err;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
memcpy(bh->b_data+offset, data, len);
flush_dcache_page(bh->b_page);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, bh);
brelse(bh);
out:
if (inode->i_size < off + len) {
i_size_write(inode, off + len);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::layoutUpdated()
{
if (frame() && frame()->page())
frame()->page()->chromeClient().layoutUpdated(frame());
markers().updateRenderedRectsForMarkers();
if (isRenderingReady() && body() && !styleEngine().hasPendingSheets()) {
if (!m_documentTiming.firstLayout())
m_documentTiming.markFirstLayout();
}
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool mouse_press() const { return mouse_press_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TestRenderViewHost::CreateRenderView(
int opener_frame_route_id,
int proxy_route_id,
const FrameReplicationState& replicated_frame_state,
bool window_was_created_with_opener) {
DCHECK(!IsRenderViewLive());
GetWidget()->set_renderer_initialized(true);
DCHECK(IsRenderViewLive());
opener_frame_route_id_ = opener_frame_route_id;
RenderFrameHost* main_frame = GetMainFrame();
if (main_frame)
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(main_frame)->SetRenderFrameCreated(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ath_get_skb_tid(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_node *an, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u8 tidno = skb->priority & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
return ATH_AN_2_TID(an, tidno);
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,667 |
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