instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SSW( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
exc->GS.single_width_value = FT_MulFix( args[0],
exc->tt_metrics.scale );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::UIResourceProvider& CompositorImpl::GetUIResourceProvider() {
return *this;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(struct packet_sock *po,
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue)
{
struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc;
pkc = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring);
spin_lock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
pkc->delete_blk_timer = 1;
spin_unlock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
prb_del_retire_blk_timer(pkc);
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::publishPostScriptUpdateAd( ClassAd* ad )
{
if( post_script && post_script->PublishUpdateAd(ad) ) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateOutstandingRequestsStats(
const ResourceRequestInfoImpl& info,
const OustandingRequestsStats& stats) {
if (stats.memory_cost == 0 && stats.num_requests == 0)
outstanding_requests_stats_map_.erase(info.GetChildID());
else
outstanding_requests_stats_map_[info.GetChildID()] = stats;
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int register_oom_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&oom_notify_list, nb);
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestRenderFrame::Navigate(const network::ResourceResponseHead& head,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params) {
if (!IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled()) {
CommitNavigation(head, common_params, commit_params,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr(),
std::make_unique<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>(),
base::nullopt,
blink::mojom::ControllerServiceWorkerInfoPtr(),
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerProviderInfoForWindowPtr(),
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr(),
base::UnguessableToken::Create(), base::DoNothing());
} else {
BindNavigationClient(
mojo::MakeRequestAssociatedWithDedicatedPipe(&mock_navigation_client_));
CommitPerNavigationMojoInterfaceNavigation(
head, common_params, commit_params,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr(),
std::make_unique<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>(), base::nullopt,
blink::mojom::ControllerServiceWorkerInfoPtr(),
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerProviderInfoForWindowPtr(),
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr(), base::UnguessableToken::Create(),
base::BindOnce(&MockFrameHost::DidCommitProvisionalLoad,
base::Unretained(mock_frame_host_.get())));
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::DocumentLoadComplete(int page_count) {
FormTextFieldFocusChange(false);
DCHECK(document_load_state_ == LOAD_STATE_LOADING);
document_load_state_ = LOAD_STATE_COMPLETE;
UserMetricsRecordAction("PDF.LoadSuccess");
if (IsPrintPreview()) {
AppendBlankPrintPreviewPages();
OnGeometryChanged(0, 0);
}
pp::VarDictionary bookmarks_message;
bookmarks_message.Set(pp::Var(kType), pp::Var(kJSBookmarksType));
bookmarks_message.Set(pp::Var(kJSBookmarks), engine_->GetBookmarks());
PostMessage(bookmarks_message);
pp::VarDictionary progress_message;
progress_message.Set(pp::Var(kType), pp::Var(kJSLoadProgressType));
progress_message.Set(pp::Var(kJSProgressPercentage), pp::Var(100));
PostMessage(progress_message);
if (!full_)
return;
if (did_call_start_loading_) {
pp::PDF::DidStopLoading(this);
did_call_start_loading_ = false;
}
int content_restrictions =
CONTENT_RESTRICTION_CUT | CONTENT_RESTRICTION_PASTE;
if (!engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_COPY))
content_restrictions |= CONTENT_RESTRICTION_COPY;
if (!engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_PRINT_LOW_QUALITY) &&
!engine_->HasPermission(PDFEngine::PERMISSION_PRINT_HIGH_QUALITY)) {
content_restrictions |= CONTENT_RESTRICTION_PRINT;
}
pp::PDF::SetContentRestriction(this, content_restrictions);
uma_.HistogramCustomCounts("PDF.PageCount", page_count, 1, 1000000, 50);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_namesp_match(int arg_flags, int ondisk_flags)
{
return XFS_ATTR_NSP_ONDISK(ondisk_flags) == XFS_ATTR_NSP_ARGS_TO_ONDISK(arg_flags);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 44,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Debugger::setPauseOnExceptionsState(PauseOnExceptionsState pauseOnExceptionsState)
{
DCHECK(enabled());
v8::HandleScope scope(m_isolate);
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(debuggerContext());
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { v8::Int32::New(m_isolate, pauseOnExceptionsState) };
callDebuggerMethod("setPauseOnExceptionsState", 1, argv);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __declspec(dllexport)
#endif
SQLITE_API int sqlite3_icu_init(
sqlite3 *db,
char **pzErrMsg,
const sqlite3_api_routines *pApi
){
SQLITE_EXTENSION_INIT2(pApi)
return sqlite3IcuInit(db);
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoftAVC::SoftAVC(
const char *name,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent(
name, "video_decoder.avc", OMX_VIDEO_CodingAVC,
kProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kProfileLevels),
320 /* width */, 240 /* height */, callbacks, appData, component),
mHandle(NULL),
mInputBufferCount(0),
mFirstPicture(NULL),
mFirstPictureId(-1),
mPicId(0),
mHeadersDecoded(false),
mEOSStatus(INPUT_DATA_AVAILABLE),
mSignalledError(false) {
const size_t kMinCompressionRatio = 2;
const size_t kMaxOutputBufferSize = 2048 * 2048 * 3 / 2;
initPorts(
kNumInputBuffers, kMaxOutputBufferSize / kMinCompressionRatio /* minInputBufferSize */,
kNumOutputBuffers, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC, kMinCompressionRatio);
CHECK_EQ(initDecoder(), (status_t)OK);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipgre_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
/* All the routers (except for Linux) return only
8 bytes of packet payload. It means, that precise relaying of
ICMP in the real Internet is absolutely infeasible.
Moreover, Cisco "wise men" put GRE key to the third word
in GRE header. It makes impossible maintaining even soft state for keyed
GRE tunnels with enabled checksum. Tell them "thank you".
Well, I wonder, rfc1812 was written by Cisco employee,
what the hell these idiots break standrads established
by themself???
*/
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
__be16 *p = (__be16*)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
int grehlen = (iph->ihl<<2) + 4;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct ip_tunnel *t;
__be16 flags;
flags = p[0];
if (flags&(GRE_CSUM|GRE_KEY|GRE_SEQ|GRE_ROUTING|GRE_VERSION)) {
if (flags&(GRE_VERSION|GRE_ROUTING))
return;
if (flags&GRE_KEY) {
grehlen += 4;
if (flags&GRE_CSUM)
grehlen += 4;
}
}
/* If only 8 bytes returned, keyed message will be dropped here */
if (skb_headlen(skb) < grehlen)
return;
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
return;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
/* Impossible event. */
return;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
/* Soft state for pmtu is maintained by IP core. */
return;
default:
/* All others are translated to HOST_UNREACH.
rfc2003 contains "deep thoughts" about NET_UNREACH,
I believe they are just ether pollution. --ANK
*/
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
if (code != ICMP_EXC_TTL)
return;
break;
}
rcu_read_lock();
t = ipgre_tunnel_lookup(skb->dev, iph->daddr, iph->saddr,
flags & GRE_KEY ?
*(((__be32 *)p) + (grehlen / 4) - 1) : 0,
p[1]);
if (t == NULL || t->parms.iph.daddr == 0 ||
ipv4_is_multicast(t->parms.iph.daddr))
goto out;
if (t->parms.iph.ttl == 0 && type == ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED)
goto out;
if (time_before(jiffies, t->err_time + IPTUNNEL_ERR_TIMEO))
t->err_count++;
else
t->err_count = 1;
t->err_time = jiffies;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MessageLoop::RunTask(PendingTask* pending_task) {
DCHECK(nestable_tasks_allowed_);
current_pending_task_ = pending_task;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DecrementHighResTaskCountIfNeeded(*pending_task);
#endif
nestable_tasks_allowed_ = false;
TRACE_TASK_EXECUTION("MessageLoop::RunTask", *pending_task);
for (auto& observer : task_observers_)
observer.WillProcessTask(*pending_task);
task_annotator_.RunTask("MessageLoop::PostTask", pending_task);
for (auto& observer : task_observers_)
observer.DidProcessTask(*pending_task);
nestable_tasks_allowed_ = true;
current_pending_task_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DidCreateOrOpen(File::Error error) {
error_ = error;
MessageLoop::current()->QuitWhenIdle();
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CreateContextProviderOnMainThread(
ContextProviderCreationInfo* creation_info,
WaitableEvent* waitable_event) {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
creation_info->created_context_provider =
Platform::Current()->CreateOffscreenGraphicsContext3DProvider(
creation_info->context_attributes, creation_info->url, 0,
creation_info->gl_info);
waitable_event->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static JSValueRef textZoomOutCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
notImplemented();
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unix_get_secdata(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
UNIXCB(skb).secid = scm->secid;
}
Commit Message: unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue
Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com> writes:
An AF_UNIX datagram socket being the client in an n:1 association with
some server socket is only allowed to send messages to the server if the
receive queue of this socket contains at most sk_max_ack_backlog
datagrams. This implies that prospective writers might be forced to go
to sleep despite none of the message presently enqueued on the server
receive queue were sent by them. In order to ensure that these will be
woken up once space becomes again available, the present unix_dgram_poll
routine does a second sock_poll_wait call with the peer_wait wait queue
of the server socket as queue argument (unix_dgram_recvmsg does a wake
up on this queue after a datagram was received). This is inherently
problematic because the server socket is only guaranteed to remain alive
for as long as the client still holds a reference to it. In case the
connection is dissolved via connect or by the dead peer detection logic
in unix_dgram_sendmsg, the server socket may be freed despite "the
polling mechanism" (in particular, epoll) still has a pointer to the
corresponding peer_wait queue. There's no way to forcibly deregister a
wait queue with epoll.
Based on an idea by Jason Baron, the patch below changes the code such
that a wait_queue_t belonging to the client socket is enqueued on the
peer_wait queue of the server whenever the peer receive queue full
condition is detected by either a sendmsg or a poll. A wake up on the
peer queue is then relayed to the ordinary wait queue of the client
socket via wake function. The connection to the peer wait queue is again
dissolved if either a wake up is about to be relayed or the client
socket reconnects or a dead peer is detected or the client socket is
itself closed. This enables removing the second sock_poll_wait from
unix_dgram_poll, thus avoiding the use-after-free, while still ensuring
that no blocked writer sleeps forever.
Signed-off-by: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@mobileactivedefense.com>
Fixes: ec0d215f9420 ("af_unix: fix 'poll for write'/connected DGRAM sockets")
Reviewed-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLDisable(GLenum cap) {
glDisable(cap);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int entersafe_preinstall_keys(sc_card_t *card,int (*install_rsa)(sc_card_t *,u8))
{
int r;
u8 sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
sc_apdu_t apdu;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
{/* RSA */
u8 rsa_index;
for(rsa_index=ENTERSAFE_MIN_KEY_ID;
rsa_index<=ENTERSAFE_MAX_KEY_ID;
++rsa_index)
{
r=install_rsa(card,rsa_index);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Preinstall rsa key failed");
}
}
{/* key maintain */
/* create key maintain*/
sbuf[0] = 0; /* key len extern */
sbuf[1] = sizeof(key_maintain); /* key len */
sbuf[2] = 0x03; /* USAGE */
sbuf[3] = ENTERSAFE_AC_ALWAYS; /* use AC */
sbuf[4] = ENTERSAFE_AC_ALWAYS; /* CHANGE AC */
sbuf[5] = ENTERSAFE_AC_NEVER; /* UPDATE AC */
sbuf[6] = 0x01; /* ALGO */
sbuf[7] = 0x00; /* EC */
sbuf[8] = 0x00; /* VER */
memcpy(&sbuf[9], key_maintain, sizeof(key_maintain));
sc_format_apdu(card,&apdu,SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT,0xF0,0x00,0x00);
apdu.cla=0x84;
apdu.data=sbuf;
apdu.lc=apdu.datalen=0x19;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card,&apdu,init_key,sizeof(init_key),0,1);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Preinstall key maintain failed");
}
{/* user PIN */
memset(sbuf,0,sizeof(sbuf));
sbuf[0] = 0; /* key len extern */
sbuf[1] = 16; /* key len */
sbuf[2] = 0x0B; /* USAGE */
sbuf[3] = ENTERSAFE_AC_ALWAYS; /* use AC */
sbuf[4] = 0X04; /* CHANGE AC */
sbuf[5] = 0x38; /* UPDATE AC */
sbuf[6] = 0x01; /* ALGO */
sbuf[7] = 0xFF; /* EC */
sbuf[8] = 0x00; /* VER */
sc_format_apdu(card,&apdu,SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT,0xF0,0x00,ENTERSAFE_USER_PIN_ID);
apdu.cla=0x84;
apdu.data=sbuf;
apdu.lc=apdu.datalen=0x19;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card,&apdu,init_key,sizeof(init_key),0,1);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Preinstall user PIN failed");
}
{/* user PUK */
memset(sbuf,0,sizeof(sbuf));
sbuf[0] = 0; /* key len extern */
sbuf[1] = 16; /* key len */
sbuf[2] = 0x0B; /* USAGE */
sbuf[3] = ENTERSAFE_AC_ALWAYS; /* use AC */
sbuf[4] = 0X08; /* CHANGE AC */
sbuf[5] = 0xC0; /* UPDATE AC */
sbuf[6] = 0x01; /* ALGO */
sbuf[7] = 0xFF; /* EC */
sbuf[8] = 0x00; /* VER */
sc_format_apdu(card,&apdu,SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT,0xF0,0x00,ENTERSAFE_USER_PIN_ID+1);
apdu.cla=0x84;
apdu.data=sbuf;
apdu.lc=apdu.datalen=0x19;
r = entersafe_transmit_apdu(card,&apdu,init_key,sizeof(init_key),0,1);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Preinstall user PUK failed");
}
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE,SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clipOutPositionedObjects(const PaintInfo* paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& offset, TrackedRendererListHashSet* positionedObjects)
{
if (!positionedObjects)
return;
TrackedRendererListHashSet::const_iterator end = positionedObjects->end();
for (TrackedRendererListHashSet::const_iterator it = positionedObjects->begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RenderBox* r = *it;
paintInfo->context->clipOut(IntRect(offset.x() + r->x(), offset.y() + r->y(), r->width(), r->height()));
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long bt_sock_data_wait(struct sock *sk, long timeo)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
break;
if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
break;
if (signal_pending(current) || !timeo)
break;
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
return timeo;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::StartSessionFromUserInteraction(
const gfx::Rect& rect) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (!InitiateUserInteraction(false /* is_toggle */))
return;
if (rect.IsEmpty()) {
mojom::VoiceInteractionFrameworkInstance* framework_instance =
ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework(),
StartVoiceInteractionSession);
DCHECK(framework_instance);
framework_instance->StartVoiceInteractionSession(IsHomescreenActive());
} else {
mojom::VoiceInteractionFrameworkInstance* framework_instance =
ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework(),
StartVoiceInteractionSessionForRegion);
DCHECK(framework_instance);
framework_instance->StartVoiceInteractionSessionForRegion(rect);
}
VLOG(1) << "Sent voice interaction request.";
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringURLAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithUndefinedOrNullCheck>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectedtreatnullasnullstringtreatundefinedasnullstringurlattrAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Range* Editor::findRangeOfString(const String& target,
const EphemeralRangeInFlatTree& reference,
FindOptions options) {
return findRangeOfStringAlgorithm<EditingInFlatTreeStrategy>(
*frame().document(), target, reference, options);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_heartbeat(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *) arg;
struct sctp_chunk *reply;
/* Send a heartbeat to our peer. */
reply = sctp_make_heartbeat(asoc, transport);
if (!reply)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
/* Set rto_pending indicating that an RTT measurement
* is started with this heartbeat chunk.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_RTO_PENDING,
SCTP_TRANSPORT(transport));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(reply));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TaskManagerView::WindowClosing() {
if (instance_ == this)
instance_ = NULL;
task_manager_->OnWindowClosed();
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int no_sideband(transport_smart *t, struct git_odb_writepack *writepack, gitno_buffer *buf, git_transfer_progress *stats)
{
int recvd;
do {
if (t->cancelled.val) {
giterr_set(GITERR_NET, "The fetch was cancelled by the user");
return GIT_EUSER;
}
if (writepack->append(writepack, buf->data, buf->offset, stats) < 0)
return -1;
gitno_consume_n(buf, buf->offset);
if ((recvd = gitno_recv(buf)) < 0)
return recvd;
} while(recvd > 0);
if (writepack->commit(writepack, stats) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 71,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebviewHandler::Parse(Extension* extension, base::string16* error) {
scoped_ptr<WebviewInfo> info(new WebviewInfo());
const base::DictionaryValue* dict_value = NULL;
if (!extension->manifest()->GetDictionary(keys::kWebview,
&dict_value)) {
*error = base::ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidWebview);
return false;
}
const base::ListValue* url_list = NULL;
if (!dict_value->GetList(keys::kWebviewAccessibleResources,
&url_list)) {
*error = base::ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidWebviewAccessibleResourcesList);
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < url_list->GetSize(); ++i) {
std::string relative_path;
if (!url_list->GetString(i, &relative_path)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidWebviewAccessibleResource, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
URLPattern pattern(URLPattern::SCHEME_EXTENSION);
if (pattern.Parse(extension->url().spec()) != URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidURLPatternError, extension->url().spec());
return false;
}
while (relative_path[0] == '/')
relative_path = relative_path.substr(1, relative_path.length() - 1);
pattern.SetPath(pattern.path() + relative_path);
info->webview_accessible_resources_.AddPattern(pattern);
}
const base::ListValue* partition_list = NULL;
if (!dict_value->GetList(keys::kWebviewPrivilegedPartitions,
&partition_list)) {
*error = base::ASCIIToUTF16(errors::kInvalidWebviewPrivilegedPartitionList);
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < partition_list->GetSize(); ++i) {
std::string partition_wildcard;
if (!partition_list->GetString(i, &partition_wildcard)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidWebviewPrivilegedPartition, base::IntToString(i));
return false;
}
info->webview_privileged_partitions_.push_back(partition_wildcard);
}
extension->SetManifestData(keys::kWebviewAccessibleResources, info.release());
return true;
}
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrepareTabs(const char* url1 = kTestUrl,
const char* url2 = kTestUrl,
const char* url3 = kTestUrl) {
contents1_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents1_.get());
nav_handle1_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url1, contents1_.get());
contents2_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents2_.get());
nav_handle2_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url2, contents2_.get());
contents3_ = CreateTestWebContents();
ResourceCoordinatorTabHelper::CreateForWebContents(contents3_.get());
nav_handle3_ = CreateTabAndNavigation(url3, contents3_.get());
contents1_->WasHidden();
contents2_->WasHidden();
contents3_->WasHidden();
throttle1_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle1_.get());
throttle2_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle2_.get());
throttle3_ = std::make_unique<NonResumingBackgroundTabNavigationThrottle>(
nav_handle3_.get());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t local_removexattr_nofollow(FsContext *ctx, const char *path,
const char *name)
{
char *dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(path);
char *filename = g_path_get_basename(path);
int dirfd;
ssize_t ret = -1;
dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(ctx, dirpath);
if (dirfd == -1) {
goto out;
}
ret = fremovexattrat_nofollow(dirfd, filename, name);
close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
out:
g_free(dirpath);
g_free(filename);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 7,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfat_build_slots(struct inode *dir, const unsigned char *name,
int len, int is_dir, int cluster,
struct timespec *ts,
struct msdos_dir_slot *slots, int *nr_slots)
{
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(dir->i_sb);
struct fat_mount_options *opts = &sbi->options;
struct msdos_dir_slot *ps;
struct msdos_dir_entry *de;
unsigned char cksum, lcase;
unsigned char msdos_name[MSDOS_NAME];
wchar_t *uname;
__le16 time, date;
u8 time_cs;
int err, ulen, usize, i;
loff_t offset;
*nr_slots = 0;
uname = __getname();
if (!uname)
return -ENOMEM;
err = xlate_to_uni(name, len, (unsigned char *)uname, &ulen, &usize,
opts->unicode_xlate, opts->utf8, sbi->nls_io);
if (err)
goto out_free;
err = vfat_is_used_badchars(uname, ulen);
if (err)
goto out_free;
err = vfat_create_shortname(dir, sbi->nls_disk, uname, ulen,
msdos_name, &lcase);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
else if (err == 1) {
de = (struct msdos_dir_entry *)slots;
err = 0;
goto shortname;
}
/* build the entry of long file name */
cksum = fat_checksum(msdos_name);
*nr_slots = usize / 13;
for (ps = slots, i = *nr_slots; i > 0; i--, ps++) {
ps->id = i;
ps->attr = ATTR_EXT;
ps->reserved = 0;
ps->alias_checksum = cksum;
ps->start = 0;
offset = (i - 1) * 13;
fatwchar_to16(ps->name0_4, uname + offset, 5);
fatwchar_to16(ps->name5_10, uname + offset + 5, 6);
fatwchar_to16(ps->name11_12, uname + offset + 11, 2);
}
slots[0].id |= 0x40;
de = (struct msdos_dir_entry *)ps;
shortname:
/* build the entry of 8.3 alias name */
(*nr_slots)++;
memcpy(de->name, msdos_name, MSDOS_NAME);
de->attr = is_dir ? ATTR_DIR : ATTR_ARCH;
de->lcase = lcase;
fat_time_unix2fat(sbi, ts, &time, &date, &time_cs);
de->time = de->ctime = time;
de->date = de->cdate = de->adate = date;
de->ctime_cs = time_cs;
de->start = cpu_to_le16(cluster);
de->starthi = cpu_to_le16(cluster >> 16);
de->size = 0;
out_free:
__putname(uname);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pivot_root(const char * new_root, const char * put_old)
{
#ifdef __NR_pivot_root
return syscall(__NR_pivot_root, new_root, put_old);
#else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
#endif
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<IOMXObserver> OMXNodeInstance::observer() {
return mObserver;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahash_op_unaligned_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
{
struct ahash_request *areq = req->data;
struct ahash_request_priv *priv = areq->priv;
crypto_completion_t complete = priv->complete;
void *data = priv->data;
ahash_op_unaligned_finish(areq, err);
complete(data, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __u32 sctp_generate_tag(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
/* I believe that this random number generator complies with RFC1750.
* A tag of 0 is reserved for special cases (e.g. INIT).
*/
__u32 x;
do {
get_random_bytes(&x, sizeof(__u32));
} while (x == 0);
return x;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Extension* AutomationProvider::GetEnabledExtension(int extension_handle) {
const Extension* extension =
extension_tracker_->GetResource(extension_handle);
ExtensionService* service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
if (extension && service &&
service->GetExtensionById(extension->id(), false))
return extension;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::Value GetNavigationType(
const GURL& old_url,
const GURL& new_url,
ReloadType reload_type,
const NavigationEntryImpl& entry,
const FrameNavigationEntry& frame_entry,
bool is_same_document_history_load) {
switch (reload_type) {
case ReloadType::NORMAL:
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD;
case ReloadType::BYPASSING_CACHE:
case ReloadType::DISABLE_PREVIEWS:
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE;
case ReloadType::ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL:
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL;
case ReloadType::NONE:
break; // Fall through to rest of function.
}
if (entry.restore_type() == RestoreType::LAST_SESSION_EXITED_CLEANLY) {
if (entry.GetHasPostData())
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE_WITH_POST;
else
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE;
}
if (frame_entry.page_state().IsValid()) {
if (is_same_document_history_load)
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::HISTORY_SAME_DOCUMENT;
else
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::HISTORY_DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT;
}
DCHECK(!is_same_document_history_load);
if (new_url.has_ref() && old_url.EqualsIgnoringRef(new_url) &&
frame_entry.method() == "GET") {
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::SAME_DOCUMENT;
} else {
return FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT;
}
}
Commit Message: Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
CWE ID: | 0 | 153,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
*/
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( r, &grp->N ) >= 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 1 ) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( s, &grp->N ) >= 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
/*
* Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &e, buf, blen ) );
/*
* Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );
/*
* Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
*
* Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
* mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures.
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, &u2, Q ) );
if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op)
* Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v)
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &R.X, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
/*
* Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r
*/
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &R.X, r ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_pick_kdf_alg(krb5_context context,
krb5_octet_data **kdf_list,
krb5_octet_data **alg_oid)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_octet_data *req_oid = NULL;
const krb5_octet_data *supp_oid = NULL;
krb5_octet_data *tmp_oid = NULL;
int i, j = 0;
/* if we don't find a match, return NULL value */
*alg_oid = NULL;
/* for each of the OIDs that the server supports... */
for (i = 0; NULL != (supp_oid = supported_kdf_alg_ids[i]); i++) {
/* if the requested OID is in the client's list, use it. */
for (j = 0; NULL != (req_oid = kdf_list[j]); j++) {
if ((req_oid->length == supp_oid->length) &&
(0 == memcmp(req_oid->data, supp_oid->data, req_oid->length))) {
tmp_oid = k5alloc(sizeof(krb5_octet_data), &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
tmp_oid->data = k5alloc(supp_oid->length, &retval);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
tmp_oid->length = supp_oid->length;
memcpy(tmp_oid->data, supp_oid->data, tmp_oid->length);
*alg_oid = tmp_oid;
/* don't free the OID in clean-up if we are returning it */
tmp_oid = NULL;
goto cleanup;
}
}
}
cleanup:
if (tmp_oid)
krb5_free_octet_data(context, tmp_oid);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT (draft9) null ptr deref [CVE-2012-1016]
Don't check for an agility KDF identifier in the non-draft9 reply
structure when we're building a draft9 reply, because it'll be NULL.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when handling
a draft9 request, leading to a crash of the KDC process. An attacker
would need to have a valid PKINIT certificate, or an unauthenticated
attacker could execute the attack if anonymous PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: reformat comment and edit log message]
(back ported from commit cd5ff932c9d1439c961b0cf9ccff979356686aff)
ticket: 7527 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.4
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline bool turboSwizzled(J_COLOR_SPACE colorSpace) { return colorSpace == JCS_EXT_RGBA || colorSpace == JCS_EXT_BGRA; }
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_video_get_event(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct compat_video_event __user *up)
{
struct video_event kevent;
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) &kevent);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err) {
err = put_user(kevent.type, &up->type);
err |= put_user(kevent.timestamp, &up->timestamp);
err |= put_user(kevent.u.size.w, &up->u.size.w);
err |= put_user(kevent.u.size.h, &up->u.size.h);
err |= put_user(kevent.u.size.aspect_ratio,
&up->u.size.aspect_ratio);
if (err)
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_GT( INS_ARG )
{ (void)exc;
if ( args[0] > args[1] )
args[0] = 1;
else
args[0] = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: commentDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *value)
{
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.comment(%s)\n", value);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int verify_replay(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL];
if ((p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) && !rt)
return -EINVAL;
if (!rt)
return 0;
if (p->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP)
return -EINVAL;
if (p->replay_window != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:
1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
code later on.
2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (<http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/>). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.
To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.
To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Martin Willi <martin@revosec.ch>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiDsCreateOperand (
ACPI_WALK_STATE *WalkState,
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *Arg,
UINT32 ArgIndex)
{
ACPI_STATUS Status = AE_OK;
char *NameString;
UINT32 NameLength;
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT *ObjDesc;
ACPI_PARSE_OBJECT *ParentOp;
UINT16 Opcode;
ACPI_INTERPRETER_MODE InterpreterMode;
const ACPI_OPCODE_INFO *OpInfo;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE_PTR (DsCreateOperand, Arg);
/* A valid name must be looked up in the namespace */
if ((Arg->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_INT_NAMEPATH_OP) &&
(Arg->Common.Value.String) &&
!(Arg->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK))
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH, "Getting a name: Arg=%p\n", Arg));
/* Get the entire name string from the AML stream */
Status = AcpiExGetNameString (ACPI_TYPE_ANY,
Arg->Common.Value.Buffer, &NameString, &NameLength);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
/* All prefixes have been handled, and the name is in NameString */
/*
* Special handling for BufferField declarations. This is a deferred
* opcode that unfortunately defines the field name as the last
* parameter instead of the first. We get here when we are performing
* the deferred execution, so the actual name of the field is already
* in the namespace. We don't want to attempt to look it up again
* because we may be executing in a different scope than where the
* actual opcode exists.
*/
if ((WalkState->DeferredNode) &&
(WalkState->DeferredNode->Type == ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER_FIELD) &&
(ArgIndex == (UINT32)
((WalkState->Opcode == AML_CREATE_FIELD_OP) ? 3 : 2)))
{
ObjDesc = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, WalkState->DeferredNode);
Status = AE_OK;
}
else /* All other opcodes */
{
/*
* Differentiate between a namespace "create" operation
* versus a "lookup" operation (IMODE_LOAD_PASS2 vs.
* IMODE_EXECUTE) in order to support the creation of
* namespace objects during the execution of control methods.
*/
ParentOp = Arg->Common.Parent;
OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode);
if ((OpInfo->Flags & AML_NSNODE) &&
(ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode != AML_INT_METHODCALL_OP) &&
(ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode != AML_REGION_OP) &&
(ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode != AML_INT_NAMEPATH_OP))
{
/* Enter name into namespace if not found */
InterpreterMode = ACPI_IMODE_LOAD_PASS2;
}
else
{
/* Return a failure if name not found */
InterpreterMode = ACPI_IMODE_EXECUTE;
}
Status = AcpiNsLookup (WalkState->ScopeInfo, NameString,
ACPI_TYPE_ANY, InterpreterMode,
ACPI_NS_SEARCH_PARENT | ACPI_NS_DONT_OPEN_SCOPE, WalkState,
ACPI_CAST_INDIRECT_PTR (ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, &ObjDesc));
/*
* The only case where we pass through (ignore) a NOT_FOUND
* error is for the CondRefOf opcode.
*/
if (Status == AE_NOT_FOUND)
{
if (ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_CONDITIONAL_REF_OF_OP)
{
/*
* For the Conditional Reference op, it's OK if
* the name is not found; We just need a way to
* indicate this to the interpreter, set the
* object to the root
*/
ObjDesc = ACPI_CAST_PTR (
ACPI_OPERAND_OBJECT, AcpiGbl_RootNode);
Status = AE_OK;
}
else if (ParentOp->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_EXTERNAL_OP)
{
/*
* This opcode should never appear here. It is used only
* by AML disassemblers and is surrounded by an If(0)
* by the ASL compiler.
*
* Therefore, if we see it here, it is a serious error.
*/
Status = AE_AML_BAD_OPCODE;
}
else
{
/*
* We just plain didn't find it -- which is a
* very serious error at this point
*/
Status = AE_AML_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
}
}
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
ACPI_ERROR_NAMESPACE (NameString, Status);
}
}
/* Free the namestring created above */
ACPI_FREE (NameString);
/* Check status from the lookup */
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
/* Put the resulting object onto the current object stack */
Status = AcpiDsObjStackPush (ObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
AcpiDbDisplayArgumentObject (ObjDesc, WalkState);
}
else
{
/* Check for null name case */
if ((Arg->Common.AmlOpcode == AML_INT_NAMEPATH_OP) &&
!(Arg->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK))
{
/*
* If the name is null, this means that this is an
* optional result parameter that was not specified
* in the original ASL. Create a Zero Constant for a
* placeholder. (Store to a constant is a Noop.)
*/
Opcode = AML_ZERO_OP; /* Has no arguments! */
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH,
"Null namepath: Arg=%p\n", Arg));
}
else
{
Opcode = Arg->Common.AmlOpcode;
}
/* Get the object type of the argument */
OpInfo = AcpiPsGetOpcodeInfo (Opcode);
if (OpInfo->ObjectType == ACPI_TYPE_INVALID)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
}
if ((OpInfo->Flags & AML_HAS_RETVAL) ||
(Arg->Common.Flags & ACPI_PARSEOP_IN_STACK))
{
/*
* Use value that was already previously returned
* by the evaluation of this argument
*/
Status = AcpiDsResultPop (&ObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
/*
* Only error is underflow, and this indicates
* a missing or null operand!
*/
ACPI_EXCEPTION ((AE_INFO, Status,
"Missing or null operand"));
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
else
{
/* Create an ACPI_INTERNAL_OBJECT for the argument */
ObjDesc = AcpiUtCreateInternalObject (OpInfo->ObjectType);
if (!ObjDesc)
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_NO_MEMORY);
}
/* Initialize the new object */
Status = AcpiDsInitObjectFromOp (
WalkState, Arg, Opcode, &ObjDesc);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
AcpiUtDeleteObjectDesc (ObjDesc);
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
}
/* Put the operand object on the object stack */
Status = AcpiDsObjStackPush (ObjDesc, WalkState);
if (ACPI_FAILURE (Status))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (Status);
}
AcpiDbDisplayArgumentObject (ObjDesc, WalkState);
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
Commit Message: acpi: acpica: fix acpi operand cache leak in dswstate.c
I found an ACPI cache leak in ACPI early termination and boot continuing case.
When early termination occurs due to malicious ACPI table, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI function and continues to boot process. While kernel terminates
ACPI function, kmem_cache_destroy() reports Acpi-Operand cache leak.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.585957] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.587218] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.588530] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.589790] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.591534] ACPI Error: Illegal I/O port address/length above 64K: C806E00000004002/0x2 (20170303/hwvalid-155)
>[ 0.594351] ACPI Exception: AE_LIMIT, Unable to initialize fixed events (20170303/evevent-88)
>[ 0.597858] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.599162] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler (20170303/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.601836] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has objects
>[ 0.603556] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5 #26
>[ 0.605159] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.609177] Call Trace:
>[ 0.610063] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x81
>[ 0.611118] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x1aa/0x1c0
>[ 0.612632] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.613906] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0x10
>[ 0.617986] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.619293] ? acpi_terminate+0xa/0x14
>[ 0.620394] ? acpi_init+0x2af/0x34f
>[ 0.621616] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.623412] ? video_setup+0x7f/0x7f
>[ 0.624585] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x27/0x27
>[ 0.625861] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1a0
>[ 0.627513] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x19e/0x21f
>[ 0.628972] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.630043] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.631084] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
>[ 0.633343] vgaarb: loaded
>[ 0.635036] EDAC MC: Ver: 3.0.0
>[ 0.638601] PCI: Probing PCI hardware
>[ 0.639833] PCI host bridge to bus 0000:00
>[ 0.641031] pci_bus 0000:00: root bus resource [io 0x0000-0xffff]
> ... Continue to boot and log is omitted ...
I analyzed this memory leak in detail and found acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_
delete() function miscalculated the top of the stack. acpi_ds_obj_stack_push()
function uses walk_state->operand_index for start position of the top, but
acpi_ds_obj_stack_pop_and_delete() function considers index 0 for it.
Therefore, this causes acpi operand memory leak.
This cache leak causes a security threat because an old kernel (<= 4.9) shows
memory locations of kernel functions in stack dump. Some malicious users
could use this information to neutralize kernel ASLR.
I made a patch to fix ACPI operand cache leak.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 61,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_RSHUTDOWN_FUNCTION(session) /* {{{ */
{
int i;
zend_try {
php_session_flush(TSRMLS_C);
} zend_end_try();
php_rshutdown_session_globals(TSRMLS_C);
/* this should NOT be done in php_rshutdown_session_globals() */
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
if (PS(mod_user_names).names[i] != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(mod_user_names).names[i]);
PS(mod_user_names).names[i] = NULL;
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::GetPrintSettingsFromUser(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebNode& node,
int expected_pages_count,
bool is_scripted,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* print_settings) {
PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrint_Params params;
params.cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
params.has_selection = frame->HasSelection();
params.expected_pages_count = expected_pages_count;
MarginType margin_type = DEFAULT_MARGINS;
if (PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node))
margin_type = GetMarginsForPdf(frame, node, print_pages_params_->params);
params.margin_type = margin_type;
params.is_scripted = is_scripted;
params.is_modifiable = !PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node);
Send(new PrintHostMsg_DidShowPrintDialog(routing_id()));
print_pages_params_.reset();
auto msg = base::MakeUnique<PrintHostMsg_ScriptedPrint>(routing_id(), params,
print_settings);
msg->EnableMessagePumping();
Send(msg.release());
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rotateContigSamples32bits(uint16 rotation, uint16 spp, uint16 bps, uint32 width,
uint32 length, uint32 col, uint8 *src, uint8 *dst)
{
int ready_bits = 0 /*, shift_width = 0 */;
/* int bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel; */
uint32 row, rowsize, bit_offset;
uint32 src_byte, src_bit;
uint32 longbuff1 = 0, longbuff2 = 0;
uint64 maskbits = 0, matchbits = 0;
uint64 buff1 = 0, buff2 = 0, buff3 = 0;
uint8 bytebuff1 = 0, bytebuff2 = 0, bytebuff3 = 0, bytebuff4 = 0;
uint8 *next;
tsample_t sample;
if ((src == NULL) || (dst == NULL))
{
TIFFError("rotateContigSamples24bits","Invalid src or destination buffer");
return (1);
}
/* bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8; */
/* bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8; */
/* if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1)) */
/* shift_width = bytes_per_pixel; */
/* else */
/* shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1; */
rowsize = ((bps * spp * width) + 7) / 8;
ready_bits = 0;
maskbits = (uint64)-1 >> (64 - bps);
buff1 = buff2 = 0;
for (row = 0; row < length; row++)
{
bit_offset = col * bps * spp;
for (sample = 0; sample < spp; sample++)
{
if (sample == 0)
{
src_byte = bit_offset / 8;
src_bit = bit_offset % 8;
}
else
{
src_byte = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) / 8;
src_bit = (bit_offset + (sample * bps)) % 8;
}
switch (rotation)
{
case 90: next = src + src_byte - (row * rowsize);
break;
case 270: next = src + src_byte + (row * rowsize);
break;
default: TIFFError("rotateContigSamples8bits", "Invalid rotation %d", rotation);
return (1);
}
matchbits = maskbits << (64 - src_bit - bps);
if (little_endian)
{
longbuff1 = (next[0] << 24) | (next[1] << 16) | (next[2] << 8) | next[3];
longbuff2 = longbuff1;
}
else
{
longbuff1 = (next[3] << 24) | (next[2] << 16) | (next[1] << 8) | next[0];
longbuff2 = longbuff1;
}
buff3 = ((uint64)longbuff1 << 32) | longbuff2;
buff1 = (buff3 & matchbits) << (src_bit);
if (ready_bits < 32)
{ /* add another bps bits to the buffer */
bytebuff1 = bytebuff2 = bytebuff3 = bytebuff4 = 0;
buff2 = (buff2 | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
}
else /* If we have a full buffer's worth, write it out */
{
bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
*dst++ = bytebuff1;
bytebuff2 = (buff2 >> 48);
*dst++ = bytebuff2;
bytebuff3 = (buff2 >> 40);
*dst++ = bytebuff3;
bytebuff4 = (buff2 >> 32);
*dst++ = bytebuff4;
ready_bits -= 32;
/* shift in new bits */
buff2 = ((buff2 << 32) | (buff1 >> ready_bits));
}
ready_bits += bps;
}
}
while (ready_bits > 0)
{
bytebuff1 = (buff2 >> 56);
*dst++ = bytebuff1;
buff2 = (buff2 << 8);
ready_bits -= 8;
}
return (0);
} /* end rotateContigSamples32bits */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_queue_stats_for_port(struct ofport *port, uint32_t queue_id,
struct queue_stats_cbdata *cbdata)
{
cbdata->ofport = port;
if (queue_id == OFPQ_ALL) {
netdev_dump_queue_stats(port->netdev,
handle_queue_stats_dump_cb, cbdata);
} else {
struct netdev_queue_stats stats;
if (!netdev_get_queue_stats(port->netdev, queue_id, &stats)) {
put_queue_stats(cbdata, queue_id, &stats);
} else {
return OFPERR_OFPQOFC_BAD_QUEUE;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_queue_set_addr(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n, hwaddr addr)
{
vdev->vq[n].vring.desc = addr;
virtio_queue_update_rings(vdev, n);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::OnEncryptedTypesChanged(
syncable::ModelTypeSet encrypted_types,
bool encrypt_everything) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
SyncManager::Observer, observers_,
OnEncryptedTypesChanged(encrypted_types, encrypt_everything));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UrlFetcherDownloader::OnNetworkFetcherComplete(base::FilePath file_path,
int net_error,
int64_t content_size) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
const base::TimeTicks download_end_time(base::TimeTicks::Now());
const base::TimeDelta download_time =
download_end_time >= download_start_time_
? download_end_time - download_start_time_
: base::TimeDelta();
int error = -1;
if (!file_path.empty() && response_code_ == 200) {
DCHECK_EQ(0, net_error);
error = 0;
} else if (response_code_ != -1) {
error = response_code_;
} else {
error = net_error;
}
const bool is_handled = error == 0 || IsHttpServerError(error);
Result result;
result.error = error;
if (!error) {
result.response = file_path;
}
DownloadMetrics download_metrics;
download_metrics.url = url();
download_metrics.downloader = DownloadMetrics::kUrlFetcher;
download_metrics.error = error;
download_metrics.downloaded_bytes = error ? -1 : content_size;
download_metrics.total_bytes = total_bytes_;
download_metrics.download_time_ms = download_time.InMilliseconds();
VLOG(1) << "Downloaded " << content_size << " bytes in "
<< download_time.InMilliseconds() << "ms from " << url().spec()
<< " to " << result.response.value();
if (error && !download_dir_.empty()) {
base::PostTask(FROM_HERE, kTaskTraits,
base::BindOnce(IgnoreResult(&base::DeleteFileRecursively),
download_dir_));
}
main_task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&UrlFetcherDownloader::OnDownloadComplete,
base::Unretained(this), is_handled, result,
download_metrics));
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t ReadFromInput(CompoundBufferInputStream* input,
void* data, size_t size) {
uint8* out = reinterpret_cast<uint8*>(data);
int out_size = size;
const void* in;
int in_size = 0;
while (true) {
if (!input->Next(&in, &in_size)) {
return size - out_size;
}
EXPECT_GT(in_size, -1);
if (out_size <= in_size) {
memcpy(out, in, out_size);
if (in_size > out_size) {
input->BackUp(in_size - out_size);
}
return size; // Copied all of it.
}
memcpy(out, in, in_size);
out += in_size;
out_size -= in_size;
}
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip6_tnl_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip6_tnl *t = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct ip6_tnl_net *ip6n = net_generic(net, ip6_tnl_net_id);
if (dev == ip6n->fb_tnl_dev) {
spin_lock_bh(&ip6_tnl_lock);
ip6n->tnls_wc[0] = NULL;
spin_unlock_bh(&ip6_tnl_lock);
} else {
ip6_tnl_unlink(ip6n, t);
}
ip6_tnl_dst_reset(t);
dev_put(dev);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: POINTER_COLOR_UPDATE* update_read_pointer_color(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s, BYTE xorBpp)
{
POINTER_COLOR_UPDATE* pointer_color = calloc(1, sizeof(POINTER_COLOR_UPDATE));
if (!pointer_color)
goto fail;
if (!_update_read_pointer_color(s, pointer_color, xorBpp))
goto fail;
return pointer_color;
fail:
free_pointer_color_update(update->context, pointer_color);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_compr_get_codec_caps(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
int retval;
struct snd_compr_codec_caps *caps;
if (!stream->ops->get_codec_caps)
return -ENXIO;
caps = kmalloc(sizeof(*caps), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!caps)
return -ENOMEM;
retval = stream->ops->get_codec_caps(stream, caps);
if (retval)
goto out;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, caps, sizeof(*caps)))
retval = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(caps);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int LayerTreeHostImpl::RequestedMSAASampleCount() const {
if (settings_.gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count == -1) {
float device_scale_factor = pending_tree_
? pending_tree_->device_scale_factor()
: active_tree_->device_scale_factor();
return device_scale_factor >= 2.0f ? 4 : 8;
}
return settings_.gpu_rasterization_msaa_sample_count;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::updateViewportSize(bool setFixedReportedSize, bool sendResizeEvent)
{
if (!m_backingStore)
return;
ASSERT(m_mainFrame->view());
IntSize visibleSize = actualVisibleSize();
if (setFixedReportedSize)
m_mainFrame->view()->setFixedReportedSize(visibleSize);
IntRect frameRect = IntRect(scrollPosition(), visibleSize);
if (frameRect != m_mainFrame->view()->frameRect()) {
m_mainFrame->view()->setFrameRect(frameRect);
m_mainFrame->view()->adjustViewSize();
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
if (m_fullscreenVideoNode) {
Document* document = m_fullscreenVideoNode->document();
ASSERT(document);
ASSERT(document->fullScreenRenderer());
int width = m_mainFrame->view()->visibleContentRect().size().width();
document->fullScreenRenderer()->style()->setWidth(Length(width, Fixed));
}
#endif
}
if (sendResizeEvent && shouldSendResizeEvent())
m_mainFrame->eventHandler()->sendResizeEvent();
m_mainFrame->view()->repaintFixedElementsAfterScrolling();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void detach_mnt(struct mount *mnt, struct path *old_path)
{
old_path->dentry = mnt->mnt_mountpoint;
old_path->mnt = &mnt->mnt_parent->mnt;
unhash_mnt(mnt);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int nfsd_fh_hashval(struct knfsd_fh *fh)
{
return jhash2(fh->fh_base.fh_pad, XDR_QUADLEN(fh->fh_size), 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct cgroup_process_info *lxc_cgroup_process_info_get_init(struct cgroup_meta_data *meta)
{
return lxc_cgroup_process_info_get(1, meta);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ModuleSystem::RequireAsync(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(1, args.Length());
std::string module_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context_->v8_context();
v8::Local<v8::Promise::Resolver> resolver(
v8::Promise::Resolver::New(v8_context).ToLocalChecked());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(resolver->GetPromise());
scoped_ptr<v8::Global<v8::Promise::Resolver>> global_resolver(
new v8::Global<v8::Promise::Resolver>(GetIsolate(), resolver));
gin::ModuleRegistry* module_registry =
gin::ModuleRegistry::From(v8_context);
if (!module_registry) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
resolver->Reject(v8_context, v8::Exception::Error(ToV8StringUnsafe(
GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists")));
return;
}
module_registry->LoadModule(
GetIsolate(), module_name,
base::Bind(&ModuleSystem::OnModuleLoaded, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(&global_resolver)));
if (module_registry->available_modules().count(module_name) == 0)
LoadModule(module_name);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API ut64 r_bin_a2b(RBin *bin, ut64 addr) {
RBinObject *o = r_bin_cur_object (bin);
return o? o->baddr_shift + addr: addr;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool npidentifier_cache_has_int(int32_t value, NPIdentifier *pident)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY(g_npidentifier_cache == NULL))
return false;
NPIdentifierFindArgs args;
args.info.string_len = 0;
args.info.u.value = value;
return npidentifier_cache_find(&args, pident);
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_update_reordering(struct sock *sk, const int metric,
const int ts)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (metric > tp->reordering) {
int mib_idx;
tp->reordering = min(TCP_MAX_REORDERING, metric);
/* This exciting event is worth to be remembered. 8) */
if (ts)
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPTSREORDER;
else if (tcp_is_reno(tp))
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPRENOREORDER;
else if (tcp_is_fack(tp))
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPFACKREORDER;
else
mib_idx = LINUX_MIB_TCPSACKREORDER;
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), mib_idx);
#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 1
printk(KERN_DEBUG "Disorder%d %d %u f%u s%u rr%d\n",
tp->rx_opt.sack_ok, inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state,
tp->reordering,
tp->fackets_out,
tp->sacked_out,
tp->undo_marker ? tp->undo_retrans : 0);
#endif
tcp_disable_fack(tp);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_set_hardlink(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, __le16 *target_file)
{
struct smb2_file_link_info info;
void **data;
unsigned int size[2];
int rc;
int len = (2 * UniStrnlen((wchar_t *)target_file, PATH_MAX));
data = kmalloc(sizeof(void *) * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
info.ReplaceIfExists = 0; /* 1 = replace existing link with new */
/* 0 = fail if link already exists */
info.RootDirectory = 0; /* MBZ for network ops (why does spec say?) */
info.FileNameLength = cpu_to_le32(len);
data[0] = &info;
size[0] = sizeof(struct smb2_file_link_info);
data[1] = target_file;
size[1] = len + 2 /* null */;
rc = send_set_info(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
current->tgid, FILE_LINK_INFORMATION, 2, data, size);
kfree(data);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo::IdentityInfo()
: identity_status(PageInfo::SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_UNKNOWN),
safe_browsing_status(PageInfo::SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_NONE),
connection_status(PageInfo::SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNKNOWN),
show_ssl_decision_revoke_button(false),
show_change_password_buttons(false) {}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 1 | 172,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_mmu_slot_apply_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *new)
{
/* Still write protect RO slot */
if (new->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY) {
kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(kvm, new);
return;
}
/*
* Call kvm_x86_ops dirty logging hooks when they are valid.
*
* kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty is called when:
*
* - KVM_MR_CREATE with dirty logging is disabled
* - KVM_MR_FLAGS_ONLY with dirty logging is disabled in new flag
*
* The reason is, in case of PML, we need to set D-bit for any slots
* with dirty logging disabled in order to eliminate unnecessary GPA
* logging in PML buffer (and potential PML buffer full VMEXT). This
* guarantees leaving PML enabled during guest's lifetime won't have
* any additonal overhead from PML when guest is running with dirty
* logging disabled for memory slots.
*
* kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty is called when switching new slot
* to dirty logging mode.
*
* If kvm_x86_ops dirty logging hooks are invalid, use write protect.
*
* In case of write protect:
*
* Write protect all pages for dirty logging.
*
* All the sptes including the large sptes which point to this
* slot are set to readonly. We can not create any new large
* spte on this slot until the end of the logging.
*
* See the comments in fast_page_fault().
*/
if (new->flags & KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES) {
if (kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty)
kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty(kvm, new);
else
kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(kvm, new);
} else {
if (kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty)
kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty(kvm, new);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_mspel8_mc12_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, ptrdiff_t stride)
{
uint8_t halfH[88];
uint8_t halfV[64];
uint8_t halfHV[64];
wmv2_mspel8_h_lowpass(halfH, src-stride, 8, stride, 11);
wmv2_mspel8_v_lowpass(halfV, src, 8, stride, 8);
wmv2_mspel8_v_lowpass(halfHV, halfH+8, 8, 8, 8);
put_pixels8_l2_8(dst, halfV, halfHV, stride, 8, 8, 8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ccm_init_mac(struct aead_request *req, u8 maciv[], u32 msglen)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
__be32 *n = (__be32 *)&maciv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 8];
u32 l = req->iv[0] + 1;
/* verify that CCM dimension 'L' is set correctly in the IV */
if (l < 2 || l > 8)
return -EINVAL;
/* verify that msglen can in fact be represented in L bytes */
if (l < 4 && msglen >> (8 * l))
return -EOVERFLOW;
/*
* Even if the CCM spec allows L values of up to 8, the Linux cryptoapi
* uses a u32 type to represent msglen so the top 4 bytes are always 0.
*/
n[0] = 0;
n[1] = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
memcpy(maciv, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l);
/*
* Meaning of byte 0 according to CCM spec (RFC 3610/NIST 800-38C)
* - bits 0..2 : max # of bytes required to represent msglen, minus 1
* (already set by caller)
* - bits 3..5 : size of auth tag (1 => 4 bytes, 2 => 6 bytes, etc)
* - bit 6 : indicates presence of authenticate-only data
*/
maciv[0] |= (crypto_aead_authsize(aead) - 2) << 2;
if (req->assoclen)
maciv[0] |= 0x40;
memset(&req->iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - l], 0, l);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_bh_delay_or_unwritten(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
return (buffer_delay(bh) || buffer_unwritten(bh)) && buffer_dirty(bh);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebSandboxFlags WebLocalFrameImpl::EffectiveSandboxFlags() const {
if (!GetFrame())
return WebSandboxFlags::kNone;
return static_cast<WebSandboxFlags>(
GetFrame()->Loader().EffectiveSandboxFlags());
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(const QualifiedName& qName)
{
return hasValidNamespaceForElements(qName);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destroy_device_list(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
blkdev_put(FDEV(i).bdev, FMODE_EXCL);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
kfree(FDEV(i).blkz_type);
#endif
}
kfree(sbi->devs);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | 0 | 63,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::computeCompositingRequirements(RenderLayer* ancestorLayer, RenderLayer* layer, OverlapMap* overlapMap, CompositingRecursionData& currentRecursionData, bool& descendantHas3DTransform, Vector<RenderLayer*>& unclippedDescendants)
{
layer->stackingNode()->updateLayerListsIfNeeded();
if (overlapMap)
overlapMap->geometryMap().pushMappingsToAncestor(layer, ancestorLayer);
layer->setHasCompositingDescendant(false);
layer->setHasNonCompositedChild(false);
CompositingReasons reasonsToComposite = CompositingReasonNone;
CompositingReasons directReasons = directReasonsForCompositing(layer);
if (currentRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor && currentRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor->renderer()->isVideo())
directReasons |= CompositingReasonLayerForVideoOverlay;
if (canBeComposited(layer))
reasonsToComposite |= directReasons;
CompositingReasons overlapCompositingReason = currentRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing ? CompositingReasonAssumedOverlap : CompositingReasonNone;
if (m_renderView->compositorDrivenAcceleratedScrollingEnabled()) {
Vector<size_t> unclippedDescendantsToRemove;
for (size_t i = 0; i < unclippedDescendants.size(); i++) {
RenderLayer* unclippedDescendant = unclippedDescendants.at(i);
if (unclippedDescendant->renderer()->containingBlock() == layer->renderer()) {
unclippedDescendantsToRemove.append(i);
continue;
}
if (layer->scrollsWithRespectTo(unclippedDescendant))
reasonsToComposite |= CompositingReasonAssumedOverlap;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < unclippedDescendantsToRemove.size(); i++)
unclippedDescendants.remove(unclippedDescendantsToRemove.at(unclippedDescendantsToRemove.size() - i - 1));
if (reasonsToComposite & CompositingReasonOutOfFlowClipping)
unclippedDescendants.append(layer);
}
bool haveComputedBounds = false;
IntRect absBounds;
if (overlapMap && !overlapMap->isEmpty() && currentRecursionData.m_testingOverlap && !requiresCompositingOrSquashing(directReasons)) {
absBounds = enclosingIntRect(overlapMap->geometryMap().absoluteRect(layer->overlapBounds()));
if (absBounds.isEmpty())
absBounds.setSize(IntSize(1, 1));
haveComputedBounds = true;
overlapCompositingReason = overlapMap->overlapsLayers(absBounds) ? CompositingReasonOverlap : CompositingReasonNone;
}
reasonsToComposite |= overlapCompositingReason;
if (currentRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer && requiresSquashing(reasonsToComposite)
&& layer->scrollsWithRespectTo(currentRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer))
reasonsToComposite |= CompositingReasonOverlapsWithoutSquashingTarget;
CompositingRecursionData childRecursionData(currentRecursionData);
childRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing = false;
bool willBeCompositedOrSquashed = canBeComposited(layer) && requiresCompositingOrSquashing(reasonsToComposite);
if (willBeCompositedOrSquashed) {
currentRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing = true;
childRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor = layer;
if (overlapMap)
overlapMap->beginNewOverlapTestingContext();
childRecursionData.m_testingOverlap = true;
}
#if !ASSERT_DISABLED
LayerListMutationDetector mutationChecker(layer->stackingNode());
#endif
bool anyDescendantHas3DTransform = false;
bool willHaveForegroundLayer = false;
if (layer->stackingNode()->isStackingContainer()) {
RenderLayerStackingNodeIterator iterator(*layer->stackingNode(), NegativeZOrderChildren);
while (RenderLayerStackingNode* curNode = iterator.next()) {
computeCompositingRequirements(layer, curNode->layer(), overlapMap, childRecursionData, anyDescendantHas3DTransform, unclippedDescendants);
if (childRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing) {
reasonsToComposite |= CompositingReasonNegativeZIndexChildren;
if (!willBeCompositedOrSquashed) {
childRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor = layer;
overlapMap->beginNewOverlapTestingContext();
willBeCompositedOrSquashed = true;
willHaveForegroundLayer = true;
if (overlapMap) {
overlapMap->geometryMap().pushMappingsToAncestor(curNode->layer(), layer);
IntRect childAbsBounds = enclosingIntRect(overlapMap->geometryMap().absoluteRect(curNode->layer()->overlapBounds()));
bool boundsComputed = true;
overlapMap->beginNewOverlapTestingContext();
addToOverlapMap(*overlapMap, curNode->layer(), childAbsBounds, boundsComputed);
overlapMap->finishCurrentOverlapTestingContext();
overlapMap->geometryMap().popMappingsToAncestor(layer);
}
}
}
}
}
if (overlapMap && willHaveForegroundLayer) {
ASSERT(willBeCompositedOrSquashed);
overlapMap->finishCurrentOverlapTestingContext();
overlapMap->beginNewOverlapTestingContext();
childRecursionData.m_testingOverlap = true;
}
if (requiresCompositing(reasonsToComposite)) {
currentRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer = layer;
childRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer = layer;
}
RenderLayerStackingNodeIterator iterator(*layer->stackingNode(), NormalFlowChildren | PositiveZOrderChildren);
while (RenderLayerStackingNode* curNode = iterator.next())
computeCompositingRequirements(layer, curNode->layer(), overlapMap, childRecursionData, anyDescendantHas3DTransform, unclippedDescendants);
currentRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer = childRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer;
if (layer->isRootLayer()) {
if (inCompositingMode() && m_hasAcceleratedCompositing)
willBeCompositedOrSquashed = true;
}
if (overlapMap && childRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor && !childRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor->isRootLayer())
addToOverlapMap(*overlapMap, layer, absBounds, haveComputedBounds);
if (layer->stackingNode()->isStackingContext()) {
layer->setShouldIsolateCompositedDescendants(childRecursionData.m_hasUnisolatedCompositedBlendingDescendant);
} else {
layer->setShouldIsolateCompositedDescendants(false);
currentRecursionData.m_hasUnisolatedCompositedBlendingDescendant = childRecursionData.m_hasUnisolatedCompositedBlendingDescendant;
}
CompositingReasons subtreeCompositingReasons = subtreeReasonsForCompositing(layer->renderer(), childRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing, anyDescendantHas3DTransform);
reasonsToComposite |= subtreeCompositingReasons;
if (!willBeCompositedOrSquashed && canBeComposited(layer) && requiresCompositingOrSquashing(subtreeCompositingReasons)) {
childRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor = layer;
if (overlapMap) {
overlapMap->beginNewOverlapTestingContext();
addToOverlapMapRecursive(*overlapMap, layer);
}
willBeCompositedOrSquashed = true;
}
if (layer->reflectionInfo()) {
CompositingReasons reflectionCompositingReason = willBeCompositedOrSquashed ? CompositingReasonReflectionOfCompositedParent : CompositingReasonNone;
layer->reflectionInfo()->reflectionLayer()->setCompositingReasons(layer->reflectionInfo()->reflectionLayer()->compositingReasons() | reflectionCompositingReason);
}
if (childRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing)
currentRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing = true;
if (willBeCompositedOrSquashed && layer->blendInfo().hasBlendMode())
currentRecursionData.m_hasUnisolatedCompositedBlendingDescendant = true;
layer->setHasCompositingDescendant(childRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing);
bool isCompositedClippingLayer = canBeComposited(layer) && (reasonsToComposite & CompositingReasonClipsCompositingDescendants);
if ((!childRecursionData.m_testingOverlap && !isCompositedClippingLayer) || isRunningAcceleratedTransformAnimation(layer->renderer()))
currentRecursionData.m_testingOverlap = false;
if (overlapMap && childRecursionData.m_compositingAncestor == layer && !layer->isRootLayer())
overlapMap->finishCurrentOverlapTestingContext();
if (layer->isRootLayer()) {
if (childRecursionData.m_subtreeIsCompositing || requiresCompositingOrSquashing(reasonsToComposite) || m_forceCompositingMode) {
willBeCompositedOrSquashed = true;
reasonsToComposite |= CompositingReasonRoot;
} else {
enableCompositingMode(false);
willBeCompositedOrSquashed = false;
reasonsToComposite = CompositingReasonNone;
}
}
if (requiresCompositing(reasonsToComposite))
currentRecursionData.m_mostRecentCompositedLayer = layer;
layer->setCompositingReasons(reasonsToComposite);
if (!willBeCompositedOrSquashed && layer->parent())
layer->parent()->setHasNonCompositedChild(true);
descendantHas3DTransform |= anyDescendantHas3DTransform || layer->has3DTransform();
if (overlapMap)
overlapMap->geometryMap().popMappingsToAncestor(ancestorLayer);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cxusb_streaming_ctrl(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap, int onoff)
{
u8 buf[2] = { 0x03, 0x00 };
if (onoff)
cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_STREAMING_ON, buf, 2, NULL, 0);
else
cxusb_ctrl_msg(adap->dev, CMD_STREAMING_OFF, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hub_port_status(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
u16 *status, u16 *change)
{
return hub_ext_port_status(hub, port1, HUB_PORT_STATUS,
status, change, NULL);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SMD( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SMD
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThread::EnsureWebKitInitialized() {
if (webkit_client_.get())
return;
v8::V8::SetCounterFunction(base::StatsTable::FindLocation);
v8::V8::SetCreateHistogramFunction(CreateHistogram);
v8::V8::SetAddHistogramSampleFunction(AddHistogramSample);
webkit_client_.reset(new RendererWebKitClientImpl);
WebKit::initialize(webkit_client_.get());
WebScriptController::enableV8SingleThreadMode();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
webkit_glue::EnableWebCoreLogChannels(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kWebCoreLogChannels));
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBenchmarking))
RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::BenchmarkingExtension::Get());
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kPlaybackMode) ||
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kRecordMode) ||
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNoJsRandomness)) {
RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::PlaybackExtension::Get());
}
web_database_observer_impl_.reset(new WebDatabaseObserverImpl(this));
WebKit::WebDatabase::setObserver(web_database_observer_impl_.get());
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSockets(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableWebSockets));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDatabase(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDataTransferItems(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDataTransferItems));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableApplicationCache(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableApplicationCache));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableNotifications(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDesktopNotifications));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableLocalStorage(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableLocalStorage));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSessionStorage(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSessionStorage));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableIndexedDatabase(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableIndexedDatabase));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableGeolocation(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGeolocation));
WebKit::WebRuntimeFeatures::enableMediaStream(
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableMediaStream));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableWebAudio(false);
#else
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableWebAudio(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableWebAudio));
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::enablePushState(true);
#ifdef TOUCH_UI
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTouch(true);
#else
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableTouch(false);
#endif
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDeviceMotion(
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDeviceMotion));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableDeviceOrientation(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDeviceOrientation));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableSpeechInput(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSpeechInput));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableFileSystem(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFileSystem));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableJavaScriptI18NAPI(
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableJavaScriptI18NAPI));
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableQuota(true);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderProcessObserver, observers_, WebKitInitialized());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WTF::PassRefPtr<WebCore::Widget> ewk_frame_plugin_create(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const WebCore::IntSize& pluginSize, WebCore::HTMLPlugInElement* element, const WebCore::KURL& url, const WTF::Vector<WTF::String>& paramNames, const WTF::Vector<WTF::String>& paramValues, const WTF::String& mimeType, bool loadManually)
{
#if ENABLE(NETSCAPE_PLUGIN_API)
DBG("ewkFrame=%p, size=%dx%d, element=%p, url=%s, mimeType=%s",
ewkFrame, pluginSize.width(), pluginSize.height(), element,
url.string().utf8().data(), mimeType.utf8().data());
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, sd, 0);
WTF::RefPtr<WebCore::PluginView> pluginView = WebCore::PluginView::create
(sd->frame, pluginSize, element, url, paramNames, paramValues,
mimeType, loadManually);
if (pluginView->status() == WebCore::PluginStatusLoadedSuccessfully)
return pluginView.release();
#endif // #if ENABLE(NETSCAPE_PLUGIN_API)
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FUZ_displayMallocStats(mallocCounter_t count)
{
DISPLAYLEVEL(3, "peak:%6u KB, nbMallocs:%2u, total:%6u KB \n",
(U32)(count.peakMalloc >> 10),
count.nbMalloc,
(U32)(count.totalMalloc >> 10));
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::GetOfflineIdsForClientIdWhenLoadDone(
const ClientId& client_id,
const MultipleOfflineIdCallback& callback) const {
DCHECK(is_loaded_);
callback.Run(MaybeGetOfflineIdsForClientId(client_id));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ldb_dn_is_null(struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
if ( ! dn || dn->invalid) return false;
if (ldb_dn_has_extended(dn)) return false;
if (dn->linearized && (dn->linearized[0] == '\0')) return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MessageLoop::ClearTaskRunnerForTesting() {
DCHECK_EQ(this, current());
DCHECK(!unbound_task_runner_);
task_runner_ = nullptr;
thread_task_runner_handle_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BubbleManager::UpdateAllBubbleAnchors() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_NE(manager_state_, ITERATING_BUBBLES);
ManagerState original_state = manager_state_;
manager_state_ = ITERATING_BUBBLES;
for (auto& controller : controllers_)
controller->UpdateAnchorPosition();
manager_state_ = original_state;
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pppol2tp_recv(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, int data_len)
{
struct pppol2tp_session *ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
struct sock *sk = NULL;
/* If the socket is bound, send it in to PPP's input queue. Otherwise
* queue it on the session socket.
*/
sk = ps->sock;
if (sk == NULL)
goto no_sock;
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_BOUND) {
struct pppox_sock *po;
l2tp_dbg(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA,
"%s: recv %d byte data frame, passing to ppp\n",
session->name, data_len);
/* We need to forget all info related to the L2TP packet
* gathered in the skb as we are going to reuse the same
* skb for the inner packet.
* Namely we need to:
* - reset xfrm (IPSec) information as it applies to
* the outer L2TP packet and not to the inner one
* - release the dst to force a route lookup on the inner
* IP packet since skb->dst currently points to the dst
* of the UDP tunnel
* - reset netfilter information as it doesn't apply
* to the inner packet either
*/
secpath_reset(skb);
skb_dst_drop(skb);
nf_reset(skb);
po = pppox_sk(sk);
ppp_input(&po->chan, skb);
} else {
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: socket not bound\n",
session->name);
/* Not bound. Nothing we can do, so discard. */
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
return;
no_sock:
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_DATA, "%s: no socket\n", session->name);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags,
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* GLES2Implementation::MapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM(GLuint target,
GLintptr offset,
GLsizeiptr size,
GLenum access) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glMapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM("
<< target << ", " << offset << ", " << size << ", "
<< GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(access) << ")");
if (access != GL_WRITE_ONLY) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glMapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM", access, "access");
return nullptr;
}
if (!ValidateSize("glMapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM", size) ||
!ValidateOffset("glMapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM", offset)) {
return nullptr;
}
int32_t shm_id;
unsigned int shm_offset;
void* mem = mapped_memory_->Alloc(size, &shm_id, &shm_offset);
if (!mem) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glMapBufferSubDataCHROMIUM", "out of memory");
return nullptr;
}
std::pair<MappedBufferMap::iterator, bool> result = mapped_buffers_.insert(
std::make_pair(mem, MappedBuffer(access, shm_id, mem, shm_offset, target,
offset, size)));
DCHECK(result.second);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" returned " << mem);
return mem;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_ap_rescan_and_attach_pending(void)
{
entry_connection_t *entry_conn;
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(NULL == pending_entry_connections))
pending_entry_connections = smartlist_new();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
if (conn->marked_for_close ||
conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT)
continue;
entry_conn = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
tor_assert(entry_conn);
if (! smartlist_contains(pending_entry_connections, entry_conn)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a connection %p that was supposed to be "
"in pending_entry_connections, but wasn't. No worries; "
"adding it.",
pending_entry_connections);
untried_pending_connections = 1;
connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(entry_conn);
}
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
vmx->guest_msrs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) * sizeof(vmx->guest_msrs[0])
> PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!vmx->guest_msrs) {
goto uninit_vcpu;
}
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
goto free_msrs;
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id())));
loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
err = vmx_vcpu_setup(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
put_cpu();
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu)) {
err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (enable_ept) {
if (!kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr)
kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr =
VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (nested) {
nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(vmx);
vmx->nested.vpid02 = allocate_vpid();
}
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
/*
* If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
* of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
* avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
* for the guest, etc.
*/
if (enable_pml) {
err = vmx_create_pml_buffer(vmx);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);
uninit_vcpu:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
free_vcpu:
free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zspec_op(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
gx_device *dev = gs_currentdevice(igs);
int i, nprocs = sizeof(spec_op_defs) / sizeof(spec_op_t), code, proc = -1;
ref opname, nref, namestr;
char *data;
/* At the very minimum we need a name object telling us which sepc_op to perform */
check_op(1);
if (!r_has_type(op, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
ref_assign(&opname, op);
/* Find the relevant spec_op name */
for (i=0;i<nprocs;i++) {
code = names_ref(imemory->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table, (const byte *)spec_op_defs[i].name, strlen(spec_op_defs[i].name), &nref, 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (name_eq(&opname, &nref)) {
proc = i;
break;
}
}
if (proc < 0)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
pop(1); /* We don't need the name of the spec_op any more */
op = osp;
switch(proc) {
case 0:
{
stack_param_list list;
dev_param_req_t request;
ref rkeys;
/* Get a single device parameter, we should be supplied with
* the name of the paramter, as a name object.
*/
check_op(1);
if (!r_has_type(op, t_name))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
ref_assign(&opname, op);
name_string_ref(imemory, &opname, &namestr);
data = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(imemory, r_size(&namestr) + 1, "temporary special_op string");
if (data == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
memset(data, 0x00, r_size(&namestr) + 1);
memcpy(data, namestr.value.bytes, r_size(&namestr));
/* Discard the parameter name now, we're done with it */
pop (1);
/* Make a null object so that the stack param list won't check for requests */
make_null(&rkeys);
stack_param_list_write(&list, &o_stack, &rkeys, iimemory);
/* Stuff the data into a structure for passing to the spec_op */
request.Param = data;
request.list = &list;
code = dev_proc(dev, dev_spec_op)(dev, gxdso_get_dev_param, &request, sizeof(dev_param_req_t));
gs_free_object(imemory, data, "temporary special_op string");
if (code < 0) {
if (code == gs_error_undefined) {
op = osp;
push(1);
make_bool(op, 0);
} else
return_error(code);
} else {
op = osp;
push(1);
make_bool(op, 1);
}
}
break;
default:
/* Belt and braces; it shold not be possible to get here, as the table
* containing the names should mirror the entries in this switch. If we
* found a name there should be a matching case here.
*/
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct in_device *inetdev_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct in_device *in_dev;
int err = -ENOMEM;
ASSERT_RTNL();
in_dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*in_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!in_dev)
goto out;
memcpy(&in_dev->cnf, dev_net(dev)->ipv4.devconf_dflt,
sizeof(in_dev->cnf));
in_dev->cnf.sysctl = NULL;
in_dev->dev = dev;
in_dev->arp_parms = neigh_parms_alloc(dev, &arp_tbl);
if (!in_dev->arp_parms)
goto out_kfree;
if (IPV4_DEVCONF(in_dev->cnf, FORWARDING))
dev_disable_lro(dev);
/* Reference in_dev->dev */
dev_hold(dev);
/* Account for reference dev->ip_ptr (below) */
in_dev_hold(in_dev);
err = devinet_sysctl_register(in_dev);
if (err) {
in_dev->dead = 1;
in_dev_put(in_dev);
in_dev = NULL;
goto out;
}
ip_mc_init_dev(in_dev);
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
ip_mc_up(in_dev);
/* we can receive as soon as ip_ptr is set -- do this last */
rcu_assign_pointer(dev->ip_ptr, in_dev);
out:
return in_dev ?: ERR_PTR(err);
out_kfree:
kfree(in_dev);
in_dev = NULL;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnAllocateSharedMemory(
uint32 buffer_size,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* handle) {
ChildProcessHostImpl::AllocateSharedMemory(
buffer_size, peer_handle(), handle);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ForwardToJavaFrameRegistry(
mojo::InterfaceRequest<Interface> request,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
render_frame_host->GetJavaInterfaces()->GetInterface(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t String8::append(const String8& other)
{
const size_t otherLen = other.bytes();
if (bytes() == 0) {
setTo(other);
return NO_ERROR;
} else if (otherLen == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
return real_append(other.string(), otherLen);
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_STACK_PUSH(const struct nx_action_stack *nasp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *tlv_bitmap, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
struct ofpact_stack *push = ofpact_put_STACK_PUSH(ofpacts);
enum ofperr error = decode_stack_action(nasp, vl_mff_map, tlv_bitmap,
push);
return error ? error : nxm_stack_push_check(push, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void yyfatal(
yyscan_t yyscanner,
const char *error_message)
{
jmp_buf* recovery_state = (jmp_buf*) yr_thread_storage_get_value(
&recovery_state_key);
longjmp(*recovery_state, 1);
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: last_sync_action_show(struct mddev *mddev, char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%s\n", mddev->last_sync_action);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,399 |
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