instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned usb_bus_is_wusb(struct usb_bus *bus)
{
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(bus);
return hcd->wireless;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourceRequestBlockedReason BaseFetchContext::CanRequestInternal(
Resource::Type type,
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const KURL& url,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy,
FetchParameters::OriginRestriction origin_restriction,
ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirect_status) const {
if (IsDetached()) {
if (!resource_request.GetKeepalive() ||
redirect_status == ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus::kNoRedirect) {
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther;
}
}
if (ShouldBlockRequestByInspector(resource_request.Url()))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kInspector;
SecurityOrigin* security_origin = options.security_origin.get();
if (!security_origin)
security_origin = GetSecurityOrigin();
if (origin_restriction != FetchParameters::kNoOriginRestriction &&
security_origin && !security_origin->CanDisplay(url)) {
if (reporting_policy == SecurityViolationReportingPolicy::kReport) {
AddErrorConsoleMessage(
"Not allowed to load local resource: " + url.GetString(), kJSSource);
}
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1) << "ResourceFetcher::requestResource URL was not "
"allowed by SecurityOrigin::CanDisplay";
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther;
}
switch (type) {
case Resource::kMainResource:
case Resource::kImage:
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
case Resource::kScript:
case Resource::kFont:
case Resource::kRaw:
case Resource::kLinkPrefetch:
case Resource::kTextTrack:
case Resource::kImportResource:
case Resource::kMedia:
case Resource::kManifest:
case Resource::kMock:
if (origin_restriction == FetchParameters::kRestrictToSameOrigin &&
!security_origin->CanRequest(url)) {
PrintAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOrigin;
}
break;
case Resource::kXSLStyleSheet:
DCHECK(RuntimeEnabledFeatures::XSLTEnabled());
case Resource::kSVGDocument:
if (!security_origin->CanRequest(url)) {
PrintAccessDeniedMessage(url);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOrigin;
}
break;
}
WebURLRequest::RequestContext request_context =
resource_request.GetRequestContext();
if (CheckCSPForRequestInternal(
request_context, url, options, reporting_policy, redirect_status,
ContentSecurityPolicy::CheckHeaderType::kCheckEnforce) ==
ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kCSP) {
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kCSP;
}
if (type == Resource::kScript || type == Resource::kImportResource) {
if (!AllowScriptFromSource(url)) {
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kCSP;
}
}
if (type != Resource::kMainResource && IsSVGImageChromeClient() &&
!url.ProtocolIsData())
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOrigin;
WebURLRequest::FrameType frame_type = resource_request.GetFrameType();
if (frame_type != WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeTopLevel) {
bool is_subresource = frame_type == WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeNone;
const SecurityOrigin* embedding_origin =
is_subresource ? GetSecurityOrigin() : GetParentSecurityOrigin();
DCHECK(embedding_origin);
if (SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(url.Protocol()) &&
!SchemeRegistry::ShouldTreatURLSchemeAsLegacy(
embedding_origin->Protocol())) {
CountDeprecation(WebFeature::kLegacyProtocolEmbeddedAsSubresource);
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOrigin;
}
if (ShouldBlockFetchAsCredentialedSubresource(resource_request, url))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOrigin;
}
if (ShouldBlockFetchByMixedContentCheck(request_context, frame_type,
resource_request.GetRedirectStatus(),
url, reporting_policy))
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kMixedContent;
if (url.PotentiallyDanglingMarkup() && url.ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily()) {
CountDeprecation(WebFeature::kCanRequestURLHTTPContainingNewline);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::RestrictCanRequestURLCharacterSetEnabled())
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kOther;
}
if (GetSubresourceFilter() && type != Resource::kMainResource &&
type != Resource::kImportResource) {
if (!GetSubresourceFilter()->AllowLoad(url, request_context,
reporting_policy)) {
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kSubresourceFilter;
}
}
return ResourceRequestBlockedReason::kNone;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TT_New_Context( TT_Driver driver )
{
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Error error;
TT_ExecContext exec = NULL;
if ( !driver )
goto Fail;
memory = driver->root.root.memory;
/* allocate object */
if ( FT_NEW( exec ) )
goto Fail;
/* initialize it; in case of error this deallocates `exec' too */
error = Init_Context( exec, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
return exec;
Fail:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_ptr<LayerImpl> Layer::CreateLayerImpl(LayerTreeImpl* tree_impl) {
return LayerImpl::Create(tree_impl, layer_id_);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedTextureUploadTimer::~ScopedTextureUploadTimer() {
decoder_->texture_upload_count_++;
decoder_->total_texture_upload_time_ +=
base::TimeTicks::HighResNow() - begin_time_;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::DeleteContentsTexturesOnImplThread(
ResourceProvider* resource_provider) {
DCHECK(proxy_->IsImplThread());
if (contents_texture_manager_)
contents_texture_manager_->ClearAllMemory(resource_provider);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::Get(
int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
int64_t index_id,
const IndexedDBKeyRange& key_range,
bool key_only,
scoped_refptr<IndexedDBCallbacks> callbacks) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->database()->Get(transaction, object_store_id, index_id,
base::MakeUnique<IndexedDBKeyRange>(key_range),
key_only, callbacks);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __end_block_io_op(struct pending_req *pending_req, int error)
{
/* An error fails the entire request. */
if ((pending_req->operation == BLKIF_OP_FLUSH_DISKCACHE) &&
(error == -EOPNOTSUPP)) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "flush diskcache op failed, not supported\n");
xen_blkbk_flush_diskcache(XBT_NIL, pending_req->blkif->be, 0);
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if ((pending_req->operation == BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER) &&
(error == -EOPNOTSUPP)) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "write barrier op failed, not supported\n");
xen_blkbk_barrier(XBT_NIL, pending_req->blkif->be, 0);
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (error) {
pr_debug(DRV_PFX "Buffer not up-to-date at end of operation,"
" error=%d\n", error);
pending_req->status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
}
/*
* If all of the bio's have completed it is time to unmap
* the grant references associated with 'request' and provide
* the proper response on the ring.
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&pending_req->pendcnt)) {
xen_blkbk_unmap(pending_req->blkif,
pending_req->segments,
pending_req->nr_pages);
make_response(pending_req->blkif, pending_req->id,
pending_req->operation, pending_req->status);
xen_blkif_put(pending_req->blkif);
if (atomic_read(&pending_req->blkif->refcnt) <= 2) {
if (atomic_read(&pending_req->blkif->drain))
complete(&pending_req->blkif->drain_complete);
}
free_req(pending_req->blkif, pending_req);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pcrypt_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct pcrypt_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int t2p_process_jpeg_strip(
unsigned char* strip,
tsize_t* striplength,
unsigned char* buffer,
tsize_t* bufferoffset,
tstrip_t no,
uint32 height){
tsize_t i=0;
while (i < *striplength) {
tsize_t datalen;
uint16 ri;
uint16 v_samp;
uint16 h_samp;
int j;
int ncomp;
/* marker header: one or more FFs */
if (strip[i] != 0xff)
return(0);
i++;
while (i < *striplength && strip[i] == 0xff)
i++;
if (i >= *striplength)
return(0);
/* SOI is the only pre-SOS marker without a length word */
if (strip[i] == 0xd8)
datalen = 0;
else {
if ((*striplength - i) <= 2)
return(0);
datalen = (strip[i+1] << 8) | strip[i+2];
if (datalen < 2 || datalen >= (*striplength - i))
return(0);
}
switch( strip[i] ){
case 0xd8: /* SOI - start of image */
_TIFFmemcpy(&(buffer[*bufferoffset]), &(strip[i-1]), 2);
*bufferoffset+=2;
break;
case 0xc0: /* SOF0 */
case 0xc1: /* SOF1 */
case 0xc3: /* SOF3 */
case 0xc9: /* SOF9 */
case 0xca: /* SOF10 */
if(no==0){
_TIFFmemcpy(&(buffer[*bufferoffset]), &(strip[i-1]), datalen+2);
ncomp = buffer[*bufferoffset+9];
if (ncomp < 1 || ncomp > 4)
return(0);
v_samp=1;
h_samp=1;
for(j=0;j<ncomp;j++){
uint16 samp = buffer[*bufferoffset+11+(3*j)];
if( (samp>>4) > h_samp)
h_samp = (samp>>4);
if( (samp & 0x0f) > v_samp)
v_samp = (samp & 0x0f);
}
v_samp*=8;
h_samp*=8;
ri=((( ((uint16)(buffer[*bufferoffset+5])<<8) |
(uint16)(buffer[*bufferoffset+6]) )+v_samp-1)/
v_samp);
ri*=((( ((uint16)(buffer[*bufferoffset+7])<<8) |
(uint16)(buffer[*bufferoffset+8]) )+h_samp-1)/
h_samp);
buffer[*bufferoffset+5]=
(unsigned char) ((height>>8) & 0xff);
buffer[*bufferoffset+6]=
(unsigned char) (height & 0xff);
*bufferoffset+=datalen+2;
/* insert a DRI marker */
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=0xff;
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=0xdd;
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=0x00;
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=0x04;
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=(ri >> 8) & 0xff;
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]= ri & 0xff;
}
break;
case 0xc4: /* DHT */
case 0xdb: /* DQT */
_TIFFmemcpy(&(buffer[*bufferoffset]), &(strip[i-1]), datalen+2);
*bufferoffset+=datalen+2;
break;
case 0xda: /* SOS */
if(no==0){
_TIFFmemcpy(&(buffer[*bufferoffset]), &(strip[i-1]), datalen+2);
*bufferoffset+=datalen+2;
} else {
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=0xff;
buffer[(*bufferoffset)++]=
(unsigned char)(0xd0 | ((no-1)%8));
}
i += datalen + 1;
/* copy remainder of strip */
_TIFFmemcpy(&(buffer[*bufferoffset]), &(strip[i]), *striplength - i);
*bufferoffset+= *striplength - i;
return(1);
default:
/* ignore any other marker */
break;
}
i += datalen + 1;
}
/* failed to find SOS marker */
return(0);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 166,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CoreEnterLeaveEvent(DeviceIntPtr mouse,
int type,
int mode, int detail, WindowPtr pWin, Window child)
{
xEvent event = {
.u.u.type = type,
.u.u.detail = detail
};
WindowPtr focus;
DeviceIntPtr keybd;
GrabPtr grab = mouse->deviceGrab.grab;
Mask mask;
keybd = GetMaster(mouse, KEYBOARD_OR_FLOAT);
if ((pWin == mouse->valuator->motionHintWindow) &&
(detail != NotifyInferior))
mouse->valuator->motionHintWindow = NullWindow;
if (grab) {
mask = (pWin == grab->window) ? grab->eventMask : 0;
if (grab->ownerEvents)
mask |= EventMaskForClient(pWin, rClient(grab));
}
else {
mask = pWin->eventMask | wOtherEventMasks(pWin);
}
event.u.enterLeave.time = currentTime.milliseconds;
event.u.enterLeave.rootX = mouse->spriteInfo->sprite->hot.x;
event.u.enterLeave.rootY = mouse->spriteInfo->sprite->hot.y;
/* Counts on the same initial structure of crossing & button events! */
FixUpEventFromWindow(mouse->spriteInfo->sprite, &event, pWin, None, FALSE);
/* Enter/Leave events always set child */
event.u.enterLeave.child = child;
event.u.enterLeave.flags = event.u.keyButtonPointer.sameScreen ?
ELFlagSameScreen : 0;
event.u.enterLeave.state =
mouse->button ? (mouse->button->state & 0x1f00) : 0;
if (keybd)
event.u.enterLeave.state |=
XkbGrabStateFromRec(&keybd->key->xkbInfo->state);
event.u.enterLeave.mode = mode;
focus = (keybd) ? keybd->focus->win : None;
if ((focus != NoneWin) &&
((pWin == focus) || (focus == PointerRootWin) || IsParent(focus, pWin)))
event.u.enterLeave.flags |= ELFlagFocus;
if ((mask & GetEventFilter(mouse, &event))) {
if (grab)
TryClientEvents(rClient(grab), mouse, &event, 1, mask,
GetEventFilter(mouse, &event), grab);
else
DeliverEventsToWindow(mouse, pWin, &event, 1,
GetEventFilter(mouse, &event), NullGrab);
}
if ((type == EnterNotify) && (mask & KeymapStateMask)) {
xKeymapEvent ke = {
.type = KeymapNotify
};
ClientPtr client = grab ? rClient(grab) : wClient(pWin);
int rc;
rc = XaceHook(XACE_DEVICE_ACCESS, client, keybd, DixReadAccess);
if (rc == Success)
memcpy((char *) &ke.map[0], (char *) &keybd->key->down[1], 31);
if (grab)
TryClientEvents(rClient(grab), keybd, (xEvent *) &ke, 1,
mask, KeymapStateMask, grab);
else
DeliverEventsToWindow(mouse, pWin, (xEvent *) &ke, 1,
KeymapStateMask, NullGrab);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetReleaseTrackCallback(AutomationJSONReply* reply,
const std::string& track) {
if (track.empty()) {
reply->SendError("Unable to get release track.");
delete reply;
return;
}
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> return_value(new DictionaryValue);
return_value->SetString("release_track", track);
const UpdateEngineClient::Status& status =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetUpdateEngineClient()->GetLastStatus();
UpdateEngineClient::UpdateStatusOperation update_status =
status.status;
return_value->SetString("status", UpdateStatusToString(update_status));
if (update_status == UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_DOWNLOADING)
return_value->SetDouble("download_progress", status.download_progress);
if (status.last_checked_time > 0)
return_value->SetInteger("last_checked_time", status.last_checked_time);
if (status.new_size > 0)
return_value->SetInteger("new_size", status.new_size);
reply->SendSuccess(return_value.get());
delete reply;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static LayoutRect LocalToAbsolute(const LayoutBox& box, LayoutRect rect) {
return LayoutRect(
box.LocalToAbsoluteQuad(FloatQuad(FloatRect(rect)), kUseTransforms)
.BoundingBox());
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_rgn (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, EAS_I32 size, EAS_U16 artIndex)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U32 temp;
EAS_I32 chunkPos;
EAS_I32 endChunk;
EAS_I32 rgnhPos;
EAS_I32 lartPos;
EAS_I32 lartSize;
EAS_I32 lar2Pos;
EAS_I32 lar2Size;
EAS_I32 wlnkPos;
EAS_I32 wsmpPos;
EAS_U32 waveIndex;
S_DLS_ART_VALUES art;
S_WSMP_DATA wsmp;
S_WSMP_DATA *pWsmp;
EAS_U16 regionIndex;
/* seek to start of chunk */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* no chunks found yet */
rgnhPos = lartPos = lartSize = lar2Pos = lar2Size = wsmpPos = wlnkPos = 0;
regionIndex = (EAS_U16) pDLSData->regionCount;
/* read to end of chunk */
endChunk = pos + size;
while (pos < endChunk)
{
chunkPos = pos;
/* get the next chunk type */
if ((result = NextChunk(pDLSData, &pos, &temp, &size)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse useful chunks */
switch (temp)
{
case CHUNK_CDL:
if ((result = Parse_cdl(pDLSData, size, &temp)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* if conditional chunk evaluates false, skip this list */
if (!temp)
return EAS_SUCCESS;
break;
case CHUNK_RGNH:
rgnhPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_WLNK:
wlnkPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_WSMP:
wsmpPos = chunkPos + 8;
break;
case CHUNK_LART:
lartPos = chunkPos + 12;
lartSize = size;
break;
case CHUNK_LAR2:
lar2Pos = chunkPos + 12;
lar2Size = size;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* must have a rgnh chunk to be useful */
if (!rgnhPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS rgn chunk has no rgnh chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* must have a wlnk chunk to be useful */
if (!wlnkPos)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_ERROR, "DLS rgn chunk has no wlnk chunk\n"); */ }
return EAS_ERROR_UNRECOGNIZED_FORMAT;
}
/* parse wlnk chunk */
if ((result = Parse_wlnk(pDLSData, wlnkPos, &waveIndex)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (waveIndex >= pDLSData->waveCount)
{
return EAS_FAILURE;
}
pWsmp = &pDLSData->wsmpData[waveIndex];
/* if there is any articulation data, parse it */
EAS_HWMemCpy(&art, &defaultArt, sizeof(S_DLS_ART_VALUES));
if (lartPos)
{
if ((result = Parse_lart(pDLSData, lartPos, lartSize, &art)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
if (lar2Pos)
{
if ((result = Parse_lart(pDLSData, lar2Pos, lar2Size, &art)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
/* if second pass, process region header */
if (pDLSData->pDLS)
{
/* if local data was found convert it */
if (art.values[PARAM_MODIFIED] == EAS_TRUE)
{
Convert_art(pDLSData, &art, (EAS_U16) pDLSData->artCount);
artIndex = (EAS_U16) pDLSData->artCount;
}
/* parse region header */
if ((result = Parse_rgnh(pDLSData, rgnhPos, &pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSRegions[regionIndex & REGION_INDEX_MASK])) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* parse wsmp chunk, copying parameters from original first */
if (wsmpPos)
{
EAS_HWMemCpy(&wsmp, pWsmp, sizeof(wsmp));
if ((result = Parse_wsmp(pDLSData, wsmpPos, &wsmp)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
pWsmp = &wsmp;
}
Convert_rgn(pDLSData, regionIndex, artIndex, (EAS_U16) waveIndex, pWsmp);
/* ensure loopStart and loopEnd fall in the range */
if (pWsmp->loopLength != 0)
{
EAS_U32 sampleLen = pDLSData->pDLS->pDLSSampleLen[waveIndex];
if (sampleLen < sizeof(EAS_SAMPLE)
|| (pWsmp->loopStart + pWsmp->loopLength) * sizeof(EAS_SAMPLE) > sampleLen - sizeof(EAS_SAMPLE))
{
return EAS_FAILURE;
}
}
}
/* if local articulation, bump count */
if (art.values[PARAM_MODIFIED])
pDLSData->artCount++;
/* increment region count */
pDLSData->regionCount++;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix NULL pointer dereference
Bug: 29770686
Bug: 23304983
Change-Id: I1648aab90bc281702a00744bf884ae8bb8009412
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ec_device_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buffer,
size_t length, loff_t *offset)
{
struct cros_ec_dev *ec = filp->private_data;
char msg[sizeof(struct ec_response_get_version) +
sizeof(CROS_EC_DEV_VERSION)];
size_t count;
int ret;
if (*offset != 0)
return 0;
ret = ec_get_version(ec, msg, sizeof(msg));
if (ret)
return ret;
count = min(length, strlen(msg));
if (copy_to_user(buffer, msg, count))
return -EFAULT;
*offset = count;
return count;
}
Commit Message: platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThread::IsRegisteredExtension(
const std::string& v8_extension_name) const {
return v8_extensions_.find(v8_extension_name) != v8_extensions_.end();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: prot_remove_tube(tube t)
{
ms_remove(&tubes, t);
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_push_have_row(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep row)
{
if (png_ptr->row_fn != NULL)
(*(png_ptr->row_fn))(png_ptr, row, png_ptr->row_number,
(int)png_ptr->pass);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundTriggerHwService::Module::binderDied(
const wp<IBinder> &who __unused) {
ALOGW("client binder died for module %d", mDescriptor.handle);
detach();
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int yam_info_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &yam_seqops);
}
Commit Message: hamradio/yam: fix info leak in ioctl
The yam_ioctl() code fails to initialise the cmd field
of the struct yamdrv_ioctl_cfg. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the 4-byte info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 39,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(addFromString)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
zend_string *buffer;
char *name;
size_t name_len;
ze_zip_object *ze_obj;
struct zip_source *zs;
int pos = 0;
int cur_idx;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "sS",
&name, &name_len, &buffer) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ze_obj = Z_ZIP_P(self);
if (ze_obj->buffers_cnt) {
ze_obj->buffers = (char **)erealloc(ze_obj->buffers, sizeof(char *) * (ze_obj->buffers_cnt+1));
pos = ze_obj->buffers_cnt++;
} else {
ze_obj->buffers = (char **)emalloc(sizeof(char *));
ze_obj->buffers_cnt++;
pos = 0;
}
ze_obj->buffers[pos] = (char *)emalloc(ZSTR_LEN(buffer) + 1);
memcpy(ze_obj->buffers[pos], ZSTR_VAL(buffer), ZSTR_LEN(buffer) + 1);
zs = zip_source_buffer(intern, ze_obj->buffers[pos], ZSTR_LEN(buffer), 0);
if (zs == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cur_idx = zip_name_locate(intern, (const char *)name, 0);
/* TODO: fix _zip_replace */
if (cur_idx >= 0) {
if (zip_delete(intern, cur_idx) == -1) {
zip_source_free(zs);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (zip_add(intern, name, zs) == -1) {
zip_source_free(zs);
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
zip_error_clear(intern);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual bool MyIpAddressEx(std::string* ip_address_list) {
my_ip_address_ex_count++;
*ip_address_list = my_ip_address_ex_result;
return !my_ip_address_ex_result.empty();
}
Commit Message: Test for error in handling getters changing element kind.
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Merged-In: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
Change-Id: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
(cherry picked from commit 59b9b11a462fe3aad313b8538fb98468f22d9095)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 164,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_get_test_protocol_id(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->protocol->id;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RequestScanningStartImpl(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothScanClientAssociatedPtr client,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRequestLEScanOptionsPtr options,
RequestScanningStartCallback callback,
device::BluetoothAdapter* adapter) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (IsRequestScanOptionsInvalid(options)) {
CrashRendererAndClosePipe(bad_message::BDH_INVALID_OPTIONS);
return;
}
if (!adapter) {
auto result = blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewErrorResult(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::BLUETOOTH_LOW_ENERGY_NOT_AVAILABLE);
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(result));
return;
}
const url::Origin requesting_origin =
render_frame_host_->GetLastCommittedOrigin();
const url::Origin embedding_origin =
web_contents()->GetMainFrame()->GetLastCommittedOrigin();
bool blocked = GetContentClient()->browser()->IsBluetoothScanningBlocked(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext(), requesting_origin, embedding_origin);
if (blocked) {
auto result = blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewErrorResult(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SCANNING_BLOCKED);
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(result));
return;
}
if (discovery_callback_) {
auto result = blink::mojom::RequestScanningStartResult::NewErrorResult(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::PROMPT_CANCELED);
std::move(callback).Run(std::move(result));
return;
}
if (discovery_session_) {
if (AreScanFiltersAllowed(options->filters)) {
auto scanning_client = std::make_unique<ScanningClient>(
std::move(client), std::move(options), std::move(callback), nullptr);
scanning_client->RunRequestScanningStartCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS);
scanning_client->set_allow_send_event(true);
scanning_clients_.push_back(std::move(scanning_client));
return;
}
device_scanning_prompt_controller_ =
std::make_unique<BluetoothDeviceScanningPromptController>(
this, render_frame_host_);
scanning_clients_.push_back(std::make_unique<ScanningClient>(
std::move(client), std::move(options), std::move(callback),
device_scanning_prompt_controller_.get()));
device_scanning_prompt_controller_->ShowPermissionPrompt();
return;
}
discovery_callback_ = std::move(callback);
adapter->StartDiscoverySession(
base::Bind(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnStartDiscoverySession,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), base::Passed(&client),
base::Passed(&options)),
base::Bind(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnDiscoverySessionError,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsmp_stop (GsmClient *client,
GError **error)
{
GsmXSMPClient *xsmp = (GsmXSMPClient *) client;
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: xsmp_stop ('%s')", xsmp->priv->description);
if (xsmp->priv->conn == NULL) {
g_set_error (error,
GSM_CLIENT_ERROR,
GSM_CLIENT_ERROR_NOT_REGISTERED,
"Client is not registered");
return FALSE;
}
SmsDie (xsmp->priv->conn);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 63,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SimilarToTopDomains(base::StringPiece16 hostname) {
size_t hostname_length = hostname.length() - (hostname.back() == '.' ? 1 : 0);
icu::UnicodeString host(FALSE, hostname.data(), hostname_length);
if (lgc_letters_n_ascii_.span(host, 0, USET_SPAN_CONTAINED) == host.length())
diacritic_remover_->transliterate(host);
extra_confusable_mapper_->transliterate(host);
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
icu::UnicodeString skeleton;
int32_t u04cf_pos;
if ((u04cf_pos = host.indexOf(0x4CF)) != -1) {
icu::UnicodeString host_alt(host);
size_t length = host_alt.length();
char16_t* buffer = host_alt.getBuffer(-1);
for (char16_t* uc = buffer + u04cf_pos ; uc < buffer + length; ++uc) {
if (*uc == 0x4CF)
*uc = 0x6C; // Lowercase L
}
host_alt.releaseBuffer(length);
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, host_alt, skeleton, &status);
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton))
return true;
}
uspoof_getSkeletonUnicodeString(checker_, 0, host, skeleton, &status);
return U_SUCCESS(status) && LookupMatchInTopDomains(skeleton);
}
Commit Message: Add confusability mapping entries for Myanmar and Georgian
U+10D5 (ვ), U+1012 (ဒ) => 3
Bug: 847242, 849398
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I9abb8560cf1c9e8e5e8d89980780b89461f7be52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1091430
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565709}
CWE ID: | 0 | 153,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit cros_ec_dev_exit(void)
{
platform_driver_unregister(&cros_ec_dev_driver);
unregister_chrdev(ec_major, CROS_EC_DEV_NAME);
class_unregister(&cros_class);
}
Commit Message: platform/chrome: cros_ec_dev - double fetch bug in ioctl
We verify "u_cmd.outsize" and "u_cmd.insize" but we need to make sure
that those values have not changed between the two copy_from_user()
calls. Otherwise it could lead to a buffer overflow.
Additionally, cros_ec_cmd_xfer() can set s_cmd->insize to a lower value.
We should use the new smaller value so we don't copy too much data to
the user.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Fixes: a841178445bb ('mfd: cros_ec: Use a zero-length array for command data')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Gwendal Grignou <gwendal@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetView(RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view) {
if (view)
view_ = view->GetWeakPtr();
else
view_.reset();
if (view_ && renderer_initialized_) {
Send(new ViewMsg_SetSurfaceIdNamespace(routing_id_,
view_->GetSurfaceIdNamespace()));
}
synthetic_gesture_controller_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib3f(
GLuint index, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1, GLfloat v2) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttrib3f: index out of range");
return;
}
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 value;
value.v[0] = v0;
value.v[1] = v1;
value.v[2] = v2;
value.v[3] = 1.0f;
info->set_value(value);
glVertexAttrib3f(index, v0, v1, v2);
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sgpd_del(GF_Box *a)
{
GF_SampleGroupDescriptionBox *p = (GF_SampleGroupDescriptionBox *)a;
while (gf_list_count(p->group_descriptions)) {
void *ptr = gf_list_last(p->group_descriptions);
sgpd_del_entry(p->grouping_type, ptr);
gf_list_rem_last(p->group_descriptions);
}
gf_list_del(p->group_descriptions);
gf_free(p);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::OnSyncCycleCompleted(
const SyncSessionSnapshot& snapshot) {
if (!sync_loop_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
host_.Call(
FROM_HERE,
&SyncBackendHost::HandleSyncCycleCompletedOnFrontendLoop,
snapshot);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int scsi_hd_initfn(SCSIDevice *dev)
{
return scsi_initfn(dev, TYPE_DISK);
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 41,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int curl_mvsprintf(char *buffer, const char *format, va_list ap_save)
{
int retcode;
retcode = dprintf_formatf(&buffer, storebuffer, format, ap_save);
*buffer=0; /* we terminate this with a zero byte */
return retcode;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AutofillDialogViews::SuggestedButton::ResourceIDForState() const {
views::Button::ButtonState button_state = state();
if (button_state == views::Button::STATE_PRESSED)
return IDR_AUTOFILL_DIALOG_MENU_BUTTON_P;
else if (button_state == views::Button::STATE_HOVERED)
return IDR_AUTOFILL_DIALOG_MENU_BUTTON_H;
else if (button_state == views::Button::STATE_DISABLED)
return IDR_AUTOFILL_DIALOG_MENU_BUTTON_D;
DCHECK_EQ(views::Button::STATE_NORMAL, button_state);
return IDR_AUTOFILL_DIALOG_MENU_BUTTON;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport MagickBooleanType ReadPSDLayers(Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const MagickBooleanType skip_layers,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
type[4];
LayerInfo
*layer_info;
MagickSizeType
size;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
j,
number_layers;
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
if (size == 0)
{
/*
Skip layers & masks.
*/
(void) ReadBlobLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
status=MagickFalse;
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
return(MagickTrue);
else
{
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count != 0) && (LocaleNCompare(type,"Lr16",4) == 0))
size=GetPSDSize(psd_info,image);
else
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
if (size != 0)
{
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) NULL;
number_layers=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
if (number_layers < 0)
{
/*
The first alpha channel in the merged result contains the
transparency data for the merged result.
*/
number_layers=MagickAbsoluteValue(number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" negative layer count corrected for");
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
/*
We only need to know if the image has an alpha channel
*/
if (skip_layers != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image contains %.20g layers",(double) number_layers);
if (number_layers == 0)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"InvalidNumberOfLayers",
image->filename);
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) number_layers,
sizeof(*layer_info));
if (layer_info == (LayerInfo *) NULL)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of LayerInfo failed");
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(layer_info,0,(size_t) number_layers*
sizeof(*layer_info));
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading layer #%.20g",(double) i+1);
layer_info[i].page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].page.width=(size_t) (x-layer_info[i].page.x);
layer_info[i].page.height=(size_t) (y-layer_info[i].page.y);
layer_info[i].channels=ReadBlobShort(image);
if (layer_info[i].channels > MaxPSDChannels)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded",
image->filename);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), channels=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].page.x,(double) layer_info[i].page.y,
(double) layer_info[i].page.height,(double)
layer_info[i].page.width,(double) layer_info[i].channels);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short) ReadBlobShort(image);
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=(size_t) GetPSDSize(psd_info,
image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" channel[%.20g]: type=%.20g, size=%.20g",(double) j,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type,
(double) layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size);
}
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
ReversePSDString(image,type,4);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(type,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer type was %.4s instead of 8BIM", type);
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader",
image->filename);
}
(void) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) layer_info[i].blendkey);
ReversePSDString(image,layer_info[i].blendkey,4);
layer_info[i].opacity=(Quantum) ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
layer_info[i].clipping=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
layer_info[i].visible=!(layer_info[i].flags & 0x02);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" blend=%.4s, opacity=%.20g, clipping=%s, flags=%d, visible=%s",
layer_info[i].blendkey,(double) layer_info[i].opacity,
layer_info[i].clipping ? "true" : "false",layer_info[i].flags,
layer_info[i].visible ? "true" : "false");
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /* filler */
size=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (size != 0)
{
MagickSizeType
combined_length,
length;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer contains additional info");
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer mask info.
*/
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=ReadBlobSignedLong(image);
layer_info[i].mask.page.height=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.y);
layer_info[i].mask.page.width=(size_t) (ReadBlobLong(image)-
layer_info[i].mask.page.x);
layer_info[i].mask.background=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(
image);
layer_info[i].mask.flags=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (!(layer_info[i].mask.flags & 0x01))
{
layer_info[i].mask.page.y=layer_info[i].mask.page.y-
layer_info[i].page.y;
layer_info[i].mask.page.x=layer_info[i].mask.page.x-
layer_info[i].page.x;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer mask: offset(%.20g,%.20g), size(%.20g,%.20g), length=%.20g",
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.x,(double)
layer_info[i].mask.page.y,(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.width,
(double) layer_info[i].mask.page.height,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length)-18);
/*
Skip over the rest of the layer mask information.
*/
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType) (length-18)) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
}
length=ReadBlobLong(image);
combined_length+=length+4;
if (length != 0)
{
/*
Layer blending ranges info.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer blending ranges: length=%.20g",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
/*
We read it, but don't use it...
*/
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=8)
{
size_t blend_source=ReadBlobLong(image);
size_t blend_dest=ReadBlobLong(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" source(%x), dest(%x)",(unsigned int)
blend_source,(unsigned int) blend_dest);
}
}
/*
Layer name.
*/
length=(MagickSizeType) ReadBlobByte(image);
combined_length+=length+1;
if (length > 0)
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length++,layer_info[i].name);
layer_info[i].name[length]='\0';
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer name: %s",layer_info[i].name);
if ((length % 4) != 0)
{
length=4-(length % 4);
combined_length+=length;
/* Skip over the padding of the layer name */
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,length) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
length=(MagickSizeType) size-combined_length;
if (length > 0)
{
unsigned char
*info;
layer_info[i].info=AcquireStringInfo((const size_t) length);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(layer_info[i].info);
(void) ReadBlob(image,(const size_t) length,info);
}
}
}
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if ((layer_info[i].page.width == 0) ||
(layer_info[i].page.height == 0))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is empty");
continue;
}
/*
Allocate layered image.
*/
layer_info[i].image=CloneImage(image,layer_info[i].page.width,
layer_info[i].page.height,MagickFalse,exception);
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" allocation of image for layer %.20g failed",(double) i);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
if (layer_info[i].info != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) SetImageProfile(layer_info[i].image,"psd:additional-info",
layer_info[i].info);
layer_info[i].info=DestroyStringInfo(layer_info[i].info);
}
}
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=0; j < layer_info[i].channels; j++)
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,(MagickSizeType)
layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size) == MagickFalse)
{
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
}
}
continue;
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading data for layer %.20g",(double) i);
status=ReadPSDLayer(image,image_info,psd_info,&layer_info[i],
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,i,(MagickSizeType)
number_layers);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (layer_info[i].image == (Image *) NULL)
{
for (j=i; j < number_layers - 1; j++)
layer_info[j] = layer_info[j+1];
number_layers--;
i--;
}
}
if (number_layers > 0)
{
for (i=0; i < number_layers; i++)
{
if (i > 0)
layer_info[i].image->previous=layer_info[i-1].image;
if (i < (number_layers-1))
layer_info[i].image->next=layer_info[i+1].image;
layer_info[i].image->page=layer_info[i].page;
}
image->next=layer_info[0].image;
layer_info[0].image->previous=image;
}
layer_info=(LayerInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(layer_info);
}
else
layer_info=DestroyLayerInfo(layer_info,number_layers);
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory leak.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 1 | 168,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ProcessFinishedAsyncTransfers() {
ProcessPendingReadPixels();
if (engine() && query_manager_.get())
query_manager_->ProcessPendingTransferQueries();
async_pixel_transfer_manager_->BindCompletedAsyncTransfers();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void feh_wm_set_bg(char *fil, Imlib_Image im, int centered, int scaled,
int filled, int desktop, int use_filelist)
{
XGCValues gcvalues;
XGCValues gcval;
GC gc;
char bgname[20];
int num = (int) rand();
char bgfil[4096];
char sendbuf[4096];
/*
* TODO this re-implements mkstemp (badly). However, it is only needed
* for non-file images and enlightenment. Might be easier to just remove
* it.
*/
snprintf(bgname, sizeof(bgname), "FEHBG_%d", num);
if (!fil && im) {
if (getenv("HOME") == NULL) {
weprintf("Cannot save wallpaper to temporary file: You have no HOME");
return;
}
snprintf(bgfil, sizeof(bgfil), "%s/.%s.png", getenv("HOME"), bgname);
imlib_context_set_image(im);
imlib_image_set_format("png");
gib_imlib_save_image(im, bgfil);
D(("bg saved as %s\n", bgfil));
fil = bgfil;
}
if (feh_wm_get_wm_is_e() && (enl_ipc_get_win() != None)) {
if (use_filelist) {
feh_wm_load_next(&im);
fil = FEH_FILE(filelist->data)->filename;
}
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.file %s", bgname, fil);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
if (scaled) {
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.solid 0 0 0", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.tile 0", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.xjust 512", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.yjust 512", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.xperc 1024", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.yperc 1024", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
} else if (centered) {
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.solid 0 0 0", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.tile 0", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.xjust 512", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.yjust 512", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
} else {
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "background %s bg.tile 1", bgname);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
}
snprintf(sendbuf, sizeof(sendbuf), "use_bg %s %d", bgname, desktop);
enl_ipc_send(sendbuf);
enl_ipc_sync();
} else {
Atom prop_root, prop_esetroot, type;
int format, i;
unsigned long length, after;
unsigned char *data_root = NULL, *data_esetroot = NULL;
Pixmap pmap_d1, pmap_d2;
gib_list *l;
/* string for sticking in ~/.fehbg */
char *fehbg = NULL;
char fehbg_args[512];
fehbg_args[0] = '\0';
char *home;
char filbuf[4096];
char *bgfill = NULL;
bgfill = opt.image_bg == IMAGE_BG_WHITE ? "--image-bg white" : "--image-bg black" ;
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXINERAMA
if (opt.xinerama) {
if (opt.xinerama_index >= 0) {
snprintf(fehbg_args, sizeof(fehbg_args),
"--xinerama-index %d", opt.xinerama_index);
}
}
else
snprintf(fehbg_args, sizeof(fehbg_args), "--no-xinerama");
#endif /* HAVE_LIBXINERAMA */
/* local display to set closedownmode on */
Display *disp2;
Window root2;
int depth2;
int in, out, w, h;
D(("Falling back to XSetRootWindowPixmap\n"));
/* Put the filename in filbuf between ' and escape ' in the filename */
out = 0;
if (fil && !use_filelist) {
filbuf[out++] = '\'';
fil = feh_absolute_path(fil);
for (in = 0; fil[in] && out < 4092; in++) {
if (fil[in] == '\'')
filbuf[out++] = '\\';
filbuf[out++] = fil[in];
}
filbuf[out++] = '\'';
free(fil);
} else {
for (l = filelist; l && out < 4092; l = l->next) {
filbuf[out++] = '\'';
fil = feh_absolute_path(FEH_FILE(l->data)->filename);
for (in = 0; fil[in] && out < 4092; in++) {
if (fil[in] == '\'')
filbuf[out++] = '\\';
filbuf[out++] = fil[in];
}
filbuf[out++] = '\'';
filbuf[out++] = ' ';
free(fil);
}
}
filbuf[out++] = 0;
if (scaled) {
pmap_d1 = XCreatePixmap(disp, root, scr->width, scr->height, depth);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXINERAMA
if (opt.xinerama_index >= 0) {
if (opt.image_bg == IMAGE_BG_WHITE)
gcval.foreground = WhitePixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
else
gcval.foreground = BlackPixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
gc = XCreateGC(disp, root, GCForeground, &gcval);
XFillRectangle(disp, pmap_d1, gc, 0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
XFreeGC(disp, gc);
}
if (opt.xinerama && xinerama_screens) {
for (i = 0; i < num_xinerama_screens; i++) {
if (opt.xinerama_index < 0 || opt.xinerama_index == i) {
feh_wm_set_bg_scaled(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
xinerama_screens[i].x_org, xinerama_screens[i].y_org,
xinerama_screens[i].width, xinerama_screens[i].height);
}
}
}
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBXINERAMA */
feh_wm_set_bg_scaled(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
fehbg = estrjoin(" ", "feh", fehbg_args, "--bg-scale", filbuf, NULL);
} else if (centered) {
D(("centering\n"));
pmap_d1 = XCreatePixmap(disp, root, scr->width, scr->height, depth);
if (opt.image_bg == IMAGE_BG_WHITE)
gcval.foreground = WhitePixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
else
gcval.foreground = BlackPixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
gc = XCreateGC(disp, root, GCForeground, &gcval);
XFillRectangle(disp, pmap_d1, gc, 0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXINERAMA
if (opt.xinerama && xinerama_screens) {
for (i = 0; i < num_xinerama_screens; i++) {
if (opt.xinerama_index < 0 || opt.xinerama_index == i) {
feh_wm_set_bg_centered(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
xinerama_screens[i].x_org, xinerama_screens[i].y_org,
xinerama_screens[i].width, xinerama_screens[i].height);
}
}
}
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBXINERAMA */
feh_wm_set_bg_centered(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
XFreeGC(disp, gc);
fehbg = estrjoin(" ", "feh", fehbg_args, bgfill, "--bg-center", filbuf, NULL);
} else if (filled == 1) {
pmap_d1 = XCreatePixmap(disp, root, scr->width, scr->height, depth);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXINERAMA
if (opt.xinerama_index >= 0) {
if (opt.image_bg == IMAGE_BG_WHITE)
gcval.foreground = WhitePixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
else
gcval.foreground = BlackPixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
gc = XCreateGC(disp, root, GCForeground, &gcval);
XFillRectangle(disp, pmap_d1, gc, 0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
XFreeGC(disp, gc);
}
if (opt.xinerama && xinerama_screens) {
for (i = 0; i < num_xinerama_screens; i++) {
if (opt.xinerama_index < 0 || opt.xinerama_index == i) {
feh_wm_set_bg_filled(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
xinerama_screens[i].x_org, xinerama_screens[i].y_org,
xinerama_screens[i].width, xinerama_screens[i].height);
}
}
}
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBXINERAMA */
feh_wm_set_bg_filled(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist
, 0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
fehbg = estrjoin(" ", "feh", fehbg_args, "--bg-fill", filbuf, NULL);
} else if (filled == 2) {
pmap_d1 = XCreatePixmap(disp, root, scr->width, scr->height, depth);
if (opt.image_bg == IMAGE_BG_WHITE)
gcval.foreground = WhitePixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
else
gcval.foreground = BlackPixel(disp, DefaultScreen(disp));
gc = XCreateGC(disp, root, GCForeground, &gcval);
XFillRectangle(disp, pmap_d1, gc, 0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
#ifdef HAVE_LIBXINERAMA
if (opt.xinerama && xinerama_screens) {
for (i = 0; i < num_xinerama_screens; i++) {
if (opt.xinerama_index < 0 || opt.xinerama_index == i) {
feh_wm_set_bg_maxed(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
xinerama_screens[i].x_org, xinerama_screens[i].y_org,
xinerama_screens[i].width, xinerama_screens[i].height);
}
}
}
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBXINERAMA */
feh_wm_set_bg_maxed(pmap_d1, im, use_filelist,
0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
XFreeGC(disp, gc);
fehbg = estrjoin(" ", "feh", fehbg_args, bgfill, "--bg-max", filbuf, NULL);
} else {
if (use_filelist)
feh_wm_load_next(&im);
w = gib_imlib_image_get_width(im);
h = gib_imlib_image_get_height(im);
pmap_d1 = XCreatePixmap(disp, root, w, h, depth);
gib_imlib_render_image_on_drawable(pmap_d1, im, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0);
fehbg = estrjoin(" ", "feh --bg-tile", filbuf, NULL);
}
if (fehbg && !opt.no_fehbg) {
home = getenv("HOME");
if (home) {
FILE *fp;
char *path;
struct stat s;
path = estrjoin("/", home, ".fehbg", NULL);
if ((fp = fopen(path, "w")) == NULL) {
weprintf("Can't write to %s", path);
} else {
fprintf(fp, "#!/bin/sh\n%s\n", fehbg);
fclose(fp);
stat(path, &s);
if (chmod(path, s.st_mode | S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP) != 0) {
weprintf("Can't set %s as executable", path);
}
}
free(path);
}
}
free(fehbg);
/* create new display, copy pixmap to new display */
disp2 = XOpenDisplay(NULL);
if (!disp2)
eprintf("Can't reopen X display.");
root2 = RootWindow(disp2, DefaultScreen(disp2));
depth2 = DefaultDepth(disp2, DefaultScreen(disp2));
XSync(disp, False);
pmap_d2 = XCreatePixmap(disp2, root2, scr->width, scr->height, depth2);
gcvalues.fill_style = FillTiled;
gcvalues.tile = pmap_d1;
gc = XCreateGC(disp2, pmap_d2, GCFillStyle | GCTile, &gcvalues);
XFillRectangle(disp2, pmap_d2, gc, 0, 0, scr->width, scr->height);
XFreeGC(disp2, gc);
XSync(disp2, False);
XSync(disp, False);
XFreePixmap(disp, pmap_d1);
prop_root = XInternAtom(disp2, "_XROOTPMAP_ID", True);
prop_esetroot = XInternAtom(disp2, "ESETROOT_PMAP_ID", True);
if (prop_root != None && prop_esetroot != None) {
XGetWindowProperty(disp2, root2, prop_root, 0L, 1L,
False, AnyPropertyType, &type, &format, &length, &after, &data_root);
if (type == XA_PIXMAP) {
XGetWindowProperty(disp2, root2,
prop_esetroot, 0L, 1L,
False, AnyPropertyType,
&type, &format, &length, &after, &data_esetroot);
if (data_root && data_esetroot) {
if (type == XA_PIXMAP && *((Pixmap *) data_root) == *((Pixmap *) data_esetroot)) {
XKillClient(disp2, *((Pixmap *)
data_root));
}
}
}
}
if (data_root)
XFree(data_root);
if (data_esetroot)
XFree(data_esetroot);
/* This will locate the property, creating it if it doesn't exist */
prop_root = XInternAtom(disp2, "_XROOTPMAP_ID", False);
prop_esetroot = XInternAtom(disp2, "ESETROOT_PMAP_ID", False);
if (prop_root == None || prop_esetroot == None)
eprintf("creation of pixmap property failed.");
XChangeProperty(disp2, root2, prop_root, XA_PIXMAP, 32, PropModeReplace, (unsigned char *) &pmap_d2, 1);
XChangeProperty(disp2, root2, prop_esetroot, XA_PIXMAP, 32,
PropModeReplace, (unsigned char *) &pmap_d2, 1);
XSetWindowBackgroundPixmap(disp2, root2, pmap_d2);
XClearWindow(disp2, root2);
XFlush(disp2);
XSetCloseDownMode(disp2, RetainPermanent);
XCloseDisplay(disp2);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rds_recv_incoming(struct rds_connection *conn, __be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
struct rds_incoming *inc, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct rds_sock *rs = NULL;
struct sock *sk;
unsigned long flags;
inc->i_conn = conn;
inc->i_rx_jiffies = jiffies;
rdsdebug("conn %p next %llu inc %p seq %llu len %u sport %u dport %u "
"flags 0x%x rx_jiffies %lu\n", conn,
(unsigned long long)conn->c_next_rx_seq,
inc,
(unsigned long long)be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence),
be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len),
be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sport),
be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_dport),
inc->i_hdr.h_flags,
inc->i_rx_jiffies);
/*
* Sequence numbers should only increase. Messages get their
* sequence number as they're queued in a sending conn. They
* can be dropped, though, if the sending socket is closed before
* they hit the wire. So sequence numbers can skip forward
* under normal operation. They can also drop back in the conn
* failover case as previously sent messages are resent down the
* new instance of a conn. We drop those, otherwise we have
* to assume that the next valid seq does not come after a
* hole in the fragment stream.
*
* The headers don't give us a way to realize if fragments of
* a message have been dropped. We assume that frags that arrive
* to a flow are part of the current message on the flow that is
* being reassembled. This means that senders can't drop messages
* from the sending conn until all their frags are sent.
*
* XXX we could spend more on the wire to get more robust failure
* detection, arguably worth it to avoid data corruption.
*/
if (be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence) < conn->c_next_rx_seq &&
(inc->i_hdr.h_flags & RDS_FLAG_RETRANSMITTED)) {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_old_seq);
goto out;
}
conn->c_next_rx_seq = be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence) + 1;
if (rds_sysctl_ping_enable && inc->i_hdr.h_dport == 0) {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_ping);
rds_send_pong(conn, inc->i_hdr.h_sport);
goto out;
}
rs = rds_find_bound(daddr, inc->i_hdr.h_dport);
if (!rs) {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_no_sock);
goto out;
}
/* Process extension headers */
rds_recv_incoming_exthdrs(inc, rs);
/* We can be racing with rds_release() which marks the socket dead. */
sk = rds_rs_to_sk(rs);
/* serialize with rds_release -> sock_orphan */
write_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_recv_lock, flags);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
rdsdebug("adding inc %p to rs %p's recv queue\n", inc, rs);
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_queued);
rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta(rs, sk, inc->i_conn->c_lcong,
be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len),
inc->i_hdr.h_dport);
rds_inc_addref(inc);
list_add_tail(&inc->i_item, &rs->rs_recv_queue);
__rds_wake_sk_sleep(sk);
} else {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_dead_sock);
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_recv_lock, flags);
out:
if (rs)
rds_sock_put(rs);
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 19,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_insert(png_const_charp what,
void (*insert)(png_structp, png_infop, int, png_charpp),
int nparams, png_charpp list)
{
int i;
chunk_insert *cip;
cip = malloc(offsetof(chunk_insert,parameters) +
nparams * sizeof (png_charp));
if (cip == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "--insert %s: out of memory allocating %d parameters\n",
what, nparams);
exit(1);
}
cip->next = NULL;
cip->insert = insert;
cip->nparams = nparams;
for (i=0; i<nparams; ++i)
cip->parameters[i] = list[i];
return cip;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t ewk_frame_source_get(const Evas_Object* ewkFrame, char** frameSource)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, -1);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, -1);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame->document(), -1);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(frameSource, -1);
WTF::String source;
*frameSource = 0; // Saves 0 to pointer until it's not allocated.
if (!smartData->frame->document()->isHTMLDocument()) {
WRN("Only HTML documents are supported");
return -1;
}
WebCore::Node* documentNode = smartData->frame->document()->documentElement();
if (documentNode)
for (WebCore::Node* node = documentNode->firstChild(); node; node = node->parentElement()) {
if (node->hasTagName(WebCore::HTMLNames::htmlTag)) {
WebCore::HTMLElement* element = static_cast<WebCore::HTMLElement*>(node);
if (element)
source = element->outerHTML();
break;
}
}
if (source.isEmpty()) {
if (smartData->frame->document()->head())
source = smartData->frame->document()->head()->outerHTML();
if (smartData->frame->document()->body())
source += smartData->frame->document()->body()->outerHTML();
}
size_t sourceLength = strlen(source.utf8().data());
*frameSource = static_cast<char*>(malloc(sourceLength + 1));
if (!*frameSource) {
CRITICAL("Could not allocate memory.");
return -1;
}
strncpy(*frameSource, source.utf8().data(), sourceLength);
(*frameSource)[sourceLength] = '\0';
return sourceLength;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void nested_release_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exec_control;
if (enable_shadow_vmcs) {
if (vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 != NULL) {
/* copy to memory all shadowed fields in case
they were modified */
copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;
exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull);
}
}
kunmap(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page);
nested_release_page(vmx->nested.current_vmcs12_page);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ip_tunnel **__ipip_bucket(struct ipip_net *ipn,
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms)
{
__be32 remote = parms->iph.daddr;
__be32 local = parms->iph.saddr;
unsigned h = 0;
int prio = 0;
if (remote) {
prio |= 2;
h ^= HASH(remote);
}
if (local) {
prio |= 1;
h ^= HASH(local);
}
return &ipn->tunnels[prio][h];
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_net_vhost_status(VirtIONet *n, uint8_t status)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(n->nic);
int queues = n->multiqueue ? n->max_queues : 1;
if (!nc->peer) {
return;
}
if (nc->peer->info->type != NET_CLIENT_OPTIONS_KIND_TAP) {
return;
}
if (!tap_get_vhost_net(nc->peer)) {
return;
}
if (!!n->vhost_started ==
(virtio_net_started(n, status) && !nc->peer->link_down)) {
return;
}
if (!n->vhost_started) {
int r;
if (!vhost_net_query(tap_get_vhost_net(nc->peer), vdev)) {
return;
}
n->vhost_started = 1;
r = vhost_net_start(vdev, n->nic->ncs, queues);
if (r < 0) {
error_report("unable to start vhost net: %d: "
"falling back on userspace virtio", -r);
n->vhost_started = 0;
}
} else {
vhost_net_stop(vdev, n->nic->ncs, queues);
n->vhost_started = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL JP2SeekHandler(OPJ_OFF_T offset,void *context)
{
Image
*image;
image=(Image *) context;
return(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET) < 0 ? OPJ_FALSE : OPJ_TRUE);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/501
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 62,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_csk_init_xmit_timers(struct sock *sk,
void (*retransmit_handler)(unsigned long),
void (*delack_handler)(unsigned long),
void (*keepalive_handler)(unsigned long))
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
setup_timer(&icsk->icsk_retransmit_timer, retransmit_handler,
(unsigned long)sk);
setup_timer(&icsk->icsk_delack_timer, delack_handler,
(unsigned long)sk);
setup_timer(&sk->sk_timer, keepalive_handler, (unsigned long)sk);
icsk->icsk_pending = icsk->icsk_ack.pending = 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::AddResourceTiming(const ResourceTimingInfo& info) {
if (global_scope_->IsWorkletGlobalScope())
return;
WorkerGlobalScopePerformance::performance(*ToWorkerGlobalScope(global_scope_))
->AddResourceTiming(info);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!(vcpu->arch.st.msr_val & KVM_MSR_ENABLED))
return;
if (unlikely(kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
&vcpu->arch.st.steal, sizeof(struct kvm_steal_time))))
return;
vcpu->arch.st.steal.steal += vcpu->arch.st.accum_steal;
vcpu->arch.st.steal.version += 2;
vcpu->arch.st.accum_steal = 0;
kvm_write_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.st.stime,
&vcpu->arch.st.steal, sizeof(struct kvm_steal_time));
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mailimf_to_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx, struct mailimf_to ** result)
{
struct mailimf_address_list * addr_list;
struct mailimf_to * to;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
int res;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_token_case_insensitive_parse(message, length,
&cur_token, "To");
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_colon_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_address_list_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &addr_list);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto err;
}
r = mailimf_unstrict_crlf_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
res = r;
goto free_addr_list;
}
to = mailimf_to_new(addr_list);
if (to == NULL) {
res = MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
goto free_addr_list;
}
* result = to;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
free_addr_list:
mailimf_address_list_free(addr_list);
err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShaderManager::ShaderInfo* CreateShaderInfo(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
GLenum shader_type) {
return shader_manager()->CreateShaderInfo(
client_id, service_id, shader_type);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *string_of_NPStreamType(int stype)
{
const char *str;
switch (stype) {
#define _(VAL) case VAL: str = #VAL; break;
_(NP_NORMAL);
_(NP_SEEK);
_(NP_ASFILE);
_(NP_ASFILEONLY);
#undef _
default:
str = "<unknown stream type>";
break;
}
return str;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ahash_final(struct ahash_request *req)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
pr_debug("%s: data size: %d\n", __func__, req->nbytes);
if ((hash_mode == HASH_MODE_DMA) && req_ctx->dma_mode)
ret = hash_dma_final(req);
else
ret = hash_hw_final(req);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: hash_hw/dma_final() failed\n", __func__);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __static_initializer() { mt_init(); }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EglRenderingVDAClient::EglRenderingVDAClient(
RenderingHelper* rendering_helper,
int rendering_window_id,
ClientStateNotification* note,
const std::string& encoded_data,
int num_NALUs_per_decode,
int num_in_flight_decodes,
int num_play_throughs,
int reset_after_frame_num,
int delete_decoder_state,
int profile)
: rendering_helper_(rendering_helper),
rendering_window_id_(rendering_window_id),
encoded_data_(encoded_data), num_NALUs_per_decode_(num_NALUs_per_decode),
num_in_flight_decodes_(num_in_flight_decodes), outstanding_decodes_(0),
encoded_data_next_pos_to_decode_(0), next_bitstream_buffer_id_(0),
note_(note),
remaining_play_throughs_(num_play_throughs),
reset_after_frame_num_(reset_after_frame_num),
delete_decoder_state_(delete_decoder_state),
state_(CS_CREATED),
num_decoded_frames_(0), num_done_bitstream_buffers_(0),
profile_(profile) {
CHECK_GT(num_NALUs_per_decode, 0);
CHECK_GT(num_in_flight_decodes, 0);
CHECK_GT(num_play_throughs, 0);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: android::SoftOMXComponent *createSoftOMXComponent(
const char *name, const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks, OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component) {
return new android::SoftMPEG2(name, callbacks, appData, component);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorResourceAgent::replayXHR(ErrorString*, const String& requestId)
{
String actualRequestId = requestId;
XHRReplayData* xhrReplayData = m_resourcesData->xhrReplayData(requestId);
if (!xhrReplayData)
return;
ExecutionContext* executionContext = xhrReplayData->executionContext();
if (!executionContext) {
m_resourcesData->setXHRReplayData(requestId, 0);
return;
}
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<XMLHttpRequest> xhr = XMLHttpRequest::create(executionContext);
Resource* cachedResource = memoryCache()->resourceForURL(xhrReplayData->url());
if (cachedResource)
memoryCache()->remove(cachedResource);
xhr->open(xhrReplayData->method(), xhrReplayData->url(), xhrReplayData->async(), IGNORE_EXCEPTION);
HTTPHeaderMap::const_iterator end = xhrReplayData->headers().end();
for (HTTPHeaderMap::const_iterator it = xhrReplayData->headers().begin(); it!= end; ++it)
xhr->setRequestHeader(it->key, it->value, IGNORE_EXCEPTION);
xhr->sendForInspectorXHRReplay(xhrReplayData->formData(), IGNORE_EXCEPTION);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tenbytefloat2int (uint8_t *bytes)
{ int val = 3 ;
if (bytes [0] & 0x80) /* Negative number. */
return 0 ;
if (bytes [0] <= 0x3F) /* Less than 1. */
return 1 ;
if (bytes [0] > 0x40) /* Way too big. */
return 0x4000000 ;
if (bytes [0] == 0x40 && bytes [1] > 0x1C) /* Too big. */
return 800000000 ;
/* Ok, can handle it. */
val = (bytes [2] << 23) | (bytes [3] << 15) | (bytes [4] << 7) | (bytes [5] >> 1) ;
val >>= (29 - bytes [1]) ;
return val ;
} /* tenbytefloat2int */
Commit Message: src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 67,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
int proglen, oldproglen = 0;
struct jit_context ctx = {};
u8 *image = NULL;
int *addrs;
int pass;
int i;
if (!bpf_jit_enable)
return;
if (!prog || !prog->len)
return;
addrs = kmalloc(prog->len * sizeof(*addrs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!addrs)
return;
/* Before first pass, make a rough estimation of addrs[]
* each bpf instruction is translated to less than 64 bytes
*/
for (proglen = 0, i = 0; i < prog->len; i++) {
proglen += 64;
addrs[i] = proglen;
}
ctx.cleanup_addr = proglen;
for (pass = 0; pass < 10; pass++) {
proglen = do_jit(prog, addrs, image, oldproglen, &ctx);
if (proglen <= 0) {
image = NULL;
if (header)
bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
goto out;
}
if (image) {
if (proglen != oldproglen) {
pr_err("bpf_jit: proglen=%d != oldproglen=%d\n",
proglen, oldproglen);
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (proglen == oldproglen) {
header = bpf_jit_binary_alloc(proglen, &image,
1, jit_fill_hole);
if (!header)
goto out;
}
oldproglen = proglen;
}
if (bpf_jit_enable > 1)
bpf_jit_dump(prog->len, proglen, 0, image);
if (image) {
bpf_flush_icache(header, image + proglen);
set_memory_ro((unsigned long)header, header->pages);
prog->bpf_func = (void *)image;
prog->jited = true;
}
out:
kfree(addrs);
}
Commit Message: x86: bpf_jit: fix compilation of large bpf programs
x86 has variable length encoding. x86 JIT compiler is trying
to pick the shortest encoding for given bpf instruction.
While doing so the jump targets are changing, so JIT is doing
multiple passes over the program. Typical program needs 3 passes.
Some very short programs converge with 2 passes. Large programs
may need 4 or 5. But specially crafted bpf programs may hit the
pass limit and if the program converges on the last iteration
the JIT compiler will be producing an image full of 'int 3' insns.
Fix this corner case by doing final iteration over bpf program.
Fixes: 0a14842f5a3c ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 1 | 166,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool XSSAuditor::FilterLinkToken(const FilterTokenRequest& request) {
DCHECK_EQ(request.token.GetType(), HTMLToken::kStartTag);
DCHECK(HasName(request.token, linkTag));
size_t index_of_attribute = 0;
if (!FindAttributeWithName(request.token, relAttr, index_of_attribute))
return false;
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute =
request.token.Attributes().at(index_of_attribute);
LinkRelAttribute parsed_attribute(attribute.Value());
if (!parsed_attribute.IsImport())
return false;
return EraseAttributeIfInjected(request, hrefAttr, kURLWithUniqueOrigin,
kSrcLikeAttributeTruncation,
kAllowSameOriginHref);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 146,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::AppCacheAccessed(const GURL& manifest_url,
bool blocked_by_policy) {
if (blocked_by_policy) {
blocked_local_shared_objects_.appcaches()->AddAppCache(manifest_url);
OnContentBlocked(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES, std::string());
} else {
allowed_local_shared_objects_.appcaches()->AddAppCache(manifest_url);
OnContentAccessed(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES);
}
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
{
unsigned char *p;
if (s->state == a)
{
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*p=SSL3_MT_CCS;
s->init_num=1;
s->init_off=0;
s->state=b;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
{
console_verbose();
spin_lock_irq(&die_lock);
printk("%s: %lx\n", str, (err & 0xffffff));
show_regs(regs);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_screen(ScreenPtr pScreen, int i, Bool gpu)
{
int scanlinepad, format, depth, bitsPerPixel, j, k;
dixInitScreenSpecificPrivates(pScreen);
if (!dixAllocatePrivates(&pScreen->devPrivates, PRIVATE_SCREEN)) {
return -1;
}
pScreen->myNum = i;
if (gpu) {
pScreen->myNum += GPU_SCREEN_OFFSET;
pScreen->isGPU = TRUE;
}
pScreen->totalPixmapSize = 0; /* computed in CreateScratchPixmapForScreen */
pScreen->ClipNotify = 0; /* for R4 ddx compatibility */
pScreen->CreateScreenResources = 0;
xorg_list_init(&pScreen->pixmap_dirty_list);
xorg_list_init(&pScreen->slave_list);
/*
* This loop gets run once for every Screen that gets added,
* but thats ok. If the ddx layer initializes the formats
* one at a time calling AddScreen() after each, then each
* iteration will make it a little more accurate. Worst case
* we do this loop N * numPixmapFormats where N is # of screens.
* Anyway, this must be called after InitOutput and before the
* screen init routine is called.
*/
for (format = 0; format < screenInfo.numPixmapFormats; format++) {
depth = screenInfo.formats[format].depth;
bitsPerPixel = screenInfo.formats[format].bitsPerPixel;
scanlinepad = screenInfo.formats[format].scanlinePad;
j = indexForBitsPerPixel[bitsPerPixel];
k = indexForScanlinePad[scanlinepad];
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].padPixelsLog2 = answer[j][k];
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].padRoundUp =
(scanlinepad / bitsPerPixel) - 1;
j = indexForBitsPerPixel[8]; /* bits per byte */
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].padBytesLog2 = answer[j][k];
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].bitsPerPixel = bitsPerPixel;
if (answerBytesPerPixel[bitsPerPixel]) {
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].notPower2 = 1;
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].bytesPerPixel =
answerBytesPerPixel[bitsPerPixel];
}
else {
PixmapWidthPaddingInfo[depth].notPower2 = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ShellWindowFrameView::NonClientHitTest(const gfx::Point& point) {
if (frame_->IsFullscreen())
return HTCLIENT;
#if defined(USE_ASH)
gfx::Rect expanded_bounds = bounds();
int outside_bounds = ui::GetDisplayLayout() == ui::LAYOUT_TOUCH ?
kResizeOutsideBoundsSizeTouch :
kResizeOutsideBoundsSize;
expanded_bounds.Inset(-outside_bounds, -outside_bounds);
if (!expanded_bounds.Contains(point))
return HTNOWHERE;
#endif
bool can_ever_resize = frame_->widget_delegate() ?
frame_->widget_delegate()->CanResize() :
false;
int resize_border =
frame_->IsMaximized() || frame_->IsFullscreen() ? 0 :
kResizeInsideBoundsSize;
int frame_component = GetHTComponentForFrame(point,
resize_border,
resize_border,
kResizeAreaCornerSize,
kResizeAreaCornerSize,
can_ever_resize);
if (frame_component != HTNOWHERE)
return frame_component;
int client_component = frame_->client_view()->NonClientHitTest(point);
if (client_component != HTNOWHERE)
return client_component;
if (close_button_->visible() &&
close_button_->GetMirroredBounds().Contains(point))
return HTCLOSE;
return HTCAPTION;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 103,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmctl_nolock(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int shmid,
int cmd, int version, void __user *buf)
{
int err;
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
/* preliminary security checks for *_INFO */
if (cmd == IPC_INFO || cmd == SHM_INFO) {
err = security_shm_shmctl(NULL, cmd);
if (err)
return err;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
{
struct shminfo64 shminfo;
memset(&shminfo, 0, sizeof(shminfo));
shminfo.shmmni = shminfo.shmseg = ns->shm_ctlmni;
shminfo.shmmax = ns->shm_ctlmax;
shminfo.shmall = ns->shm_ctlall;
shminfo.shmmin = SHMMIN;
if(copy_shminfo_to_user (buf, &shminfo, version))
return -EFAULT;
down_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
err = ipc_get_maxid(&shm_ids(ns));
up_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
if(err<0)
err = 0;
goto out;
}
case SHM_INFO:
{
struct shm_info shm_info;
memset(&shm_info, 0, sizeof(shm_info));
down_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
shm_info.used_ids = shm_ids(ns).in_use;
shm_get_stat (ns, &shm_info.shm_rss, &shm_info.shm_swp);
shm_info.shm_tot = ns->shm_tot;
shm_info.swap_attempts = 0;
shm_info.swap_successes = 0;
err = ipc_get_maxid(&shm_ids(ns));
up_read(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem);
if (copy_to_user(buf, &shm_info, sizeof(shm_info))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
err = err < 0 ? 0 : err;
goto out;
}
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
{
struct shmid64_ds tbuf;
int result;
rcu_read_lock();
if (cmd == SHM_STAT) {
shp = shm_obtain_object(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock;
}
result = shp->shm_perm.id;
} else {
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock;
}
result = 0;
}
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &shp->shm_perm, S_IRUGO))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
memset(&tbuf, 0, sizeof(tbuf));
kernel_to_ipc64_perm(&shp->shm_perm, &tbuf.shm_perm);
tbuf.shm_segsz = shp->shm_segsz;
tbuf.shm_atime = shp->shm_atim;
tbuf.shm_dtime = shp->shm_dtim;
tbuf.shm_ctime = shp->shm_ctim;
tbuf.shm_cpid = shp->shm_cprid;
tbuf.shm_lpid = shp->shm_lprid;
tbuf.shm_nattch = shp->shm_nattch;
rcu_read_unlock();
if (copy_shmid_to_user(buf, &tbuf, version))
err = -EFAULT;
else
err = result;
goto out;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_init_struct(struct efx_nic *efx, const struct efx_nic_type *type,
struct pci_dev *pci_dev, struct net_device *net_dev)
{
int i;
/* Initialise common structures */
memset(efx, 0, sizeof(*efx));
spin_lock_init(&efx->biu_lock);
#ifdef CONFIG_SFC_MTD
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&efx->mtd_list);
#endif
INIT_WORK(&efx->reset_work, efx_reset_work);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&efx->monitor_work, efx_monitor);
efx->pci_dev = pci_dev;
efx->msg_enable = debug;
efx->state = STATE_INIT;
strlcpy(efx->name, pci_name(pci_dev), sizeof(efx->name));
efx->net_dev = net_dev;
spin_lock_init(&efx->stats_lock);
mutex_init(&efx->mac_lock);
efx->mac_op = type->default_mac_ops;
efx->phy_op = &efx_dummy_phy_operations;
efx->mdio.dev = net_dev;
INIT_WORK(&efx->mac_work, efx_mac_work);
for (i = 0; i < EFX_MAX_CHANNELS; i++) {
efx->channel[i] = efx_alloc_channel(efx, i, NULL);
if (!efx->channel[i])
goto fail;
}
efx->type = type;
EFX_BUG_ON_PARANOID(efx->type->phys_addr_channels > EFX_MAX_CHANNELS);
/* Higher numbered interrupt modes are less capable! */
efx->interrupt_mode = max(efx->type->max_interrupt_mode,
interrupt_mode);
/* Would be good to use the net_dev name, but we're too early */
snprintf(efx->workqueue_name, sizeof(efx->workqueue_name), "sfc%s",
pci_name(pci_dev));
efx->workqueue = create_singlethread_workqueue(efx->workqueue_name);
if (!efx->workqueue)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
efx_fini_struct(efx);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpu::QueryManager* GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetQueryManager() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t TestURLLoader::Open(const pp::URLRequestInfo& request,
bool trusted,
std::string* response_body) {
pp::URLLoader loader(instance_);
if (trusted)
url_loader_trusted_interface_->GrantUniversalAccess(loader.pp_resource());
{
TestCompletionCallback open_callback(instance_->pp_instance(),
callback_type());
open_callback.WaitForResult(
loader.Open(request, open_callback.GetCallback()));
if (open_callback.result() != PP_OK)
return open_callback.result();
}
int32_t bytes_read = 0;
do {
char buffer[1024];
TestCompletionCallback read_callback(instance_->pp_instance(),
callback_type());
read_callback.WaitForResult(loader.ReadResponseBody(
&buffer, sizeof(buffer), read_callback.GetCallback()));
bytes_read = read_callback.result();
if (bytes_read < 0)
return bytes_read;
if (response_body)
response_body->append(std::string(buffer, bytes_read));
} while (bytes_read > 0);
return PP_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_timer_free(struct snd_timer *timer)
{
if (!timer)
return 0;
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
if (! list_empty(&timer->open_list_head)) {
struct list_head *p, *n;
struct snd_timer_instance *ti;
pr_warn("ALSA: timer %p is busy?\n", timer);
list_for_each_safe(p, n, &timer->open_list_head) {
list_del_init(p);
ti = list_entry(p, struct snd_timer_instance, open_list);
ti->timer = NULL;
}
}
list_del(&timer->device_list);
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
if (timer->private_free)
timer->private_free(timer);
kfree(timer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 52,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvmppc_st(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *eaddr, int size, void *ptr,
bool data)
{
ulong mp_pa = vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK;
struct kvmppc_pte pte;
int r;
vcpu->stat.st++;
r = kvmppc_xlate(vcpu, *eaddr, data ? XLATE_DATA : XLATE_INST,
XLATE_WRITE, &pte);
if (r < 0)
return r;
*eaddr = pte.raddr;
if (!pte.may_write)
return -EPERM;
/* Magic page override */
if (kvmppc_supports_magic_page(vcpu) && mp_pa &&
((pte.raddr & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK) == mp_pa) &&
!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_PR)) {
void *magic = vcpu->arch.shared;
magic += pte.eaddr & 0xfff;
memcpy(magic, ptr, size);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
if (kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, pte.raddr, ptr, size))
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutocompleteEditModel::UpdatePermanentText(
const string16& new_permanent_text) {
const bool visibly_changed_permanent_text =
(permanent_text_ != new_permanent_text) &&
(!user_input_in_progress_ || !has_focus_);
permanent_text_ = new_permanent_text;
return visibly_changed_permanent_text;
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix4x2fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
Vector<GLfloat>& value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformMatrixParameters("uniformMatrix4x2fv", location,
transpose, value.data(), value.size(), 8,
src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->UniformMatrix4x2fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.size() - src_offset)) >> 3, transpose,
value.data() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_ColorantOrderType_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsUInt8Number* ColorantOrder;
cmsUInt32Number Count;
*nItems = 0;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &Count)) return NULL;
if (Count > cmsMAXCHANNELS) return NULL;
ColorantOrder = (cmsUInt8Number*) _cmsCalloc(self ->ContextID, cmsMAXCHANNELS, sizeof(cmsUInt8Number));
if (ColorantOrder == NULL) return NULL;
memset(ColorantOrder, 0xFF, cmsMAXCHANNELS * sizeof(cmsUInt8Number));
if (io ->Read(io, ColorantOrder, sizeof(cmsUInt8Number), Count) != Count) {
_cmsFree(self ->ContextID, (void*) ColorantOrder);
return NULL;
}
*nItems = 1;
return (void*) ColorantOrder;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addEventListenerMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "addEventListener", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
EventTarget* impl = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (DOMWindow* window = impl->toDOMWindow()) {
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(info.GetIsolate(), window->frame(), exceptionState)) {
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
if (!window->document())
return;
}
RefPtr<EventListener> listener = V8EventListenerList::getEventListener(info[1], false, ListenerFindOrCreate);
if (listener) {
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithNullCheck>, eventName, info[0]);
impl->addEventListener(eventName, listener, info[2]->BooleanValue());
if (!impl->toNode())
addHiddenValueToArray(info.Holder(), info[1], V8TestObjectPython::eventListenerCacheIndex, info.GetIsolate());
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (1 << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *expand_home(const char *path, const char* homedir)
{
assert(path);
assert(homedir);
char *new_name = NULL;
if (strncmp(path, "${HOME}", 7) == 0) {
if (asprintf(&new_name, "%s%s", homedir, path + 7) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
return new_name;
}
else if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
if (asprintf(&new_name, "%s%s", homedir, path + 1) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
return new_name;
}
return strdup(path);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_getline(char *s, int n, request_rec *r, int fold)
{
char *tmp_s = s;
apr_status_t rv;
apr_size_t len;
apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
tmp_bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
rv = ap_rgetline(&tmp_s, n, &len, r, fold, tmp_bb);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
/* Map the out-of-space condition to the old API. */
if (rv == APR_ENOSPC) {
return n;
}
/* Anything else is just bad. */
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return -1;
}
return (int)len;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smb2cli_conn_set_io_priority(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
uint8_t io_priority)
{
conn->smb2.io_priority = io_priority;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: timespec_to_jiffies(const struct timespec *value)
{
unsigned long sec = value->tv_sec;
long nsec = value->tv_nsec + TICK_NSEC - 1;
if (sec >= MAX_SEC_IN_JIFFIES){
sec = MAX_SEC_IN_JIFFIES;
nsec = 0;
}
return (((u64)sec * SEC_CONVERSION) +
(((u64)nsec * NSEC_CONVERSION) >>
(NSEC_JIFFIE_SC - SEC_JIFFIE_SC))) >> SEC_JIFFIE_SC;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: list_add_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT);
event->attach_state |= PERF_ATTACH_CONTEXT;
/*
* If we're a stand alone event or group leader, we go to the context
* list, group events are kept attached to the group so that
* perf_group_detach can, at all times, locate all siblings.
*/
if (event->group_leader == event) {
struct list_head *list;
event->group_caps = event->event_caps;
list = ctx_group_list(event, ctx);
list_add_tail(&event->group_entry, list);
}
list_update_cgroup_event(event, ctx, true);
list_add_rcu(&event->event_entry, &ctx->event_list);
ctx->nr_events++;
if (event->attr.inherit_stat)
ctx->nr_stat++;
ctx->generation++;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 85,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TestOpenReadFile(const std::wstring& path) {
return TestOpenFile(path, false);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChildProcessLauncherHelper::CreateNamedPlatformChannelOnClientThread() {
return base::nullopt;
}
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Bo <boliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639}
CWE ID: CWE-664 | 0 | 151,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabsUpdateFunction::RunImpl() {
DictionaryValue* update_props = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &update_props));
Value* tab_value = NULL;
if (HasOptionalArgument(0)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->Get(0, &tab_value));
}
int tab_id = -1;
WebContents* contents = NULL;
if (tab_value == NULL || tab_value->IsType(Value::TYPE_NULL)) {
Browser* browser = GetCurrentBrowser();
if (!browser) {
error_ = keys::kNoCurrentWindowError;
return false;
}
contents = browser->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents();
if (!contents) {
error_ = keys::kNoSelectedTabError;
return false;
}
tab_id = SessionID::IdForTab(contents);
} else {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(tab_value->GetAsInteger(&tab_id));
}
int tab_index = -1;
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
if (!GetTabById(tab_id, profile(), include_incognito(),
NULL, &tab_strip, &contents, &tab_index, &error_)) {
return false;
}
web_contents_ = contents;
bool is_async = false;
if (!UpdateURLIfPresent(update_props, tab_id, &is_async))
return false;
bool active = false;
if (update_props->HasKey(keys::kSelectedKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetBoolean(
keys::kSelectedKey, &active));
if (update_props->HasKey(keys::kActiveKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetBoolean(
keys::kActiveKey, &active));
if (active) {
if (tab_strip->active_index() != tab_index) {
tab_strip->ActivateTabAt(tab_index, false);
DCHECK_EQ(contents, tab_strip->GetActiveWebContents());
}
web_contents_->GetDelegate()->ActivateContents(web_contents_);
}
if (update_props->HasKey(keys::kHighlightedKey)) {
bool highlighted = false;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetBoolean(
keys::kHighlightedKey, &highlighted));
if (highlighted != tab_strip->IsTabSelected(tab_index))
tab_strip->ToggleSelectionAt(tab_index);
}
if (update_props->HasKey(keys::kPinnedKey)) {
bool pinned = false;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetBoolean(
keys::kPinnedKey, &pinned));
tab_strip->SetTabPinned(tab_index, pinned);
tab_index = tab_strip->GetIndexOfWebContents(contents);
}
if (update_props->HasKey(keys::kOpenerTabIdKey)) {
int opener_id = -1;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(update_props->GetInteger(
keys::kOpenerTabIdKey, &opener_id));
WebContents* opener_contents = NULL;
if (!ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(
opener_id, profile(), include_incognito(),
NULL, NULL, &opener_contents, NULL))
return false;
tab_strip->SetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(tab_index, opener_contents);
}
if (!is_async) {
PopulateResult();
SendResponse(true);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da3_node_order(
struct xfs_inode *dp,
struct xfs_buf *node1_bp,
struct xfs_buf *node2_bp)
{
struct xfs_da_intnode *node1;
struct xfs_da_intnode *node2;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree1;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree2;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr node1hdr;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr node2hdr;
node1 = node1_bp->b_addr;
node2 = node2_bp->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&node1hdr, node1);
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&node2hdr, node2);
btree1 = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node1);
btree2 = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(node2);
if (node1hdr.count > 0 && node2hdr.count > 0 &&
((be32_to_cpu(btree2[0].hashval) < be32_to_cpu(btree1[0].hashval)) ||
(be32_to_cpu(btree2[node2hdr.count - 1].hashval) <
be32_to_cpu(btree1[node1hdr.count - 1].hashval)))) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QVector<Archive::Entry*> Part::filesForIndexes(const QModelIndexList& list) const
{
QVector<Archive::Entry*> ret;
foreach(const QModelIndex& index, list) {
ret << m_model->entryForIndex(index);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 9,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dev_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct sk_buff *segs;
int features = dev->features & ~(illegal_highdma(dev, skb) ?
NETIF_F_SG : 0);
segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, features);
/* Verifying header integrity only. */
if (!segs)
return 0;
if (IS_ERR(segs))
return PTR_ERR(segs);
skb->next = segs;
DEV_GSO_CB(skb)->destructor = skb->destructor;
skb->destructor = dev_gso_skb_destructor;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t Document::UkmSourceID() const {
DCHECK(ukm_recorder_);
return ukm_source_id_;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockGenerateRandom(uint8_t* output, size_t n) {
memset(output, 0xaa, n);
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *PingImages(ImageInfo *image_info,const char *filename,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
ping_filename[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image,
*images;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Ping image list from a file.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,"filename",filename);
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,image_info->filename,
(int) image_info->scene,ping_filename,exception);
if (LocaleCompare(ping_filename,image_info->filename) != 0)
{
ExceptionInfo
*sans;
ssize_t
extent,
scene;
/*
Images of the form image-%d.png[1-5].
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
sans=AcquireExceptionInfo();
(void) SetImageInfo(read_info,0,sans);
sans=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans);
if (read_info->number_scenes == 0)
{
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(PingImage(image_info,exception));
}
(void) CopyMagickString(ping_filename,read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent);
images=NewImageList();
extent=(ssize_t) (read_info->scene+read_info->number_scenes);
for (scene=(ssize_t) read_info->scene; scene < (ssize_t) extent; scene++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,(Image *) NULL,ping_filename,
(int) scene,read_info->filename,exception);
image=PingImage(read_info,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
continue;
AppendImageToList(&images,image);
}
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
return(images);
}
return(PingImage(image_info,exception));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/pull/34
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 74,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Track::GetCodecId() const
{
return m_info.codecId;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::DidStopLoading(RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
SendMessageToEmbedder(new BrowserPluginMsg_LoadStop(embedder_routing_id(),
instance_id()));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Insert_Y_Turn( RAS_ARGS Int y )
{
PLong y_turns;
Int n;
n = ras.numTurns - 1;
y_turns = ras.sizeBuff - ras.numTurns;
/* look for first y value that is <= */
while ( n >= 0 && y < y_turns[n] )
n--;
/* if it is <, simply insert it, ignore if == */
if ( n >= 0 && y > y_turns[n] )
while ( n >= 0 )
{
Int y2 = (Int)y_turns[n];
y_turns[n] = y;
y = y2;
n--;
}
if ( n < 0 )
{
ras.maxBuff--;
if ( ras.maxBuff <= ras.top )
{
ras.error = FT_THROW( Overflow );
return FAILURE;
}
ras.numTurns++;
ras.sizeBuff[-ras.numTurns] = y;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HttpProxyClientSocket::IsConnectedAndIdle() const {
return next_state_ == STATE_DONE &&
transport_->socket()->IsConnectedAndIdle();
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncBackendHost::MakePendingConfigModeState(
const DataTypeController::TypeMap& data_type_controllers,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
CancelableTask* ready_task,
ModelSafeRoutingInfo* routing_info,
sync_api::ConfigureReason reason) {
PendingConfigureDataTypesState* state = new PendingConfigureDataTypesState();
for (DataTypeController::TypeMap::const_iterator it =
data_type_controllers.begin();
it != data_type_controllers.end(); ++it) {
syncable::ModelType type = it->first;
if (types.count(type) == 0) {
state->deleted_type = true;
routing_info->erase(type);
} else {
if (routing_info->count(type) == 0) {
(*routing_info)[type] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
state->added_types.set(type);
}
}
}
state->ready_task.reset(ready_task);
state->initial_types = types;
state->reason = reason;
return state;
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *AcquireLZMAMemory(void *context,size_t items,size_t size)
{
(void) context;
return((void *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) items,(size_t) size));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void platform_device_del(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
int i;
if (pdev) {
device_remove_properties(&pdev->dev);
device_del(&pdev->dev);
if (pdev->id_auto) {
ida_simple_remove(&platform_devid_ida, pdev->id);
pdev->id = PLATFORM_DEVID_AUTO;
}
for (i = 0; i < pdev->num_resources; i++) {
struct resource *r = &pdev->resource[i];
if (r->parent)
release_resource(r);
}
}
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_notified() const { return is_notified_; }
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 147,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Writer()
: m_position(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::UpdateScrollbarTheme(
mojom::UpdateScrollbarThemeParamsPtr params) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
static_cast<WebScrollbarBehaviorImpl*>(
blink_platform_impl_->ScrollbarBehavior())
->set_jump_on_track_click(params->jump_on_track_click);
blink::WebScrollbarTheme::UpdateScrollbarsWithNSDefaults(
params->initial_button_delay, params->autoscroll_button_delay,
params->preferred_scroller_style, params->redraw,
params->button_placement);
is_elastic_overscroll_enabled_ = params->scroll_view_rubber_banding;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qcow2_probe(const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size, const char *filename)
{
const QCowHeader *cow_header = (const void *)buf;
if (buf_size >= sizeof(QCowHeader) &&
be32_to_cpu(cow_header->magic) == QCOW_MAGIC &&
be32_to_cpu(cow_header->version) >= 2)
return 100;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_check_demo_mode_write_protect(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,115 |
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