instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crypto_retrieve_signer_identity(krb5_context context,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
const char **identity)
{
*identity = id_cryptoctx->identity;
if (*identity == NULL)
return ENOENT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_sdp_idx_using_mdep_filter(UINT8 app_idx, UINT8 mcl_idx, UINT8 *p_sdp_idx)
{
btif_hl_app_cb_t *p_acb =BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(app_idx);
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb =BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
UINT8 i, j, num_recs,num_elems, num_mdeps, mdep_idx;
tBTA_HL_MDEP_ROLE peer_mdep_role;
UINT16 data_type;
tBTA_HL_SDP_MDEP_CFG *p_mdep;
BOOLEAN found = FALSE;
BOOLEAN elem_found;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_find_sdp_idx_using_mdep_filter");
num_recs = p_mcb->sdp.num_recs;
num_elems = p_acb->filter.num_elems;
if (!num_elems)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_find_sdp_idx_using_mdep_filter num_elem=0");
*p_sdp_idx = 0;
found = TRUE;
return found;
}
for (i=0; i<num_recs; i++)
{
num_mdeps = p_mcb->sdp.sdp_rec[i].num_mdeps;
for (j=0; j<num_elems; j++ )
{
data_type = p_acb->filter.elem[j].data_type;
peer_mdep_role = p_acb->filter.elem[j].peer_mdep_role;
elem_found = FALSE;
mdep_idx=0;
while (!elem_found && mdep_idx < num_mdeps )
{
p_mdep = &(p_mcb->sdp.sdp_rec[i].mdep_cfg[mdep_idx]);
if ( (p_mdep->data_type == data_type) &&
(p_mdep->mdep_role == peer_mdep_role) )
{
elem_found = TRUE;
}
else
{
mdep_idx++;
}
}
if (!elem_found)
{
found = FALSE;
break;
}
else
{
found = TRUE;
}
}
if (found)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_find_sdp_idx_using_mdep_filter found idx=%d",i);
*p_sdp_idx = i;
break;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s found=%d sdp_idx=%d",__FUNCTION__ , found, *p_sdp_idx);
btif_hl_reset_mdep_filter(app_idx);
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeHttpAuthHandler::SetAuth(JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>&,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& username,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& password) {
if (observer_) {
base::string16 username16 = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, username);
base::string16 password16 = ConvertJavaStringToUTF16(env, password);
observer_->SetAuth(username16, password16);
}
}
Commit Message: Auto-dismiss http auth dialogs on navigation for Android.
BUG=884179
Change-Id: I18287e9c641045d5a74f3804e06ca17485e38957
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227482
Commit-Queue: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#591747}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::DidLoadAllScriptBlockingResources() {
execute_scripts_waiting_for_resources_task_handle_ =
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kNetworking)
->PostCancellableTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&Document::ExecuteScriptsWaitingForResources,
WrapWeakPersistent(this)));
if (IsHTMLDocument() && body()) {
BeginLifecycleUpdatesIfRenderingReady();
} else if (!IsHTMLDocument() && documentElement()) {
BeginLifecycleUpdatesIfRenderingReady();
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_encode_open_confirm(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr, struct nfsd4_open_confirm *oc)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
if (!nfserr)
nfserr = nfsd4_encode_stateid(xdr, &oc->oc_resp_stateid);
return nfserr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Bool leap_year(u32 year) {
year += 1900;
return (year % 4) == 0 && ((year % 100) != 0 || (year % 400) == 0) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_video::execute_omx_flush(OMX_U32 flushType)
{
bool bRet = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("execute_omx_flush - %u", (unsigned int)flushType);
#ifdef _MSM8974_
/* XXX: The driver/hardware does not support flushing of individual ports
* in all states. So we pretty much need to flush both ports internally,
* but client should only get the FLUSH_(INPUT|OUTPUT)_DONE for the one it
* requested. Since OMX_COMPONENT_(OUTPUT|INPUT)_FLUSH_PENDING isn't set,
* we automatically omit sending the FLUSH done for the "opposite" port. */
input_flush_progress = true;
output_flush_progress = true;
bRet = execute_flush_all();
#else
if (flushType == 0 || flushType == OMX_ALL) {
input_flush_progress = true;
bRet = execute_input_flush();
}
if (flushType == 1 || flushType == OMX_ALL) {
output_flush_progress = true;
bRet = execute_output_flush();
}
#endif
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundChannel::setLoop(int loop)
{
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
if (mAudioTrack != NULL && mSample != 0) {
uint32_t loopEnd = mSample->size()/mNumChannels/
((mSample->format() == AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT) ? sizeof(int16_t) : sizeof(uint8_t));
mAudioTrack->setLoop(0, loopEnd, loop);
mLoop = loop;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_region_resize(OnigRegion* region, int n)
{
region->num_regs = n;
if (n < ONIG_NREGION)
n = ONIG_NREGION;
if (region->allocated == 0) {
region->beg = (int* )xmalloc(n * sizeof(int));
region->end = (int* )xmalloc(n * sizeof(int));
if (region->beg == 0 || region->end == 0)
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
region->allocated = n;
}
else if (region->allocated < n) {
region->beg = (int* )xrealloc(region->beg, n * sizeof(int));
region->end = (int* )xrealloc(region->end, n * sizeof(int));
if (region->beg == 0 || region->end == 0)
return ONIGERR_MEMORY;
region->allocated = n;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntPoint RenderLayerScrollableArea::scrollPosition() const
{
return IntPoint(m_scrollOffset);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static WebView* createWebViewForTextSelection(const std::string& url)
{
WebView* webView = FrameTestHelpers::createWebViewAndLoad(url, true);
webView->settings()->setDefaultFontSize(12);
webView->enableFixedLayoutMode(false);
webView->resize(WebSize(640, 480));
return webView;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SpdyProxyClientSocket::IsConnectedAndIdle() const {
return IsConnected() && read_buffer_queue_.IsEmpty() &&
spdy_stream_->IsOpen();
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char __init get_fdc_version(void)
{
int r;
output_byte(FD_DUMPREGS); /* 82072 and better know DUMPREGS */
if (FDCS->reset)
return FDC_NONE;
r = result();
if (r <= 0x00)
return FDC_NONE; /* No FDC present ??? */
if ((r == 1) && (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80)) {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 8272A\n", fdc);
return FDC_8272A; /* 8272a/765 don't know DUMPREGS */
}
if (r != 10) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: DUMPREGS: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
if (!fdc_configure()) {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82072\n", fdc);
return FDC_82072; /* 82072 doesn't know CONFIGURE */
}
output_byte(FD_PERPENDICULAR);
if (need_more_output() == MORE_OUTPUT) {
output_byte(0);
} else {
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82072A\n", fdc);
return FDC_82072A; /* 82072A as found on Sparcs. */
}
output_byte(FD_UNLOCK);
r = result();
if ((r == 1) && (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80)) {
pr_info("FDC %d is a pre-1991 82077\n", fdc);
return FDC_82077_ORIG; /* Pre-1991 82077, doesn't know
* LOCK/UNLOCK */
}
if ((r != 1) || (reply_buffer[0] != 0x00)) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: UNLOCK: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
output_byte(FD_PARTID);
r = result();
if (r != 1) {
pr_info("FDC %d init: PARTID: unexpected return of %d bytes.\n",
fdc, r);
return FDC_UNKNOWN;
}
if (reply_buffer[0] == 0x80) {
pr_info("FDC %d is a post-1991 82077\n", fdc);
return FDC_82077; /* Revised 82077AA passes all the tests */
}
switch (reply_buffer[0] >> 5) {
case 0x0:
/* Either a 82078-1 or a 82078SL running at 5Volt */
pr_info("FDC %d is an 82078.\n", fdc);
return FDC_82078;
case 0x1:
pr_info("FDC %d is a 44pin 82078\n", fdc);
return FDC_82078;
case 0x2:
pr_info("FDC %d is a S82078B\n", fdc);
return FDC_S82078B;
case 0x3:
pr_info("FDC %d is a National Semiconductor PC87306\n", fdc);
return FDC_87306;
default:
pr_info("FDC %d init: 82078 variant with unknown PARTID=%d.\n",
fdc, reply_buffer[0] >> 5);
return FDC_82078_UNKN;
}
} /* get_fdc_version */
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmsvga_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
struct vmsvga_state_s *s = opaque;
s->invalidated = 1;
if (s->config) {
s->fifo = (uint32_t *) s->fifo_ptr;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_dec_allocate (opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t * p_code_block)
{
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_CBLK_DATA_SIZE);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_max_size = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_CBLK_DATA_SIZE;
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate 8192 elements of code_block->data\n");*/
p_code_block->segs = (opj_tcd_seg_t *) opj_calloc(OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS,sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));
if (! p_code_block->segs) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "Allocate %d elements of code_block->data\n", OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS * sizeof(opj_tcd_seg_t));*/
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = OPJ_J2K_DEFAULT_NB_SEGS;
/*fprintf(stderr, "m_current_max_segs of code_block->data = %d\n", p_code_block->m_current_max_segs);*/
} else {
/* sanitize */
OPJ_BYTE* l_data = p_code_block->data;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_max_size = p_code_block->data_max_size;
opj_tcd_seg_t * l_segs = p_code_block->segs;
OPJ_UINT32 l_current_max_segs = p_code_block->m_current_max_segs;
memset(p_code_block, 0, sizeof(opj_tcd_cblk_dec_t));
p_code_block->data = l_data;
p_code_block->data_max_size = l_data_max_size;
p_code_block->segs = l_segs;
p_code_block->m_current_max_segs = l_current_max_segs;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Add sanity check for tile coordinates (#823)
Coordinates are casted from OPJ_UINT32 to OPJ_INT32
Add sanity check for negative values and upper bound becoming lower
than lower bound.
See also
https://pdfium.googlesource.com/pdfium/+/b6befb2ed2485a3805cddea86dc7574510178ea9
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int bpf_obj_pin_user(u32 ufd, const char __user *pathname)
{
struct filename *pname;
enum bpf_type type;
void *raw;
int ret;
pname = getname(pathname);
if (IS_ERR(pname))
return PTR_ERR(pname);
raw = bpf_fd_probe_obj(ufd, &type);
if (IS_ERR(raw)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(raw);
goto out;
}
ret = bpf_obj_do_pin(pname, raw, type);
if (ret != 0)
bpf_any_put(raw, type);
out:
putname(pname);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INLINE void impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(void* pv_ctxt, UWORD32 u4_no_of_bits)
{
stream_t *ps_stream = (stream_t *)pv_ctxt;
FLUSH_BITS(ps_stream->u4_offset,ps_stream->u4_buf,ps_stream->u4_buf_nxt,u4_no_of_bits,ps_stream->pu4_buf_aligned)
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 173,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string GetNewTabBackgroundTilingCSS(
const ui::ThemeProvider* theme_provider) {
int repeat_mode = theme_provider->GetDisplayProperty(
ThemeProperties::NTP_BACKGROUND_TILING);
return ThemeProperties::TilingToString(repeat_mode);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ip_tunnel *ipgre_tunnel_locate(struct net *net,
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms, int create)
{
struct ip_tunnel *t, *nt;
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
struct ipgre_net *ign = net_generic(net, ipgre_net_id);
t = ipgre_tunnel_find(net, parms, ARPHRD_IPGRE);
if (t || !create)
return t;
if (parms->name[0])
strlcpy(name, parms->name, IFNAMSIZ);
else
strcpy(name, "gre%d");
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*t), name, ipgre_tunnel_setup);
if (!dev)
return NULL;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
if (strchr(name, '%')) {
if (dev_alloc_name(dev, name) < 0)
goto failed_free;
}
nt = netdev_priv(dev);
nt->parms = *parms;
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &ipgre_link_ops;
dev->mtu = ipgre_tunnel_bind_dev(dev);
if (register_netdevice(dev) < 0)
goto failed_free;
dev_hold(dev);
ipgre_tunnel_link(ign, nt);
return nt;
failed_free:
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
vcpu = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vcpu) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
err = kvm_vcpu_init(vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
err = create_hyp_mappings(vcpu, vcpu + 1);
if (err)
goto vcpu_uninit;
return vcpu;
vcpu_uninit:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
free_vcpu:
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vcpu);
out:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline ssize_t WritePSDOffset(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image,
const MagickSizeType size,const MagickSizeType offset)
{
MagickSizeType
current_offset;
ssize_t
result;
current_offset=TellBlob(image);
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
if (psd_info->version == 1)
result=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size);
else
result=(WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned short) size));
SeekBlob(image,current_offset,SEEK_SET);
return(result);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isdn_net_ciscohdlck_slarp_send_reply(isdn_net_local *lp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned char *p;
struct in_device *in_dev = NULL;
__be32 addr = 0; /* local ipv4 address */
__be32 mask = 0; /* local netmask */
if ((in_dev = lp->netdev->dev->ip_ptr) != NULL) {
/* take primary(first) address of interface */
struct in_ifaddr *ifa = in_dev->ifa_list;
if (ifa != NULL) {
addr = ifa->ifa_local;
mask = ifa->ifa_mask;
}
}
skb = isdn_net_ciscohdlck_alloc_skb(lp, 4 + 14);
if (!skb)
return;
p = skb_put(skb, 4 + 14);
/* cisco header */
*(u8 *)(p + 0) = CISCO_ADDR_UNICAST;
*(u8 *)(p + 1) = CISCO_CTRL;
*(__be16 *)(p + 2) = cpu_to_be16(CISCO_TYPE_SLARP);
/* slarp reply, send own ip/netmask; if values are nonsense remote
* should think we are unable to provide it with an address via SLARP */
*(__be32 *)(p + 4) = cpu_to_be32(CISCO_SLARP_REPLY);
*(__be32 *)(p + 8) = addr; // address
*(__be32 *)(p + 12) = mask; // netmask
*(__be16 *)(p + 16) = cpu_to_be16(0); // unused
p += 18;
isdn_net_write_super(lp, skb);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int UnpackWPG2Raster(Image *image,int bpp,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
RunCount,
XorMe = 0;
size_t
x,
y;
ssize_t
i,
ldblk;
unsigned int
SampleSize=1;
unsigned char
bbuf,
*BImgBuff,
SampleBuffer[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
x=0;
y=0;
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk,
sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if(BImgBuff==NULL)
return(-2);
while( y< image->rows)
{
bbuf=ReadBlobByte(image);
switch(bbuf)
{
case 0x7D:
SampleSize=ReadBlobByte(image); /* DSZ */
if(SampleSize>8)
return(-2);
if(SampleSize<1)
return(-2);
break;
case 0x7E:
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr,
"\nUnsupported WPG token XOR, please report!");
XorMe=!XorMe;
break;
case 0x7F:
RunCount=ReadBlobByte(image); /* BLK */
if (RunCount < 0)
break;
for(i=0; i < SampleSize*(RunCount+1); i++)
{
InsertByte6(0);
}
break;
case 0xFD:
RunCount=ReadBlobByte(image); /* EXT */
if (RunCount < 0)
break;
for(i=0; i<= RunCount;i++)
for(bbuf=0; bbuf < SampleSize; bbuf++)
InsertByte6(SampleBuffer[bbuf]);
break;
case 0xFE:
RunCount=ReadBlobByte(image); /* RST */
if (RunCount < 0)
break;
if(x!=0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stderr,
"\nUnsupported WPG2 unaligned token RST x=%.20g, please report!\n"
,(double) x);
return(-3);
}
{
/* duplicate the previous row RunCount x */
for(i=0;i<=RunCount;i++)
{
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,(ssize_t) (image->rows >= y ? y : image->rows-1),
bpp,exception);
y++;
}
}
break;
case 0xFF:
RunCount=ReadBlobByte(image); /* WHT */
if (RunCount < 0)
break;
for(i=0; i < SampleSize*(RunCount+1); i++)
{
InsertByte6(0xFF);
}
break;
default:
RunCount=bbuf & 0x7F;
if(bbuf & 0x80) /* REP */
{
for(i=0; i < SampleSize; i++)
SampleBuffer[i]=ReadBlobByte(image);
for(i=0;i<=RunCount;i++)
for(bbuf=0;bbuf<SampleSize;bbuf++)
InsertByte6(SampleBuffer[bbuf]);
}
else { /* NRP */
for(i=0; i< SampleSize*(RunCount+1);i++)
{
bbuf=ReadBlobByte(image);
InsertByte6(bbuf);
}
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
break;
}
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Ensure image extent does not exceed maximum
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvlan_set_lockdep_class(struct net_device *dev)
{
lockdep_set_class(&dev->addr_list_lock,
&macvlan_netdev_addr_lock_key);
netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, macvlan_set_lockdep_class_one, NULL);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_close(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid)
{
struct smb2_close_req *req;
struct smb2_close_rsp *rsp;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
struct kvec iov[1];
int resp_buftype;
int rc = 0;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Close\n");
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_CLOSE, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, 1, &resp_buftype, 0);
rsp = (struct smb2_close_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (rc != 0) {
if (tcon)
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_CLOSE_HE);
goto close_exit;
}
/* BB FIXME - decode close response, update inode for caching */
close_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_ppm_dumpparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, FILE *out)
{
jpc_ppm_t *ppm = &ms->parms.ppm;
fprintf(out, "ind=%d; len = %"PRIuFAST16";\n", ppm->ind, ppm->len);
if (ppm->len > 0) {
fprintf(out, "data =\n");
jas_memdump(out, ppm->data, ppm->len);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::ReturnCurrInputBuffer_Locked() {
DCHECK(decoder_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
lock_.AssertAcquired();
DCHECK(curr_input_buffer_.get());
curr_input_buffer_.reset();
TRACE_COUNTER1("Video Decoder", "Input buffers", input_buffers_.size());
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 148,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CountScreenshots() {
DownloadPrefs* download_prefs = DownloadPrefs::FromBrowserContext(
ProfileManager::GetActiveUserProfile());
base::FileEnumerator enumerator(download_prefs->DownloadPath(),
false, base::FileEnumerator::FILES,
"Screenshot*");
int count = 0;
while (!enumerator.Next().empty())
count++;
return count;
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
aacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type)
{
struct key_restriction *keyres;
kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
/*
* keyring->restrict_link is only assigned at key allocation time
* or with the key type locked, so the only values that could be
* concurrently assigned to keyring->restrict_link are for key
* types other than dead_type. Given this, it's ok to check
* the key type before acquiring keyring->sem.
*/
if (!dead_type || !keyring->restrict_link ||
keyring->restrict_link->keytype != dead_type) {
kleave(" [no restriction gc]");
return;
}
/* Lock the keyring to ensure that a link is not in progress */
down_write(&keyring->sem);
keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
keyres->check = restrict_link_reject;
key_put(keyres->key);
keyres->key = NULL;
keyres->keytype = NULL;
up_write(&keyring->sem);
kleave(" [restriction gc]");
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gfs2_flock(struct file *file, int cmd, struct file_lock *fl)
{
if (!(fl->fl_flags & FL_FLOCK))
return -ENOLCK;
if (fl->fl_type & LOCK_MAND)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (fl->fl_type == F_UNLCK) {
do_unflock(file, fl);
return 0;
} else {
return do_flock(file, cmd, fl);
}
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual uint32_t getCaps() {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IHDCP::getInterfaceDescriptor());
remote()->transact(HDCP_GET_CAPS, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: HDCP: buffer over flow check -- DO NOT MERGE
bug: 20222489
Change-Id: I3a64a5999d68ea243d187f12ec7717b7f26d93a3
(cherry picked from commit 532cd7b86a5fdc7b9a30a45d8ae2d16ef7660a72)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_pcm_hw_constraint_ranges(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime,
unsigned int cond,
snd_pcm_hw_param_t var,
const struct snd_pcm_hw_constraint_ranges *r)
{
return snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, cond, var,
snd_pcm_hw_rule_ranges, (void *)r,
var, -1);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode parse_proxy(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn, char *proxy,
curl_proxytype proxytype)
{
char *prox_portno;
char *endofprot;
/* We use 'proxyptr' to point to the proxy name from now on... */
char *proxyptr;
char *portptr;
char *atsign;
long port = -1;
char *proxyuser = NULL;
char *proxypasswd = NULL;
bool sockstype;
/* We do the proxy host string parsing here. We want the host name and the
* port name. Accept a protocol:// prefix
*/
/* Parse the protocol part if present */
endofprot = strstr(proxy, "://");
if(endofprot) {
proxyptr = endofprot + 3;
if(checkprefix("https", proxy))
proxytype = CURLPROXY_HTTPS;
else if(checkprefix("socks5h", proxy))
proxytype = CURLPROXY_SOCKS5_HOSTNAME;
else if(checkprefix("socks5", proxy))
proxytype = CURLPROXY_SOCKS5;
else if(checkprefix("socks4a", proxy))
proxytype = CURLPROXY_SOCKS4A;
else if(checkprefix("socks4", proxy) || checkprefix("socks", proxy))
proxytype = CURLPROXY_SOCKS4;
else if(checkprefix("http:", proxy))
; /* leave it as HTTP or HTTP/1.0 */
else {
/* Any other xxx:// reject! */
failf(data, "Unsupported proxy scheme for \'%s\'", proxy);
return CURLE_COULDNT_CONNECT;
}
}
else
proxyptr = proxy; /* No xxx:// head: It's a HTTP proxy */
#ifdef USE_SSL
if(!(Curl_ssl->supports & SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY))
#endif
if(proxytype == CURLPROXY_HTTPS) {
failf(data, "Unsupported proxy \'%s\', libcurl is built without the "
"HTTPS-proxy support.", proxy);
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
}
sockstype = proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS5_HOSTNAME ||
proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS5 ||
proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS4A ||
proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS4;
/* Is there a username and password given in this proxy url? */
atsign = strchr(proxyptr, '@');
if(atsign) {
CURLcode result =
Curl_parse_login_details(proxyptr, atsign - proxyptr,
&proxyuser, &proxypasswd, NULL);
if(result)
return result;
proxyptr = atsign + 1;
}
/* start scanning for port number at this point */
portptr = proxyptr;
/* detect and extract RFC6874-style IPv6-addresses */
if(*proxyptr == '[') {
char *ptr = ++proxyptr; /* advance beyond the initial bracket */
while(*ptr && (ISXDIGIT(*ptr) || (*ptr == ':') || (*ptr == '.')))
ptr++;
if(*ptr == '%') {
/* There might be a zone identifier */
if(strncmp("%25", ptr, 3))
infof(data, "Please URL encode %% as %%25, see RFC 6874.\n");
ptr++;
/* Allow unreserved characters as defined in RFC 3986 */
while(*ptr && (ISALPHA(*ptr) || ISXDIGIT(*ptr) || (*ptr == '-') ||
(*ptr == '.') || (*ptr == '_') || (*ptr == '~')))
ptr++;
}
if(*ptr == ']')
/* yeps, it ended nicely with a bracket as well */
*ptr++ = 0;
else
infof(data, "Invalid IPv6 address format\n");
portptr = ptr;
/* Note that if this didn't end with a bracket, we still advanced the
* proxyptr first, but I can't see anything wrong with that as no host
* name nor a numeric can legally start with a bracket.
*/
}
/* Get port number off proxy.server.com:1080 */
prox_portno = strchr(portptr, ':');
if(prox_portno) {
char *endp = NULL;
*prox_portno = 0x0; /* cut off number from host name */
prox_portno ++;
/* now set the local port number */
port = strtol(prox_portno, &endp, 10);
if((endp && *endp && (*endp != '/') && (*endp != ' ')) ||
(port < 0) || (port > 65535)) {
/* meant to detect for example invalid IPv6 numerical addresses without
brackets: "2a00:fac0:a000::7:13". Accept a trailing slash only
because we then allow "URL style" with the number followed by a
slash, used in curl test cases already. Space is also an acceptable
terminating symbol. */
infof(data, "No valid port number in proxy string (%s)\n",
prox_portno);
}
else
conn->port = port;
}
else {
if(proxyptr[0]=='/') {
/* If the first character in the proxy string is a slash, fail
immediately. The following code will otherwise clear the string which
will lead to code running as if no proxy was set! */
Curl_safefree(proxyuser);
Curl_safefree(proxypasswd);
return CURLE_COULDNT_RESOLVE_PROXY;
}
/* without a port number after the host name, some people seem to use
a slash so we strip everything from the first slash */
atsign = strchr(proxyptr, '/');
if(atsign)
*atsign = '\0'; /* cut off path part from host name */
if(data->set.proxyport)
/* None given in the proxy string, then get the default one if it is
given */
port = data->set.proxyport;
else {
if(proxytype == CURLPROXY_HTTPS)
port = CURL_DEFAULT_HTTPS_PROXY_PORT;
else
port = CURL_DEFAULT_PROXY_PORT;
}
}
if(*proxyptr) {
struct proxy_info *proxyinfo =
sockstype ? &conn->socks_proxy : &conn->http_proxy;
proxyinfo->proxytype = proxytype;
if(proxyuser) {
/* found user and password, rip them out. note that we are unescaping
them, as there is otherwise no way to have a username or password
with reserved characters like ':' in them. */
Curl_safefree(proxyinfo->user);
proxyinfo->user = curl_easy_unescape(data, proxyuser, 0, NULL);
Curl_safefree(proxyuser);
if(!proxyinfo->user) {
Curl_safefree(proxypasswd);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
Curl_safefree(proxyinfo->passwd);
if(proxypasswd && strlen(proxypasswd) < MAX_CURL_PASSWORD_LENGTH)
proxyinfo->passwd = curl_easy_unescape(data, proxypasswd, 0, NULL);
else
proxyinfo->passwd = strdup("");
Curl_safefree(proxypasswd);
if(!proxyinfo->passwd)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
conn->bits.proxy_user_passwd = TRUE; /* enable it */
}
if(port >= 0) {
proxyinfo->port = port;
if(conn->port < 0 || sockstype || !conn->socks_proxy.host.rawalloc)
conn->port = port;
}
/* now, clone the cleaned proxy host name */
Curl_safefree(proxyinfo->host.rawalloc);
proxyinfo->host.rawalloc = strdup(proxyptr);
proxyinfo->host.name = proxyinfo->host.rawalloc;
if(!proxyinfo->host.rawalloc)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
Curl_safefree(proxyuser);
Curl_safefree(proxypasswd);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 77,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoRequestClearServerData() {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->RequestClearServerData();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_fd_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *path)
{
return proc_fd_info(inode, path, NULL);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageCapture::ImageCapture(ExecutionContext* context, MediaStreamTrack* track)
: ContextLifecycleObserver(context), stream_track_(track) {
DCHECK(stream_track_);
DCHECK(!service_.is_bound());
if (!GetFrame())
return;
GetFrame()->GetInterfaceProvider().GetInterface(mojo::MakeRequest(&service_));
service_.set_connection_error_handler(ConvertToBaseCallback(WTF::Bind(
&ImageCapture::OnServiceConnectionError, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
service_->GetPhotoState(
stream_track_->Component()->Source()->Id(),
ConvertToBaseCallback(WTF::Bind(
&ImageCapture::UpdateMediaTrackCapabilities, WrapPersistent(this))));
}
Commit Message: Convert MediaTrackConstraints to a ScriptValue
IDLDictionaries such as MediaTrackConstraints should not be stored on
the heap which would happen when binding one as a parameter to a
callback. This change converts the object to a ScriptValue ahead of
time. This is fine because the value will be passed to a
ScriptPromiseResolver that will converted it to a V8 value if it
isn't already.
Bug: 759457
Change-Id: I3009a0f7711cc264aeaae07a36c18a6db8c915c8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/701358
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507177}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ParseQualifiedNameResult() { }
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: header_afiol(struct archive_read *a, struct cpio *cpio,
struct archive_entry *entry, size_t *namelength, size_t *name_pad)
{
const void *h;
const char *header;
a->archive.archive_format = ARCHIVE_FORMAT_CPIO_AFIO_LARGE;
a->archive.archive_format_name = "afio large ASCII";
/* Read fixed-size portion of header. */
h = __archive_read_ahead(a, afiol_header_size, NULL);
if (h == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* Parse out octal fields. */
header = (const char *)h;
archive_entry_set_dev(entry,
(dev_t)atol16(header + afiol_dev_offset, afiol_dev_size));
archive_entry_set_ino(entry, atol16(header + afiol_ino_offset, afiol_ino_size));
archive_entry_set_mode(entry,
(mode_t)atol8(header + afiol_mode_offset, afiol_mode_size));
archive_entry_set_uid(entry, atol16(header + afiol_uid_offset, afiol_uid_size));
archive_entry_set_gid(entry, atol16(header + afiol_gid_offset, afiol_gid_size));
archive_entry_set_nlink(entry,
(unsigned int)atol16(header + afiol_nlink_offset, afiol_nlink_size));
archive_entry_set_rdev(entry,
(dev_t)atol16(header + afiol_rdev_offset, afiol_rdev_size));
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, atol16(header + afiol_mtime_offset, afiol_mtime_size), 0);
*namelength = (size_t)atol16(header + afiol_namesize_offset, afiol_namesize_size);
*name_pad = 0; /* No padding of filename. */
cpio->entry_bytes_remaining =
atol16(header + afiol_filesize_offset, afiol_filesize_size);
archive_entry_set_size(entry, cpio->entry_bytes_remaining);
cpio->entry_padding = 0;
__archive_read_consume(a, afiol_header_size);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 52,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DrawPath(GraphicsContext& context,
DisplayItemClient& client,
DisplayItem::Type type,
unsigned count) {
if (DrawingRecorder::UseCachedDrawingIfPossible(context, client, type))
return;
DrawingRecorder recorder(context, client, type);
SkPath path;
path.moveTo(0, 0);
path.lineTo(0, 100);
path.lineTo(50, 50);
path.lineTo(100, 100);
path.lineTo(100, 0);
path.close();
PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < count; i++)
context.DrawPath(path, flags);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kvm_eventfd_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQFD
spin_lock_init(&kvm->irqfds.lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->irqfds.items);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_list);
mutex_init(&kvm->irqfds.resampler_lock);
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->ioeventfds);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alloc_all_urbs(rtl8150_t * dev)
{
dev->rx_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->rx_urb)
return 0;
dev->tx_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->tx_urb) {
usb_free_urb(dev->rx_urb);
return 0;
}
dev->intr_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dev->intr_urb) {
usb_free_urb(dev->rx_urb);
usb_free_urb(dev->tx_urb);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_set_qkey(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, u32 qkey)
{
struct ib_sa_mcmember_rec rec;
int ret = 0;
if (id_priv->qkey) {
if (qkey && id_priv->qkey != qkey)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
if (qkey) {
id_priv->qkey = qkey;
return 0;
}
switch (id_priv->id.ps) {
case RDMA_PS_UDP:
case RDMA_PS_IB:
id_priv->qkey = RDMA_UDP_QKEY;
break;
case RDMA_PS_IPOIB:
ib_addr_get_mgid(&id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr, &rec.mgid);
ret = ib_sa_get_mcmember_rec(id_priv->id.device,
id_priv->id.port_num, &rec.mgid,
&rec);
if (!ret)
id_priv->qkey = be32_to_cpu(rec.qkey);
break;
default:
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::SetWindowBounds(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params) {
int window_id;
if (!params->GetInteger("windowId", &window_id))
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "windowId");
HeadlessWebContentsImpl* web_contents =
browser_->GetWebContentsForWindowId(window_id);
if (!web_contents) {
return CreateErrorResponse(command_id, kErrorServerError,
"Browser window not found");
}
const base::Value* value = nullptr;
const base::DictionaryValue* bounds_dict = nullptr;
if (!params->Get("bounds", &value) || !value->GetAsDictionary(&bounds_dict))
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "bounds");
std::string window_state;
if (!bounds_dict->GetString("windowState", &window_state)) {
window_state = "normal";
} else if (window_state != "normal" && window_state != "minimized" &&
window_state != "maximized" && window_state != "fullscreen") {
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "windowState");
}
bool set_bounds = false;
gfx::Rect bounds = web_contents->web_contents()->GetContainerBounds();
int left, top, width, height;
if (bounds_dict->GetInteger("left", &left)) {
bounds.set_x(left);
set_bounds = true;
}
if (bounds_dict->GetInteger("top", &top)) {
bounds.set_y(top);
set_bounds = true;
}
if (bounds_dict->GetInteger("width", &width)) {
if (width < 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "width");
bounds.set_width(width);
set_bounds = true;
}
if (bounds_dict->GetInteger("height", &height)) {
if (height < 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "height");
bounds.set_height(height);
set_bounds = true;
}
if (set_bounds && window_state != "normal") {
return CreateErrorResponse(
command_id, kErrorServerError,
"The 'minimized', 'maximized' and 'fullscreen' states cannot be "
"combined with 'left', 'top', 'width' or 'height'");
}
if (set_bounds && web_contents->window_state() != "normal") {
return CreateErrorResponse(
command_id, kErrorServerError,
"To resize minimized/maximized/fullscreen window, restore it to normal "
"state first.");
}
web_contents->set_window_state(window_state);
web_contents->SetBounds(bounds);
return CreateSuccessResponse(command_id, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <irisu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockAutofillPopupController() {
gfx::FontList::SetDefaultFontDescription("Arial, Times New Roman, 15px");
layout_model_.reset(
new AutofillPopupLayoutModel(this, false /* is_credit_card_field */));
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MimeHandlerViewContainer::DidReceiveData(const char* data,
int data_length) {
view_id_ += std::string(data, data_length);
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_add_alg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
int exact = 0;
const char *name;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct crypto_user_alg *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nlattr *priority = attrs[CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL];
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
exact = 1;
if (priority && !exact)
return -EINVAL;
alg = crypto_alg_match(p, exact);
if (alg)
return -EEXIST;
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
name = p->cru_driver_name;
else
name = p->cru_name;
switch (p->cru_type & p->cru_mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD:
alg = crypto_user_aead_alg(name, p->cru_type, p->cru_mask);
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_GIVCIPHER:
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER:
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ABLKCIPHER:
alg = crypto_user_skcipher_alg(name, p->cru_type, p->cru_mask);
break;
default:
alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(name, p->cru_type, p->cru_mask);
}
if (IS_ERR(alg))
return PTR_ERR(alg);
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
if (priority)
alg->cra_priority = nla_get_u32(priority);
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rpc_decode(nw_ses *ses, void *data, size_t max)
{
if (max < RPC_PKG_HEAD_SIZE)
return 0;
rpc_pkg *pkg = data;
if (le32toh(pkg->magic) != RPC_PKG_MAGIC)
return -1;
uint32_t pkg_size = RPC_PKG_HEAD_SIZE + le16toh(pkg->ext_size) + le32toh(pkg->body_size);
if (max < pkg_size)
return 0;
uint32_t crc32 = le32toh(pkg->crc32);
pkg->crc32 = 0;
if (crc32 != generate_crc32c(data, pkg_size))
return -3;
pkg->crc32 = crc32;
pkg->magic = le32toh(pkg->magic);
pkg->command = le32toh(pkg->command);
pkg->pkg_type = le16toh(pkg->pkg_type);
pkg->result = le32toh(pkg->result);
pkg->sequence = le32toh(pkg->sequence);
pkg->req_id = le64toh(pkg->req_id);
pkg->body_size = le32toh(pkg->body_size);
pkg->ext_size = le16toh(pkg->ext_size);
return pkg_size;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #131 from benjaminchodroff/master
fix memory corruption and other 32bit overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 76,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void cluster_unintern(struct cluster_list *cluster)
{
if (cluster->refcnt)
cluster->refcnt--;
if (cluster->refcnt == 0) {
hash_release(cluster_hash, cluster);
cluster_free(cluster);
}
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 91,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void shmem_destroy_inodecache(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(shmem_inode_cachep);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsAgent::runtimeFeatureStateChanged(
const WebKit::WebString& feature,
bool enabled) {
Send(new DevToolsHostMsg_RuntimePropertyChanged(
routing_id(),
feature.utf8(),
enabled ? "true" : "false"));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *Field_FindFirstSeparator( char *s )
{
int i;
for( i = 0; i < strlen( s ); i++ )
{
if( s[ i ] == ';' )
return &s[ i ];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::GetConstrainedWindowTopY(int* top_y) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
const void *buf = intf->altsetting->extra;
size_t buflen = intf->altsetting->extralen;
struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
if (!buf) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing descriptor data\n");
return NULL;
}
if (!buflen) {
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Zero length descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
while (buflen > 0) {
union_desc = (struct usb_cdc_union_desc *)buf;
if (union_desc->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE &&
union_desc->bDescriptorSubType == USB_CDC_UNION_TYPE) {
dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Found union header\n");
return union_desc;
}
buflen -= union_desc->bLength;
buf += union_desc->bLength;
}
dev_err(&intf->dev, "Missing CDC union descriptor\n");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-psu - check if CDC union descriptor is sane
Before trying to use CDC union descriptor, try to validate whether that it
is sane by checking that intf->altsetting->extra is big enough and that
descriptor bLength is not too big and not too small.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int json_array_set_new(json_t *json, size_t index, json_t *value)
{
json_array_t *array;
if(!value)
return -1;
if(!json_is_array(json) || json == value)
{
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
array = json_to_array(json);
if(index >= array->entries)
{
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
json_decref(array->table[index]);
array->table[index] = value;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewWin::IsCommandIdChecked(int command_id) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static FlagsState* GetInstance() {
return Singleton<FlagsState>::get();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_reject_sidr_req(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
enum ib_cm_sidr_status status)
{
struct ib_cm_sidr_rep_param param;
memset(¶m, 0, sizeof param);
param.status = status;
ib_send_cm_sidr_rep(&cm_id_priv->id, ¶m);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct rfcomm_dev *rfcomm_dev_get(int id)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev;
spin_lock(&rfcomm_dev_lock);
dev = __rfcomm_dev_get(id);
if (dev) {
if (test_bit(RFCOMM_TTY_RELEASED, &dev->flags))
dev = NULL;
else
tty_port_get(&dev->port);
}
spin_unlock(&rfcomm_dev_lock);
return dev;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int walk_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
int err = 0;
unsigned long next;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
if (start >= end)
return -EINVAL;
if (!walk->mm)
return -EINVAL;
VM_BUG_ON_MM(!rwsem_is_locked(&walk->mm->mmap_sem), walk->mm);
vma = find_vma(walk->mm, start);
do {
if (!vma) { /* after the last vma */
walk->vma = NULL;
next = end;
} else if (start < vma->vm_start) { /* outside vma */
walk->vma = NULL;
next = min(end, vma->vm_start);
} else { /* inside vma */
walk->vma = vma;
next = min(end, vma->vm_end);
vma = vma->vm_next;
err = walk_page_test(start, next, walk);
if (err > 0) {
/*
* positive return values are purely for
* controlling the pagewalk, so should never
* be passed to the callers.
*/
err = 0;
continue;
}
if (err < 0)
break;
}
if (walk->vma || walk->pte_hole)
err = __walk_page_range(start, next, walk);
if (err)
break;
} while (start = next, start < end);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm/pagewalk.c: report holes in hugetlb ranges
This matters at least for the mincore syscall, which will otherwise copy
uninitialized memory from the page allocator to userspace. It is
probably also a correctness error for /proc/$pid/pagemap, but I haven't
tested that.
Removing the `walk->hugetlb_entry` condition in walk_hugetlb_range() has
no effect because the caller already checks for that.
This only reports holes in hugetlb ranges to callers who have specified
a hugetlb_entry callback.
This issue was found using an AFL-based fuzzer.
v2:
- don't crash on ->pte_hole==NULL (Andrew Morton)
- add Cc stable (Andrew Morton)
Fixes: 1e25a271c8ac ("mincore: apply page table walker on do_mincore()")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 59,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeContentLogicalHeight(const Length& height, LayoutUnit intrinsicContentHeight) const
{
LayoutUnit heightIncludingScrollbar = computeContentAndScrollbarLogicalHeightUsing(height, intrinsicContentHeight);
if (heightIncludingScrollbar == -1)
return -1;
return std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, adjustContentBoxLogicalHeightForBoxSizing(heightIncludingScrollbar) - scrollbarLogicalHeight());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: directory_load_state_free (DirectoryLoadState *state)
{
if (state->enumerator)
{
if (!g_file_enumerator_is_closed (state->enumerator))
{
g_file_enumerator_close_async (state->enumerator,
0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
g_object_unref (state->enumerator);
}
if (state->load_mime_list_hash != NULL)
{
istr_set_destroy (state->load_mime_list_hash);
}
nautilus_file_unref (state->load_directory_file);
g_object_unref (state->cancellable);
g_free (state);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __meminit __add_zone(struct zone *zone, unsigned long phys_start_pfn)
{
struct pglist_data *pgdat = zone->zone_pgdat;
int nr_pages = PAGES_PER_SECTION;
int nid = pgdat->node_id;
int zone_type;
unsigned long flags;
zone_type = zone - pgdat->node_zones;
if (!zone->wait_table) {
int ret;
ret = init_currently_empty_zone(zone, phys_start_pfn,
nr_pages, MEMMAP_HOTPLUG);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
pgdat_resize_lock(zone->zone_pgdat, &flags);
grow_zone_span(zone, phys_start_pfn, phys_start_pfn + nr_pages);
grow_pgdat_span(zone->zone_pgdat, phys_start_pfn,
phys_start_pfn + nr_pages);
pgdat_resize_unlock(zone->zone_pgdat, &flags);
memmap_init_zone(nr_pages, nid, zone_type,
phys_start_pfn, MEMMAP_HOTPLUG);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/hotplug: correctly add new zone to all other nodes' zone lists
When online_pages() is called to add new memory to an empty zone, it
rebuilds all zone lists by calling build_all_zonelists(). But there's a
bug which prevents the new zone to be added to other nodes' zone lists.
online_pages() {
build_all_zonelists()
.....
node_set_state(zone_to_nid(zone), N_HIGH_MEMORY)
}
Here the node of the zone is put into N_HIGH_MEMORY state after calling
build_all_zonelists(), but build_all_zonelists() only adds zones from
nodes in N_HIGH_MEMORY state to the fallback zone lists.
build_all_zonelists()
->__build_all_zonelists()
->build_zonelists()
->find_next_best_node()
->for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
So memory in the new zone will never be used by other nodes, and it may
cause strange behavor when system is under memory pressure. So put node
into N_HIGH_MEMORY state before calling build_all_zonelists().
Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Liu <liuj97@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Keping Chen <chenkeping@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedTextureBinder::ScopedTextureBinder(ContextState* state,
ErrorState* error_state,
GLuint id,
GLenum target)
: state_(state), error_state_(error_state), target_(target) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("ScopedTextureBinder::ctor", error_state_);
auto* api = state->api();
api->glActiveTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE0);
api->glBindTextureFn(target, id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void port_subs_info_init(struct snd_seq_port_subs_info *grp)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&grp->list_head);
grp->count = 0;
grp->exclusive = 0;
rwlock_init(&grp->list_lock);
init_rwsem(&grp->list_mutex);
grp->open = NULL;
grp->close = NULL;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebLocalFrameImpl::WebLocalFrameImpl(
WebTreeScopeType scope,
WebFrameClient* client,
blink::InterfaceRegistry* interface_registry)
: WebLocalFrameBase(scope),
local_frame_client_(LocalFrameClientImpl::Create(this)),
client_(client),
autofill_client_(0),
input_events_scale_factor_for_emulation_(1),
interface_registry_(interface_registry),
web_dev_tools_frontend_(0),
input_method_controller_(*this),
text_checker_client_(new TextCheckerClientImpl(this)),
spell_check_panel_host_client_(nullptr),
self_keep_alive_(this) {
DCHECK(client_);
g_frame_count++;
client_->BindToFrame(this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zend_bool ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_str_exists(const HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len)
{
zend_ulong h;
Bucket *p;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
h = zend_inline_hash_func(str, len);
p = zend_hash_str_find_bucket(ht, str, len, h);
return p ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::Float32ArrayAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_float32ArrayAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::Float32ArrayAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::ActivateNearestFindResult(float x,
float y) {
GetOrCreateFindRequestManager()->ActivateNearestFindResult(x, y);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Range> Range::create(PassRefPtr<Document> ownerDocument, const Position& start, const Position& end)
{
return adoptRef(new Range(ownerDocument, start.containerNode(), start.computeOffsetInContainerNode(), end.containerNode(), end.computeOffsetInContainerNode()));
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
dec->numtiles = dec->numhtiles * dec->numvtiles;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("numtiles = %d; numhtiles = %d; numvtiles = %d;\n",
dec->numtiles, dec->numhtiles, dec->numvtiles));
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
tile->pi = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CustomButton::ViewHierarchyChanged(
const ViewHierarchyChangedDetails& details) {
if (!details.is_add && state_ != STATE_DISABLED)
SetState(STATE_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Custom buttons should only handle accelerators when focused.
BUG=541415
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1437523005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360130}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageHandler::NavigationReset(NavigationRequest* navigation_request) {
auto navigate_callback = navigate_callbacks_.find(
navigation_request->frame_tree_node()->devtools_frame_token());
if (navigate_callback == navigate_callbacks_.end())
return;
std::string frame_id =
navigation_request->frame_tree_node()->devtools_frame_token().ToString();
bool success = navigation_request->net_error() == net::OK;
std::string error_string =
net::ErrorToString(navigation_request->net_error());
navigate_callback->second->sendSuccess(
frame_id,
Maybe<std::string>(
navigation_request->devtools_navigation_token().ToString()),
success ? Maybe<std::string>() : Maybe<std::string>(error_string));
navigate_callbacks_.erase(navigate_callback);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const GLubyte* GLES2Implementation::GetStringi(GLenum name, GLuint index) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetStringi("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringStringType(name) << "," << index
<< ")");
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetStringi");
UpdateCachedExtensionsIfNeeded();
if (name != GL_EXTENSIONS) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glGetStringi", "name");
return nullptr;
}
if (index >= cached_extensions_.size()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetStringi", "index too large");
return nullptr;
}
const char* result = cached_extensions_[index];
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" returned " << result);
CheckGLError();
return reinterpret_cast<const GLubyte*>(result);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void readpng_cleanup(int free_image_data)
{
if (free_image_data && image_data) {
free(image_data);
image_data = NULL;
}
if (png_ptr && info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
png_ptr = NULL;
info_ptr = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static SpiceWatch *dummy_watch_add(int fd, int event_mask, SpiceWatchFunc func, void *opaque)
{
return NULL; // apparently allowed?
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gup_pmd_range(pud_t pud, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
unsigned long next;
pmd_t *pmdp;
pmdp = pmd_offset(&pud, addr);
do {
pmd_t pmd = READ_ONCE(*pmdp);
next = pmd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (!pmd_present(pmd))
return 0;
if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(pmd) || pmd_huge(pmd) ||
pmd_devmap(pmd))) {
/*
* NUMA hinting faults need to be handled in the GUP
* slowpath for accounting purposes and so that they
* can be serialised against THP migration.
*/
if (pmd_protnone(pmd))
return 0;
if (!gup_huge_pmd(pmd, pmdp, addr, next, write,
pages, nr))
return 0;
} else if (unlikely(is_hugepd(__hugepd(pmd_val(pmd))))) {
/*
* architecture have different format for hugetlbfs
* pmd format and THP pmd format
*/
if (!gup_huge_pd(__hugepd(pmd_val(pmd)), addr,
PMD_SHIFT, next, write, pages, nr))
return 0;
} else if (!gup_pte_range(pmd, addr, next, write, pages, nr))
return 0;
} while (pmdp++, addr = next, addr != end);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_check_loops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
const struct nft_chain *chain)
{
const struct nft_rule *rule;
const struct nft_expr *expr, *last;
const struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_set_binding *binding;
struct nft_set_iter iter;
if (ctx->chain == chain)
return -ELOOP;
list_for_each_entry(rule, &chain->rules, list) {
nft_rule_for_each_expr(expr, last, rule) {
const struct nft_data *data = NULL;
int err;
if (!expr->ops->validate)
continue;
err = expr->ops->validate(ctx, expr, &data);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (data == NULL)
continue;
switch (data->verdict) {
case NFT_JUMP:
case NFT_GOTO:
err = nf_tables_check_loops(ctx, data->chain);
if (err < 0)
return err;
default:
break;
}
}
}
list_for_each_entry(set, &ctx->table->sets, list) {
if (!(set->flags & NFT_SET_MAP) ||
set->dtype != NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
continue;
list_for_each_entry(binding, &set->bindings, list) {
if (binding->chain != chain)
continue;
iter.skip = 0;
iter.count = 0;
iter.err = 0;
iter.fn = nf_tables_loop_check_setelem;
set->ops->walk(ctx, set, &iter);
if (iter.err < 0)
return iter.err;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_pem_cert(FILE *out, certificate_t *cert)
{
chunk_t encoded;
if (cert->get_encoding(cert, CERT_PEM, &encoded))
{
fprintf(out, "%.*s", (int)encoded.len, encoded.ptr);
free(encoded.ptr);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 12,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int NsSetParameter (preproc_effect_t *effect, void *pParam, void *pValue)
{
int status = 0;
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inet6_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_dev *idev,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int event, unsigned int flags)
{
struct net_device *dev = idev->dev;
struct ifinfomsg *hdr;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
void *protoinfo;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*hdr), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
hdr = nlmsg_data(nlh);
hdr->ifi_family = AF_INET6;
hdr->__ifi_pad = 0;
hdr->ifi_type = dev->type;
hdr->ifi_index = dev->ifindex;
hdr->ifi_flags = dev_get_flags(dev);
hdr->ifi_change = 0;
if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFNAME, dev->name) ||
(dev->addr_len &&
nla_put(skb, IFLA_ADDRESS, dev->addr_len, dev->dev_addr)) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_MTU, dev->mtu) ||
(dev->ifindex != dev->iflink &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_LINK, dev->iflink)))
goto nla_put_failure;
protoinfo = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_PROTINFO);
if (protoinfo == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (inet6_fill_ifla6_attrs(skb, idev) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, protoinfo);
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
if (item) {
dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
OPENSSL_free(item->data);
pitem_free(item);
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __exit iwch_cm_term(void)
{
flush_workqueue(workq);
destroy_workqueue(workq);
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void connect_to_smartsocket(asocket* s) {
D("Connecting to smart socket");
asocket* ss = create_smart_socket();
s->peer = ss;
ss->peer = s;
s->ready(s);
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsKeyValueInDict(const JsonKeyValue* key_value,
DictionaryValue* dict) {
Value* value = NULL;
std::string value_str;
if (dict->Get(key_value->key, &value) &&
value->GetAsString(&value_str) &&
CompareJsonValues(value_str, key_value->value, key_value->op))
return true;
DictionaryValue* args_dict = NULL;
dict->GetDictionary("args", &args_dict);
if (args_dict)
return IsKeyValueInDict(key_value, args_dict);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* Type_ProfileSequenceDesc_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsDupProfileSequenceDescription((cmsSEQ*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct thread_info *ti;
unsigned long *stackend;
int err;
prepare_to_copy(orig);
tsk = alloc_task_struct();
if (!tsk)
return NULL;
ti = alloc_thread_info(tsk);
if (!ti) {
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
err = arch_dup_task_struct(tsk, orig);
if (err)
goto out;
tsk->stack = ti;
err = prop_local_init_single(&tsk->dirties);
if (err)
goto out;
setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
clear_user_return_notifier(tsk);
stackend = end_of_stack(tsk);
*stackend = STACK_END_MAGIC; /* for overflow detection */
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
#endif
/* One for us, one for whoever does the "release_task()" (usually parent) */
atomic_set(&tsk->usage,2);
atomic_set(&tsk->fs_excl, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE
tsk->btrace_seq = 0;
#endif
tsk->splice_pipe = NULL;
account_kernel_stack(ti, 1);
return tsk;
out:
free_thread_info(ti);
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: pids: fix fork_idle() to setup ->pids correctly
copy_process(pid => &init_struct_pid) doesn't do attach_pid/etc.
It shouldn't, but this means that the idle threads run with the wrong
pids copied from the caller's task_struct. In x86 case the caller is
either kernel_init() thread or keventd.
In particular, this means that after the series of cpu_up/cpu_down an
idle thread (which never exits) can run with .pid pointing to nowhere.
Change fork_idle() to initialize idle->pids[] correctly. We only set
.pid = &init_struct_pid but do not add .node to list, INIT_TASK() does
the same for the boot-cpu idle thread (swapper).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at>
Cc: Mathias Krause <Mathias.Krause@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::UpdateType() {
DCHECK(input_type_);
DCHECK(input_type_view_);
const AtomicString& new_type_name =
InputType::NormalizeTypeName(FastGetAttribute(typeAttr));
if (input_type_->FormControlType() == new_type_name)
return;
InputType* new_type = InputType::Create(*this, new_type_name);
RemoveFromRadioButtonGroup();
ValueMode old_value_mode = input_type_->GetValueMode();
bool did_respect_height_and_width =
input_type_->ShouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes();
bool could_be_successful_submit_button = CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton();
input_type_view_->DestroyShadowSubtree();
DropInnerEditorElement();
LazyReattachIfAttached();
if (input_type_->SupportsRequired() != new_type->SupportsRequired() &&
IsRequired()) {
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoRequired);
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoOptional);
}
if (input_type_->SupportsReadOnly() != new_type->SupportsReadOnly()) {
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoReadOnly);
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoReadWrite);
}
if (input_type_->IsCheckable() != new_type->IsCheckable()) {
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoChecked);
}
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoIndeterminate);
if (input_type_->IsSteppable() || new_type->IsSteppable()) {
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoInRange);
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoOutOfRange);
}
bool placeholder_changed =
input_type_->SupportsPlaceholder() != new_type->SupportsPlaceholder();
has_been_password_field_ |= new_type_name == InputTypeNames::password;
input_type_ = new_type;
input_type_view_ = input_type_->CreateView();
if (input_type_view_->NeedsShadowSubtree()) {
EnsureUserAgentShadowRoot();
CreateShadowSubtree();
}
SetNeedsWillValidateCheck();
if (placeholder_changed) {
UpdatePlaceholderText();
UpdatePlaceholderVisibility();
PseudoStateChanged(CSSSelector::kPseudoPlaceholderShown);
}
ValueMode new_value_mode = input_type_->GetValueMode();
if (old_value_mode == ValueMode::kValue &&
(new_value_mode == ValueMode::kDefault ||
new_value_mode == ValueMode::kDefaultOn)) {
if (HasDirtyValue())
setAttribute(valueAttr, AtomicString(non_attribute_value_));
non_attribute_value_ = String();
has_dirty_value_ = false;
}
else if (old_value_mode != ValueMode::kValue &&
new_value_mode == ValueMode::kValue) {
AtomicString value_string = FastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
input_type_->WarnIfValueIsInvalid(value_string);
non_attribute_value_ = SanitizeValue(value_string);
has_dirty_value_ = false;
}
else if (old_value_mode != ValueMode::kFilename &&
new_value_mode == ValueMode::kFilename) {
non_attribute_value_ = String();
has_dirty_value_ = false;
} else {
if (!HasDirtyValue()) {
String default_value = FastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
if (!default_value.IsNull())
input_type_->WarnIfValueIsInvalid(default_value);
}
if (new_value_mode == ValueMode::kValue) {
String new_value = SanitizeValue(non_attribute_value_);
if (!EqualIgnoringNullity(new_value, non_attribute_value_)) {
if (HasDirtyValue())
setValue(new_value);
else
SetNonDirtyValue(new_value);
}
}
}
needs_to_update_view_value_ = true;
input_type_view_->UpdateView();
if (did_respect_height_and_width !=
input_type_->ShouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes()) {
DCHECK(GetElementData());
AttributeCollection attributes = AttributesWithoutUpdate();
if (const Attribute* height = attributes.Find(heightAttr)) {
TextControlElement::AttributeChanged(AttributeModificationParams(
heightAttr, height->Value(), height->Value(),
AttributeModificationReason::kDirectly));
}
if (const Attribute* width = attributes.Find(widthAttr)) {
TextControlElement::AttributeChanged(
AttributeModificationParams(widthAttr, width->Value(), width->Value(),
AttributeModificationReason::kDirectly));
}
if (const Attribute* align = attributes.Find(alignAttr)) {
TextControlElement::AttributeChanged(
AttributeModificationParams(alignAttr, align->Value(), align->Value(),
AttributeModificationReason::kDirectly));
}
}
if (GetDocument().FocusedElement() == this)
GetDocument().UpdateFocusAppearanceLater();
ClearValueBeforeFirstUserEdit();
AddToRadioButtonGroup();
SetNeedsValidityCheck();
if ((could_be_successful_submit_button || CanBeSuccessfulSubmitButton()) &&
formOwner() && isConnected())
formOwner()->InvalidateDefaultButtonStyle();
NotifyFormStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::IndexedDBAccessed(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const GURL& url,
const string16& description,
bool blocked_by_policy) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
TabSpecificContentSettings* settings = Get(render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (settings)
settings->OnIndexedDBAccessed(url, description, blocked_by_policy);
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::buildAccessKeyMap(TreeScope* scope)
{
ASSERT(scope);
Node* rootNode = scope->rootNode();
for (Element* element = ElementTraversal::firstWithin(rootNode); element; element = ElementTraversal::next(element, rootNode)) {
const AtomicString& accessKey = element->getAttribute(accesskeyAttr);
if (!accessKey.isEmpty())
m_elementsByAccessKey.set(accessKey.impl(), element);
for (ShadowRoot* root = element->youngestShadowRoot(); root; root = root->olderShadowRoot())
buildAccessKeyMap(root);
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Document::requestIdleCallback(IdleRequestCallback* callback, const IdleRequestOptions& options)
{
return ensureScriptedIdleTaskController().registerCallback(callback, options);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fixup_appledouble(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
{
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
(void)pathname; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
atomic_set(&mm->mm_users, 1);
atomic_set(&mm->mm_count, 1);
init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->mmlist);
mm->flags = (current->mm) ?
(current->mm->flags & MMF_INIT_MASK) : default_dump_filter;
mm->core_state = NULL;
mm->nr_ptes = 0;
memset(&mm->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(mm->rss_stat));
spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock);
mm->free_area_cache = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->cached_hole_size = ~0UL;
mm_init_aio(mm);
mm_init_owner(mm, p);
if (likely(!mm_alloc_pgd(mm))) {
mm->def_flags = 0;
mmu_notifier_mm_init(mm);
return mm;
}
free_mm(mm);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *alloc_huge_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, int avoid_reserve)
{
struct hugepage_subpool *spool = subpool_vma(vma);
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct page *page;
long map_chg, map_commit;
long gbl_chg;
int ret, idx;
struct hugetlb_cgroup *h_cg;
idx = hstate_index(h);
/*
* Examine the region/reserve map to determine if the process
* has a reservation for the page to be allocated. A return
* code of zero indicates a reservation exists (no change).
*/
map_chg = gbl_chg = vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, addr);
if (map_chg < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
/*
* Processes that did not create the mapping will have no
* reserves as indicated by the region/reserve map. Check
* that the allocation will not exceed the subpool limit.
* Allocations for MAP_NORESERVE mappings also need to be
* checked against any subpool limit.
*/
if (map_chg || avoid_reserve) {
gbl_chg = hugepage_subpool_get_pages(spool, 1);
if (gbl_chg < 0) {
vma_end_reservation(h, vma, addr);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
}
/*
* Even though there was no reservation in the region/reserve
* map, there could be reservations associated with the
* subpool that can be used. This would be indicated if the
* return value of hugepage_subpool_get_pages() is zero.
* However, if avoid_reserve is specified we still avoid even
* the subpool reservations.
*/
if (avoid_reserve)
gbl_chg = 1;
}
ret = hugetlb_cgroup_charge_cgroup(idx, pages_per_huge_page(h), &h_cg);
if (ret)
goto out_subpool_put;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
/*
* glb_chg is passed to indicate whether or not a page must be taken
* from the global free pool (global change). gbl_chg == 0 indicates
* a reservation exists for the allocation.
*/
page = dequeue_huge_page_vma(h, vma, addr, avoid_reserve, gbl_chg);
if (!page) {
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
page = alloc_buddy_huge_page_with_mpol(h, vma, addr);
if (!page)
goto out_uncharge_cgroup;
if (!avoid_reserve && vma_has_reserves(vma, gbl_chg)) {
SetPagePrivate(page);
h->resv_huge_pages--;
}
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
list_move(&page->lru, &h->hugepage_activelist);
/* Fall through */
}
hugetlb_cgroup_commit_charge(idx, pages_per_huge_page(h), h_cg, page);
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long)spool);
map_commit = vma_commit_reservation(h, vma, addr);
if (unlikely(map_chg > map_commit)) {
/*
* The page was added to the reservation map between
* vma_needs_reservation and vma_commit_reservation.
* This indicates a race with hugetlb_reserve_pages.
* Adjust for the subpool count incremented above AND
* in hugetlb_reserve_pages for the same page. Also,
* the reservation count added in hugetlb_reserve_pages
* no longer applies.
*/
long rsv_adjust;
rsv_adjust = hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1);
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -rsv_adjust);
}
return page;
out_uncharge_cgroup:
hugetlb_cgroup_uncharge_cgroup(idx, pages_per_huge_page(h), h_cg);
out_subpool_put:
if (map_chg || avoid_reserve)
hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1);
vma_end_reservation(h, vma, addr);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WM_SYMBOL int WildMidi_GetMidiOutput(midi * handle, int8_t **buffer, uint32_t *size) {
if (__builtin_expect((!WM_Initialized), 0)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (-1);
}
if (__builtin_expect((handle == NULL), 0)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL handle)", 0);
return (-1);
}
if (__builtin_expect((buffer == NULL), 0)) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL buffer pointer)", 0);
return (-1);
}
return _WM_Event2Midi(handle, (uint8_t **)buffer, size);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
struct vmw_resource *res;
struct vmw_resource *tmp;
union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *arg =
(union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *)data;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_req *req = &arg->req;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep = &arg->rep;
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
int ret;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t backup_handle;
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
128;
size = vmw_user_surface_size + 128;
/* Define a surface based on the parameters. */
ret = vmw_surface_gb_priv_define(dev,
size,
req->svga3d_flags,
req->format,
req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_scanout,
req->mip_levels,
req->multisample_count,
req->array_size,
req->base_size,
&srf);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
user_srf = container_of(srf, struct vmw_user_surface, srf);
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv))
user_srf->master = drm_master_get(file_priv->master);
ret = ttm_read_lock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
res = &user_srf->srf.res;
if (req->buffer_handle != SVGA3D_INVALID_ID) {
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
res->backup_size) {
DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
res->backup_size,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
&backup_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
tmp = vmw_resource_reference(res);
ret = ttm_prime_object_init(tfile, res->backup_size, &user_srf->prime,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
VMW_RES_SURFACE,
&vmw_user_surface_base_release, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&tmp);
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
rep->handle = user_srf->prime.base.hash.key;
rep->backup_size = res->backup_size;
if (res->backup) {
rep->buffer_map_handle =
drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&res->backup->base.vma_node);
rep->buffer_size = res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
rep->buffer_handle = backup_handle;
} else {
rep->buffer_map_handle = 0;
rep->buffer_size = 0;
rep->buffer_handle = SVGA3D_INVALID_ID;
}
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
out_unlock:
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 168,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlCtxtReadIO(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlInputReadCallback ioread,
xmlInputCloseCallback ioclose, void *ioctx,
const char *URL,
const char *encoding, int options)
{
xmlParserInputBufferPtr input;
xmlParserInputPtr stream;
if (ioread == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
xmlInitParser();
htmlCtxtReset(ctxt);
input = xmlParserInputBufferCreateIO(ioread, ioclose, ioctx,
XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
if (input == NULL) {
if (ioclose != NULL)
ioclose(ioctx);
return (NULL);
}
stream = xmlNewIOInputStream(ctxt, input, XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE);
if (stream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(input);
return (NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, stream);
return (htmlDoRead(ctxt, URL, encoding, options, 1));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_valid_extent_idx(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_extent_idx *ext_idx)
{
ext4_fsblk_t block = ext4_idx_pblock(ext_idx);
return ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb), block, 1);
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Plugin::GetExitStatus(NaClSrpcArg* prop_value) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("GetExitStatus (this=%p)\n", reinterpret_cast<void*>(this)));
prop_value->tag = NACL_SRPC_ARG_TYPE_INT;
prop_value->u.ival = exit_status();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(origin_circuit_t *circ,
entry_connection_t *conn,
node_t *node,
const tor_addr_t *addr)
{
int make_reject_all = 0;
const sa_family_t family = tor_addr_family(addr);
if (node) {
tor_addr_t tmp;
int asked_for_family = tor_addr_parse(&tmp, conn->socks_request->address);
if (family == AF_UNSPEC) {
make_reject_all = 1;
} else if (node_exit_policy_is_exact(node, family) &&
asked_for_family != -1 && !conn->chosen_exit_name) {
make_reject_all = 1;
}
if (make_reject_all) {
log_info(LD_APP,
"Exitrouter %s seems to be more restrictive than its exit "
"policy. Not using this router as exit for now.",
node_describe(node));
policies_set_node_exitpolicy_to_reject_all(node);
}
}
if (family != AF_UNSPEC)
addr_policy_append_reject_addr(&circ->prepend_policy, addr);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,833 |
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