instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode(Node* node)
{
RenderObject* r = node->renderer();
if (!r) {
return (node->hasTagName(blockquoteTag)
|| node->hasTagName(ddTag)
|| node->hasTagName(divTag)
|| node->hasTagName(dlTag)
|| node->hasTagName(dtTag)
|| node->hasTagName(h1Tag)
|| node->hasTagName(h2Tag)
|| node->hasTagName(h3Tag)
|| node->hasTagName(h4Tag)
|| node->hasTagName(h5Tag)
|| node->hasTagName(h6Tag)
|| node->hasTagName(hrTag)
|| node->hasTagName(liTag)
|| node->hasTagName(listingTag)
|| node->hasTagName(olTag)
|| node->hasTagName(pTag)
|| node->hasTagName(preTag)
|| node->hasTagName(trTag)
|| node->hasTagName(ulTag));
}
if (isTableCell(node))
return false;
if (r->isTableRow()) {
RenderTable* t = toRenderTableRow(r)->table();
if (t && !t->isInline())
return true;
}
return !r->isInline() && r->isRenderBlock()
&& !r->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() && !r->isBody() && !r->isRubyText();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsf_infile_tar_child_by_name (GsfInfile *infile, char const *name, GError **err)
{
GsfInfileTar *tar = GSF_INFILE_TAR (infile);
unsigned ui;
for (ui = 0; ui < tar->children->len; ui++) {
const TarChild *c = &g_array_index (tar->children,
TarChild,
ui);
if (strcmp (name, c->name) == 0)
return gsf_infile_tar_child_by_index (infile, ui, err);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tar: fix crash on broken tar file.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 47,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iperf_set_test_reverse(struct iperf_test *ipt, int reverse)
{
ipt->reverse = reverse;
if (ipt->reverse)
ipt->sender = ! ipt->sender;
check_sender_has_retransmits(ipt);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
{
struct timer_rec_s *timer = data;
timer_expired = TRUE;
crm_err("Call %d timed out after %ds", timer->call_id, timer->timeout);
/* Always return TRUE, never remove the handler
* We do that after the while-loop in cib_native_perform_op()
*/
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HistogramBase* LinearHistogram::FactoryGet(const char* name,
Sample minimum,
Sample maximum,
uint32_t bucket_count,
int32_t flags) {
return FactoryGet(std::string(name), minimum, maximum, bucket_count, flags);
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FoFiType1 *FoFiType1::make(char *fileA, int lenA) {
return new FoFiType1(fileA, lenA, gFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetString(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetString& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetString*>(cmd_data);
GLenum name = static_cast<GLenum>(c.name);
if (!validators_->string_type.IsValid(name)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM("glGetString", name, "name");
return error::kNoError;
}
const char* str = nullptr;
std::string extensions;
switch (name) {
case GL_VERSION:
str = GetServiceVersionString(feature_info_.get());
break;
case GL_SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION:
str = GetServiceShadingLanguageVersionString(feature_info_.get());
break;
case GL_EXTENSIONS: {
gfx::ExtensionSet extension_set = feature_info_->extensions();
if (feature_info_->IsWebGLContext()) {
if (!derivatives_explicitly_enabled_)
extension_set.erase(kOESDerivativeExtension);
if (!frag_depth_explicitly_enabled_)
extension_set.erase(kEXTFragDepthExtension);
if (!draw_buffers_explicitly_enabled_)
extension_set.erase(kEXTDrawBuffersExtension);
if (!shader_texture_lod_explicitly_enabled_)
extension_set.erase(kEXTShaderTextureLodExtension);
if (!multi_draw_explicitly_enabled_)
extension_set.erase(kWEBGLMultiDrawExtension);
if (!multi_draw_instanced_explicitly_enabled_)
extension_set.erase(kWEBGLMultiDrawInstancedExtension);
}
if (supports_post_sub_buffer_)
extension_set.insert("GL_CHROMIUM_post_sub_buffer");
extensions = gfx::MakeExtensionString(extension_set);
str = extensions.c_str();
break;
}
default:
str = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(api()->glGetStringFn(name));
break;
}
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(c.bucket_id);
bucket->SetFromString(str);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::adjustForBorderFit(LayoutUnit x, LayoutUnit& left, LayoutUnit& right) const
{
RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit(x, left, right);
if (m_floatingObjects && style()->visibility() == VISIBLE) {
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
FloatingObject* floatingObject = *it;
if (floatingObject->shouldPaint()) {
LayoutUnit floatLeft = xPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject) - floatingObject->renderer()->x();
LayoutUnit floatRight = floatLeft + floatingObject->renderer()->width();
left = min(left, floatLeft);
right = max(right, floatRight);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RE_NODE* yr_re_node_create(
int type,
RE_NODE* left,
RE_NODE* right)
{
RE_NODE* result = (RE_NODE*) yr_malloc(sizeof(RE_NODE));
if (result != NULL)
{
result->type = type;
result->left = left;
result->right = right;
result->greedy = TRUE;
result->forward_code = NULL;
result->backward_code = NULL;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock* sk,
struct sockaddr __user *addrs,
int addrs_size)
{
sctp_assoc_t assoc_id = 0;
int err = 0;
err = __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(sk, addrs, addrs_size, &assoc_id);
if (err)
return err;
else
return assoc_id;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_EIF( INS_ARG )
{
/* nothing to do */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DocumentLoader::MaybeCreateArchive() {
if (!IsArchiveMIMEType(response_.MimeType()))
return false;
DCHECK(GetResource());
ArchiveResource* main_resource = fetcher_->CreateArchive(GetResource());
if (!main_resource)
return false;
CommitNavigation(main_resource->MimeType(), main_resource->Url());
if (!frame_)
return false;
scoped_refptr<SharedBuffer> data(main_resource->Data());
for (const auto& span : *data)
CommitData(span.data(), span.size());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetImportance(ChildProcessImportance importance) {
if (importance_ == importance)
return;
ChildProcessImportance old = importance_;
importance_ = importance;
process_->UpdateWidgetImportance(old, importance_);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_symlinkargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_symlinkargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, avail;
char *old, *new;
struct kvec *vec;
if (!(p = decode_fh(p, &args->ffh)) ||
!(p = decode_filename(p, &args->fname, &args->flen))
)
return 0;
p = decode_sattr3(p, &args->attrs);
/* now decode the pathname, which might be larger than the first page.
* As we have to check for nul's anyway, we copy it into a new page
* This page appears in the rq_res.pages list, but as pages_len is always
* 0, it won't get in the way
*/
len = ntohl(*p++);
if (len == 0 || len > NFS3_MAXPATHLEN || len >= PAGE_SIZE)
return 0;
args->tname = new = page_address(*(rqstp->rq_next_page++));
args->tlen = len;
/* first copy and check from the first page */
old = (char*)p;
vec = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
if ((void *)old > vec->iov_base + vec->iov_len)
return 0;
avail = vec->iov_len - (old - (char*)vec->iov_base);
while (len && avail && *old) {
*new++ = *old++;
len--;
avail--;
}
/* now copy next page if there is one */
if (len && !avail && rqstp->rq_arg.page_len) {
avail = min_t(unsigned int, rqstp->rq_arg.page_len, PAGE_SIZE);
old = page_address(rqstp->rq_arg.pages[0]);
}
while (len && avail && *old) {
*new++ = *old++;
len--;
avail--;
}
*new = '\0';
if (len)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GIFLZWContext::outputRow(GIFRow::const_iterator rowBegin)
{
int drowStart = irow;
int drowEnd = irow;
if (m_frameContext->progressiveDisplay() && m_frameContext->interlaced() && ipass < 4) {
unsigned rowDup = 0;
unsigned rowShift = 0;
switch (ipass) {
case 1:
rowDup = 7;
rowShift = 3;
break;
case 2:
rowDup = 3;
rowShift = 1;
break;
case 3:
rowDup = 1;
rowShift = 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
drowStart -= rowShift;
drowEnd = drowStart + rowDup;
if (((m_frameContext->height() - 1) - drowEnd) <= rowShift)
drowEnd = m_frameContext->height() - 1;
if (drowStart < 0)
drowStart = 0;
if ((unsigned)drowEnd >= m_frameContext->height())
drowEnd = m_frameContext->height() - 1;
}
if ((unsigned)drowStart >= m_frameContext->height())
return true;
if (!m_client->haveDecodedRow(m_frameContext->frameId(), rowBegin, m_frameContext->width(),
drowStart, drowEnd - drowStart + 1, m_frameContext->progressiveDisplay() && m_frameContext->interlaced() && ipass > 1))
return false;
if (!m_frameContext->interlaced())
irow++;
else {
do {
switch (ipass) {
case 1:
irow += 8;
if (irow >= m_frameContext->height()) {
ipass++;
irow = 4;
}
break;
case 2:
irow += 8;
if (irow >= m_frameContext->height()) {
ipass++;
irow = 2;
}
break;
case 3:
irow += 4;
if (irow >= m_frameContext->height()) {
ipass++;
irow = 1;
}
break;
case 4:
irow += 2;
if (irow >= m_frameContext->height()) {
ipass++;
irow = 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
} while (irow > (m_frameContext->height() - 1));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: intercepted_requests() {
return intercepted_requests_;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunAriaTest(const base::FilePath::CharType* file_path) {
base::FilePath test_path = GetTestFilePath("accessibility", "aria");
{
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(test_path)) << test_path.LossyDisplayName();
}
base::FilePath aria_file = test_path.Append(base::FilePath(file_path));
RunTest(aria_file, "accessibility/aria");
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cdf_dump_property_info(const cdf_property_info_t *info, size_t count)
{
cdf_timestamp_t tp;
struct timespec ts;
char buf[64];
size_t i, j;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
cdf_print_property_name(buf, sizeof(buf), info[i].pi_id);
(void)fprintf(stderr, "%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u) %s: ", i, buf);
switch (info[i].pi_type) {
case CDF_NULL:
break;
case CDF_SIGNED16:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "signed 16 [%hd]\n",
info[i].pi_s16);
break;
case CDF_SIGNED32:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "signed 32 [%d]\n",
info[i].pi_s32);
break;
case CDF_UNSIGNED32:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "unsigned 32 [%u]\n",
info[i].pi_u32);
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_STRING:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "string %u [%.*s]\n",
info[i].pi_str.s_len,
info[i].pi_str.s_len, info[i].pi_str.s_buf);
break;
case CDF_LENGTH32_WSTRING:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "string %u [",
info[i].pi_str.s_len);
for (j = 0; j < info[i].pi_str.s_len - 1; j++)
(void)fputc(info[i].pi_str.s_buf[j << 1], stderr);
(void)fprintf(stderr, "]\n");
break;
case CDF_FILETIME:
tp = info[i].pi_tp;
if (tp < 1000000000000000LL) {
cdf_print_elapsed_time(buf, sizeof(buf), tp);
(void)fprintf(stderr, "timestamp %s\n", buf);
} else {
cdf_timestamp_to_timespec(&ts, tp);
(void)fprintf(stderr, "timestamp %s",
cdf_ctime(&ts.tv_sec));
}
break;
case CDF_CLIPBOARD:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "CLIPBOARD %u\n", info[i].pi_u32);
break;
default:
DPRINTF(("Don't know how to deal with %x\n",
info[i].pi_type));
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: add more check found by cert's fuzzer.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init dccp_v6_init_net(struct net *net)
{
if (dccp_hashinfo.bhash == NULL)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
return inet_ctl_sock_create(&net->dccp.v6_ctl_sk, PF_INET6,
SOCK_DCCP, IPPROTO_DCCP, net);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int local_name_to_path(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *dir_path,
const char *name, V9fsPath *target)
{
if (dir_path) {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s/%s", dir_path->data, name);
} else {
v9fs_path_sprintf(target, "%s", name);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 165,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Locale& Document::getCachedLocale(const AtomicString& locale)
{
AtomicString localeKey = locale;
if (locale.isEmpty() || !RuntimeEnabledFeatures::langAttributeAwareFormControlUIEnabled())
return Locale::defaultLocale();
LocaleIdentifierToLocaleMap::AddResult result = m_localeCache.add(localeKey, nullptr);
if (result.isNewEntry)
result.iterator->value = Locale::create(localeKey);
return *(result.iterator->value);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sd_numa_init(struct sched_domain_topology_level *tl, int cpu)
{
struct sched_domain *sd = *per_cpu_ptr(tl->data.sd, cpu);
int level = tl->numa_level;
int sd_weight = cpumask_weight(
sched_domains_numa_masks[level][cpu_to_node(cpu)]);
*sd = (struct sched_domain){
.min_interval = sd_weight,
.max_interval = 2*sd_weight,
.busy_factor = 32,
.imbalance_pct = 125,
.cache_nice_tries = 2,
.busy_idx = 3,
.idle_idx = 2,
.newidle_idx = 0,
.wake_idx = 0,
.forkexec_idx = 0,
.flags = 1*SD_LOAD_BALANCE
| 1*SD_BALANCE_NEWIDLE
| 0*SD_BALANCE_EXEC
| 0*SD_BALANCE_FORK
| 0*SD_BALANCE_WAKE
| 0*SD_WAKE_AFFINE
| 0*SD_SHARE_CPUPOWER
| 0*SD_SHARE_PKG_RESOURCES
| 1*SD_SERIALIZE
| 0*SD_PREFER_SIBLING
| 1*SD_NUMA
| sd_local_flags(level)
,
.last_balance = jiffies,
.balance_interval = sd_weight,
};
SD_INIT_NAME(sd, NUMA);
sd->private = &tl->data;
/*
* Ugly hack to pass state to sd_numa_mask()...
*/
sched_domains_curr_level = tl->numa_level;
return sd;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ctr_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
struct crypto_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
struct crypto_ctr_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_cipher *cipher;
cipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(spawn);
if (IS_ERR(cipher))
return PTR_ERR(cipher);
ctx->child = cipher;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int allocateSpace(MemPage *pPage, int nByte, int *pIdx){
const int hdr = pPage->hdrOffset; /* Local cache of pPage->hdrOffset */
u8 * const data = pPage->aData; /* Local cache of pPage->aData */
int top; /* First byte of cell content area */
int rc = SQLITE_OK; /* Integer return code */
int gap; /* First byte of gap between cell pointers and cell content */
assert( sqlite3PagerIswriteable(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage->pBt );
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pPage->pBt->mutex) );
assert( nByte>=0 ); /* Minimum cell size is 4 */
assert( pPage->nFree>=nByte );
assert( pPage->nOverflow==0 );
assert( nByte < (int)(pPage->pBt->usableSize-8) );
assert( pPage->cellOffset == hdr + 12 - 4*pPage->leaf );
gap = pPage->cellOffset + 2*pPage->nCell;
assert( gap<=65536 );
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-29356-02391 If the database uses a 65536-byte page size
** and the reserved space is zero (the usual value for reserved space)
** then the cell content offset of an empty page wants to be 65536.
** However, that integer is too large to be stored in a 2-byte unsigned
** integer, so a value of 0 is used in its place. */
top = get2byte(&data[hdr+5]);
assert( top<=(int)pPage->pBt->usableSize ); /* Prevent by getAndInitPage() */
if( gap>top ){
if( top==0 && pPage->pBt->usableSize==65536 ){
top = 65536;
}else{
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
}
/* If there is enough space between gap and top for one more cell pointer
** array entry offset, and if the freelist is not empty, then search the
** freelist looking for a free slot big enough to satisfy the request.
*/
testcase( gap+2==top );
testcase( gap+1==top );
testcase( gap==top );
if( (data[hdr+2] || data[hdr+1]) && gap+2<=top ){
u8 *pSpace = pageFindSlot(pPage, nByte, &rc);
if( pSpace ){
assert( pSpace>=data && (pSpace - data)<65536 );
*pIdx = (int)(pSpace - data);
return SQLITE_OK;
}else if( rc ){
return rc;
}
}
/* The request could not be fulfilled using a freelist slot. Check
** to see if defragmentation is necessary.
*/
testcase( gap+2+nByte==top );
if( gap+2+nByte>top ){
assert( pPage->nCell>0 || CORRUPT_DB );
rc = defragmentPage(pPage, MIN(4, pPage->nFree - (2+nByte)));
if( rc ) return rc;
top = get2byteNotZero(&data[hdr+5]);
assert( gap+2+nByte<=top );
}
/* Allocate memory from the gap in between the cell pointer array
** and the cell content area. The btreeInitPage() call has already
** validated the freelist. Given that the freelist is valid, there
** is no way that the allocation can extend off the end of the page.
** The assert() below verifies the previous sentence.
*/
top -= nByte;
put2byte(&data[hdr+5], top);
assert( top+nByte <= (int)pPage->pBt->usableSize );
*pIdx = top;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
bool req_int_win = !irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) &&
vcpu->run->request_interrupt_window;
bool req_immediate_exit = false;
if (vcpu->requests) {
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_RELOAD, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MIGRATE_TIMER, vcpu))
__kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MASTERCLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_gen_update_masterclock(vcpu->kvm);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_GLOBAL_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu))
kvm_gen_kvmclock_update(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu)) {
r = kvm_guest_time_update(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r))
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC, vcpu))
kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu))
kvm_x86_ops->tlb_flush(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_REPORT_TPR_ACCESS, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_TPR_ACCESS;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_DEACTIVATE_FPU, vcpu)) {
vcpu->fpu_active = 0;
kvm_x86_ops->fpu_deactivate(vcpu);
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_APF_HALT, vcpu)) {
/* Page is swapped out. Do synthetic halt */
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = true;
r = 1;
goto out;
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu))
record_steal_time(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu))
process_nmi(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu))
kvm_handle_pmu_event(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_PMI, vcpu))
kvm_deliver_pmi(vcpu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SCAN_IOAPIC, vcpu))
vcpu_scan_ioapic(vcpu);
}
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu) || req_int_win) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED) {
r = 1;
goto out;
}
if (inject_pending_event(vcpu, req_int_win) != 0)
req_immediate_exit = true;
/* enable NMI/IRQ window open exits if needed */
else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_pending)
kvm_x86_ops->enable_nmi_window(vcpu);
else if (kvm_cpu_has_injectable_intr(vcpu) || req_int_win)
kvm_x86_ops->enable_irq_window(vcpu);
if (kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu)) {
/*
* Update architecture specific hints for APIC
* virtual interrupt delivery.
*/
if (kvm_x86_ops->hwapic_irr_update)
kvm_x86_ops->hwapic_irr_update(vcpu,
kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu));
update_cr8_intercept(vcpu);
kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic(vcpu);
}
}
r = kvm_mmu_reload(vcpu);
if (unlikely(r)) {
goto cancel_injection;
}
preempt_disable();
kvm_x86_ops->prepare_guest_switch(vcpu);
if (vcpu->fpu_active)
kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
kvm_load_guest_xcr0(vcpu);
vcpu->mode = IN_GUEST_MODE;
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
/* We should set ->mode before check ->requests,
* see the comment in make_all_cpus_request.
*/
smp_mb__after_srcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_disable();
if (vcpu->mode == EXITING_GUEST_MODE || vcpu->requests
|| need_resched() || signal_pending(current)) {
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
local_irq_enable();
preempt_enable();
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
r = 1;
goto cancel_injection;
}
if (req_immediate_exit)
smp_send_reschedule(vcpu->cpu);
kvm_guest_enter();
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs)) {
set_debugreg(0, 7);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[0], 0);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[1], 1);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[2], 2);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.eff_db[3], 3);
set_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
}
trace_kvm_entry(vcpu->vcpu_id);
kvm_x86_ops->run(vcpu);
/*
* Do this here before restoring debug registers on the host. And
* since we do this before handling the vmexit, a DR access vmexit
* can (a) read the correct value of the debug registers, (b) set
* KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT again.
*/
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)) {
int i;
WARN_ON(vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP);
kvm_x86_ops->sync_dirty_debug_regs(vcpu);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_DB_REGS; i++)
vcpu->arch.eff_db[i] = vcpu->arch.db[i];
}
/*
* If the guest has used debug registers, at least dr7
* will be disabled while returning to the host.
* If we don't have active breakpoints in the host, we don't
* care about the messed up debug address registers. But if
* we have some of them active, restore the old state.
*/
if (hw_breakpoint_active())
hw_breakpoint_restore();
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc(vcpu,
native_read_tsc());
vcpu->mode = OUTSIDE_GUEST_MODE;
smp_wmb();
/* Interrupt is enabled by handle_external_intr() */
kvm_x86_ops->handle_external_intr(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.exits;
/*
* We must have an instruction between local_irq_enable() and
* kvm_guest_exit(), so the timer interrupt isn't delayed by
* the interrupt shadow. The stat.exits increment will do nicely.
* But we need to prevent reordering, hence this barrier():
*/
barrier();
kvm_guest_exit();
preempt_enable();
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
/*
* Profile KVM exit RIPs:
*/
if (unlikely(prof_on == KVM_PROFILING)) {
unsigned long rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
profile_hit(KVM_PROFILING, (void *)rip);
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_always_catchup))
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
if (vcpu->arch.apic_attention)
kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
r = kvm_x86_ops->handle_exit(vcpu);
return r;
cancel_injection:
kvm_x86_ops->cancel_injection(vcpu);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(vcpu);
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoadingPredictor::PreconnectFinished(
std::unique_ptr<PreconnectStats> stats) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (shutdown_)
return;
DCHECK(stats);
active_hints_.erase(stats->url);
stats_collector_->RecordPreconnectStats(std::move(stats));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GlobalHistogramAllocator::ImportHistogramsToStatisticsRecorder() {
Reference record_to_ignore = last_created();
while (true) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram =
import_iterator_.GetNextWithIgnore(record_to_ignore);
if (!histogram)
break;
StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(histogram.release());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContents* InterstitialPageImpl::web_contents() const {
return web_contents_;
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t csum_and_copy_from_iter(void *addr, size_t bytes, __wsum *csum,
struct iov_iter *i)
{
char *to = addr;
__wsum sum, next;
size_t off = 0;
sum = *csum;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
iterate_and_advance(i, bytes, v, ({
int err = 0;
next = csum_and_copy_from_user(v.iov_base,
(to += v.iov_len) - v.iov_len,
v.iov_len, 0, &err);
if (!err) {
sum = csum_block_add(sum, next, off);
off += v.iov_len;
}
err ? v.iov_len : 0;
}), ({
char *p = kmap_atomic(v.bv_page);
next = csum_partial_copy_nocheck(p + v.bv_offset,
(to += v.bv_len) - v.bv_len,
v.bv_len, 0);
kunmap_atomic(p);
sum = csum_block_add(sum, next, off);
off += v.bv_len;
}),({
next = csum_partial_copy_nocheck(v.iov_base,
(to += v.iov_len) - v.iov_len,
v.iov_len, 0);
sum = csum_block_add(sum, next, off);
off += v.iov_len;
})
)
*csum = sum;
return bytes;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 68,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateDevices(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::string script = request::findValue(&req, "script");
if (script.empty())
{
return;
}
std::string content = req.content;
std::vector<std::string> allParameters;
std::vector<std::string> allParts;
StringSplit(req.uri, "?", allParts);
if (!allParts.empty())
{
StringSplit(allParts[1], "&", allParameters);
}
CLuaHandler luaScript;
bool ret = luaScript.executeLuaScript(script, content, allParameters);
if (ret)
{
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "Update Device";
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void exposeJSAccessorsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::exposeJSAccessorsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_proc_read_setup(struct nfs_read_data *data, struct rpc_message *msg)
{
data->timestamp = jiffies;
msg->rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_READ];
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int chmd_error(struct mschm_decompressor *base) {
struct mschm_decompressor_p *self = (struct mschm_decompressor_p *) base;
return (self) ? self->error : MSPACK_ERR_ARGS;
}
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 76,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gio_poll_destroy(gpointer data)
{
/* adaptor->source is valid but about to be destroyed (ref_count == 0) in gmain.c
* adaptor->channel will still have ref_count > 0... should be == 1
*/
struct gio_to_qb_poll *adaptor = (struct gio_to_qb_poll *)data;
crm_trace("Destroying adaptor %p channel %p (ref=%d)", adaptor, adaptor->channel, gio_adapter_refcount(adaptor));
adaptor->is_used = QB_FALSE;
adaptor->channel = NULL;
adaptor->source = 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: snd_compr_set_params(struct snd_compr_stream *stream, unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_compr_params *params;
int retval;
if (stream->runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN) {
/*
* we should allow parameter change only when stream has been
* opened not in other cases
*/
params = kmalloc(sizeof(*params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!params)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(params, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(*params))) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
retval = snd_compress_check_input(params);
if (retval)
goto out;
retval = snd_compr_allocate_buffer(stream, params);
if (retval) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
retval = stream->ops->set_params(stream, params);
if (retval)
goto out;
stream->metadata_set = false;
stream->next_track = false;
if (stream->direction == SND_COMPRESS_PLAYBACK)
stream->runtime->state = SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP;
else
stream->runtime->state = SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED;
} else {
return -EPERM;
}
out:
kfree(params);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_SET_VLAN_PCP(const struct ofpact_vlan_pcp *vlan_pcp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint8_t pcp = vlan_pcp->vlan_pcp;
/* Push a VLAN tag, if none is present and this form of the action calls
* for such a feature. */
if (ofp_version > OFP10_VERSION
&& vlan_pcp->push_vlan_if_needed
&& !vlan_pcp->flow_has_vlan) {
put_OFPAT11_PUSH_VLAN(out, htons(ETH_TYPE_VLAN_8021Q));
}
if (ofp_version == OFP10_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT10_SET_VLAN_PCP(out, pcp);
} else if (ofp_version == OFP11_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT11_SET_VLAN_PCP(out, pcp);
} else {
put_set_field(out, ofp_version, MFF_VLAN_PCP, pcp);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUniform1uiv(
GLint location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLuint* v) {
api()->glUniform1uivFn(location, count, const_cast<const GLuint*>(v));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Texture::Create() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
Destroy();
glGenTextures(1, &id_);
ScopedTexture2DBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, GL_NEAREST);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, GL_NEAREST);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexParameteri(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
glTexImage2D(
GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, GL_RGBA, 16, 16, 0, GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, NULL);
estimated_size_ = 16u * 16u * 4u;
decoder_->UpdateBackbufferMemoryAccounting();
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ImportBGROQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelOpacity(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
}
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::BeforeUnloadTimeout() {
if (render_view_host_->GetDelegate()->ShouldIgnoreUnresponsiveRenderer())
return;
SimulateBeforeUnloadAck();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_subscription_permission(struct snd_seq_client *client,
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport,
struct snd_seq_client_port *dport,
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs)
{
if (client->number != subs->sender.client &&
client->number != subs->dest.client) {
/* connection by third client - check export permission */
if (check_port_perm(sport, SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_CAP_NO_EXPORT))
return -EPERM;
if (check_port_perm(dport, SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_CAP_NO_EXPORT))
return -EPERM;
}
/* check read permission */
/* if sender or receiver is the subscribing client itself,
* no permission check is necessary
*/
if (client->number != subs->sender.client) {
if (! check_port_perm(sport, PERM_RD))
return -EPERM;
}
/* check write permission */
if (client->number != subs->dest.client) {
if (! check_port_perm(dport, PERM_WR))
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> enabledAtRuntimeAttr2AttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.enabledAtRuntimeAttr2._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->enabledAtRuntimeAttr2());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::handleAriaRoleChanged(Node* node) {
if (AXObject* obj = getOrCreate(node)) {
obj->updateAccessibilityRole();
m_modificationCount++;
obj->notifyIfIgnoredValueChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_mtree(struct archive_read *a, struct mtree *mtree)
{
ssize_t len;
uintmax_t counter;
char *p;
struct mtree_option *global;
struct mtree_entry *last_entry;
int r, is_form_d;
mtree->archive_format = ARCHIVE_FORMAT_MTREE;
mtree->archive_format_name = "mtree";
global = NULL;
last_entry = NULL;
(void)detect_form(a, &is_form_d);
for (counter = 1; ; ++counter) {
len = readline(a, mtree, &p, 65536);
if (len == 0) {
mtree->this_entry = mtree->entries;
free_options(global);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
if (len < 0) {
free_options(global);
return ((int)len);
}
/* Leading whitespace is never significant, ignore it. */
while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') {
++p;
--len;
}
/* Skip content lines and blank lines. */
if (*p == '#')
continue;
if (*p == '\r' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\0')
continue;
if (*p != '/') {
r = process_add_entry(a, mtree, &global, p, len,
&last_entry, is_form_d);
} else if (strncmp(p, "/set", 4) == 0) {
if (p[4] != ' ' && p[4] != '\t')
break;
r = process_global_set(a, &global, p);
} else if (strncmp(p, "/unset", 6) == 0) {
if (p[6] != ' ' && p[6] != '\t')
break;
r = process_global_unset(a, &global, p);
} else
break;
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free_options(global);
return r;
}
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Can't parse line %ju", counter);
free_options(global);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha512_sparc64_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sha512_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count[0] % SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE;
/* Handle the fast case right here */
if (partial + len < SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE) {
if ((sctx->count[0] += len) < len)
sctx->count[1]++;
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
} else
__sha512_sparc64_update(sctx, data, len, partial);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jsvArrayAddUnique(JsVar *arr, JsVar *v) {
JsVar *idx = jsvGetIndexOf(arr, v, false); // did it already exist?
if (!idx) {
jsvArrayPush(arr, v); // if 0, it failed
} else {
jsvUnLock(idx);
}
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(io_destroy, aio_context_t, ctx)
{
struct kioctx *ioctx = lookup_ioctx(ctx);
if (likely(NULL != ioctx)) {
struct completion requests_done =
COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK(requests_done);
int ret;
/* Pass requests_done to kill_ioctx() where it can be set
* in a thread-safe way. If we try to set it here then we have
* a race condition if two io_destroy() called simultaneously.
*/
ret = kill_ioctx(current->mm, ioctx, &requests_done);
percpu_ref_put(&ioctx->users);
/* Wait until all IO for the context are done. Otherwise kernel
* keep using user-space buffers even if user thinks the context
* is destroyed.
*/
if (!ret)
wait_for_completion(&requests_done);
return ret;
}
pr_debug("EINVAL: invalid context id\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: aio: lift iov_iter_init() into aio_setup_..._rw()
the only non-trivial detail is that we do it before rw_verify_area(),
so we'd better cap the length ourselves in aio_setup_single_rw()
case (for vectored case rw_copy_check_uvector() will do that for us).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 95,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fsmMkdirs(rpmfiles files, rpmfs fs, rpmPlugins plugins)
{
DNLI_t dnli = dnlInitIterator(files, fs, 0);
struct stat sb;
const char *dpath;
int dc = rpmfilesDC(files);
int rc = 0;
int i;
int ldnlen = 0;
int ldnalloc = 0;
char * ldn = NULL;
short * dnlx = NULL;
dnlx = (dc ? xcalloc(dc, sizeof(*dnlx)) : NULL);
if (dnlx != NULL)
while ((dpath = dnlNextIterator(dnli)) != NULL) {
size_t dnlen = strlen(dpath);
char * te, dn[dnlen+1];
dc = dnli->isave;
if (dc < 0) continue;
dnlx[dc] = dnlen;
if (dnlen <= 1)
continue;
if (dnlen <= ldnlen && rstreq(dpath, ldn))
continue;
/* Copy as we need to modify the string */
(void) stpcpy(dn, dpath);
/* Assume '/' directory exists, "mkdir -p" for others if non-existent */
for (i = 1, te = dn + 1; *te != '\0'; te++, i++) {
if (*te != '/')
continue;
*te = '\0';
/* Already validated? */
if (i < ldnlen &&
(ldn[i] == '/' || ldn[i] == '\0') && rstreqn(dn, ldn, i))
{
*te = '/';
/* Move pre-existing path marker forward. */
dnlx[dc] = (te - dn);
continue;
}
/* Validate next component of path. */
rc = fsmStat(dn, 1, &sb); /* lstat */
*te = '/';
/* Directory already exists? */
if (rc == 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
/* Move pre-existing path marker forward. */
dnlx[dc] = (te - dn);
} else if (rc == RPMERR_ENOENT) {
*te = '\0';
mode_t mode = S_IFDIR | (_dirPerms & 07777);
rpmFsmOp op = (FA_CREATE|FAF_UNOWNED);
/* Run fsm file pre hook for all plugins */
rc = rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePre(plugins, NULL, dn, mode, op);
if (!rc)
rc = fsmMkdir(dn, mode);
if (!rc) {
rc = rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePrepare(plugins, NULL, dn, dn,
mode, op);
}
/* Run fsm file post hook for all plugins */
rpmpluginsCallFsmFilePost(plugins, NULL, dn, mode, op, rc);
if (!rc) {
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG,
"%s directory created with perms %04o\n",
dn, (unsigned)(mode & 07777));
}
*te = '/';
}
if (rc)
break;
}
if (rc) break;
/* Save last validated path. */
if (ldnalloc < (dnlen + 1)) {
ldnalloc = dnlen + 100;
ldn = xrealloc(ldn, ldnalloc);
}
if (ldn != NULL) { /* XXX can't happen */
strcpy(ldn, dn);
ldnlen = dnlen;
}
}
free(dnlx);
free(ldn);
dnlFreeIterator(dnli);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isdn_net_swap_usage(int i1, int i2)
{
int u1 = dev->usage[i1] & ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE;
int u2 = dev->usage[i2] & ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE;
#ifdef ISDN_DEBUG_NET_ICALL
printk(KERN_DEBUG "n_fi: usage of %d and %d\n", i1, i2);
#endif
dev->usage[i1] &= ~ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE;
dev->usage[i1] |= u2;
dev->usage[i2] &= ~ISDN_USAGE_EXCLUSIVE;
dev->usage[i2] |= u1;
isdn_info_update();
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void trgt_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_TrackGroupTypeBox *ptr = (GF_TrackGroupTypeBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int encode_public_key(RSA *rsa, u8 *key, size_t *keysize)
{
u8 buf[1024], *p = buf;
u8 bnbuf[256];
int base = 0;
int r;
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
switch (RSA_bits(rsa)) {
case 512:
base = 32;
break;
case 768:
base = 48;
break;
case 1024:
base = 64;
break;
case 2048:
base = 128;
break;
}
if (base == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Key length invalid.\n");
return 2;
}
*p++ = (5 * base + 7) >> 8;
*p++ = (5 * base + 7) & 0xFF;
*p++ = opt_key_num;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
r = bn2cf(rsa_n, bnbuf);
if (r != 2*base) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid public key.\n");
return 2;
}
memcpy(p, bnbuf, 2*base);
p += 2*base;
memset(p, 0, base);
p += base;
memset(bnbuf, 0, 2*base);
memcpy(p, bnbuf, 2*base);
p += 2*base;
r = bn2cf(rsa_e, bnbuf);
memcpy(p, bnbuf, 4);
p += 4;
memcpy(key, buf, p - buf);
*keysize = p - buf;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arch_destroy_sched_domains(const struct cpumask *cpu_map,
struct cpumask *tmpmask)
{
free_sched_groups(cpu_map, tmpmask);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_response_header(sapi_header_struct *h, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *s, *p;
int len;
ALLOCA_FLAG(use_heap)
if (h->header_len > 0) {
p = strchr(h->header, ':');
len = p - h->header;
if (p && (len > 0)) {
while (len > 0 && (h->header[len-1] == ' ' || h->header[len-1] == '\t')) {
len--;
}
if (len) {
s = do_alloca(len + 1, use_heap);
memcpy(s, h->header, len);
s[len] = 0;
do {
p++;
} while (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t');
add_assoc_stringl_ex(return_value, s, len+1, p, h->header_len - (p - h->header), 1);
free_alloca(s, use_heap);
}
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rq_attach_root(struct rq *rq, struct root_domain *rd)
{
struct root_domain *old_rd = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rq->lock, flags);
if (rq->rd) {
old_rd = rq->rd;
if (cpumask_test_cpu(rq->cpu, old_rd->online))
set_rq_offline(rq);
cpumask_clear_cpu(rq->cpu, old_rd->span);
/*
* If we dont want to free the old_rd yet then
* set old_rd to NULL to skip the freeing later
* in this function:
*/
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&old_rd->refcount))
old_rd = NULL;
}
atomic_inc(&rd->refcount);
rq->rd = rd;
cpumask_set_cpu(rq->cpu, rd->span);
if (cpumask_test_cpu(rq->cpu, cpu_active_mask))
set_rq_online(rq);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rq->lock, flags);
if (old_rd)
call_rcu_sched(&old_rd->rcu, free_rootdomain);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_world_get_option_from_uri(raptor_world* world, raptor_uri *uri)
{
unsigned char *uri_string;
int i;
raptor_option option = (raptor_option)-1;
if(!uri)
return option;
RAPTOR_ASSERT_OBJECT_POINTER_RETURN_VALUE(world, raptor_world, (raptor_option)-1);
raptor_world_open(world);
uri_string = raptor_uri_as_string(uri);
if(strncmp((const char*)uri_string, raptor_option_uri_prefix,
raptor_option_uri_prefix_len))
return option;
uri_string += raptor_option_uri_prefix_len;
for(i = 0; i <= RAPTOR_OPTION_LAST; i++)
if(!strcmp(raptor_options_list[i].name, (const char*)uri_string)) {
option = (raptor_option)i;
break;
}
return option;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TreeView::SetEditable(bool editable) {
if (editable == editable_)
return;
editable_ = editable;
if (!tree_view_)
return;
LONG_PTR style = GetWindowLongPtr(tree_view_, GWL_STYLE);
style &= ~TVS_EDITLABELS;
SetWindowLongPtr(tree_view_, GWL_STYLE, style);
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SimulateError() {
EXPECT_CALL(*this, OnStateChanged(media::mojom::VideoCaptureState::FAILED));
VideoCaptureControllerID id(kDeviceId);
host_->OnError(id,
media::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest);
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingGetterPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_mmap_unmark_page(void *addr)
{
struct page *page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
page->mapping = NULL;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetLoadWallpaper(const wallpaper::WallpaperInfo& info) {
SetMode(gfx::ImageSkia(), info, base::FilePath(), false);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_dir_fsync(
struct file *file,
loff_t start,
loff_t end,
int datasync)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(file->f_mapping->host);
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
xfs_lsn_t lsn = 0;
trace_xfs_dir_fsync(ip);
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED);
if (xfs_ipincount(ip))
lsn = ip->i_itemp->ili_last_lsn;
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED);
if (!lsn)
return 0;
return _xfs_log_force_lsn(mp, lsn, XFS_LOG_SYNC, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int btpan_role_to_bta(int btpan_role)
{
int bta_pan_role = PAN_ROLE_INACTIVE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btpan_role:0x%x", btpan_role);
if (btpan_role & BTPAN_ROLE_PANNAP)
bta_pan_role |= PAN_ROLE_NAP_SERVER;
if (btpan_role & BTPAN_ROLE_PANU)
bta_pan_role |= PAN_ROLE_CLIENT;
return bta_pan_role;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebView* RenderView::createView(
WebFrame* creator,
const WebURLRequest& request,
const WebWindowFeatures& features,
const WebString& frame_name) {
if (shared_popup_counter_->data > kMaximumNumberOfUnacknowledgedPopups)
return NULL;
ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow_Params params;
params.opener_id = routing_id_;
params.user_gesture = creator->isProcessingUserGesture();
params.window_container_type = WindowFeaturesToContainerType(features);
params.session_storage_namespace_id = session_storage_namespace_id_;
params.frame_name = frame_name;
params.opener_frame_id = creator->identifier();
params.opener_url = creator->document().url();
params.opener_security_origin =
creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8();
if (!request.isNull())
params.target_url = request.url();
int32 routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
int64 cloned_session_storage_namespace_id;
bool opener_suppressed = creator->willSuppressOpenerInNewFrame();
render_thread_->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_CreateWindow(params,
&routing_id,
&cloned_session_storage_namespace_id));
if (routing_id == MSG_ROUTING_NONE)
return NULL;
RenderView* view = RenderView::Create(render_thread_,
0,
routing_id_,
renderer_preferences_,
webkit_preferences_,
shared_popup_counter_,
routing_id,
cloned_session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name);
view->opened_by_user_gesture_ = params.user_gesture;
view->opener_suppressed_ = opener_suppressed;
GURL creator_url(creator->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8());
if (!creator_url.is_valid() || !creator_url.IsStandard())
creator_url = GURL();
view->creator_url_ = creator_url;
view->alternate_error_page_url_ = alternate_error_page_url_;
return view->webview();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VaapiPicture* VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::PictureById(
int32_t picture_buffer_id) {
Pictures::iterator it = pictures_.find(picture_buffer_id);
if (it == pictures_.end()) {
VLOGF(4) << "Picture id " << picture_buffer_id << " does not exist";
return NULL;
}
return it->second.get();
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 148,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs12_export_to_file)
{
X509 * cert = NULL;
BIO * bio_out = NULL;
PKCS12 * p12 = NULL;
char * filename;
char * friendly_name = NULL;
int filename_len;
char * pass;
int pass_len;
zval **zcert = NULL, *zpkey = NULL, *args = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
long certresource, keyresource;
zval ** item;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Zpzs|a", &zcert, &filename, &filename_len, &zpkey, &pass, &pass_len, &args) == FAILURE)
return;
RETVAL_FALSE;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get cert from parameter 1");
return;
}
priv_key = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(&zpkey, 0, "", 1, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (priv_key == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "cannot get private key from parameter 3");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cert && !X509_check_private_key(cert, priv_key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "private key does not correspond to cert");
goto cleanup;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* parse extra config from args array, promote this to an extra function */
if (args && zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "friendly_name", sizeof("friendly_name"), (void**)&item) == SUCCESS && Z_TYPE_PP(item) == IS_STRING)
friendly_name = Z_STRVAL_PP(item);
/* certpbe (default RC2-40)
keypbe (default 3DES)
friendly_caname
*/
if (args && zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(args), "extracerts", sizeof("extracerts"), (void**)&item) == SUCCESS)
ca = php_array_to_X509_sk(item TSRMLS_CC);
/* end parse extra config */
/*PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca,
int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);*/
p12 = PKCS12_create(pass, friendly_name, priv_key, cert, ca, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
bio_out = BIO_new_file(filename, "w");
if (bio_out) {
i2d_PKCS12_bio(bio_out, p12);
RETVAL_TRUE;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "error opening file %s", filename);
}
BIO_free(bio_out);
PKCS12_free(p12);
php_sk_X509_free(ca);
cleanup:
if (keyresource == -1 && priv_key) {
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
}
if (certresource == -1 && cert) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
unsigned int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(buflen, PAGE_SIZE);
int ret = -ENOMEM, i;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages))
return -ERANGE;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
/* Handle the case where the passed-in buffer is too short */
if (res.acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_TRUNC) {
/* Did the user only issue a request for the acl length? */
if (buf == NULL)
goto out_ok;
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
if (buf) {
if (res.acl_len > buflen) {
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
}
out_ok:
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::UnapplySteadyStateElisions(UnelisionGesture gesture) {
if (IsSelectAll() && gesture != UnelisionGesture::HOME_KEY_PRESSED)
return false;
size_t start, end;
GetSelectionBounds(&start, &end);
base::string16 original_text = GetText();
base::string16 original_selected_text = GetSelectedText();
if (!model()->Unelide(false /* exit_query_in_omnibox */))
return false;
size_t offset = GetText().find(original_text);
if (offset != base::string16::npos) {
if (start != end && gesture == UnelisionGesture::MOUSE_RELEASE &&
!model()->ClassifiesAsSearch(original_selected_text)) {
if (start != 0)
start += offset;
if (end != 0)
end += offset;
} else {
start += offset;
end += offset;
}
OffsetDoubleClickWord(offset);
}
SelectRange(gfx::Range(start, end));
return true;
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandlerProxy::HandleOverscroll(
const gfx::PointF& causal_event_viewport_point,
const cc::InputHandlerScrollResult& scroll_result) {
DCHECK(client_);
if (!scroll_result.did_overscroll_root)
return;
TRACE_EVENT2("input",
"InputHandlerProxy::DidOverscroll",
"dx",
scroll_result.unused_scroll_delta.x(),
"dy",
scroll_result.unused_scroll_delta.y());
current_overscroll_params_.reset(new DidOverscrollParams());
current_overscroll_params_->accumulated_overscroll =
scroll_result.accumulated_root_overscroll;
current_overscroll_params_->latest_overscroll_delta =
scroll_result.unused_scroll_delta;
current_overscroll_params_->causal_event_viewport_point =
causal_event_viewport_point;
current_overscroll_params_->overscroll_behavior =
scroll_result.overscroll_behavior;
return;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
CWE ID: CWE-281 | 0 | 137,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetVertexAttribIuiv(
GLuint index,
GLenum pname,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLuint* params) {
api()->glGetVertexAttribIuivRobustANGLEFn(index, pname, bufsize, length,
params);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __refill_cfs_bandwidth_runtime(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b)
{
u64 now;
if (cfs_b->quota == RUNTIME_INF)
return;
now = sched_clock_cpu(smp_processor_id());
cfs_b->runtime = cfs_b->quota;
cfs_b->runtime_expires = now + ktime_to_ns(cfs_b->period);
cfs_b->expires_seq++;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *br_multicast_alloc_query(struct net_bridge *br,
struct br_ip *addr)
{
switch (addr->proto) {
case htons(ETH_P_IP):
return br_ip4_multicast_alloc_query(br, addr->u.ip4);
#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
return br_ip6_multicast_alloc_query(br, &addr->u.ip6);
#endif
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 27,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void scheduler_ipi(void)
{
/*
* Fold TIF_NEED_RESCHED into the preempt_count; anybody setting
* TIF_NEED_RESCHED remotely (for the first time) will also send
* this IPI.
*/
preempt_fold_need_resched();
if (llist_empty(&this_rq()->wake_list)
&& !tick_nohz_full_cpu(smp_processor_id())
&& !got_nohz_idle_kick())
return;
/*
* Not all reschedule IPI handlers call irq_enter/irq_exit, since
* traditionally all their work was done from the interrupt return
* path. Now that we actually do some work, we need to make sure
* we do call them.
*
* Some archs already do call them, luckily irq_enter/exit nest
* properly.
*
* Arguably we should visit all archs and update all handlers,
* however a fair share of IPIs are still resched only so this would
* somewhat pessimize the simple resched case.
*/
irq_enter();
tick_nohz_full_check();
sched_ttwu_pending();
/*
* Check if someone kicked us for doing the nohz idle load balance.
*/
if (unlikely(got_nohz_idle_kick())) {
this_rq()->idle_balance = 1;
raise_softirq_irqoff(SCHED_SOFTIRQ);
}
irq_exit();
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool ReadMPEElem(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self,
cmsIOHANDLER* io,
void* Cargo,
cmsUInt32Number n,
cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsStageSignature ElementSig;
cmsTagTypeHandler* TypeHandler;
cmsUInt32Number nItems;
cmsPipeline *NewLUT = (cmsPipeline *) Cargo;
_cmsTagTypePluginChunkType* MPETypePluginChunk = ( _cmsTagTypePluginChunkType*) _cmsContextGetClientChunk(self->ContextID, MPEPlugin);
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, (cmsUInt32Number*) &ElementSig)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, NULL)) return FALSE;
TypeHandler = GetHandler((cmsTagTypeSignature) ElementSig, MPETypePluginChunk ->TagTypes, SupportedMPEtypes);
if (TypeHandler == NULL) {
char String[5];
_cmsTagSignature2String(String, (cmsTagSignature) ElementSig);
cmsSignalError(self ->ContextID, cmsERROR_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, "Unknown MPE type '%s' found.", String);
return FALSE;
}
if (TypeHandler ->ReadPtr != NULL) {
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(NewLUT, cmsAT_END, (cmsStage*) TypeHandler ->ReadPtr(self, io, &nItems, SizeOfTag)))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_siz_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
assert(siz->width && siz->height && siz->tilewidth &&
siz->tileheight && siz->numcomps);
if (jpc_putuint16(out, siz->caps) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->width) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->height) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->xoff) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->yoff) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_putuint16(out, siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_putuint8(out, ((siz->comps[i].sgnd & 1) << 7) |
((siz->comps[i].prec - 1) & 0x7f)) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform1fv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform1fv",
Program::kUniform1f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL) {
scoped_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[count]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < count; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii] != 0.0f);
}
DoUniform1iv(real_location, count, temp.get());
} else {
glUniform1fv(real_location, count, value);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct xt_counters *alloc_counters(const struct xt_table *table)
{
unsigned int countersize;
struct xt_counters *counters;
const struct xt_table_info *private = table->private;
/* We need atomic snapshot of counters: rest doesn't change
(other than comefrom, which userspace doesn't care
about). */
countersize = sizeof(struct xt_counters) * private->number;
counters = vzalloc(countersize);
if (counters == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
get_counters(private, counters);
return counters;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct resv_map *resv_map_alloc(void)
{
struct resv_map *resv_map = kmalloc(sizeof(*resv_map), GFP_KERNEL);
struct file_region *rg = kmalloc(sizeof(*rg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resv_map || !rg) {
kfree(resv_map);
kfree(rg);
return NULL;
}
kref_init(&resv_map->refs);
spin_lock_init(&resv_map->lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resv_map->regions);
resv_map->adds_in_progress = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&resv_map->region_cache);
list_add(&rg->link, &resv_map->region_cache);
resv_map->region_cache_count = 1;
return resv_map;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs41_call_sync_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs41_call_sync_data *data = calldata;
nfs41_sequence_done(task, data->seq_res);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pipe2, int __user *, fildes, int, flags)
{
struct file *files[2];
int fd[2];
int error;
error = __do_pipe_flags(fd, files, flags);
if (!error) {
if (unlikely(copy_to_user(fildes, fd, sizeof(fd)))) {
fput(files[0]);
fput(files[1]);
put_unused_fd(fd[0]);
put_unused_fd(fd[1]);
error = -EFAULT;
} else {
fd_install(fd[0], files[0]);
fd_install(fd[1], files[1]);
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAACEncoder2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (!mSentCodecSpecificData) {
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ALOGE("Unable to initialize encoder for profile / sample-rate / bit-rate / channels");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
OMX_U32 actualBitRate = aacEncoder_GetParam(mAACEncoder, AACENC_BITRATE);
if (mBitRate != actualBitRate) {
ALOGW("Requested bitrate %u unsupported, using %u", mBitRate, actualBitRate);
}
AACENC_InfoStruct encInfo;
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncInfo(mAACEncoder, &encInfo)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get AAC encoder info");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFilledLen = encInfo.confSize;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
uint8_t *out = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
memcpy(out, encInfo.confBuf, encInfo.confSize);
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mSentCodecSpecificData = true;
}
size_t numBytesPerInputFrame =
mNumChannels * kNumSamplesPerFrame * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mAACProfile == OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectELD && numBytesPerInputFrame > 512) {
numBytesPerInputFrame = 512;
}
for (;;) {
while (mInputSize < numBytesPerInputFrame) {
if (mSawInputEOS || inQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
const void *inData = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
size_t copy = numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize;
if (copy > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
copy = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
if (mInputFrame == NULL) {
mInputFrame = new int16_t[numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t)];
}
if (mInputSize == 0) {
mInputTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
memcpy((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize, inData, copy);
mInputSize += copy;
inHeader->nOffset += copy;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= copy;
inHeader->nTimeStamp +=
(copy * 1000000ll / mSampleRate)
/ (mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEOS = true;
memset((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize,
0,
numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize);
mInputSize = numBytesPerInputFrame;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inData = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
}
}
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
uint8_t *outPtr = (uint8_t *)outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
size_t outAvailable = outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset;
AACENC_InArgs inargs;
AACENC_OutArgs outargs;
memset(&inargs, 0, sizeof(inargs));
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
inargs.numInSamples = numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t);
void* inBuffer[] = { (unsigned char *)mInputFrame };
INT inBufferIds[] = { IN_AUDIO_DATA };
INT inBufferSize[] = { (INT)numBytesPerInputFrame };
INT inBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(int16_t) };
AACENC_BufDesc inBufDesc;
inBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(inBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
inBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&inBuffer;
inBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = inBufferIds;
inBufDesc.bufSizes = inBufferSize;
inBufDesc.bufElSizes = inBufferElSize;
void* outBuffer[] = { outPtr };
INT outBufferIds[] = { OUT_BITSTREAM_DATA };
INT outBufferSize[] = { 0 };
INT outBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(UCHAR) };
AACENC_BufDesc outBufDesc;
outBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(outBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
outBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&outBuffer;
outBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = outBufferIds;
outBufDesc.bufSizes = outBufferSize;
outBufDesc.bufElSizes = outBufferElSize;
AACENC_ERROR encoderErr = AACENC_OK;
size_t nOutputBytes = 0;
do {
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
outBuffer[0] = outPtr;
outBufferSize[0] = outAvailable - nOutputBytes;
encoderErr = aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder,
&inBufDesc,
&outBufDesc,
&inargs,
&outargs);
if (encoderErr == AACENC_OK) {
outPtr += outargs.numOutBytes;
nOutputBytes += outargs.numOutBytes;
if (outargs.numInSamples > 0) {
int numRemainingSamples = inargs.numInSamples - outargs.numInSamples;
if (numRemainingSamples > 0) {
memmove(mInputFrame,
&mInputFrame[outargs.numInSamples],
sizeof(int16_t) * numRemainingSamples);
}
inargs.numInSamples -= outargs.numInSamples;
}
}
} while (encoderErr == AACENC_OK && inargs.numInSamples > 0);
outHeader->nFilledLen = nOutputBytes;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
if (mSawInputEOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mInputTimeUs;
#if 0
ALOGI("sending %d bytes of data (time = %lld us, flags = 0x%08lx)",
nOutputBytes, mInputTimeUs, outHeader->nFlags);
hexdump(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset, outHeader->nFilledLen);
#endif
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
outInfo = NULL;
mInputSize = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib4fv(GLuint index, const GLfloat* v) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttrib4fv: index out of range");
return;
}
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 value;
value.v[0] = v[0];
value.v[1] = v[1];
value.v[2] = v[2];
value.v[3] = v[3];
info->set_value(value);
glVertexAttrib4fv(index, v);
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
int retval = 0;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_setsockopt(sk: %p... optname: %d)\n",
sk, optname);
/* I can hardly begin to describe how wrong this is. This is
* so broken as to be worse than useless. The API draft
* REALLY is NOT helpful here... I am not convinced that the
* semantics of setsockopt() with a level OTHER THAN SOL_SCTP
* are at all well-founded.
*/
if (level != SOL_SCTP) {
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_sk(sk)->pf->af;
retval = af->setsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
goto out_nounlock;
}
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_bindx(sk, (struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen, SCTP_BINDX_ADD_ADDR);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_bindx(sk, (struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen, SCTP_BINDX_REM_ADDR);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX_OLD:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_connectx_old(sk,
(struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
/* 'optlen' is the size of the addresses buffer. */
retval = sctp_setsockopt_connectx(sk,
(struct sockaddr __user *)optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DISABLE_FRAGMENTS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_disable_fragments(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_EVENTS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_events(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTOCLOSE:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_autoclose(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_PARAMS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_peer_addr_params(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DELAYED_SACK:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_delayed_ack(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_partial_delivery_point(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_INITMSG:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_initmsg(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_SEND_PARAM:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_default_send_param(sk, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_primary_addr(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_peer_primary_addr(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_NODELAY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_nodelay(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RTOINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_rtoinfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ASSOCINFO:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_associnfo(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_mappedv4(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAXSEG:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_maxseg(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ADAPTATION_LAYER:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_adaptation_layer(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_CONTEXT:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_context(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_FRAGMENT_INTERLEAVE:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_fragment_interleave(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAX_BURST:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_maxburst(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_auth_chunk(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_HMAC_IDENT:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_hmac_ident(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_KEY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_active_key(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_del_key(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTO_ASCONF:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS:
retval = sctp_setsockopt_paddr_thresholds(sk, optval, optlen);
break;
default:
retval = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
sctp_release_sock(sk);
out_nounlock:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void drop_futex_key_refs(union futex_key *key)
{
if (!key->both.ptr) {
/* If we're here then we tried to put a key we failed to get */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return;
}
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU))
return;
switch (key->both.offset & (FUT_OFF_INODE|FUT_OFF_MMSHARED)) {
case FUT_OFF_INODE:
iput(key->shared.inode);
break;
case FUT_OFF_MMSHARED:
mmdrop(key->private.mm);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void perf_tp_event(u64 addr, u64 count, void *record, int entry_size,
struct pt_regs *regs, struct hlist_head *head, int rctx,
struct task_struct *task)
{
struct perf_sample_data data;
struct perf_event *event;
struct perf_raw_record raw = {
.size = entry_size,
.data = record,
};
perf_sample_data_init(&data, addr, 0);
data.raw = &raw;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(event, head, hlist_entry) {
if (perf_tp_event_match(event, &data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, count, &data, regs);
}
/*
* If we got specified a target task, also iterate its context and
* deliver this event there too.
*/
if (task && task != current) {
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
struct trace_entry *entry = record;
rcu_read_lock();
ctx = rcu_dereference(task->perf_event_ctxp[perf_sw_context]);
if (!ctx)
goto unlock;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) {
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT)
continue;
if (event->attr.config != entry->type)
continue;
if (perf_tp_event_match(event, &data, regs))
perf_swevent_event(event, count, &data, regs);
}
unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(rctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForFullscreenMode() {
if (is_locked_fullscreen_)
return;
const bool is_fullscreen = window() && window()->IsFullscreen();
const bool show_main_ui = IsShowingMainUI();
const bool show_location_bar = IsShowingLocationBar();
const bool main_not_fullscreen = show_main_ui && !is_fullscreen;
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_OPEN_CURRENT_URL, show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_SHOW_AS_TAB,
!browser_->is_type_tabbed() && !is_fullscreen);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_TOOLBAR, show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION, show_location_bar);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH, show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_FOCUS_MENU_BAR, main_not_fullscreen);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_FOCUS_NEXT_PANE, main_not_fullscreen);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_FOCUS_PREVIOUS_PANE, main_not_fullscreen);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_FOCUS_BOOKMARKS, main_not_fullscreen);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(
IDC_FOCUS_INACTIVE_POPUP_FOR_ACCESSIBILITY, main_not_fullscreen);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEVELOPER_MENU, show_main_ui);
#if defined(GOOGLE_CHROME_BUILD)
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FEEDBACK, show_main_ui);
#endif
UpdateShowSyncState(show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINES, show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_VIEW_PASSWORDS, show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_ABOUT, show_main_ui);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_SHOW_APP_MENU, show_main_ui);
if (base::debug::IsProfilingSupported())
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_PROFILING_ENABLED, show_main_ui);
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool fullscreen_enabled = is_fullscreen ||
profile()->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kFullscreenAllowed);
#else
const bool fullscreen_enabled = true;
#endif
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_FULLSCREEN, fullscreen_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_TOGGLE_FULLSCREEN_TOOLBAR,
fullscreen_enabled);
UpdateCommandsForBookmarkBar();
UpdateCommandsForIncognitoAvailability();
UpdateCommandsForHostedAppAvailability();
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnAcceleratedPluginAllocatedIOSurface(
int32 width,
int32 height,
uint32 surface_id) {
if (plugin_)
plugin_->AcceleratedPluginAllocatedIOSurface(width, height, surface_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_dump_policy_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_policy_walk *) &cb->args[1];
struct net *net = sock_net(cb->skb->sk);
xfrm_policy_walk_done(walk, net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 167,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *new_page_node(struct page *p, unsigned long private,
int **result)
{
struct page_to_node *pm = (struct page_to_node *)private;
while (pm->node != MAX_NUMNODES && pm->page != p)
pm++;
if (pm->node == MAX_NUMNODES)
return NULL;
*result = &pm->status;
if (PageHuge(p))
return alloc_huge_page_node(page_hstate(compound_head(p)),
pm->node);
else
return __alloc_pages_node(pm->node,
GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_THISNODE, 0);
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 54,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static apr_status_t reset_banner(void *dummy)
{
banner_locked = 0;
ap_server_tokens = SrvTk_FULL;
server_banner = NULL;
server_description = NULL;
return APR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintViewManagerBase::RenderAllMissingPagesNow() {
if (!print_job_.get() || !print_job_->is_job_pending())
return false;
if (!web_contents() ||
!web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost() ||
!web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->IsRenderViewLive()) {
return false;
}
if (print_job_->document() && print_job_->document()->IsComplete()) {
printing_succeeded_ = true;
return true;
}
if (!RunInnerMessageLoop()) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vcpu_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len,
const void *v)
{
int handled = 0;
int n;
do {
n = min(len, 8);
if (!(vcpu->arch.apic &&
!kvm_iodevice_write(&vcpu->arch.apic->dev, addr, n, v))
&& kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu->kvm, KVM_MMIO_BUS, addr, n, v))
break;
handled += n;
addr += n;
len -= n;
v += n;
} while (len);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: have_sampled_guard_with_id(guard_selection_t *gs, const uint8_t *rsa_id)
{
return get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldDeferDraws() {
return !offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get() &&
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer.get() == nullptr &&
surface_->DeferDraws();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_wddx_packet_rsrc(zend_resource *rsrc)
{
smart_str *str = (smart_str *)rsrc->ptr;
smart_str_free(str);
efree(str);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73831 - NULL Pointer Dereference while unserialize php object
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 71,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_queue_set_guest_notifier_fd_handler(VirtQueue *vq, bool assign,
bool with_irqfd)
{
if (assign && !with_irqfd) {
event_notifier_set_handler(&vq->guest_notifier, false,
virtio_queue_guest_notifier_read);
} else {
event_notifier_set_handler(&vq->guest_notifier, false, NULL);
}
if (!assign) {
/* Test and clear notifier before closing it,
* in case poll callback didn't have time to run. */
virtio_queue_guest_notifier_read(&vq->guest_notifier);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void xen_blk_drain_io(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
{
struct xen_blkif *blkif = ring->blkif;
atomic_set(&blkif->drain, 1);
do {
if (atomic_read(&ring->inflight) == 0)
break;
wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
&blkif->drain_complete, HZ);
if (!atomic_read(&blkif->drain))
break;
} while (!kthread_should_stop());
atomic_set(&blkif->drain, 0);
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Tags::SimpleTag::GetTagName() const { return m_tag_name; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uv__process_open_stream(uv_stdio_container_t* container,
int pipefds[2],
int writable) {
int flags;
if (!(container->flags & UV_CREATE_PIPE) || pipefds[0] < 0)
return 0;
if (uv__close(pipefds[1]))
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EINPROGRESS)
abort();
pipefds[1] = -1;
uv__nonblock(pipefds[0], 1);
if (container->data.stream->type == UV_NAMED_PIPE &&
((uv_pipe_t*)container->data.stream)->ipc)
flags = UV_STREAM_READABLE | UV_STREAM_WRITABLE;
else if (writable)
flags = UV_STREAM_WRITABLE;
else
flags = UV_STREAM_READABLE;
return uv__stream_open(container->data.stream, pipefds[0], flags);
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asmlinkage void __exception do_undefinstr(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
siginfo_t info;
void __user *pc = (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/* check for AArch32 breakpoint instructions */
if (compat_user_mode(regs) && aarch32_break_trap(regs) == 0)
return;
#endif
if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(current, SIGILL) &&
printk_ratelimit()) {
pr_info("%s[%d]: undefined instruction: pc=%p\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), pc);
dump_instr(KERN_INFO, regs);
}
info.si_signo = SIGILL;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = ILL_ILLOPC;
info.si_addr = pc;
arm64_notify_die("Oops - undefined instruction", regs, &info, 0);
}
Commit Message: arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,885 |
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