instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: circle_diameter(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(2 * circle->radius);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ghash_async_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
struct ghash_async_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
struct ahash_request *cryptd_req = ahash_request_ctx(req);
struct cryptd_ahash *cryptd_tfm = ctx->cryptd_tfm;
if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
ahash_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &cryptd_tfm->base);
return crypto_ahash_digest(cryptd_req);
} else {
struct shash_desc *desc = cryptd_shash_desc(cryptd_req);
struct crypto_shash *child = cryptd_ahash_child(cryptd_tfm);
desc->tfm = child;
desc->flags = req->base.flags;
return shash_ahash_digest(req, desc);
}
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *get_backtrace(const char *dump_dir_name, unsigned timeout_sec, const char *debuginfo_dirs)
{
INITIALIZE_LIBABRT();
struct dump_dir *dd = dd_opendir(dump_dir_name, /*flags:*/ 0);
if (!dd)
return NULL;
char *executable = dd_load_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE);
dd_close(dd);
/* Let user know what's going on */
log(_("Generating backtrace"));
unsigned i = 0;
char *args[25];
args[i++] = (char*)"gdb";
args[i++] = (char*)"-batch";
struct strbuf *set_debug_file_directory = strbuf_new();
unsigned auto_load_base_index = 0;
if(debuginfo_dirs == NULL)
{
strbuf_append_str(set_debug_file_directory, "set debug-file-directory /");
}
else
{
strbuf_append_str(set_debug_file_directory, "set debug-file-directory /usr/lib/debug");
struct strbuf *debug_directories = strbuf_new();
const char *p = debuginfo_dirs;
while (1)
{
while (*p == ':')
p++;
if (*p == '\0')
break;
const char *colon_or_nul = strchrnul(p, ':');
strbuf_append_strf(debug_directories, "%s%.*s/usr/lib/debug", (debug_directories->len == 0 ? "" : ":"),
(int)(colon_or_nul - p), p);
p = colon_or_nul;
}
strbuf_append_strf(set_debug_file_directory, ":%s", debug_directories->buf);
args[i++] = (char*)"-iex";
auto_load_base_index = i;
args[i++] = xasprintf("add-auto-load-safe-path %s", debug_directories->buf);
args[i++] = (char*)"-iex";
args[i++] = xasprintf("add-auto-load-scripts-directory %s", debug_directories->buf);
strbuf_free(debug_directories);
}
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
const unsigned debug_dir_cmd_index = i++;
args[debug_dir_cmd_index] = strbuf_free_nobuf(set_debug_file_directory);
/* "file BINARY_FILE" is needed, without it gdb cannot properly
* unwind the stack. Currently the unwind information is located
* in .eh_frame which is stored only in binary, not in coredump
* or debuginfo.
*
* Fedora GDB does not strictly need it, it will find the binary
* by its build-id. But for binaries either without build-id
* (= built on non-Fedora GCC) or which do not have
* their debuginfo rpm installed gdb would not find BINARY_FILE
* so it is still makes sense to supply "file BINARY_FILE".
*
* Unfortunately, "file BINARY_FILE" doesn't work well if BINARY_FILE
* was deleted (as often happens during system updates):
* gdb uses specified BINARY_FILE
* even if it is completely unrelated to the coredump.
* See https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=525721
*
* TODO: check mtimes on COREFILE and BINARY_FILE and not supply
* BINARY_FILE if it is newer (to at least avoid gdb complaining).
*/
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
const unsigned file_cmd_index = i++;
args[file_cmd_index] = xasprintf("file %s", executable);
free(executable);
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
const unsigned core_cmd_index = i++;
args[core_cmd_index] = xasprintf("core-file %s/"FILENAME_COREDUMP, dump_dir_name);
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
const unsigned bt_cmd_index = i++;
/*args[9] = ... see below */
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
args[i++] = (char*)"info sharedlib";
/* glibc's abort() stores its message in __abort_msg variable */
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
args[i++] = (char*)"print (char*)__abort_msg";
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
args[i++] = (char*)"print (char*)__glib_assert_msg";
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
args[i++] = (char*)"info all-registers";
args[i++] = (char*)"-ex";
const unsigned dis_cmd_index = i++;
args[dis_cmd_index] = (char*)"disassemble";
args[i++] = NULL;
/* Get the backtrace, but try to cap its size */
/* Limit bt depth. With no limit, gdb sometimes OOMs the machine */
unsigned bt_depth = 1024;
const char *thread_apply_all = "thread apply all";
const char *full = " full";
char *bt = NULL;
while (1)
{
args[bt_cmd_index] = xasprintf("%s backtrace %u%s", thread_apply_all, bt_depth, full);
bt = exec_vp(args, /*redirect_stderr:*/ 1, timeout_sec, NULL);
free(args[bt_cmd_index]);
if ((bt && strnlen(bt, 256*1024) < 256*1024) || bt_depth <= 32)
{
break;
}
bt_depth /= 2;
if (bt)
log("Backtrace is too big (%u bytes), reducing depth to %u",
(unsigned)strlen(bt), bt_depth);
else
/* (NB: in fact, current impl. of exec_vp() never returns NULL) */
log("Failed to generate backtrace, reducing depth to %u",
bt_depth);
free(bt);
/* Replace -ex disassemble (which disasms entire function $pc points to)
* to a version which analyzes limited, small patch of code around $pc.
* (Users reported a case where bare "disassemble" attempted to process
* entire .bss).
* TODO: what if "$pc-N" underflows? in my test, this happens:
* Dump of assembler code from 0xfffffffffffffff0 to 0x30:
* End of assembler dump.
* (IOW: "empty" dump)
*/
args[dis_cmd_index] = (char*)"disassemble $pc-20, $pc+64";
if (bt_depth <= 64 && thread_apply_all[0] != '\0')
{
/* This program likely has gazillion threads, dont try to bt them all */
bt_depth = 128;
thread_apply_all = "";
}
if (bt_depth <= 64 && full[0] != '\0')
{
/* Looks like there are gigantic local structures or arrays, disable "full" bt */
bt_depth = 128;
full = "";
}
}
if (auto_load_base_index > 0)
{
free(args[auto_load_base_index]);
free(args[auto_load_base_index + 2]);
}
free(args[debug_dir_cmd_index]);
free(args[file_cmd_index]);
free(args[core_cmd_index]);
return bt;
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 96,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void blk_free_request(struct request_list *rl, struct request *rq)
{
if (rq->rq_flags & RQF_ELVPRIV) {
elv_put_request(rl->q, rq);
if (rq->elv.icq)
put_io_context(rq->elv.icq->ioc);
}
mempool_free(rq, rl->rq_pool);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(char *md5_hash, struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct in6_addr *saddr, *daddr;
struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp;
struct hash_desc *desc;
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
if (sk) {
saddr = &inet6_sk(sk)->saddr;
daddr = &inet6_sk(sk)->daddr;
} else if (req) {
saddr = &inet6_rsk(req)->loc_addr;
daddr = &inet6_rsk(req)->rmt_addr;
} else {
const struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
saddr = &ip6h->saddr;
daddr = &ip6h->daddr;
}
hp = tcp_get_md5sig_pool();
if (!hp)
goto clear_hash_noput;
desc = &hp->md5_desc;
if (crypto_hash_init(desc))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_v6_md5_hash_pseudoheader(hp, daddr, saddr, skb->len))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_header(hp, th))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_skb_data(hp, skb, th->doff << 2))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key))
goto clear_hash;
if (crypto_hash_final(desc, md5_hash))
goto clear_hash;
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
return 0;
clear_hash:
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
clear_hash_noput:
memset(md5_hash, 0, 16);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: writeRandomBytes_getrandom_nonblock(void *target, size_t count) {
int success = 0; /* full count bytes written? */
size_t bytesWrittenTotal = 0;
const unsigned int getrandomFlags = GRND_NONBLOCK;
do {
void *const currentTarget = (void *)((char *)target + bytesWrittenTotal);
const size_t bytesToWrite = count - bytesWrittenTotal;
const int bytesWrittenMore =
# if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM)
getrandom(currentTarget, bytesToWrite, getrandomFlags);
# else
syscall(SYS_getrandom, currentTarget, bytesToWrite, getrandomFlags);
# endif
if (bytesWrittenMore > 0) {
bytesWrittenTotal += bytesWrittenMore;
if (bytesWrittenTotal >= count)
success = 1;
}
} while (! success && (errno == EINTR));
return success;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::ContinueSearchTermResolutionRequest() {
DCHECK(context_.get());
if (!context_.get())
return;
GURL request_url(BuildRequestUrl(context_->selected_text));
DCHECK(request_url.is_valid());
search_term_fetcher_.reset(
net::URLFetcher::Create(kContextualSearchURLFetcherID, request_url,
net::URLFetcher::GET, this).release());
search_term_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(url_request_context_);
net::HttpRequestHeaders headers;
variations::AppendVariationHeaders(
search_term_fetcher_->GetOriginalURL(),
false, // Impossible to be incognito at this point.
false, &headers);
search_term_fetcher_->SetExtraRequestHeaders(headers.ToString());
SetDiscourseContextAndAddToHeader(*context_);
search_term_fetcher_->Start();
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_call_sync(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
struct nfs_server *server,
struct rpc_message *msg,
struct nfs4_sequence_args *args,
struct nfs4_sequence_res *res,
int cache_reply)
{
return server->nfs_client->cl_mvops->call_sync(clnt, server, msg,
args, res, cache_reply);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unbind_rdev_from_array(struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
bd_unlink_disk_holder(rdev->bdev, rdev->mddev->gendisk);
list_del_rcu(&rdev->same_set);
printk(KERN_INFO "md: unbind<%s>\n", bdevname(rdev->bdev,b));
rdev->mddev = NULL;
sysfs_remove_link(&rdev->kobj, "block");
sysfs_put(rdev->sysfs_state);
rdev->sysfs_state = NULL;
rdev->badblocks.count = 0;
/* We need to delay this, otherwise we can deadlock when
* writing to 'remove' to "dev/state". We also need
* to delay it due to rcu usage.
*/
synchronize_rcu();
INIT_WORK(&rdev->del_work, md_delayed_delete);
kobject_get(&rdev->kobj);
queue_work(md_misc_wq, &rdev->del_work);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32 get_bits(vorb *f, int n)
{
uint32 z;
if (f->valid_bits < 0) return 0;
if (f->valid_bits < n) {
if (n > 24) {
z = get_bits(f, 24);
z += get_bits(f, n-24) << 24;
return z;
}
if (f->valid_bits == 0) f->acc = 0;
while (f->valid_bits < n) {
int z = get8_packet_raw(f);
if (z == EOP) {
f->valid_bits = INVALID_BITS;
return 0;
}
f->acc += z << f->valid_bits;
f->valid_bits += 8;
}
}
if (f->valid_bits < 0) return 0;
z = f->acc & ((1 << n)-1);
f->acc >>= n;
f->valid_bits -= n;
return z;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 75,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void walk_splay(cmap_splay *tree, unsigned int node, void (*fn)(cmap_splay *, void *), void *arg)
{
int from = TOP;
while (node != EMPTY)
{
switch (from)
{
case TOP:
if (tree[node].left != EMPTY)
{
node = tree[node].left;
from = TOP;
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case LEFT:
fn(&tree[node], arg);
if (tree[node].right != EMPTY)
{
node = tree[node].right;
from = TOP;
break;
}
/* fallthrough */
case RIGHT:
{
unsigned int parent = tree[node].parent;
if (parent == EMPTY)
return;
if (tree[parent].left == node)
from = LEFT;
else
{
assert(tree[parent].right == node);
from = RIGHT;
}
node = parent;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_tty_hangup(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tty_struct *tty =
container_of(work, struct tty_struct, hangup_work);
__tty_hangup(tty, 0);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hugetlb_vm_op_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct resv_map *reservations = vma_resv_map(vma);
unsigned long reserve;
unsigned long start;
unsigned long end;
if (reservations) {
start = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, vma->vm_start);
end = vma_hugecache_offset(h, vma, vma->vm_end);
reserve = (end - start) -
region_count(&reservations->regions, start, end);
kref_put(&reservations->refs, resv_map_release);
if (reserve) {
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -reserve);
hugetlb_put_quota(vma->vm_file->f_mapping, reserve);
}
}
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string TestURLLoader::LoadAndCompareBody(
const pp::URLRequestInfo& request,
const std::string& expected_body) {
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
pp::URLLoader loader(instance_);
callback.WaitForResult(loader.Open(request, callback.GetCallback()));
CHECK_CALLBACK_BEHAVIOR(callback);
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, callback.result());
pp::URLResponseInfo response_info(loader.GetResponseInfo());
if (response_info.is_null())
return "URLLoader::GetResponseInfo returned null";
int32_t status_code = response_info.GetStatusCode();
if (status_code != 200)
return "Unexpected HTTP status code";
std::string body;
std::string error = ReadEntireResponseBody(&loader, &body);
if (!error.empty())
return error;
if (body.size() != expected_body.size())
return "URLLoader::ReadResponseBody returned unexpected content length";
if (body != expected_body)
return "URLLoader::ReadResponseBody returned unexpected content";
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 156,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::Copy() {
gtk_window_util::DoCopy(
window_, chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_url_bar_activated(void *user_data, Evas_Object *url_bar, void *event_info)
{
Browser_Window *app_data = (Browser_Window *)user_data;
const char *user_url = elm_entry_entry_get(url_bar);
char *url = url_from_user_input(user_url);
ewk_view_url_set(app_data->webview, url);
free(url);
/* Give focus back to the view */
view_focus_set(app_data, EINA_TRUE);
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PluginChannel::CleanUp() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugin_stubs_.size(); ++i)
RemoveRoute(plugin_stubs_[i]->instance_id());
scoped_refptr<PluginChannel> me(this);
plugin_stubs_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int basic_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_login", sizeof("_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
!zend_hash_exists(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_digest", sizeof("_digest"))) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_password", sizeof("_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ImportRGBOQuantum(const Image *image,QuantumInfo *quantum_info,
const MagickSizeType number_pixels,const unsigned char *magick_restrict p,
Quantum *magick_restrict q,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned int
pixel;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
switch (quantum_info->depth)
{
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 10:
{
pixel=0;
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
{
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
quantum;
ssize_t
n;
n=0;
quantum=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
switch (n % 3)
{
case 0:
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 22) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 1:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 12) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
case 2:
{
quantum=(size_t) (ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
(((pixel >> 2) & 0x3ff) << 6)));
break;
}
}
switch (i)
{
case 0: SetPixelRed(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 1: SetPixelGreen(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 2: SetPixelBlue(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
case 3: SetPixelOpacity(image,(Quantum) quantum,q); break;
}
n++;
}
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) (pixel << 6)),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(QuantumRange*
HalfToSinglePrecision(pixel)),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushShortPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
float
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushFloatPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushLongPixel(quantum_info->endian,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 64:
{
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
double
pixel;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p=PushDoublePixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ClampToQuantum(pixel),q);
p+=quantum_info->pad;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
range=GetQuantumRange(quantum_info->depth);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) number_pixels; x++)
{
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
p=PushQuantumPixel(quantum_info,p,&pixel);
SetPixelOpacity(image,ScaleAnyToQuantum(pixel,range),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/129
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 71,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smp_proc_pair_fail(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(uint8_t*)p_data;
/* Cancel pending auth complete timer if set */
alarm_cancel(p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kadm5_setv4key_principal(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal,
krb5_keyblock *keyblock)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_timestamp now;
kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
krb5_keysalt keysalt;
int i, kvno, ret;
krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_key_data tmp_key_data;
krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
memset( &tmp_key_data, 0, sizeof(tmp_key_data));
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if (principal == NULL || keyblock == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if (hist_princ && /* this will be NULL when initializing the databse */
((krb5_principal_compare(handle->context,
principal, hist_princ)) == TRUE))
return KADM5_PROTECT_PRINCIPAL;
if (keyblock->enctype != ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)
return KADM5_SETV4KEY_INVAL_ENCTYPE;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
for (kvno = 0, i=0; i<kdb->n_key_data; i++)
if (kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno > kvno)
kvno = kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno;
if (kdb->key_data != NULL)
cleanup_key_data(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data);
kdb->key_data = calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_key_data));
if (kdb->key_data == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
kdb->n_key_data = 1;
keysalt.type = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_V4;
/* XXX data.magic? */
keysalt.data.length = 0;
keysalt.data.data = NULL;
ret = kdb_get_active_mkey(handle, NULL, &act_mkey);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* use tmp_key_data as temporary location and reallocate later */
ret = krb5_dbe_encrypt_key_data(handle->context, act_mkey, keyblock,
&keysalt, kvno + 1, kdb->key_data);
if (ret) {
goto done;
}
kdb->attributes &= ~KRB5_KDB_REQUIRES_PWCHANGE;
ret = krb5_timeofday(handle->context, &now);
if (ret)
goto done;
if ((adb.aux_attributes & KADM5_POLICY)) {
ret = get_policy(handle, adb.policy, &pol, &have_pol);
if (ret)
goto done;
}
if (have_pol) {
if (pol.pw_max_life)
kdb->pw_expiration = ts_incr(now, pol.pw_max_life);
else
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
} else {
kdb->pw_expiration = 0;
}
ret = krb5_dbe_update_last_pwd_change(handle->context, kdb, now);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* unlock principal on this KDC */
kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
/* key data changed, let the database provider know */
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA | KADM5_FAIL_AUTH_COUNT;
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
for (i = 0; i < tmp_key_data.key_data_ver; i++) {
if (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i]) {
memset (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i], 0, tmp_key_data.key_data_length[i]);
free (tmp_key_data.key_data_contents[i]);
}
}
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (have_pol)
kadm5_free_policy_ent(handle->lhandle, &pol);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90
| 0
| 84,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *register_input_filter(cmd_parms *cmd, void *_cfg,
const char* filter, const char *file, const char *function)
{
const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, NOT_IN_DIRECTORY|NOT_IN_FILES|
NOT_IN_HTACCESS);
if (err) {
return err;
}
if (!function) function = "handle";
return register_filter_function_hook(filter, cmd, _cfg, file,
function, AP_LUA_FILTER_INPUT);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void tun_flow_save_rps_rxhash(struct tun_flow_entry *e, u32 hash)
{
if (unlikely(e->rps_rxhash != hash))
e->rps_rxhash = hash;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCreateReadWriteFileSystem(
int child_id, const std::string& filesystem_id) {
GrantPermissionsForFileSystem(
child_id, filesystem_id, CREATE_READ_WRITE_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfsd4_release_compoundargs(void *rq, __be32 *p, void *resp)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp = rq;
struct nfsd4_compoundargs *args = rqstp->rq_argp;
if (args->ops != args->iops) {
kfree(args->ops);
args->ops = args->iops;
}
kfree(args->tmpp);
args->tmpp = NULL;
while (args->to_free) {
struct svcxdr_tmpbuf *tb = args->to_free;
args->to_free = tb->next;
kfree(tb);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int getresult(struct protstream *p, const char *tag)
{
char buf[4096];
char *str = (char *) buf;
while(1) {
if (!prot_fgets(str, sizeof(buf), p)) {
return IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
}
if (!strncmp(str, tag, strlen(tag))) {
str += strlen(tag);
if(!*str) {
/* We got a tag, but no response */
return IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
}
str++;
if (!strncasecmp(str, "OK ", 3)) { return 0; }
if (!strncasecmp(str, "NO ", 3)) { return IMAP_REMOTE_DENIED; }
return IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE; /* huh? */
}
/* skip this line, we don't really care */
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 95,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: loop_set_status_old(struct loop_device *lo, const struct loop_info __user *arg)
{
struct loop_info info;
struct loop_info64 info64;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof (struct loop_info)))
return -EFAULT;
loop_info64_from_old(&info, &info64);
return loop_set_status(lo, &info64);
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 84,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::OnReportConsoleMessage(
ServiceWorkerVersion* version,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageSource source,
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel message_level,
const base::string16& message,
int line_number,
const GURL& source_url) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
const bool is_builtin_component = HasWebUIScheme(source_url);
LogConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessageLevelToLogSeverity(message_level), message,
line_number, is_builtin_component, wrapper_->is_incognito(),
base::UTF8ToUTF16(source_url.spec()));
observer_list_->Notify(
FROM_HERE, &ServiceWorkerContextCoreObserver::OnReportConsoleMessage,
version->version_id(),
ConsoleMessage(source, message_level, message, line_number, source_url));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::SetScriptedPrintBlocked(bool blocked) {
is_scripted_printing_blocked_ = blocked;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_default_rgb(fz_context *ctx, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs)
{
if (default_cs)
return default_cs->rgb;
else
return fz_device_rgb(ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CLASS kodak_jpeg_load_raw() {}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OpenDownload(DownloadItem* download) {
platform_util::OpenItem(download->GetFullPath());
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned char unimap_bsearch(const uni_to_enc *table, unsigned code_key_a, size_t num)
{
const uni_to_enc *l = table,
*h = &table[num-1],
*m;
unsigned short code_key;
/* we have no mappings outside the BMP */
if (code_key_a > 0xFFFFU)
return 0;
code_key = (unsigned short) code_key_a;
while (l <= h) {
m = l + (h - l) / 2;
if (code_key < m->un_code_point)
h = m - 1;
else if (code_key > m->un_code_point)
l = m + 1;
else
return m->cs_code;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_attr_community (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
if (length == 0)
{
attr->community = NULL;
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
attr->community =
community_parse ((u_int32_t *)stream_pnt (peer->ibuf), length);
/* XXX: fix community_parse to use stream API and remove this */
stream_forward_getp (peer->ibuf, length);
if (!attr->community)
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_OPT_ATTR_ERR,
args->total);
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int yy_flex_strlen (yyconst char * s , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
int n;
for ( n = 0; s[n]; ++n )
;
return n;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 70,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_nameserver_free(struct nameserver *server)
{
if (server->socket >= 0)
evutil_closesocket(server->socket);
(void) event_del(&server->event);
event_debug_unassign(&server->event);
if (server->state == 0)
(void) event_del(&server->timeout_event);
if (server->probe_request) {
evdns_cancel_request(server->base, server->probe_request);
server->probe_request = NULL;
}
event_debug_unassign(&server->timeout_event);
mm_free(server);
}
Commit Message: evdns: name_parse(): fix remote stack overread
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"the name_parse() function in libevent's DNS code is vulnerable to a buffer overread.
971 if (cp != name_out) {
972 if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
973 *cp++ = '.';
974 }
975 if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
976 memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
977 cp += label_len;
978 j += label_len;
No check is made against length before the memcpy occurs.
This was found through the Tor bug bounty program and the discovery should be credited to 'Guido Vranken'."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/e4fcf540e9b89ab86d02):
set $PROT_NONE=0x0
set $PROT_READ=0x1
set $PROT_WRITE=0x2
set $MAP_ANONYMOUS=0x20
set $MAP_SHARED=0x01
set $MAP_FIXED=0x10
set $MAP_32BIT=0x40
start
set $length=202
# overread
set $length=2
# allocate with mmap to have a seg fault on page boundary
set $l=(1<<20)*2
p mmap(0, $l, $PROT_READ|$PROT_WRITE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $packet=(char *)$1+$l-$length
# hack the packet
set $packet[0]=63
set $packet[1]='/'
p malloc(sizeof(int))
set $idx=(int *)$2
set $idx[0]=0
set $name_out_len=202
p malloc($name_out_len)
set $name_out=$3
# have WRITE only mapping to fail on read
set $end=$1+$l
p (void *)mmap($end, 1<<12, $PROT_NONE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_FIXED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $m=$4
p name_parse($packet, $length, $idx, $name_out, $name_out_len)
x/2s (char *)$name_out
Before this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:33
After this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
$5 = -1
0x633030: "/"
0x633032: ""
(gdb) p $m
$6 = (void *) 0x40200000
(gdb) p $1
$7 = 1073741824
(gdb) p/x $1
$8 = 0x40000000
(gdb) quit
P.S. plus drop one condition duplicate.
Fixes: #317
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebKitTestController::OnGoToOffset(int offset) {
main_window_->GoBackOrForward(offset);
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hfi1_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *fp)
{
/* The real work is performed later in assign_ctxt() */
fp->private_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct hfi1_filedata), GFP_KERNEL);
if (fp->private_data) /* no cpu affinity by default */
((struct hfi1_filedata *)fp->private_data)->rec_cpu_num = -1;
return fp->private_data ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: intptr_t Parcel::readIntPtr() const
{
return readAligned<intptr_t>();
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebPreferences& RenderFrameImpl::GetWebkitPreferences() {
return render_view_->GetWebkitPreferences();
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥ] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡვဒ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add additional Lao character to IDN confusables
U+0E01 (ก) => n
Prior Lao/Thai entries were added in crrev.com/c/1058710.
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Bug: 882078
Change-Id: I1e90b144a1d791341b515d026a6bc4be7cbed57d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1220773
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Christopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#591227}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jobject Bitmap_creator(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jintArray jColors,
jint offset, jint stride, jint width, jint height,
jint configHandle, jboolean isMutable) {
SkColorType colorType = GraphicsJNI::legacyBitmapConfigToColorType(configHandle);
if (NULL != jColors) {
size_t n = env->GetArrayLength(jColors);
if (n < SkAbs32(stride) * (size_t)height) {
doThrowAIOOBE(env);
return NULL;
}
}
if (colorType == kARGB_4444_SkColorType) {
colorType = kN32_SkColorType;
}
SkBitmap bitmap;
bitmap.setInfo(SkImageInfo::Make(width, height, colorType, kPremul_SkAlphaType));
jbyteArray buff = GraphicsJNI::allocateJavaPixelRef(env, &bitmap, NULL);
if (NULL == buff) {
return NULL;
}
if (jColors != NULL) {
GraphicsJNI::SetPixels(env, jColors, offset, stride,
0, 0, width, height, bitmap);
}
return GraphicsJNI::createBitmap(env, new SkBitmap(bitmap), buff,
getPremulBitmapCreateFlags(isMutable), NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long copy_shmid_to_user(void __user *buf, struct shmid64_ds *in, int version)
{
switch(version) {
case IPC_64:
return copy_to_user(buf, in, sizeof(*in));
case IPC_OLD:
{
struct shmid_ds out;
memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(&in->shm_perm, &out.shm_perm);
out.shm_segsz = in->shm_segsz;
out.shm_atime = in->shm_atime;
out.shm_dtime = in->shm_dtime;
out.shm_ctime = in->shm_ctime;
out.shm_cpid = in->shm_cpid;
out.shm_lpid = in->shm_lpid;
out.shm_nattch = in->shm_nattch;
return copy_to_user(buf, &out, sizeof(out));
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BackTexture::AllocateStorage(
const gfx::Size& size, GLenum format, bool zero) {
DCHECK_NE(id(), 0u);
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackTexture::AllocateStorage",
decoder_->error_state_.get());
ScopedTextureBinder binder(&decoder_->state_, decoder_->error_state_.get(),
id(), Target());
uint32_t image_size = 0;
GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(size.width(), size.height(), 1, format,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, 8, &image_size, nullptr,
nullptr);
bool success = false;
size_ = size;
if (decoder_->should_use_native_gmb_for_backbuffer_) {
DestroyNativeGpuMemoryBuffer(true);
success = AllocateNativeGpuMemoryBuffer(size, format, zero);
} else {
{
std::unique_ptr<char[]> zero_data;
if (zero) {
zero_data.reset(new char[image_size]);
memset(zero_data.get(), 0, image_size);
}
api()->glTexImage2DFn(Target(),
0, // mip level
format, size.width(), size.height(),
0, // border
format, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, zero_data.get());
}
decoder_->texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(
texture_ref_.get(), Target(),
0, // level
GL_RGBA, size.width(), size.height(),
1, // depth
0, // border
GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, gfx::Rect(size));
success = api()->glGetErrorFn() == GL_NO_ERROR;
}
if (success) {
memory_tracker_.TrackMemFree(bytes_allocated_);
bytes_allocated_ = image_size;
memory_tracker_.TrackMemAlloc(bytes_allocated_);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OJPEGWriteStreamSos(TIFF* tif, void** mem, uint32* len)
{
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint8 m;
assert(OJPEG_BUFFER>=2+6+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2);
assert(255>=6+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2);
sp->out_buffer[0]=255;
sp->out_buffer[1]=JPEG_MARKER_SOS;
/* Ls */
sp->out_buffer[2]=0;
sp->out_buffer[3]=6+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2;
/* Ns */
sp->out_buffer[4]=sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane;
for (m=0; m<sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane; m++)
{
/* Cs */
sp->out_buffer[5+m*2]=sp->sos_cs[sp->plane_sample_offset+m];
/* Td and Ta */
sp->out_buffer[5+m*2+1]=sp->sos_tda[sp->plane_sample_offset+m];
}
/* Ss */
sp->out_buffer[5+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2]=0;
/* Se */
sp->out_buffer[5+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2+1]=63;
/* Ah and Al */
sp->out_buffer[5+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2+2]=0;
*len=8+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2;
*mem=(void*)sp->out_buffer;
sp->out_state++;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 70,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDisable(GLenum cap) {
api()->glDisableFn(cap);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextureBase* GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::GetTextureBase(uint32_t client_id) {
scoped_refptr<TexturePassthrough> texture = nullptr;
if (resources_->texture_object_map.GetServiceID(client_id, &texture)) {
return texture.get();
} else {
return nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_array_elements(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return elements_worker(fcinfo, "json_array_elements", false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t InputDispatcher::InputState::findKeyMemento(const KeyEntry* entry) const {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mKeyMementos.size(); i++) {
const KeyMemento& memento = mKeyMementos.itemAt(i);
if (memento.deviceId == entry->deviceId
&& memento.source == entry->source
&& memento.keyCode == entry->keyCode
&& memento.scanCode == entry->scanCode) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void http_end_txn_clean_session(struct stream *s)
{
int prev_status = s->txn->status;
struct proxy *fe = strm_fe(s);
struct proxy *be = s->be;
struct conn_stream *cs;
struct connection *srv_conn;
struct server *srv;
unsigned int prev_flags = s->txn->flags;
/* FIXME: We need a more portable way of releasing a backend's and a
* server's connections. We need a safer way to reinitialize buffer
* flags. We also need a more accurate method for computing per-request
* data.
*/
/*
* XXX cognet: This is probably wrong, this is killing a whole
* connection, in the new world order, we probably want to just kill
* the stream, this is to be revisited the day we handle multiple
* streams in one server connection.
*/
cs = objt_cs(s->si[1].end);
srv_conn = cs_conn(cs);
/* unless we're doing keep-alive, we want to quickly close the connection
* to the server.
*/
if (((s->txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) ||
!si_conn_ready(&s->si[1])) {
s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_NOLINGER | SI_FL_NOHALF;
si_shutr(&s->si[1]);
si_shutw(&s->si[1]);
}
if (s->flags & SF_BE_ASSIGNED) {
HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&be->beconn, 1);
if (unlikely(s->srv_conn))
sess_change_server(s, NULL);
}
s->logs.t_close = tv_ms_elapsed(&s->logs.tv_accept, &now);
stream_process_counters(s);
if (s->txn->status) {
int n;
n = s->txn->status / 100;
if (n < 1 || n > 5)
n = 0;
if (fe->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP) {
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&fe->fe_counters.p.http.rsp[n], 1);
}
if ((s->flags & SF_BE_ASSIGNED) &&
(be->mode == PR_MODE_HTTP)) {
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&be->be_counters.p.http.rsp[n], 1);
HA_ATOMIC_ADD(&be->be_counters.p.http.cum_req, 1);
}
}
/* don't count other requests' data */
s->logs.bytes_in -= s->req.buf->i;
s->logs.bytes_out -= s->res.buf->i;
/* let's do a final log if we need it */
if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&fe->logformat) && s->logs.logwait &&
!(s->flags & SF_MONITOR) &&
(!(fe->options & PR_O_NULLNOLOG) || s->req.total)) {
s->do_log(s);
}
/* stop tracking content-based counters */
stream_stop_content_counters(s);
stream_update_time_stats(s);
s->logs.accept_date = date; /* user-visible date for logging */
s->logs.tv_accept = now; /* corrected date for internal use */
s->logs.t_handshake = 0; /* There are no handshake in keep alive connection. */
s->logs.t_idle = -1;
tv_zero(&s->logs.tv_request);
s->logs.t_queue = -1;
s->logs.t_connect = -1;
s->logs.t_data = -1;
s->logs.t_close = 0;
s->logs.prx_queue_size = 0; /* we get the number of pending conns before us */
s->logs.srv_queue_size = 0; /* we will get this number soon */
s->logs.bytes_in = s->req.total = s->req.buf->i;
s->logs.bytes_out = s->res.total = s->res.buf->i;
if (s->pend_pos)
pendconn_free(s->pend_pos);
if (objt_server(s->target)) {
if (s->flags & SF_CURR_SESS) {
s->flags &= ~SF_CURR_SESS;
HA_ATOMIC_SUB(&objt_server(s->target)->cur_sess, 1);
}
if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), be))
process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target));
}
s->target = NULL;
/* only release our endpoint if we don't intend to reuse the
* connection.
*/
if (((s->txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_KAL) ||
!si_conn_ready(&s->si[1])) {
si_release_endpoint(&s->si[1]);
srv_conn = NULL;
}
s->si[1].state = s->si[1].prev_state = SI_ST_INI;
s->si[1].err_type = SI_ET_NONE;
s->si[1].conn_retries = 0; /* used for logging too */
s->si[1].exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
s->si[1].flags &= SI_FL_ISBACK | SI_FL_DONT_WAKE; /* we're in the context of process_stream */
s->req.flags &= ~(CF_SHUTW|CF_SHUTW_NOW|CF_AUTO_CONNECT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WAKE_CONNECT|CF_WROTE_DATA);
s->res.flags &= ~(CF_SHUTR|CF_SHUTR_NOW|CF_READ_ATTACHED|CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_NOEXP|CF_STREAMER|CF_STREAMER_FAST|CF_WRITE_PARTIAL|CF_NEVER_WAIT|CF_WROTE_DATA|CF_WRITE_EVENT);
s->flags &= ~(SF_DIRECT|SF_ASSIGNED|SF_ADDR_SET|SF_BE_ASSIGNED|SF_FORCE_PRST|SF_IGNORE_PRST);
s->flags &= ~(SF_CURR_SESS|SF_REDIRECTABLE|SF_SRV_REUSED);
s->flags &= ~(SF_ERR_MASK|SF_FINST_MASK|SF_REDISP);
s->txn->meth = 0;
http_reset_txn(s);
s->txn->flags |= TX_NOT_FIRST | TX_WAIT_NEXT_RQ;
if (prev_status == 401 || prev_status == 407) {
/* In HTTP keep-alive mode, if we receive a 401, we still have
* a chance of being able to send the visitor again to the same
* server over the same connection. This is required by some
* broken protocols such as NTLM, and anyway whenever there is
* an opportunity for sending the challenge to the proper place,
* it's better to do it (at least it helps with debugging).
*/
s->txn->flags |= TX_PREFER_LAST;
if (srv_conn)
srv_conn->flags |= CO_FL_PRIVATE;
}
/* Never ever allow to reuse a connection from a non-reuse backend */
if (srv_conn && (be->options & PR_O_REUSE_MASK) == PR_O_REUSE_NEVR)
srv_conn->flags |= CO_FL_PRIVATE;
if (fe->options2 & PR_O2_INDEPSTR)
s->si[1].flags |= SI_FL_INDEP_STR;
if (fe->options2 & PR_O2_NODELAY) {
s->req.flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
s->res.flags |= CF_NEVER_WAIT;
}
/* we're removing the analysers, we MUST re-enable events detection.
* We don't enable close on the response channel since it's either
* already closed, or in keep-alive with an idle connection handler.
*/
channel_auto_read(&s->req);
channel_auto_close(&s->req);
channel_auto_read(&s->res);
/* we're in keep-alive with an idle connection, monitor it if not already done */
if (srv_conn && LIST_ISEMPTY(&srv_conn->list)) {
srv = objt_server(srv_conn->target);
if (!srv)
si_idle_cs(&s->si[1], NULL);
else if (srv_conn->flags & CO_FL_PRIVATE)
si_idle_cs(&s->si[1], (srv->priv_conns ? &srv->priv_conns[tid] : NULL));
else if (prev_flags & TX_NOT_FIRST)
/* note: we check the request, not the connection, but
* this is valid for strategies SAFE and AGGR, and in
* case of ALWS, we don't care anyway.
*/
si_idle_cs(&s->si[1], (srv->safe_conns ? &srv->safe_conns[tid] : NULL));
else
si_idle_cs(&s->si[1], (srv->idle_conns ? &srv->idle_conns[tid] : NULL));
}
s->req.analysers = strm_li(s) ? strm_li(s)->analysers : 0;
s->res.analysers = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btrfs_endio_direct_write(struct bio *bio, int err)
{
struct btrfs_dio_private *dip = bio->bi_private;
struct inode *inode = dip->inode;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered = NULL;
u64 ordered_offset = dip->logical_offset;
u64 ordered_bytes = dip->bytes;
int ret;
if (err)
goto out_done;
again:
ret = btrfs_dec_test_first_ordered_pending(inode, &ordered,
&ordered_offset,
ordered_bytes, !err);
if (!ret)
goto out_test;
ordered->work.func = finish_ordered_fn;
ordered->work.flags = 0;
btrfs_queue_worker(&root->fs_info->endio_write_workers,
&ordered->work);
out_test:
/*
* our bio might span multiple ordered extents. If we haven't
* completed the accounting for the whole dio, go back and try again
*/
if (ordered_offset < dip->logical_offset + dip->bytes) {
ordered_bytes = dip->logical_offset + dip->bytes -
ordered_offset;
ordered = NULL;
goto again;
}
out_done:
bio->bi_private = dip->private;
kfree(dip);
/* If we had an error make sure to clear the uptodate flag */
if (err)
clear_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &bio->bi_flags);
dio_end_io(bio, err);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlinkTestRunner::ClearDevToolsLocalStorage() {
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_ClearDevToolsLocalStorage(routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
void *context, int len)
{ return 0; }
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __netdev_update_features(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_device *upper, *lower;
netdev_features_t features;
struct list_head *iter;
int err = -1;
ASSERT_RTNL();
features = netdev_get_wanted_features(dev);
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_fix_features)
features = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_fix_features(dev, features);
/* driver might be less strict about feature dependencies */
features = netdev_fix_features(dev, features);
/* some features can't be enabled if they're off an an upper device */
netdev_for_each_upper_dev_rcu(dev, upper, iter)
features = netdev_sync_upper_features(dev, upper, features);
if (dev->features == features)
goto sync_lower;
netdev_dbg(dev, "Features changed: %pNF -> %pNF\n",
&dev->features, &features);
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_set_features)
err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_set_features(dev, features);
else
err = 0;
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
netdev_err(dev,
"set_features() failed (%d); wanted %pNF, left %pNF\n",
err, &features, &dev->features);
/* return non-0 since some features might have changed and
* it's better to fire a spurious notification than miss it
*/
return -1;
}
sync_lower:
/* some features must be disabled on lower devices when disabled
* on an upper device (think: bonding master or bridge)
*/
netdev_for_each_lower_dev(dev, lower, iter)
netdev_sync_lower_features(dev, lower, features);
if (!err) {
netdev_features_t diff = features ^ dev->features;
if (diff & NETIF_F_RX_UDP_TUNNEL_PORT) {
/* udp_tunnel_{get,drop}_rx_info both need
* NETIF_F_RX_UDP_TUNNEL_PORT enabled on the
* device, or they won't do anything.
* Thus we need to update dev->features
* *before* calling udp_tunnel_get_rx_info,
* but *after* calling udp_tunnel_drop_rx_info.
*/
if (features & NETIF_F_RX_UDP_TUNNEL_PORT) {
dev->features = features;
udp_tunnel_get_rx_info(dev);
} else {
udp_tunnel_drop_rx_info(dev);
}
}
dev->features = features;
}
return err < 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_OFPAT_RAW_POP_MPLS(ovs_be16 ethertype,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
struct ofpbuf *out)
{
ofpact_put_POP_MPLS(out)->ethertype = ethertype;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::CloseContents(TabContents* source) {
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_) {
ClearUnloadState(source, true);
return;
}
TabContentsWrapper* source_wrapper =
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(source);
if (g_browser_process->background_printing_manager()->
OwnInitiatorTab(source_wrapper)) {
return;
}
int index = tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetWrapperIndex(source);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
NOTREACHED() << "CloseContents called for tab not in our strip";
return;
}
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->CloseTabContentsAt(
index,
TabStripModel::CLOSE_CREATE_HISTORICAL_TAB);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Chapters::Edition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x36) { // Atom ID
status = ParseAtom(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::dispatchOnInspectorBackend(const WebString& message)
{
inspectorController()->dispatchMessageFromFrontend(message);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ffs_data_reset(struct ffs_data *ffs)
{
ENTER();
ffs_data_clear(ffs);
ffs->epfiles = NULL;
ffs->raw_descs_data = NULL;
ffs->raw_descs = NULL;
ffs->raw_strings = NULL;
ffs->stringtabs = NULL;
ffs->raw_descs_length = 0;
ffs->fs_descs_count = 0;
ffs->hs_descs_count = 0;
ffs->ss_descs_count = 0;
ffs->strings_count = 0;
ffs->interfaces_count = 0;
ffs->eps_count = 0;
ffs->ev.count = 0;
ffs->state = FFS_READ_DESCRIPTORS;
ffs->setup_state = FFS_NO_SETUP;
ffs->flags = 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 49,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Size RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetBackingStoreSize() {
BackingStore* backing_store = GetBackingStore(false);
return backing_store ? backing_store->size() : gfx::Size();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len,
register const u_char *bp2, int ttl)
{
int version, type, auth_type = VRRP_AUTH_NONE; /* keep compiler happy */
const char *type_s;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
version = (bp[0] & 0xf0) >> 4;
type = bp[0] & 0x0f;
type_s = tok2str(type2str, "unknown type (%u)", type);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VRRPv%u, %s", version, type_s));
if (ttl != 255)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (ttl %u)", ttl));
if (version < 2 || version > 3 || type != VRRP_TYPE_ADVERTISEMENT)
return;
ND_TCHECK(bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", vrid %u, prio %u", bp[1], bp[2]));
ND_TCHECK(bp[5]);
if (version == 2) {
auth_type = bp[4];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", authtype %s", tok2str(auth2str, NULL, auth_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %us, length %u", bp[5], len));
} else { /* version == 3 */
uint16_t intvl = (bp[4] & 0x0f) << 8 | bp[5];
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", intvl %ucs, length %u", intvl, len));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
int naddrs = bp[3];
int i;
char c;
if (version == 2 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
vec[0].ptr = bp;
vec[0].len = len;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
if (version == 3 && ND_TTEST2(bp[0], len)) {
uint16_t cksum = nextproto4_cksum(ndo, (const struct ip *)bp2, bp,
len, len, IPPROTO_VRRP);
if (cksum)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", (bad vrrp cksum %x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[6])));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", addrs"));
if (naddrs > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%d)", naddrs));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ":"));
c = ' ';
bp += 8;
for (i = 0; i < naddrs; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
c = ',';
bp += 4;
}
if (version == 2 && auth_type == VRRP_AUTH_SIMPLE) { /* simple text password */
ND_TCHECK(bp[7]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " auth \""));
if (fn_printn(ndo, bp, 8, ndo->ndo_snapend)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vrrp]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14463/VRRP: Add a missing bounds check
In vrrp_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(HttpParams, offsetExists)
{
char *name_str;
int name_len;
zval **zparam, *zparams;
if (SUCCESS != zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &name_str, &name_len)) {
return;
}
zparams = php_http_ztyp(IS_ARRAY, zend_read_property(php_http_params_class_entry, getThis(), ZEND_STRL("params"), 0 TSRMLS_CC));
if (SUCCESS == zend_symtable_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(zparams), name_str, name_len + 1, (void *) &zparam)) {
RETVAL_BOOL(Z_TYPE_PP(zparam) != IS_NULL);
} else {
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&zparams);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 93,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillManager::IsFormNonSecure(const FormData& form) const {
return !client_->IsContextSecure() ||
(form.action.is_valid() && form.action.SchemeIs("http"));
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::LimitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_limitedToOnlyOneAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::LimitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bus_activation_reload (BusActivation *activation,
const DBusString *address,
DBusList **directories,
DBusError *error)
{
DBusList *link;
char *dir;
if (activation->server_address != NULL)
dbus_free (activation->server_address);
if (!_dbus_string_copy_data (address, &activation->server_address))
{
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
if (activation->entries != NULL)
_dbus_hash_table_unref (activation->entries);
activation->entries = _dbus_hash_table_new (DBUS_HASH_STRING, NULL,
(DBusFreeFunction)bus_activation_entry_unref);
if (activation->entries == NULL)
{
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
if (activation->directories != NULL)
_dbus_hash_table_unref (activation->directories);
activation->directories = _dbus_hash_table_new (DBUS_HASH_STRING, NULL,
(DBusFreeFunction)bus_service_directory_unref);
if (activation->directories == NULL)
{
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
link = _dbus_list_get_first_link (directories);
while (link != NULL)
{
BusServiceDirectory *s_dir;
dir = _dbus_strdup ((const char *) link->data);
if (!dir)
{
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
s_dir = dbus_new0 (BusServiceDirectory, 1);
if (!s_dir)
{
dbus_free (dir);
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
s_dir->refcount = 1;
s_dir->dir_c = dir;
s_dir->entries = _dbus_hash_table_new (DBUS_HASH_STRING, NULL,
(DBusFreeFunction)bus_activation_entry_unref);
if (!s_dir->entries)
{
bus_service_directory_unref (s_dir);
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
if (!_dbus_hash_table_insert_string (activation->directories, s_dir->dir_c, s_dir))
{
bus_service_directory_unref (s_dir);
BUS_SET_OOM (error);
goto failed;
}
/* only fail on OOM, it is ok if we can't read the directory */
if (!update_directory (activation, s_dir, error))
{
if (dbus_error_has_name (error, DBUS_ERROR_NO_MEMORY))
goto failed;
else
dbus_error_free (error);
}
link = _dbus_list_get_next_link (directories, link);
}
return TRUE;
failed:
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Debugger::disable()
{
if (--m_enableCount)
return;
DCHECK(enabled());
clearBreakpoints();
m_debuggerScript.Reset();
m_debuggerContext.Reset();
allAsyncTasksCanceled();
v8::Debug::SetDebugEventListener(m_isolate, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int intel_pmu_cpu_prepare(int cpu)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu);
if (!cpu_has_ht_siblings())
return NOTIFY_OK;
cpuc->per_core = kzalloc_node(sizeof(struct intel_percore),
GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
if (!cpuc->per_core)
return NOTIFY_BAD;
raw_spin_lock_init(&cpuc->per_core->lock);
cpuc->per_core->core_id = -1;
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,808
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ram_save_page(QEMUFile *f, RAMBlock* block, ram_addr_t offset,
bool last_stage)
{
int bytes_sent;
int cont;
ram_addr_t current_addr;
MemoryRegion *mr = block->mr;
uint8_t *p;
int ret;
bool send_async = true;
cont = (block == last_sent_block) ? RAM_SAVE_FLAG_CONTINUE : 0;
p = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(mr) + offset;
/* In doubt sent page as normal */
bytes_sent = -1;
ret = ram_control_save_page(f, block->offset,
offset, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE, &bytes_sent);
XBZRLE_cache_lock();
current_addr = block->offset + offset;
if (ret != RAM_SAVE_CONTROL_NOT_SUPP) {
if (ret != RAM_SAVE_CONTROL_DELAYED) {
if (bytes_sent > 0) {
acct_info.norm_pages++;
} else if (bytes_sent == 0) {
acct_info.dup_pages++;
}
}
} else if (is_zero_range(p, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
acct_info.dup_pages++;
bytes_sent = save_block_hdr(f, block, offset, cont,
RAM_SAVE_FLAG_COMPRESS);
qemu_put_byte(f, 0);
bytes_sent++;
/* Must let xbzrle know, otherwise a previous (now 0'd) cached
* page would be stale
*/
xbzrle_cache_zero_page(current_addr);
} else if (!ram_bulk_stage && migrate_use_xbzrle()) {
bytes_sent = save_xbzrle_page(f, &p, current_addr, block,
offset, cont, last_stage);
if (!last_stage) {
/* Can't send this cached data async, since the cache page
* might get updated before it gets to the wire
*/
send_async = false;
}
}
/* XBZRLE overflow or normal page */
if (bytes_sent == -1) {
bytes_sent = save_block_hdr(f, block, offset, cont, RAM_SAVE_FLAG_PAGE);
if (send_async) {
qemu_put_buffer_async(f, p, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
} else {
qemu_put_buffer(f, p, TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
}
bytes_sent += TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
acct_info.norm_pages++;
}
XBZRLE_cache_unlock();
return bytes_sent;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(guard_selection_t *gs)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
entry_guard_set_filtered_flags(options, gs, guard);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean irssi_ssl_init(void)
{
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
if(!ssl_ctx)
{
g_error("Initialization of the SSL library failed");
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct pppox_sock *pppoe_get_idx(struct pppoe_net *pn, loff_t pos)
{
struct pppox_sock *po;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < PPPOE_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
po = pn->hash_table[i];
while (po) {
if (!pos--)
goto out;
po = po->next;
}
}
out:
return po;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsPS(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 4)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"%!",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
if (memcmp(magick,"\004%!",3) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/715
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ion_handle *ion_import_dma_buf(struct ion_client *client,
struct dma_buf *dmabuf)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer;
struct ion_handle *handle;
int ret;
/* if this memory came from ion */
if (dmabuf->ops != &dma_buf_ops) {
pr_err("%s: can not import dmabuf from another exporter\n",
__func__);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
buffer = dmabuf->priv;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
/* if a handle exists for this buffer just take a reference to it */
handle = ion_handle_lookup(client, buffer);
if (!IS_ERR(handle)) {
ion_handle_get(handle);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
goto end;
}
handle = ion_handle_create(client, buffer);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
goto end;
}
ret = ion_handle_add(client, handle);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
if (ret) {
ion_handle_put(handle);
handle = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
end:
return handle;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lxc_clear_config_network(struct lxc_conf *c)
{
struct lxc_list *it,*next;
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it, &c->network, next) {
lxc_remove_nic(it);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xml2_close_cb(void *context)
{
(void)context; /* UNUSED */
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 61,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionTtsSpeakFunction::SpeechFinished() {
error_ = utterance_->error();
bool success = error_.empty();
SendResponse(success);
Release(); // Balanced in RunImpl().
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TextIterator::TextIterator(const Range* r, TextIteratorBehavior behavior)
: m_startContainer(0)
, m_startOffset(0)
, m_endContainer(0)
, m_endOffset(0)
, m_positionNode(0)
, m_textCharacters(0)
, m_textLength(0)
, m_remainingTextBox(0)
, m_firstLetterText(0)
, m_sortedTextBoxesPosition(0)
, m_emitsCharactersBetweenAllVisiblePositions(behavior & TextIteratorEmitsCharactersBetweenAllVisiblePositions)
, m_entersTextControls(behavior & TextIteratorEntersTextControls)
, m_emitsTextWithoutTranscoding(behavior & TextIteratorEmitsTextsWithoutTranscoding)
, m_emitsOriginalText(behavior & TextIteratorEmitsOriginalText)
, m_handledFirstLetter(false)
, m_ignoresStyleVisibility(behavior & TextIteratorIgnoresStyleVisibility)
, m_emitsObjectReplacementCharacters(behavior & TextIteratorEmitsObjectReplacementCharacters)
, m_stopsOnFormControls(behavior & TextIteratorStopsOnFormControls)
, m_shouldStop(false)
, m_emitsImageAltText(behavior & TextIteratorEmitsImageAltText)
{
if (!r)
return;
Node* startContainer = r->startContainer();
if (!startContainer)
return;
int startOffset = r->startOffset();
Node* endContainer = r->endContainer();
int endOffset = r->endOffset();
ASSERT(r->boundaryPointsValid());
m_startContainer = startContainer;
m_startOffset = startOffset;
m_endContainer = endContainer;
m_endOffset = endOffset;
m_node = r->firstNode();
if (!m_node)
return;
setUpFullyClippedStack(m_fullyClippedStack, m_node);
m_offset = m_node == m_startContainer ? m_startOffset : 0;
m_handledNode = false;
m_handledChildren = false;
m_pastEndNode = nextInPreOrderCrossingShadowBoundaries(endContainer, endOffset);
m_needsAnotherNewline = false;
m_textBox = 0;
m_hasEmitted = false;
m_lastTextNode = 0;
m_lastTextNodeEndedWithCollapsedSpace = false;
m_lastCharacter = 0;
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_positionNode = m_node;
#endif
advance();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool isObservable(JSTestActiveDOMObject* jsTestActiveDOMObject)
{
if (jsTestActiveDOMObject->hasCustomProperties())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageInfo::RecordPasswordReuseEvent() {
if (!password_protection_service_) {
return;
}
if (safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE) {
safe_browsing::LogWarningAction(
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::SHOWN,
safe_browsing::LoginReputationClientRequest::PasswordReuseEvent::
SIGN_IN_PASSWORD,
password_protection_service_->GetSyncAccountType());
} else {
safe_browsing::LogWarningAction(
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::SHOWN,
safe_browsing::LoginReputationClientRequest::PasswordReuseEvent::
ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD,
password_protection_service_->GetSyncAccountType());
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 1
| 172,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_find_common_endpoints_reverse(struct usb_host_interface *alt,
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **bulk_in,
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **bulk_out,
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **int_in,
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **int_out)
{
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd;
int i;
if (bulk_in)
*bulk_in = NULL;
if (bulk_out)
*bulk_out = NULL;
if (int_in)
*int_in = NULL;
if (int_out)
*int_out = NULL;
for (i = alt->desc.bNumEndpoints - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
epd = &alt->endpoint[i].desc;
if (match_endpoint(epd, bulk_in, bulk_out, int_in, int_out))
return 0;
}
return -ENXIO;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void NORETURN diagnose_missing_default(const char *def)
{
unsigned char sha1[20];
int flags;
const char *refname;
refname = resolve_ref_unsafe(def, 0, sha1, &flags);
if (!refname || !(flags & REF_ISSYMREF) || (flags & REF_ISBROKEN))
die(_("your current branch appears to be broken"));
skip_prefix(refname, "refs/heads/", &refname);
die(_("your current branch '%s' does not have any commits yet"),
refname);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_ioc_bulkstat(
xfs_mount_t *mp,
unsigned int cmd,
void __user *arg)
{
xfs_fsop_bulkreq_t bulkreq;
int count; /* # of records returned */
xfs_ino_t inlast; /* last inode number */
int done;
int error;
/* done = 1 if there are more stats to get and if bulkstat */
/* should be called again (unused here, but used in dmapi) */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return -XFS_ERROR(EIO);
if (copy_from_user(&bulkreq, arg, sizeof(xfs_fsop_bulkreq_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
if (copy_from_user(&inlast, bulkreq.lastip, sizeof(__s64)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
if ((count = bulkreq.icount) <= 0)
return -XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
if (bulkreq.ubuffer == NULL)
return -XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FSINUMBERS)
error = xfs_inumbers(mp, &inlast, &count,
bulkreq.ubuffer, xfs_inumbers_fmt);
else if (cmd == XFS_IOC_FSBULKSTAT_SINGLE)
error = xfs_bulkstat_single(mp, &inlast,
bulkreq.ubuffer, &done);
else /* XFS_IOC_FSBULKSTAT */
error = xfs_bulkstat(mp, &inlast, &count, xfs_bulkstat_one,
sizeof(xfs_bstat_t), bulkreq.ubuffer,
&done);
if (error)
return -error;
if (bulkreq.ocount != NULL) {
if (copy_to_user(bulkreq.lastip, &inlast,
sizeof(xfs_ino_t)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
if (copy_to_user(bulkreq.ocount, &count, sizeof(count)))
return -XFS_ERROR(EFAULT);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int send_reply(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct genlmsghdr *genlhdr = nlmsg_data(nlmsg_hdr(skb));
void *reply = genlmsg_data(genlhdr);
int rc;
rc = genlmsg_end(skb, reply);
if (rc < 0) {
nlmsg_free(skb);
return rc;
}
return genlmsg_reply(skb, info);
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 26,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECL_PIOCTL(PGetFID)
{
AFS_STATCNT(PGetFID);
if (!avc)
return EINVAL;
if (afs_pd_putBytes(aout, &avc->f.fid, sizeof(struct VenusFid)) != 0)
return EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AlarmManager* TestExtensionSystem::alarm_manager() {
return alarm_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::setURL(const KURL& url)
{
setHref(AtomicString(url.getString()));
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int unmap_and_move_huge_page(new_page_t get_new_page,
free_page_t put_new_page, unsigned long private,
struct page *hpage, int force,
enum migrate_mode mode)
{
int rc = -EAGAIN;
int *result = NULL;
int page_was_mapped = 0;
struct page *new_hpage;
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = NULL;
/*
* Movability of hugepages depends on architectures and hugepage size.
* This check is necessary because some callers of hugepage migration
* like soft offline and memory hotremove don't walk through page
* tables or check whether the hugepage is pmd-based or not before
* kicking migration.
*/
if (!hugepage_migration_supported(page_hstate(hpage))) {
putback_active_hugepage(hpage);
return -ENOSYS;
}
new_hpage = get_new_page(hpage, private, &result);
if (!new_hpage)
return -ENOMEM;
if (!trylock_page(hpage)) {
if (!force || mode != MIGRATE_SYNC)
goto out;
lock_page(hpage);
}
if (PageAnon(hpage))
anon_vma = page_get_anon_vma(hpage);
if (unlikely(!trylock_page(new_hpage)))
goto put_anon;
if (page_mapped(hpage)) {
try_to_unmap(hpage,
TTU_MIGRATION|TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK|TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS);
page_was_mapped = 1;
}
if (!page_mapped(hpage))
rc = move_to_new_page(new_hpage, hpage, mode);
if (page_was_mapped)
remove_migration_ptes(hpage,
rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS ? new_hpage : hpage);
unlock_page(new_hpage);
put_anon:
if (anon_vma)
put_anon_vma(anon_vma);
if (rc == MIGRATEPAGE_SUCCESS) {
hugetlb_cgroup_migrate(hpage, new_hpage);
put_new_page = NULL;
}
unlock_page(hpage);
out:
if (rc != -EAGAIN)
putback_active_hugepage(hpage);
/*
* If migration was not successful and there's a freeing callback, use
* it. Otherwise, put_page() will drop the reference grabbed during
* isolation.
*/
if (put_new_page)
put_new_page(new_hpage, private);
else
putback_active_hugepage(new_hpage);
if (result) {
if (rc)
*result = rc;
else
*result = page_to_nid(new_hpage);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: mm: migrate dirty page without clear_page_dirty_for_io etc
clear_page_dirty_for_io() has accumulated writeback and memcg subtleties
since v2.6.16 first introduced page migration; and the set_page_dirty()
which completed its migration of PageDirty, later had to be moderated to
__set_page_dirty_nobuffers(); then PageSwapBacked had to skip that too.
No actual problems seen with this procedure recently, but if you look into
what the clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)+set_page_dirty(newpage) is actually
achieving, it turns out to be nothing more than moving the PageDirty flag,
and its NR_FILE_DIRTY stat from one zone to another.
It would be good to avoid a pile of irrelevant decrementations and
incrementations, and improper event counting, and unnecessary descent of
the radix_tree under tree_lock (to set the PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY which
radix_tree_replace_slot() left in place anyway).
Do the NR_FILE_DIRTY movement, like the other stats movements, while
interrupts still disabled in migrate_page_move_mapping(); and don't even
bother if the zone is the same. Do the PageDirty movement there under
tree_lock too, where old page is frozen and newpage not yet visible:
bearing in mind that as soon as newpage becomes visible in radix_tree, an
un-page-locked set_page_dirty() might interfere (or perhaps that's just
not possible: anything doing so should already hold an additional
reference to the old page, preventing its migration; but play safe).
But we do still need to transfer PageDirty in migrate_page_copy(), for
those who don't go the mapping route through migrate_page_move_mapping().
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 54,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void i2c_deblock_gpio_cfg(void)
{
/* set I2C bus 1 deblocking GPIOs input, but 0 value for open drain */
qrio_gpio_direction_input(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1);
qrio_gpio_direction_input(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1);
qrio_set_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SCL1, 0);
qrio_set_gpio(DEBLOCK_PORT1, DEBLOCK_SDA1, 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionService::EnableExtension(const std::string& extension_id) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (IsExtensionEnabled(extension_id))
return;
extension_prefs_->SetExtensionState(extension_id, Extension::ENABLED);
const Extension* extension =
GetExtensionByIdInternal(extension_id, false, true, false);
if (!extension)
return;
extensions_.push_back(make_scoped_refptr(extension));
ExtensionList::iterator iter = std::find(disabled_extensions_.begin(),
disabled_extensions_.end(),
extension);
disabled_extensions_.erase(iter);
extension_prefs_->SetBrowserActionVisibility(extension, true);
NotifyExtensionLoaded(extension);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, set)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, SNMP_CMD_SET, (-1));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_run_handler_expand (void) {
uzbl.net.useragent = "Test uzbl uzr agent";
run_handler("sync_spawn echo @useragent", "result:");
assert(uzbl.comm.sync_stdout);
/* the result should begin with the standard handler arguments */
gchar *rest = assert_sync_beginswith_stdarg();
/* the rest of the result should be the arguments passed to run_handler. */
/* the user-specified arguments to the handler should have been expanded */
g_assert_cmpstr("result: Test uzbl uzr agent\n", ==, rest);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetBackground(const SkBitmap& background) {
Send(new ViewMsg_SetBackground(GetRoutingID(), background));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 vmx_read_l1_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 host_tsc)
{
u64 tsc_offset;
tsc_offset = is_guest_mode(vcpu) ?
to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset :
vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET);
return host_tsc + tsc_offset;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMDataStoreHandle::DOMDataStoreHandle(bool initialize)
: m_store(adoptPtr(!initialize ? 0 : new ScopedDOMDataStore()))
{
if (m_store)
V8PerIsolateData::current()->registerDOMDataStore(m_store.get());
}
Commit Message: [V8] ASSERT that removeAllDOMObjects() is called only on worker threads
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100046
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
This function is called only on worker threads. We should ASSERT that
fact and remove the dead code that tries to handle the main thread
case.
* bindings/v8/V8DOMMap.cpp:
(WebCore::removeAllDOMObjects):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@132156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserTabStripController::CloseTab(int model_index,
CloseTabSource source) {
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
tabstrip_->PrepareForCloseAt(model_index, source);
model_->CloseTabContentsAt(model_index,
TabStripModel::CLOSE_USER_GESTURE |
TabStripModel::CLOSE_CREATE_HISTORICAL_TAB);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_check_deleg(struct nfs4_client *cl, struct nfsd4_open *open,
struct nfs4_delegation **dp)
{
int flags;
__be32 status = nfserr_bad_stateid;
struct nfs4_delegation *deleg;
deleg = find_deleg_stateid(cl, &open->op_delegate_stateid);
if (deleg == NULL)
goto out;
flags = share_access_to_flags(open->op_share_access);
status = nfs4_check_delegmode(deleg, flags);
if (status) {
nfs4_put_stid(&deleg->dl_stid);
goto out;
}
*dp = deleg;
out:
if (!nfsd4_is_deleg_cur(open))
return nfs_ok;
if (status)
return status;
open->op_openowner->oo_flags |= NFS4_OO_CONFIRMED;
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pfkey_send_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_tmpl *t, struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
struct sadb_address *addr;
struct sadb_x_policy *pol;
int sockaddr_size;
int size;
struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *xfrm_ctx;
int ctx_size = 0;
sockaddr_size = pfkey_sockaddr_size(x->props.family);
if (!sockaddr_size)
return -EINVAL;
size = sizeof(struct sadb_msg) +
(sizeof(struct sadb_address) * 2) +
(sockaddr_size * 2) +
sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy);
if (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_AH)
size += count_ah_combs(t);
else if (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_ESP)
size += count_esp_combs(t);
if ((xfrm_ctx = x->security)) {
ctx_size = PFKEY_ALIGN8(xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
size += sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size;
}
skb = alloc_skb(size + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_ACQUIRE;
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = pfkey_proto2satype(x->id.proto);
hdr->sadb_msg_len = size / sizeof(uint64_t);
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = x->km.seq = get_acqseq();
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = 0;
/* src address */
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC;
addr->sadb_address_proto = 0;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen =
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&x->props.saddr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
x->props.family);
if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)
BUG();
/* dst address */
addr = (struct sadb_address*) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size);
addr->sadb_address_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_address)+sockaddr_size)/
sizeof(uint64_t);
addr->sadb_address_exttype = SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST;
addr->sadb_address_proto = 0;
addr->sadb_address_reserved = 0;
addr->sadb_address_prefixlen =
pfkey_sockaddr_fill(&x->id.daddr, 0,
(struct sockaddr *) (addr + 1),
x->props.family);
if (!addr->sadb_address_prefixlen)
BUG();
pol = (struct sadb_x_policy *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy));
pol->sadb_x_policy_len = sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy)/sizeof(uint64_t);
pol->sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY;
pol->sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC;
pol->sadb_x_policy_dir = XFRM_POLICY_OUT + 1;
pol->sadb_x_policy_reserved = 0;
pol->sadb_x_policy_id = xp->index;
pol->sadb_x_policy_priority = xp->priority;
/* Set sadb_comb's. */
if (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_AH)
dump_ah_combs(skb, t);
else if (x->id.proto == IPPROTO_ESP)
dump_esp_combs(skb, t);
/* security context */
if (xfrm_ctx) {
sec_ctx = (struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *) skb_put(skb,
sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size);
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_len =
(sizeof(struct sadb_x_sec_ctx) + ctx_size) / sizeof(uint64_t);
sec_ctx->sadb_x_sec_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_doi = xfrm_ctx->ctx_doi;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_alg = xfrm_ctx->ctx_alg;
sec_ctx->sadb_x_ctx_len = xfrm_ctx->ctx_len;
memcpy(sec_ctx + 1, xfrm_ctx->ctx_str,
xfrm_ctx->ctx_len);
}
return pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_REGISTERED, NULL, xs_net(x));
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_root_to_dirty_list(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
spin_lock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock);
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ROOT_TRACK_DIRTY, &root->state) &&
list_empty(&root->dirty_list)) {
list_add(&root->dirty_list,
&root->fs_info->dirty_cowonly_roots);
}
spin_unlock(&root->fs_info->trans_lock);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 45,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<DictionaryValue*>* GetAppInfoFromExtensions(
const ExtensionSet* extensions,
ExtensionService* ext_service) {
std::vector<DictionaryValue*>* apps_list =
new std::vector<DictionaryValue*>();
for (ExtensionSet::const_iterator ext = extensions->begin();
ext != extensions->end(); ++ext) {
if ((*ext)->is_app()) {
DictionaryValue* app_info = new DictionaryValue();
AppLauncherHandler::CreateAppInfo(*ext, NULL, ext_service, app_info);
app_info->SetBoolean("is_component_extension",
(*ext)->location() == extensions::Extension::COMPONENT);
int launch_type;
const char* kLaunchType = "launch_type";
if (!app_info->GetInteger(kLaunchType, &launch_type)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Can't get integer from key " << kLaunchType;
continue;
}
if (launch_type == extensions::ExtensionPrefs::LAUNCH_PINNED) {
app_info->SetString(kLaunchType, "pinned");
} else if (launch_type == extensions::ExtensionPrefs::LAUNCH_REGULAR) {
app_info->SetString(kLaunchType, "regular");
} else if (launch_type == extensions::ExtensionPrefs::LAUNCH_FULLSCREEN) {
app_info->SetString(kLaunchType, "fullscreen");
} else if (launch_type == extensions::ExtensionPrefs::LAUNCH_WINDOW) {
app_info->SetString(kLaunchType, "window");
} else {
app_info->SetString(kLaunchType, "unknown");
}
apps_list->push_back(app_info);
}
}
return apps_list;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebLocalFrameImpl::~WebLocalFrameImpl() {
DCHECK(!frame_widget_);
g_frame_count--;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,435
|
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