instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *inpic)
{
KerndeintContext *kerndeint = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = inlink->dst->outputs[0];
AVFrame *outpic;
const uint8_t *prvp; ///< Previous field's pixel line number n
const uint8_t *prvpp; ///< Previous field's pixel line number (n - 1)
const uint8_t *prvpn; ///< Previous field's pixel line number (n + 1)
const uint8_t *prvppp; ///< Previous field's pixel line number (n - 2)
const uint8_t *prvpnn; ///< Previous field's pixel line number (n + 2)
const uint8_t *prvp4p; ///< Previous field's pixel line number (n - 4)
const uint8_t *prvp4n; ///< Previous field's pixel line number (n + 4)
const uint8_t *srcp; ///< Current field's pixel line number n
const uint8_t *srcpp; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n - 1)
const uint8_t *srcpn; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n + 1)
const uint8_t *srcppp; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n - 2)
const uint8_t *srcpnn; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n + 2)
const uint8_t *srcp3p; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n - 3)
const uint8_t *srcp3n; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n + 3)
const uint8_t *srcp4p; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n - 4)
const uint8_t *srcp4n; ///< Current field's pixel line number (n + 4)
uint8_t *dstp, *dstp_saved;
const uint8_t *srcp_saved;
int src_linesize, psrc_linesize, dst_linesize, bwidth;
int x, y, plane, val, hi, lo, g, h, n = kerndeint->frame++;
double valf;
const int thresh = kerndeint->thresh;
const int order = kerndeint->order;
const int map = kerndeint->map;
const int sharp = kerndeint->sharp;
const int twoway = kerndeint->twoway;
const int is_packed_rgb = kerndeint->is_packed_rgb;
outpic = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!outpic) {
av_frame_free(&inpic);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(outpic, inpic);
outpic->interlaced_frame = 0;
for (plane = 0; inpic->data[plane] && plane < 4; plane++) {
h = plane == 0 ? inlink->h : FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, kerndeint->vsub);
bwidth = kerndeint->tmp_bwidth[plane];
srcp = srcp_saved = inpic->data[plane];
src_linesize = inpic->linesize[plane];
psrc_linesize = kerndeint->tmp_linesize[plane];
dstp = dstp_saved = outpic->data[plane];
dst_linesize = outpic->linesize[plane];
srcp = srcp_saved + (1 - order) * src_linesize;
dstp = dstp_saved + (1 - order) * dst_linesize;
for (y = 0; y < h; y += 2) {
memcpy(dstp, srcp, bwidth);
srcp += 2 * src_linesize;
dstp += 2 * dst_linesize;
}
memcpy(dstp_saved + order * dst_linesize, srcp_saved + (1 - order) * src_linesize, bwidth);
memcpy(dstp_saved + (2 + order ) * dst_linesize, srcp_saved + (3 - order) * src_linesize, bwidth);
memcpy(dstp_saved + (h - 2 + order) * dst_linesize, srcp_saved + (h - 1 - order) * src_linesize, bwidth);
memcpy(dstp_saved + (h - 4 + order) * dst_linesize, srcp_saved + (h - 3 - order) * src_linesize, bwidth);
/* For the other field choose adaptively between using the previous field
or the interpolant from the current field. */
prvp = kerndeint->tmp_data[plane] + 5 * psrc_linesize - (1 - order) * psrc_linesize;
prvpp = prvp - psrc_linesize;
prvppp = prvp - 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvp4p = prvp - 4 * psrc_linesize;
prvpn = prvp + psrc_linesize;
prvpnn = prvp + 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvp4n = prvp + 4 * psrc_linesize;
srcp = srcp_saved + 5 * src_linesize - (1 - order) * src_linesize;
srcpp = srcp - src_linesize;
srcppp = srcp - 2 * src_linesize;
srcp3p = srcp - 3 * src_linesize;
srcp4p = srcp - 4 * src_linesize;
srcpn = srcp + src_linesize;
srcpnn = srcp + 2 * src_linesize;
srcp3n = srcp + 3 * src_linesize;
srcp4n = srcp + 4 * src_linesize;
dstp = dstp_saved + 5 * dst_linesize - (1 - order) * dst_linesize;
for (y = 5 - (1 - order); y <= h - 5 - (1 - order); y += 2) {
for (x = 0; x < bwidth; x++) {
if (thresh == 0 || n == 0 ||
(abs((int)prvp[x] - (int)srcp[x]) > thresh) ||
(abs((int)prvpp[x] - (int)srcpp[x]) > thresh) ||
(abs((int)prvpn[x] - (int)srcpn[x]) > thresh)) {
if (map) {
g = x & ~3;
if (is_packed_rgb) {
AV_WB32(dstp + g, 0xffffffff);
x = g + 3;
} else if (inlink->format == AV_PIX_FMT_YUYV422) {
AV_WB32(dstp + g, 0xeb80eb80);
x = g + 3;
} else {
dstp[x] = plane == 0 ? 235 : 128;
}
} else {
if (is_packed_rgb) {
hi = 255;
lo = 0;
} else if (inlink->format == AV_PIX_FMT_YUYV422) {
hi = x & 1 ? 240 : 235;
lo = 16;
} else {
hi = plane == 0 ? 235 : 240;
lo = 16;
}
if (sharp) {
if (twoway) {
valf = + 0.526 * ((int)srcpp[x] + (int)srcpn[x])
+ 0.170 * ((int)srcp[x] + (int)prvp[x])
- 0.116 * ((int)srcppp[x] + (int)srcpnn[x] + (int)prvppp[x] + (int)prvpnn[x])
- 0.026 * ((int)srcp3p[x] + (int)srcp3n[x])
+ 0.031 * ((int)srcp4p[x] + (int)srcp4n[x] + (int)prvp4p[x] + (int)prvp4n[x]);
} else {
valf = + 0.526 * ((int)srcpp[x] + (int)srcpn[x])
+ 0.170 * ((int)prvp[x])
- 0.116 * ((int)prvppp[x] + (int)prvpnn[x])
- 0.026 * ((int)srcp3p[x] + (int)srcp3n[x])
+ 0.031 * ((int)prvp4p[x] + (int)prvp4p[x]);
}
dstp[x] = av_clip(valf, lo, hi);
} else {
if (twoway) {
val = (8 * ((int)srcpp[x] + (int)srcpn[x]) + 2 * ((int)srcp[x] + (int)prvp[x])
- (int)(srcppp[x]) - (int)(srcpnn[x])
- (int)(prvppp[x]) - (int)(prvpnn[x])) >> 4;
} else {
val = (8 * ((int)srcpp[x] + (int)srcpn[x]) + 2 * ((int)prvp[x])
- (int)(prvppp[x]) - (int)(prvpnn[x])) >> 4;
}
dstp[x] = av_clip(val, lo, hi);
}
}
} else {
dstp[x] = srcp[x];
}
}
prvp += 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvpp += 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvppp += 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvpn += 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvpnn += 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvp4p += 2 * psrc_linesize;
prvp4n += 2 * psrc_linesize;
srcp += 2 * src_linesize;
srcpp += 2 * src_linesize;
srcppp += 2 * src_linesize;
srcp3p += 2 * src_linesize;
srcp4p += 2 * src_linesize;
srcpn += 2 * src_linesize;
srcpnn += 2 * src_linesize;
srcp3n += 2 * src_linesize;
srcp4n += 2 * src_linesize;
dstp += 2 * dst_linesize;
}
srcp = inpic->data[plane];
dstp = kerndeint->tmp_data[plane];
av_image_copy_plane(dstp, psrc_linesize, srcp, src_linesize, bwidth, h);
}
av_frame_free(&inpic);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, outpic);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_bit_string(const u8 * inbuf, size_t inlen, void *outbuf,
size_t outlen, int invert)
{
const u8 *in = inbuf;
u8 *out = (u8 *) outbuf;
int zero_bits = *in & 0x07;
size_t octets_left = inlen - 1;
int i, count = 0;
memset(outbuf, 0, outlen);
in++;
if (outlen < octets_left)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
if (inlen < 1)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
while (octets_left) {
/* 1st octet of input: ABCDEFGH, where A is the MSB */
/* 1st octet of output: HGFEDCBA, where A is the LSB */
/* first bit in bit string is the LSB in first resulting octet */
int bits_to_go;
*out = 0;
if (octets_left == 1)
bits_to_go = 8 - zero_bits;
else
bits_to_go = 8;
if (invert)
for (i = 0; i < bits_to_go; i++) {
*out |= ((*in >> (7 - i)) & 1) << i;
}
else {
*out = *in;
}
out++;
in++;
octets_left--;
count++;
}
return (count * 8) - zero_bits;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryAndObserve(
const base::Optional<url::Origin>& origin,
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryRequest default_factory_request) {
bool bypass_redirect_checks = CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryInternal(
origin, std::move(default_factory_request));
if (IsOutOfProcessNetworkService() &&
(!network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_ ||
network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_.encountered_error())) {
StoragePartition* storage_partition = BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), GetSiteInstance());
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryParamsPtr params =
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryParams::New();
params->process_id = GetProcess()->GetID();
storage_partition->GetNetworkContext()->CreateURLLoaderFactory(
mojo::MakeRequest(&network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_),
std::move(params));
network_service_connection_error_handler_holder_
.set_connection_error_handler(base::BindOnce(
&RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateSubresourceLoaderFactories,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
return bypass_redirect_checks;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j, err;
err = bpf_prog_calc_tag(env->prog);
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose(env, "BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose(env, "invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose(env,
"unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose(env, "fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
err = check_map_prog_compatibility(env, map, env->prog);
if (err) {
fdput(f);
return err;
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_used_maps()
*/
map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_STORAGE &&
bpf_cgroup_storage_assign(env->prog, map)) {
verbose(env,
"only one cgroup storage is allowed\n");
fdput(f);
return -EBUSY;
}
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
continue;
}
/* Basic sanity check before we invest more work here. */
if (!bpf_opcode_in_insntable(insn->code)) {
verbose(env, "unknown opcode %02x\n", insn->code);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip6mr_mfc_add(struct net *net, struct mr6_table *mrt,
struct mf6cctl *mfc, int mrtsock, int parent)
{
bool found = false;
int line;
struct mfc6_cache *uc, *c;
unsigned char ttls[MAXMIFS];
int i;
if (mfc->mf6cc_parent >= MAXMIFS)
return -ENFILE;
memset(ttls, 255, MAXMIFS);
for (i = 0; i < MAXMIFS; i++) {
if (IF_ISSET(i, &mfc->mf6cc_ifset))
ttls[i] = 1;
}
line = MFC6_HASH(&mfc->mf6cc_mcastgrp.sin6_addr, &mfc->mf6cc_origin.sin6_addr);
list_for_each_entry(c, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[line], list) {
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_origin, &mfc->mf6cc_origin.sin6_addr) &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_mcastgrp,
&mfc->mf6cc_mcastgrp.sin6_addr) &&
(parent == -1 || parent == mfc->mf6cc_parent)) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (found) {
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
c->mf6c_parent = mfc->mf6cc_parent;
ip6mr_update_thresholds(mrt, c, ttls);
if (!mrtsock)
c->mfc_flags |= MFC_STATIC;
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
mr6_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_NEWROUTE);
return 0;
}
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&mfc->mf6cc_mcastgrp.sin6_addr) &&
!ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&mfc->mf6cc_mcastgrp.sin6_addr))
return -EINVAL;
c = ip6mr_cache_alloc();
if (!c)
return -ENOMEM;
c->mf6c_origin = mfc->mf6cc_origin.sin6_addr;
c->mf6c_mcastgrp = mfc->mf6cc_mcastgrp.sin6_addr;
c->mf6c_parent = mfc->mf6cc_parent;
ip6mr_update_thresholds(mrt, c, ttls);
if (!mrtsock)
c->mfc_flags |= MFC_STATIC;
write_lock_bh(&mrt_lock);
list_add(&c->list, &mrt->mfc6_cache_array[line]);
write_unlock_bh(&mrt_lock);
/*
* Check to see if we resolved a queued list. If so we
* need to send on the frames and tidy up.
*/
found = false;
spin_lock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
list_for_each_entry(uc, &mrt->mfc6_unres_queue, list) {
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&uc->mf6c_origin, &c->mf6c_origin) &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&uc->mf6c_mcastgrp, &c->mf6c_mcastgrp)) {
list_del(&uc->list);
atomic_dec(&mrt->cache_resolve_queue_len);
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (list_empty(&mrt->mfc6_unres_queue))
del_timer(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer);
spin_unlock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
if (found) {
ip6mr_cache_resolve(net, mrt, uc, c);
ip6mr_cache_free(uc);
}
mr6_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_NEWROUTE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 93,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pfkey_add(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct xfrm_state *x;
int err;
struct km_event c;
x = pfkey_msg2xfrm_state(net, hdr, ext_hdrs);
if (IS_ERR(x))
return PTR_ERR(x);
xfrm_state_hold(x);
if (hdr->sadb_msg_type == SADB_ADD)
err = xfrm_state_add(x);
else
err = xfrm_state_update(x);
xfrm_audit_state_add(x, err ? 0 : 1,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current), 0);
if (err < 0) {
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
__xfrm_state_put(x);
goto out;
}
if (hdr->sadb_msg_type == SADB_ADD)
c.event = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
else
c.event = XFRM_MSG_UPDSA;
c.seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq;
c.portid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid;
km_state_notify(x, &c);
out:
xfrm_state_put(x);
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smp_fetch_stcode(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct http_txn *txn;
char *ptr;
int len;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
txn = smp->strm->txn;
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)
return 0;
len = txn->rsp.sl.st.c_l;
ptr = txn->rsp.chn->buf->p + txn->rsp.sl.st.c;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_SINT;
smp->data.u.sint = __strl2ui(ptr, len);
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: update_port_config(struct ofconn *ofconn, struct ofport *port,
enum ofputil_port_config config,
enum ofputil_port_config mask)
{
enum ofputil_port_config toggle = (config ^ port->pp.config) & mask;
if (toggle & OFPUTIL_PC_PORT_DOWN
&& (config & OFPUTIL_PC_PORT_DOWN
? netdev_turn_flags_off(port->netdev, NETDEV_UP, NULL)
: netdev_turn_flags_on(port->netdev, NETDEV_UP, NULL))) {
/* We tried to bring the port up or down, but it failed, so don't
* update the "down" bit. */
toggle &= ~OFPUTIL_PC_PORT_DOWN;
}
if (toggle) {
enum ofputil_port_config old_config = port->pp.config;
port->pp.config ^= toggle;
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->port_reconfigured(port, old_config);
connmgr_send_port_status(port->ofproto->connmgr, ofconn, &port->pp,
OFPPR_MODIFY);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_rename(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const struct nfs_renameargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->old_dir, &hdr);
encode_savefh(xdr, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->new_dir, &hdr);
encode_rename(xdr, args->old_name, args->new_name, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_restorefh(xdr, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void init_revisions(struct rev_info *revs, const char *prefix)
{
memset(revs, 0, sizeof(*revs));
revs->abbrev = DEFAULT_ABBREV;
revs->ignore_merges = 1;
revs->simplify_history = 1;
DIFF_OPT_SET(&revs->pruning, RECURSIVE);
DIFF_OPT_SET(&revs->pruning, QUICK);
revs->pruning.add_remove = file_add_remove;
revs->pruning.change = file_change;
revs->sort_order = REV_SORT_IN_GRAPH_ORDER;
revs->dense = 1;
revs->prefix = prefix;
revs->max_age = -1;
revs->min_age = -1;
revs->skip_count = -1;
revs->max_count = -1;
revs->max_parents = -1;
revs->commit_format = CMIT_FMT_DEFAULT;
init_grep_defaults();
grep_init(&revs->grep_filter, prefix);
revs->grep_filter.status_only = 1;
revs->grep_filter.regflags = REG_NEWLINE;
diff_setup(&revs->diffopt);
if (prefix && !revs->diffopt.prefix) {
revs->diffopt.prefix = prefix;
revs->diffopt.prefix_length = strlen(prefix);
}
revs->notes_opt.use_default_notes = -1;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_word_stream_buf_get_next_word(Jbig2WordStream *self, int offset, uint32_t *word)
{
Jbig2WordStreamBuf *z = (Jbig2WordStreamBuf *) self;
const byte *data = z->data;
uint32_t result;
if (offset + 4 < z->size)
result = (data[offset] << 24) | (data[offset + 1] << 16) | (data[offset + 2] << 8) | data[offset + 3];
else if (offset > z->size)
return -1;
else {
int i;
result = 0;
for (i = 0; i < z->size - offset; i++)
result |= data[offset + i] << ((3 - i) << 3);
}
*word = result;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int inet_rtm_getroute(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr* nlh, void *arg)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(in_skb->sk);
struct rtmsg *rtm;
struct nlattr *tb[RTA_MAX+1];
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
__be32 dst = 0;
__be32 src = 0;
u32 iif;
int err;
int mark;
struct sk_buff *skb;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*rtm), tb, RTA_MAX, rtm_ipv4_policy);
if (err < 0)
goto errout;
rtm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
skb = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (skb == NULL) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto errout;
}
/* Reserve room for dummy headers, this skb can pass
through good chunk of routing engine.
*/
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* Bugfix: need to give ip_route_input enough of an IP header to not gag. */
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol = IPPROTO_ICMP;
skb_reserve(skb, MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct iphdr));
src = tb[RTA_SRC] ? nla_get_be32(tb[RTA_SRC]) : 0;
dst = tb[RTA_DST] ? nla_get_be32(tb[RTA_DST]) : 0;
iif = tb[RTA_IIF] ? nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_IIF]) : 0;
mark = tb[RTA_MARK] ? nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_MARK]) : 0;
if (iif) {
struct net_device *dev;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, iif);
if (dev == NULL) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto errout_free;
}
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
skb->dev = dev;
skb->mark = mark;
local_bh_disable();
err = ip_route_input(skb, dst, src, rtm->rtm_tos, dev);
local_bh_enable();
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (err == 0 && rt->dst.error)
err = -rt->dst.error;
} else {
struct flowi4 fl4 = {
.daddr = dst,
.saddr = src,
.flowi4_tos = rtm->rtm_tos,
.flowi4_oif = tb[RTA_OIF] ? nla_get_u32(tb[RTA_OIF]) : 0,
.flowi4_mark = mark,
};
rt = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
err = 0;
if (IS_ERR(rt))
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
}
if (err)
goto errout_free;
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
if (rtm->rtm_flags & RTM_F_NOTIFY)
rt->rt_flags |= RTCF_NOTIFY;
err = rt_fill_info(net, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
RTM_NEWROUTE, 0, 0);
if (err <= 0)
goto errout_free;
err = rtnl_unicast(skb, net, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).pid);
errout:
return err;
errout_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
goto errout;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_var(WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page; (void) result;
if(!argv_idx(argv, 0))
return;
gchar **split = g_strsplit(argv_idx(argv, 0), "=", 2);
if (split[0] != NULL) {
gchar *value = parseenv(split[1] ? g_strchug(split[1]) : " ");
set_var_value(g_strstrip(split[0]), value);
g_free(value);
}
g_strfreev(split);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void usb_root_hub_lost_power(struct usb_device *rhdev)
{
dev_notice(&rhdev->dev, "root hub lost power or was reset\n");
rhdev->reset_resume = 1;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSValue jsTestObjReflectedURLAttr(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = jsString(exec, impl->getURLAttribute(WebCore::HTMLNames::reflectedurlattrAttr));
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BlinkTestRunner::ApplyPreferences() {
WebPreferences prefs = render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences();
ExportLayoutTestSpecificPreferences(prefs_, &prefs);
render_view()->SetWebkitPreferences(prefs);
Send(new ShellViewHostMsg_OverridePreferences(routing_id(), prefs));
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: download::DownloadItem* DownloadManagerImpl::GetDownload(uint32_t download_id) {
return base::ContainsKey(downloads_, download_id)
? downloads_[download_id].get()
: nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::dispatchWindowEvent(PassRefPtr<Event> event, PassRefPtr<EventTarget> target)
{
ASSERT(!NoEventDispatchAssertion::isEventDispatchForbidden());
DOMWindow* domWindow = this->domWindow();
if (!domWindow)
return;
domWindow->dispatchEvent(event, target);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void shm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct shm_file_data *sfd = shm_file_data(file);
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
shp = shm_lock(sfd->ns, sfd->id);
shp->shm_atim = get_seconds();
shp->shm_lprid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
shp->shm_nattch++;
shm_unlock(shp);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 42,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadController::HasFileAccessPermission(
ui::WindowAndroid* window_android) {
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> jwindow_android = window_android->GetJavaObject();
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!jwindow_android.is_null());
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
return Java_DownloadController_hasFileAccess(
env, GetJavaObject()->Controller(env), jwindow_android);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dev_add_offload(struct packet_offload *po)
{
struct packet_offload *elem;
spin_lock(&offload_lock);
list_for_each_entry(elem, &offload_base, list) {
if (po->priority < elem->priority)
break;
}
list_add_rcu(&po->list, elem->list.prev);
spin_unlock(&offload_lock);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ehci_trace_qh(EHCIQueue *q, hwaddr addr, EHCIqh *qh)
{
/* need three here due to argument count limits */
trace_usb_ehci_qh_ptrs(q, addr, qh->next,
qh->current_qtd, qh->next_qtd, qh->altnext_qtd);
trace_usb_ehci_qh_fields(addr,
get_field(qh->epchar, QH_EPCHAR_RL),
get_field(qh->epchar, QH_EPCHAR_MPLEN),
get_field(qh->epchar, QH_EPCHAR_EPS),
get_field(qh->epchar, QH_EPCHAR_EP),
get_field(qh->epchar, QH_EPCHAR_DEVADDR));
trace_usb_ehci_qh_bits(addr,
(bool)(qh->epchar & QH_EPCHAR_C),
(bool)(qh->epchar & QH_EPCHAR_H),
(bool)(qh->epchar & QH_EPCHAR_DTC),
(bool)(qh->epchar & QH_EPCHAR_I));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int http_process_request(struct session *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &txn->req;
struct connection *cli_conn = objt_conn(req->prod->end);
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY)) {
/* we need more data */
channel_dont_connect(req);
return 0;
}
DPRINTF(stderr,"[%u] %s: session=%p b=%p, exp(r,w)=%u,%u bf=%08x bh=%d analysers=%02x\n",
now_ms, __FUNCTION__,
s,
req,
req->rex, req->wex,
req->flags,
req->buf->i,
req->analysers);
if (s->fe->comp || s->be->comp)
select_compression_request_header(s, req->buf);
/*
* Right now, we know that we have processed the entire headers
* and that unwanted requests have been filtered out. We can do
* whatever we want with the remaining request. Also, now we
* may have separate values for ->fe, ->be.
*/
/*
* If HTTP PROXY is set we simply get remote server address parsing
* incoming request. Note that this requires that a connection is
* allocated on the server side.
*/
if ((s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_PROXY) && !(s->flags & SN_ADDR_SET)) {
struct connection *conn;
char *path;
/* Note that for now we don't reuse existing proxy connections */
if (unlikely((conn = si_alloc_conn(req->cons, 0)) == NULL)) {
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
txn->status = 500;
req->analysers = 0;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_500));
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_RESOURCE;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_FINST_R;
return 0;
}
path = http_get_path(txn);
url2sa(req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u,
path ? path - (req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u) : msg->sl.rq.u_l,
&conn->addr.to, NULL);
/* if the path was found, we have to remove everything between
* req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u and path (excluded). If it was not
* found, we need to replace from req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u for
* u_l characters by a single "/".
*/
if (path) {
char *cur_ptr = req->buf->p;
char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
int delta;
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u, path, NULL, 0);
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
cur_end += delta;
if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH, cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
goto return_bad_req;
}
else {
char *cur_ptr = req->buf->p;
char *cur_end = cur_ptr + txn->req.sl.rq.l;
int delta;
delta = buffer_replace2(req->buf, req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u,
req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u + msg->sl.rq.u_l, "/", 1);
http_msg_move_end(&txn->req, delta);
cur_end += delta;
if (http_parse_reqline(&txn->req, HTTP_MSG_RQMETH, cur_ptr, cur_end + 1, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
/*
* 7: Now we can work with the cookies.
* Note that doing so might move headers in the request, but
* the fields will stay coherent and the URI will not move.
* This should only be performed in the backend.
*/
if ((s->be->cookie_name || s->be->appsession_name || s->fe->capture_name)
&& !(txn->flags & (TX_CLDENY|TX_CLTARPIT)))
manage_client_side_cookies(s, req);
/*
* 8: the appsession cookie was looked up very early in 1.2,
* so let's do the same now.
*/
/* It needs to look into the URI unless persistence must be ignored */
if ((txn->sessid == NULL) && s->be->appsession_name && !(s->flags & SN_IGNORE_PRST)) {
get_srv_from_appsession(s, req->buf->p + msg->sl.rq.u, msg->sl.rq.u_l);
}
/* add unique-id if "header-unique-id" is specified */
if (!LIST_ISEMPTY(&s->fe->format_unique_id)) {
if ((s->unique_id = pool_alloc2(pool2_uniqueid)) == NULL)
goto return_bad_req;
s->unique_id[0] = '\0';
build_logline(s, s->unique_id, UNIQUEID_LEN, &s->fe->format_unique_id);
}
if (s->fe->header_unique_id && s->unique_id) {
chunk_printf(&trash, "%s: %s", s->fe->header_unique_id, s->unique_id);
if (trash.len < 0)
goto return_bad_req;
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, trash.len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
/*
* 9: add X-Forwarded-For if either the frontend or the backend
* asks for it.
*/
if ((s->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FWDFOR) {
struct hdr_ctx ctx = { .idx = 0 };
if (!((s->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_FF_ALWAYS) &&
http_find_header2(s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name : s->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name,
s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len ? s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len : s->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len,
req->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
/* The header is set to be added only if none is present
* and we found it, so don't do anything.
*/
}
else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
/* Add an X-Forwarded-For header unless the source IP is
* in the 'except' network range.
*/
if ((!s->fe->except_mask.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->fe->except_mask.s_addr)
!= s->fe->except_net.s_addr) &&
(!s->be->except_mask.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask.s_addr)
!= s->be->except_net.s_addr)) {
int len;
unsigned char *pn;
pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr;
/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
* x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
* However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
* on the frontend's header name.
*/
if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
} else {
len = s->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
}
len += snprintf(trash.str + len, trash.size - len, ": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1], pn[2], pn[3]);
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
else if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
/* FIXME: for the sake of completeness, we should also support
* 'except' here, although it is mostly useless in this case.
*/
int len;
char pn[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
inet_ntop(AF_INET6,
(const void *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)(&cli_conn->addr.from))->sin6_addr,
pn, sizeof(pn));
/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
* x-forwarded-for, because the header is really meant for the backends.
* However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
* on the frontend's header name.
*/
if (s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len) {
len = s->be->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->be->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
} else {
len = s->fe->fwdfor_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->fe->fwdfor_hdr_name, len);
}
len += snprintf(trash.str + len, trash.size - len, ": %s", pn);
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
/*
* 10: add X-Original-To if either the frontend or the backend
* asks for it.
*/
if ((s->fe->options | s->be->options) & PR_O_ORGTO) {
/* FIXME: don't know if IPv6 can handle that case too. */
if (cli_conn && cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
/* Add an X-Original-To header unless the destination IP is
* in the 'except' network range.
*/
conn_get_to_addr(cli_conn);
if (cli_conn->addr.to.ss_family == AF_INET &&
((!s->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->fe->except_mask_to.s_addr)
!= s->fe->except_to.s_addr) &&
(!s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr ||
(((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr.s_addr & s->be->except_mask_to.s_addr)
!= s->be->except_to.s_addr))) {
int len;
unsigned char *pn;
pn = (unsigned char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.to)->sin_addr;
/* Note: we rely on the backend to get the header name to be used for
* x-original-to, because the header is really meant for the backends.
* However, if the backend did not specify any option, we have to rely
* on the frontend's header name.
*/
if (s->be->orgto_hdr_len) {
len = s->be->orgto_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->be->orgto_hdr_name, len);
} else {
len = s->fe->orgto_hdr_len;
memcpy(trash.str, s->fe->orgto_hdr_name, len);
}
len += snprintf(trash.str + len, trash.size - len, ": %d.%d.%d.%d", pn[0], pn[1], pn[2], pn[3]);
if (unlikely(http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, len) < 0))
goto return_bad_req;
}
}
}
/* 11: add "Connection: close" or "Connection: keep-alive" if needed and not yet set.
* If an "Upgrade" token is found, the header is left untouched in order not to have
* to deal with some servers bugs : some of them fail an Upgrade if anything but
* "Upgrade" is present in the Connection header.
*/
if (!(txn->flags & TX_HDR_CONN_UPG) &&
(((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) != TX_CON_WANT_TUN) ||
((s->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL ||
(s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL))) {
unsigned int want_flags = 0;
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_VER_11) {
if (((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) >= TX_CON_WANT_SCL ||
((s->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL ||
(s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) == PR_O_HTTP_PCL)) &&
!((s->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
want_flags |= TX_CON_CLO_SET;
} else {
if (((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL &&
((s->fe->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) != PR_O_HTTP_PCL &&
(s->be->options & PR_O_HTTP_MODE) != PR_O_HTTP_PCL)) ||
((s->fe->options2|s->be->options2) & PR_O2_FAKE_KA))
want_flags |= TX_CON_KAL_SET;
}
if (want_flags != (txn->flags & (TX_CON_CLO_SET|TX_CON_KAL_SET)))
http_change_connection_header(txn, msg, want_flags);
}
/* If we have no server assigned yet and we're balancing on url_param
* with a POST request, we may be interested in checking the body for
* that parameter. This will be done in another analyser.
*/
if (!(s->flags & (SN_ASSIGNED|SN_DIRECT)) &&
s->txn.meth == HTTP_METH_POST && s->be->url_param_name != NULL &&
(msg->flags & (HTTP_MSGF_CNT_LEN|HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK))) {
channel_dont_connect(req);
req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_BODY;
}
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_XFER_LEN) {
req->analysers |= AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY;
#ifdef TCP_QUICKACK
/* We expect some data from the client. Unless we know for sure
* we already have a full request, we have to re-enable quick-ack
* in case we previously disabled it, otherwise we might cause
* the client to delay further data.
*/
if ((s->listener->options & LI_O_NOQUICKACK) &&
cli_conn && conn_ctrl_ready(cli_conn) &&
((msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK) ||
(msg->body_len > req->buf->i - txn->req.eoh - 2)))
setsockopt(cli_conn->t.sock.fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_QUICKACK, &one, sizeof(one));
#endif
}
/*************************************************************
* OK, that's finished for the headers. We have done what we *
* could. Let's switch to the DATA state. *
************************************************************/
req->analyse_exp = TICK_ETERNITY;
req->analysers &= ~an_bit;
/* if the server closes the connection, we want to immediately react
* and close the socket to save packets and syscalls.
*/
if (!(req->analysers & AN_REQ_HTTP_XFER_BODY))
req->cons->flags |= SI_FL_NOHALF;
s->logs.tv_request = now;
/* OK let's go on with the BODY now */
return 1;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR) || msg->err_pos >= 0) {
/* we detected a parsing error. We want to archive this request
* in the dedicated proxy area for later troubleshooting.
*/
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, msg->msg_state, s->fe);
}
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
txn->status = 400;
req->analysers = 0;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_400));
s->fe->fe_counters.failed_req++;
if (s->listener->counters)
s->listener->counters->failed_req++;
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_FINST_R;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction TabsGetAllInWindowFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<tabs::GetAllInWindow::Params> params(
tabs::GetAllInWindow::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
int window_id = extension_misc::kCurrentWindowId;
if (params->window_id.get())
window_id = *params->window_id;
Browser* browser = NULL;
std::string error;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, window_id, &browser, &error))
return RespondNow(Error(error));
return RespondNow(
OneArgument(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabList(browser, extension())));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_CodersInfo(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_coders_info *ci)
{
const unsigned char *p;
struct _7z_digests digest;
unsigned i;
memset(ci, 0, sizeof(*ci));
memset(&digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
goto failed;
if (*p != kFolder)
goto failed;
/*
* Read NumFolders.
*/
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &(ci->numFolders)) < 0)
goto failed;
if (UMAX_ENTRY < ci->numFolders)
return (-1);
/*
* Read External.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
goto failed;
switch (*p) {
case 0:
ci->folders =
calloc((size_t)ci->numFolders, sizeof(*ci->folders));
if (ci->folders == NULL)
return (-1);
for (i = 0; i < ci->numFolders; i++) {
if (read_Folder(a, &(ci->folders[i])) < 0)
goto failed;
}
break;
case 1:
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &(ci->dataStreamIndex)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (UMAX_ENTRY < ci->dataStreamIndex)
return (-1);
if (ci->numFolders > 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, -1,
"Malformed 7-Zip archive");
goto failed;
}
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, -1,
"Malformed 7-Zip archive");
goto failed;
}
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
goto failed;
if (*p != kCodersUnPackSize)
goto failed;
for (i = 0; i < ci->numFolders; i++) {
struct _7z_folder *folder = &(ci->folders[i]);
unsigned j;
folder->unPackSize =
calloc((size_t)folder->numOutStreams, sizeof(*folder->unPackSize));
if (folder->unPackSize == NULL)
goto failed;
for (j = 0; j < folder->numOutStreams; j++) {
if (parse_7zip_uint64(a, &(folder->unPackSize[j])) < 0)
goto failed;
}
}
/*
* Read CRCs.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
goto failed;
if (*p == kEnd)
return (0);
if (*p != kCRC)
goto failed;
if (read_Digests(a, &digest, (size_t)ci->numFolders) < 0)
goto failed;
for (i = 0; i < ci->numFolders; i++) {
ci->folders[i].digest_defined = digest.defineds[i];
ci->folders[i].digest = digest.digests[i];
}
/*
* Must be kEnd.
*/
if ((p = header_bytes(a, 1)) == NULL)
goto failed;
if (*p != kEnd)
goto failed;
free_Digest(&digest);
return (0);
failed:
free_Digest(&digest);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 53,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64 Get(int64 metahandle, syncable::BaseVersion field) {
const int64 kDefaultValue = -100;
return GetField(metahandle, field, kDefaultValue);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: device_drive_eject_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
gchar **options = user_data_elements[0];
int n;
char *argv[16];
GError *error;
char *mount_path;
error = NULL;
mount_path = NULL;
if (!device->priv->device_is_drive)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not a drive");
goto out;
}
if (!device->priv->device_is_media_available)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "No media in drive");
goto out;
}
if (device_local_is_busy (device, TRUE, &error))
{
dbus_g_method_return_error (context, error);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
for (n = 0; options[n] != NULL; n++)
{
const char *option = options[n];
throw_error (context, ERROR_INVALID_OPTION, "Unknown option %s", option);
goto out;
}
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "eject";
argv[n++] = device->priv->device_file;
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context, "DriveEject", FALSE, device, argv, NULL, drive_eject_completed_cb, FALSE, NULL, NULL))
{
goto out;
}
out:
;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::Enable(int total_buffer_size,
int resource_buffer_size) {
if (!GetFrontend())
return;
resources_data_->SetResourcesDataSizeLimits(total_buffer_size,
resource_buffer_size);
state_->setBoolean(NetworkAgentState::kNetworkAgentEnabled, true);
state_->setInteger(NetworkAgentState::kTotalBufferSize, total_buffer_size);
state_->setInteger(NetworkAgentState::kResourceBufferSize,
resource_buffer_size);
instrumenting_agents_->addInspectorNetworkAgent(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RList *r_bin_wasm_get_memories (RBinWasmObj *bin) {
RBinWasmSection *memory;
RList *memories;
if (!bin || !bin->g_sections) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->g_memories) {
return bin->g_memories;
}
if (!(memories = r_bin_wasm_get_sections_by_id (bin->g_sections,
R_BIN_WASM_SECTION_MEMORY))) {
return r_list_new();
}
if (!(memory = (RBinWasmSection*) r_list_first (memories))) {
return r_list_new();
}
bin->g_memories = r_bin_wasm_get_memory_entries (bin, memory);
return bin->g_memories;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::InvalidateNodeListCaches(const QualifiedName* attr_name) {
for (const LiveNodeListBase* list : lists_invalidated_at_document_)
list->InvalidateCacheForAttribute(attr_name);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void treatReturnedNullStringAsUndefinedStringMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::treatReturnedNullStringAsUndefinedStringMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int inotify_fasync(int fd, struct file *file, int on)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group = file->private_data;
return fasync_helper(fd, file, on, &group->inotify_data.fa) >= 0 ? 0 : -EIO;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseRenderingContext2D::stroke(Path2D* dom_path) {
DrawPathInternal(dom_path->GetPath(),
CanvasRenderingContext2DState::kStrokePaintType);
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutSVGResourceMarker::LayoutSVGResourceMarker(SVGMarkerElement* node)
: LayoutSVGResourceContainer(node)
{
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: file_buffer(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const char *inname __attribute__ ((unused)),
const void *buf, size_t nb)
{
int m = 0, rv = 0, looks_text = 0;
int mime = ms->flags & MAGIC_MIME;
const unsigned char *ubuf = CAST(const unsigned char *, buf);
unichar *u8buf = NULL;
size_t ulen;
const char *code = NULL;
const char *code_mime = "binary";
const char *type = "application/octet-stream";
const char *def = "data";
const char *ftype = NULL;
if (nb == 0) {
def = "empty";
type = "application/x-empty";
goto simple;
} else if (nb == 1) {
def = "very short file (no magic)";
goto simple;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_ENCODING) == 0) {
looks_text = file_encoding(ms, ubuf, nb, &u8buf, &ulen,
&code, &code_mime, &ftype);
}
#ifdef __EMX__
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_APPTYPE) == 0 && inname) {
switch (file_os2_apptype(ms, inname, buf, nb)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
break;
default:
return 1;
}
}
#endif
#if HAVE_FORK
/* try compression stuff */
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_COMPRESS) == 0)
if ((m = file_zmagic(ms, fd, inname, ubuf, nb)) != 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "zmagic %d\n", m);
goto done_encoding;
}
#endif
/* Check if we have a tar file */
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_TAR) == 0)
if ((m = file_is_tar(ms, ubuf, nb)) != 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "tar %d\n", m);
goto done;
}
/* Check if we have a CDF file */
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_CDF) == 0)
if ((m = file_trycdf(ms, fd, ubuf, nb)) != 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "cdf %d\n", m);
goto done;
}
/* try soft magic tests */
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_SOFT) == 0)
if ((m = file_softmagic(ms, ubuf, nb, 0, BINTEST,
looks_text)) != 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "softmagic %d\n", m);
#ifdef BUILTIN_ELF
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_ELF) == 0 && m == 1 &&
nb > 5 && fd != -1) {
/*
* We matched something in the file, so this
* *might* be an ELF file, and the file is at
* least 5 bytes long, so if it's an ELF file
* it has at least one byte past the ELF magic
* number - try extracting information from the
* ELF headers that cannot easily * be
* extracted with rules in the magic file.
*/
if ((m = file_tryelf(ms, fd, ubuf, nb)) != 0)
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"elf %d\n", m);
}
#endif
goto done;
}
/* try text properties */
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_NO_CHECK_TEXT) == 0) {
if ((m = file_ascmagic(ms, ubuf, nb, looks_text)) != 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
(void)fprintf(stderr, "ascmagic %d\n", m);
goto done;
}
}
simple:
/* give up */
m = 1;
if ((!mime || (mime & MAGIC_MIME_TYPE)) &&
file_printf(ms, "%s", mime ? type : def) == -1) {
rv = -1;
}
done:
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_MIME_ENCODING) != 0) {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_MIME_TYPE)
if (file_printf(ms, "; charset=") == -1)
rv = -1;
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", code_mime) == -1)
rv = -1;
}
#if HAVE_FORK
done_encoding:
#endif
free(u8buf);
if (rv)
return rv;
return m;
}
Commit Message: - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u64 nf_tables_alloc_handle(struct nft_table *table)
{
return ++table->hgenerator;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 57,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pop_args ()
{
#if defined (ARRAY_VARS) && defined (DEBUGGER)
SHELL_VAR *bash_argv_v, *bash_argc_v;
ARRAY *bash_argv_a, *bash_argc_a;
ARRAY_ELEMENT *ce;
intmax_t i;
GET_ARRAY_FROM_VAR ("BASH_ARGV", bash_argv_v, bash_argv_a);
GET_ARRAY_FROM_VAR ("BASH_ARGC", bash_argc_v, bash_argc_a);
ce = array_shift (bash_argc_a, 1, 0);
if (ce == 0 || legal_number (element_value (ce), &i) == 0)
i = 0;
for ( ; i > 0; i--)
array_pop (bash_argv_a);
array_dispose_element (ce);
#endif /* ARRAY_VARS && DEBUGGER */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetEntityDeclHandler(XML_Parser parser, XML_EntityDeclHandler handler) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_entityDeclHandler = handler;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::setLogicalOverrideSize(RenderBox* child, LayoutUnit childPreferredSize)
{
if (hasOrthogonalFlow(child))
child->setOverrideLogicalContentHeight(childPreferredSize - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
else
child->setOverrideLogicalContentWidth(childPreferredSize - child->borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_decode_generic_template0(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2GenericRegionParams *params, Jbig2ArithState *as, Jbig2Image *image, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
const int GBW = image->width;
const int GBH = image->height;
const int rowstride = image->stride;
int x, y;
byte *gbreg_line = (byte *) image->data;
/* todo: currently we only handle the nominal gbat location */
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
printf("P4\n%d %d\n", GBW, GBH);
#endif
if (GBW <= 0)
return 0;
for (y = 0; y < GBH; y++) {
uint32_t CONTEXT;
uint32_t line_m1;
uint32_t line_m2;
int padded_width = (GBW + 7) & -8;
line_m1 = (y >= 1) ? gbreg_line[-rowstride] : 0;
line_m2 = (y >= 2) ? gbreg_line[-(rowstride << 1)] << 6 : 0;
CONTEXT = (line_m1 & 0x7f0) | (line_m2 & 0xf800);
/* 6.2.5.7 3d */
for (x = 0; x < padded_width; x += 8) {
byte result = 0;
int x_minor;
int minor_width = GBW - x > 8 ? 8 : GBW - x;
if (y >= 1)
line_m1 = (line_m1 << 8) | (x + 8 < GBW ? gbreg_line[-rowstride + (x >> 3) + 1] : 0);
if (y >= 2)
line_m2 = (line_m2 << 8) | (x + 8 < GBW ? gbreg_line[-(rowstride << 1) + (x >> 3) + 1] << 6 : 0);
/* This is the speed-critical inner loop. */
for (x_minor = 0; x_minor < minor_width; x_minor++) {
bool bit;
bit = jbig2_arith_decode(as, &GB_stats[CONTEXT]);
if (bit < 0)
return -1;
result |= bit << (7 - x_minor);
CONTEXT = ((CONTEXT & 0x7bf7) << 1) | bit | ((line_m1 >> (7 - x_minor)) & 0x10) | ((line_m2 >> (7 - x_minor)) & 0x800);
}
gbreg_line[x >> 3] = result;
}
#ifdef OUTPUT_PBM
fwrite(gbreg_line, 1, rowstride, stdout);
#endif
gbreg_line += rowstride;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udp_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct udp_sock *up = udp_sk(sk);
struct flowi4 fl4_stack;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
int ulen = len;
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
int free = 0;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr, faddr, saddr;
__be16 dport;
u8 tos;
int err, is_udplite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
int corkreq = up->corkflag || msg->msg_flags&MSG_MORE;
int (*getfrag)(void *, char *, int, int, int, struct sk_buff *);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ip_options_data opt_copy;
if (len > 0xFFFF)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/*
* Check the flags.
*/
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB) /* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
ipc.ttl = 0;
ipc.tos = -1;
getfrag = is_udplite ? udplite_getfrag : ip_generic_getfrag;
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
if (up->pending) {
/*
* There are pending frames.
* The socket lock must be held while it's corked.
*/
lock_sock(sk);
if (likely(up->pending)) {
if (unlikely(up->pending != AF_INET)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
goto do_append_data;
}
release_sock(sk);
}
ulen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_in *usin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*usin))
return -EINVAL;
if (usin->sin_family != AF_INET) {
if (usin->sin_family != AF_UNSPEC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
}
daddr = usin->sin_addr.s_addr;
dport = usin->sin_port;
if (dport == 0)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
dport = inet->inet_dport;
/* Open fast path for connected socket.
Route will not be used, if at least one option is set.
*/
connected = 1;
}
ipc.addr = inet->inet_saddr;
ipc.oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &ipc.tx_flags);
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = ip_cmsg_send(sock_net(sk), msg, &ipc);
if (err)
return err;
if (ipc.opt)
free = 1;
connected = 0;
}
if (!ipc.opt) {
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
if (inet_opt) {
memcpy(&opt_copy, inet_opt,
sizeof(*inet_opt) + inet_opt->opt.optlen);
ipc.opt = &opt_copy.opt;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
saddr = ipc.addr;
ipc.addr = faddr = daddr;
if (ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.srr) {
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
faddr = ipc.opt->opt.faddr;
connected = 0;
}
tos = get_rttos(&ipc, inet);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LOCALROUTE) ||
(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTROUTE) ||
(ipc.opt && ipc.opt->opt.is_strictroute)) {
tos |= RTO_ONLINK;
connected = 0;
}
if (ipv4_is_multicast(daddr)) {
if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->mc_index;
if (!saddr)
saddr = inet->mc_addr;
connected = 0;
} else if (!ipc.oif)
ipc.oif = inet->uc_index;
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *)sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
if (rt == NULL) {
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
fl4 = &fl4_stack;
flowi4_init_output(fl4, ipc.oif, sk->sk_mark, tos,
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk)|FLOWI_FLAG_CAN_SLEEP,
faddr, saddr, dport, inet->inet_sport);
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, fl4, sk);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(rt);
rt = NULL;
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP_INC_STATS_BH(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
goto out;
}
err = -EACCES;
if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_BROADCAST) &&
!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_BROADCAST))
goto out;
if (connected)
sk_dst_set(sk, dst_clone(&rt->dst));
}
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
saddr = fl4->saddr;
if (!ipc.addr)
daddr = ipc.addr = fl4->daddr;
/* Lockless fast path for the non-corking case. */
if (!corkreq) {
skb = ip_make_skb(sk, fl4, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), &ipc, &rt,
msg->msg_flags);
err = PTR_ERR(skb);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skb))
err = udp_send_skb(skb, fl4);
goto out;
}
lock_sock(sk);
if (unlikely(up->pending)) {
/* The socket is already corked while preparing it. */
/* ... which is an evident application bug. --ANK */
release_sock(sk);
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_DEBUG pr_fmt("cork app bug 2\n"));
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Now cork the socket to pend data.
*/
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
fl4->daddr = daddr;
fl4->saddr = saddr;
fl4->fl4_dport = dport;
fl4->fl4_sport = inet->inet_sport;
up->pending = AF_INET;
do_append_data:
up->len += ulen;
err = ip_append_data(sk, fl4, getfrag, msg->msg_iov, ulen,
sizeof(struct udphdr), &ipc, &rt,
corkreq ? msg->msg_flags|MSG_MORE : msg->msg_flags);
if (err)
udp_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!corkreq)
err = udp_push_pending_frames(sk);
else if (unlikely(skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)))
up->pending = 0;
release_sock(sk);
out:
ip_rt_put(rt);
if (free)
kfree(ipc.opt);
if (!err)
return len;
/*
* ENOBUFS = no kernel mem, SOCK_NOSPACE = no sndbuf space. Reporting
* ENOBUFS might not be good (it's not tunable per se), but otherwise
* we don't have a good statistic (IpOutDiscards but it can be too many
* things). We could add another new stat but at least for now that
* seems like overkill.
*/
if (err == -ENOBUFS || test_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags)) {
UDP_INC_STATS_USER(sock_net(sk),
UDP_MIB_SNDBUFERRORS, is_udplite);
}
return err;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(&rt->dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags&MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sf_set_chunk (SNDFILE * sndfile, const SF_CHUNK_INFO * chunk_info)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
VALIDATE_SNDFILE_AND_ASSIGN_PSF (sndfile, psf, 1) ;
if (chunk_info == NULL || chunk_info->data == NULL)
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_PTR ;
if (psf->set_chunk)
return psf->set_chunk (psf, chunk_info) ;
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_FORMAT ;
} /* sf_set_chunk */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 95,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BaseRenderingContext2D::BaseRenderingContext2D()
: clip_antialiasing_(kNotAntiAliased) {
state_stack_.push_back(CanvasRenderingContext2DState::Create());
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,904
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t String8::unlockBuffer(size_t size)
{
if (size != this->size()) {
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::bufferFromData(mString)
->editResize(size+1);
if (! buf) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
char* str = (char*)buf->data();
str[size] = 0;
mString = str;
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,420
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodDocumentArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodDocumentArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodDocumentArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_gc_protect(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value obj)
{
if (mrb_immediate_p(obj)) return;
gc_protect(mrb, &mrb->gc, mrb_basic_ptr(obj));
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wait_worker_and_cache_frame(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx) {
YV12_BUFFER_CONFIG sd;
vp9_ppflags_t flags = {0, 0, 0};
const VPxWorkerInterface *const winterface = vpx_get_worker_interface();
VPxWorker *const worker = &ctx->frame_workers[ctx->next_output_worker_id];
FrameWorkerData *const frame_worker_data = (FrameWorkerData *)worker->data1;
ctx->next_output_worker_id =
(ctx->next_output_worker_id + 1) % ctx->num_frame_workers;
winterface->sync(worker);
frame_worker_data->received_frame = 0;
++ctx->available_threads;
check_resync(ctx, frame_worker_data->pbi);
if (vp9_get_raw_frame(frame_worker_data->pbi, &sd, &flags) == 0) {
VP9_COMMON *const cm = &frame_worker_data->pbi->common;
RefCntBuffer *const frame_bufs = cm->buffer_pool->frame_bufs;
ctx->frame_cache[ctx->frame_cache_write].fb_idx = cm->new_fb_idx;
yuvconfig2image(&ctx->frame_cache[ctx->frame_cache_write].img, &sd,
frame_worker_data->user_priv);
ctx->frame_cache[ctx->frame_cache_write].img.fb_priv =
frame_bufs[cm->new_fb_idx].raw_frame_buffer.priv;
ctx->frame_cache_write =
(ctx->frame_cache_write + 1) % FRAME_CACHE_SIZE;
++ctx->num_cache_frames;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int qcow2_snapshot_delete(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot sn;
int snapshot_index, ret;
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Can't find the snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Remove it from the snapshot list */
memmove(s->snapshots + snapshot_index,
s->snapshots + snapshot_index + 1,
(s->nb_snapshots - snapshot_index - 1) * sizeof(sn));
s->nb_snapshots--;
ret = qcow2_write_snapshots(bs);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret,
"Failed to remove snapshot from snapshot list");
return ret;
}
/*
* The snapshot is now unused, clean up. If we fail after this point, we
* won't recover but just leak clusters.
*/
g_free(sn.id_str);
g_free(sn.name);
/*
* Now decrease the refcounts of clusters referenced by the snapshot and
* free the L1 table.
*/
ret = qcow2_update_snapshot_refcount(bs, sn.l1_table_offset,
sn.l1_size, -1);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Failed to free the cluster and L1 table");
return ret;
}
qcow2_free_clusters(bs, sn.l1_table_offset, sn.l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t),
QCOW2_DISCARD_SNAPSHOT);
/* must update the copied flag on the current cluster offsets */
ret = qcow2_update_snapshot_refcount(bs, s->l1_table_offset, s->l1_size, 0);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret,
"Failed to update snapshot status in disk");
return ret;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ALLOC
{
BdrvCheckResult result = {0};
qcow2_check_refcounts(bs, &result, 0);
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *pcrb_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_PcrInfoBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_PCRB);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGElement::MarkForLayoutAndParentResourceInvalidation(
LayoutObject& layout_object) {
LayoutSVGResourceContainer::MarkForLayoutAndParentResourceInvalidation(
layout_object, true);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintJobWorker::OnNewPage() {
if (!document_.get()) // Spurious message.
return;
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
if (page_number_ == PageNumber::npos()) {
int page_count = document_->page_count();
if (!page_count) {
return;
}
page_number_.Init(document_->settings(), page_count);
}
DCHECK_NE(page_number_, PageNumber::npos());
while (true) {
scoped_refptr<PrintedPage> page = document_->GetPage(page_number_.ToInt());
if (!page.get()) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&PrintJobWorker::OnNewPage,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(500));
break;
}
SpoolPage(page.get());
++page_number_;
if (page_number_ == PageNumber::npos()) {
OnDocumentDone();
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* find_file_within(const char* path, const char* name,
char* buf, size_t bufsize, int search)
{
size_t pathlen = strlen(path);
size_t namelen = strlen(name);
size_t childlen = pathlen + namelen + 1;
char* actual;
if (bufsize <= childlen) {
return NULL;
}
memcpy(buf, path, pathlen);
buf[pathlen] = '/';
actual = buf + pathlen + 1;
memcpy(actual, name, namelen + 1);
if (search && access(buf, F_OK)) {
struct dirent* entry;
DIR* dir = opendir(path);
if (!dir) {
ERROR("opendir %s failed: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
return actual;
}
while ((entry = readdir(dir))) {
if (!strcasecmp(entry->d_name, name)) {
/* we have a match - replace the name, don't need to copy the null again */
memcpy(actual, entry->d_name, namelen);
break;
}
}
closedir(dir);
}
return actual;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 160,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sadb_msg *pfkey_get_base_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, int *errp)
{
struct sadb_msg *hdr = NULL;
if (skb->len < sizeof(*hdr)) {
*errp = -EMSGSIZE;
} else {
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb->data;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_version != PF_KEY_V2 ||
hdr->sadb_msg_reserved != 0 ||
(hdr->sadb_msg_type <= SADB_RESERVED ||
hdr->sadb_msg_type > SADB_MAX)) {
hdr = NULL;
*errp = -EINVAL;
} else if (hdr->sadb_msg_len != (skb->len /
sizeof(uint64_t)) ||
hdr->sadb_msg_len < (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) /
sizeof(uint64_t))) {
hdr = NULL;
*errp = -EMSGSIZE;
} else {
*errp = 0;
}
}
return hdr;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 31,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool xmp_get_property_float(XmpPtr xmp, const char *schema, const char *name,
double *property, uint32_t *propsBits)
{
CHECK_PTR(xmp, false);
RESET_ERROR;
bool ret = false;
try {
auto txmp = reinterpret_cast<const SXMPMeta *>(xmp);
XMP_OptionBits optionBits;
ret = txmp->GetProperty_Float(schema, name, property, &optionBits);
if (propsBits) {
*propsBits = optionBits;
}
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t regulator_suspend_standby_state_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return regulator_print_state(buf,
rdev->constraints->state_standby.enabled);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err trak_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TrackBox *p;
p = (GF_TrackBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TrackBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->Header) {
gf_isom_box_dump(p->Header, trace);
} else if (p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<!--INVALID FILE: Missing Track Header-->\n");
}
if (p->References) gf_isom_box_dump(p->References, trace);
if (p->meta) gf_isom_box_dump(p->meta, trace);
if (p->editBox) gf_isom_box_dump(p->editBox, trace);
if (p->Media) gf_isom_box_dump(p->Media, trace);
if (p->groups) gf_isom_box_dump(p->groups, trace);
if (p->udta) gf_isom_box_dump(p->udta, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TrackBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL security_fips_encrypt(BYTE* data, int length, rdpRdp* rdp)
{
crypto_des3_encrypt(rdp->fips_encrypt, length, data, data);
rdp->encrypt_use_count++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jpc_cod_destroyparms(jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_cod_t *cod = &ms->parms.cod;
jpc_cox_destroycompparms(&cod->compparms);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sctp_chunk_hold(struct sctp_chunk *ch)
{
atomic_inc(&ch->refcnt);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ide_sector_read_cb(void *opaque, int ret)
{
IDEState *s = opaque;
int n;
s->pio_aiocb = NULL;
s->status &= ~BUSY_STAT;
if (ret == -ECANCELED) {
return;
}
block_acct_done(blk_get_stats(s->blk), &s->acct);
if (ret != 0) {
if (ide_handle_rw_error(s, -ret, IDE_RETRY_PIO |
IDE_RETRY_READ)) {
return;
}
}
n = s->nsector;
if (n > s->req_nb_sectors) {
n = s->req_nb_sectors;
}
/* Allow the guest to read the io_buffer */
ide_transfer_start(s, s->io_buffer, n * BDRV_SECTOR_SIZE, ide_sector_read);
ide_set_irq(s->bus);
ide_set_sector(s, ide_get_sector(s) + n);
s->nsector -= n;
s->io_buffer_offset += 512 * n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport signed int ReadBlobLSBSignedLong(Image *image)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
quantum.unsigned_value=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionSettingsHandler::HandleLoadMessage(const ListValue* args) {
FilePath::StringType string_path;
CHECK_EQ(1U, args->GetSize()) << args->GetSize();
CHECK(args->GetString(0, &string_path));
extensions::UnpackedInstaller::Create(extension_service_)->
Load(FilePath(string_path));
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_script_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
if (!strvec)
return;
alloc_vrrp_script(strvec_slot(strvec, 1));
script_user_set = false;
remove_script = false;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *stco_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_ChunkOffsetBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STCO);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::LocationByteStringAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_locationByteString_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::LocationByteStringAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_map *map, int func_id)
{
if (!map)
return 0;
/* We need a two way check, first is from map perspective ... */
switch (map->map_type) {
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stackid)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup)
goto error;
break;
/* devmap returns a pointer to a live net_device ifindex that we cannot
* allow to be modified from bpf side. So do not allow lookup elements
* for now.
*/
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
goto error;
break;
/* Restrict bpf side of cpumap, open when use-cases appear */
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_redirect_map)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS:
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP:
if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update &&
func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem)
goto error;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* ... and second from the function itself. */
switch (func_id) {
case BPF_FUNC_tail_call:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_output:
case BPF_FUNC_perf_event_read_value:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_get_stackid:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_current_task_under_cgroup:
case BPF_FUNC_skb_under_cgroup:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_redirect_map:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_DEVMAP &&
map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
goto error;
break;
case BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update:
if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP)
goto error;
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
error:
verbose(env, "cannot pass map_type %d into func %s#%d\n",
map->map_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dcbnl_setapp(struct net_device *netdev, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
u32 seq, struct nlattr **tb, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
u16 id;
u8 up, idtype;
struct nlattr *app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_MAX + 1];
if (!tb[DCB_ATTR_APP])
return -EINVAL;
ret = nla_parse_nested(app_tb, DCB_APP_ATTR_MAX, tb[DCB_ATTR_APP],
dcbnl_app_nest);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* all must be non-null */
if ((!app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_IDTYPE]) ||
(!app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_ID]) ||
(!app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_PRIORITY]))
return -EINVAL;
/* either by eth type or by socket number */
idtype = nla_get_u8(app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_IDTYPE]);
if ((idtype != DCB_APP_IDTYPE_ETHTYPE) &&
(idtype != DCB_APP_IDTYPE_PORTNUM))
return -EINVAL;
id = nla_get_u16(app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_ID]);
up = nla_get_u8(app_tb[DCB_APP_ATTR_PRIORITY]);
if (netdev->dcbnl_ops->setapp) {
ret = netdev->dcbnl_ops->setapp(netdev, idtype, id, up);
} else {
struct dcb_app app;
app.selector = idtype;
app.protocol = id;
app.priority = up;
ret = dcb_setapp(netdev, &app);
}
ret = nla_put_u8(skb, DCB_ATTR_APP, ret);
dcbnl_cee_notify(netdev, RTM_SETDCB, DCB_CMD_SAPP, seq, 0);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnResize(const ResizeParams& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer", "RenderViewImpl::OnResize");
if (webview()) {
webview()->HidePopups();
if (send_preferred_size_changes_ &&
webview()->MainFrame()->IsWebLocalFrame()) {
webview()->MainFrame()->ToWebLocalFrame()->SetCanHaveScrollbars(
ShouldDisplayScrollbars(params.new_size.width(),
params.new_size.height()));
}
if (display_mode_ != params.display_mode) {
display_mode_ = params.display_mode;
webview()->SetDisplayMode(display_mode_);
}
}
browser_controls_shrink_blink_size_ =
params.browser_controls_shrink_blink_size;
top_controls_height_ = params.top_controls_height;
bottom_controls_height_ = params.bottom_controls_height;
if (device_scale_factor_for_testing_) {
ResizeParams p(params);
p.screen_info.device_scale_factor = *device_scale_factor_for_testing_;
p.physical_backing_size =
gfx::ScaleToCeiledSize(p.new_size, p.screen_info.device_scale_factor);
RenderWidget::OnResize(p);
} else {
RenderWidget::OnResize(params);
}
if (params.scroll_focused_node_into_view)
webview()->ScrollFocusedEditableElementIntoView();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dictEncObjKeyCompare(void *privdata, const void *key1,
const void *key2)
{
robj *o1 = (robj*) key1, *o2 = (robj*) key2;
int cmp;
if (o1->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_INT &&
o2->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_INT)
return o1->ptr == o2->ptr;
o1 = getDecodedObject(o1);
o2 = getDecodedObject(o2);
cmp = dictSdsKeyCompare(privdata,o1->ptr,o2->ptr);
decrRefCount(o1);
decrRefCount(o2);
return cmp;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 70,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool vnc_worker_thread_running(void)
{
return queue; /* Check global queue */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 17,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HANDLE _dbus_global_lock (const char *mutexname)
{
HANDLE mutex;
DWORD gotMutex;
mutex = CreateMutexA( NULL, FALSE, mutexname );
if( !mutex )
{
return FALSE;
}
gotMutex = WaitForSingleObject( mutex, INFINITE );
switch( gotMutex )
{
case WAIT_ABANDONED:
ReleaseMutex (mutex);
CloseHandle (mutex);
return 0;
case WAIT_FAILED:
case WAIT_TIMEOUT:
return 0;
}
return mutex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_free_tgt_pgs(struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
int count;
if (!fod->data_sg || !fod->data_sg_cnt)
return;
fc_dma_unmap_sg(fod->tgtport->dev, fod->data_sg, fod->data_sg_cnt,
((fod->io_dir == NVMET_FCP_WRITE) ?
DMA_FROM_DEVICE : DMA_TO_DEVICE));
for_each_sg(fod->data_sg, sg, fod->data_sg_cnt, count)
__free_page(sg_page(sg));
kfree(fod->data_sg);
fod->data_sg = NULL;
fod->data_sg_cnt = 0;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ctr_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_ctr_crypt_128bit(&serpent_ctr, desc, dst, src, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,989
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace(InlineBidiResolver& resolver, LineInfo& lineInfo,
FloatingObject* lastFloatFromPreviousLine, LineWidth& width)
{
while (!resolver.position().atEnd() && !requiresLineBox(resolver.position(), lineInfo, LeadingWhitespace)) {
RenderObject* object = resolver.position().m_obj;
if (object->isOutOfFlowPositioned()) {
setStaticPositions(m_block, toRenderBox(object));
if (object->style()->isOriginalDisplayInlineType()) {
resolver.runs().addRun(createRun(0, 1, object, resolver));
lineInfo.incrementRunsFromLeadingWhitespace();
}
} else if (object->isFloating()) {
LayoutUnit marginOffset = (!object->previousSibling() && m_block->isSelfCollapsingBlock() && m_block->style()->clear() && m_block->getClearDelta(m_block, LayoutUnit())) ? m_block->collapsedMarginBeforeForChild(m_block) : LayoutUnit();
LayoutUnit oldLogicalHeight = m_block->logicalHeight();
m_block->setLogicalHeight(oldLogicalHeight + marginOffset);
m_block->positionNewFloatOnLine(m_block->insertFloatingObject(toRenderBox(object)), lastFloatFromPreviousLine, lineInfo, width);
m_block->setLogicalHeight(oldLogicalHeight);
} else if (object->isText() && object->style()->hasTextCombine() && object->isCombineText() && !toRenderCombineText(object)->isCombined()) {
toRenderCombineText(object)->combineText();
if (toRenderCombineText(object)->isCombined())
continue;
}
resolver.increment();
}
resolver.commitExplicitEmbedding();
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bad_file( const char *dirpath, const char *name, Directory & dir )
{
MyString pathname;
MyString buf;
if( is_relative_to_cwd( name ) ) {
pathname.sprintf( "%s%c%s", dirpath, DIR_DELIM_CHAR, name );
}
else {
pathname = name;
}
if( VerboseFlag ) {
printf( "%s - BAD\n", pathname.Value() );
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "%s - BAD\n", pathname.Value() );
}
if( RmFlag ) {
bool removed = dir.Remove_Full_Path( pathname.Value() );
if( !removed && privsep_enabled() ) {
removed = privsep_remove_dir( pathname.Value() );
if( VerboseFlag ) {
if( removed ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "%s - failed to remove directly, but succeeded via privsep switchboard\n", pathname.Value() );
printf( "%s - failed to remove directly, but succeeded via privsep switchboard\n", pathname.Value() );
}
}
}
if( removed ) {
buf.sprintf( "%s - Removed", pathname.Value() );
} else {
buf.sprintf( "%s - Can't Remove", pathname.Value() );
}
} else {
buf.sprintf( "%s - Not Removed", pathname.Value() );
}
BadFiles->append( buf.Value() );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void prefetch_motion(VP8Context *s, VP8Macroblock *mb, int mb_x, int mb_y,
int mb_xy, int ref)
{
/* Don't prefetch refs that haven't been used very often this frame. */
if (s->ref_count[ref - 1] > (mb_xy >> 5)) {
int x_off = mb_x << 4, y_off = mb_y << 4;
int mx = (mb->mv.x >> 2) + x_off + 8;
int my = (mb->mv.y >> 2) + y_off;
uint8_t **src = s->framep[ref]->tf.f->data;
int off = mx + (my + (mb_x & 3) * 4) * s->linesize + 64;
/* For threading, a ff_thread_await_progress here might be useful, but
* it actually slows down the decoder. Since a bad prefetch doesn't
* generate bad decoder output, we don't run it here. */
s->vdsp.prefetch(src[0] + off, s->linesize, 4);
off = (mx >> 1) + ((my >> 1) + (mb_x & 7)) * s->uvlinesize + 64;
s->vdsp.prefetch(src[1] + off, src[2] - src[1], 2);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf)
{
chunk_t *chunk;
tor_assert(string);
/* make sure we don't ask for too much */
tor_assert(string_len <= buf->datalen);
/* assert_buf_ok(buf); */
chunk = buf->head;
while (string_len) {
size_t copy = string_len;
tor_assert(chunk);
if (chunk->datalen < copy)
copy = chunk->datalen;
memcpy(string, chunk->data, copy);
string_len -= copy;
string += copy;
chunk = chunk->next;
}
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL TemplateURL::GenerateSearchURL(
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data) const {
if (!url_ref_->IsValid(search_terms_data))
return GURL();
if (!url_ref_->SupportsReplacement(search_terms_data))
return GURL(url());
return GURL(url_ref_->ReplaceSearchTerms(
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs(
base::ASCIIToUTF16("blah.blah.blah.blah.blah")),
search_terms_data, NULL));
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uas_cmd_cmplt(struct urb *urb)
{
if (urb->status)
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "cmd cmplt err %d\n", urb->status);
usb_free_urb(urb);
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::DidUpdateBackingStore(
const gfx::Rect& scroll_rect,
const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_delta,
const std::vector<gfx::Rect>& copy_rects) {
TRACE_EVENT0("ui::gtk", "RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::DidUpdateBackingStore");
if (is_hidden_)
return;
if (about_to_validate_and_paint_)
invalid_rect_.Union(scroll_rect);
else
Paint(scroll_rect);
for (size_t i = 0; i < copy_rects.size(); ++i) {
gfx::Rect rect = gfx::SubtractRects(copy_rects[i], scroll_rect);
if (rect.IsEmpty())
continue;
if (about_to_validate_and_paint_)
invalid_rect_.Union(rect);
else
Paint(rect);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendReplyAndDeleteThis() {
filter_->Send(reply_msg_);
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 116,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXTreeSerializerTest() {}
Commit Message: When serializing accessibility tree, skip invalid children.
See bug for specific repro in the wild, but essentially we need to check
if the child is valid just before serializing, and not trust the list of
children of a node.
BUG=479743
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144363004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#332748}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 127,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_sched_domain(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct sched_domain *sd = container_of(rcu, struct sched_domain, rcu);
/*
* If its an overlapping domain it has private groups, iterate and
* nuke them all.
*/
if (sd->flags & SD_OVERLAP) {
free_sched_groups(sd->groups, 1);
} else if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sd->groups->ref)) {
kfree(sd->groups->sgp);
kfree(sd->groups);
}
kfree(sd);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bta_av_rc_disc_done(UNUSED_ATTR tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb = &bta_av_cb;
tBTA_AV_SCB* p_scb = NULL;
tBTA_AV_LCB* p_lcb;
uint8_t rc_handle;
tBTA_AV_FEAT peer_features = 0; /* peer features mask */
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: bta_av_rc_disc_done disc:x%x", __func__, p_cb->disc);
if (!p_cb->disc) {
return;
}
if ((p_cb->disc & BTA_AV_CHNL_MSK) == BTA_AV_CHNL_MSK) {
/* this is the rc handle/index to tBTA_AV_RCB */
rc_handle = p_cb->disc & (~BTA_AV_CHNL_MSK);
} else {
/* Validate array index*/
if (((p_cb->disc & BTA_AV_HNDL_MSK) - 1) < BTA_AV_NUM_STRS) {
p_scb = p_cb->p_scb[(p_cb->disc & BTA_AV_HNDL_MSK) - 1];
}
if (p_scb) {
rc_handle = p_scb->rc_handle;
} else {
p_cb->disc = 0;
return;
}
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: rc_handle %d", __func__, rc_handle);
#if (BTA_AV_SINK_INCLUDED == TRUE)
if (p_cb->sdp_a2dp_snk_handle) {
/* This is Sink + CT + TG(Abs Vol) */
peer_features =
bta_avk_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REM_CTRL_TARGET);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: populating rem ctrl target features %d", __func__,
peer_features);
if (BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL &
bta_avk_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL))
peer_features |= (BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL | BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT);
} else
#endif
if (p_cb->sdp_a2dp_handle) {
/* check peer version and whether support CT and TG role */
peer_features =
bta_av_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL);
if ((p_cb->features & BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL) &&
((peer_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_ADV_CTRL) == 0)) {
/* if we support advance control and peer does not, check their support on
* TG role
* some implementation uses 1.3 on CT ans 1.4 on TG */
peer_features |=
bta_av_check_peer_features(UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REM_CTRL_TARGET);
}
/* Change our features if the remote AVRCP version is 1.3 or less */
tSDP_DISC_REC* p_rec = nullptr;
p_rec = SDP_FindServiceInDb(p_cb->p_disc_db,
UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL, p_rec);
if (p_rec != NULL &&
SDP_FindAttributeInRec(p_rec, ATTR_ID_BT_PROFILE_DESC_LIST) != NULL) {
/* get profile version (if failure, version parameter is not updated) */
uint16_t peer_rc_version = 0xFFFF; // Don't change the AVRCP version
SDP_FindProfileVersionInRec(p_rec, UUID_SERVCLASS_AV_REMOTE_CONTROL,
&peer_rc_version);
if (peer_rc_version <= AVRC_REV_1_3) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Using AVRCP 1.3 Capabilities with remote device",
__func__);
p_bta_av_cfg = &bta_av_cfg_compatibility;
}
}
}
p_cb->disc = 0;
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_cb->p_disc_db);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: peer_features 0x%x, features 0x%x", __func__,
peer_features, p_cb->features);
/* if we have no rc connection */
if (rc_handle == BTA_AV_RC_HANDLE_NONE) {
if (p_scb) {
/* if peer remote control service matches ours and USE_RC is true */
if ((((p_cb->features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT) &&
(peer_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG)) ||
((p_cb->features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCTG) &&
(peer_features & BTA_AV_FEAT_RCCT)))) {
p_lcb = bta_av_find_lcb(p_scb->PeerAddress(), BTA_AV_LCB_FIND);
if (p_lcb) {
rc_handle = bta_av_rc_create(p_cb, AVCT_INT,
(uint8_t)(p_scb->hdi + 1), p_lcb->lidx);
p_cb->rcb[rc_handle].peer_features = peer_features;
} else {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: can not find LCB!!", __func__);
}
} else if (p_scb->use_rc) {
/* can not find AVRC on peer device. report failure */
p_scb->use_rc = false;
tBTA_AV_RC_OPEN rc_open;
rc_open.peer_addr = p_scb->PeerAddress();
rc_open.peer_features = 0;
rc_open.status = BTA_AV_FAIL_SDP;
tBTA_AV bta_av_data;
bta_av_data.rc_open = rc_open;
(*p_cb->p_cback)(BTA_AV_RC_OPEN_EVT, &bta_av_data);
}
}
} else {
tBTA_AV_RC_FEAT rc_feat;
p_cb->rcb[rc_handle].peer_features = peer_features;
rc_feat.rc_handle = rc_handle;
rc_feat.peer_features = peer_features;
if (p_scb == NULL) {
/*
* In case scb is not created by the time we are done with SDP
* we still need to send RC feature event. So we need to get BD
* from Message
*/
rc_feat.peer_addr = p_cb->lcb[p_cb->rcb[rc_handle].lidx].addr;
} else {
rc_feat.peer_addr = p_scb->PeerAddress();
}
tBTA_AV bta_av_data;
bta_av_data.rc_feat = rc_feat;
(*p_cb->p_cback)(BTA_AV_RC_FEAT_EVT, &bta_av_data);
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: script_security_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
script_security = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 75,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PermissionPromptImpl::~PermissionPromptImpl() {
if (bubble_delegate_)
bubble_delegate_->CloseBubble();
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 146,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GahpClient::globus_gram_client_job_signal(const char * job_contact,
globus_gram_protocol_job_signal_t signal,
const char * signal_arg,
int * job_status,
int * failure_code)
{
static const char* command = "GRAM_JOB_SIGNAL";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
if (!signal_arg) signal_arg=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(job_contact) );
char *esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(signal_arg) );
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s %d %s",esc1,signal,esc2);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 4) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
*failure_code = atoi(result->argv[2]);
if ( rc == 0 ) {
*job_status = atoi(result->argv[3]);
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long do_set_mempolicy(unsigned short mode, unsigned short flags,
nodemask_t *nodes)
{
struct mempolicy *new, *old;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
NODEMASK_SCRATCH(scratch);
int ret;
if (!scratch)
return -ENOMEM;
new = mpol_new(mode, flags, nodes);
if (IS_ERR(new)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new);
goto out;
}
/*
* prevent changing our mempolicy while show_numa_maps()
* is using it.
* Note: do_set_mempolicy() can be called at init time
* with no 'mm'.
*/
if (mm)
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
task_lock(current);
ret = mpol_set_nodemask(new, nodes, scratch);
if (ret) {
task_unlock(current);
if (mm)
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mpol_put(new);
goto out;
}
old = current->mempolicy;
current->mempolicy = new;
mpol_set_task_struct_flag();
if (new && new->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE &&
nodes_weight(new->v.nodes))
current->il_next = first_node(new->v.nodes);
task_unlock(current);
if (mm)
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mpol_put(old);
ret = 0;
out:
NODEMASK_SCRATCH_FREE(scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetGet)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
zval zfname;
phar_entry_info *entry;
zend_string *sfname;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* security is 0 here so that we can get a better error message than "entry doesn't exist" */
if (!(entry = phar_get_entry_info_dir(phar_obj->archive, fname, fname_len, 1, &error, 0))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist%s%s", fname, error?", ":"", error?error:"");
} else {
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot directly get any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (entry->is_temp_dir) {
efree(entry->filename);
efree(entry);
}
sfname = strpprintf(0, "phar://%s/%s", phar_obj->archive->fname, fname);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&zfname, sfname);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex1(phar_obj->spl.info_class, return_value, &zfname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zfname);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 165,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_ext_rm_idx(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
int err;
ext4_fsblk_t leaf;
/* free index block */
path--;
leaf = idx_pblock(path->p_idx);
BUG_ON(path->p_hdr->eh_entries == 0);
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
return err;
le16_add_cpu(&path->p_hdr->eh_entries, -1);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
return err;
ext_debug("index is empty, remove it, free block %llu\n", leaf);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, 0, leaf, 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA | EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_FORGET);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::OverridePageVisibilityState(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState* visibility_state) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents =
WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host);
DCHECK(web_contents);
prerender::PrerenderManager* prerender_manager =
prerender::PrerenderManagerFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
if (prerender_manager &&
prerender_manager->IsWebContentsPrerendering(web_contents, nullptr)) {
*visibility_state = blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState::kPrerender;
}
}
Commit Message: service worker: Make navigate/openWindow go through more security checks.
WindowClient.navigate() and Clients.openWindow() were implemented in
a way that directly navigated to the URL without going through
some checks that the normal navigation path goes through. This CL
attempts to fix that:
- WindowClient.navigate() now goes through Navigator::RequestOpenURL()
instead of directly through WebContents::OpenURL().
- Clients.openWindow() now calls more ContentBrowserClient functions
for manipulating the navigation before invoking
ContentBrowserClient::OpenURL().
Bug: 904219
Change-Id: Ic38978aee98c09834fdbbc240164068faa3fd4f5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1345686
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610753}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 153,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int local_lsetxattr(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
char *path = fs_path->data;
return v9fs_set_xattr(ctx, path, name, value, size, flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int whiteheat_firmware_attach(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
/* We want this device to fail to have a driver assigned to it */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockDownloadFile* MockDownloadFileFactory::GetExistingFile(
const DownloadId& id) {
DCHECK(files_.find(id) != files_.end());
return files_[id];
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_default_root(pool *p, int allow_symlinks, const char **root) {
config_rec *c = NULL;
const char *dir = NULL;
int res;
c = find_config(main_server->conf, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
while (c != NULL) {
pr_signals_handle();
/* Check the groups acl */
if (c->argc < 2) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
res = pr_expr_eval_group_and(((char **) c->argv)+1);
if (res) {
dir = c->argv[0];
break;
}
c = find_config_next(c, c->next, CONF_PARAM, "DefaultRoot", FALSE);
}
if (dir != NULL) {
const char *new_dir;
/* Check for any expandable variables. */
new_dir = path_subst_uservar(p, &dir);
if (new_dir != NULL) {
dir = new_dir;
}
if (strncmp(dir, "/", 2) == 0) {
dir = NULL;
} else {
char *realdir;
int xerrno = 0;
if (allow_symlinks == FALSE) {
char *path, target_path[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
struct stat st;
size_t pathlen;
/* First, deal with any possible interpolation. dir_realpath() will
* do this for us, but dir_realpath() ALSO automatically follows
* symlinks, which is what we do NOT want to do here.
*/
path = pstrdup(p, dir);
if (*path != '/') {
if (*path == '~') {
if (pr_fs_interpolate(dir, target_path,
sizeof(target_path)-1) < 0) {
return -1;
}
path = target_path;
}
}
/* Note: lstat(2) is sensitive to the presence of a trailing slash on
* the path, particularly in the case of a symlink to a directory.
* Thus to get the correct test, we need to remove any trailing slash
* that might be present. Subtle.
*/
pathlen = strlen(path);
if (pathlen > 1 &&
path[pathlen-1] == '/') {
path[pathlen-1] = '\0';
}
pr_fs_clear_cache2(path);
res = pr_fsio_lstat(path, &st);
if (res < 0) {
xerrno = errno;
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING, "error: unable to check %s: %s", path,
strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
return -1;
}
if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_WARNING,
"error: DefaultRoot %s is a symlink (denied by AllowChrootSymlinks "
"config)", path);
errno = EPERM;
return -1;
}
}
/* We need to be the final user here so that if the user has their home
* directory with a mode the user proftpd is running (i.e. the User
* directive) as can not traverse down, we can still have the default
* root.
*/
pr_fs_clear_cache2(dir);
PRIVS_USER
realdir = dir_realpath(p, dir);
xerrno = errno;
PRIVS_RELINQUISH
if (realdir) {
dir = realdir;
} else {
/* Try to provide a more informative message. */
char interp_dir[PR_TUNABLE_PATH_MAX + 1];
memset(interp_dir, '\0', sizeof(interp_dir));
(void) pr_fs_interpolate(dir, interp_dir, sizeof(interp_dir)-1);
pr_log_pri(PR_LOG_NOTICE,
"notice: unable to use DefaultRoot '%s' [resolved to '%s']: %s",
dir, interp_dir, strerror(xerrno));
errno = xerrno;
}
}
}
*root = dir;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 1
| 168,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: skip_12(struct file *file)
/* Skip exactly 12 bytes in the input stream - used to skip a CRC and chunk
* header that has been read before.
*/
{
/* Since the chunks were read before this shouldn't fail: */
if (fseek(file->file, 12, SEEK_CUR) != 0)
{
if (errno != 0)
file->read_errno = errno;
stop(file, UNEXPECTED_ERROR_CODE, "reskip");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64_t FrameFetchContext::ServiceWorkerID() const {
DCHECK(IsControlledByServiceWorker() !=
blink::mojom::ControllerServiceWorkerMode::kNoController);
DCHECK(MasterDocumentLoader());
auto* service_worker_network_provider =
MasterDocumentLoader()->GetServiceWorkerNetworkProvider();
return service_worker_network_provider
? service_worker_network_provider->ControllerServiceWorkerID()
: -1;
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 145,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NuPlayer::GenericSource::isStreaming() const {
return mIsStreaming;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::SetFlingCurveParameters(
const std::vector<float>& new_touchpad,
const std::vector<float>& new_touchscreen) {
webkit_platform_support_->SetFlingCurveParameters(new_touchpad,
new_touchscreen);
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int register_netdevice(struct net_device *dev)
{
int ret;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
BUG_ON(dev_boot_phase);
ASSERT_RTNL();
might_sleep();
/* When net_device's are persistent, this will be fatal. */
BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNINITIALIZED);
BUG_ON(!net);
spin_lock_init(&dev->addr_list_lock);
netdev_set_addr_lockdep_class(dev);
ret = dev_get_valid_name(net, dev, dev->name);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* Init, if this function is available */
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_init) {
ret = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_init(dev);
if (ret) {
if (ret > 0)
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
if (((dev->hw_features | dev->features) &
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER) &&
(!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid ||
!dev->netdev_ops->ndo_vlan_rx_kill_vid)) {
netdev_WARN(dev, "Buggy VLAN acceleration in driver!\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_uninit;
}
ret = -EBUSY;
if (!dev->ifindex)
dev->ifindex = dev_new_index(net);
else if (__dev_get_by_index(net, dev->ifindex))
goto err_uninit;
/* Transfer changeable features to wanted_features and enable
* software offloads (GSO and GRO).
*/
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_SOFT_FEATURES;
dev->features |= NETIF_F_SOFT_FEATURES;
dev->wanted_features = dev->features & dev->hw_features;
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_NOCACHE_COPY;
}
/* Make NETIF_F_HIGHDMA inheritable to VLAN devices.
*/
dev->vlan_features |= NETIF_F_HIGHDMA;
/* Make NETIF_F_SG inheritable to tunnel devices.
*/
dev->hw_enc_features |= NETIF_F_SG;
/* Make NETIF_F_SG inheritable to MPLS.
*/
dev->mpls_features |= NETIF_F_SG;
ret = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_POST_INIT, dev);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret)
goto err_uninit;
ret = netdev_register_kobject(dev);
if (ret)
goto err_uninit;
dev->reg_state = NETREG_REGISTERED;
__netdev_update_features(dev);
/*
* Default initial state at registry is that the
* device is present.
*/
set_bit(__LINK_STATE_PRESENT, &dev->state);
linkwatch_init_dev(dev);
dev_init_scheduler(dev);
dev_hold(dev);
list_netdevice(dev);
add_device_randomness(dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
/* If the device has permanent device address, driver should
* set dev_addr and also addr_assign_type should be set to
* NET_ADDR_PERM (default value).
*/
if (dev->addr_assign_type == NET_ADDR_PERM)
memcpy(dev->perm_addr, dev->dev_addr, dev->addr_len);
/* Notify protocols, that a new device appeared. */
ret = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_REGISTER, dev);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret) {
rollback_registered(dev);
dev->reg_state = NETREG_UNREGISTERED;
}
/*
* Prevent userspace races by waiting until the network
* device is fully setup before sending notifications.
*/
if (!dev->rtnl_link_ops ||
dev->rtnl_link_state == RTNL_LINK_INITIALIZED)
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, ~0U, GFP_KERNEL);
out:
return ret;
err_uninit:
if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_uninit)
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_uninit(dev);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 48,930
|
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