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stringclasses 1
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stringlengths 56
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pkinit(krb5_context context,
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
krb5_principal principal,
const char *user_id,
const char *x509_anchors,
char * const * pool,
char * const * pki_revoke,
int flags,
krb5_prompter_fct prompter,
void *prompter_data,
char *password)
{
#ifdef PKINIT
krb5_error_code ret;
char *anchors = NULL;
if (opt->opt_private == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("PKINIT: on non extendable opt", ""));
return EINVAL;
}
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx =
calloc(1, sizeof(*opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx));
if (opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx == NULL)
return krb5_enomem(context);
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->require_binding = 0;
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->require_eku = 1;
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->require_krbtgt_otherName = 1;
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->peer = NULL;
/* XXX implement krb5_appdefault_strings */
if (pool == NULL)
pool = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL,
"appdefaults",
"pkinit_pool",
NULL);
if (pki_revoke == NULL)
pki_revoke = krb5_config_get_strings(context, NULL,
"appdefaults",
"pkinit_revoke",
NULL);
if (x509_anchors == NULL) {
krb5_appdefault_string(context, "kinit",
krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal),
"pkinit_anchors", NULL, &anchors);
x509_anchors = anchors;
}
if (flags & KRB5_GIC_OPT_PKINIT_ANONYMOUS)
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->anonymous = 1;
ret = _krb5_pk_load_id(context,
&opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->id,
user_id,
x509_anchors,
pool,
pki_revoke,
prompter,
prompter_data,
password);
if (ret) {
free(opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx);
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx = NULL;
return ret;
}
if (opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->id->certs) {
_krb5_pk_set_user_id(context,
principal,
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx,
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->id->certs);
} else
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->id->cert = NULL;
if ((flags & KRB5_GIC_OPT_PKINIT_USE_ENCKEY) == 0) {
hx509_context hx509ctx = context->hx509ctx;
hx509_cert cert = opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->id->cert;
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->keyex = USE_DH;
/*
* If its a ECDSA certs, lets select ECDSA as the keyex algorithm.
*/
if (cert) {
AlgorithmIdentifier alg;
ret = hx509_cert_get_SPKI_AlgorithmIdentifier(hx509ctx, cert, &alg);
if (ret == 0) {
if (der_heim_oid_cmp(&alg.algorithm, &asn1_oid_id_ecPublicKey) == 0)
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->keyex = USE_ECDH;
free_AlgorithmIdentifier(&alg);
}
}
} else {
opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->keyex = USE_RSA;
if (opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx->id->certs == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("No anonymous pkinit support in RSA mode", ""));
return EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
#else
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("no support for PKINIT compiled in", ""));
return EINVAL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_close_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
int call_close = 0;
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(calldata->arg.seqid, task) != 0)
return;
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_DOWNGRADE];
calldata->arg.fmode = FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE;
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
/* Calculate the change in open mode */
if (state->n_rdwr == 0) {
if (state->n_rdonly == 0) {
call_close |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
call_close |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
calldata->arg.fmode &= ~FMODE_READ;
}
if (state->n_wronly == 0) {
call_close |= test_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
call_close |= test_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
calldata->arg.fmode &= ~FMODE_WRITE;
}
}
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
if (!call_close) {
/* Note: exit _without_ calling nfs4_close_done */
task->tk_action = NULL;
return;
}
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0) {
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE];
if (calldata->roc &&
pnfs_roc_drain(calldata->inode, &calldata->roc_barrier)) {
rpc_sleep_on(&NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode)->roc_rpcwaitq,
task, NULL);
return;
}
}
nfs_fattr_init(calldata->res.fattr);
calldata->timestamp = jiffies;
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode),
&calldata->arg.seq_args, &calldata->res.seq_res,
1, task))
return;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ThreadHeap::RegisterWeakTable(void* table,
EphemeronCallback iteration_callback) {
DCHECK(thread_state_->InAtomicMarkingPause());
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
auto result = ephemeron_callbacks_.insert(table, iteration_callback);
DCHECK(result.is_new_entry ||
result.stored_value->value == iteration_callback);
#else
ephemeron_callbacks_.insert(table, iteration_callback);
#endif // DCHECK_IS_ON()
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *ext4_decode_error(struct super_block *sb, int errno,
char nbuf[16])
{
char *errstr = NULL;
switch (errno) {
case -EFSCORRUPTED:
errstr = "Corrupt filesystem";
break;
case -EFSBADCRC:
errstr = "Filesystem failed CRC";
break;
case -EIO:
errstr = "IO failure";
break;
case -ENOMEM:
errstr = "Out of memory";
break;
case -EROFS:
if (!sb || (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal &&
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT))
errstr = "Journal has aborted";
else
errstr = "Readonly filesystem";
break;
default:
/* If the caller passed in an extra buffer for unknown
* errors, textualise them now. Else we just return
* NULL. */
if (nbuf) {
/* Check for truncated error codes... */
if (snprintf(nbuf, 16, "error %d", -errno) >= 0)
errstr = nbuf;
}
break;
}
return errstr;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: box_add(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
Point *p = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOX_P(box_construct((box->high.x + p->x),
(box->low.x + p->x),
(box->high.y + p->y),
(box->low.y + p->y)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline double DrawEpsilonReciprocal(const double x)
{
double sign = x < 0.0 ? -1.0 : 1.0;
return((sign*x) >= DrawEpsilon ? 1.0/x : sign*(1.0/DrawEpsilon));
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::sourceWasAdded(HTMLSourceElement* source) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "sourceWasAdded(" << (void*)this << ", " << source << ")";
KURL url = source->getNonEmptyURLAttribute(srcAttr);
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "sourceWasAdded(" << (void*)this << ") - 'src' is "
<< urlForLoggingMedia(url);
if (fastHasAttribute(srcAttr))
return;
if (getNetworkState() == HTMLMediaElement::kNetworkEmpty) {
invokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm();
m_nextChildNodeToConsider = source;
return;
}
if (m_currentSourceNode && source == m_currentSourceNode->nextSibling()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "sourceWasAdded(" << (void*)this
<< ") - <source> inserted immediately after current source";
m_nextChildNodeToConsider = source;
return;
}
if (m_nextChildNodeToConsider)
return;
if (m_loadState != WaitingForSource)
return;
setShouldDelayLoadEvent(true);
setNetworkState(kNetworkLoading);
m_nextChildNodeToConsider = source;
scheduleNextSourceChild();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void enforcedRangeUnsignedLongAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->enforcedRangeUnsignedLongAttr());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct lh_table* lh_table_new(int size, const char *name,
lh_entry_free_fn *free_fn,
lh_hash_fn *hash_fn,
lh_equal_fn *equal_fn)
{
int i;
struct lh_table *t;
t = (struct lh_table*)calloc(1, sizeof(struct lh_table));
if(!t) lh_abort("lh_table_new: calloc failed\n");
t->count = 0;
t->size = size;
t->name = name;
t->table = (struct lh_entry*)calloc(size, sizeof(struct lh_entry));
if(!t->table) lh_abort("lh_table_new: calloc failed\n");
t->free_fn = free_fn;
t->hash_fn = hash_fn;
t->equal_fn = equal_fn;
for(i = 0; i < size; i++) t->table[i].k = LH_EMPTY;
return t;
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 40,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: makepng_warning(png_structp png_ptr, png_const_charp message)
{
const char **ep = png_get_error_ptr(png_ptr);
const char *name;
if (ep != NULL && *ep != NULL)
name = *ep;
else
name = "makepng";
fprintf(stderr, "%s: warning: %s\n", name, message);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void efx_init_channels(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;
struct efx_rx_queue *rx_queue;
struct efx_channel *channel;
/* Calculate the rx buffer allocation parameters required to
* support the current MTU, including padding for header
* alignment and overruns.
*/
efx->rx_buffer_len = (max(EFX_PAGE_IP_ALIGN, NET_IP_ALIGN) +
EFX_MAX_FRAME_LEN(efx->net_dev->mtu) +
efx->type->rx_buffer_hash_size +
efx->type->rx_buffer_padding);
efx->rx_buffer_order = get_order(efx->rx_buffer_len +
sizeof(struct efx_rx_page_state));
/* Initialise the channels */
efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx) {
netif_dbg(channel->efx, drv, channel->efx->net_dev,
"init chan %d\n", channel->channel);
efx_init_eventq(channel);
efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue(tx_queue, channel)
efx_init_tx_queue(tx_queue);
/* The rx buffer allocation strategy is MTU dependent */
efx_rx_strategy(channel);
efx_for_each_channel_rx_queue(rx_queue, channel)
efx_init_rx_queue(rx_queue);
WARN_ON(channel->rx_pkt != NULL);
efx_rx_strategy(channel);
}
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeHttpAuthHandler::OnAutofillDataAvailable(
const base::string16& username,
const base::string16& password) {
DCHECK(java_chrome_http_auth_handler_.obj() != NULL);
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> j_username =
ConvertUTF16ToJavaString(env, username);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> j_password =
ConvertUTF16ToJavaString(env, password);
Java_ChromeHttpAuthHandler_onAutofillDataAvailable(
env, java_chrome_http_auth_handler_, j_username, j_password);
}
Commit Message: Auto-dismiss http auth dialogs on navigation for Android.
BUG=884179
Change-Id: I18287e9c641045d5a74f3804e06ca17485e38957
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1227482
Commit-Queue: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#591747}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 144,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isofile_free(struct isofile *file)
{
struct content *con, *tmp;
con = file->content.next;
while (con != NULL) {
tmp = con;
con = con->next;
free(tmp);
}
archive_entry_free(file->entry);
archive_string_free(&(file->parentdir));
archive_string_free(&(file->basename));
archive_string_free(&(file->basename_utf16));
archive_string_free(&(file->symlink));
free(file);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rule_criteria_destroy(struct rule_criteria *criteria)
{
cls_rule_destroy(&criteria->cr);
criteria->version = OVS_VERSION_NOT_REMOVED; /* Mark as destroyed. */
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_secinfo(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_secinfo_res *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_sequence(xdr, &res->seq_res, rqstp);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_putfh(xdr);
if (status)
goto out;
status = decode_secinfo(xdr, res);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: magic_descriptor(struct magic_set *ms, int fd)
{
if (ms == NULL)
return NULL;
return file_or_fd(ms, NULL, fd);
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 45,976
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_net_uninit(VMXNET3State *s)
{
g_free(s->mcast_list);
vmxnet3_deactivate_device(s);
qemu_del_nic(s->nic);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u64 nsec_to_cycles(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 nsec)
{
u64 ret;
WARN_ON(preemptible());
if (kvm_tsc_changes_freq())
printk_once(KERN_WARNING
"kvm: unreliable cycle conversion on adjustable rate TSC\n");
ret = nsec * vcpu_tsc_khz(vcpu);
do_div(ret, USEC_PER_SEC);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnDeviceScaleFactorChanged(
float device_scale_factor) {
if (!host_)
return;
device_scale_factor_ = device_scale_factor;
BackingStoreAura* backing_store = static_cast<BackingStoreAura*>(
host_->GetBackingStore(false));
if (backing_store) // NULL in hardware path.
backing_store->ScaleFactorChanged(device_scale_factor);
UpdateScreenInfo(window_);
host_->NotifyScreenInfoChanged();
current_cursor_.SetScaleFactor(device_scale_factor);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stringArrayAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, v8Array(imp->stringArrayAttribute(), info.GetIsolate()));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_packet(unsigned char *data, int data_len, const struct sockaddr_in *address) {
struct mt_mactelnet_hdr pkthdr;
struct mt_connection *curconn = NULL;
struct mt_packet pdata;
struct net_interface *interface;
/* Check for minimal size */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN - 4) {
return;
}
parse_packet(data, &pkthdr);
/* Drop packets not belonging to us */
if ((interface = find_socket(pkthdr.dstaddr)) < 0) {
return;
}
switch (pkthdr.ptype) {
case MT_PTYPE_PING:
if (pings++ > MT_MAXPPS) {
/* Don't want it to wrap around back to the valid range */
pings--;
break;
}
init_pongpacket(&pdata, (unsigned char *)&(pkthdr.dstaddr), (unsigned char *)&(pkthdr.srcaddr));
add_packetdata(&pdata, pkthdr.data - 4, data_len - (MT_HEADER_LEN - 4));
{
if (index >= 0) {
send_special_udp(interface, MT_MACTELNET_PORT, &pdata);
}
}
break;
case MT_PTYPE_SESSIONSTART:
curconn = list_find_connection(pkthdr.seskey, (unsigned char *)&(pkthdr.srcaddr));
if (curconn != NULL) {
/* Ignore multiple session starts from the same sender, this can be same mac but different interface */
break;
}
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("(%d) New connection from %s."), pkthdr.seskey, ether_ntoa((struct ether_addr*)&(pkthdr.srcaddr)));
curconn = calloc(1, sizeof(struct mt_connection));
curconn->seskey = pkthdr.seskey;
curconn->lastdata = time(NULL);
curconn->state = STATE_AUTH;
curconn->interface = interface;
strncpy(curconn->interface_name, interface->name, 254);
curconn->interface_name[255] = '\0';
memcpy(curconn->srcmac, pkthdr.srcaddr, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(curconn->srcip, &(address->sin_addr), IPV4_ALEN);
curconn->srcport = htons(address->sin_port);
memcpy(curconn->dstmac, pkthdr.dstaddr, ETH_ALEN);
list_add_connection(curconn);
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, pkthdr.dstaddr, pkthdr.srcaddr, pkthdr.seskey, pkthdr.counter);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
break;
case MT_PTYPE_END:
curconn = list_find_connection(pkthdr.seskey, (unsigned char *)&(pkthdr.srcaddr));
if (curconn == NULL) {
break;
}
if (curconn->state != STATE_CLOSED) {
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_END, pkthdr.dstaddr, pkthdr.srcaddr, pkthdr.seskey, pkthdr.counter);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
}
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, _("(%d) Connection closed."), curconn->seskey);
list_remove_connection(curconn);
return;
case MT_PTYPE_ACK:
curconn = list_find_connection(pkthdr.seskey, (unsigned char *)&(pkthdr.srcaddr));
if (curconn == NULL) {
break;
}
if (pkthdr.counter <= curconn->outcounter) {
curconn->wait_for_ack = 0;
curconn->lastack = pkthdr.counter;
}
if (time(0) - curconn->lastdata > 9 || pkthdr.counter == curconn->lastack) {
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, pkthdr.dstaddr, pkthdr.srcaddr, pkthdr.seskey, pkthdr.counter);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
}
curconn->lastdata = time(NULL);
return;
case MT_PTYPE_DATA:
curconn = list_find_connection(pkthdr.seskey, (unsigned char *)&(pkthdr.srcaddr));
if (curconn == NULL) {
break;
}
curconn->lastdata = time(NULL);
/* now check the right size */
if (data_len < MT_HEADER_LEN) {
/* Ignore illegal packet */
return;
}
/* ack the data packet */
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, pkthdr.dstaddr, pkthdr.srcaddr, pkthdr.seskey, pkthdr.counter + (data_len - MT_HEADER_LEN));
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
/* Accept first packet, and all packets greater than incounter, and if counter has
wrapped around. */
if (curconn->incounter == 0 || pkthdr.counter > curconn->incounter || (curconn->incounter - pkthdr.counter) > 16777216) {
curconn->incounter = pkthdr.counter;
} else {
/* Ignore double or old packets */
return;
}
handle_data_packet(curconn, &pkthdr, data_len);
break;
default:
if (curconn) {
syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("(%d) Unhandeled packet type: %d"), curconn->seskey, pkthdr.ptype);
init_packet(&pdata, MT_PTYPE_ACK, pkthdr.dstaddr, pkthdr.srcaddr, pkthdr.seskey, pkthdr.counter);
send_udp(curconn, &pdata);
}
}
if (0 && curconn != NULL) {
printf("Packet, incounter %d, outcounter %d\n", curconn->incounter, curconn->outcounter);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashError Splash::restoreState() {
SplashState *oldState;
if (!state->next) {
return splashErrNoSave;
}
oldState = state;
state = state->next;
delete oldState;
return splashOk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *phar_get_link_location(phar_entry_info *entry) /* {{{ */
{
char *p, *ret = NULL;
if (!entry->link) {
return NULL;
}
if (entry->link[0] == '/') {
return estrdup(entry->link + 1);
}
p = strrchr(entry->filename, '/');
if (p) {
*p = '\0';
spprintf(&ret, 0, "%s/%s", entry->filename, entry->link);
return ret;
}
return entry->link;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidCommitNavigationInternal(
const blink::WebHistoryItem& item,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type,
bool was_within_same_document,
ui::PageTransition transition,
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderRequest
remote_interface_provider_request) {
DCHECK(!(was_within_same_document &&
remote_interface_provider_request.is_pending()));
UpdateStateForCommit(item, commit_type, transition);
if (was_within_same_document) {
GetFrameHost()->DidCommitSameDocumentNavigation(
MakeDidCommitProvisionalLoadParams(commit_type, transition));
} else {
GetFrameHost()->DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
MakeDidCommitProvisionalLoadParams(commit_type, transition),
std::move(remote_interface_provider_request));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: okeys_object_field_start(void *state, char *fname, bool isnull)
{
OkeysState *_state = (OkeysState *) state;
/* only collecting keys for the top level object */
if (_state->lex->lex_level != 1)
return;
/* enlarge result array if necessary */
if (_state->result_count >= _state->result_size)
{
_state->result_size *= 2;
_state->result = (char **)
repalloc(_state->result, sizeof(char *) * _state->result_size);
}
/* save a copy of the field name */
_state->result[_state->result_count++] = pstrdup(fname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BackRenderbuffer::AllocateStorage(const gfx::Size& size,
GLenum format,
GLsizei samples) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackRenderbuffer::AllocateStorage",
decoder_->error_state_.get());
ScopedRenderBufferBinder binder(&decoder_->state_,
decoder_->error_state_.get(), id_);
uint32_t estimated_size = 0;
if (!decoder_->renderbuffer_manager()->ComputeEstimatedRenderbufferSize(
size.width(), size.height(), samples, format, &estimated_size)) {
return false;
}
decoder_->RenderbufferStorageMultisampleHelper(GL_RENDERBUFFER, samples,
format, size.width(),
size.height(), kDoNotForce);
bool alpha_channel_needs_clear =
(format == GL_RGBA || format == GL_RGBA8) &&
!decoder_->offscreen_buffer_should_have_alpha_;
if (alpha_channel_needs_clear) {
GLuint fbo;
api()->glGenFramebuffersEXTFn(1, &fbo);
{
ScopedFramebufferBinder binder(decoder_, fbo);
api()->glFramebufferRenderbufferEXTFn(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER, GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0, GL_RENDERBUFFER, id_);
api()->glClearColorFn(0, 0, 0, decoder_->BackBufferAlphaClearColor());
decoder_->state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
decoder_->state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
decoder_->ClearDeviceWindowRectangles();
api()->glClearFn(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT);
decoder_->RestoreClearState();
}
api()->glDeleteFramebuffersEXTFn(1, &fbo);
}
bool success = api()->glGetErrorFn() == GL_NO_ERROR;
if (success) {
memory_tracker_.TrackMemFree(bytes_allocated_);
bytes_allocated_ = estimated_size;
memory_tracker_.TrackMemAlloc(bytes_allocated_);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_lease_context(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct kvec *iov,
unsigned int *num_iovec, __u8 *oplock)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
iov[num].iov_base = server->ops->create_lease_buf(oplock+1, *oplock);
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = server->vals->create_lease_size;
req->RequestedOplockLevel = SMB2_OPLOCK_LEVEL_LEASE;
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset = cpu_to_le32(
sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) - 4 +
iov[num - 1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength,
server->vals->create_lease_size);
inc_rfc1001_len(&req->hdr, server->vals->create_lease_size);
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface::put(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, JSValue value, PutPropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface*>(cell);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
lookupPut<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface, Base>(exec, propertyName, value, &JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceTable, thisObject, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init init(void)
{
if (!force && is_blacklisted_cpu()) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"camellia-x86_64: performance on this CPU "
"would be suboptimal: disabling "
"camellia-x86_64.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return crypto_register_algs(camellia_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(camellia_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *phar_get_link_location(phar_entry_info *entry TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *p, *ret = NULL;
if (!entry->link) {
return NULL;
}
if (entry->link[0] == '/') {
return estrdup(entry->link + 1);
}
p = strrchr(entry->filename, '/');
if (p) {
*p = '\0';
spprintf(&ret, 0, "%s/%s", entry->filename, entry->link);
return ret;
}
return entry->link;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::BookmarkCurrentPage() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Star"), profile_);
BookmarkModel* model = profile()->GetBookmarkModel();
if (!model || !model->IsLoaded())
return; // Ignore requests until bookmarks are loaded.
GURL url;
string16 title;
TabContents* tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
bookmark_utils::GetURLAndTitleToBookmark(tab, &url, &title);
bool was_bookmarked = model->IsBookmarked(url);
if (!was_bookmarked && profile_->IsOffTheRecord()) {
tab->SaveFavicon();
}
model->SetURLStarred(url, title, true);
if (window_->IsActive() && model->IsBookmarked(url)) {
window_->ShowBookmarkBubble(url, was_bookmarked);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output;
size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen;
int r;
u_int ssh1cipher = 0;
if (!compat20) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen,
(int)ssh1cipher);
if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context) != (int)slen ||
cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_set_keyiv(state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
* count from the completion of the authentication.
*/
state->rekey_time = monotime();
/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen ||
cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
cipher_set_keycontext(state->send_context, keyout);
cipher_set_keycontext(state->receive_context, keyin);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_compress_state(ssh, m)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
sshbuf_reset(state->input);
sshbuf_reset(state->output);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(m))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 17,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double Instance::CalculateZoom(uint32 control_id) const {
if (control_id == kZoomInButtonId) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < chrome_page_zoom::kPresetZoomFactorsSize; ++i) {
double current_zoom = chrome_page_zoom::kPresetZoomFactors[i];
if (current_zoom - content::kEpsilon > zoom_)
return current_zoom;
}
} else {
for (size_t i = chrome_page_zoom::kPresetZoomFactorsSize; i > 0; --i) {
double current_zoom = chrome_page_zoom::kPresetZoomFactors[i - 1];
if (current_zoom + content::kEpsilon < zoom_)
return current_zoom;
}
}
return zoom_;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool hasErrorInfo(ExecState* exec, JSObject* error)
{
return error->hasProperty(exec, Identifier(exec, linePropertyName))
|| error->hasProperty(exec, Identifier(exec, sourceURLPropertyName));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned char *PopRunlengthPacket(Image *image,unsigned char *pixels,
size_t length,PixelPacket pixel,IndexPacket index)
{
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
{
unsigned int
value;
value=(unsigned int) index;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 32:
{
*pixels++=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
*pixels++=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
}
case 16:
*pixels++=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
case 8:
{
*pixels++=(unsigned char) value;
break;
}
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"ImageDepthNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
}
switch (image->depth)
{
case 32:
{
unsigned int
value;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToLong(pixel.opacity);
pixels=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
value;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel.opacity);
pixels=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
unsigned char
value;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
value=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.opacity);
pixels=PopCharPixel(value,pixels);
}
break;
}
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"ImageDepthNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
}
*pixels++=(unsigned char) length;
return(pixels);
}
switch (image->depth)
{
case 32:
{
unsigned int
value;
value=ScaleQuantumToLong(pixel.red);
pixels=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToLong(pixel.green);
pixels=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
value=ScaleQuantumToLong(pixel.blue);
pixels=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToLong(index);
pixels=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToLong(pixel.opacity);
pixels=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
value;
value=ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel.red);
pixels=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel.green);
pixels=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
value=ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel.blue);
pixels=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToShort(index);
pixels=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
value=ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel.opacity);
pixels=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,value,pixels);
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
unsigned char
value;
value=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.red);
pixels=PopCharPixel(value,pixels);
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
{
value=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.green);
pixels=PopCharPixel(value,pixels);
value=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.blue);
pixels=PopCharPixel(value,pixels);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
value=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(index);
pixels=PopCharPixel(value,pixels);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
value=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel.opacity);
pixels=PopCharPixel(value,pixels);
}
break;
}
default:
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"ImageDepthNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
}
*pixels++=(unsigned char) length;
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_internal_pointer_end_ex(HashTable *ht, HashPosition *pos)
{
uint32_t idx;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(&ht->nInternalPointer != pos || GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
idx = ht->nNumUsed;
while (idx > 0) {
idx--;
if (Z_TYPE(ht->arData[idx].val) != IS_UNDEF) {
*pos = idx;
return;
}
}
*pos = HT_INVALID_IDX;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 69,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::EqualsDelegate(InfoBarDelegate* delegate) const {
ConfirmInfoBarDelegate* confirm_delegate =
delegate->AsConfirmInfoBarDelegate();
return confirm_delegate &&
(confirm_delegate->GetMessageText() == GetMessageText());
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MemoryInstrumentation* MemoryInstrumentation::GetInstance() {
return g_instance;
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 150,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_from_user_state(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_usersa_info *p)
{
memcpy(&x->id, &p->id, sizeof(x->id));
memcpy(&x->sel, &p->sel, sizeof(x->sel));
memcpy(&x->lft, &p->lft, sizeof(x->lft));
x->props.mode = p->mode;
x->props.replay_window = min_t(unsigned int, p->replay_window,
sizeof(x->replay.bitmap) * 8);
x->props.reqid = p->reqid;
x->props.family = p->family;
memcpy(&x->props.saddr, &p->saddr, sizeof(x->props.saddr));
x->props.flags = p->flags;
if (!x->sel.family && !(p->flags & XFRM_STATE_AF_UNSPEC))
x->sel.family = p->family;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct buffer_head *ext4_bread(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t block, int map_flags)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
bh = ext4_getblk(handle, inode, block, map_flags);
if (IS_ERR(bh))
return bh;
if (!bh || buffer_uptodate(bh))
return bh;
ll_rw_block(READ | REQ_META | REQ_PRIO, 1, &bh);
wait_on_buffer(bh);
if (buffer_uptodate(bh))
return bh;
put_bh(bh);
return ERR_PTR(-EIO);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_NOTIFY_INFO(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
guint32 count;
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_version, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_flags, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_notify_info_count, &count);
if (!di->conformant_run)
col_append_fstr(
pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %d %s", count,
notify_plural(count));
offset = dissect_ndr_ucarray(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
dissect_NOTIFY_INFO_DATA);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 52,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int PermissionsBubbleDialogDelegateView::GetDialogButtons() const {
return ui::DIALOG_BUTTON_OK | ui::DIALOG_BUTTON_CANCEL;
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 146,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_getattr_three(struct xdr_stream *xdr,
uint32_t bm0, uint32_t bm1, uint32_t bm2,
struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
__be32 *p;
p = reserve_space(xdr, 4);
*p = cpu_to_be32(OP_GETATTR);
if (bm2) {
p = reserve_space(xdr, 16);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(3);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(bm0);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(bm1);
*p = cpu_to_be32(bm2);
} else if (bm1) {
p = reserve_space(xdr, 12);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(2);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(bm0);
*p = cpu_to_be32(bm1);
} else {
p = reserve_space(xdr, 8);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1);
*p = cpu_to_be32(bm0);
}
hdr->nops++;
hdr->replen += decode_getattr_maxsz;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_stco_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int i;
int mode64 = co64_required(track); // use 32 bit size variant if possible
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
if (mode64)
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "co64");
else
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "stco");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* version & flags */
avio_wb32(pb, track->chunkCount); /* entry count */
for (i = 0; i < track->entry; i++) {
if (!track->cluster[i].chunkNum)
continue;
if (mode64 == 1)
avio_wb64(pb, track->cluster[i].pos + track->data_offset);
else
avio_wb32(pb, track->cluster[i].pos + track->data_offset);
}
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int swevent_hlist_get_cpu(struct perf_event *event, int cpu)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = &per_cpu(swevent_htable, cpu);
int err = 0;
mutex_lock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
if (!swevent_hlist_deref(swhash) && cpu_online(cpu)) {
struct swevent_hlist *hlist;
hlist = kzalloc(sizeof(*hlist), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hlist) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(swhash->swevent_hlist, hlist);
}
swhash->hlist_refcount++;
exit:
mutex_unlock(&swhash->hlist_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourcePtr<RawResource> ResourceFetcher::fetchTextTrack(FetchRequest& request)
{
return toRawResource(requestResource(Resource::TextTrack, request));
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 35,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long long Track::GetSeekPreRoll() const
{
return m_info.seekPreRoll;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ctr_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm));
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int err;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
kernel_fpu_begin();
while ((nbytes = walk.nbytes) >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
aesni_ctr_enc_tfm(ctx, walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
nbytes & AES_BLOCK_MASK, walk.iv);
nbytes &= AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, nbytes);
}
if (walk.nbytes) {
ctr_crypt_final(ctx, &walk);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
kernel_fpu_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long exit_qualification;
bool has_error_code = false;
u32 error_code = 0;
u16 tss_selector;
int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
switch (type) {
case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
has_error_code = true;
error_code =
vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
}
/* fall through */
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
tss_selector = exit_qualification;
if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
if (kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1, reason,
has_error_code, error_code) == EMULATE_FAIL) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
/* clear all local breakpoint enable flags */
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7) & ~55);
/*
* TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
* Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::OnClearCachedPagesDone(
base::Time start_time,
size_t deleted_page_count,
ClearStorageResult result) {
last_clear_cached_pages_time_ = start_time;
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int brport_nla_put_flag(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 flags, u32 mask,
unsigned int attrnum, unsigned int flag)
{
if (mask & flag)
return nla_put_u8(skb, attrnum, !!(flags & flag));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::MaybeReattachToRenderFrame() {
if (!EnsureAgent())
return;
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport QuantumInfo *DestroyQuantumInfo(QuantumInfo *quantum_info)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (quantum_info->semaphore != (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
RelinquishSemaphoreInfo(&quantum_info->semaphore);
quantum_info->signature=(~MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(quantum_info);
return(quantum_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_get_num_spots(gx_device * dev)
{
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &icc_profile,
&render_cond);
return dev->color_info.num_components - icc_profile->num_comps;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: map_engine_defer(script_t* script, int num_frames)
{
struct deferred* deferred;
if (++s_num_deferreds > s_max_deferreds) {
s_max_deferreds = s_num_deferreds * 2;
s_deferreds = realloc(s_deferreds, s_max_deferreds * sizeof(struct deferred));
}
deferred = &s_deferreds[s_num_deferreds - 1];
deferred->script = script;
deferred->frames_left = num_frames;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashCoord Splash::getLineDashPhase() {
return state->lineDashPhase;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t virtio_config_modern_readb(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint32_t addr)
{
VirtioDeviceClass *k = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(vdev);
uint8_t val;
if (addr + sizeof(val) > vdev->config_len) {
return (uint32_t)-1;
}
k->get_config(vdev, vdev->config);
val = ldub_p(vdev->config + addr);
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_all_translation_tables(exporter_ipfix_domain_t *exporter) {
input_translation_t *table, *next;
LogInfo("Process_ipfix: Withdraw all templates from observation domain %u\n",
exporter->info.id);
table = exporter->input_translation_table;
while ( table ) {
next = table->next;
dbg_printf("\n[%u] Withdraw template ID: %u\n", exporter->info.id, table->id);
free(table->sequence);
free(table->extension_info.map);
free(table);
table = next;
}
exporter->input_translation_table = NULL;
exporter->current_table = NULL;
} // End of remove_all_translation_tables
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 88,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_master(vrrp_t * vrrp)
{
/* Send the VRRP advert */
vrrp_state_master_tx(vrrp);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SVGFEColorMatrixElement::setFilterEffectAttribute(FilterEffect* effect, const QualifiedName& attrName)
{
FEColorMatrix* colorMatrix = static_cast<FEColorMatrix*>(effect);
if (attrName == SVGNames::typeAttr)
return colorMatrix->setType(m_type->currentValue()->enumValue());
if (attrName == SVGNames::valuesAttr)
return colorMatrix->setValues(m_values->currentValue()->toFloatVector());
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Explicitly enforce values size in feColorMatrix.
R=senorblanco@chromium.org
BUG=468519
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1075413002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@193571 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
if (!frame_)
return false;
if (!frame_->document().isNull())
GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(frame_->document().url());
base::ObserverListBase<RenderFrameObserver>::Iterator it(&observers_);
RenderFrameObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL) {
if (observer->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
}
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderFrameImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_Navigate, OnNavigate)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_BeforeUnload, OnBeforeUnload)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_SwapOut, OnSwapOut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_Stop, OnStop)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_ContextMenuClosed, OnContextMenuClosed)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_CustomContextMenuAction,
OnCustomContextMenuAction)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Undo, OnUndo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Redo, OnRedo)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Cut, OnCut)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Copy, OnCopy)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Paste, OnPaste)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_PasteAndMatchStyle, OnPasteAndMatchStyle)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Delete, OnDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_SelectAll, OnSelectAll)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_SelectRange, OnSelectRange)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_AdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset,
OnAdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Unselect, OnUnselect)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_MoveRangeSelectionExtent,
OnMoveRangeSelectionExtent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_Replace, OnReplace)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_ReplaceMisspelling, OnReplaceMisspelling)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_ExtendSelectionAndDelete,
OnExtendSelectionAndDelete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_SetCompositionFromExistingText,
OnSetCompositionFromExistingText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_ExecuteNoValueEditCommand,
OnExecuteNoValueEditCommand)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_CSSInsertRequest, OnCSSInsertRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_AddMessageToConsole, OnAddMessageToConsole)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_JavaScriptExecuteRequest,
OnJavaScriptExecuteRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_JavaScriptExecuteRequestForTests,
OnJavaScriptExecuteRequestForTests)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_JavaScriptExecuteRequestInIsolatedWorld,
OnJavaScriptExecuteRequestInIsolatedWorld)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_VisualStateRequest,
OnVisualStateRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_SetEditableSelectionOffsets,
OnSetEditableSelectionOffsets)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_Reload, OnReload)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_TextSurroundingSelectionRequest,
OnTextSurroundingSelectionRequest)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_SetAccessibilityMode,
OnSetAccessibilityMode)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(AccessibilityMsg_SnapshotTree,
OnSnapshotAccessibilityTree)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_DisownOpener, OnDisownOpener)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_CommitNavigation, OnCommitNavigation)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_DidUpdateSandboxFlags, OnDidUpdateSandboxFlags)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_SetTextTrackSettings,
OnTextTrackSettingsChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_PostMessageEvent, OnPostMessageEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_FailedNavigation, OnFailedNavigation)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_SelectPopupMenuItems, OnSelectPopupMenuItems)
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameMsg_SelectPopupMenuItem, OnSelectPopupMenuItem)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(InputMsg_CopyToFindPboard, OnCopyToFindPboard)
#endif
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sapi_header_add_op(sapi_header_op_enum op, sapi_header_struct *sapi_header TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!sapi_module.header_handler ||
(SAPI_HEADER_ADD & sapi_module.header_handler(sapi_header, op, &SG(sapi_headers) TSRMLS_CC))) {
if (op == SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE) {
char *colon_offset = strchr(sapi_header->header, ':');
if (colon_offset) {
char sav = *colon_offset;
*colon_offset = 0;
sapi_remove_header(&SG(sapi_headers).headers, sapi_header->header, strlen(sapi_header->header));
*colon_offset = sav;
}
}
zend_llist_add_element(&SG(sapi_headers).headers, (void *) sapi_header);
} else {
sapi_free_header(sapi_header);
}
}
Commit Message: Update header handling to RFC 7230
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 56,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOL update_send_set_keyboard_indicators(rdpContext* context,
UINT16 led_flags)
{
wStream* s;
rdpRdp* rdp = context->rdp;
s = rdp_data_pdu_init(rdp);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
Stream_Write_UINT16(s,
0); /* unitId should be 0 according to MS-RDPBCGR 2.2.8.2.1.1 */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, led_flags); /* ledFlags (2 bytes) */
return rdp_send_data_pdu(rdp, s, DATA_PDU_TYPE_SET_KEYBOARD_INDICATORS,
rdp->mcs->userId);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vq_log_access_ok(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
void __user *log_base)
{
size_t s = vhost_has_feature(vq, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX) ? 2 : 0;
return vq_memory_access_ok(log_base, vq->memory,
vhost_has_feature(vq, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) &&
(!vq->log_used || log_access_ok(log_base, vq->log_addr,
sizeof *vq->used +
vq->num * sizeof *vq->used->ring + s));
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int credssp_write_ts_password_creds(rdpCredssp* credssp, wStream* s)
{
int size = 0;
int innerSize = credssp_sizeof_ts_password_creds(credssp);
/* TSPasswordCreds (SEQUENCE) */
size += ber_write_sequence_tag(s, innerSize);
/* [0] domainName (OCTET STRING) */
size += ber_write_sequence_octet_string(s, 0, (BYTE*) credssp->identity.Domain, credssp->identity.DomainLength * 2);
/* [1] userName (OCTET STRING) */
size += ber_write_sequence_octet_string(s, 1, (BYTE*) credssp->identity.User, credssp->identity.UserLength * 2);
/* [2] password (OCTET STRING) */
size += ber_write_sequence_octet_string(s, 2, (BYTE*) credssp->identity.Password, credssp->identity.PasswordLength * 2);
return size;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::~ChromeContentBrowserClient() {
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void recordIcingSelectionAvailable(const std::string& encoding,
const base::string16& surrounding_text,
size_t start_offset,
size_t end_offset) {
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void update_free(rdpUpdate* update)
{
if (update != NULL)
{
OFFSCREEN_DELETE_LIST* deleteList = &(update->altsec->create_offscreen_bitmap.deleteList);
if (deleteList)
free(deleteList->indices);
free(update->pointer);
if (update->primary)
{
free(update->primary->polyline.points);
free(update->primary->polygon_sc.points);
free(update->primary->fast_glyph.glyphData.aj);
free(update->primary);
}
free(update->secondary);
free(update->altsec);
if (update->window)
{
free(update->window->monitored_desktop.windowIds);
update_free_window_state(&update->window->window_state);
update_free_window_icon_info(update->window->window_icon.iconInfo);
free(update->window);
}
MessageQueue_Free(update->queue);
free(update);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: e1000e_link_down(E1000ECore *core)
{
e1000x_update_regs_on_link_down(core->mac, core->phy[0]);
e1000e_update_flowctl_status(core);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_ctx_unlock(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static LayoutSize sizeFor(HTMLImageElement* image)
{
if (ImageResource* cachedImage = image->cachedImage())
return cachedImage->imageSizeForRenderer(image->renderer(), 1.0f); // FIXME: Not sure about this.
return IntSize();
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockWidgetInputHandler::MessageVector ExpectGestureScrollEndForWheelScrolling(
bool is_last) {
MockWidgetInputHandler::MessageVector events =
GetAndResetDispatchedMessages();
if (is_last) {
EXPECT_EQ("GestureScrollEnd", GetMessageNames(events));
return events;
}
EXPECT_EQ(0U, events.size());
return events;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NotifyRedirectOnUI(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_host,
scoped_ptr<ResourceRedirectDetails> details) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* host =
RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, render_frame_host);
WebContentsImpl* web_contents =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(host));
if (!web_contents)
return;
web_contents->DidGetRedirectForResourceRequest(host, *details.get());
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 132,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebString WebLocalFrameImpl::SelectionAsText() const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
WebPluginContainerImpl* plugin_container =
GetFrame()->GetWebPluginContainer();
if (plugin_container)
return plugin_container->Plugin()->SelectionAsText();
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
String text = GetFrame()->Selection().SelectedText(
TextIteratorBehavior::EmitsObjectReplacementCharacterBehavior());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
ReplaceNewlinesWithWindowsStyleNewlines(text);
#endif
ReplaceNBSPWithSpace(text);
return text;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputWindowInfo::isTrustedOverlay() const {
return layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_INPUT_METHOD_DIALOG
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_MAGNIFICATION_OVERLAY
|| layoutParamsType == TYPE_SECURE_SYSTEM_OVERLAY;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 174,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *m4ds_New()
{
GF_MPEG4ExtensionDescriptorsBox *tmp = (GF_MPEG4ExtensionDescriptorsBox *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_MPEG4ExtensionDescriptorsBox));
if (tmp == NULL) return NULL;
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(GF_MPEG4ExtensionDescriptorsBox));
tmp->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_M4DS;
tmp->descriptors = gf_list_new();
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PositionWithAffinity RenderBox::positionForPoint(const LayoutPoint& point)
{
if (!firstChild())
return createPositionWithAffinity(nonPseudoNode() ? firstPositionInOrBeforeNode(nonPseudoNode()) : Position());
if (isTable() && nonPseudoNode()) {
LayoutUnit right = contentWidth() + borderAndPaddingWidth();
LayoutUnit bottom = contentHeight() + borderAndPaddingHeight();
if (point.x() < 0 || point.x() > right || point.y() < 0 || point.y() > bottom) {
if (point.x() <= right / 2)
return createPositionWithAffinity(firstPositionInOrBeforeNode(nonPseudoNode()));
return createPositionWithAffinity(lastPositionInOrAfterNode(nonPseudoNode()));
}
}
LayoutUnit minDist = LayoutUnit::max();
RenderBox* closestRenderer = 0;
LayoutPoint adjustedPoint = point;
if (isTableRow())
adjustedPoint.moveBy(location());
for (RenderObject* renderObject = firstChild(); renderObject; renderObject = renderObject->nextSibling()) {
if ((!renderObject->firstChild() && !renderObject->isInline() && !renderObject->isRenderBlockFlow() )
|| renderObject->style()->visibility() != VISIBLE)
continue;
if (!renderObject->isBox())
continue;
RenderBox* renderer = toRenderBox(renderObject);
LayoutUnit top = renderer->borderTop() + renderer->paddingTop() + (isTableRow() ? LayoutUnit() : renderer->y());
LayoutUnit bottom = top + renderer->contentHeight();
LayoutUnit left = renderer->borderLeft() + renderer->paddingLeft() + (isTableRow() ? LayoutUnit() : renderer->x());
LayoutUnit right = left + renderer->contentWidth();
if (point.x() <= right && point.x() >= left && point.y() <= top && point.y() >= bottom) {
if (renderer->isTableRow())
return renderer->positionForPoint(point + adjustedPoint - renderer->locationOffset());
return renderer->positionForPoint(point - renderer->locationOffset());
}
LayoutPoint cmp;
if (point.x() > right) {
if (point.y() < top)
cmp = LayoutPoint(right, top);
else if (point.y() > bottom)
cmp = LayoutPoint(right, bottom);
else
cmp = LayoutPoint(right, point.y());
} else if (point.x() < left) {
if (point.y() < top)
cmp = LayoutPoint(left, top);
else if (point.y() > bottom)
cmp = LayoutPoint(left, bottom);
else
cmp = LayoutPoint(left, point.y());
} else {
if (point.y() < top)
cmp = LayoutPoint(point.x(), top);
else
cmp = LayoutPoint(point.x(), bottom);
}
LayoutSize difference = cmp - point;
LayoutUnit dist = difference.width() * difference.width() + difference.height() * difference.height();
if (dist < minDist) {
closestRenderer = renderer;
minDist = dist;
}
}
if (closestRenderer)
return closestRenderer->positionForPoint(adjustedPoint - closestRenderer->locationOffset());
return createPositionWithAffinity(firstPositionInOrBeforeNode(nonPseudoNode()));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tok2strbuf(register const struct tok *lp, register const char *fmt,
register u_int v, char *buf, size_t bufsize)
{
if (lp != NULL) {
while (lp->s != NULL) {
if (lp->v == v)
return (lp->s);
++lp;
}
}
if (fmt == NULL)
fmt = "#%d";
(void)snprintf(buf, bufsize, fmt, v);
return (const char *)buf;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 62,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int drm_mode_create_standard_connector_properties(struct drm_device *dev)
{
struct drm_property *edid;
struct drm_property *dpms;
int i;
/*
* Standard properties (apply to all connectors)
*/
edid = drm_property_create(dev, DRM_MODE_PROP_BLOB |
DRM_MODE_PROP_IMMUTABLE,
"EDID", 0);
dev->mode_config.edid_property = edid;
dpms = drm_property_create(dev, DRM_MODE_PROP_ENUM,
"DPMS", ARRAY_SIZE(drm_dpms_enum_list));
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(drm_dpms_enum_list); i++)
drm_property_add_enum(dpms, i, drm_dpms_enum_list[i].type,
drm_dpms_enum_list[i].name);
dev->mode_config.dpms_property = dpms;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_init_io(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct RClass *io;
io = mrb_define_class(mrb, "IO", mrb->object_class);
MRB_SET_INSTANCE_TT(io, MRB_TT_DATA);
mrb_include_module(mrb, io, mrb_module_get(mrb, "Enumerable")); /* 15.2.20.3 */
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, io, "_popen", mrb_io_s_popen, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, io, "_sysclose", mrb_io_s_sysclose, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, io, "for_fd", mrb_io_s_for_fd, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, io, "select", mrb_io_s_select, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, io, "sysopen", mrb_io_s_sysopen, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
#ifndef _WIN32
mrb_define_class_method(mrb, io, "_pipe", mrb_io_s_pipe, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
#endif
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "initialize", mrb_io_initialize, MRB_ARGS_ANY()); /* 15.2.20.5.21 (x)*/
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "initialize_copy", mrb_io_initialize_copy, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "_check_readable", mrb_io_check_readable, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "isatty", mrb_io_isatty, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "sync", mrb_io_sync, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "sync=", mrb_io_set_sync, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "sysread", mrb_io_sysread, MRB_ARGS_ANY());
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "sysseek", mrb_io_sysseek, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "syswrite", mrb_io_syswrite, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "close", mrb_io_close, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.20.5.1 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "close_write", mrb_io_close_write, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "close_on_exec=", mrb_io_set_close_on_exec, MRB_ARGS_REQ(1));
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "close_on_exec?", mrb_io_close_on_exec_p, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "closed?", mrb_io_closed, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.20.5.2 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "pid", mrb_io_pid, MRB_ARGS_NONE()); /* 15.2.20.5.2 */
mrb_define_method(mrb, io, "fileno", mrb_io_fileno, MRB_ARGS_NONE());
mrb_gv_set(mrb, mrb_intern_cstr(mrb, "$/"), mrb_str_new_cstr(mrb, "\n"));
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 83,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_int_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
char *name = strvec_slot(strvec, 1);
if (strlen(name) >= IFNAMSIZ) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Interface name '%s' too long - ignoring", name);
return;
}
vrrp->ifp = if_get_by_ifname(name, IF_CREATE_IF_DYNAMIC);
if (!vrrp->ifp)
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "WARNING - interface %s for vrrp_instance %s doesn't exist", name, vrrp->iname);
else if (vrrp->ifp->hw_type == ARPHRD_LOOPBACK) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s) cannot use a loopback interface (%s) for vrrp - ignoring", vrrp->iname, vrrp->ifp->ifname);
vrrp->ifp = NULL;
}
#ifdef _HAVE_VRRP_VMAC_
vrrp->configured_ifp = vrrp->ifp;
#endif
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void airo_read_wireless_stats(struct airo_info *local)
{
StatusRid status_rid;
StatsRid stats_rid;
CapabilityRid cap_rid;
__le32 *vals = stats_rid.vals;
/* Get stats out of the card */
clear_bit(JOB_WSTATS, &local->jobs);
if (local->power.event) {
up(&local->sem);
return;
}
readCapabilityRid(local, &cap_rid, 0);
readStatusRid(local, &status_rid, 0);
readStatsRid(local, &stats_rid, RID_STATS, 0);
up(&local->sem);
/* The status */
local->wstats.status = le16_to_cpu(status_rid.mode);
/* Signal quality and co */
if (local->rssi) {
local->wstats.qual.level =
airo_rssi_to_dbm(local->rssi,
le16_to_cpu(status_rid.sigQuality));
/* normalizedSignalStrength appears to be a percentage */
local->wstats.qual.qual =
le16_to_cpu(status_rid.normalizedSignalStrength);
} else {
local->wstats.qual.level =
(le16_to_cpu(status_rid.normalizedSignalStrength) + 321) / 2;
local->wstats.qual.qual = airo_get_quality(&status_rid, &cap_rid);
}
if (le16_to_cpu(status_rid.len) >= 124) {
local->wstats.qual.noise = 0x100 - status_rid.noisedBm;
local->wstats.qual.updated = IW_QUAL_ALL_UPDATED | IW_QUAL_DBM;
} else {
local->wstats.qual.noise = 0;
local->wstats.qual.updated = IW_QUAL_QUAL_UPDATED | IW_QUAL_LEVEL_UPDATED | IW_QUAL_NOISE_INVALID | IW_QUAL_DBM;
}
/* Packets discarded in the wireless adapter due to wireless
* specific problems */
local->wstats.discard.nwid = le32_to_cpu(vals[56]) +
le32_to_cpu(vals[57]) +
le32_to_cpu(vals[58]); /* SSID Mismatch */
local->wstats.discard.code = le32_to_cpu(vals[6]);/* RxWepErr */
local->wstats.discard.fragment = le32_to_cpu(vals[30]);
local->wstats.discard.retries = le32_to_cpu(vals[10]);
local->wstats.discard.misc = le32_to_cpu(vals[1]) +
le32_to_cpu(vals[32]);
local->wstats.miss.beacon = le32_to_cpu(vals[34]);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltExtElementLookup(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
const xmlChar * name, const xmlChar * URI)
{
xsltTransformFunction ret;
if ((name == NULL) || (URI == NULL))
return (NULL);
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->extElements != NULL)) {
XML_CAST_FPTR(ret) = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->extElements, name, URI);
if (ret != NULL) {
return(ret);
}
}
ret = xsltExtModuleElementLookup(name, URI);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<MainThreadTaskQueue> RendererSchedulerImpl::V8TaskQueue() {
helper_.CheckOnValidThread();
return v8_task_queue_;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_sigstack, struct sigstack __user *, uss,
struct sigstack __user *, uoss)
{
unsigned long usp = rdusp();
unsigned long oss_sp = current->sas_ss_sp + current->sas_ss_size;
unsigned long oss_os = on_sig_stack(usp);
int error;
if (uss) {
void __user *ss_sp;
error = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(ss_sp, &uss->ss_sp))
goto out;
/* If the current stack was set with sigaltstack, don't
swap stacks while we are on it. */
error = -EPERM;
if (current->sas_ss_sp && on_sig_stack(usp))
goto out;
/* Since we don't know the extent of the stack, and we don't
track onstack-ness, but rather calculate it, we must
presume a size. Ho hum this interface is lossy. */
current->sas_ss_sp = (unsigned long)ss_sp - SIGSTKSZ;
current->sas_ss_size = SIGSTKSZ;
}
if (uoss) {
error = -EFAULT;
if (! access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uoss, sizeof(*uoss))
|| __put_user(oss_sp, &uoss->ss_sp)
|| __put_user(oss_os, &uoss->ss_onstack))
goto out;
}
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_hello_message(const char *uuid,
const char *client_name, const char *major_version, const char *minor_version)
{
xmlNode *hello_node = NULL;
xmlNode *hello = NULL;
if (uuid == NULL || strlen(uuid) == 0
|| client_name == NULL || strlen(client_name) == 0
|| major_version == NULL || strlen(major_version) == 0
|| minor_version == NULL || strlen(minor_version) == 0) {
crm_err("Missing fields, Hello message will not be valid.");
return NULL;
}
hello_node = create_xml_node(NULL, XML_TAG_OPTIONS);
crm_xml_add(hello_node, "major_version", major_version);
crm_xml_add(hello_node, "minor_version", minor_version);
crm_xml_add(hello_node, "client_name", client_name);
crm_xml_add(hello_node, "client_uuid", uuid);
crm_trace("creating hello message");
hello = create_request(CRM_OP_HELLO, hello_node, NULL, NULL, client_name, uuid);
free_xml(hello_node);
return hello;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 86,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline static int php_openssl_safe_mode_chk(char *filename TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(filename, NULL, CHECKUID_CHECK_FILE_AND_DIR))) {
return -1;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(filename TSRMLS_CC)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isofs_dentry_cmp(const struct dentry *parent, const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int len, const char *str, const struct qstr *name)
{
return isofs_dentry_cmp_common(len, str, name, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 36,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pcrypt_aead_givenc(struct padata_priv *padata)
{
struct pcrypt_request *preq = pcrypt_padata_request(padata);
struct aead_givcrypt_request *req = pcrypt_request_ctx(preq);
padata->info = crypto_aead_givencrypt(req);
if (padata->info == -EINPROGRESS)
return;
padata_do_serial(padata);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,870
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int megasas_ld_get_info_submit(SCSIDevice *sdev, int lun,
MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
struct mfi_ld_info *info = cmd->iov_buf;
size_t dcmd_size = sizeof(struct mfi_ld_info);
uint8_t cdb[6];
SCSIRequest *req;
ssize_t len, resid;
uint16_t sdev_id = ((sdev->id & 0xFF) << 8) | (lun & 0xFF);
uint64_t ld_size;
if (!cmd->iov_buf) {
cmd->iov_buf = g_malloc0(dcmd_size);
info = cmd->iov_buf;
megasas_setup_inquiry(cdb, 0x83, sizeof(info->vpd_page83));
req = scsi_req_new(sdev, cmd->index, lun, cdb, cmd);
if (!req) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_req_alloc_failed(cmd->index,
"LD get info vpd inquiry");
g_free(cmd->iov_buf);
cmd->iov_buf = NULL;
return MFI_STAT_FLASH_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
trace_megasas_dcmd_internal_submit(cmd->index,
"LD get info vpd inquiry", lun);
len = scsi_req_enqueue(req);
if (len > 0) {
cmd->iov_size = len;
scsi_req_continue(req);
}
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
}
info->ld_config.params.state = MFI_LD_STATE_OPTIMAL;
info->ld_config.properties.ld.v.target_id = lun;
info->ld_config.params.stripe_size = 3;
info->ld_config.params.num_drives = 1;
info->ld_config.params.is_consistent = 1;
/* Logical device size is in blocks */
blk_get_geometry(sdev->conf.blk, &ld_size);
info->size = cpu_to_le64(ld_size);
memset(info->ld_config.span, 0, sizeof(info->ld_config.span));
info->ld_config.span[0].start_block = 0;
info->ld_config.span[0].num_blocks = info->size;
info->ld_config.span[0].array_ref = cpu_to_le16(sdev_id);
resid = dma_buf_read(cmd->iov_buf, dcmd_size, &cmd->qsg);
g_free(cmd->iov_buf);
cmd->iov_size = dcmd_size - resid;
cmd->iov_buf = NULL;
return MFI_STAT_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromWBMPCtx (gdIOCtx * infile)
{
/* FILE *wbmp_file; */
Wbmp *wbmp;
gdImagePtr im = NULL;
int black, white;
int col, row, pos;
if (readwbmp (&gd_getin, infile, &wbmp)) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(im = gdImageCreate (wbmp->width, wbmp->height))) {
freewbmp (wbmp);
return NULL;
}
/* create the background color */
white = gdImageColorAllocate(im, 255, 255, 255);
/* create foreground color */
black = gdImageColorAllocate(im, 0, 0, 0);
/* fill in image (in a wbmp 1 = white/ 0 = black) */
pos = 0;
for (row = 0; row < wbmp->height; row++) {
for (col = 0; col < wbmp->width; col++) {
if (wbmp->bitmap[pos++] == WBMP_WHITE) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, col, row, white);
} else {
gdImageSetPixel(im, col, row, black);
}
}
}
freewbmp(wbmp);
return im;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 91,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothDiscoveryFailure() {
}
Commit Message: Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sock_i_uid(struct sock *sk)
{
int uid;
read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
uid = sk->sk_socket ? SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_uid : 0;
read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
return uid;
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMakeTextWritingDirectionNatural(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
MutableStylePropertySet* style =
MutableStylePropertySet::Create(kHTMLQuirksMode);
style->SetProperty(CSSPropertyUnicodeBidi, CSSValueNormal);
frame.GetEditor().ApplyStyle(
style, InputEvent::InputType::kFormatSetBlockTextDirection);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::fill_buffer_done(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE * buffer)
{
#ifdef _MSM8974_
int index = buffer - m_out_mem_ptr;
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("fill_buffer_done: buffer->pBuffer[%p], flags=0x%x size = %u",
buffer->pBuffer, (unsigned)buffer->nFlags, (unsigned int)buffer->nFilledLen);
if (buffer == NULL || ((buffer - m_out_mem_ptr) > (int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
pending_output_buffers--;
if(!secure_session) {
extra_data_handle.create_extra_data(buffer);
#ifndef _MSM8974_
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EXTRADATA) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("parsing extradata");
extra_data_handle.parse_extra_data(buffer);
}
#endif
}
/* For use buffer we need to copy the data */
if (m_pCallbacks.FillBufferDone) {
if (buffer->nFilledLen > 0) {
m_fbd_count++;
if (dev_get_output_log_flag()) {
dev_output_log_buffers((const char*)buffer->pBuffer, buffer->nFilledLen);
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
if (buffer->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EXTRADATA) {
if (!dev_handle_extradata((void *)buffer, index))
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to parse extradata");
dev_extradata_log_buffers((char *)(((unsigned long)buffer->pBuffer + buffer->nOffset +
buffer->nFilledLen + 3) & (~3)));
}
#endif
m_pCallbacks.FillBufferDone (hComp,m_app_data,buffer);
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int process_level0_path(LHAFileHeader *header, uint8_t *data,
size_t data_len)
{
unsigned int i;
if (data_len == 0) {
return 1;
}
header->filename = malloc(data_len + 1);
if (header->filename == NULL) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(header->filename, data, data_len);
header->filename[data_len] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < data_len; ++i) {
if (header->filename[i] == '\\') {
header->filename[i] = '/';
}
}
return split_header_filename(header);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 73,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON*) cJSON_AddArrayToObject(cJSON * const object, const char * const name)
{
cJSON *array = cJSON_CreateArray();
if (add_item_to_object(object, name, array, &global_hooks, false))
{
return array;
}
cJSON_Delete(array);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dwc3_ep_inc_trb(u8 *index)
{
(*index)++;
if (*index == (DWC3_TRB_NUM - 1))
*index = 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x509_crt_verify_child(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int path_cnt, int self_cnt, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
int ret;
uint32_t parent_flags = 0;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
mbedtls_x509_crt *grandparent;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
/* Counting intermediate self signed certificates */
if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
self_cnt++;
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA */
if( 1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED );
}
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( child->sig_md );
if( md_info == NULL )
{
/*
* Cannot check 'unknown' hash
*/
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
else
{
mbedtls_md( md_info, child->tbs.p, child->tbs.len, hash );
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
#endif
/* Look for a grandparent in trusted CAs */
for( grandparent = trust_ca;
grandparent != NULL;
grandparent = grandparent->next )
{
if( x509_crt_check_parent( parent, grandparent,
0, path_cnt == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
if( grandparent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( parent, grandparent, ca_crl, profile,
path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
/* Look for a grandparent upwards the chain */
for( grandparent = parent->next;
grandparent != NULL;
grandparent = grandparent->next )
{
/* +2 because the current step is not yet accounted for
* and because max_pathlen is one higher than it should be.
* Also self signed certificates do not count to the limit. */
if( grandparent->max_pathlen > 0 &&
grandparent->max_pathlen < 2 + path_cnt - self_cnt )
{
continue;
}
if( x509_crt_check_parent( parent, grandparent,
0, path_cnt == 0 ) == 0 )
break;
}
/* Is our parent part of the chain or at the top? */
if( grandparent != NULL )
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_child( parent, grandparent, trust_ca, ca_crl,
profile, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
ret = x509_crt_verify_top( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, &parent_flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
}
/* child is verified to be a child of the parent, call verify callback */
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, child, path_cnt, flags ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*flags |= parent_flags;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Only return VERIFY_FAILED from a single point
Everything else is a fatal error. Also improve documentation about that for
the vrfy callback.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 1
| 170,020
|
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