instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_hd_new(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, const Jbig2PatternDictParams *params, Jbig2Image *image)
{
Jbig2PatternDict *new;
const int N = params->GRAYMAX + 1;
const int HPW = params->HDPW;
const int HPH = params->HDPH;
int i;
/* allocate a new struct */
new = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2PatternDict, 1);
if (new != NULL) {
new->patterns = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, N);
if (new->patterns == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "failed to allocate pattern in collective bitmap dictionary");
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, new);
return NULL;
}
new->n_patterns = N;
new->HPW = HPW;
new->HPH = HPH;
/* 6.7.5(4) - copy out the individual pattern images */
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
new->patterns[i] = jbig2_image_new(ctx, HPW, HPH);
if (new->patterns[i] == NULL) {
int j;
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "failed to allocate pattern element image");
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, new->patterns[j]);
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, new);
return NULL;
}
/* compose with the REPLACE operator; the source
will be clipped to the destintion, selecting the
proper sub image */
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, new->patterns[i], image, -i * HPW, 0, JBIG2_COMPOSE_REPLACE);
}
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "failed to allocate collective bitmap dictionary");
}
return new;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool StringToGestureSourceType(Maybe<std::string> in,
SyntheticGestureParams::GestureSourceType& out) {
if (!in.isJust()) {
out = SyntheticGestureParams::GestureSourceType::DEFAULT_INPUT;
return true;
}
if (in.fromJust() == Input::GestureSourceTypeEnum::Default) {
out = SyntheticGestureParams::GestureSourceType::DEFAULT_INPUT;
return true;
}
if (in.fromJust() == Input::GestureSourceTypeEnum::Touch) {
out = SyntheticGestureParams::GestureSourceType::TOUCH_INPUT;
return true;
}
if (in.fromJust() == Input::GestureSourceTypeEnum::Mouse) {
out = SyntheticGestureParams::GestureSourceType::MOUSE_INPUT;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _rpc_pid2jid(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
job_id_request_msg_t *req = (job_id_request_msg_t *) msg->data;
slurm_msg_t resp_msg;
job_id_response_msg_t resp;
bool found = false;
List steps;
ListIterator i;
step_loc_t *stepd;
steps = stepd_available(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name);
i = list_iterator_create(steps);
while ((stepd = list_next(i))) {
int fd;
fd = stepd_connect(stepd->directory, stepd->nodename,
stepd->jobid, stepd->stepid,
&stepd->protocol_version);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
if (stepd_pid_in_container(
fd, stepd->protocol_version,
req->job_pid)
|| req->job_pid == stepd_daemon_pid(
fd, stepd->protocol_version)) {
slurm_msg_t_copy(&resp_msg, msg);
resp.job_id = stepd->jobid;
resp.return_code = SLURM_SUCCESS;
found = true;
close(fd);
break;
}
close(fd);
}
list_iterator_destroy(i);
FREE_NULL_LIST(steps);
if (found) {
debug3("_rpc_pid2jid: pid(%u) found in %u",
req->job_pid, resp.job_id);
resp_msg.address = msg->address;
resp_msg.msg_type = RESPONSE_JOB_ID;
resp_msg.data = &resp;
slurm_send_node_msg(msg->conn_fd, &resp_msg);
} else {
debug3("_rpc_pid2jid: pid(%u) not found", req->job_pid);
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __kprobes add_preempt_count(int val)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT
/*
* Underflow?
*/
if (DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON((preempt_count() < 0)))
return;
#endif
preempt_count() += val;
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT
/*
* Spinlock count overflowing soon?
*/
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON((preempt_count() & PREEMPT_MASK) >=
PREEMPT_MASK - 10);
#endif
if (preempt_count() == val)
trace_preempt_off(CALLER_ADDR0, get_parent_ip(CALLER_ADDR1));
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnablePassiveDocumentWheelEventListeners(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetPassiveDocumentWheelEventListenersEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_v6_send_reset(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
u32 seq = 0, ack_seq = 0;
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
const __u8 *hash_location = NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
unsigned char newhash[16];
int genhash;
struct sock *sk1 = NULL;
#endif
int oif;
if (th->rst)
return;
/* If sk not NULL, it means we did a successful lookup and incoming
* route had to be correct. prequeue might have dropped our dst.
*/
if (!sk && !ipv6_unicast_destination(skb))
return;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
rcu_read_lock();
hash_location = tcp_parse_md5sig_option(th);
if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk)) {
key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &ipv6h->saddr);
} else if (hash_location) {
/*
* active side is lost. Try to find listening socket through
* source port, and then find md5 key through listening socket.
* we are not loose security here:
* Incoming packet is checked with md5 hash with finding key,
* no RST generated if md5 hash doesn't match.
*/
sk1 = inet6_lookup_listener(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev),
&tcp_hashinfo, NULL, 0,
&ipv6h->saddr,
th->source, &ipv6h->daddr,
ntohs(th->source), tcp_v6_iif(skb));
if (!sk1)
goto out;
key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk1, &ipv6h->saddr);
if (!key)
goto out;
genhash = tcp_v6_md5_hash_skb(newhash, key, NULL, skb);
if (genhash || memcmp(hash_location, newhash, 16) != 0)
goto out;
}
#endif
if (th->ack)
seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
else
ack_seq = ntohl(th->seq) + th->syn + th->fin + skb->len -
(th->doff << 2);
oif = sk ? sk->sk_bound_dev_if : 0;
tcp_v6_send_response(sk, skb, seq, ack_seq, 0, 0, 0, oif, key, 1, 0, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
#endif
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderScale (ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: delete_file_recursively (GFile *file,
GCancellable *cancellable,
DeleteCallback callback,
gpointer callback_data)
{
gboolean success;
g_autoptr (GError) error = NULL;
do
{
g_autoptr (GFileEnumerator) enumerator = NULL;
success = g_file_delete (file, cancellable, &error);
if (success ||
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_EMPTY))
{
break;
}
g_clear_error (&error);
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NONE,
cancellable, &error);
if (enumerator)
{
GFileInfo *info;
success = TRUE;
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
while (info != NULL)
{
g_autoptr (GFile) child = NULL;
child = g_file_enumerator_get_child (enumerator, info);
success = success && delete_file_recursively (child,
cancellable,
callback,
callback_data);
g_object_unref (info);
info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator,
cancellable,
&error);
}
}
if (error != NULL)
{
success = FALSE;
}
}
while (success);
if (callback)
{
callback (file, error, callback_data);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NTPResourceCache::NTPResourceCache(Profile* profile) : profile_(profile) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED,
content::Source<ThemeService>(
ThemeServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile)));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NTP4_INTRO_PREF_CHANGED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
pref_change_registrar_.Init(profile_->GetPrefs());
pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kSyncAcknowledgedSyncTypes, this);
pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kShowBookmarkBar, this);
pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kNTPShownPage, this);
pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kSyncPromoShowNTPBubble, this);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string PrintProp(IBusProperty *prop, int tree_level) {
if (!prop) {
return "";
}
std::stringstream stream;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "=========================" << std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "key: " << Or(prop->key, "<none>")
<< std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "icon: " << Or(prop->icon, "<none>")
<< std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "label: "
<< ((prop->label && prop->label->text) ? prop->label->text : "<none>")
<< std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "tooptip: "
<< ((prop->tooltip && prop->tooltip->text)
? prop->tooltip->text : "<none>") << std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "sensitive: "
<< (prop->sensitive ? "YES" : "NO") << std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "visible: " << (prop->visible ? "YES" : "NO")
<< std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "type: " << PropTypeToString(prop->type)
<< std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "state: " << PropStateToString(prop->state)
<< std::endl;
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "sub_props: "
<< (PropertyHasChildren(prop) ? "" : "<none>") << std::endl;
stream << PrintPropList(prop->sub_props, tree_level + 1);
stream << Spacer(tree_level) << "=========================" << std::endl;
return stream.str();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsLog::CloseLog() {
DCHECK(!closed_);
closed_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::GetAttribLocationHelper(
GLuint client_id,
uint32_t location_shm_id,
uint32_t location_shm_offset,
const std::string& name_str) {
if (!StringIsValidForGLES(name_str)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetAttribLocation", "Invalid character");
return error::kNoError;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
client_id, "glGetAttribLocation");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!program->IsValid()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetAttribLocation", "program not linked");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint* location = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLint*>(
location_shm_id, location_shm_offset, sizeof(GLint));
if (!location) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (*location != -1) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
*location = program->GetAttribLocation(name_str);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int run_script(const char *name, const char *section,
const char *script, ...)
{
int ret;
char *buffer, *p;
size_t size = 0;
va_list ap;
INFO("Executing script '%s' for container '%s', config section '%s'",
script, name, section);
va_start(ap, script);
while ((p = va_arg(ap, char *)))
size += strlen(p) + 1;
va_end(ap);
size += strlen(script);
size += strlen(name);
size += strlen(section);
size += 3;
if (size > INT_MAX)
return -1;
buffer = alloca(size);
if (!buffer) {
ERROR("failed to allocate memory");
return -1;
}
ret = snprintf(buffer, size, "%s %s %s", script, name, section);
if (ret < 0 || ret >= size) {
ERROR("Script name too long");
return -1;
}
va_start(ap, script);
while ((p = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
int len = size-ret;
int rc;
rc = snprintf(buffer + ret, len, " %s", p);
if (rc < 0 || rc >= len) {
ERROR("Script args too long");
return -1;
}
ret += rc;
}
va_end(ap);
return run_buffer(buffer);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pfn_t kvm_pin_pages(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t gfn, unsigned long size)
{
gfn_t end_gfn;
pfn_t pfn;
pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm, slot, gfn);
end_gfn = gfn + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
gfn += 1;
if (is_error_pfn(pfn))
return pfn;
while (gfn < end_gfn)
gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm, slot, gfn++);
return pfn;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkitWebViewBaseContainerRemove(GtkContainer* container, GtkWidget* widget)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(container);
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webView->priv;
GtkWidget* widgetContainer = GTK_WIDGET(container);
gboolean wasVisible = gtk_widget_get_visible(widget);
gtk_widget_unparent(widget);
if (priv->inspectorView == widget) {
priv->inspectorView = 0;
priv->inspectorViewHeight = 0;
} else {
ASSERT(priv->children.contains(widget));
priv->children.remove(widget);
}
if (wasVisible && gtk_widget_get_visible(widgetContainer))
gtk_widget_queue_resize(widgetContainer);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void svc_rdma_get_write_arrays(struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
struct rpcrdma_write_array **write,
struct rpcrdma_write_array **reply)
{
__be32 *p;
p = (__be32 *)&rmsgp->rm_body.rm_chunks[0];
/* Read list */
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 5;
/* Write list */
if (*p != xdr_zero) {
*write = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)p;
while (*p++ != xdr_zero)
p += 1 + be32_to_cpu(*p) * 4;
} else {
*write = NULL;
p++;
}
/* Reply chunk */
if (*p != xdr_zero)
*reply = (struct rpcrdma_write_array *)p;
else
*reply = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 1 | 168,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataRootDirectory::FindEntryByPath(const FilePath& file_path,
const FindEntryCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
std::vector<FilePath::StringType> components;
file_path.GetComponents(&components);
GDataDirectory* current_dir = this;
FilePath directory_path;
util::GDataSearchPathType path_type =
util::GetSearchPathStatusForPathComponents(components);
if (path_type == util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_ROOT ||
path_type == util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_QUERY) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, file_path.DirName(),
fake_search_directory_.get());
return;
}
if (path_type != util::GDATA_SEARCH_PATH_INVALID) {
if (!ModifyFindEntryParamsForSearchPath(file_path,
&components, ¤t_dir, &directory_path)) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < components.size() && current_dir; i++) {
directory_path = directory_path.Append(current_dir->file_name());
if (i == components.size() - 1) {
if (current_dir->file_name() == components[i])
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, directory_path, current_dir);
else
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
GDataEntry* entry = current_dir->FindChild(components[i + 1]);
if (!entry) {
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
if (entry->file_info().is_directory) {
current_dir = entry->AsGDataDirectory();
} else {
if ((i + 1) == (components.size() - 1))
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK, directory_path, entry);
else
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
return;
}
}
callback.Run(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, FilePath(), NULL);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bt_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct bt_sock_list *sk_list;
struct bt_seq_state *s;
sk_list = PDE_DATA(inode);
s = __seq_open_private(file, &bt_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct bt_seq_state));
if (!s)
return -ENOMEM;
s->l = sk_list;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int exclusive_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct pmu *pmu = event->pmu;
if (!(pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE))
return 0;
/*
* Prevent co-existence of per-task and cpu-wide events on the
* same exclusive pmu.
*
* Negative pmu::exclusive_cnt means there are cpu-wide
* events on this "exclusive" pmu, positive means there are
* per-task events.
*
* Since this is called in perf_event_alloc() path, event::ctx
* doesn't exist yet; it is, however, safe to use PERF_ATTACH_TASK
* to mean "per-task event", because unlike other attach states it
* never gets cleared.
*/
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK) {
if (!atomic_inc_unless_negative(&pmu->exclusive_cnt))
return -EBUSY;
} else {
if (!atomic_dec_unless_positive(&pmu->exclusive_cnt))
return -EBUSY;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidUpdateCurrentHistoryItem() {
render_view_->StartNavStateSyncTimerIfNecessary(this);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GotChromeAccessToken(const base::Optional<std::string>& access_token,
base::Time expiration_time,
const GoogleServiceAuthError& error) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(host_->sequence_checker_);
if (!access_token) {
OnMintTokenFailure(error);
return;
}
mint_token_flow_->Start(host_->delegate_->GetRequestContext(),
*access_token);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::drawArrays(GLenum mode,
GLint first,
GLsizei count) {
if (!ValidateDrawArrays("drawArrays"))
return;
if (!bound_vertex_array_object_->IsAllEnabledAttribBufferBound()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "drawArrays",
"no buffer is bound to enabled attribute");
return;
}
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
ClearIfComposited();
ContextGL()->DrawArrays(mode, first, count);
MarkContextChanged(kCanvasChanged);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 cifs_posix_convert_flags(unsigned int flags)
{
u32 posix_flags = 0;
if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
posix_flags = SMB_O_RDONLY;
else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
posix_flags = SMB_O_WRONLY;
else if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)
posix_flags = SMB_O_RDWR;
if (flags & O_CREAT) {
posix_flags |= SMB_O_CREAT;
if (flags & O_EXCL)
posix_flags |= SMB_O_EXCL;
} else if (flags & O_EXCL)
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Application %s pid %d has incorrectly set O_EXCL flag but not O_CREAT on file open. Ignoring O_EXCL\n",
current->comm, current->tgid);
if (flags & O_TRUNC)
posix_flags |= SMB_O_TRUNC;
/* be safe and imply O_SYNC for O_DSYNC */
if (flags & O_DSYNC)
posix_flags |= SMB_O_SYNC;
if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
posix_flags |= SMB_O_DIRECTORY;
if (flags & O_NOFOLLOW)
posix_flags |= SMB_O_NOFOLLOW;
if (flags & O_DIRECT)
posix_flags |= SMB_O_DIRECT;
return posix_flags;
}
Commit Message: cifs: ensure that uncached writes handle unmapped areas correctly
It's possible for userland to pass down an iovec via writev() that has a
bogus user pointer in it. If that happens and we're doing an uncached
write, then we can end up getting less bytes than we expect from the
call to iov_iter_copy_from_user. This is CVE-2014-0069
cifs_iovec_write isn't set up to handle that situation however. It'll
blindly keep chugging through the page array and not filling those pages
with anything useful. Worse yet, we'll later end up with a negative
number in wdata->tailsz, which will confuse the sending routines and
cause an oops at the very least.
Fix this by having the copy phase of cifs_iovec_write stop copying data
in this situation and send the last write as a short one. At the same
time, we want to avoid sending a zero-length write to the server, so
break out of the loop and set rc to -EFAULT if that happens. This also
allows us to handle the case where no address in the iovec is valid.
[Note: Marking this for stable on v3.4+ kernels, but kernels as old as
v2.6.38 may have a similar problem and may need similar fix]
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_cmdline(int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
bool reopen_log = false;
int signum;
struct utsname uname_buf;
int longindex;
int curind;
bool bad_option = false;
unsigned facility;
mode_t new_umask_val;
struct option long_options[] = {
{"use-file", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
{"vrrp", no_argument, NULL, 'P'},
{"check", no_argument, NULL, 'C'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
{"no_bfd", no_argument, NULL, 'B'},
#endif
{"all", no_argument, NULL, 3 },
{"log-console", no_argument, NULL, 'l'},
{"log-detail", no_argument, NULL, 'D'},
{"log-facility", required_argument, NULL, 'S'},
{"log-file", optional_argument, NULL, 'g'},
{"flush-log-file", no_argument, NULL, 2 },
{"no-syslog", no_argument, NULL, 'G'},
{"umask", required_argument, NULL, 'u'},
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
{"release-vips", no_argument, NULL, 'X'},
{"dont-release-vrrp", no_argument, NULL, 'V'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
{"dont-release-ipvs", no_argument, NULL, 'I'},
#endif
{"dont-respawn", no_argument, NULL, 'R'},
{"dont-fork", no_argument, NULL, 'n'},
{"dump-conf", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
{"pid", required_argument, NULL, 'p'},
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
{"vrrp_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'r'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
{"checkers_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
{"address-monitoring", no_argument, NULL, 'a'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
{"bfd_pid", required_argument, NULL, 'b'},
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
{"snmp", no_argument, NULL, 'x'},
{"snmp-agent-socket", required_argument, NULL, 'A'},
#endif
{"core-dump", no_argument, NULL, 'm'},
{"core-dump-pattern", optional_argument, NULL, 'M'},
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
{"mem-check-log", no_argument, NULL, 'L'},
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
{"namespace", required_argument, NULL, 's'},
#endif
{"config-id", required_argument, NULL, 'i'},
{"signum", required_argument, NULL, 4 },
{"config-test", optional_argument, NULL, 't'},
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
{"perf", optional_argument, NULL, 5 },
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
{"debug", optional_argument, NULL, 6 },
#endif
{"version", no_argument, NULL, 'v'},
{"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
};
/* Unfortunately, if a short option is used, getopt_long() doesn't change the value
* of longindex, so we need to ensure that before calling getopt_long(), longindex
* is set to a known invalid value */
curind = optind;
while (longindex = -1, (c = getopt_long(argc, argv, ":vhlndu:DRS:f:p:i:mM::g::Gt::"
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
"PC"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
"r:VX"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
"ac:I"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
"Bb:"
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
"xA:"
#endif
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
"L"
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
"s:"
#endif
, long_options, &longindex)) != -1) {
/* Check for an empty option argument. For example --use-file= returns
* a 0 length option, which we don't want */
if (longindex >= 0 && long_options[longindex].has_arg == required_argument && optarg && !optarg[0]) {
c = ':';
optarg = NULL;
}
switch (c) {
case 'v':
fprintf(stderr, "%s", version_string);
#ifdef GIT_COMMIT
fprintf(stderr, ", git commit %s", GIT_COMMIT);
#endif
fprintf(stderr, "\n\n%s\n\n", COPYRIGHT_STRING);
fprintf(stderr, "Built with kernel headers for Linux %d.%d.%d\n",
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 16) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff,
(LINUX_VERSION_CODE ) & 0xff);
uname(&uname_buf);
fprintf(stderr, "Running on %s %s %s\n\n", uname_buf.sysname, uname_buf.release, uname_buf.version);
fprintf(stderr, "configure options: %s\n\n", KEEPALIVED_CONFIGURE_OPTIONS);
fprintf(stderr, "Config options: %s\n\n", CONFIGURATION_OPTIONS);
fprintf(stderr, "System options: %s\n", SYSTEM_OPTIONS);
exit(0);
break;
case 'h':
usage(argv[0]);
exit(0);
break;
case 'l':
__set_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug);
reopen_log = true;
break;
case 'n':
__set_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug);
break;
case 'd':
__set_bit(DUMP_CONF_BIT, &debug);
break;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'V':
__set_bit(DONT_RELEASE_VRRP_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
case 'I':
__set_bit(DONT_RELEASE_IPVS_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
case 'D':
if (__test_bit(LOG_DETAIL_BIT, &debug))
__set_bit(LOG_EXTRA_DETAIL_BIT, &debug);
else
__set_bit(LOG_DETAIL_BIT, &debug);
break;
case 'R':
__set_bit(DONT_RESPAWN_BIT, &debug);
break;
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'X':
__set_bit(RELEASE_VIPS_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
case 'S':
if (!read_unsigned(optarg, &facility, 0, LOG_FACILITY_MAX, false))
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid log facility '%s'\n", optarg);
else {
log_facility = LOG_FACILITY[facility].facility;
reopen_log = true;
}
break;
case 'g':
if (optarg && optarg[0])
log_file_name = optarg;
else
log_file_name = "/tmp/keepalived.log";
open_log_file(log_file_name, NULL, NULL, NULL);
break;
case 'G':
__set_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug);
reopen_log = true;
break;
case 'u':
new_umask_val = set_umask(optarg);
if (umask_cmdline)
umask_val = new_umask_val;
break;
case 't':
__set_bit(CONFIG_TEST_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(DONT_RESPAWN_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(DONT_FORK_BIT, &debug);
__set_bit(NO_SYSLOG_BIT, &debug);
if (optarg && optarg[0]) {
int fd = open(optarg, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
if (fd == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open config-test log file %s\n", optarg);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
close(fd);
}
break;
case 'f':
conf_file = optarg;
break;
case 2: /* --flush-log-file */
set_flush_log_file();
break;
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
case 'P':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
break;
case 'C':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
case 'B':
__clear_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
break;
#endif
case 'p':
main_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
case 'c':
checkers_pidfile = optarg;
break;
case 'a':
__set_bit(LOG_ADDRESS_CHANGES, &debug);
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
case 'r':
vrrp_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
case 'b':
bfd_pidfile = optarg;
break;
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
case 'x':
snmp = 1;
break;
case 'A':
snmp_socket = optarg;
break;
#endif
case 'M':
set_core_dump_pattern = true;
if (optarg && optarg[0])
core_dump_pattern = optarg;
/* ... falls through ... */
case 'm':
create_core_dump = true;
break;
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
case 'L':
__set_bit(MEM_CHECK_LOG_BIT, &debug);
break;
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
case 's':
override_namespace = MALLOC(strlen(optarg) + 1);
strcpy(override_namespace, optarg);
break;
#endif
case 'i':
FREE_PTR(config_id);
config_id = MALLOC(strlen(optarg) + 1);
strcpy(config_id, optarg);
break;
case 4: /* --signum */
signum = get_signum(optarg);
if (signum == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown sigfunc %s\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
printf("%d\n", signum);
exit(0);
break;
case 3: /* --all */
__set_bit(RUN_ALL_CHILDREN, &daemon_mode);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
__set_bit(DAEMON_VRRP, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
__set_bit(DAEMON_CHECKERS, &daemon_mode);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
__set_bit(DAEMON_BFD, &daemon_mode);
#endif
break;
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
case 5:
if (optarg && optarg[0]) {
if (!strcmp(optarg, "run"))
perf_run = PERF_RUN;
else if (!strcmp(optarg, "all"))
perf_run = PERF_ALL;
else if (!strcmp(optarg, "end"))
perf_run = PERF_END;
else
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unknown perf start point %s", optarg);
}
else
perf_run = PERF_RUN;
break;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
case 6:
set_debug_options(optarg && optarg[0] ? optarg : NULL);
break;
#endif
case '?':
if (optopt && argv[curind][1] != '-')
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option -%c\n", optopt);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option %s\n", argv[curind]);
bad_option = true;
break;
case ':':
if (optopt && argv[curind][1] != '-')
fprintf(stderr, "Missing parameter for option -%c\n", optopt);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Missing parameter for option --%s\n", long_options[longindex].name);
bad_option = true;
break;
default:
exit(1);
break;
}
curind = optind;
}
if (optind < argc) {
printf("Unexpected argument(s): ");
while (optind < argc)
printf("%s ", argv[optind++]);
printf("\n");
}
if (bad_option)
exit(1);
return reopen_log;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 1 | 168,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReferrerPolicy WorkerFetchContext::GetReferrerPolicy() const {
return global_scope_->GetReferrerPolicy();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapter::NotifyGattServicesDiscovered(BluetoothDevice* device) {
DCHECK(device->GetAdapter() == this);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.GattServicesDiscovered(this, device);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntSize PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollbarOffset(
const Scrollbar& scrollbar) const {
if (&scrollbar == VerticalScrollbar()) {
return IntSize(
VerticalScrollbarStart(0, Layer()->PixelSnappedSize().Width()),
GetLayoutBox()->BorderTop().ToInt());
}
if (&scrollbar == HorizontalScrollbar()) {
return IntSize(HorizontalScrollbarStart(0),
GetLayoutBox()->BorderTop().ToInt() +
VisibleContentRect(kIncludeScrollbars).Height() -
HorizontalScrollbar()->ScrollbarThickness());
}
NOTREACHED();
return IntSize();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dwc3_cleanup_done_reqs(struct dwc3 *dwc, struct dwc3_ep *dep,
const struct dwc3_event_depevt *event, int status)
{
struct dwc3_request *req, *n;
struct dwc3_trb *trb;
bool ioc = false;
int ret = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, n, &dep->started_list, list) {
unsigned length;
int chain;
length = req->request.length;
chain = req->num_pending_sgs > 0;
if (chain) {
struct scatterlist *sg = req->sg;
struct scatterlist *s;
unsigned int pending = req->num_pending_sgs;
unsigned int i;
for_each_sg(sg, s, pending, i) {
trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->trb_dequeue];
if (trb->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_HWO)
break;
req->sg = sg_next(s);
req->num_pending_sgs--;
ret = __dwc3_cleanup_done_trbs(dwc, dep, req, trb,
event, status, chain);
if (ret)
break;
}
} else {
trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->trb_dequeue];
ret = __dwc3_cleanup_done_trbs(dwc, dep, req, trb,
event, status, chain);
}
if (req->unaligned || req->zero) {
trb = &dep->trb_pool[dep->trb_dequeue];
ret = __dwc3_cleanup_done_trbs(dwc, dep, req, trb,
event, status, false);
req->unaligned = false;
req->zero = false;
}
req->request.actual = length - req->remaining;
if ((req->request.actual < length) && req->num_pending_sgs)
return __dwc3_gadget_kick_transfer(dep);
dwc3_gadget_giveback(dep, req, status);
if (ret) {
if ((event->status & DEPEVT_STATUS_IOC) &&
(trb->ctrl & DWC3_TRB_CTRL_IOC))
ioc = true;
break;
}
}
/*
* Our endpoint might get disabled by another thread during
* dwc3_gadget_giveback(). If that happens, we're just gonna return 1
* early on so DWC3_EP_BUSY flag gets cleared
*/
if (!dep->endpoint.desc)
return 1;
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(dep->endpoint.desc) &&
list_empty(&dep->started_list)) {
if (list_empty(&dep->pending_list)) {
/*
* If there is no entry in request list then do
* not issue END TRANSFER now. Just set PENDING
* flag, so that END TRANSFER is issued when an
* entry is added into request list.
*/
dep->flags = DWC3_EP_PENDING_REQUEST;
} else {
dwc3_stop_active_transfer(dwc, dep->number, true);
dep->flags = DWC3_EP_ENABLED;
}
return 1;
}
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_isoc(dep->endpoint.desc) && ioc)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AffineTransform::isInvertible() const
{
return det() != 0.0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext2_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, int name_index, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t value_len, int flags)
{
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_header *header = NULL;
struct ext2_xattr_entry *here, *last;
size_t name_len, free, min_offs = sb->s_blocksize;
int not_found = 1, error;
char *end;
/*
* header -- Points either into bh, or to a temporarily
* allocated buffer.
* here -- The named entry found, or the place for inserting, within
* the block pointed to by header.
* last -- Points right after the last named entry within the block
* pointed to by header.
* min_offs -- The offset of the first value (values are aligned
* towards the end of the block).
* end -- Points right after the block pointed to by header.
*/
ea_idebug(inode, "name=%d.%s, value=%p, value_len=%ld",
name_index, name, value, (long)value_len);
if (value == NULL)
value_len = 0;
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
name_len = strlen(name);
if (name_len > 255 || value_len > sb->s_blocksize)
return -ERANGE;
down_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
if (EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl) {
/* The inode already has an extended attribute block. */
bh = sb_bread(sb, EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
if (!bh)
goto cleanup;
ea_bdebug(bh, "b_count=%d, refcount=%d",
atomic_read(&(bh->b_count)),
le32_to_cpu(HDR(bh)->h_refcount));
header = HDR(bh);
end = bh->b_data + bh->b_size;
if (header->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
header->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
bad_block: ext2_error(sb, "ext2_xattr_set",
"inode %ld: bad block %d", inode->i_ino,
EXT2_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
error = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Find the named attribute. */
here = FIRST_ENTRY(bh);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(here)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(here);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
if (offs < min_offs)
min_offs = offs;
}
not_found = name_index - here->e_name_index;
if (!not_found)
not_found = name_len - here->e_name_len;
if (!not_found)
not_found = memcmp(name, here->e_name,name_len);
if (not_found <= 0)
break;
here = next;
}
last = here;
/* We still need to compute min_offs and last. */
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
struct ext2_xattr_entry *next = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(last);
if ((char *)next >= end)
goto bad_block;
if (!last->e_value_block && last->e_value_size) {
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
if (offs < min_offs)
min_offs = offs;
}
last = next;
}
/* Check whether we have enough space left. */
free = min_offs - ((char*)last - (char*)header) - sizeof(__u32);
} else {
/* We will use a new extended attribute block. */
free = sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct ext2_xattr_header) - sizeof(__u32);
here = last = NULL; /* avoid gcc uninitialized warning. */
}
if (not_found) {
/* Request to remove a nonexistent attribute? */
error = -ENODATA;
if (flags & XATTR_REPLACE)
goto cleanup;
error = 0;
if (value == NULL)
goto cleanup;
} else {
/* Request to create an existing attribute? */
error = -EEXIST;
if (flags & XATTR_CREATE)
goto cleanup;
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
size_t size = le32_to_cpu(here->e_value_size);
if (le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs) + size >
sb->s_blocksize || size > sb->s_blocksize)
goto bad_block;
free += EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(size);
}
free += EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
}
error = -ENOSPC;
if (free < EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len) + EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len))
goto cleanup;
/* Here we know that we can set the new attribute. */
if (header) {
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
/* assert(header == HDR(bh)); */
ce = mb_cache_entry_get(ext2_xattr_cache, bh->b_bdev,
bh->b_blocknr);
lock_buffer(bh);
if (header->h_refcount == cpu_to_le32(1)) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "modifying in-place");
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
/* keep the buffer locked while modifying it. */
} else {
int offset;
if (ce)
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
unlock_buffer(bh);
ea_bdebug(bh, "cloning");
header = kmalloc(bh->b_size, GFP_KERNEL);
error = -ENOMEM;
if (header == NULL)
goto cleanup;
memcpy(header, HDR(bh), bh->b_size);
header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
offset = (char *)here - bh->b_data;
here = ENTRY((char *)header + offset);
offset = (char *)last - bh->b_data;
last = ENTRY((char *)header + offset);
}
} else {
/* Allocate a buffer where we construct the new block. */
header = kzalloc(sb->s_blocksize, GFP_KERNEL);
error = -ENOMEM;
if (header == NULL)
goto cleanup;
end = (char *)header + sb->s_blocksize;
header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(EXT2_XATTR_MAGIC);
header->h_blocks = header->h_refcount = cpu_to_le32(1);
last = here = ENTRY(header+1);
}
/* Iff we are modifying the block in-place, bh is locked here. */
if (not_found) {
/* Insert the new name. */
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
size_t rest = (char *)last - (char *)here;
memmove((char *)here + size, here, rest);
memset(here, 0, size);
here->e_name_index = name_index;
here->e_name_len = name_len;
memcpy(here->e_name, name, name_len);
} else {
if (!here->e_value_block && here->e_value_size) {
char *first_val = (char *)header + min_offs;
size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(here->e_value_offs);
char *val = (char *)header + offs;
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(
le32_to_cpu(here->e_value_size));
if (size == EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len)) {
/* The old and the new value have the same
size. Just replace. */
here->e_value_size = cpu_to_le32(value_len);
memset(val + size - EXT2_XATTR_PAD, 0,
EXT2_XATTR_PAD); /* Clear pad bytes. */
memcpy(val, value, value_len);
goto skip_replace;
}
/* Remove the old value. */
memmove(first_val + size, first_val, val - first_val);
memset(first_val, 0, size);
here->e_value_offs = 0;
min_offs += size;
/* Adjust all value offsets. */
last = ENTRY(header+1);
while (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(last)) {
size_t o = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
if (!last->e_value_block && o < offs)
last->e_value_offs =
cpu_to_le16(o + size);
last = EXT2_XATTR_NEXT(last);
}
}
if (value == NULL) {
/* Remove the old name. */
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_LEN(name_len);
last = ENTRY((char *)last - size);
memmove(here, (char*)here + size,
(char*)last - (char*)here);
memset(last, 0, size);
}
}
if (value != NULL) {
/* Insert the new value. */
here->e_value_size = cpu_to_le32(value_len);
if (value_len) {
size_t size = EXT2_XATTR_SIZE(value_len);
char *val = (char *)header + min_offs - size;
here->e_value_offs =
cpu_to_le16((char *)val - (char *)header);
memset(val + size - EXT2_XATTR_PAD, 0,
EXT2_XATTR_PAD); /* Clear the pad bytes. */
memcpy(val, value, value_len);
}
}
skip_replace:
if (IS_LAST_ENTRY(ENTRY(header+1))) {
/* This block is now empty. */
if (bh && header == HDR(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh); /* we were modifying in-place. */
error = ext2_xattr_set2(inode, bh, NULL);
} else {
ext2_xattr_rehash(header, here);
if (bh && header == HDR(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh); /* we were modifying in-place. */
error = ext2_xattr_set2(inode, bh, header);
}
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
if (!(bh && header == HDR(bh)))
kfree(header);
up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 1 | 169,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::StartPrinting(
const WebPrintParams& webkit_print_params) {
web_print_params_ = webkit_print_params;
gfx::Size print_layout_size(web_print_params_.printContentArea.width,
web_print_params_.printContentArea.height);
print_layout_size.set_height(static_cast<int>(
static_cast<double>(print_layout_size.height()) * 1.25));
web_view_->resize(print_layout_size);
expected_pages_count_ = frame_->printBegin(web_print_params_,
node_to_print_,
&use_browser_overlays_);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_set_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 this_tsc_khz)
{
u32 thresh_lo, thresh_hi;
int use_scaling = 0;
/* Compute a scale to convert nanoseconds in TSC cycles */
kvm_get_time_scale(this_tsc_khz, NSEC_PER_SEC / 1000,
&vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_shift,
&vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_mult);
vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz = this_tsc_khz;
/*
* Compute the variation in TSC rate which is acceptable
* within the range of tolerance and decide if the
* rate being applied is within that bounds of the hardware
* rate. If so, no scaling or compensation need be done.
*/
thresh_lo = adjust_tsc_khz(tsc_khz, -tsc_tolerance_ppm);
thresh_hi = adjust_tsc_khz(tsc_khz, tsc_tolerance_ppm);
if (this_tsc_khz < thresh_lo || this_tsc_khz > thresh_hi) {
pr_debug("kvm: requested TSC rate %u falls outside tolerance [%u,%u]\n", this_tsc_khz, thresh_lo, thresh_hi);
use_scaling = 1;
}
kvm_x86_ops->set_tsc_khz(vcpu, this_tsc_khz, use_scaling);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct k_itimer *__lock_timer(timer_t timer_id, unsigned long *flags)
{
struct k_itimer *timr;
/*
* timer_t could be any type >= int and we want to make sure any
* @timer_id outside positive int range fails lookup.
*/
if ((unsigned long long)timer_id > INT_MAX)
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
timr = posix_timer_by_id(timer_id);
if (timr) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&timr->it_lock, *flags);
if (timr->it_signal == current->signal) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return timr;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timr->it_lock, *flags);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: errorProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
UNUSED_P(s);
UNUSED_P(end);
UNUSED_P(nextPtr);
return parser->m_errorCode;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: obtain_nonce(unsigned char* nonce)
{
int fd = -1;
int ok = -1;
ssize_t r;
if ((fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY)) < 0)
goto fail;
if ((r = read(fd, nonce, 8)) < 0 || r != 8)
goto fail;
ok = 0;
fail:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
return (ok);
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::clearHistory()
{
PageGroup::removeAllVisitedLinks();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void add_pending_sha1(struct rev_info *revs, const char *name,
const unsigned char *sha1, unsigned int flags)
{
struct object *object = get_reference(revs, name, sha1, flags);
add_pending_object(revs, object, name);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_wrmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
if (vmx_set_msr(vcpu, &msr) != 0) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlobStorageContext::NotifyTransportCompleteInternal(BlobEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(entry);
for (ShareableBlobDataItem* shareable_item :
entry->building_state_->transport_items) {
DCHECK(shareable_item->state() == ShareableBlobDataItem::QUOTA_GRANTED);
shareable_item->set_state(ShareableBlobDataItem::POPULATED_WITH_QUOTA);
}
entry->set_status(BlobStatus::PENDING_INTERNALS);
if (entry->CanFinishBuilding())
FinishBuilding(entry);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPS_RTree * comps_rtree_create(void* (*data_constructor)(void*),
void* (*data_cloner)(void*),
void (*data_destructor)(void*)) {
COMPS_RTree *ret;
if ((ret = malloc(sizeof(COMPS_RTree))) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->subnodes = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(ret->subnodes, NULL, NULL, &comps_rtree_data_destroy_v);
if (ret->subnodes == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->data_constructor = data_constructor;
ret->data_cloner = data_cloner;
ret->data_destructor = data_destructor;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ClientPolicyController* StubOfflinePageModel::GetPolicyController() {
return &policy_controller_;
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::OpenDevice(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
const std::string& device_id,
MediaStreamType type,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin,
OpenDeviceCallback open_device_cb,
DeviceStoppedCallback device_stopped_cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(type == MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE ||
type == MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE);
DVLOG(1) << "OpenDevice ({page_request_id = " << page_request_id << "})";
StreamControls controls;
if (IsAudioInputMediaType(type)) {
controls.audio.requested = true;
controls.audio.stream_type = type;
controls.audio.device_id = device_id;
} else if (IsVideoInputMediaType(type)) {
controls.video.requested = true;
controls.video.stream_type = type;
controls.video.device_id = device_id;
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
DeviceRequest* request = new DeviceRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
false /* user gesture */, MEDIA_OPEN_DEVICE_PEPPER_ONLY, controls,
std::move(salt_and_origin), std::move(device_stopped_cb));
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->open_device_cb = std::move(open_device_cb);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 173,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void debugfs_remove_recursive(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct dentry *child, *parent;
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry))
return;
parent = dentry;
down:
inode_lock(d_inode(parent));
loop:
/*
* The parent->d_subdirs is protected by the d_lock. Outside that
* lock, the child can be unlinked and set to be freed which can
* use the d_u.d_child as the rcu head and corrupt this list.
*/
spin_lock(&parent->d_lock);
list_for_each_entry(child, &parent->d_subdirs, d_child) {
if (!simple_positive(child))
continue;
/* perhaps simple_empty(child) makes more sense */
if (!list_empty(&child->d_subdirs)) {
spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock);
inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
parent = child;
goto down;
}
spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock);
if (!__debugfs_remove(child, parent))
simple_release_fs(&debugfs_mount, &debugfs_mount_count);
/*
* The parent->d_lock protects agaist child from unlinking
* from d_subdirs. When releasing the parent->d_lock we can
* no longer trust that the next pointer is valid.
* Restart the loop. We'll skip this one with the
* simple_positive() check.
*/
goto loop;
}
spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock);
inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
child = parent;
parent = parent->d_parent;
inode_lock(d_inode(parent));
if (child != dentry)
/* go up */
goto loop;
if (!__debugfs_remove(child, parent))
simple_release_fs(&debugfs_mount, &debugfs_mount_count);
inode_unlock(d_inode(parent));
synchronize_srcu(&debugfs_srcu);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ns_qprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, register const u_char *bp, int is_mdns)
{
register const u_char *np = cp;
register u_int i, class;
cp = ns_nskip(ndo, cp);
if (cp == NULL || !ND_TTEST2(*cp, 4))
return(NULL);
/* print the qtype */
i = EXTRACT_16BITS(cp);
cp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(ns_type2str, "Type%d", i)));
/* print the qclass (if it's not IN) */
i = EXTRACT_16BITS(cp);
cp += 2;
if (is_mdns)
class = (i & ~C_QU);
else
class = i;
if (class != C_IN)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(ns_class2str, "(Class %d)", class)));
if (is_mdns) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, i & C_QU ? " (QU)" : " (QM)"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "? "));
cp = ns_nprint(ndo, np, bp);
return(cp ? cp + 4 : NULL);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12995/Check for DNS compression pointers that don't point backwards.
This is what BIND 9.11.0-P2 does; it not only detects pointers that
loop, as "point backwards" means "point before anything we've processed
so far, including what we're processing right now", so the pointer can't
point to itself (as that's what we're processing right now).
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Also, add some infinite-pointer-loop captures.
More checks should be done. We might, for example, want to make sure
the upper 2 bits of the label length/pointer byte are 00 or 11, and that
if we encounter a pointer and jump backwards to what we think is a label
the label ends before the beginning of the last label we processed, to
make sure the pointer doesn't point backwards into the *middle* of a
label, and also make sure the entire name is <= 255 bytes long.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 62,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotifyOnUI(int type, int render_process_id, int render_view_id,
scoped_ptr<T> detail) {
RenderViewHostImpl* host =
RenderViewHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id, render_view_id);
if (host) {
RenderViewHostDelegate* delegate = host->GetDelegate();
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
type, Source<WebContents>(delegate->GetAsWebContents()),
Details<T>(detail.get()));
}
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void shmem_init_inode(void *foo)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = foo;
inode_init_once(&info->vfs_inode);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::PauseAnimation(int animation_id, double time_offset) {
layer_animation_controller_->PauseAnimation(animation_id, time_offset);
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::FrontendWebContentsObserver::DidFinishNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() && navigation_handle->HasCommitted())
devtools_bindings_->DidNavigateMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: Improve sanitization of remoteFrontendUrl in DevTools
This change ensures that the decoded remoteFrontendUrl parameter cannot
contain any single quote in its value. As of this commit, none of the
permitted query params in SanitizeFrontendQueryParam can contain single
quotes.
Note that the existing SanitizeEndpoint function does not explicitly
check for single quotes. This is fine since single quotes in the query
string are already URL-encoded and the values validated by
SanitizeEndpoint are not url-decoded elsewhere.
BUG=798163
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/798163#c1
TEST=./unit_tests --gtest_filter=DevToolsUIBindingsTest.SanitizeFrontendURL
Change-Id: I5a08e8ce6f1abc2c8d2a0983fef63e1e194cd242
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/846979
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#527250}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::Home(WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Home"));
OpenURL(GetHomePage(), GURL(), disposition,
PageTransition::AUTO_BOOKMARK | PageTransition::HOME_PAGE);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<MediaSource> MPEG4Extractor::getTrack(size_t index) {
status_t err;
if ((err = readMetaData()) != OK) {
return NULL;
}
Track *track = mFirstTrack;
while (index > 0) {
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
track = track->next;
--index;
}
if (track == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
Trex *trex = NULL;
int32_t trackId;
if (track->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTrex.size(); i++) {
Trex *t = &mTrex.editItemAt(index);
if (t->track_ID == (uint32_t) trackId) {
trex = t;
break;
}
}
}
ALOGV("getTrack called, pssh: %zu", mPssh.size());
return new MPEG4Source(this,
track->meta, mDataSource, track->timescale, track->sampleTable,
mSidxEntries, trex, mMoofOffset);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionTabUtil::IsCrashURL(const GURL& url) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 116,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::GetWindowTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
is_uploading_ ? IDS_AUTOFILL_SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_TITLE_TO_CLOUD
: IDS_AUTOFILL_SAVE_CARD_PROMPT_TITLE_LOCAL);
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnHistoryDeleted() {
if (ukm_service_)
ukm_service_->Purge();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ApplyPSDOpacityMask(Image *image,const Image *mask,
Quantum background,MagickBooleanType revert,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*complete_mask;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PixelInfo
color;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" applying opacity mask");
complete_mask=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,
exception);
complete_mask->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
GetPixelInfo(complete_mask,&color);
color.red=background;
SetImageColor(complete_mask,&color,exception);
status=CompositeImage(complete_mask,mask,OverCompositeOp,MagickTrue,
mask->page.x-image->page.x,mask->page.y-image->page.y,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
complete_mask=DestroyImage(complete_mask);
return(status);
}
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
p=GetAuthenticPixels(complete_mask,0,y,complete_mask->columns,1,exception);
if ((q == (Quantum *) NULL) || (p == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
MagickRealType
alpha,
intensity;
alpha=GetPixelAlpha(image,q);
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(complete_mask,p);
if (revert == MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum(intensity*(QuantumScale*alpha)),q);
else if (intensity > 0)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ClampToQuantum((alpha/intensity)*QuantumRange),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p+=GetPixelChannels(complete_mask);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
complete_mask=DestroyImage(complete_mask);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fix improper cast that could cause an overflow as demonstrated in #347.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void join_reactor_thread() {
pthread_join(thread, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetAllChanged() {
grandchild1->ClearChangedToRoot();
grandchild2->ClearChangedToRoot();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wb_write_to_temp(struct archive_write *a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
const char *xp = buff;
size_t xs = s;
/*
* If a written data size is big enough to use system-call
* and there is no waiting data, this calls write_to_temp() in
* order to reduce a extra memory copy.
*/
if (wb_remaining(a) == wb_buffmax() && s > (1024 * 16)) {
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)a->format_data;
xs = s % LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE;
iso9660->wbuff_offset += s - xs;
if (write_to_temp(a, buff, s - xs) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (xs == 0)
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
xp += s - xs;
}
while (xs) {
size_t size = xs;
if (size > wb_remaining(a))
size = wb_remaining(a);
memcpy(wb_buffptr(a), xp, size);
if (wb_consume(a, size) != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
xs -= size;
xp += size;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct user_namespace *seq_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if (!ns->parent)
return -EPERM;
if ((seq_ns != ns) && (seq_ns != ns->parent))
return -EPERM;
/* Anyone can set any valid project id no capability needed */
return map_write(file, buf, size, ppos, -1,
&ns->projid_map, &ns->parent->projid_map);
}
Commit Message: userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainSetMemoryStatsPeriod(virDomainPtr domain, int period,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "period=%d, flags=%x", period, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
/* This must be positive to set the balloon collection period */
virCheckNonNegativeArgGoto(period, error);
if (conn->driver->domainSetMemoryStatsPeriod) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainSetMemoryStatsPeriod(domain, period, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tiff_mapproc(thandle_t h, tdata_t *d, toff_t *o)
{
(void)h;
(void)d;
(void)o;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> InspectorParseAuthorStyleSheetEvent::Data(
const CSSStyleSheetResource* cached_style_sheet) {
std::unique_ptr<TracedValue> value = TracedValue::Create();
value->SetString("styleSheetUrl", cached_style_sheet->Url().GetString());
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
if (unlikely(size > PAGE_SIZE))
return kmalloc_large_node(size, flags, node);
s = get_slab(size, flags);
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
return s;
return slab_alloc(s, flags, node, __builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::OnPrintPages() {
if (ipc_nesting_level_ > 1)
return;
auto weak_this = weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = render_frame()->GetWebFrame();
frame->DispatchBeforePrintEvent();
if (!weak_this)
return;
auto plugin = delegate_->GetPdfElement(frame);
Print(frame, plugin, false /* is_scripted? */);
if (weak_this)
frame->DispatchAfterPrintEvent();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int exp_rdonly(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
{
return nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp) & NFSEXP_READONLY;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_lop_for_pdf14(gs_gstate *pgs, const gx_drawing_color *pdcolor)
{
bool hastrans = false;
/* We'd really rather not have to set the pdf14 bit in the lop, as this
* makes other operations much slower. We have no option however, if the
* current colour involves transparency, or if it's anything other than
* a completely solid (or transparent) operation in the normal blend mode.
*/
if (pdcolor != NULL)
{
if (gx_dc_is_pattern1_color(pdcolor) &&
gx_pattern1_get_transptr(pdcolor) != NULL) {
hastrans = true;
} else if (gx_dc_is_pattern2_color(pdcolor)) {
/* FIXME: Here we assume that ALL type 2 patterns are
* transparent - this test could be better. */
hastrans = true;
}
}
/* The only idempotent blend modes are Normal, Darken and Lighten */
if ((pgs->alpha != 0xFFFF) ||
(pgs->blend_mode != BLEND_MODE_Normal && pgs->blend_mode != BLEND_MODE_Darken && pgs->blend_mode != BLEND_MODE_Lighten) ||
(pgs->opacity.alpha != 1.0) ||
(pgs->shape.alpha != 1.0) ||
(hastrans))
{
/*
* The blend operations are not idempotent. Force non-idempotent
* filling and stroking operations.
*/
pgs->log_op |= lop_pdf14;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_arch_vcpu_in_kernel(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_INI_MH(phar_ini_cache_list) /* {{{ */
{
PHAR_G(cache_list) = ZSTR_VAL(new_value);
if (stage == ZEND_INI_STAGE_STARTUP) {
phar_split_cache_list();
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proto_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open_net(inode, file, &proto_seq_ops,
sizeof(struct seq_net_private));
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Condor_Auth_SSL :: Condor_Auth_SSL(ReliSock * sock, int /* remote */)
: Condor_Auth_Base ( sock, CAUTH_SSL )
{
m_crypto = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: convert_bytes_to_data( png_structp png,
png_row_infop row_info,
png_bytep data )
{
unsigned int i;
FT_UNUSED( png );
for ( i = 0; i < row_info->rowbytes; i += 4 )
{
unsigned char* base = &data[i];
unsigned int red = base[0];
unsigned int green = base[1];
unsigned int blue = base[2];
base[0] = blue;
base[1] = green;
base[2] = red;
base[3] = 0xFF;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void update_rq_clock(struct rq *rq)
{
s64 delta;
lockdep_assert_held(&rq->lock);
if (rq->clock_skip_update & RQCF_ACT_SKIP)
return;
delta = sched_clock_cpu(cpu_of(rq)) - rq->clock;
if (delta < 0)
return;
rq->clock += delta;
update_rq_clock_task(rq, delta);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vpx_codec_err_t SetFrameBufferFunctions(
int num_buffers,
vpx_get_frame_buffer_cb_fn_t cb_get,
vpx_release_frame_buffer_cb_fn_t cb_release) {
if (num_buffers > 0) {
num_buffers_ = num_buffers;
EXPECT_TRUE(fb_list_.CreateBufferList(num_buffers_));
}
return decoder_->SetFrameBufferFunctions(cb_get, cb_release, &fb_list_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(
Profile* profile,
const extensions::Extension* app) {
chrome::ShowCreateChromeAppShortcutsDialog(GetNativeWindow(), profile, app);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_sync_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
del_timer_sync(&q->timeout);
cancel_work_sync(&q->timeout_work);
if (q->mq_ops) {
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
int i;
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&q->requeue_work);
queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i)
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hctx->run_work);
} else {
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&q->delay_work);
}
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: conv_ext0be(const UChar* s, const UChar* end, UChar* conv)
{
while (s < end) {
*conv++ = '\0';
*conv++ = *s++;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int update_private_key(const u8 *key, size_t keysize)
{
int r, idx = 0;
sc_path_t path;
r = select_app_df();
if (r)
return 1;
sc_format_path("I0012", &path);
r = sc_select_file(card, &path, NULL);
if (r) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to select private key file: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
idx = keysize * (opt_key_num-1);
r = sc_update_binary(card, idx, key, keysize, 0);
if (r < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to write private key: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
return 2;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_restore_security_env(struct sc_card *card, int se_num)
{
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void echo_erase_tab(unsigned int num_chars, int after_tab,
struct n_tty_data *ldata)
{
add_echo_byte(ECHO_OP_START, ldata);
add_echo_byte(ECHO_OP_ERASE_TAB, ldata);
/* We only need to know this modulo 8 (tab spacing) */
num_chars &= 7;
/* Set the high bit as a flag if num_chars is after a previous tab */
if (after_tab)
num_chars |= 0x80;
add_echo_byte(num_chars, ldata);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 39,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackgroundLoaderOffliner::RenderProcessGone(
base::TerminationStatus status) {
if (pending_request_) {
SavePageRequest request(*pending_request_.get());
switch (status) {
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_OOM:
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_CRASHED:
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING:
std::move(completion_callback_)
.Run(request, Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED_NO_NEXT);
break;
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED:
default:
std::move(completion_callback_)
.Run(request, Offliner::RequestStatus::LOADING_FAILED);
}
ResetState();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 139,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfio_pci_get_irq_count(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int irq_type)
{
if (irq_type == VFIO_PCI_INTX_IRQ_INDEX) {
u8 pin;
pci_read_config_byte(vdev->pdev, PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN, &pin);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_INTX) && !vdev->nointx && pin)
return 1;
} else if (irq_type == VFIO_PCI_MSI_IRQ_INDEX) {
u8 pos;
u16 flags;
pos = vdev->pdev->msi_cap;
if (pos) {
pci_read_config_word(vdev->pdev,
pos + PCI_MSI_FLAGS, &flags);
return 1 << ((flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_QMASK) >> 1);
}
} else if (irq_type == VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX) {
u8 pos;
u16 flags;
pos = vdev->pdev->msix_cap;
if (pos) {
pci_read_config_word(vdev->pdev,
pos + PCI_MSIX_FLAGS, &flags);
return (flags & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_QSIZE) + 1;
}
} else if (irq_type == VFIO_PCI_ERR_IRQ_INDEX) {
if (pci_is_pcie(vdev->pdev))
return 1;
} else if (irq_type == VFIO_PCI_REQ_IRQ_INDEX) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_openssl_load_rand_file(const char * file, int *egdsocket, int *seeded TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char buffer[MAXPATHLEN];
*egdsocket = 0;
*seeded = 0;
if (file == NULL) {
file = RAND_file_name(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
} else if (RAND_egd(file) > 0) {
/* if the given filename is an EGD socket, don't
* write anything back to it */
*egdsocket = 1;
return SUCCESS;
}
if (file == NULL || !RAND_load_file(file, -1)) {
if (RAND_status() == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unable to load random state; not enough random data!");
return FAILURE;
}
return FAILURE;
}
*seeded = 1;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getpeername, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, usockaddr,
int __user *, usockaddr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int len, err, fput_needed;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock != NULL) {
err = security_socket_getpeername(sock);
if (err) {
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
return err;
}
err =
sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&address, &len,
1);
if (!err)
err = move_addr_to_user((struct sockaddr *)&address, len, usockaddr,
usockaddr_len);
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeMetricsServiceClient::SyncStateAllowsExtensionUkm() {
return SyncDisableObserver::SyncStateAllowsExtensionUkm();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ffs_data_opened(struct ffs_data *ffs)
{
ENTER();
atomic_inc(&ffs->ref);
if (atomic_add_return(1, &ffs->opened) == 1 &&
ffs->state == FFS_DEACTIVATED) {
ffs->state = FFS_CLOSING;
ffs_data_reset(ffs);
}
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintViewManagerBase::OnShowInvalidPrinterSettingsError() {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&ShowWarningMessageBox,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS)));
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
if (!context->sockaddr) {
void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return -ENOMEM;
context->sockaddr = p;
}
context->sockaddr_len = len;
memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_4x4blk(dec_struct_t * ps_dec,
WORD16 *pi2_out_coeff_data,
UWORD8 *pu1_inv_scan)
{
tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4 = (tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data;
UWORD16 u2_sig_coeff_map = ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map;
WORD32 idx = 0;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data = &ps_tu_4x4->ai2_level[0];
WORD32 dc_only_flag = 0;
WORD32 num_coeff = 0;
PROFILE_DISABLE_UNPACK_LUMA()
while(u2_sig_coeff_map)
{
idx = CLZ(u2_sig_coeff_map);
idx = 31 - idx;
RESET_BIT(u2_sig_coeff_map,idx);
idx = pu1_inv_scan[idx];
pi2_out_coeff_data[idx] = *pi2_coeff_data++;
num_coeff++;
}
if((num_coeff == 1) && (idx == 0))
{
dc_only_flag = 1;
}
{
WORD32 offset;
offset = (UWORD8 *)pi2_coeff_data - (UWORD8 *)ps_tu_4x4;
offset = ALIGN4(offset);
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = (void *)((UWORD8 *)ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data + offset);
}
return dc_only_flag;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix for handling invalid intra mode
Bug: 28165659
Change-Id: I2291a287c27291695f4f3d6e753b6bbd7dfd9e42
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetWebGLVersion(
const CanvasRenderingContext* context) {
if (!context->Is3d())
return 0;
return static_cast<const WebGLRenderingContextBase*>(context)->ContextType();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1 || shdr->sh_size > SIZE_MAX) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; i >= 0 && cnt < shdr->sh_info && (end - (char *)defs > i); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
int vdaux = verdef->vd_aux;
if (vdaux < 1 || (char *)UINTPTR_MAX - vstart < vdaux) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
vstart += vdaux;
if (vstart > end || end - vstart < sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux))) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || end - vstart < sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux))) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
if ((st32)verdef->vd_next < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: Invalid vd_next in the ELF version\n");
break;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 differently since ptr diff might not fit in ptrdiff_t
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 170,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SplashOutputDev::drawMaskedImage(GfxState *state, Object *ref,
Stream *str, int width, int height,
GfxImageColorMap *colorMap,
Stream *maskStr, int maskWidth,
int maskHeight, GBool maskInvert) {
GfxImageColorMap *maskColorMap;
Object maskDecode, decodeLow, decodeHigh;
double *ctm;
SplashCoord mat[6];
SplashOutMaskedImageData imgData;
SplashOutImageMaskData imgMaskData;
SplashColorMode srcMode;
SplashBitmap *maskBitmap;
Splash *maskSplash;
SplashColor maskColor;
GfxGray gray;
GfxRGB rgb;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
GfxCMYK cmyk;
#endif
Guchar pix;
int n, i;
if (maskWidth > width || maskHeight > height) {
decodeLow.initInt(maskInvert ? 0 : 1);
decodeHigh.initInt(maskInvert ? 1 : 0);
maskDecode.initArray(xref);
maskDecode.arrayAdd(&decodeLow);
maskDecode.arrayAdd(&decodeHigh);
maskColorMap = new GfxImageColorMap(1, &maskDecode,
new GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace());
maskDecode.free();
drawSoftMaskedImage(state, ref, str, width, height, colorMap,
maskStr, maskWidth, maskHeight, maskColorMap);
delete maskColorMap;
} else {
mat[0] = (SplashCoord)width;
mat[1] = 0;
mat[2] = 0;
mat[3] = (SplashCoord)height;
mat[4] = 0;
mat[5] = 0;
imgMaskData.imgStr = new ImageStream(maskStr, maskWidth, 1, 1);
imgMaskData.imgStr->reset();
imgMaskData.invert = maskInvert ? 0 : 1;
imgMaskData.width = maskWidth;
imgMaskData.height = maskHeight;
imgMaskData.y = 0;
maskBitmap = new SplashBitmap(width, height, 1, splashModeMono1, gFalse);
maskSplash = new Splash(maskBitmap, gFalse);
maskColor[0] = 0;
maskSplash->clear(maskColor);
maskColor[0] = 0xff;
maskSplash->setFillPattern(new SplashSolidColor(maskColor));
maskSplash->fillImageMask(&imageMaskSrc, &imgMaskData,
maskWidth, maskHeight, mat, gFalse);
delete imgMaskData.imgStr;
maskStr->close();
delete maskSplash;
ctm = state->getCTM();
mat[0] = ctm[0];
mat[1] = ctm[1];
mat[2] = -ctm[2];
mat[3] = -ctm[3];
mat[4] = ctm[2] + ctm[4];
mat[5] = ctm[3] + ctm[5];
imgData.imgStr = new ImageStream(str, width,
colorMap->getNumPixelComps(),
colorMap->getBits());
imgData.imgStr->reset();
imgData.colorMap = colorMap;
imgData.mask = maskBitmap;
imgData.colorMode = colorMode;
imgData.width = width;
imgData.height = height;
imgData.y = 0;
imgData.lookup = NULL;
if (colorMap->getNumPixelComps() == 1) {
n = 1 << colorMap->getBits();
switch (colorMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
case splashModeMono8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmalloc(n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getGray(&pix, &gray);
imgData.lookup[i] = colToByte(gray);
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
case splashModeBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 3);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[3*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[3*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[3*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getRGB(&pix, &rgb);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(rgb.r);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(rgb.g);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(rgb.b);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = 255;
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
imgData.lookup = (SplashColorPtr)gmallocn(n, 4);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
pix = (Guchar)i;
colorMap->getCMYK(&pix, &cmyk);
imgData.lookup[4*i] = colToByte(cmyk.c);
imgData.lookup[4*i+1] = colToByte(cmyk.m);
imgData.lookup[4*i+2] = colToByte(cmyk.y);
imgData.lookup[4*i+3] = colToByte(cmyk.k);
}
break;
#endif
}
}
if (colorMode == splashModeMono1) {
srcMode = splashModeMono8;
} else {
srcMode = colorMode;
}
splash->drawImage(&maskedImageSrc, &imgData, srcMode, gTrue,
width, height, mat);
delete maskBitmap;
gfree(imgData.lookup);
delete imgData.imgStr;
str->close();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PostBrowserStart() {
chromeos::system::StatisticsProvider::GetInstance();
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kEnableBluetooth)) {
chromeos::BluetoothManager::Initialize();
}
#if defined(USE_AURA)
power_button_observer_.reset(new chromeos::PowerButtonObserver);
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->AddObserver(
power_button_observer_.get());
#endif
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PostBrowserStart();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftrace_graph_probe_sched_switch(void *ignore,
struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next)
{
unsigned long long timestamp;
int index;
/*
* Does the user want to count the time a function was asleep.
* If so, do not update the time stamps.
*/
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_SLEEP_TIME)
return;
timestamp = trace_clock_local();
prev->ftrace_timestamp = timestamp;
/* only process tasks that we timestamped */
if (!next->ftrace_timestamp)
return;
/*
* Update all the counters in next to make up for the
* time next was sleeping.
*/
timestamp -= next->ftrace_timestamp;
for (index = next->curr_ret_stack; index >= 0; index--)
next->ret_stack[index].calltime += timestamp;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t pagemap_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
struct pagemapread pm;
struct mm_walk pagemap_walk = {};
unsigned long src;
unsigned long svpfn;
unsigned long start_vaddr;
unsigned long end_vaddr;
int ret = 0, copied = 0;
if (!mm || !mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto out;
ret = -EINVAL;
/* file position must be aligned */
if ((*ppos % PM_ENTRY_BYTES) || (count % PM_ENTRY_BYTES))
goto out_mm;
ret = 0;
if (!count)
goto out_mm;
/* do not disclose physical addresses: attack vector */
pm.show_pfn = file_ns_capable(file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
pm.len = (PAGEMAP_WALK_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
pm.buffer = kmalloc_array(pm.len, PM_ENTRY_BYTES, GFP_KERNEL);
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (!pm.buffer)
goto out_mm;
pagemap_walk.pmd_entry = pagemap_pmd_range;
pagemap_walk.pte_hole = pagemap_pte_hole;
#ifdef CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE
pagemap_walk.hugetlb_entry = pagemap_hugetlb_range;
#endif
pagemap_walk.mm = mm;
pagemap_walk.private = ±
src = *ppos;
svpfn = src / PM_ENTRY_BYTES;
start_vaddr = svpfn << PAGE_SHIFT;
end_vaddr = mm->task_size;
/* watch out for wraparound */
if (svpfn > mm->task_size >> PAGE_SHIFT)
start_vaddr = end_vaddr;
/*
* The odds are that this will stop walking way
* before end_vaddr, because the length of the
* user buffer is tracked in "pm", and the walk
* will stop when we hit the end of the buffer.
*/
ret = 0;
while (count && (start_vaddr < end_vaddr)) {
int len;
unsigned long end;
pm.pos = 0;
end = (start_vaddr + PAGEMAP_WALK_SIZE) & PAGEMAP_WALK_MASK;
/* overflow ? */
if (end < start_vaddr || end > end_vaddr)
end = end_vaddr;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
ret = walk_page_range(start_vaddr, end, &pagemap_walk);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
start_vaddr = end;
len = min(count, PM_ENTRY_BYTES * pm.pos);
if (copy_to_user(buf, pm.buffer, len)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_free;
}
copied += len;
buf += len;
count -= len;
}
*ppos += copied;
if (!ret || ret == PM_END_OF_BUFFER)
ret = copied;
out_free:
kfree(pm.buffer);
out_mm:
mmput(mm);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CString TextCodecUTF8::EncodeCommon(const CharType* characters,
wtf_size_t length) {
CHECK_LE(length, std::numeric_limits<wtf_size_t>::max() / 3);
Vector<uint8_t> bytes(length * 3);
wtf_size_t i = 0;
wtf_size_t bytes_written = 0;
while (i < length) {
UChar32 character;
U16_NEXT(characters, i, length, character);
if (0xD800 <= character && character <= 0xDFFF)
character = kReplacementCharacter;
U8_APPEND_UNSAFE(bytes.data(), bytes_written, character);
}
return CString(reinterpret_cast<char*>(bytes.data()), bytes_written);
}
Commit Message: Add bounds CHECK to UTF-8 decoder memory allocation.
Avoid integer overflow when computing a total buffer size from a base
buffer and small partial sequence buffer.
Bug: 901030
Change-Id: Ic82db2c6af770bd748fb1ec881999d0dfaac30f0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1313833
Reviewed-by: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605011}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 143,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::ImageNotifyFinished(ImageResourceContent* resource) {
RESOURCE_LOADING_DVLOG(1)
<< "ImageLoader::imageNotifyFinished " << this
<< "; has pending load event=" << pending_load_event_.IsActive();
DCHECK(failed_load_url_.IsEmpty());
DCHECK_EQ(resource, image_content_.Get());
if (loading_image_document_)
CHECK(image_complete_);
else
CHECK(!image_complete_);
image_complete_ = true;
delay_until_image_notify_finished_ = nullptr;
if (image_content_)
image_content_->UpdateImageAnimationPolicy();
UpdateLayoutObject();
if (image_content_ && image_content_->HasImage()) {
Image& image = *image_content_->GetImage();
if (IsHTMLImageElement(element_)) {
Image::RecordCheckerableImageUMA(image, Image::ImageType::kImg);
} else if (IsSVGImageElement(element_)) {
Image::RecordCheckerableImageUMA(image, Image::ImageType::kSvg);
}
if (image.IsSVGImage()) {
SVGImage& svg_image = ToSVGImage(image);
svg_image.CheckLoaded();
svg_image.UpdateUseCounters(GetElement()->GetDocument());
}
}
DispatchDecodeRequestsIfComplete();
if (loading_image_document_) {
CHECK(!pending_load_event_.IsActive());
return;
}
if (resource->ErrorOccurred()) {
pending_load_event_.Cancel();
Optional<ResourceError> error = resource->GetResourceError();
if (error && error->IsAccessCheck())
CrossSiteOrCSPViolationOccurred(AtomicString(error->FailingURL()));
if (!suppress_error_events_)
DispatchErrorEvent();
return;
}
CHECK(!pending_load_event_.IsActive());
pending_load_event_ = PostCancellableTask(
*GetElement()->GetDocument().GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation),
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&ImageLoader::DispatchPendingLoadEvent, WrapPersistent(this),
WTF::Passed(IncrementLoadEventDelayCount::Create(
GetElement()->GetDocument()))));
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct pid_namespace *ns;
ns = (struct pid_namespace *)sb->s_fs_info;
if (ns->proc_self)
dput(ns->proc_self);
if (ns->proc_thread_self)
dput(ns->proc_thread_self);
kill_anon_super(sb);
put_pid_ns(ns);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_draw_vbo(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, int length)
{
struct pipe_draw_info info;
uint32_t cso;
if (length != VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct pipe_draw_info));
info.start = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_START);
info.count = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_COUNT);
info.mode = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_MODE);
info.indexed = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_INDEXED);
info.instance_count = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_INSTANCE_COUNT);
info.index_bias = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_INDEX_BIAS);
info.start_instance = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_START_INSTANCE);
info.primitive_restart = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_PRIMITIVE_RESTART);
info.restart_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_RESTART_INDEX);
info.min_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_MIN_INDEX);
info.max_index = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_MAX_INDEX);
cso = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_DRAW_VBO_COUNT_FROM_SO);
vrend_draw_vbo(ctx->grctx, &info, cso);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void put_futex_key(int fshared, union futex_key *key)
{
drop_futex_key_refs(key);
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_ISOFile *package_file(char *file_name, char *fcc, const char *tmpdir, Bool make_wgt)
{
fprintf(stderr, "XML Not supported in this build of GPAC - cannot package file\n");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RTCVoidRequestImpl::requestFailed(const String& error)
{
if (m_errorCallback.get())
m_errorCallback->handleEvent(error);
clear();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,386 |
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