instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbChooserContext::GetAllGrantedObjects() {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<ChooserContextBase::Object>> objects =
ChooserContextBase::GetAllGrantedObjects();
for (const auto& map_entry : ephemeral_devices_) {
const GURL& requesting_origin = map_entry.first.first;
const GURL& embedding_origin = map_entry.first.second;
if (!CanRequestObjectPermission(requesting_origin, embedding_origin))
continue;
for (const std::string& guid : map_entry.second) {
auto dict_it = ephemeral_dicts_.find(guid);
DCHECK(dict_it != ephemeral_dicts_.end());
auto object = dict_it->second.CreateDeepCopy();
objects.push_back(std::make_unique<ChooserContextBase::Object>(
requesting_origin, embedding_origin, object.get(), "preference",
is_incognito_));
}
}
return objects;
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXTree::AXTree(const AXTreeUpdate& initial_state) {
CHECK(Unserialize(initial_state)) << error();
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xml_diff_object(xmlNode * old, xmlNode * new)
{
xmlNode *cIter = NULL;
xmlAttr *pIter = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(new != NULL, return);
if(old == NULL) {
crm_node_created(new);
__xml_acl_post_process(new); /* Check creation is allowed */
return;
} else {
xml_private_t *p = new->_private;
if(p->flags & xpf_processed) {
/* Avoid re-comparing nodes */
return;
}
p->flags |= xpf_processed;
}
for (pIter = crm_first_attr(new); pIter != NULL; pIter = pIter->next) {
xml_private_t *p = pIter->_private;
/* Assume everything was just created and take it from there */
p->flags |= xpf_created;
}
for (pIter = crm_first_attr(old); pIter != NULL; ) {
xmlAttr *prop = pIter;
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
const char *name = (const char *)pIter->name;
const char *old_value = crm_element_value(old, name);
xmlAttr *exists = xmlHasProp(new, pIter->name);
pIter = pIter->next;
if(exists == NULL) {
p = new->doc->_private;
/* Prevent the dirty flag being set recursively upwards */
clear_bit(p->flags, xpf_tracking);
exists = xmlSetProp(new, (const xmlChar *)name, (const xmlChar *)old_value);
set_bit(p->flags, xpf_tracking);
p = exists->_private;
p->flags = 0;
crm_trace("Lost %s@%s=%s", old->name, name, old_value);
xml_remove_prop(new, name);
} else {
int p_new = __xml_offset((xmlNode*)exists);
int p_old = __xml_offset((xmlNode*)prop);
const char *value = crm_element_value(new, name);
p = exists->_private;
p->flags = (p->flags & ~xpf_created);
if(strcmp(value, old_value) != 0) {
/* Restore the original value, so we can call crm_xml_add() whcih checks ACLs */
char *vcopy = crm_element_value_copy(new, name);
crm_trace("Modified %s@%s %s->%s", old->name, name, old_value, vcopy);
xmlSetProp(new, prop->name, (const xmlChar *)old_value);
crm_xml_add(new, name, vcopy);
free(vcopy);
} else if(p_old != p_new) {
crm_info("Moved %s@%s (%d -> %d)", old->name, name, p_old, p_new);
__xml_node_dirty(new);
p->flags |= xpf_dirty|xpf_moved;
if(p_old > p_new) {
p = prop->_private;
p->flags |= xpf_skip;
} else {
p = exists->_private;
p->flags |= xpf_skip;
}
}
}
}
for (pIter = crm_first_attr(new); pIter != NULL; ) {
xmlAttr *prop = pIter;
xml_private_t *p = pIter->_private;
pIter = pIter->next;
if(is_set(p->flags, xpf_created)) {
char *name = strdup((const char *)prop->name);
char *value = crm_element_value_copy(new, name);
crm_trace("Created %s@%s=%s", new->name, name, value);
/* Remove plus create wont work as it will modify the relative attribute ordering */
if(__xml_acl_check(new, name, xpf_acl_write)) {
crm_attr_dirty(prop);
} else {
xmlUnsetProp(new, prop->name); /* Remove - change not allowed */
}
free(value);
free(name);
}
}
for (cIter = __xml_first_child(old); cIter != NULL; ) {
xmlNode *old_child = cIter;
xmlNode *new_child = find_entity(new, crm_element_name(cIter), ID(cIter));
cIter = __xml_next(cIter);
if(new_child) {
__xml_diff_object(old_child, new_child);
} else {
xml_private_t *p = old_child->_private;
/* Create then free (which will check the acls if necessary) */
xmlNode *candidate = add_node_copy(new, old_child);
xmlNode *top = xmlDocGetRootElement(candidate->doc);
__xml_node_clean(candidate);
__xml_acl_apply(top); /* Make sure any ACLs are applied to 'candidate' */
free_xml(candidate);
if(NULL == find_entity(new, crm_element_name(old_child), ID(old_child))) {
p->flags |= xpf_skip;
}
}
}
for (cIter = __xml_first_child(new); cIter != NULL; ) {
xmlNode *new_child = cIter;
xmlNode *old_child = find_entity(old, crm_element_name(cIter), ID(cIter));
cIter = __xml_next(cIter);
if(old_child == NULL) {
xml_private_t *p = new_child->_private;
p->flags |= xpf_skip;
__xml_diff_object(old_child, new_child);
} else {
/* Check for movement, we already checked for differences */
int p_new = __xml_offset(new_child);
int p_old = __xml_offset(old_child);
xml_private_t *p = new_child->_private;
if(p_old != p_new) {
crm_info("%s.%s moved from %d to %d - %d",
new_child->name, ID(new_child), p_old, p_new);
p->flags |= xpf_moved;
if(p_old > p_new) {
p = old_child->_private;
p->flags |= xpf_skip;
} else {
p = new_child->_private;
p->flags |= xpf_skip;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY ImportSecurityContextA(SEC_CHAR* pszPackage, PSecBuffer pPackedContext, HANDLE pToken, PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
return SEC_E_OK;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_func_state *state = cur_func(env);
int new_ofs = state->acquired_refs;
int id, err;
err = realloc_reference_state(state, state->acquired_refs + 1, true);
if (err)
return err;
id = ++env->id_gen;
state->refs[new_ofs].id = id;
state->refs[new_ofs].insn_idx = insn_idx;
return id;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 91,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int user_path_at_empty(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,
struct path *path, int *empty)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct filename *tmp = getname_flags(name, flags, empty);
int err = PTR_ERR(tmp);
if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
BUG_ON(flags & LOOKUP_PARENT);
err = filename_lookup(dfd, tmp, flags, &nd);
putname(tmp);
if (!err)
*path = nd.path;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rc_free_icc_profile(gs_memory_t * mem, void *ptr_in, client_name_t cname)
{
cmm_profile_t *profile = (cmm_profile_t *)ptr_in;
gs_memory_t *mem_nongc = profile->memory;
if_debug2m(gs_debug_flag_icc, mem,
"[icc] rc decrement profile = 0x%p rc = %ld\n",
ptr_in, profile->rc.ref_count);
if (profile->rc.ref_count <= 1 ) {
/* Clear out the buffer if it is full */
if (profile->buffer != NULL) {
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, profile->buffer, "rc_free_icc_profile(buffer)");
profile->buffer = NULL;
}
if_debug0m(gs_debug_flag_icc, mem, "[icc] profile freed\n");
/* Release this handle if it has been set */
if (profile->profile_handle != NULL) {
profile->release(profile->profile_handle);
profile->profile_handle = NULL;
}
/* Release the name if it has been set */
if (profile->name != NULL) {
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, profile->name,"rc_free_icc_profile(name)");
profile->name = NULL;
profile->name_length = 0;
}
profile->hash_is_valid = 0;
if (profile->lock != NULL) {
gx_monitor_free(profile->lock);
profile->lock = NULL;
}
/* If we had a DeviceN profile with names deallocate that now */
if (profile->spotnames != NULL) {
/* Free the linked list in this object */
gsicc_free_spotnames(profile->spotnames, mem_nongc);
/* Free the main object */
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, profile->spotnames, "rc_free_icc_profile(spotnames)");
}
/* If we allocated a buffer to hold the v2 profile then free that */
if (profile->v2_data != NULL) {
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, profile->v2_data, "rc_free_icc_profile(v2_data)");
}
gs_free_object(mem_nongc, profile, "rc_free_icc_profile");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asf_read_picture(AVFormatContext *s, int len)
{
AVPacket pkt = { 0 };
const CodecMime *mime = ff_id3v2_mime_tags;
enum AVCodecID id = AV_CODEC_ID_NONE;
char mimetype[64];
uint8_t *desc = NULL;
AVStream *st = NULL;
int ret, type, picsize, desc_len;
/* type + picsize + mime + desc */
if (len < 1 + 4 + 2 + 2) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid attached picture size: %d.\n", len);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* picture type */
type = avio_r8(s->pb);
len--;
if (type >= FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(ff_id3v2_picture_types) || type < 0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unknown attached picture type: %d.\n", type);
type = 0;
}
/* picture data size */
picsize = avio_rl32(s->pb);
len -= 4;
/* picture MIME type */
len -= avio_get_str16le(s->pb, len, mimetype, sizeof(mimetype));
while (mime->id != AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) {
if (!strncmp(mime->str, mimetype, sizeof(mimetype))) {
id = mime->id;
break;
}
mime++;
}
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unknown attached picture mimetype: %s.\n",
mimetype);
return 0;
}
if (picsize >= len) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid attached picture data size: %d >= %d.\n",
picsize, len);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* picture description */
desc_len = (len - picsize) * 2 + 1;
desc = av_malloc(desc_len);
if (!desc)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
len -= avio_get_str16le(s->pb, len - picsize, desc, desc_len);
ret = av_get_packet(s->pb, &pkt, picsize);
if (ret < 0)
goto fail;
st = avformat_new_stream(s, NULL);
if (!st) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto fail;
}
st->disposition |= AV_DISPOSITION_ATTACHED_PIC;
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
st->codecpar->codec_id = id;
st->attached_pic = pkt;
st->attached_pic.stream_index = st->index;
st->attached_pic.flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
if (*desc)
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "title", desc, AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_VAL);
else
av_freep(&desc);
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "comment", ff_id3v2_picture_types[type], 0);
return 0;
fail:
av_freep(&desc);
av_packet_unref(&pkt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 61,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaInterfaceProxy::OnConnectionError() {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
interface_factory_ptr_.reset();
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _zip_read4(unsigned char **a)
{
unsigned int ret;
ret = ((((((*a)[3]<<8)+(*a)[2])<<8)+(*a)[1])<<8)+(*a)[0];
*a += 4;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 4,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_unescape_bytea)
{
char *from = NULL, *to = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
size_t to_len;
int from_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&from, &from_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#if HAVE_PQUNESCAPEBYTEA
tmp = (char *)PQunescapeBytea((unsigned char*)from, &to_len);
to = estrndup(tmp, to_len);
PQfreemem(tmp);
#else
to = (char *)php_pgsql_unescape_bytea((unsigned char*)from, &to_len);
#endif
if (!to) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,"Invalid parameter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETVAL_STRINGL(to, to_len, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ep_send_events_proc(struct eventpoll *ep, struct list_head *head,
void *priv)
{
struct ep_send_events_data *esed = priv;
int eventcnt;
unsigned int revents;
struct epitem *epi;
struct epoll_event __user *uevent;
poll_table pt;
init_poll_funcptr(&pt, NULL);
/*
* We can loop without lock because we are passed a task private list.
* Items cannot vanish during the loop because ep_scan_ready_list() is
* holding "mtx" during this call.
*/
for (eventcnt = 0, uevent = esed->events;
!list_empty(head) && eventcnt < esed->maxevents;) {
epi = list_first_entry(head, struct epitem, rdllink);
list_del_init(&epi->rdllink);
pt._key = epi->event.events;
revents = epi->ffd.file->f_op->poll(epi->ffd.file, &pt) &
epi->event.events;
/*
* If the event mask intersect the caller-requested one,
* deliver the event to userspace. Again, ep_scan_ready_list()
* is holding "mtx", so no operations coming from userspace
* can change the item.
*/
if (revents) {
if (__put_user(revents, &uevent->events) ||
__put_user(epi->event.data, &uevent->data)) {
list_add(&epi->rdllink, head);
return eventcnt ? eventcnt : -EFAULT;
}
eventcnt++;
uevent++;
if (epi->event.events & EPOLLONESHOT)
epi->event.events &= EP_PRIVATE_BITS;
else if (!(epi->event.events & EPOLLET)) {
/*
* If this file has been added with Level
* Trigger mode, we need to insert back inside
* the ready list, so that the next call to
* epoll_wait() will check again the events
* availability. At this point, no one can insert
* into ep->rdllist besides us. The epoll_ctl()
* callers are locked out by
* ep_scan_ready_list() holding "mtx" and the
* poll callback will queue them in ep->ovflist.
*/
list_add_tail(&epi->rdllink, &ep->rdllist);
}
}
}
return eventcnt;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_schema_version(const char *name)
{
int lpc = 0;
if(name == NULL) {
name = "none";
}
for (; lpc < xml_schema_max; lpc++) {
if (safe_str_eq(name, known_schemas[lpc].name)) {
return lpc;
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutEmbeddedContent* HTMLFrameOwnerElement::GetLayoutEmbeddedContent() const {
if (!GetLayoutObject() || !GetLayoutObject()->IsLayoutEmbeddedContent())
return nullptr;
return ToLayoutEmbeddedContent(GetLayoutObject());
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PasswordAutofillAgent::GetPasswordFormFromUnownedInputElements() {
content::RenderFrame* frame = render_frame();
if (!frame)
return nullptr;
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = frame->GetWebFrame();
if (!web_frame)
return nullptr;
return CreateSimplifiedPasswordFormFromUnownedInputElements(
*web_frame, &field_data_manager_, &username_detector_cache_);
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RilSapSocket::onCommandsSocketClosed() {
sendDisconnect();
RLOGE("Socket command closed");
}
Commit Message: Replace variable-length arrays on stack with malloc.
Bug: 30202619
Change-Id: Ib95e08a1c009d88a4b4fd8d8fdba0641c6129008
(cherry picked from commit 943905bb9f99e3caa856b42c531e2be752da8834)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BlockRequestsForRoute(
const GlobalFrameRoutingId& global_routing_id) {
DCHECK(io_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(blocked_loaders_map_.find(global_routing_id) ==
blocked_loaders_map_.end())
<< "BlockRequestsForRoute called multiple time for the same RFH";
blocked_loaders_map_[global_routing_id] =
std::make_unique<BlockedLoadersList>();
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(spl_array)
{
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(ArrayObject, spl_array_object_new, spl_funcs_ArrayObject);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, Aggregate);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, ArrayAccess);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, Serializable);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayObject, Countable);
memcpy(&spl_handler_ArrayObject, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_handler_ArrayObject.clone_obj = spl_array_object_clone;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.read_dimension = spl_array_read_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.write_dimension = spl_array_write_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.unset_dimension = spl_array_unset_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.has_dimension = spl_array_has_dimension;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.count_elements = spl_array_object_count_elements;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_properties = spl_array_get_properties;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_debug_info = spl_array_get_debug_info;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_gc = spl_array_get_gc;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.read_property = spl_array_read_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.write_property = spl_array_write_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.get_property_ptr_ptr = spl_array_get_property_ptr_ptr;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.has_property = spl_array_has_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.unset_property = spl_array_unset_property;
spl_handler_ArrayObject.compare_objects = spl_array_compare_objects;
REGISTER_SPL_STD_CLASS_EX(ArrayIterator, spl_array_object_new, spl_funcs_ArrayIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, Iterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, ArrayAccess);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, SeekableIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, Serializable);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(ArrayIterator, Countable);
memcpy(&spl_handler_ArrayIterator, &spl_handler_ArrayObject, sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
spl_ce_ArrayIterator->get_iterator = spl_array_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_SUB_CLASS_EX(RecursiveArrayIterator, ArrayIterator, spl_array_object_new, spl_funcs_RecursiveArrayIterator);
REGISTER_SPL_IMPLEMENTS(RecursiveArrayIterator, RecursiveIterator);
spl_ce_RecursiveArrayIterator->get_iterator = spl_array_get_iterator;
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayObject, "STD_PROP_LIST", SPL_ARRAY_STD_PROP_LIST);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayObject, "ARRAY_AS_PROPS", SPL_ARRAY_ARRAY_AS_PROPS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayIterator, "STD_PROP_LIST", SPL_ARRAY_STD_PROP_LIST);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(ArrayIterator, "ARRAY_AS_PROPS", SPL_ARRAY_ARRAY_AS_PROPS);
REGISTER_SPL_CLASS_CONST_LONG(RecursiveArrayIterator, "CHILD_ARRAYS_ONLY", SPL_ARRAY_CHILD_ARRAYS_ONLY);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 49,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_layoutcommit_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutcommit_data *data = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(data->args.inode);
if (nfs4_setup_sequence(server, &data->args.seq_args,
&data->res.seq_res, 1, task))
return;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smb2_reconnect_server(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = container_of(work,
struct TCP_Server_Info, reconnect.work);
struct cifs_ses *ses;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon, *tcon2;
struct list_head tmp_list;
int tcon_exist = false;
/* Prevent simultaneous reconnects that can corrupt tcon->rlist list */
mutex_lock(&server->reconnect_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_list);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Need negotiate, reconnecting tcons\n");
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) {
list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) {
if (tcon->need_reconnect || tcon->need_reopen_files) {
tcon->tc_count++;
list_add_tail(&tcon->rlist, &tmp_list);
tcon_exist = true;
}
}
}
/*
* Get the reference to server struct to be sure that the last call of
* cifs_put_tcon() in the loop below won't release the server pointer.
*/
if (tcon_exist)
server->srv_count++;
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(tcon, tcon2, &tmp_list, rlist) {
if (!smb2_reconnect(SMB2_INTERNAL_CMD, tcon))
cifs_reopen_persistent_handles(tcon);
list_del_init(&tcon->rlist);
cifs_put_tcon(tcon);
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Reconnecting tcons finished\n");
mutex_unlock(&server->reconnect_mutex);
/* now we can safely release srv struct */
if (tcon_exist)
cifs_put_tcp_session(server, 1);
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testRandomFrameDecode(const char* gifFile)
{
SCOPED_TRACE(gifFile);
RefPtr<SharedBuffer> fullData = readFile(gifFile);
ASSERT_TRUE(fullData.get());
Vector<unsigned> baselineHashes;
createDecodingBaseline(fullData.get(), &baselineHashes);
size_t frameCount = baselineHashes.size();
OwnPtr<GIFImageDecoder> decoder = createDecoder();
decoder->setData(fullData.get(), true);
const size_t skippingStep = 5;
for (size_t i = 0; i < skippingStep; ++i) {
for (size_t j = i; j < frameCount; j += skippingStep) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Random i:" << i << " j:" << j);
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(j);
EXPECT_EQ(baselineHashes[j], hashSkBitmap(frame->getSkBitmap()));
}
}
decoder = createDecoder();
decoder->setData(fullData.get(), true);
for (size_t i = frameCount; i; --i) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Reverse i:" << i);
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(i - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(baselineHashes[i - 1], hashSkBitmap(frame->getSkBitmap()));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ReturnSubscriberTexture(
base::WeakPtr<DelegatedFrameHost> dfh,
scoped_refptr<OwnedMailbox> subscriber_texture,
uint32 sync_point) {
if (!subscriber_texture.get())
return;
if (!dfh)
return;
subscriber_texture->UpdateSyncPoint(sync_point);
if (dfh->frame_subscriber_ && subscriber_texture->texture_id())
dfh->idle_frame_subscriber_textures_.push_back(subscriber_texture);
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceFetcher::ResourceNeedsLoad(Resource* resource,
const FetchParameters& params,
RevalidationPolicy policy) {
if (resource->GetType() == Resource::kFont && !params.IsLinkPreload())
return false;
if (resource->GetType() == Resource::kImage &&
ShouldDeferImageLoad(resource->Url()))
return false;
return policy != kUse || resource->StillNeedsLoad();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnCreateChildFrame(
int new_routing_id,
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderRequest
new_interface_provider_provider_request,
blink::mojom::DocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest
document_interface_broker_content_request,
blink::mojom::DocumentInterfaceBrokerRequest
document_interface_broker_blink_request,
blink::WebTreeScopeType scope,
const std::string& frame_name,
const std::string& frame_unique_name,
bool is_created_by_script,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_frame_token,
const blink::FramePolicy& frame_policy,
const FrameOwnerProperties& frame_owner_properties,
const blink::FrameOwnerElementType owner_type) {
DCHECK(!frame_unique_name.empty());
DCHECK(new_interface_provider_provider_request.is_pending());
DCHECK(document_interface_broker_content_request.is_pending());
DCHECK(document_interface_broker_blink_request.is_pending());
if (owner_type == blink::FrameOwnerElementType::kNone) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
GetProcess(), bad_message::RFH_CHILD_FRAME_NEEDS_OWNER_ELEMENT_TYPE);
}
if (!is_active() || !IsCurrent() || !render_frame_created_)
return;
frame_tree_->AddFrame(
frame_tree_node_, GetProcess()->GetID(), new_routing_id,
std::move(new_interface_provider_provider_request),
std::move(document_interface_broker_content_request),
std::move(document_interface_broker_blink_request), scope, frame_name,
frame_unique_name, is_created_by_script, devtools_frame_token,
frame_policy, frame_owner_properties, was_discarded_, owner_type);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_channel_init_auth_caps(RedLinkInfo *link, RedChannel *channel)
{
if (sasl_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
red_channel_set_common_cap(channel, SPICE_COMMON_CAP_AUTH_SASL);
} else {
red_channel_set_common_cap(channel, SPICE_COMMON_CAP_AUTH_SPICE);
}
red_channel_set_common_cap(channel, SPICE_COMMON_CAP_PROTOCOL_AUTH_SELECTION);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int V8Debugger::markContext(const V8ContextInfo& info)
{
DCHECK(info.context->GetIsolate() == m_isolate);
int contextId = ++m_lastContextId;
String16 debugData = String16::fromInteger(info.contextGroupId) + "," + String16::fromInteger(contextId) + "," + info.auxData;
v8::Context::Scope contextScope(info.context);
info.context->SetEmbedderData(static_cast<int>(v8::Context::kDebugIdIndex), toV8String(m_isolate, debugData));
return contextId;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _launch_job_fail(uint32_t job_id, uint32_t slurm_rc)
{
complete_batch_script_msg_t comp_msg;
struct requeue_msg req_msg;
slurm_msg_t resp_msg;
int rc = 0, rpc_rc;
static time_t config_update = 0;
static bool requeue_no_hold = false;
if (config_update != conf->last_update) {
char *sched_params = slurm_get_sched_params();
requeue_no_hold = (sched_params && strstr(
sched_params,
"nohold_on_prolog_fail"));
xfree(sched_params);
config_update = conf->last_update;
}
slurm_msg_t_init(&resp_msg);
if (slurm_rc == ESLURMD_CREDENTIAL_REVOKED) {
comp_msg.job_id = job_id;
comp_msg.job_rc = INFINITE;
comp_msg.slurm_rc = slurm_rc;
comp_msg.node_name = conf->node_name;
comp_msg.jobacct = NULL; /* unused */
resp_msg.msg_type = REQUEST_COMPLETE_BATCH_SCRIPT;
resp_msg.data = &comp_msg;
} else {
req_msg.job_id = job_id;
req_msg.job_id_str = NULL;
if (requeue_no_hold) {
req_msg.state = JOB_PENDING;
} else {
req_msg.state = (JOB_REQUEUE_HOLD|JOB_LAUNCH_FAILED);
}
resp_msg.msg_type = REQUEST_JOB_REQUEUE;
resp_msg.data = &req_msg;
}
rpc_rc = slurm_send_recv_controller_rc_msg(&resp_msg, &rc);
if ((resp_msg.msg_type == REQUEST_JOB_REQUEUE) &&
((rc == ESLURM_DISABLED) || (rc == ESLURM_BATCH_ONLY))) {
info("Could not launch job %u and not able to requeue it, "
"cancelling job", job_id);
if ((slurm_rc == ESLURMD_PROLOG_FAILED) &&
(rc == ESLURM_BATCH_ONLY)) {
char *buf = NULL;
xstrfmtcat(buf, "Prolog failure on node %s",
conf->node_name);
slurm_notify_job(job_id, buf);
xfree(buf);
}
comp_msg.job_id = job_id;
comp_msg.job_rc = INFINITE;
comp_msg.slurm_rc = slurm_rc;
comp_msg.node_name = conf->node_name;
comp_msg.jobacct = NULL; /* unused */
resp_msg.msg_type = REQUEST_COMPLETE_BATCH_SCRIPT;
resp_msg.data = &comp_msg;
rpc_rc = slurm_send_recv_controller_rc_msg(&resp_msg, &rc);
}
return rpc_rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fileHandle_t FS_FCreateOpenPipeFile( const char *filename ) {
char *ospath;
FILE *fifo;
fileHandle_t f;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
f = FS_HandleForFile();
fsh[f].zipFile = qfalse;
Q_strncpyz( fsh[f].name, filename, sizeof( fsh[f].name ) );
ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, filename );
if ( fs_debug->integer ) {
Com_Printf( "FS_FCreateOpenPipeFile: %s\n", ospath );
}
FS_CheckFilenameIsMutable( ospath, __func__ );
fifo = Sys_Mkfifo( ospath );
if( fifo ) {
fsh[f].handleFiles.file.o = fifo;
fsh[f].handleSync = qfalse;
}
else
{
Com_Printf( S_COLOR_YELLOW "WARNING: Could not create new com_pipefile at %s. "
"com_pipefile will not be used.\n", ospath );
f = 0;
}
return f;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ttusbdecfe_dvbs_set_voltage(struct dvb_frontend* fe, fe_sec_voltage_t voltage)
{
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
switch (voltage) {
case SEC_VOLTAGE_13:
state->voltage = 13;
break;
case SEC_VOLTAGE_18:
state->voltage = 18;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl
We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 35,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WindowsGetAllFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<GetAll::Params> params(GetAll::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
bool populate_tabs = false;
if (params->get_info.get() && params->get_info->populate.get())
populate_tabs = *params->get_info->populate;
ListValue* window_list = new ListValue();
const WindowControllerList::ControllerList& windows =
WindowControllerList::GetInstance()->windows();
for (WindowControllerList::ControllerList::const_iterator iter =
windows.begin();
iter != windows.end(); ++iter) {
if (!this->CanOperateOnWindow(*iter))
continue;
if (populate_tabs)
window_list->Append((*iter)->CreateWindowValueWithTabs(GetExtension()));
else
window_list->Append((*iter)->CreateWindowValue());
}
SetResult(window_list);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bust_spinlocks(int yes)
{
if (yes) {
oops_in_progress = 1;
} else {
int loglevel_save = console_loglevel;
console_unblank();
oops_in_progress = 0;
/*
* OK, the message is on the console. Now we call printk()
* without oops_in_progress set so that printk will give klogd
* a poke. Hold onto your hats...
*/
console_loglevel = 15;
printk(" ");
console_loglevel = loglevel_save;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int snd_compr_get_poll(struct snd_compr_stream *stream)
{
if (stream->direction == SND_COMPRESS_PLAYBACK)
return POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
else
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testFreeCrash_Bug20080827() {
char const * const sourceUri = "abc";
char const * const baseUri = "http://www.example.org/";
int res;
UriParserStateA state;
UriUriA absoluteDest;
UriUriA relativeSource;
UriUriA absoluteBase;
state.uri = &relativeSource;
res = uriParseUriA(&state, sourceUri);
TEST_ASSERT(res == URI_SUCCESS);
state.uri = &absoluteBase;
res = uriParseUriA(&state, baseUri);
TEST_ASSERT(res == URI_SUCCESS);
res = uriRemoveBaseUriA(&absoluteDest, &relativeSource, &absoluteBase, URI_FALSE);
TEST_ASSERT(res == URI_ERROR_REMOVEBASE_REL_SOURCE);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&relativeSource);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&absoluteBase);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&absoluteDest); // Crashed here
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnloadController::TabInsertedAt(content::WebContents* contents,
int index,
bool foreground) {
TabAttachedImpl(contents);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_event_output_forward(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
__perf_event_output(event, data, regs, perf_output_begin_forward);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageStringUp16 (gdImagePtr im, gdFontPtr f, int x, int y, unsigned short *s, int color)
{
int i;
int l;
l = strlen16(s);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
gdImageCharUp(im, f, x, y, s[i], color);
y -= f->w;
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void parse_and_store_blob(
struct last_object *last,
unsigned char *sha1out,
uintmax_t mark)
{
static struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT;
uintmax_t len;
if (parse_data(&buf, big_file_threshold, &len))
store_object(OBJ_BLOB, &buf, last, sha1out, mark);
else {
if (last) {
strbuf_release(&last->data);
last->offset = 0;
last->depth = 0;
}
stream_blob(len, sha1out, mark);
skip_optional_lf();
}
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: send_set_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, u32 pid, int info_class,
unsigned int num, void **data, unsigned int *size)
{
struct smb2_set_info_req *req;
struct smb2_set_info_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec *iov;
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
unsigned int i;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
int flags = 0;
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
if (!num)
return -EINVAL;
iov = kmalloc(sizeof(struct kvec) * num, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_SET_INFO, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
if (encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
req->hdr.sync_hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(pid);
req->InfoType = SMB2_O_INFO_FILE;
req->FileInfoClass = info_class;
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
/* 4 for RFC1001 length and 1 for Buffer */
req->BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_set_info_req) - 1 - 4);
req->BufferLength = cpu_to_le32(*size);
inc_rfc1001_len(req, *size - 1 /* Buffer */);
memcpy(req->Buffer, *data, *size);
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for RFC1001 length */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
for (i = 1; i < num; i++) {
inc_rfc1001_len(req, size[i]);
le32_add_cpu(&req->BufferLength, size[i]);
iov[i].iov_base = (char *)data[i];
iov[i].iov_len = size[i];
}
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, num, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_set_info_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc != 0)
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_SET_INFO_HE);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> stringAttrWithGetterExceptionAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.stringAttrWithGetterException._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
String v = imp->stringAttrWithGetterException(ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec)) {
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, info.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
return v8String(v, info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT struct uncurl_conn *uncurl_new_conn(struct uncurl_conn *parent)
{
struct uncurl_conn *ucc = calloc(1, sizeof(struct uncurl_conn));
if (parent) {
memcpy(&ucc->opts, &parent->opts, sizeof(struct uncurl_opts));
memcpy(&ucc->nopts, &parent->nopts, sizeof(struct net_opts));
memcpy(&ucc->topts, &parent->topts, sizeof(struct tls_opts));
} else {
uncurl_default_opts(&ucc->opts);
net_default_opts(&ucc->nopts);
tls_default_opts(&ucc->topts);
}
ucc->seed = ws_rand(&ucc->seed);
return ucc;
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | 0 | 84,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_suppress_output(rdpContext* context, BYTE allow,
const RECTANGLE_16* area)
{
rdpRdp* rdp = context->rdp;
if (rdp->settings->SuppressOutput)
{
wStream* s = rdp_data_pdu_init(rdp);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
update_write_suppress_output(s, allow, area);
return rdp_send_data_pdu(rdp, s, DATA_PDU_TYPE_SUPPRESS_OUTPUT,
rdp->mcs->userId);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ring_buffer *__ring_buffer_alloc(unsigned long size, unsigned flags,
struct lock_class_key *key)
{
struct ring_buffer *buffer;
long nr_pages;
int bsize;
int cpu;
/* keep it in its own cache line */
buffer = kzalloc(ALIGN(sizeof(*buffer), cache_line_size()),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return NULL;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&buffer->cpumask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto fail_free_buffer;
nr_pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
buffer->flags = flags;
buffer->clock = trace_clock_local;
buffer->reader_lock_key = key;
init_irq_work(&buffer->irq_work.work, rb_wake_up_waiters);
init_waitqueue_head(&buffer->irq_work.waiters);
/* need at least two pages */
if (nr_pages < 2)
nr_pages = 2;
/*
* In case of non-hotplug cpu, if the ring-buffer is allocated
* in early initcall, it will not be notified of secondary cpus.
* In that off case, we need to allocate for all possible cpus.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
cpu_notifier_register_begin();
cpumask_copy(buffer->cpumask, cpu_online_mask);
#else
cpumask_copy(buffer->cpumask, cpu_possible_mask);
#endif
buffer->cpus = nr_cpu_ids;
bsize = sizeof(void *) * nr_cpu_ids;
buffer->buffers = kzalloc(ALIGN(bsize, cache_line_size()),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer->buffers)
goto fail_free_cpumask;
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
buffer->buffers[cpu] =
rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(buffer, nr_pages, cpu);
if (!buffer->buffers[cpu])
goto fail_free_buffers;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
buffer->cpu_notify.notifier_call = rb_cpu_notify;
buffer->cpu_notify.priority = 0;
__register_cpu_notifier(&buffer->cpu_notify);
cpu_notifier_register_done();
#endif
mutex_init(&buffer->mutex);
return buffer;
fail_free_buffers:
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu) {
if (buffer->buffers[cpu])
rb_free_cpu_buffer(buffer->buffers[cpu]);
}
kfree(buffer->buffers);
fail_free_cpumask:
free_cpumask_var(buffer->cpumask);
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
cpu_notifier_register_done();
#endif
fail_free_buffer:
kfree(buffer);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
{
struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
long ret;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user);
gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group);
ret = -EINVAL;
if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid))
goto error;
if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid))
goto error;
ret = 0;
if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1)
goto error;
key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
goto error;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
/* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
ret = -EACCES;
down_write(&key->sem);
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
/* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid))
goto error_put;
/* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
* than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid))
goto error_put;
}
/* change the UID */
if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
/* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ?
key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
newowner->qnbytes)
goto quota_overrun;
newowner->qnkeys++;
newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
key->user->qnkeys--;
key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
}
atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
}
zapowner = key->user;
key->user = newowner;
key->uid = uid;
}
/* change the GID */
if (group != (gid_t) -1)
key->gid = gid;
ret = 0;
error_put:
up_write(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
if (zapowner)
key_user_put(zapowner);
error:
return ret;
quota_overrun:
spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
zapowner = newowner;
ret = -EDQUOT;
goto error_put;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between read and revoke
This fixes CVE-2015-7550.
There's a race between keyctl_read() and keyctl_revoke(). If the revoke
happens between keyctl_read() checking the validity of a key and the key's
semaphore being taken, then the key type read method will see a revoked key.
This causes a problem for the user-defined key type because it assumes in
its read method that there will always be a payload in a non-revoked key
and doesn't check for a NULL pointer.
Fix this by making keyctl_read() check the validity of a key after taking
semaphore instead of before.
I think the bug was introduced with the original keyrings code.
This was discovered by a multithreaded test program generated by syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller). Here's a cleaned up version:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *thr0(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
keyctl_revoke(key);
return 0;
}
void *thr1(void *arg)
{
key_serial_t key = (unsigned long)arg;
char buffer[16];
keyctl_read(key, buffer, 16);
return 0;
}
int main()
{
key_serial_t key = add_key("user", "%", "foo", 3, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
pthread_t th[5];
pthread_create(&th[0], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[1], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[2], 0, thr0, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_create(&th[3], 0, thr1, (void *)(unsigned long)key);
pthread_join(th[0], 0);
pthread_join(th[1], 0);
pthread_join(th[2], 0);
pthread_join(th[3], 0);
return 0;
}
Build as:
cc -o keyctl-race keyctl-race.c -lkeyutils -lpthread
Run as:
while keyctl-race; do :; done
as it may need several iterations to crash the kernel. The crash can be
summarised as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: [<ffffffff81279b08>] user_read+0x56/0xa3
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81276aa9>] keyctl_read_key+0xb6/0xd7
[<ffffffff81277815>] SyS_keyctl+0x83/0xe0
[<ffffffff815dbb97>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 57,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline int run_delalloc_nocow(struct inode *inode,
struct page *locked_page,
u64 start, u64 end, int *page_started, int force,
unsigned long *nr_written)
{
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_file_extent_item *fi;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
u64 cow_start;
u64 cur_offset;
u64 extent_end;
u64 extent_offset;
u64 disk_bytenr;
u64 num_bytes;
u64 disk_num_bytes;
u64 ram_bytes;
int extent_type;
int ret, err;
int type;
int nocow;
int check_prev = 1;
bool nolock;
u64 ino = btrfs_ino(inode);
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path) {
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(inode, start, end, locked_page,
EXTENT_LOCKED | EXTENT_DELALLOC |
EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING |
EXTENT_DEFRAG, PAGE_UNLOCK |
PAGE_CLEAR_DIRTY |
PAGE_SET_WRITEBACK |
PAGE_END_WRITEBACK);
return -ENOMEM;
}
nolock = btrfs_is_free_space_inode(inode);
if (nolock)
trans = btrfs_join_transaction_nolock(root);
else
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(inode, start, end, locked_page,
EXTENT_LOCKED | EXTENT_DELALLOC |
EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING |
EXTENT_DEFRAG, PAGE_UNLOCK |
PAGE_CLEAR_DIRTY |
PAGE_SET_WRITEBACK |
PAGE_END_WRITEBACK);
btrfs_free_path(path);
return PTR_ERR(trans);
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
cow_start = (u64)-1;
cur_offset = start;
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_lookup_file_extent(trans, root, path, ino,
cur_offset, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (ret > 0 && path->slots[0] > 0 && check_prev) {
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key,
path->slots[0] - 1);
if (found_key.objectid == ino &&
found_key.type == BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY)
path->slots[0]--;
}
check_prev = 0;
next_slot:
leaf = path->nodes[0];
if (path->slots[0] >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf)) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (ret > 0)
break;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
}
nocow = 0;
disk_bytenr = 0;
num_bytes = 0;
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, path->slots[0]);
if (found_key.objectid > ino ||
found_key.type > BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_KEY ||
found_key.offset > end)
break;
if (found_key.offset > cur_offset) {
extent_end = found_key.offset;
extent_type = 0;
goto out_check;
}
fi = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_file_extent_item);
extent_type = btrfs_file_extent_type(leaf, fi);
ram_bytes = btrfs_file_extent_ram_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG ||
extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
disk_bytenr = btrfs_file_extent_disk_bytenr(leaf, fi);
extent_offset = btrfs_file_extent_offset(leaf, fi);
extent_end = found_key.offset +
btrfs_file_extent_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
disk_num_bytes =
btrfs_file_extent_disk_num_bytes(leaf, fi);
if (extent_end <= start) {
path->slots[0]++;
goto next_slot;
}
if (disk_bytenr == 0)
goto out_check;
if (btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, fi) ||
btrfs_file_extent_encryption(leaf, fi) ||
btrfs_file_extent_other_encoding(leaf, fi))
goto out_check;
if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG && !force)
goto out_check;
if (btrfs_extent_readonly(root, disk_bytenr))
goto out_check;
if (btrfs_cross_ref_exist(trans, root, ino,
found_key.offset -
extent_offset, disk_bytenr))
goto out_check;
disk_bytenr += extent_offset;
disk_bytenr += cur_offset - found_key.offset;
num_bytes = min(end + 1, extent_end) - cur_offset;
/*
* if there are pending snapshots for this root,
* we fall into common COW way.
*/
if (!nolock) {
err = btrfs_start_write_no_snapshoting(root);
if (!err)
goto out_check;
}
/*
* force cow if csum exists in the range.
* this ensure that csum for a given extent are
* either valid or do not exist.
*/
if (csum_exist_in_range(root, disk_bytenr, num_bytes))
goto out_check;
nocow = 1;
} else if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_INLINE) {
extent_end = found_key.offset +
btrfs_file_extent_inline_len(leaf,
path->slots[0], fi);
extent_end = ALIGN(extent_end, root->sectorsize);
} else {
BUG_ON(1);
}
out_check:
if (extent_end <= start) {
path->slots[0]++;
if (!nolock && nocow)
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
goto next_slot;
}
if (!nocow) {
if (cow_start == (u64)-1)
cow_start = cur_offset;
cur_offset = extent_end;
if (cur_offset > end)
break;
path->slots[0]++;
goto next_slot;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
if (cow_start != (u64)-1) {
ret = cow_file_range(inode, locked_page,
cow_start, found_key.offset - 1,
page_started, nr_written, 1);
if (ret) {
if (!nolock && nocow)
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
goto error;
}
cow_start = (u64)-1;
}
if (extent_type == BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC) {
struct extent_map *em;
struct extent_map_tree *em_tree;
em_tree = &BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
em = alloc_extent_map();
BUG_ON(!em); /* -ENOMEM */
em->start = cur_offset;
em->orig_start = found_key.offset - extent_offset;
em->len = num_bytes;
em->block_len = num_bytes;
em->block_start = disk_bytenr;
em->orig_block_len = disk_num_bytes;
em->ram_bytes = ram_bytes;
em->bdev = root->fs_info->fs_devices->latest_bdev;
em->mod_start = em->start;
em->mod_len = em->len;
set_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_PINNED, &em->flags);
set_bit(EXTENT_FLAG_FILLING, &em->flags);
em->generation = -1;
while (1) {
write_lock(&em_tree->lock);
ret = add_extent_mapping(em_tree, em, 1);
write_unlock(&em_tree->lock);
if (ret != -EEXIST) {
free_extent_map(em);
break;
}
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, em->start,
em->start + em->len - 1, 0);
}
type = BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC;
} else {
type = BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW;
}
ret = btrfs_add_ordered_extent(inode, cur_offset, disk_bytenr,
num_bytes, num_bytes, type);
BUG_ON(ret); /* -ENOMEM */
if (root->root_key.objectid ==
BTRFS_DATA_RELOC_TREE_OBJECTID) {
ret = btrfs_reloc_clone_csums(inode, cur_offset,
num_bytes);
if (ret) {
if (!nolock && nocow)
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
goto error;
}
}
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(inode, cur_offset,
cur_offset + num_bytes - 1,
locked_page, EXTENT_LOCKED |
EXTENT_DELALLOC, PAGE_UNLOCK |
PAGE_SET_PRIVATE2);
if (!nolock && nocow)
btrfs_end_write_no_snapshoting(root);
cur_offset = extent_end;
if (cur_offset > end)
break;
}
btrfs_release_path(path);
if (cur_offset <= end && cow_start == (u64)-1) {
cow_start = cur_offset;
cur_offset = end;
}
if (cow_start != (u64)-1) {
ret = cow_file_range(inode, locked_page, cow_start, end,
page_started, nr_written, 1);
if (ret)
goto error;
}
error:
err = btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
if (!ret)
ret = err;
if (ret && cur_offset < end)
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(inode, cur_offset, end,
locked_page, EXTENT_LOCKED |
EXTENT_DELALLOC | EXTENT_DEFRAG |
EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING, PAGE_UNLOCK |
PAGE_CLEAR_DIRTY |
PAGE_SET_WRITEBACK |
PAGE_END_WRITEBACK);
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectUnsignedLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "reflectUnsignedLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned, cppValue, toUInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setUnsignedIntegralAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectunsignedlongattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxEditModel::CreatedKeywordSearchByInsertingSpaceInMiddle(
const base::string16& old_text,
const base::string16& new_text,
size_t caret_position) const {
DCHECK_GE(new_text.length(), caret_position);
if ((paste_state_ != NONE) || (caret_position < 2) ||
(old_text.length() < caret_position) ||
(new_text.length() == caret_position))
return false;
size_t space_position = caret_position - 1;
if (!IsSpaceCharForAcceptingKeyword(new_text[space_position]) ||
IsWhitespace(new_text[space_position - 1]) ||
new_text.compare(0, space_position, old_text, 0, space_position) ||
!new_text.compare(space_position, new_text.length() - space_position,
old_text, space_position,
old_text.length() - space_position)) {
return false;
}
base::string16 keyword;
base::TrimWhitespace(new_text.substr(0, space_position), base::TRIM_LEADING,
&keyword);
return !keyword.empty() && !autocomplete_controller()->keyword_provider()->
GetKeywordForText(keyword).empty();
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastConfigDelegateChromeos::CastToReceiver(
const std::string& receiver_id) {
ExecuteJavaScript("backgroundSetup.launchDesktopMirroring('" + receiver_id +
"');");
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hstore_recv(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
int32 buflen;
HStore *out;
Pairs *pairs;
int32 i;
int32 pcount;
StringInfo buf = (StringInfo) PG_GETARG_POINTER(0);
pcount = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
if (pcount == 0)
{
out = hstorePairs(NULL, 0, 0);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
pairs = palloc(pcount * sizeof(Pairs));
for (i = 0; i < pcount; ++i)
{
int rawlen = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
int len;
if (rawlen < 0)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for hstore key")));
pairs[i].key = pq_getmsgtext(buf, rawlen, &len);
pairs[i].keylen = hstoreCheckKeyLen(len);
pairs[i].needfree = true;
rawlen = pq_getmsgint(buf, 4);
if (rawlen < 0)
{
pairs[i].val = NULL;
pairs[i].vallen = 0;
pairs[i].isnull = true;
}
else
{
pairs[i].val = pq_getmsgtext(buf, rawlen, &len);
pairs[i].vallen = hstoreCheckValLen(len);
pairs[i].isnull = false;
}
}
pcount = hstoreUniquePairs(pairs, pcount, &buflen);
out = hstorePairs(pairs, pcount, buflen);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_format_type(const char *ptr, int type)
{
int quad = 0;
if (*ptr == '\0') {
/* Missing format string; bad */
return -1;
}
switch (type) {
case FILE_FMT_QUAD:
quad = 1;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case FILE_FMT_NUM:
if (*ptr == '-')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
if (quad) {
if (*ptr++ != 'l')
return -1;
if (*ptr++ != 'l')
return -1;
}
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'l':
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'i':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case 'h':
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'h':
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'i':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case 'd':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case 'i':
case 'c':
case 'd':
case 'u':
case 'o':
case 'x':
case 'X':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case FILE_FMT_FLOAT:
case FILE_FMT_DOUBLE:
if (*ptr == '-')
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
switch (*ptr++) {
case 'e':
case 'E':
case 'f':
case 'F':
case 'g':
case 'G':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
case FILE_FMT_STR:
if (*ptr == '-')
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char )*ptr))
ptr++;
if (*ptr == '.') {
ptr++;
while (isdigit((unsigned char )*ptr))
ptr++;
}
switch (*ptr++) {
case 's':
return 0;
default:
return -1;
}
default:
/* internal error */
abort();
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 7,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l_set_timeout(lua_State *L) {
long timeout = luaL_checkinteger(L, 2);
struct ssh_userdata *state = NULL;
state = (struct ssh_userdata *) nseU_checkudata(L, 1, SSH2_UDATA, "ssh2");
libssh2_session_set_timeout(state->session, timeout);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 93,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_get_capabilities(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
__u32 caps;
caps = USBDEVFS_CAP_ZERO_PACKET | USBDEVFS_CAP_NO_PACKET_SIZE_LIM |
USBDEVFS_CAP_REAP_AFTER_DISCONNECT | USBDEVFS_CAP_MMAP |
USBDEVFS_CAP_DROP_PRIVILEGES;
if (!ps->dev->bus->no_stop_on_short)
caps |= USBDEVFS_CAP_BULK_CONTINUATION;
if (ps->dev->bus->sg_tablesize)
caps |= USBDEVFS_CAP_BULK_SCATTER_GATHER;
if (put_user(caps, (__u32 __user *)arg))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::PromiseMethodWithoutExceptionStateMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_promiseMethodWithoutExceptionState");
test_object_v8_internal::PromiseMethodWithoutExceptionStateMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CompositedLayerRasterInvalidatorTest& Chunk(int type) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(FakeDisplayItemClient, fake_client, ());
fake_client.ClearIsJustCreated();
PaintChunk::Id id(fake_client, static_cast<DisplayItem::Type>(
DisplayItem::kDrawingFirst + type));
data_.chunks.emplace_back(0, 0, id, DefaultPropertyTreeState());
data_.chunks.back().bounds =
FloatRect(type * 110, type * 220, type * 220 + 200, type * 110 + 200);
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rewrite_data_page(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
int err;
fio->new_blkaddr = fio->old_blkaddr;
stat_inc_inplace_blocks(fio->sbi);
err = f2fs_submit_page_bio(fio);
f2fs_update_iostat(fio->sbi, fio->io_type, F2FS_BLKSIZE);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnGetV8HeapStats() {
v8::HeapStatistics heap_stats;
v8::V8::GetHeapStatistics(&heap_stats);
RenderThread::Get()->Send(new ChromeViewHostMsg_V8HeapStats(
heap_stats.total_heap_size(), heap_stats.used_heap_size()));
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_server(char *buf, int len)
{
char *data = get_data(buf, len);
char error_buf[512];
if (data == NULL) {
LOGE("No data found");
return NULL;
}
json_settings settings = { 0 };
json_value *obj = json_parse_ex(&settings, data, strlen(data), error_buf);
if (obj == NULL) {
LOGE("%s", error_buf);
return NULL;
}
struct server *server = ss_malloc(sizeof(struct server));
memset(server, 0, sizeof(struct server));
if (obj->type == json_object) {
int i = 0;
for (i = 0; i < obj->u.object.length; i++) {
char *name = obj->u.object.values[i].name;
json_value *value = obj->u.object.values[i].value;
if (strcmp(name, "server_port") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_string) {
strncpy(server->port, value->u.string.ptr, 8);
} else if (value->type == json_integer) {
snprintf(server->port, 8, "%" PRIu64 "", value->u.integer);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "password") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_string) {
strncpy(server->password, value->u.string.ptr, 128);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "method") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_string) {
server->method = strdup(value->u.string.ptr);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "fast_open") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_boolean) {
strncpy(server->fast_open, (value->u.boolean ? "true" : "false"), 8);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "plugin") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_string) {
server->plugin = strdup(value->u.string.ptr);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "plugin_opts") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_string) {
server->plugin_opts = strdup(value->u.string.ptr);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "mode") == 0) {
if (value->type == json_string) {
server->mode = strdup(value->u.string.ptr);
}
} else {
LOGE("invalid data: %s", data);
break;
}
}
}
json_value_free(obj);
return server;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1734
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 60,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::InvalidateCachedExtensions() {
cached_extension_string_ = nullptr;
cached_extensions_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::StartConfiguration(const base::Closure& callback) {
sync_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoStartConfiguration, core_.get(), callback));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct bnep_session *__bnep_get_session(u8 *dst)
{
struct bnep_session *s;
BT_DBG("");
list_for_each_entry(s, &bnep_session_list, list)
if (ether_addr_equal(dst, s->eh.h_source))
return s;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nr_set_lockdep_one(struct net_device *dev,
struct netdev_queue *txq,
void *_unused)
{
lockdep_set_class(&txq->_xmit_lock, &nr_netdev_xmit_lock_key);
}
Commit Message: netrom: fix info leak via msg_name in nr_recvmsg()
In case msg_name is set the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of
struct sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Also
the sax25_ndigis member does not get assigned, leaking four more
bytes.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ucvector_cleanup(void* p)
{
((ucvector*)p)->size = ((ucvector*)p)->allocsize = 0;
free(((ucvector*)p)->data);
((ucvector*)p)->data = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline LineContribType * _gdContributionsAlloc(unsigned int line_length, unsigned int windows_size)
{
unsigned int u = 0;
LineContribType *res;
int overflow_error = 0;
res = (LineContribType *) gdMalloc(sizeof(LineContribType));
if (!res) {
return NULL;
}
res->WindowSize = windows_size;
res->LineLength = line_length;
if (overflow2(line_length, sizeof(ContributionType))) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
res->ContribRow = (ContributionType *) gdMalloc(line_length * sizeof(ContributionType));
if (res->ContribRow == NULL) {
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
for (u = 0 ; u < line_length ; u++) {
if (overflow2(windows_size, sizeof(double))) {
overflow_error = 1;
} else {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights = (double *) gdMalloc(windows_size * sizeof(double));
}
if (overflow_error == 1 || res->ContribRow[u].Weights == NULL) {
unsigned int i;
u--;
for (i=0;i<=u;i++) {
gdFree(res->ContribRow[i].Weights);
}
gdFree(res->ContribRow);
gdFree(res);
return NULL;
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned underflow
No need to decrease `u`, so we don't do it. While we're at it, we also factor
out the overflow check of the loop, what improves performance and readability.
This issue has been reported by Stefan Esser to security@libgd.org.
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 1 | 168,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction InputImeCommitTextFunction::Run() {
InputImeEventRouter* event_router =
GetInputImeEventRouter(Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context()));
InputMethodEngineBase* engine =
event_router ? event_router->GetActiveEngine(extension_id()) : nullptr;
if (engine) {
std::unique_ptr<CommitText::Params> parent_params(
CommitText::Params::Create(*args_));
const CommitText::Params::Parameters& params = parent_params->parameters;
std::string error;
if (!engine->CommitText(params.context_id, params.text.c_str(), &error)) {
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> results =
std::make_unique<base::ListValue>();
results->Append(std::make_unique<base::Value>(false));
return RespondNow(ErrorWithArguments(std::move(results), error));
}
}
return RespondNow(OneArgument(std::make_unique<base::Value>(true)));
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 144,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_close_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state *state = calldata->state;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(calldata->inode);
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &calldata->res.seq_res))
return;
/* hmm. we are done with the inode, and in the process of freeing
* the state_owner. we keep this around to process errors
*/
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
if (calldata->roc)
pnfs_roc_set_barrier(state->inode,
calldata->roc_barrier);
nfs_set_open_stateid(state, &calldata->res.stateid, 0);
renew_lease(server, calldata->timestamp);
nfs4_close_clear_stateid_flags(state,
calldata->arg.fmode);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (calldata->arg.fmode == 0)
break;
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, state) == -EAGAIN)
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
}
nfs_release_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
nfs_refresh_inode(calldata->inode, calldata->res.fattr);
dprintk("%s: done, ret = %d!\n", __func__, task->tk_status);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_v4_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
const struct iphdr *iph;
const struct tcphdr *th;
bool refcounted;
struct sock *sk;
int ret;
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto discard_it;
/* Count it even if it's bad */
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INSEGS);
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct tcphdr)))
goto discard_it;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
if (unlikely(th->doff < sizeof(struct tcphdr) / 4))
goto bad_packet;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, th->doff * 4))
goto discard_it;
/* An explanation is required here, I think.
* Packet length and doff are validated by header prediction,
* provided case of th->doff==0 is eliminated.
* So, we defer the checks. */
if (skb_checksum_init(skb, IPPROTO_TCP, inet_compute_pseudo))
goto csum_error;
th = (const struct tcphdr *)skb->data;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
/* This is tricky : We move IPCB at its correct location into TCP_SKB_CB()
* barrier() makes sure compiler wont play fool^Waliasing games.
*/
memmove(&TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->header.h4, IPCB(skb),
sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
barrier();
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ntohl(th->seq);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq = (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + th->syn + th->fin +
skb->len - th->doff * 4);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq = ntohl(th->ack_seq);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_flags = tcp_flag_byte(th);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = 0;
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ip_dsfield = ipv4_get_dsfield(iph);
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked = 0;
lookup:
sk = __inet_lookup_skb(&tcp_hashinfo, skb, __tcp_hdrlen(th), th->source,
th->dest, &refcounted);
if (!sk)
goto no_tcp_socket;
process:
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
goto do_time_wait;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
struct sock *nsk;
sk = req->rsk_listener;
if (unlikely(tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))) {
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_it;
}
if (unlikely(sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)) {
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(sk, req);
goto lookup;
}
/* We own a reference on the listener, increase it again
* as we might lose it too soon.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
refcounted = true;
nsk = tcp_check_req(sk, skb, req, false);
if (!nsk) {
reqsk_put(req);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (nsk == sk) {
reqsk_put(req);
} else if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
tcp_v4_send_reset(nsk, skb);
goto discard_and_relse;
} else {
sock_put(sk);
return 0;
}
}
if (unlikely(iph->ttl < inet_sk(sk)->min_ttl)) {
__NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPMINTTLDROP);
goto discard_and_relse;
}
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(sk, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
if (tcp_v4_inbound_md5_hash(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
nf_reset(skb);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
goto discard_and_relse;
skb->dev = NULL;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
ret = tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
goto put_and_return;
}
sk_incoming_cpu_update(sk);
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(sk), skb);
ret = 0;
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
if (!tcp_prequeue(sk, skb))
ret = tcp_v4_do_rcv(sk, skb);
} else if (tcp_add_backlog(sk, skb)) {
goto discard_and_relse;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
put_and_return:
if (refcounted)
sock_put(sk);
return ret;
no_tcp_socket:
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto discard_it;
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
csum_error:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
bad_packet:
__TCP_INC_STATS(net, TCP_MIB_INERRS);
} else {
tcp_v4_send_reset(NULL, skb);
}
discard_it:
/* Discard frame. */
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
discard_and_relse:
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
if (refcounted)
sock_put(sk);
goto discard_it;
do_time_wait:
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
}
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb)) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto csum_error;
}
switch (tcp_timewait_state_process(inet_twsk(sk), skb, th)) {
case TCP_TW_SYN: {
struct sock *sk2 = inet_lookup_listener(dev_net(skb->dev),
&tcp_hashinfo, skb,
__tcp_hdrlen(th),
iph->saddr, th->source,
iph->daddr, th->dest,
inet_iif(skb));
if (sk2) {
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
sk = sk2;
refcounted = false;
goto process;
}
/* Fall through to ACK */
}
case TCP_TW_ACK:
tcp_v4_timewait_ack(sk, skb);
break;
case TCP_TW_RST:
tcp_v4_send_reset(sk, skb);
inet_twsk_deschedule_put(inet_twsk(sk));
goto discard_it;
case TCP_TW_SUCCESS:;
}
goto discard_it;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 166,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zend_object *phar_rename_archive(phar_archive_data **sphar, char *ext, zend_bool compress) /* {{{ */
{
const char *oldname = NULL;
phar_archive_data *phar = *sphar;
char *oldpath = NULL;
char *basename = NULL, *basepath = NULL;
char *newname = NULL, *newpath = NULL;
zval ret, arg1;
zend_class_entry *ce;
char *error;
const char *pcr_error;
int ext_len = ext ? strlen(ext) : 0;
int oldname_len;
phar_archive_data *pphar = NULL;
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
if (!ext) {
if (phar->is_zip) {
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "zip";
} else {
ext = "phar.zip";
}
} else if (phar->is_tar) {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.gz";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.gz";
}
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar.bz2";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar.bz2";
}
break;
default:
if (phar->is_data) {
ext = "tar";
} else {
ext = "phar.tar";
}
}
} else {
switch (phar->flags) {
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ:
ext = "phar.gz";
break;
case PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2:
ext = "phar.bz2";
break;
default:
ext = "phar";
}
}
} else if (phar_path_check(&ext, &ext_len, &pcr_error) > pcr_is_ok) {
if (phar->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "data phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "phar converted from \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
}
return NULL;
}
if (ext[0] == '.') {
++ext;
}
oldpath = estrndup(phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
if ((oldname = zend_memrchr(phar->fname, '/', phar->fname_len))) {
++oldname;
} else {
oldname = phar->fname;
}
oldname_len = strlen(oldname);
basename = estrndup(oldname, oldname_len);
spprintf(&newname, 0, "%s.%s", strtok(basename, "."), ext);
efree(basename);
basepath = estrndup(oldpath, (strlen(oldpath) - oldname_len));
phar->fname_len = spprintf(&newpath, 0, "%s%s", basepath, newname);
phar->fname = newpath;
phar->ext = newpath + phar->fname_len - strlen(ext) - 1;
efree(basepath);
efree(newname);
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&cached_phars, newpath, phar->fname_len))) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, new phar name is in phar.cache_list", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
if (NULL != (pphar = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), newpath, phar->fname_len))) {
if (pphar->fname_len == phar->fname_len && !memcmp(pphar->fname, phar->fname, phar->fname_len)) {
if (!zend_hash_num_elements(&phar->manifest)) {
pphar->is_tar = phar->is_tar;
pphar->is_zip = phar->is_zip;
pphar->is_data = phar->is_data;
pphar->flags = phar->flags;
pphar->fp = phar->fp;
phar->fp = NULL;
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar);
*sphar = NULL;
phar = pphar;
phar->refcount++;
newpath = oldpath;
goto its_ok;
}
}
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars, a phar with that name already exists", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
its_ok:
if (SUCCESS == php_stream_stat_path(newpath, &ssb)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "phar \"%s\" exists and must be unlinked prior to conversion", newpath);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
if (!phar->is_data) {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 1, 1, 1)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
if (phar->alias) {
if (phar->is_temporary_alias) {
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
} else {
phar->alias = estrndup(newpath, strlen(newpath));
phar->alias_len = strlen(newpath);
phar->is_temporary_alias = 1;
zend_hash_str_update_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_alias_map)), newpath, phar->fname_len, phar);
}
}
} else {
if (SUCCESS != phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(newpath, phar->fname_len, (const char **) &(phar->ext), &(phar->ext_len), 0, 1, 1)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "data phar \"%s\" has invalid extension %s", phar->fname, ext);
return NULL;
}
phar->alias = NULL;
phar->alias_len = 0;
}
if ((!pphar || phar == pphar) && NULL == zend_hash_str_update_ptr(&(PHAR_G(phar_fname_map)), newpath, phar->fname_len, phar)) {
efree(oldpath);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Unable to add newly converted phar \"%s\" to the list of phars", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
phar_flush(phar, 0, 0, 1, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
efree(oldpath);
return NULL;
}
efree(oldpath);
if (phar->is_data) {
ce = phar_ce_data;
} else {
ce = phar_ce_archive;
}
ZVAL_NULL(&ret);
if (SUCCESS != object_init_ex(&ret, ce)) {
zval_dtor(&ret);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Unable to instantiate phar object when converting archive \"%s\"", phar->fname);
return NULL;
}
ZVAL_STRINGL(&arg1, phar->fname, phar->fname_len);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&ret, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, &arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
return Z_OBJ(ret);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = args->dp->i_mount;
xfs_dablk_t lblkno;
int blkcnt;
int error;
int done;
trace_xfs_attr_rmtval_remove(args);
/*
* Roll through the "value", invalidating the attribute value's blocks.
*/
lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
while (blkcnt > 0) {
struct xfs_bmbt_irec map;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
xfs_daddr_t dblkno;
int dblkcnt;
int nmap;
/*
* Try to remember where we decided to put the value.
*/
nmap = 1;
error = xfs_bmapi_read(args->dp, (xfs_fileoff_t)lblkno,
blkcnt, &map, &nmap, XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK);
if (error)
return(error);
ASSERT(nmap == 1);
ASSERT((map.br_startblock != DELAYSTARTBLOCK) &&
(map.br_startblock != HOLESTARTBLOCK));
dblkno = XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, map.br_startblock),
dblkcnt = XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, map.br_blockcount);
/*
* If the "remote" value is in the cache, remove it.
*/
bp = xfs_incore(mp->m_ddev_targp, dblkno, dblkcnt, XBF_TRYLOCK);
if (bp) {
xfs_buf_stale(bp);
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
bp = NULL;
}
lblkno += map.br_blockcount;
blkcnt -= map.br_blockcount;
}
/*
* Keep de-allocating extents until the remote-value region is gone.
*/
lblkno = args->rmtblkno;
blkcnt = args->rmtblkcnt;
done = 0;
while (!done) {
int committed;
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
error = xfs_bunmapi(args->trans, args->dp, lblkno, blkcnt,
XFS_BMAPI_ATTRFORK | XFS_BMAPI_METADATA,
1, args->firstblock, args->flist,
&done);
if (!error) {
error = xfs_bmap_finish(&args->trans, args->flist,
&committed);
}
if (error) {
ASSERT(committed);
args->trans = NULL;
xfs_bmap_cancel(args->flist);
return error;
}
/*
* bmap_finish() may have committed the last trans and started
* a new one. We need the inode to be in all transactions.
*/
if (committed)
xfs_trans_ijoin(args->trans, args->dp, 0);
/*
* Close out trans and start the next one in the chain.
*/
error = xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, args->dp);
if (error)
return (error);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 44,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebKitTestController::SetTempPath(const base::FilePath& temp_path) {
temp_path_ = temp_path;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp7_decode_frame_header(VP8Context *s, const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
VP56RangeCoder *c = &s->c;
int part1_size, hscale, vscale, i, j, ret;
int width = s->avctx->width;
int height = s->avctx->height;
if (buf_size < 4) {
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->profile = (buf[0] >> 1) & 7;
if (s->profile > 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Unknown profile %d", s->profile);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
s->keyframe = !(buf[0] & 1);
s->invisible = 0;
part1_size = AV_RL24(buf) >> 4;
if (buf_size < 4 - s->profile + part1_size) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Buffer size %d is too small, needed : %d\n", buf_size, 4 - s->profile + part1_size);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
buf += 4 - s->profile;
buf_size -= 4 - s->profile;
memcpy(s->put_pixels_tab, s->vp8dsp.put_vp8_epel_pixels_tab, sizeof(s->put_pixels_tab));
ret = ff_vp56_init_range_decoder(c, buf, part1_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
buf += part1_size;
buf_size -= part1_size;
/* A. Dimension information (keyframes only) */
if (s->keyframe) {
width = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 12);
height = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 12);
hscale = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 2);
vscale = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 2);
if (hscale || vscale)
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "Upscaling");
s->update_golden = s->update_altref = VP56_FRAME_CURRENT;
vp78_reset_probability_tables(s);
memcpy(s->prob->pred16x16, vp8_pred16x16_prob_inter,
sizeof(s->prob->pred16x16));
memcpy(s->prob->pred8x8c, vp8_pred8x8c_prob_inter,
sizeof(s->prob->pred8x8c));
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
memcpy(s->prob->mvc[i], vp7_mv_default_prob[i],
sizeof(vp7_mv_default_prob[i]));
memset(&s->segmentation, 0, sizeof(s->segmentation));
memset(&s->lf_delta, 0, sizeof(s->lf_delta));
memcpy(s->prob[0].scan, ff_zigzag_scan, sizeof(s->prob[0].scan));
}
if (s->keyframe || s->profile > 0)
memset(s->inter_dc_pred, 0 , sizeof(s->inter_dc_pred));
/* B. Decoding information for all four macroblock-level features */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
s->feature_enabled[i] = vp8_rac_get(c);
if (s->feature_enabled[i]) {
s->feature_present_prob[i] = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++)
s->feature_index_prob[i][j] =
vp8_rac_get(c) ? vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8) : 255;
if (vp7_feature_value_size[s->profile][i])
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
s->feature_value[i][j] =
vp8_rac_get(c) ? vp8_rac_get_uint(c, vp7_feature_value_size[s->profile][i]) : 0;
}
}
s->segmentation.enabled = 0;
s->segmentation.update_map = 0;
s->lf_delta.enabled = 0;
s->num_coeff_partitions = 1;
ret = ff_vp56_init_range_decoder(&s->coeff_partition[0], buf, buf_size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!s->macroblocks_base || /* first frame */
width != s->avctx->width || height != s->avctx->height ||
(width + 15) / 16 != s->mb_width || (height + 15) / 16 != s->mb_height) {
if ((ret = vp7_update_dimensions(s, width, height)) < 0)
return ret;
}
/* C. Dequantization indices */
vp7_get_quants(s);
/* D. Golden frame update flag (a Flag) for interframes only */
if (!s->keyframe) {
s->update_golden = vp8_rac_get(c) ? VP56_FRAME_CURRENT : VP56_FRAME_NONE;
s->sign_bias[VP56_FRAME_GOLDEN] = 0;
}
s->update_last = 1;
s->update_probabilities = 1;
s->fade_present = 1;
if (s->profile > 0) {
s->update_probabilities = vp8_rac_get(c);
if (!s->update_probabilities)
s->prob[1] = s->prob[0];
if (!s->keyframe)
s->fade_present = vp8_rac_get(c);
}
/* E. Fading information for previous frame */
if (s->fade_present && vp8_rac_get(c)) {
if ((ret = vp7_fade_frame(s ,c)) < 0)
return ret;
}
/* F. Loop filter type */
if (!s->profile)
s->filter.simple = vp8_rac_get(c);
/* G. DCT coefficient ordering specification */
if (vp8_rac_get(c))
for (i = 1; i < 16; i++)
s->prob[0].scan[i] = ff_zigzag_scan[vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 4)];
/* H. Loop filter levels */
if (s->profile > 0)
s->filter.simple = vp8_rac_get(c);
s->filter.level = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 6);
s->filter.sharpness = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 3);
/* I. DCT coefficient probability update; 13.3 Token Probability Updates */
vp78_update_probability_tables(s);
s->mbskip_enabled = 0;
/* J. The remaining frame header data occurs ONLY FOR INTERFRAMES */
if (!s->keyframe) {
s->prob->intra = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
s->prob->last = vp8_rac_get_uint(c, 8);
vp78_update_pred16x16_pred8x8_mvc_probabilities(s, VP7_MVC_SIZE);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ByteStringAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, impl->byteStringAttribute(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_rdfxml_record_ID(raptor_parser *rdf_parser,
raptor_rdfxml_element *element,
const unsigned char *id)
{
raptor_rdfxml_parser *rdf_xml_parser;
raptor_uri* base_uri;
size_t id_len;
int rc;
rdf_xml_parser = (raptor_rdfxml_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
if(!RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_CHECK_RDF_ID))
return 0;
base_uri = raptor_rdfxml_inscope_base_uri(rdf_parser);
id_len = strlen((const char*)id);
rc = raptor_id_set_add(rdf_xml_parser->id_set, base_uri, id, id_len);
return (rc != 0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::DestroyInputBuffers() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
free_input_buffers_.clear();
if (input_buffer_map_.empty())
return;
if (input_streamon_) {
__u32 type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN(VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, &type);
input_streamon_ = false;
}
for (const auto& input_record : input_buffer_map_) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < input_buffer_num_planes_; ++i) {
device_->Munmap(input_record.address[i], input_record.length[i]);
}
}
struct v4l2_requestbuffers reqbufs;
memset(&reqbufs, 0, sizeof(reqbufs));
reqbufs.count = 0;
reqbufs.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
reqbufs.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP;
IOCTL_OR_LOG_ERROR(VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &reqbufs);
input_buffer_map_.clear();
input_buffer_num_planes_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nl80211_send_beacon_hint_event(struct wiphy *wiphy,
struct ieee80211_channel *channel_before,
struct ieee80211_channel *channel_after)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
void *hdr;
struct nlattr *nl_freq;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!msg)
return;
hdr = nl80211hdr_put(msg, 0, 0, 0, NL80211_CMD_REG_BEACON_HINT);
if (!hdr) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
/*
* Since we are applying the beacon hint to a wiphy we know its
* wiphy_idx is valid
*/
NLA_PUT_U32(msg, NL80211_ATTR_WIPHY, get_wiphy_idx(wiphy));
/* Before */
nl_freq = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_FREQ_BEFORE);
if (!nl_freq)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nl80211_msg_put_channel(msg, channel_before))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_freq);
/* After */
nl_freq = nla_nest_start(msg, NL80211_ATTR_FREQ_AFTER);
if (!nl_freq)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nl80211_msg_put_channel(msg, channel_after))
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(msg, nl_freq);
if (genlmsg_end(msg, hdr) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
rcu_read_lock();
genlmsg_multicast_allns(msg, 0, nl80211_regulatory_mcgrp.id,
GFP_ATOMIC);
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
nla_put_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(msg, hdr);
nlmsg_free(msg);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLFormControlsCollection* HTMLFormElement::elements() {
return ensureCachedCollection<HTMLFormControlsCollection>(FormControls);
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 142,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_get_invariants(struct tg3 *tp, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
{
u32 misc_ctrl_reg;
u32 pci_state_reg, grc_misc_cfg;
u32 val;
u16 pci_cmd;
int err;
/* Force memory write invalidate off. If we leave it on,
* then on 5700_BX chips we have to enable a workaround.
* The workaround is to set the TG3PCI_DMA_RW_CTRL boundary
* to match the cacheline size. The Broadcom driver have this
* workaround but turns MWI off all the times so never uses
* it. This seems to suggest that the workaround is insufficient.
*/
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_cmd &= ~PCI_COMMAND_INVALIDATE;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
/* Important! -- Make sure register accesses are byteswapped
* correctly. Also, for those chips that require it, make
* sure that indirect register accesses are enabled before
* the first operation.
*/
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
&misc_ctrl_reg);
tp->misc_host_ctrl |= (misc_ctrl_reg &
MISC_HOST_CTRL_CHIPREV);
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
tp->misc_host_ctrl);
tg3_detect_asic_rev(tp, misc_ctrl_reg);
/* If we have 5702/03 A1 or A2 on certain ICH chipsets,
* we need to disable memory and use config. cycles
* only to access all registers. The 5702/03 chips
* can mistakenly decode the special cycles from the
* ICH chipsets as memory write cycles, causing corruption
* of register and memory space. Only certain ICH bridges
* will drive special cycles with non-zero data during the
* address phase which can fall within the 5703's address
* range. This is not an ICH bug as the PCI spec allows
* non-zero address during special cycles. However, only
* these ICH bridges are known to drive non-zero addresses
* during special cycles.
*
* Since special cycles do not cross PCI bridges, we only
* enable this workaround if the 5703 is on the secondary
* bus of these ICH bridges.
*/
if ((tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5703_A1) ||
(tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5703_A2)) {
static struct tg3_dev_id {
u32 vendor;
u32 device;
u32 rev;
} ich_chipsets[] = {
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AA_8,
PCI_ANY_ID },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801AB_8,
PCI_ANY_ID },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801BA_11,
0xa },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82801BA_6,
PCI_ANY_ID },
{ },
};
struct tg3_dev_id *pci_id = &ich_chipsets[0];
struct pci_dev *bridge = NULL;
while (pci_id->vendor != 0) {
bridge = pci_get_device(pci_id->vendor, pci_id->device,
bridge);
if (!bridge) {
pci_id++;
continue;
}
if (pci_id->rev != PCI_ANY_ID) {
if (bridge->revision > pci_id->rev)
continue;
}
if (bridge->subordinate &&
(bridge->subordinate->number ==
tp->pdev->bus->number)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, ICH_WORKAROUND);
pci_dev_put(bridge);
break;
}
}
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701) {
static struct tg3_dev_id {
u32 vendor;
u32 device;
} bridge_chipsets[] = {
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PXH_0 },
{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_PXH_1 },
{ },
};
struct tg3_dev_id *pci_id = &bridge_chipsets[0];
struct pci_dev *bridge = NULL;
while (pci_id->vendor != 0) {
bridge = pci_get_device(pci_id->vendor,
pci_id->device,
bridge);
if (!bridge) {
pci_id++;
continue;
}
if (bridge->subordinate &&
(bridge->subordinate->number <=
tp->pdev->bus->number) &&
(bridge->subordinate->busn_res.end >=
tp->pdev->bus->number)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 5701_DMA_BUG);
pci_dev_put(bridge);
break;
}
}
}
/* The EPB bridge inside 5714, 5715, and 5780 cannot support
* DMA addresses > 40-bit. This bridge may have other additional
* 57xx devices behind it in some 4-port NIC designs for example.
* Any tg3 device found behind the bridge will also need the 40-bit
* DMA workaround.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 40BIT_DMA_BUG);
tp->msi_cap = pci_find_capability(tp->pdev, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
} else {
struct pci_dev *bridge = NULL;
do {
bridge = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SERVERWORKS,
PCI_DEVICE_ID_SERVERWORKS_EPB,
bridge);
if (bridge && bridge->subordinate &&
(bridge->subordinate->number <=
tp->pdev->bus->number) &&
(bridge->subordinate->busn_res.end >=
tp->pdev->bus->number)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 40BIT_DMA_BUG);
pci_dev_put(bridge);
break;
}
} while (bridge);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5714)
tp->pdev_peer = tg3_find_peer(tp);
/* Determine TSO capabilities */
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5719_A0)
; /* Do nothing. HW bug. */
else if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS))
tg3_flag_set(tp, HW_TSO_3);
else if (tg3_flag(tp, 5755_PLUS) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906)
tg3_flag_set(tp, HW_TSO_2);
else if (tg3_flag(tp, 5750_PLUS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, HW_TSO_1);
tg3_flag_set(tp, TSO_BUG);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5750 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) >= CHIPREV_ID_5750_C2)
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_BUG);
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5700 &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5701 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5705_A0) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, TSO_BUG);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705)
tp->fw_needed = FIRMWARE_TG3TSO5;
else
tp->fw_needed = FIRMWARE_TG3TSO;
}
/* Selectively allow TSO based on operating conditions */
if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_1) ||
tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_2) ||
tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_3) ||
tp->fw_needed) {
/* For firmware TSO, assume ASF is disabled.
* We'll disable TSO later if we discover ASF
* is enabled in tg3_get_eeprom_hw_cfg().
*/
tg3_flag_set(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
} else {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_BUG);
tp->fw_needed = NULL;
}
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_A0)
tp->fw_needed = FIRMWARE_TG3;
tp->irq_max = 1;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5750_PLUS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, SUPPORT_MSI);
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5750_AX ||
tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5750_BX ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5714 &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) <= CHIPREV_ID_5714_A2 &&
tp->pdev_peer == tp->pdev))
tg3_flag_clear(tp, SUPPORT_MSI);
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5755_PLUS) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, 1SHOT_MSI);
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS)) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, SUPPORT_MSIX);
tp->irq_max = TG3_IRQ_MAX_VECS;
}
}
tp->txq_max = 1;
tp->rxq_max = 1;
if (tp->irq_max > 1) {
tp->rxq_max = TG3_RSS_MAX_NUM_QS;
tg3_rss_init_dflt_indir_tbl(tp, TG3_RSS_MAX_NUM_QS);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720)
tp->txq_max = tp->irq_max - 1;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5755_PLUS) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906)
tg3_flag_set(tp, SHORT_DMA_BUG);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719)
tp->dma_limit = TG3_TX_BD_DMA_MAX_4K;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762)
tg3_flag_set(tp, LRG_PROD_RING_CAP);
if (tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS) &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5719_A0)
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_JUMBO_BDFLAG);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) ||
tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS) ||
tg3_flag(tp, USE_JUMBO_BDFLAG))
tg3_flag_set(tp, JUMBO_CAPABLE);
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE,
&pci_state_reg);
if (pci_is_pcie(tp->pdev)) {
u16 lnkctl;
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_EXPRESS);
pcie_capability_read_word(tp->pdev, PCI_EXP_LNKCTL, &lnkctl);
if (lnkctl & PCI_EXP_LNKCTL_CLKREQ_EN) {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, HW_TSO_2);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5784 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_57780_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_57780_A1)
tg3_flag_set(tp, CLKREQ_BUG);
} else if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5717_A0) {
tg3_flag_set(tp, L1PLLPD_EN);
}
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5785) {
/* BCM5785 devices are effectively PCIe devices, and should
* follow PCIe codepaths, but do not have a PCIe capabilities
* section.
*/
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_EXPRESS);
} else if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) ||
tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
tp->pcix_cap = pci_find_capability(tp->pdev, PCI_CAP_ID_PCIX);
if (!tp->pcix_cap) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev,
"Cannot find PCI-X capability, aborting\n");
return -EIO;
}
if (!(pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_CONV_PCI_MODE))
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCIX_MODE);
}
/* If we have an AMD 762 or VIA K8T800 chipset, write
* reordering to the mailbox registers done by the host
* controller can cause major troubles. We read back from
* every mailbox register write to force the writes to be
* posted to the chip in order.
*/
if (pci_dev_present(tg3_write_reorder_chipsets) &&
!tg3_flag(tp, PCI_EXPRESS))
tg3_flag_set(tp, MBOX_WRITE_REORDER);
pci_read_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE,
&tp->pci_cacheline_sz);
pci_read_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_LATENCY_TIMER,
&tp->pci_lat_timer);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5703 &&
tp->pci_lat_timer < 64) {
tp->pci_lat_timer = 64;
pci_write_config_byte(tp->pdev, PCI_LATENCY_TIMER,
tp->pci_lat_timer);
}
/* Important! -- It is critical that the PCI-X hw workaround
* situation is decided before the first MMIO register access.
*/
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5700_BX) {
/* 5700 BX chips need to have their TX producer index
* mailboxes written twice to workaround a bug.
*/
tg3_flag_set(tp, TXD_MBOX_HWBUG);
/* If we are in PCI-X mode, enable register write workaround.
*
* The workaround is to use indirect register accesses
* for all chip writes not to mailbox registers.
*/
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
u32 pm_reg;
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG);
/* The chip can have it's power management PCI config
* space registers clobbered due to this bug.
* So explicitly force the chip into D0 here.
*/
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev,
tp->pm_cap + PCI_PM_CTRL,
&pm_reg);
pm_reg &= ~PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK;
pm_reg |= PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_ENABLE | 0 /* D0 */;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev,
tp->pm_cap + PCI_PM_CTRL,
pm_reg);
/* Also, force SERR#/PERR# in PCI command. */
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_cmd |= PCI_COMMAND_PARITY | PCI_COMMAND_SERR;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
}
}
if ((pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_BUS_SPEED_HIGH) != 0)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_HIGH_SPEED);
if ((pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_BUS_32BIT) != 0)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCI_32BIT);
/* Chip-specific fixup from Broadcom driver */
if ((tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5704_A0) &&
(!(pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_RETRY_SAME_DMA))) {
pci_state_reg |= PCISTATE_RETRY_SAME_DMA;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE, pci_state_reg);
}
/* Default fast path register access methods */
tp->read32 = tg3_read32;
tp->write32 = tg3_write32;
tp->read32_mbox = tg3_read32;
tp->write32_mbox = tg3_write32;
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write32;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write32;
/* Various workaround register access methods */
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG))
tp->write32 = tg3_write_indirect_reg32;
else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701 ||
(tg3_flag(tp, PCI_EXPRESS) &&
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5750_A0)) {
/*
* Back to back register writes can cause problems on these
* chips, the workaround is to read back all reg writes
* except those to mailbox regs.
*
* See tg3_write_indirect_reg32().
*/
tp->write32 = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, TXD_MBOX_HWBUG) || tg3_flag(tp, MBOX_WRITE_REORDER)) {
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write32_tx_mbox;
if (tg3_flag(tp, MBOX_WRITE_REORDER))
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, ICH_WORKAROUND)) {
tp->read32 = tg3_read_indirect_reg32;
tp->write32 = tg3_write_indirect_reg32;
tp->read32_mbox = tg3_read_indirect_mbox;
tp->write32_mbox = tg3_write_indirect_mbox;
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write_indirect_mbox;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write_indirect_mbox;
iounmap(tp->regs);
tp->regs = NULL;
pci_read_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &pci_cmd);
pci_cmd &= ~PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY;
pci_write_config_word(tp->pdev, PCI_COMMAND, pci_cmd);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906) {
tp->read32_mbox = tg3_read32_mbox_5906;
tp->write32_mbox = tg3_write32_mbox_5906;
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write32_mbox_5906;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write32_mbox_5906;
}
if (tp->write32 == tg3_write_indirect_reg32 ||
(tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE) &&
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701)))
tg3_flag_set(tp, SRAM_USE_CONFIG);
/* The memory arbiter has to be enabled in order for SRAM accesses
* to succeed. Normally on powerup the tg3 chip firmware will make
* sure it is enabled, but other entities such as system netboot
* code might disable it.
*/
val = tr32(MEMARB_MODE);
tw32(MEMARB_MODE, val | MEMARB_MODE_ENABLE);
tp->pci_fn = PCI_FUNC(tp->pdev->devfn) & 3;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5704 ||
tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS)) {
if (tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev,
tp->pcix_cap + PCI_X_STATUS,
&val);
tp->pci_fn = val & 0x7;
}
} else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5719 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720) {
tg3_read_mem(tp, NIC_SRAM_CPMU_STATUS, &val);
if ((val & NIC_SRAM_CPMUSTAT_SIG_MSK) != NIC_SRAM_CPMUSTAT_SIG)
val = tr32(TG3_CPMU_STATUS);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717)
tp->pci_fn = (val & TG3_CPMU_STATUS_FMSK_5717) ? 1 : 0;
else
tp->pci_fn = (val & TG3_CPMU_STATUS_FMSK_5719) >>
TG3_CPMU_STATUS_FSHFT_5719;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, FLUSH_POSTED_WRITES)) {
tp->write32_tx_mbox = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
tp->write32_rx_mbox = tg3_write_flush_reg32;
}
/* Get eeprom hw config before calling tg3_set_power_state().
* In particular, the TG3_FLAG_IS_NIC flag must be
* determined before calling tg3_set_power_state() so that
* we know whether or not to switch out of Vaux power.
* When the flag is set, it means that GPIO1 is used for eeprom
* write protect and also implies that it is a LOM where GPIOs
* are not used to switch power.
*/
tg3_get_eeprom_hw_cfg(tp);
if (tp->fw_needed && tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_ASF)) {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_CAPABLE);
tg3_flag_clear(tp, TSO_BUG);
tp->fw_needed = NULL;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE)) {
/* Allow reads and writes to the
* APE register and memory space.
*/
pci_state_reg |= PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_CTLSPC_WR |
PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_SHMEM_WR |
PCISTATE_ALLOW_APE_PSPACE_WR;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE,
pci_state_reg);
tg3_ape_lock_init(tp);
}
/* Set up tp->grc_local_ctrl before calling
* tg3_pwrsrc_switch_to_vmain(). GPIO1 driven high
* will bring 5700's external PHY out of reset.
* It is also used as eeprom write protect on LOMs.
*/
tp->grc_local_ctrl = GRC_LCLCTRL_INT_ON_ATTN | GRC_LCLCTRL_AUTO_SEEPROM;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_flag(tp, EEPROM_WRITE_PROT))
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= (GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OE1 |
GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OUTPUT1);
/* Unused GPIO3 must be driven as output on 5752 because there
* are no pull-up resistors on unused GPIO pins.
*/
else if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5752)
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OE3;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5755 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57780 ||
tg3_flag(tp, 57765_CLASS))
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_UART_SEL;
if (tp->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5761 ||
tp->pdev->device == TG3PCI_DEVICE_TIGON3_5761S) {
/* Turn off the debug UART. */
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_UART_SEL;
if (tg3_flag(tp, IS_NIC))
/* Keep VMain power. */
tp->grc_local_ctrl |= GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OE0 |
GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_OUTPUT0;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762)
tp->grc_local_ctrl |=
tr32(GRC_LOCAL_CTRL) & GRC_LCLCTRL_GPIO_UART_SEL;
/* Switch out of Vaux if it is a NIC */
tg3_pwrsrc_switch_to_vmain(tp);
/* Derive initial jumbo mode from MTU assigned in
* ether_setup() via the alloc_etherdev() call
*/
if (tp->dev->mtu > ETH_DATA_LEN && !tg3_flag(tp, 5780_CLASS))
tg3_flag_set(tp, JUMBO_RING_ENABLE);
/* Determine WakeOnLan speed to use. */
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B2) {
tg3_flag_clear(tp, WOL_SPEED_100MB);
} else {
tg3_flag_set(tp, WOL_SPEED_100MB);
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5906)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET;
/* A few boards don't want Ethernet@WireSpeed phy feature */
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700 ||
(tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705 &&
(tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5705_A0) &&
(tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) != CHIPREV_ID_5705_A1)) ||
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET) ||
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES))
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_NO_ETH_WIRE_SPEED;
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5703_AX ||
tg3_chip_rev(tp) == CHIPREV_5704_AX)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_ADC_BUG;
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5704_A0)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_5704_A0_BUG;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) &&
!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET) &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5785 &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_57780 &&
!tg3_flag(tp, 57765_PLUS)) {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5755 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5787 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5784 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5761) {
if (tp->pdev->device != PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5756 &&
tp->pdev->device != PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5722)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_JITTER_BUG;
if (tp->pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_TIGON3_5755M)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_ADJUST_TRIM;
} else
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_BER_BUG;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5784 &&
tg3_chip_rev(tp) != CHIPREV_5784_AX) {
tp->phy_otp = tg3_read_otp_phycfg(tp);
if (tp->phy_otp == 0)
tp->phy_otp = TG3_OTP_DEFAULT;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, CPMU_PRESENT))
tp->mi_mode = MAC_MI_MODE_500KHZ_CONST;
else
tp->mi_mode = MAC_MI_MODE_BASE;
tp->coalesce_mode = 0;
if (tg3_chip_rev(tp) != CHIPREV_5700_AX &&
tg3_chip_rev(tp) != CHIPREV_5700_BX)
tp->coalesce_mode |= HOSTCC_MODE_32BYTE;
/* Set these bits to enable statistics workaround. */
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5717 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5719_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5720_A0) {
tp->coalesce_mode |= HOSTCC_MODE_ATTN;
tp->grc_mode |= GRC_MODE_IRQ_ON_FLOW_ATTN;
}
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5785 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_57780)
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_PHYLIB);
err = tg3_mdio_init(tp);
if (err)
return err;
/* Initialize data/descriptor byte/word swapping. */
val = tr32(GRC_MODE);
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5720 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5762)
val &= (GRC_MODE_BYTE_SWAP_B2HRX_DATA |
GRC_MODE_WORD_SWAP_B2HRX_DATA |
GRC_MODE_B2HRX_ENABLE |
GRC_MODE_HTX2B_ENABLE |
GRC_MODE_HOST_STACKUP);
else
val &= GRC_MODE_HOST_STACKUP;
tw32(GRC_MODE, val | tp->grc_mode);
tg3_switch_clocks(tp);
/* Clear this out for sanity. */
tw32(TG3PCI_MEM_WIN_BASE_ADDR, 0);
pci_read_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_PCISTATE,
&pci_state_reg);
if ((pci_state_reg & PCISTATE_CONV_PCI_MODE) == 0 &&
!tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG)) {
if (tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_A0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B0 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B2 ||
tg3_chip_rev_id(tp) == CHIPREV_ID_5701_B5) {
void __iomem *sram_base;
/* Write some dummy words into the SRAM status block
* area, see if it reads back correctly. If the return
* value is bad, force enable the PCIX workaround.
*/
sram_base = tp->regs + NIC_SRAM_WIN_BASE + NIC_SRAM_STATS_BLK;
writel(0x00000000, sram_base);
writel(0x00000000, sram_base + 4);
writel(0xffffffff, sram_base + 4);
if (readl(sram_base) != 0x00000000)
tg3_flag_set(tp, PCIX_TARGET_HWBUG);
}
}
udelay(50);
tg3_nvram_init(tp);
grc_misc_cfg = tr32(GRC_MISC_CFG);
grc_misc_cfg &= GRC_MISC_CFG_BOARD_ID_MASK;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705 &&
(grc_misc_cfg == GRC_MISC_CFG_BOARD_ID_5788 ||
grc_misc_cfg == GRC_MISC_CFG_BOARD_ID_5788M))
tg3_flag_set(tp, IS_5788);
if (!tg3_flag(tp, IS_5788) &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5700)
tg3_flag_set(tp, TAGGED_STATUS);
if (tg3_flag(tp, TAGGED_STATUS)) {
tp->coalesce_mode |= (HOSTCC_MODE_CLRTICK_RXBD |
HOSTCC_MODE_CLRTICK_TXBD);
tp->misc_host_ctrl |= MISC_HOST_CTRL_TAGGED_STATUS;
pci_write_config_dword(tp->pdev, TG3PCI_MISC_HOST_CTRL,
tp->misc_host_ctrl);
}
/* Preserve the APE MAC_MODE bits */
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_APE))
tp->mac_mode = MAC_MODE_APE_TX_EN | MAC_MODE_APE_RX_EN;
else
tp->mac_mode = 0;
if (tg3_10_100_only_device(tp, ent))
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_10_100_ONLY;
err = tg3_phy_probe(tp);
if (err) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev, "phy probe failed, err %d\n", err);
/* ... but do not return immediately ... */
tg3_mdio_fini(tp);
}
tg3_read_vpd(tp);
tg3_read_fw_ver(tp);
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES) {
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
} else {
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700)
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
else
tp->phy_flags &= ~TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
}
/* 5700 {AX,BX} chips have a broken status block link
* change bit implementation, so we must use the
* status register in those cases.
*/
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5700)
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG);
else
tg3_flag_clear(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG);
/* The led_ctrl is set during tg3_phy_probe, here we might
* have to force the link status polling mechanism based
* upon subsystem IDs.
*/
if (tp->pdev->subsystem_vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_DELL &&
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701 &&
!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES)) {
tp->phy_flags |= TG3_PHYFLG_USE_MI_INTERRUPT;
tg3_flag_set(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG);
}
/* For all SERDES we poll the MAC status register. */
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_PHY_SERDES)
tg3_flag_set(tp, POLL_SERDES);
else
tg3_flag_clear(tp, POLL_SERDES);
tp->rx_offset = NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN;
tp->rx_copy_thresh = TG3_RX_COPY_THRESHOLD;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5701 &&
tg3_flag(tp, PCIX_MODE)) {
tp->rx_offset = NET_SKB_PAD;
#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
tp->rx_copy_thresh = ~(u16)0;
#endif
}
tp->rx_std_ring_mask = TG3_RX_STD_RING_SIZE(tp) - 1;
tp->rx_jmb_ring_mask = TG3_RX_JMB_RING_SIZE(tp) - 1;
tp->rx_ret_ring_mask = tg3_rx_ret_ring_size(tp) - 1;
tp->rx_std_max_post = tp->rx_std_ring_mask + 1;
/* Increment the rx prod index on the rx std ring by at most
* 8 for these chips to workaround hw errata.
*/
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5750 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5752 ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5755)
tp->rx_std_max_post = 8;
if (tg3_flag(tp, ASPM_WORKAROUND))
tp->pwrmgmt_thresh = tr32(PCIE_PWR_MGMT_THRESH) &
PCIE_PWR_MGMT_L1_THRESH_MSK;
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: findoprnd_recurse(QueryItem *ptr, uint32 *pos, int nnodes)
{
/* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
check_stack_depth();
if (*pos >= nnodes)
elog(ERROR, "malformed tsquery: operand not found");
if (ptr[*pos].type == QI_VAL ||
ptr[*pos].type == QI_VALSTOP) /* need to handle VALSTOP here, they
* haven't been cleaned away yet. */
{
(*pos)++;
}
else
{
Assert(ptr[*pos].type == QI_OPR);
if (ptr[*pos].qoperator.oper == OP_NOT)
{
ptr[*pos].qoperator.left = 1;
(*pos)++;
findoprnd_recurse(ptr, pos, nnodes);
}
else
{
QueryOperator *curitem = &ptr[*pos].qoperator;
int tmp = *pos;
Assert(curitem->oper == OP_AND || curitem->oper == OP_OR);
(*pos)++;
findoprnd_recurse(ptr, pos, nnodes);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd_recurse(ptr, pos, nnodes);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void list_add_leaf_cfs_rq(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
if (!cfs_rq->on_list) {
struct rq *rq = rq_of(cfs_rq);
int cpu = cpu_of(rq);
/*
* Ensure we either appear before our parent (if already
* enqueued) or force our parent to appear after us when it is
* enqueued. The fact that we always enqueue bottom-up
* reduces this to two cases and a special case for the root
* cfs_rq. Furthermore, it also means that we will always reset
* tmp_alone_branch either when the branch is connected
* to a tree or when we reach the beg of the tree
*/
if (cfs_rq->tg->parent &&
cfs_rq->tg->parent->cfs_rq[cpu]->on_list) {
/*
* If parent is already on the list, we add the child
* just before. Thanks to circular linked property of
* the list, this means to put the child at the tail
* of the list that starts by parent.
*/
list_add_tail_rcu(&cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list,
&(cfs_rq->tg->parent->cfs_rq[cpu]->leaf_cfs_rq_list));
/*
* The branch is now connected to its tree so we can
* reset tmp_alone_branch to the beginning of the
* list.
*/
rq->tmp_alone_branch = &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list;
} else if (!cfs_rq->tg->parent) {
/*
* cfs rq without parent should be put
* at the tail of the list.
*/
list_add_tail_rcu(&cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list,
&rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
/*
* We have reach the beg of a tree so we can reset
* tmp_alone_branch to the beginning of the list.
*/
rq->tmp_alone_branch = &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list;
} else {
/*
* The parent has not already been added so we want to
* make sure that it will be put after us.
* tmp_alone_branch points to the beg of the branch
* where we will add parent.
*/
list_add_rcu(&cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list,
rq->tmp_alone_branch);
/*
* update tmp_alone_branch to points to the new beg
* of the branch
*/
rq->tmp_alone_branch = &cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list;
}
cfs_rq->on_list = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JslCharPos jslCharPosClone(JslCharPos *pos) {
JslCharPos p;
p.it = jsvStringIteratorClone(&pos->it);
p.currCh = pos->currCh;
return p;
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& DocumentLoader::RequiredCSP() {
return GetFrameLoader().RequiredCSP();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *msr_devnode(struct device *dev, umode_t *mode)
{
return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "cpu/%u/msr", MINOR(dev->devt));
}
Commit Message: x86/msr: Add capabilities check
At the moment the MSR driver only relies upon file system
checks. This means that anything as root with any capability set
can write to MSRs. Historically that wasn't very interesting but
on modern processors the MSRs are such that writing to them
provides several ways to execute arbitary code in kernel space.
Sample code and documentation on doing this is circulating and
MSR attacks are used on Windows 64bit rootkits already.
In the Linux case you still need to be able to open the device
file so the impact is fairly limited and reduces the security of
some capability and security model based systems down towards
that of a generic "root owns the box" setup.
Therefore they should require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to prevent an
elevation of capabilities. The impact of this is fairly minimal
on most setups because they don't have heavy use of
capabilities. Those using SELinux, SMACK or AppArmor rules might
want to consider if their rulesets on the MSR driver could be
tighter.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Horses <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 33,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sched_destroy_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
/* wait for possible concurrent references to cfs_rqs complete */
call_rcu(&tg->rcu, sched_free_group_rcu);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_parse_search(struct ImapData *idata, const char *s)
{
unsigned int uid;
struct Header *h = NULL;
mutt_debug(2, "Handling SEARCH\n");
while ((s = imap_next_word((char *) s)) && *s != '\0')
{
if (mutt_str_atoui(s, &uid) < 0)
continue;
h = (struct Header *) mutt_hash_int_find(idata->uid_hash, uid);
if (h)
h->matched = true;
}
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveFramebuffer(GLuint client_id) {
framebuffer_manager()->RemoveFramebuffer(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int LELib_Release(effect_handle_t handle) {
LoudnessEnhancerContext * pContext = (LoudnessEnhancerContext *)handle;
ALOGV("LELib_Release %p", handle);
if (pContext == NULL) {
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
if (pContext->mCompressor != NULL) {
delete pContext->mCompressor;
pContext->mCompressor = NULL;
}
delete pContext;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostTestReadyToActivateEmpty()
: did_notify_ready_to_activate_(false),
all_tiles_required_for_activation_are_ready_to_draw_(false),
required_for_activation_count_(0) {}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xscale2pmu_write_counter(int counter, u32 val)
{
switch (counter) {
case XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c1, c1, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER0:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c0, c2, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER1:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c1, c2, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER2:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c2, c2, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER3:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c3, c2, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct fib_result *res,
struct in_device *in_dev,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u32 tos)
{
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct rtable *rth;
int err;
struct in_device *out_dev;
bool do_cache;
u32 itag = 0;
/* get a working reference to the output device */
out_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(FIB_RES_DEV(*res));
if (!out_dev) {
net_crit_ratelimited("Bug in ip_route_input_slow(). Please report.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos, FIB_RES_OIF(*res),
in_dev->dev, in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0) {
ip_handle_martian_source(in_dev->dev, in_dev, skb, daddr,
saddr);
goto cleanup;
}
do_cache = res->fi && !itag;
if (out_dev == in_dev && err && IN_DEV_TX_REDIRECTS(out_dev) &&
skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) &&
(IN_DEV_SHARED_MEDIA(out_dev) ||
inet_addr_onlink(out_dev, saddr, FIB_RES_GW(*res))))
IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_DOREDIRECT;
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/* Not IP (i.e. ARP). Do not create route, if it is
* invalid for proxy arp. DNAT routes are always valid.
*
* Proxy arp feature have been extended to allow, ARP
* replies back to the same interface, to support
* Private VLAN switch technologies. See arp.c.
*/
if (out_dev == in_dev &&
IN_DEV_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN(in_dev) == 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
}
fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
if (do_cache) {
if (fnhe)
rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
else
rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
goto out;
}
}
rth = rt_dst_alloc(out_dev->dev, 0, res->type,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY),
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(out_dev, NOXFRM), do_cache);
if (!rth) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto cleanup;
}
rth->rt_is_input = 1;
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_tot);
rth->dst.input = ip_forward;
rt_set_nexthop(rth, daddr, res, fnhe, res->fi, res->type, itag,
do_cache);
lwtunnel_set_redirect(&rth->dst);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
out:
err = 0;
cleanup:
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetUniformsES3CHROMIUM(
GLuint program,
std::vector<uint8_t>* data) {
GLuint service_program = 0;
if (!resources_->program_id_map.GetServiceID(program, &service_program)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint num_uniforms = 0;
api()->glGetProgramivFn(service_program, GL_ACTIVE_UNIFORMS, &num_uniforms);
UniformsES3Header header;
header.num_uniforms = num_uniforms;
AppendValueToBuffer(data, header);
for (GLuint uniform_index = 0;
uniform_index < static_cast<GLuint>(num_uniforms); uniform_index++) {
UniformES3Info uniform_info;
GLint uniform_block_index = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_program, 1, &uniform_index,
GL_UNIFORM_BLOCK_INDEX,
&uniform_block_index);
uniform_info.block_index = uniform_block_index;
GLint uniform_offset = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_program, 1, &uniform_index,
GL_UNIFORM_OFFSET, &uniform_offset);
uniform_info.offset = uniform_offset;
GLint uniform_array_stride = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_program, 1, &uniform_index,
GL_UNIFORM_ARRAY_STRIDE,
&uniform_array_stride);
uniform_info.array_stride = uniform_array_stride;
GLint uniform_matrix_stride = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_program, 1, &uniform_index,
GL_UNIFORM_MATRIX_STRIDE,
&uniform_matrix_stride);
uniform_info.matrix_stride = uniform_matrix_stride;
GLint uniform_is_row_major = 0;
api()->glGetActiveUniformsivFn(service_program, 1, &uniform_index,
GL_UNIFORM_IS_ROW_MAJOR,
&uniform_is_row_major);
uniform_info.is_row_major = uniform_is_row_major;
AppendValueToBuffer(data, uniform_info);
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int scsi_setup_flush_cmnd(struct scsi_device *sdp, struct request *rq)
{
rq->timeout = SD_FLUSH_TIMEOUT;
rq->retries = SD_MAX_RETRIES;
rq->cmd[0] = SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE;
rq->cmd_len = 10;
return scsi_setup_blk_pc_cmnd(sdp, rq);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t InputHandler::finishComposition()
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return -1;
if (!compositionActive())
return 0;
removeAttributedTextMarker();
InputLog(LogLevelInfo, "InputHandler::finishComposition completed");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = pci_get_drvdata(to_pci_dev(dev));
efx->state = STATE_INIT;
efx_init_channels(efx);
mutex_lock(&efx->mac_lock);
efx->phy_op->reconfigure(efx);
mutex_unlock(&efx->mac_lock);
efx_start_all(efx);
netif_device_attach(efx->net_dev);
efx->state = STATE_RUNNING;
efx->type->resume_wol(efx);
/* Reschedule any quenched resets scheduled during efx_pm_freeze() */
queue_work(reset_workqueue, &efx->reset_work);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsPNM(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t extent)
{
if (extent < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if ((*magick == (unsigned char) 'P') &&
((magick[1] == '1') || (magick[1] == '2') || (magick[1] == '3') ||
(magick[1] == '4') || (magick[1] == '5') || (magick[1] == '6') ||
(magick[1] == '7') || (magick[1] == 'F') || (magick[1] == 'f')))
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coerce_reg_to_size(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int size)
{
u64 mask;
/* clear high bits in bit representation */
reg->var_off = tnum_cast(reg->var_off, size);
/* fix arithmetic bounds */
mask = ((u64)1 << (size * 8)) - 1;
if ((reg->umin_value & ~mask) == (reg->umax_value & ~mask)) {
reg->umin_value &= mask;
reg->umax_value &= mask;
} else {
reg->umin_value = 0;
reg->umax_value = mask;
}
reg->smin_value = reg->umin_value;
reg->smax_value = reg->umax_value;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static _Bool check_notify_received (const notification_t *n) /* {{{ */
{
notification_meta_t *ptr;
for (ptr = n->meta; ptr != NULL; ptr = ptr->next)
if ((strcmp ("network:received", ptr->name) == 0)
&& (ptr->type == NM_TYPE_BOOLEAN))
return ((_Bool) ptr->nm_value.nm_boolean);
return (0);
} /* }}} _Bool check_notify_received */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::IsSecureContextImpl() const {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
return false;
if (SchemeRegistry::SchemeShouldBypassSecureContextCheck(
GetSecurityOrigin()->Protocol()))
return true;
if (!frame_)
return true;
Frame* parent = frame_->Tree().Parent();
while (parent) {
if (!parent->GetSecurityContext()
->GetSecurityOrigin()
->IsPotentiallyTrustworthy())
return false;
parent = parent->Tree().Parent();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TriState StateTextWritingDirectionRightToLeft(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*) {
return StateTextWritingDirection(frame, RightToLeftWritingDirection);
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool RunLengthEncoder::fillBuf() {
int c, c1, c2;
int n;
if (eof)
return gFalse;
if (nextEnd < bufEnd + 1) {
if ((c1 = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
return gFalse;
}
} else {
c1 = bufEnd[0] & 0xff;
}
if (nextEnd < bufEnd + 2) {
if ((c2 = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
buf[0] = 0;
buf[1] = c1;
bufPtr = buf;
bufEnd = &buf[2];
return gTrue;
}
} else {
c2 = bufEnd[1] & 0xff;
}
c = 0; // make gcc happy
if (c1 == c2) {
n = 2;
while (n < 128 && (c = str->getChar()) == c1)
++n;
buf[0] = (char)(257 - n);
buf[1] = c1;
bufEnd = &buf[2];
if (c == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
} else if (n < 128) {
buf[2] = c;
nextEnd = &buf[3];
} else {
nextEnd = bufEnd;
}
} else {
buf[1] = c1;
buf[2] = c2;
n = 2;
while (n < 128) {
if ((c = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
eof = gTrue;
break;
}
++n;
buf[n] = c;
if (buf[n] == buf[n-1])
break;
}
if (buf[n] == buf[n-1]) {
buf[0] = (char)(n-2-1);
bufEnd = &buf[n-1];
nextEnd = &buf[n+1];
} else {
buf[0] = (char)(n-1);
bufEnd = nextEnd = &buf[n+1];
}
}
bufPtr = buf;
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewZoomer(const GURL& url, double zoom_level)
: zoom_level_(zoom_level) {
host_ = net::GetHostOrSpecFromURL(url);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void sctp_set_owner_w(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = chunk->asoc;
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
/* The sndbuf space is tracked per association. */
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
skb_set_owner_w(chunk->skb, sk);
chunk->skb->destructor = sctp_wfree;
/* Save the chunk pointer in skb for sctp_wfree to use later. */
skb_shinfo(chunk->skb)->destructor_arg = chunk;
asoc->sndbuf_used += SCTP_DATA_SNDSIZE(chunk) +
sizeof(struct sk_buff) +
sizeof(struct sctp_chunk);
atomic_add(sizeof(struct sctp_chunk), &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
sk->sk_wmem_queued += chunk->skb->truesize;
sk_mem_charge(sk, chunk->skb->truesize);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,560 |
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