instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *sgpd_parse_entry(u32 grouping_type, GF_BitStream *bs, u32 entry_size, u32 *total_bytes)
{
Bool null_size_ok = GF_FALSE;
GF_DefaultSampleGroupDescriptionEntry *ptr;
switch (grouping_type) {
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_ROLL:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_PROL:
{
GF_RollRecoveryEntry *ptr;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_RollRecoveryEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
ptr->roll_distance = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 16);
*total_bytes = 2;
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_RAP:
{
GF_VisualRandomAccessEntry *ptr;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_VisualRandomAccessEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
ptr->num_leading_samples_known = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptr->num_leading_samples = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 7);
*total_bytes = 1;
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_SAP:
{
GF_SAPEntry *ptr;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_SAPEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
ptr->dependent_flag = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 3);
ptr->SAP_type = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 4);
*total_bytes = 1;
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_SYNC:
{
GF_SYNCEntry *ptr;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_SYNCEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 2);
ptr->NALU_type = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
*total_bytes = 1;
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_TELE:
{
GF_TemporalLevelEntry *ptr;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_TemporalLevelEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
ptr->level_independently_decodable = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 7);
*total_bytes = 1;
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_SEIG:
{
GF_CENCSampleEncryptionGroupEntry *ptr;
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_CENCSampleEncryptionGroupEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
gf_bs_read_u8(bs); //reserved
ptr->crypt_byte_block = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 4);
ptr->skip_byte_block = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 4);
ptr->IsProtected = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
ptr->Per_Sample_IV_size = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
gf_bs_read_data(bs, (char *)ptr->KID, 16);
*total_bytes = 20;
if ((ptr->IsProtected == 1) && !ptr->Per_Sample_IV_size) {
ptr->constant_IV_size = gf_bs_read_u8(bs);
assert((ptr->constant_IV_size == 8) || (ptr->constant_IV_size == 16));
gf_bs_read_data(bs, (char *)ptr->constant_IV, ptr->constant_IV_size);
*total_bytes += 1 + ptr->constant_IV_size;
}
if (!entry_size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] seig sample group does not indicate entry size, deprecated in spec\n"));
}
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_OINF:
{
GF_OperatingPointsInformation *ptr = gf_isom_oinf_new_entry();
u32 s = (u32) gf_bs_get_position(bs);
gf_isom_oinf_read_entry(ptr, bs);
*total_bytes = (u32) gf_bs_get_position(bs) - s;
if (!entry_size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] oinf sample group does not indicate entry size, deprecated in spec\n"));
}
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_LINF:
{
GF_LHVCLayerInformation *ptr = gf_isom_linf_new_entry();
u32 s = (u32) gf_bs_get_position(bs);
gf_isom_linf_read_entry(ptr, bs);
*total_bytes = (u32) gf_bs_get_position(bs) - s;
if (!entry_size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] linf sample group does not indicate entry size, deprecated in spec\n"));
}
return ptr;
}
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_TRIF:
if (! entry_size) {
u32 flags = gf_bs_peek_bits(bs, 24, 0);
if (flags & 0x10000) entry_size=3;
else {
if (flags & 0x80000) entry_size=7;
else entry_size=11;
if (flags & 0x200000) {
u32 nb_entries = gf_bs_peek_bits(bs, 16, entry_size);
entry_size += 2 + 2*nb_entries;
}
}
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] trif sample group does not indicate entry size, deprecated in spec\n"));
}
break;
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_NALM:
if (! entry_size) {
u64 start = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
Bool rle, large_size;
u32 entry_count;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 6);
large_size = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
rle = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
entry_count = gf_bs_read_int(bs, large_size ? 16 : 8);
gf_bs_seek(bs, start);
entry_size = 1 + large_size ? 2 : 1;
entry_size += entry_count * 2;
if (rle) entry_size += entry_count * (large_size ? 2 : 1);
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] nalm sample group does not indicate entry size, deprecated in spec\n"));
}
break;
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_TSAS:
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_STSA:
null_size_ok = GF_TRUE;
break;
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_TSCL:
entry_size = 20;
break;
case GF_ISOM_SAMPLE_GROUP_LBLI:
entry_size = 2;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (!entry_size && !null_size_ok) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] %s sample group does not indicate entry size and is not implemented, cannot parse!\n", gf_4cc_to_str( grouping_type) ));
return NULL;
}
GF_SAFEALLOC(ptr, GF_DefaultSampleGroupDescriptionEntry);
if (!ptr) return NULL;
if (entry_size) {
ptr->length = entry_size;
ptr->data = (u8 *) gf_malloc(sizeof(u8)*ptr->length);
gf_bs_read_data(bs, (char *) ptr->data, ptr->length);
*total_bytes = entry_size;
}
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long gfn_to_hva_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_hva_many(slot, gfn, NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::SetMemoryLimit(size_t limit) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
memory_limit_ = limit;
ReduceMemoryUsageUntilWithinMemoryLimit();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaRecorder::release()
{
ALOGV("release");
if (mMediaRecorder != NULL) {
return mMediaRecorder->release();
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_adjust_hints_for_addrconfig_(struct evutil_addrinfo *hints)
{
if (!(hints->ai_flags & EVUTIL_AI_ADDRCONFIG))
return;
if (hints->ai_family != PF_UNSPEC)
return;
if (!have_checked_interfaces)
evutil_check_interfaces(0);
if (had_ipv4_address && !had_ipv6_address) {
hints->ai_family = PF_INET;
} else if (!had_ipv4_address && had_ipv6_address) {
hints->ai_family = PF_INET6;
}
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string PrintPropList(IBusPropList *prop_list, int tree_level) {
if (!prop_list) {
return "";
}
std::stringstream stream;
for (int i = 0;; ++i) {
IBusProperty* prop = ibus_prop_list_get(prop_list, i);
if (!prop) {
break;
}
stream << PrintProp(prop, tree_level);
}
return stream.str();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sprint_nip(char *dest, const char *pre, const uint8_t *ip)
{
return sprintf(dest, "%s%u.%u.%u.%u", pre, ip[0], ip[1], ip[2], ip[3]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 8,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::PaintRenderingResultsToCanvas(
SourceDrawingBuffer source_buffer) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
bool must_clear_now = ClearIfComposited() != kSkipped;
if (!marked_canvas_dirty_ && !must_clear_now)
return false;
canvas()->ClearCopiedImage();
marked_canvas_dirty_ = false;
if (!canvas()->GetOrCreateImageBuffer())
return false;
ScopedTexture2DRestorer restorer(this);
ScopedFramebufferRestorer fbo_restorer(this);
GetDrawingBuffer()->ResolveAndBindForReadAndDraw();
if (!canvas()
->GetOrCreateImageBuffer()
->CopyRenderingResultsFromDrawingBuffer(GetDrawingBuffer(),
source_buffer)) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(label, is_tld_ascii);
}
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <cthomp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Color Document::themeColor() const
{
for (HTMLMetaElement* metaElement = head() ? Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::firstChild(*head()) : 0; metaElement; metaElement = Traversal<HTMLMetaElement>::nextSibling(*metaElement)) {
RGBA32 rgb = Color::transparent;
if (equalIgnoringCase(metaElement->name(), "theme-color") && CSSParser::parseColor(rgb, metaElement->content().string().stripWhiteSpace(), true))
return Color(rgb);
}
return Color();
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Extension::State ExtensionPrefs::GetExtensionState(
const std::string& extension_id) const {
const DictionaryValue* extension = GetExtensionPref(extension_id);
if (!extension)
return Extension::ENABLED;
int state = -1;
if (!extension->GetInteger(kPrefState, &state) ||
state < 0 || state >= Extension::NUM_STATES) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Bad or missing pref 'state' for extension '"
<< extension_id << "'";
return Extension::ENABLED;
}
return static_cast<Extension::State>(state);
}
Commit Message: Coverity: Add a missing NULL check.
BUG=none
TEST=none
CID=16813
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7216034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr)
{
struct neigh_table *tbl = &arp_tbl;
static const __be32 inaddr_any = 0;
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
const __be32 *pkey = daddr;
struct neighbour *n;
#if defined(CONFIG_ATM_CLIP) || defined(CONFIG_ATM_CLIP_MODULE)
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ATM)
tbl = clip_tbl_hook;
#endif
if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT))
pkey = &inaddr_any;
n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup(tbl, dev, *(__force u32 *)pkey);
if (n)
return n;
return neigh_create(tbl, pkey, dev);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_getessid(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
struct iw_point *erq,
char *essidbuf)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
int active;
int err = 0;
unsigned long flags;
if (netif_running(dev)) {
err = orinoco_hw_get_essid(priv, &active, essidbuf);
if (err < 0)
return err;
erq->length = err;
} else {
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
memcpy(essidbuf, priv->desired_essid, IW_ESSID_MAX_SIZE);
erq->length = strlen(priv->desired_essid);
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
}
erq->flags = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <comes@naic.edu>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <kilroyd@googlemail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mem_cgroup_sockets_destroy(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
{
struct proto *proto;
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_reverse(proto, &proto_list, node)
if (proto->destroy_cgroup)
proto->destroy_cgroup(memcg);
mutex_unlock(&proto_list_mutex);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
WORD32 max_tile_cols, max_tile_rows;
WORD32 max_ctb_rows, max_ctb_cols;
WORD32 max_num_cu_cols;
WORD32 max_num_cu_rows;
WORD32 max_num_4x4_cols;
WORD32 max_ctb_cnt;
WORD32 wd;
WORD32 ht;
WORD32 i;
WORD32 max_dpb_size;
void *pv_mem_ctxt = ps_codec->pv_mem_ctxt;
void *pv_buf;
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
WORD32 size;
wd = ALIGN64(ps_codec->i4_wd);
ht = ALIGN64(ps_codec->i4_ht);
max_tile_cols = (wd + MIN_TILE_WD - 1) / MIN_TILE_WD;
max_tile_rows = (ht + MIN_TILE_HT - 1) / MIN_TILE_HT;
max_ctb_rows = ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
max_ctb_cols = wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
max_ctb_cnt = max_ctb_rows * max_ctb_cols;
max_num_cu_cols = wd / MIN_CU_SIZE;
max_num_cu_rows = ht / MIN_CU_SIZE;
max_num_4x4_cols = wd / 4;
/* Allocate tile structures */
size = max_tile_cols * max_tile_rows;
size *= sizeof(tile_t);
size *= MAX_PPS_CNT;
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->ps_tile = (tile_t *)pv_buf;
/* Allocate memory to hold entry point offsets */
/* One entry point per tile */
size = max_tile_cols * max_tile_rows;
/* One entry point per row of CTBs */
/*********************************************************************/
/* Only tiles or entropy sync is enabled at a time in main */
/* profile, but since memory required does not increase too much, */
/* this allocation is done to handle both cases */
/*********************************************************************/
size += max_ctb_rows;
size *= sizeof(WORD32);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->pi4_entry_ofst = (WORD32 *)pv_buf;
/* Allocate parse skip flag buffer */
/* 1 bit per 8x8 */
size = max_num_cu_cols / 8;
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->s_parse.pu4_skip_cu_top = (UWORD32 *)pv_buf;
/* Allocate parse coding tree depth buffer */
/* 2 bits per 8x8 */
size = max_num_cu_cols / 4;
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->s_parse.pu4_ct_depth_top = (UWORD32 *)pv_buf;
/* Allocate intra flag buffer */
/* 1 bit per 8x8 */
size = max_num_cu_cols * max_num_cu_rows / 8;
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->pu1_pic_intra_flag = (UWORD8 *)pv_buf;
ps_codec->s_parse.pu1_pic_intra_flag = ps_codec->pu1_pic_intra_flag;
/* Allocate transquant bypass flag buffer */
/* 1 bit per 8x8 */
/* Extra row and column are allocated for easy processing of top and left blocks while loop filtering */
size = ((max_num_cu_cols + 8) * (max_num_cu_rows + 8)) / 8;
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 1, size);
{
WORD32 loop_filter_strd = (wd + 63) >> 6;
ps_codec->pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag_base = pv_buf;
/* The offset is added for easy processing of top and left blocks while loop filtering */
ps_codec->pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag = (UWORD8 *)pv_buf + loop_filter_strd + 1;
ps_codec->s_parse.pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag = ps_codec->pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_deblk_ctxt.pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag = ps_codec->pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag = ps_codec->pu1_pic_no_loop_filter_flag;
}
/* Initialize pointers in PPS structures */
{
pps_t *ps_pps = ps_codec->ps_pps_base;
tile_t *ps_tile = ps_codec->ps_tile;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PPS_CNT; i++)
{
ps_pps->ps_tile = ps_tile;
ps_tile += (max_tile_cols * max_tile_rows);
ps_pps++;
}
}
/* Allocate memory for job queue */
/* One job per row of CTBs */
size = max_ctb_rows;
/* One each tile a row of CTBs, num_jobs has to incremented */
size *= max_tile_cols;
/* One format convert/frame copy job per row of CTBs for non-shared mode*/
size += max_ctb_rows;
size *= sizeof(proc_job_t);
size += ihevcd_jobq_ctxt_size();
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_codec->pv_proc_jobq_buf = pv_buf;
ps_codec->i4_proc_jobq_buf_size = size;
size = max_ctb_cnt;
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->pu1_parse_map = (UWORD8 *)pv_buf;
size = max_ctb_cnt;
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->pu1_proc_map = (UWORD8 *)pv_buf;
/** Holds top and left neighbor's pu idx into picture level pu array */
/* Only one top row is enough but left has to be replicated for each process context */
size = (max_num_4x4_cols /* left */ + MAX_PROCESS_THREADS * (MAX_CTB_SIZE / 4)/* top */ + 1/* top right */) * sizeof(WORD32);
size = ALIGN4(size);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
UWORD32 *pu4_buf = (UWORD32 *)pv_buf;
ps_codec->as_process[i].pu4_pic_pu_idx_left = pu4_buf + i * (MAX_CTB_SIZE / 4);
memset(ps_codec->as_process[i].pu4_pic_pu_idx_left, 0, sizeof(UWORD32) * MAX_CTB_SIZE / 4);
ps_codec->as_process[i].pu4_pic_pu_idx_top = pu4_buf + MAX_PROCESS_THREADS * (MAX_CTB_SIZE / 4);
}
memset(ps_codec->as_process[0].pu4_pic_pu_idx_top, 0, sizeof(UWORD32) * (wd / 4 + 1));
{
/* To hold SAO left buffer for luma */
size = sizeof(UWORD8) * (MAX(ht, wd));
/* To hold SAO left buffer for chroma */
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * (MAX(ht, wd));
/* To hold SAO top buffer for luma */
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * wd;
/* To hold SAO top buffer for chroma */
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * wd;
/* To hold SAO top left luma pixel value for last output ctb in a row*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_rows;
/* To hold SAO top left chroma pixel value last output ctb in a row*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_rows * 2;
/* To hold SAO top left pixel luma for current ctb - column array*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_rows;
/* To hold SAO top left pixel chroma for current ctb-column array*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_rows * 2;
/* To hold SAO top right pixel luma pixel value last output ctb in a row*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_cols;
/* To hold SAO top right pixel chroma pixel value last output ctb in a row*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_cols * 2;
/*To hold SAO botton bottom left pixels for luma*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_rows;
/*To hold SAO botton bottom left pixels for luma*/
size += sizeof(UWORD8) * max_ctb_rows * 2;
size = ALIGN64(size);
pu1_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pu1_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pu1_buf, 0, size);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_left_luma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_left_luma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += MAX(ht, wd);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_left_chroma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_left_chroma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += MAX(ht, wd);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_luma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_luma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += wd;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_chroma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_chroma = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += wd;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_luma_top_left_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_luma_top_left_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_chroma_top_left_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_chroma_top_left_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE) * 2;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_luma_curr_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_luma_curr_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_chroma_curr_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_chroma_curr_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE) * 2;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_luma_top_right = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_luma_top_right = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_chroma_top_right = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_chroma_top_right = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE) * 2;
/*Per CTB, Store 1 value for luma , 2 values for chroma*/
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_luma_bot_left = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_luma_bot_left = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_chroma_bot_left = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.pu1_sao_src_top_left_chroma_bot_left = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += (ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE) * 2;
}
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf = (UWORD8 *)pv_buf;
WORD32 vert_bs_size, horz_bs_size;
WORD32 qp_const_flag_size;
WORD32 qp_size;
WORD32 num_8x8;
/* Max Number of vertical edges */
vert_bs_size = wd / 8 + 2 * MAX_CTB_SIZE / 8;
/* Max Number of horizontal edges - extra MAX_CTB_SIZE / 8 to handle the last 4 rows separately(shifted CTB processing) */
vert_bs_size *= (ht + MAX_CTB_SIZE) / MIN_TU_SIZE;
/* Number of bytes */
vert_bs_size /= 8;
/* Two bits per edge */
vert_bs_size *= 2;
/* Max Number of horizontal edges */
horz_bs_size = ht / 8 + MAX_CTB_SIZE / 8;
/* Max Number of vertical edges - extra MAX_CTB_SIZE / 8 to handle the last 4 columns separately(shifted CTB processing) */
horz_bs_size *= (wd + MAX_CTB_SIZE) / MIN_TU_SIZE;
/* Number of bytes */
horz_bs_size /= 8;
/* Two bits per edge */
horz_bs_size *= 2;
/* Max CTBs in a row */
qp_const_flag_size = wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE + 1 /* The last ctb row deblk is done in last ctb + 1 row.*/;
/* Max CTBs in a column */
qp_const_flag_size *= ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
/* Number of bytes */
qp_const_flag_size /= 8;
/* QP changes at CU level - So store at 8x8 level */
num_8x8 = (ht * wd) / (MIN_CU_SIZE * MIN_CU_SIZE);
qp_size = num_8x8;
/* To hold vertical boundary strength */
size += vert_bs_size;
/* To hold horizontal boundary strength */
size += horz_bs_size;
/* To hold QP */
size += qp_size;
/* To hold QP const in CTB flags */
size += qp_const_flag_size;
pu1_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pu1_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pu1_buf, 0, size);
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_vert_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_vert_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_vert_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += vert_bs_size;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_horz_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_horz_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_horz_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += horz_bs_size;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += qp_size;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp_const_in_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp_const_in_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_deblk_ctxt.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp_const_in_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += qp_const_flag_size;
pu1_buf -= (vert_bs_size + horz_bs_size + qp_size + qp_const_flag_size);
}
ps_codec->s_parse.s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_vert_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += vert_bs_size;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_bs_ctxt.pu4_pic_horz_bs = (UWORD32 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += horz_bs_size;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += qp_size;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp_const_in_ctb = (UWORD8 *)pu1_buf;
pu1_buf += qp_const_flag_size;
}
/* Max CTBs in a row */
size = wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
/* Max CTBs in a column */
size *= (ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE + 2) /* Top row and bottom row extra. This ensures accessing left,top in first row
and right in last row will not result in invalid access*/;
size *= sizeof(UWORD16);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->pu1_tile_idx_base = pv_buf;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].pu1_tile_idx = (UWORD16 *)pv_buf + wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE /* Offset 1 row */;
}
/* 4 bytes per color component per CTB */
size = 3 * 4;
/* MAX number of CTBs in a row */
size *= wd / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
/* MAX number of CTBs in a column */
size *= ht / MIN_CTB_SIZE;
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pic_sao = (sao_t *)pv_buf;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_sao_ctxt.ps_pic_sao = (sao_t *)pv_buf;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].s_sao_ctxt.ps_pic_sao = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pic_sao;
}
/* Only if width * height * 3 / 2 is greater than MIN_BITSBUF_SIZE,
then allocate dynamic bistream buffer */
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic = NULL;
size = wd * ht;
if(size > MIN_BITSBUF_SIZE)
{
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size + 16); //Alloc extra for parse optimization
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic = pv_buf;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic = size;
}
size = ihevcd_get_tu_data_size(wd * ht);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
memset(pv_buf, 0, size);
ps_codec->pv_tu_data = pv_buf;
{
sps_t *ps_sps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + ps_codec->i4_sps_id);
/* Allocate for pu_map, pu_t and pic_pu_idx for each MV bank */
/* Note: Number of luma samples is not max_wd * max_ht here, instead it is
* set to maximum number of luma samples allowed at the given level.
* This is done to ensure that any stream with width and height lesser
* than max_wd and max_ht is supported. Number of buffers required can be greater
* for lower width and heights at a given level and this increased number of buffers
* might require more memory than what max_wd and max_ht buffer would have required
* Also note one extra buffer is allocted to store current pictures MV bank
* In case of asynchronous parsing and processing, number of buffers should increase here
* based on when parsing and processing threads are synchronized
*/
max_dpb_size = ps_sps->ai1_sps_max_dec_pic_buffering[ps_sps->i1_sps_max_sub_layers - 1];
/* Size for holding mv_buf_t for each MV Bank
* One extra MV Bank is needed to hold current pics MV bank.
*/
size = (max_dpb_size + 1) * sizeof(mv_buf_t);
size += (max_dpb_size + 1) *
ihevcd_get_pic_mv_bank_size(wd * ht);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_codec->pv_mv_bank_buf_base = pv_buf;
ps_codec->i4_total_mv_bank_size = size;
}
/* In case of non-shared mode allocate for reference picture buffers */
/* In case of shared and 420p output, allocate for chroma samples */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
{
/* Number of buffers is doubled in order to return one frame at a time instead of sending
* multiple outputs during dpb full case.
* Also note one extra buffer is allocted to store current picture
* In case of asynchronous parsing and processing, number of buffers should increase here
* based on when parsing and processing threads are synchronized
*/
size = ihevcd_get_total_pic_buf_size(ps_codec, wd, ht);
pv_buf = ps_codec->pf_aligned_alloc(pv_mem_ctxt, 128, size);
RETURN_IF((NULL == pv_buf), IV_FAIL);
ps_codec->i4_total_pic_buf_size = size;
ps_codec->pu1_ref_pic_buf_base = (UWORD8 *)pv_buf;
}
ps_codec->pv_proc_jobq = ihevcd_jobq_init(ps_codec->pv_proc_jobq_buf, ps_codec->i4_proc_jobq_buf_size);
RETURN_IF((ps_codec->pv_proc_jobq == NULL), IV_FAIL);
/* Update the jobq context to all the threads */
ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq = ps_codec->pv_proc_jobq;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PROCESS_THREADS; i++)
{
ps_codec->as_process[i].pv_proc_jobq = ps_codec->pv_proc_jobq;
ps_codec->as_process[i].i4_id = i;
ps_codec->as_process[i].ps_codec = ps_codec;
/* Set the following to zero assuming it is a single core solution
* When threads are launched these will be set appropriately
*/
ps_codec->as_process[i].i4_check_parse_status = 0;
ps_codec->as_process[i].i4_check_proc_status = 0;
}
ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done = 1;
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 163,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_details)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
BIO *out;
unsigned int pbio_len;
char *pbio;
long ktype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &key) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pkey, EVP_PKEY *, &key, -1, "OpenSSL key", le_key);
if (!pkey) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
pbio_len = BIO_get_mem_data(out, &pbio);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "bits", EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "key", pbio, pbio_len, 1);
/*TODO: Use the real values once the openssl constants are used
* See the enum at the top of this file
*/
switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA;
if (pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL) {
zval *rsa;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(rsa);
array_init(rsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, d);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, iqmp);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "rsa", rsa);
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA;
if (pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL) {
zval *dsa;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(dsa);
array_init(dsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dsa", dsa);
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH;
if (pkey->pkey.dh != NULL) {
zval *dh;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(dh);
array_init(dh);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dh", dh);
}
break;
#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC;
break;
#endif
default:
ktype = -1;
break;
}
add_assoc_long(return_value, "type", ktype);
BIO_free(out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool append_ptyname(char **pp, char *name)
{
char *p;
if (!*pp) {
*pp = malloc(strlen(name) + strlen("container_ttys=") + 1);
if (!*pp)
return false;
sprintf(*pp, "container_ttys=%s", name);
return true;
}
p = realloc(*pp, strlen(*pp) + strlen(name) + 2);
if (!p)
return false;
*pp = p;
strcat(p, " ");
strcat(p, name);
return true;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct inode * inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
ssize_t length;
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
audit_get_sessionid(task));
put_task_struct(task);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned short lebytes2ushort(const u8 *buf)
{
if (buf == NULL)
return 0U;
return (unsigned short)buf[1] << 8 | (unsigned short)buf[0];
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void transport_attach(rdpTransport* transport, int sockfd)
{
transport->TcpIn->sockfd = sockfd;
transport->SplitInputOutput = FALSE;
transport->TcpOut = transport->TcpIn;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_free_lock_state(struct nfs4_lock_state *lsp)
{
struct nfs_client *clp = lsp->ls_state->owner->so_client;
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
nfs_free_unique_id(&clp->cl_lockowner_id, &lsp->ls_id);
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
rpc_destroy_wait_queue(&lsp->ls_sequence.wait);
kfree(lsp);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint64_t Histogram::name_hash() const {
return samples_->id();
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int multicast_join(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
{
struct ip_mreqn mreq;
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
memset(&mreq, 0, sizeof(mreq));
mreq.imr_address = sin->sin_addr;
mreq.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(MC_SSDP_GROUP);
if (setsockopt(sd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_ADD_MEMBERSHIP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq))) {
if (EADDRINUSE == errno)
return 0;
logit(LOG_ERR, "Failed joining group %s: %s", MC_SSDP_GROUP, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Con_PageDown( void ) {
con.display += 2;
if ( con.display > con.current ) {
con.display = con.current;
}
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GahpClient::dcloud_get_max_name_length( const char *service_url,
const char *username,
const char *password,
int *max_length )
{
static const char* command = "DELTACLOUD_GET_MAX_NAME_LENGTH";
if ( server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase( command ) == FALSE ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( !service_url ) service_url = NULLSTRING;
if ( !username ) username = NULLSTRING;
if ( !password ) password = NULLSTRING;
MyString reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(username) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(password) );
bool x = reqline.sprintf("%s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
ASSERT( x == true );
const char *buf = reqline.Value();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if ( result->argc < 2 || result->argc > 3 ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
} else if ( result->argc == 2 ) {
if ( !strcmp( result->argv[1], NULLSTRING ) ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
error_string = result->argv[1];
rc = 1;
} else {
if ( strcmp( result->argv[1], NULLSTRING ) ) {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
if ( strcmp( result->argv[2], NULLSTRING ) )
*max_length = atoi( result->argv[2] );
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SettingLevelBubbleDelegateView::~SettingLevelBubbleDelegateView() {
view_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct port *find_port_by_vtermno(u32 vtermno)
{
struct port *port;
struct console *cons;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pdrvdata_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(cons, &pdrvdata.consoles, list) {
if (cons->vtermno == vtermno) {
port = container_of(cons, struct port, cons);
goto out;
}
}
port = NULL;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pdrvdata_lock, flags);
return port;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long VideoTrack::GetWidth() const { return m_width; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoPopGroupMarkerEXT(void) {
debug_marker_manager_.PopGroup();
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
allocate_vpid(vmx);
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
vmx->guest_msrs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) * sizeof(vmx->guest_msrs[0])
> PAGE_SIZE);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!vmx->guest_msrs) {
goto uninit_vcpu;
}
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
goto free_msrs;
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id())));
loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
err = vmx_vcpu_setup(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
put_cpu();
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
if (vm_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(kvm)) {
err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (enable_ept) {
if (!kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr)
kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr =
VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);
uninit_vcpu:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
free_vcpu:
free_vpid(vmx);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const cc::LayerTreeDebugState& Compositor::GetLayerTreeDebugState() const {
return host_->GetDebugState();
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *isofs_export_get_parent(struct dentry *child)
{
unsigned long parent_block = 0;
unsigned long parent_offset = 0;
struct inode *child_inode = child->d_inode;
struct iso_inode_info *e_child_inode = ISOFS_I(child_inode);
struct iso_directory_record *de = NULL;
struct buffer_head * bh = NULL;
struct dentry *rv = NULL;
/* "child" must always be a directory. */
if (!S_ISDIR(child_inode->i_mode)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "isofs: isofs_export_get_parent(): "
"child is not a directory!\n");
rv = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
goto out;
}
/* It is an invariant that the directory offset is zero. If
* it is not zero, it means the directory failed to be
* normalized for some reason. */
if (e_child_inode->i_iget5_offset != 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "isofs: isofs_export_get_parent(): "
"child directory not normalized!\n");
rv = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
goto out;
}
/* The child inode has been normalized such that its
* i_iget5_block value points to the "." entry. Fortunately,
* the ".." entry is located in the same block. */
parent_block = e_child_inode->i_iget5_block;
/* Get the block in question. */
bh = sb_bread(child_inode->i_sb, parent_block);
if (bh == NULL) {
rv = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
goto out;
}
/* This is the "." entry. */
de = (struct iso_directory_record*)bh->b_data;
/* The ".." entry is always the second entry. */
parent_offset = (unsigned long)isonum_711(de->length);
de = (struct iso_directory_record*)(bh->b_data + parent_offset);
/* Verify it is in fact the ".." entry. */
if ((isonum_711(de->name_len) != 1) || (de->name[0] != 1)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "isofs: Unable to find the \"..\" "
"directory for NFS.\n");
rv = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
goto out;
}
/* Normalize */
isofs_normalize_block_and_offset(de, &parent_block, &parent_offset);
rv = d_obtain_alias(isofs_iget(child_inode->i_sb, parent_block,
parent_offset));
out:
if (bh)
brelse(bh);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: isofs: avoid info leak on export
For type 1 the parent_offset member in struct isofs_fid gets copied
uninitialized to userland. Fix this by initializing it to 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetCloseOnExec(nacl::Handle fd) {
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD);
CHECK_NE(flags, -1);
int rc = fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags | FD_CLOEXEC);
CHECK_EQ(rc, 0);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_file_open(
struct inode *inode,
struct file *file)
{
if (!(file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE) && i_size_read(inode) > MAX_NON_LFS)
return -EFBIG;
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(XFS_M(inode->i_sb)))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool task_will_free_mem(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
struct task_struct *p;
bool ret = true;
/*
* Skip tasks without mm because it might have passed its exit_mm and
* exit_oom_victim. oom_reaper could have rescued that but do not rely
* on that for now. We can consider find_lock_task_mm in future.
*/
if (!mm)
return false;
if (!__task_will_free_mem(task))
return false;
/*
* This task has already been drained by the oom reaper so there are
* only small chances it will free some more
*/
if (test_bit(MMF_OOM_SKIP, &mm->flags))
return false;
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) <= 1)
return true;
/*
* Make sure that all tasks which share the mm with the given tasks
* are dying as well to make sure that a) nobody pins its mm and
* b) the task is also reapable by the oom reaper.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_process(p) {
if (!process_shares_mm(p, mm))
continue;
if (same_thread_group(task, p))
continue;
ret = __task_will_free_mem(p);
if (!ret)
break;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm, oom_reaper: gather each vma to prevent leaking TLB entry
tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, 0, -1) means gathering the whole virtual memory
space. In this case, tlb->fullmm is true. Some archs like arm64
doesn't flush TLB when tlb->fullmm is true:
commit 5a7862e83000 ("arm64: tlbflush: avoid flushing when fullmm == 1").
Which causes leaking of tlb entries.
Will clarifies his patch:
"Basically, we tag each address space with an ASID (PCID on x86) which
is resident in the TLB. This means we can elide TLB invalidation when
pulling down a full mm because we won't ever assign that ASID to
another mm without doing TLB invalidation elsewhere (which actually
just nukes the whole TLB).
I think that means that we could potentially not fault on a kernel
uaccess, because we could hit in the TLB"
There could be a window between complete_signal() sending IPI to other
cores and all threads sharing this mm are really kicked off from cores.
In this window, the oom reaper may calls tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() to
flush TLB then frees pages. However, due to the above problem, the TLB
entries are not really flushed on arm64. Other threads are possible to
access these pages through TLB entries. Moreover, a copy_to_user() can
also write to these pages without generating page fault, causes
use-after-free bugs.
This patch gathers each vma instead of gathering full vm space. In this
case tlb->fullmm is not true. The behavior of oom reaper become similar
to munmapping before do_exit, which should be safe for all archs.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107095453.179940-1-wangnan0@huawei.com
Fixes: aac453635549 ("mm, oom: introduce oom reaper")
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <liubo95@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_stop_block(struct tg3 *tp, unsigned long ofs, u32 enable_bit, int silent)
{
unsigned int i;
u32 val;
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
switch (ofs) {
case RCVLSC_MODE:
case DMAC_MODE:
case MBFREE_MODE:
case BUFMGR_MODE:
case MEMARB_MODE:
/* We can't enable/disable these bits of the
* 5705/5750, just say success.
*/
return 0;
default:
break;
}
}
val = tr32(ofs);
val &= ~enable_bit;
tw32_f(ofs, val);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_WAIT_CNT; i++) {
udelay(100);
val = tr32(ofs);
if ((val & enable_bit) == 0)
break;
}
if (i == MAX_WAIT_CNT && !silent) {
dev_err(&tp->pdev->dev,
"tg3_stop_block timed out, ofs=%lx enable_bit=%x\n",
ofs, enable_bit);
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AuthenticatorBlePairingBeginSheetModel::IsAcceptButtonEnabled() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sock *x25_find_socket(unsigned int lci, struct x25_neigh *nb)
{
struct sock *s;
read_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
s = __x25_find_socket(lci, nb);
read_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
return s;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiNsValidateHandle (
ACPI_HANDLE Handle)
{
ACPI_FUNCTION_ENTRY ();
/* Parameter validation */
if ((!Handle) || (Handle == ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT))
{
return (AcpiGbl_RootNode);
}
/* We can at least attempt to verify the handle */
if (ACPI_GET_DESCRIPTOR_TYPE (Handle) != ACPI_DESC_TYPE_NAMED)
{
return (NULL);
}
return (ACPI_CAST_PTR (ACPI_NAMESPACE_NODE, Handle));
}
Commit Message: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-755 | 0 | 95,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Stream_ReadShort( FT_Stream stream,
FT_Error* error )
{
FT_Byte reads[2];
FT_Byte* p = 0;
FT_Short result = 0;
FT_ASSERT( stream );
*error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( stream->pos + 1 < stream->size )
{
if ( stream->read )
{
if ( stream->read( stream, stream->pos, reads, 2L ) != 2L )
goto Fail;
p = reads;
}
else
{
p = stream->base + stream->pos;
}
if ( p )
result = FT_NEXT_SHORT( p );
}
else
goto Fail;
stream->pos += 2;
return result;
Fail:
*error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_ReadShort:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, stream->size ));
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err dref_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_DataReferenceBox *ptr = (GF_DataReferenceBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
return gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, dref_AddDataEntry);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::AppendRendererCommandLine(
CommandLine* command_line) const {
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessType,
switches::kRendererProcess);
if (is_guest_)
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kGuestRenderer);
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
PropagateBrowserCommandLineToRenderer(browser_command_line, command_line);
const std::string locale =
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetApplicationLocale();
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kLang, locale);
std::string field_trial_states;
base::FieldTrialList::StatesToString(&field_trial_states);
if (!field_trial_states.empty()) {
command_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kForceFieldTrials,
field_trial_states);
}
GetContentClient()->browser()->AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(
command_line, GetID());
GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
DCHECK(gpu_data_manager);
gpu_data_manager->AppendRendererCommandLine(command_line);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t Camera2Client::calculateBufferSize(int width, int height,
int format, int stride) {
switch (format) {
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_YCbCr_422_SP: // NV16
return width * height * 2;
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_YCrCb_420_SP: // NV21
return width * height * 3 / 2;
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_YCbCr_422_I: // YUY2
return width * height * 2;
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_YV12: { // YV12
size_t ySize = stride * height;
size_t uvStride = (stride / 2 + 0xF) & ~0xF;
size_t uvSize = uvStride * height / 2;
return ySize + uvSize * 2;
}
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB_565:
return width * height * 2;
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_RGBA_8888:
return width * height * 4;
case HAL_PIXEL_FORMAT_RAW_SENSOR:
return width * height * 2;
default:
ALOGE("%s: Unknown preview format: %x",
__FUNCTION__, format);
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void igmp_group_added(struct ip_mc_list *im)
{
struct in_device *in_dev = im->interface;
if (im->loaded == 0) {
im->loaded = 1;
ip_mc_filter_add(in_dev, im->multiaddr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
if (im->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
return;
if (in_dev->dead)
return;
if (IGMP_V1_SEEN(in_dev) || IGMP_V2_SEEN(in_dev)) {
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
igmp_start_timer(im, IGMP_Initial_Report_Delay);
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
return;
}
/* else, v3 */
im->crcount = in_dev->mr_qrv ? in_dev->mr_qrv :
IGMP_Unsolicited_Report_Count;
igmp_ifc_event(in_dev);
#endif
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lazy_stat(struct archive_write_disk *a)
{
if (a->pst != NULL) {
/* Already have stat() data available. */
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
#ifdef HAVE_FSTAT
if (a->fd >= 0 && fstat(a->fd, &a->st) == 0) {
a->pst = &a->st;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
#endif
/*
* XXX At this point, symlinks should not be hit, otherwise
* XXX a race occurred. Do we want to check explicitly for that?
*/
if (lstat(a->name, &a->st) == 0) {
a->pst = &a->st;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno, "Couldn't stat file");
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnSwapOutACKHelper(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
bool timed_out) {
RenderViewHostImpl* rvh = RenderViewHostImpl::FromID(render_process_id,
render_view_id);
if (rvh)
rvh->OnSwapOutACK(timed_out);
}
Commit Message: Revert cross-origin auth prompt blocking.
BUG=174129
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12183030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181113 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct gnttab_copy **gopp)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = *gopp;
u16 pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info = netbk->pending_tx_info;
struct xenvif *vif = pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i, err, start;
/* Check status of header. */
err = gop->status;
if (unlikely(err)) {
pending_ring_idx_t index;
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
txp = &pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
make_tx_response(vif, txp, XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
}
/* Skip first skb fragment if it is on same page as header fragment. */
start = (frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx);
for (i = start; i < nr_frags; i++) {
int j, newerr;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[i]);
/* Check error status: if okay then remember grant handle. */
newerr = (++gop)->status;
if (likely(!newerr)) {
/* Had a previous error? Invalidate this fragment. */
if (unlikely(err))
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
continue;
}
/* Error on this fragment: respond to client with an error. */
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
make_tx_response(vif, txp, XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
/* Not the first error? Preceding frags already invalidated. */
if (err)
continue;
/* First error: invalidate header and preceding fragments. */
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
for (j = start; j < i; j++) {
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[j]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
/* Remember the error: invalidate all subsequent fragments. */
err = newerr;
}
*gopp = gop + 1;
return err;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 34,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_get_principal_keys(void *server_handle /* IN */,
krb5_principal principal /* IN */,
krb5_kvno kvno /* IN */,
kadm5_key_data **key_data_out /* OUT */,
int *n_key_data_out /* OUT */)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
kadm5_ret_t ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
kadm5_key_data *key_data = NULL;
int i, nkeys = 0;
if (principal == NULL || key_data_out == NULL || n_key_data_out == NULL)
return EINVAL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb)))
return(ret);
key_data = calloc(kdb->n_key_data, sizeof(kadm5_key_data));
if (key_data == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
for (i = 0, nkeys = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++) {
if (kvno != 0 && kvno != kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno)
continue;
key_data[nkeys].kvno = kdb->key_data[i].key_data_kvno;
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(handle->context, NULL,
&kdb->key_data[i],
&key_data[nkeys].key,
&key_data[nkeys].salt);
if (ret)
goto done;
nkeys++;
}
*n_key_data_out = nkeys;
*key_data_out = key_data;
key_data = NULL;
nkeys = 0;
ret = KADM5_OK;
done:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
kadm5_free_kadm5_key_data(handle->context, nkeys, key_data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90 | 0 | 84,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintJobWorker::OnDocumentChanged(PrintedDocument* new_document) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
DCHECK_EQ(page_number_, PageNumber::npos());
if (page_number_ != PageNumber::npos())
return;
document_ = new_document;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnMemoryDetailCollectionDone() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(waiting_for_collect_final_metrics_step_);
base::Closure callback = base::Bind(
&ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnHistogramSynchronizationDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
base::TimeDelta timeout =
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kMaxHistogramGatheringWaitDuration);
DCHECK_EQ(num_async_histogram_fetches_in_progress_, 0);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW) && !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
num_async_histogram_fetches_in_progress_ = 3;
if (!ServiceProcessControl::GetInstance()->GetHistograms(callback, timeout)) {
DCHECK_EQ(num_async_histogram_fetches_in_progress_, 3);
--num_async_histogram_fetches_in_progress_;
}
#else
num_async_histogram_fetches_in_progress_ = 2;
#endif
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReply(
FROM_HERE, {content::BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(&base::StatisticsRecorder::ImportProvidedHistograms),
callback);
content::FetchHistogramsAsynchronously(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
callback, timeout);
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void skb_set_owner_w(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
{
skb_orphan(skb);
skb->sk = sk;
#ifdef CONFIG_INET
if (unlikely(!sk_fullsock(sk))) {
skb->destructor = sock_edemux;
sock_hold(sk);
return;
}
#endif
skb->destructor = sock_wfree;
skb_set_hash_from_sk(skb, sk);
/*
* We used to take a refcount on sk, but following operation
* is enough to guarantee sk_free() wont free this sock until
* all in-flight packets are completed
*/
atomic_add(skb->truesize, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 47,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawAffineImage(Image *image,
const Image *source,const AffineMatrix *affine)
{
AffineMatrix
inverse_affine;
CacheView
*image_view,
*source_view;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
zero;
PointInfo
extent[4],
min,
max,
point;
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
edge;
ssize_t
start,
stop,
y;
/*
Determine bounding box.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(source != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(source->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(affine != (AffineMatrix *) NULL);
extent[0].x=0.0;
extent[0].y=0.0;
extent[1].x=(double) source->columns-1.0;
extent[1].y=0.0;
extent[2].x=(double) source->columns-1.0;
extent[2].y=(double) source->rows-1.0;
extent[3].x=0.0;
extent[3].y=(double) source->rows-1.0;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
{
point=extent[i];
extent[i].x=point.x*affine->sx+point.y*affine->ry+affine->tx;
extent[i].y=point.x*affine->rx+point.y*affine->sy+affine->ty;
}
min=extent[0];
max=extent[0];
for (i=1; i < 4; i++)
{
if (min.x > extent[i].x)
min.x=extent[i].x;
if (min.y > extent[i].y)
min.y=extent[i].y;
if (max.x < extent[i].x)
max.x=extent[i].x;
if (max.y < extent[i].y)
max.y=extent[i].y;
}
/*
Affine transform image.
*/
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
status=MagickTrue;
edge.x1=MagickMax(min.x,0.0);
edge.y1=MagickMax(min.y,0.0);
edge.x2=MagickMin(max.x,(double) image->columns-1.0);
edge.y2=MagickMin(max.y,(double) image->rows-1.0);
inverse_affine=InverseAffineMatrix(affine);
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&zero);
exception=(&image->exception);
start=(ssize_t) ceil(edge.y1-0.5);
stop=(ssize_t) floor(edge.y2+0.5);
source_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(source,exception);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(source,image,1,1)
#endif
for (y=start; y <= stop; y++)
{
MagickPixelPacket
composite,
pixel;
PointInfo
point;
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
SegmentInfo
inverse_edge;
ssize_t
x_offset;
inverse_edge=AffineEdge(source,&inverse_affine,(double) y,&edge);
if (inverse_edge.x2 < inverse_edge.x1)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,(ssize_t) ceil(inverse_edge.x1-
0.5),y,(size_t) (floor(inverse_edge.x2+0.5)-ceil(inverse_edge.x1-0.5)+1),
1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
indexes=GetCacheViewAuthenticIndexQueue(image_view);
pixel=zero;
composite=zero;
x_offset=0;
for (x=(ssize_t) ceil(inverse_edge.x1-0.5); x <= (ssize_t) floor(inverse_edge.x2+0.5); x++)
{
point.x=(double) x*inverse_affine.sx+y*inverse_affine.ry+
inverse_affine.tx;
point.y=(double) x*inverse_affine.rx+y*inverse_affine.sy+
inverse_affine.ty;
(void) InterpolateMagickPixelPacket(source,source_view,
UndefinedInterpolatePixel,point.x,point.y,&pixel,exception);
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,q,indexes+x_offset,&composite);
MagickPixelCompositeOver(&pixel,pixel.opacity,&composite,
composite.opacity,&composite);
SetPixelPacket(image,&composite,q,indexes+x_offset);
x_offset++;
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
source_view=DestroyCacheView(source_view);
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extract_job_on_error (AutoarExtractor *extractor,
GError *error,
gpointer user_data)
{
ExtractJob *extract_job = user_data;
GFile *source_file;
gint response_id;
source_file = autoar_extractor_get_source_file (extractor);
if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, NOT_SUPPORTED))
{
handle_unsupported_compressed_file (extract_job->common.parent_window,
source_file);
return;
}
nautilus_progress_info_take_status (extract_job->common.progress,
f (_("Error extracting “%B”"),
source_file));
response_id = run_warning ((CommonJob *) extract_job,
f (_("There was an error while extracting “%B”."),
source_file),
g_strdup (error->message),
NULL,
FALSE,
CANCEL,
SKIP,
NULL);
if (response_id == 0 || response_id == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job ((CommonJob *) extract_job);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lxc_attach(const char* name, const char* lxcpath, lxc_attach_exec_t exec_function, void* exec_payload, lxc_attach_options_t* options, pid_t* attached_process)
{
int ret, status;
pid_t init_pid, pid, attached_pid, expected;
struct lxc_proc_context_info *init_ctx;
char* cwd;
char* new_cwd;
int ipc_sockets[2];
int procfd;
signed long personality;
if (!options)
options = &attach_static_default_options;
init_pid = lxc_cmd_get_init_pid(name, lxcpath);
if (init_pid < 0) {
ERROR("failed to get the init pid");
return -1;
}
init_ctx = lxc_proc_get_context_info(init_pid);
if (!init_ctx) {
ERROR("failed to get context of the init process, pid = %ld", (long)init_pid);
return -1;
}
personality = get_personality(name, lxcpath);
if (init_ctx->personality < 0) {
ERROR("Failed to get personality of the container");
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
init_ctx->personality = personality;
init_ctx->container = lxc_container_new(name, lxcpath);
if (!init_ctx->container)
return -1;
if (!fetch_seccomp(init_ctx->container, options))
WARN("Failed to get seccomp policy");
if (!no_new_privs(init_ctx->container, options))
WARN("Could not determine whether PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is set.");
cwd = getcwd(NULL, 0);
/* determine which namespaces the container was created with
* by asking lxc-start, if necessary
*/
if (options->namespaces == -1) {
options->namespaces = lxc_cmd_get_clone_flags(name, lxcpath);
/* call failed */
if (options->namespaces == -1) {
ERROR("failed to automatically determine the "
"namespaces which the container unshared");
free(cwd);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
}
/* create a socket pair for IPC communication; set SOCK_CLOEXEC in order
* to make sure we don't irritate other threads that want to fork+exec away
*
* IMPORTANT: if the initial process is multithreaded and another call
* just fork()s away without exec'ing directly after, the socket fd will
* exist in the forked process from the other thread and any close() in
* our own child process will not really cause the socket to close properly,
* potentiall causing the parent to hang.
*
* For this reason, while IPC is still active, we have to use shutdown()
* if the child exits prematurely in order to signal that the socket
* is closed and cannot assume that the child exiting will automatically
* do that.
*
* IPC mechanism: (X is receiver)
* initial process intermediate attached
* X <--- send pid of
* attached proc,
* then exit
* send 0 ------------------------------------> X
* [do initialization]
* X <------------------------------------ send 1
* [add to cgroup, ...]
* send 2 ------------------------------------> X
* close socket close socket
* run program
*/
ret = socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, ipc_sockets);
if (ret < 0) {
SYSERROR("could not set up required IPC mechanism for attaching");
free(cwd);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
/* create intermediate subprocess, three reasons:
* 1. runs all pthread_atfork handlers and the
* child will no longer be threaded
* (we can't properly setns() in a threaded process)
* 2. we can't setns() in the child itself, since
* we want to make sure we are properly attached to
* the pidns
* 3. also, the initial thread has to put the attached
* process into the cgroup, which we can only do if
* we didn't already setns() (otherwise, user
* namespaces will hate us)
*/
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to create first subprocess");
free(cwd);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
if (pid) {
pid_t to_cleanup_pid = pid;
/* initial thread, we close the socket that is for the
* subprocesses
*/
close(ipc_sockets[1]);
free(cwd);
/* attach to cgroup, if requested */
if (options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_MOVE_TO_CGROUP) {
if (!cgroup_attach(name, lxcpath, pid))
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* Let the child process know to go ahead */
status = 0;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify attached process for initialization (0)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* get pid from intermediate process */
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_sockets[0], &attached_pid, sizeof(attached_pid), NULL);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (ret != 0)
ERROR("error using IPC to receive pid of attached process");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* ignore SIGKILL (CTRL-C) and SIGQUIT (CTRL-\) - issue #313 */
if (options->stdin_fd == 0) {
signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN);
}
/* reap intermediate process */
ret = wait_for_pid(pid);
if (ret < 0)
goto cleanup_error;
/* we will always have to reap the grandchild now */
to_cleanup_pid = attached_pid;
/* tell attached process it may start initializing */
status = 0;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify attached process for initialization (0)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* wait for the attached process to finish initializing */
expected = 1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (ret != 0)
ERROR("error using IPC to receive notification from attached process (1)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* tell attached process we're done */
status = 2;
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[0], &status, sizeof(status));
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error using IPC to notify attached process for initialization (2)");
goto cleanup_error;
}
/* now shut down communication with child, we're done */
shutdown(ipc_sockets[0], SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_sockets[0]);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
/* we're done, the child process should now execute whatever
* it is that the user requested. The parent can now track it
* with waitpid() or similar.
*/
*attached_process = attached_pid;
return 0;
cleanup_error:
/* first shut down the socket, then wait for the pid,
* otherwise the pid we're waiting for may never exit
*/
shutdown(ipc_sockets[0], SHUT_RDWR);
close(ipc_sockets[0]);
if (to_cleanup_pid)
(void) wait_for_pid(to_cleanup_pid);
lxc_proc_put_context_info(init_ctx);
return -1;
}
/* first subprocess begins here, we close the socket that is for the
* initial thread
*/
close(ipc_sockets[0]);
/* Wait for the parent to have setup cgroups */
expected = 0;
status = -1;
ret = lxc_read_nointr_expect(ipc_sockets[1], &status, sizeof(status), &expected);
if (ret <= 0) {
ERROR("error communicating with child process");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
if ((options->attach_flags & LXC_ATTACH_MOVE_TO_CGROUP) && cgns_supported())
options->namespaces |= CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
procfd = open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY);
if (procfd < 0) {
SYSERROR("Unable to open /proc");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* attach now, create another subprocess later, since pid namespaces
* only really affect the children of the current process
*/
ret = lxc_attach_to_ns(init_pid, options->namespaces);
if (ret < 0) {
ERROR("failed to enter the namespace");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* attach succeeded, try to cwd */
if (options->initial_cwd)
new_cwd = options->initial_cwd;
else
new_cwd = cwd;
ret = chdir(new_cwd);
if (ret < 0)
WARN("could not change directory to '%s'", new_cwd);
free(cwd);
/* now create the real child process */
{
struct attach_clone_payload payload = {
.ipc_socket = ipc_sockets[1],
.options = options,
.init_ctx = init_ctx,
.exec_function = exec_function,
.exec_payload = exec_payload,
.procfd = procfd
};
/* We use clone_parent here to make this subprocess a direct child of
* the initial process. Then this intermediate process can exit and
* the parent can directly track the attached process.
*/
pid = lxc_clone(attach_child_main, &payload, CLONE_PARENT);
}
/* shouldn't happen, clone() should always return positive pid */
if (pid <= 0) {
SYSERROR("failed to create subprocess");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* tell grandparent the pid of the pid of the newly created child */
ret = lxc_write_nointr(ipc_sockets[1], &pid, sizeof(pid));
if (ret != sizeof(pid)) {
/* if this really happens here, this is very unfortunate, since the
* parent will not know the pid of the attached process and will
* not be able to wait for it (and we won't either due to CLONE_PARENT)
* so the parent won't be able to reap it and the attached process
* will remain a zombie
*/
ERROR("error using IPC to notify main process of pid of the attached process");
shutdown(ipc_sockets[1], SHUT_RDWR);
rexit(-1);
}
/* the rest is in the hands of the initial and the attached process */
rexit(0);
}
Commit Message: attach: do not send procfd to attached process
So far, we opened a file descriptor refering to proc on the host inside the
host namespace and handed that fd to the attached process in
attach_child_main(). This was done to ensure that LSM labels were correctly
setup. However, by exploiting a potential kernel bug, ptrace could be used to
prevent the file descriptor from being closed which in turn could be used by an
unprivileged container to gain access to the host namespace. Aside from this
needing an upstream kernel fix, we should make sure that we don't pass the fd
for proc itself to the attached process. However, we cannot completely prevent
this, as the attached process needs to be able to change its apparmor profile
by writing to /proc/self/attr/exec or /proc/self/attr/current. To minimize the
attack surface, we only send the fd for /proc/self/attr/exec or
/proc/self/attr/current to the attached process. To do this we introduce a
little more IPC between the child and parent:
* IPC mechanism: (X is receiver)
* initial process intermediate attached
* X <--- send pid of
* attached proc,
* then exit
* send 0 ------------------------------------> X
* [do initialization]
* X <------------------------------------ send 1
* [add to cgroup, ...]
* send 2 ------------------------------------> X
* [set LXC_ATTACH_NO_NEW_PRIVS]
* X <------------------------------------ send 3
* [open LSM label fd]
* send 4 ------------------------------------> X
* [set LSM label]
* close socket close socket
* run program
The attached child tells the parent when it is ready to have its LSM labels set
up. The parent then opens an approriate fd for the child PID to
/proc/<pid>/attr/exec or /proc/<pid>/attr/current and sends it via SCM_RIGHTS
to the child. The child can then set its LSM laben. Both sides then close the
socket fds and the child execs the requested process.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 168,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: php_apache_sapi_get_stat(TSRMLS_D)
{
php_struct *ctx = SG(server_context);
ctx->finfo.st_uid = ctx->r->finfo.user;
ctx->finfo.st_gid = ctx->r->finfo.group;
ctx->finfo.st_dev = ctx->r->finfo.device;
ctx->finfo.st_ino = ctx->r->finfo.inode;
#if defined(NETWARE) && defined(CLIB_STAT_PATCH)
ctx->finfo.st_atime.tv_sec = apr_time_sec(ctx->r->finfo.atime);
ctx->finfo.st_mtime.tv_sec = apr_time_sec(ctx->r->finfo.mtime);
ctx->finfo.st_ctime.tv_sec = apr_time_sec(ctx->r->finfo.ctime);
#else
ctx->finfo.st_atime = apr_time_sec(ctx->r->finfo.atime);
ctx->finfo.st_mtime = apr_time_sec(ctx->r->finfo.mtime);
ctx->finfo.st_ctime = apr_time_sec(ctx->r->finfo.ctime);
#endif
ctx->finfo.st_size = ctx->r->finfo.size;
ctx->finfo.st_nlink = ctx->r->finfo.nlink;
return &ctx->finfo;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderThreadStarted() {
chrome_observer_.reset(new ChromeRenderProcessObserver());
extension_dispatcher_.reset(new ExtensionDispatcher());
histogram_snapshots_.reset(new RendererHistogramSnapshots());
net_predictor_.reset(new RendererNetPredictor());
spellcheck_.reset(new SpellCheck());
visited_link_slave_.reset(new VisitedLinkSlave());
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
phishing_classifier_.reset(safe_browsing::PhishingClassifierFilter::Create());
#endif
RenderThread* thread = RenderThread::current();
thread->AddFilter(new DevToolsAgentFilter());
thread->AddObserver(chrome_observer_.get());
thread->AddObserver(extension_dispatcher_.get());
thread->AddObserver(histogram_snapshots_.get());
#if defined(ENABLE_SAFE_BROWSING)
thread->AddObserver(phishing_classifier_.get());
#endif
thread->AddObserver(spellcheck_.get());
thread->AddObserver(visited_link_slave_.get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::ExternalExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::LoadTimesExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::SearchBoxExtension::Get());
v8::Extension* search_extension = extensions_v8::SearchExtension::Get();
if (search_extension)
thread->RegisterExtension(search_extension);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
thread->RegisterExtension(DomAutomationV8Extension::Get());
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableIPCFuzzing)) {
thread->channel()->set_outgoing_message_filter(LoadExternalIPCFuzzer());
}
WebString chrome_ui_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeUIScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(chrome_ui_scheme);
WebString dev_tools_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(dev_tools_scheme);
WebString internal_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeInternalScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(internal_scheme);
WebString extension_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSecure(extension_scheme);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::Home(WindowOpenDisposition disposition) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Home"), profile_);
OpenURL(GetHomePage(), GURL(), disposition, PageTransition::AUTO_BOOKMARK);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StreamPredictor::~StreamPredictor() {
gfree(predLine);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LauncherView::GetOverflowItems(std::vector<LauncherItem>* items) {
int index = 0;
while (index < view_model_->view_size() &&
view_model_->view_at(index)->visible()) {
index++;
}
while (index < view_model_->view_size()) {
const LauncherItem& item = model_->items()[index];
if (item.type == TYPE_TABBED ||
item.type == TYPE_APP_PANEL ||
item.type == TYPE_APP_SHORTCUT)
items->push_back(item);
index++;
}
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_files (CopyMoveJob *job,
const char *dest_fs_id,
SourceInfo *source_info,
TransferInfo *transfer_info)
{
CommonJob *common;
GList *l;
GFile *src;
gboolean same_fs;
int i;
GdkPoint *point;
gboolean skipped_file;
gboolean unique_names;
GFile *dest;
GFile *source_dir;
char *dest_fs_type;
GFileInfo *inf;
gboolean readonly_source_fs;
dest_fs_type = NULL;
readonly_source_fs = FALSE;
common = &job->common;
report_copy_progress (job, source_info, transfer_info);
/* Query the source dir, not the file because if it's a symlink we'll follow it */
source_dir = g_file_get_parent ((GFile *) job->files->data);
if (source_dir)
{
inf = g_file_query_filesystem_info (source_dir, "filesystem::readonly", NULL, NULL);
if (inf != NULL)
{
readonly_source_fs = g_file_info_get_attribute_boolean (inf, "filesystem::readonly");
g_object_unref (inf);
}
g_object_unref (source_dir);
}
unique_names = (job->destination == NULL);
i = 0;
for (l = job->files;
l != NULL && !job_aborted (common);
l = l->next)
{
src = l->data;
if (i < job->n_icon_positions)
{
point = &job->icon_positions[i];
}
else
{
point = NULL;
}
same_fs = FALSE;
if (dest_fs_id)
{
same_fs = has_fs_id (src, dest_fs_id);
}
if (job->destination)
{
dest = g_object_ref (job->destination);
}
else
{
dest = g_file_get_parent (src);
}
if (dest)
{
skipped_file = FALSE;
copy_move_file (job, src, dest,
same_fs, unique_names,
&dest_fs_type,
source_info, transfer_info,
job->debuting_files,
point, FALSE, &skipped_file,
readonly_source_fs);
g_object_unref (dest);
if (skipped_file)
{
transfer_add_file_to_count (src, common, transfer_info);
report_copy_progress (job, source_info, transfer_info);
}
}
i++;
}
g_free (dest_fs_type);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int skcipher_walk_next(struct skcipher_walk *walk)
{
unsigned int bsize;
unsigned int n;
int err;
walk->flags &= ~(SKCIPHER_WALK_SLOW | SKCIPHER_WALK_COPY |
SKCIPHER_WALK_DIFF);
n = walk->total;
bsize = min(walk->stride, max(n, walk->blocksize));
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk->in, n);
n = scatterwalk_clamp(&walk->out, n);
if (unlikely(n < bsize)) {
if (unlikely(walk->total < walk->blocksize))
return skcipher_walk_done(walk, -EINVAL);
slow_path:
err = skcipher_next_slow(walk, bsize);
goto set_phys_lowmem;
}
if (unlikely((walk->in.offset | walk->out.offset) & walk->alignmask)) {
if (!walk->page) {
gfp_t gfp = skcipher_walk_gfp(walk);
walk->page = (void *)__get_free_page(gfp);
if (!walk->page)
goto slow_path;
}
walk->nbytes = min_t(unsigned, n,
PAGE_SIZE - offset_in_page(walk->page));
walk->flags |= SKCIPHER_WALK_COPY;
err = skcipher_next_copy(walk);
goto set_phys_lowmem;
}
walk->nbytes = n;
return skcipher_next_fast(walk);
set_phys_lowmem:
if (!err && (walk->flags & SKCIPHER_WALK_PHYS)) {
walk->src.phys.page = virt_to_page(walk->src.virt.addr);
walk->dst.phys.page = virt_to_page(walk->dst.virt.addr);
walk->src.phys.offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
walk->dst.phys.offset &= PAGE_SIZE - 1;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2Decoder::GLES2Decoder()
: initialized_(false),
debug_(false),
log_commands_(false) {
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void daemonize(void) {
int fd;
if (fork() != 0) exit(0); /* parent exits */
setsid(); /* create a new session */
/* Every output goes to /dev/null. If Redis is daemonized but
* the 'logfile' is set to 'stdout' in the configuration file
* it will not log at all. */
if ((fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > STDERR_FILENO) close(fd);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::willSendSubmitEvent(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebFormElement& form) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderFrameObserver, observers_, WillSendSubmitEvent(form));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageFormAnalyserLogger::Send(std::string message,
ConsoleLevel level,
std::vector<blink::WebNode> nodes) {
node_buffer_[level].push_back(LogEntry{std::move(message), std::move(nodes)});
}
Commit Message: [AF] Prevent Logging Password Values to Console
Before sending over to be logged by DevTools, filter out DOM nodes that
have a type attribute equal to "password", and that are not empty.
Bug: 934609
Change-Id: I147ad0c2bad13cc50394f4b5ff2f4bfb7293114b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1506498
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Lalancette <seblalancette@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#638615}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 130,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsMotionEvent(XEvent* event) {
int type = event->type;
if (type == GenericEvent)
type = event->xgeneric.evtype;
return type == MotionNotify;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *sctp_v6_create_accept_sk(struct sock *sk,
struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sctp6_sock *newsctp6sk;
newsk = sk_alloc(sock_net(sk), PF_INET6, GFP_KERNEL, sk->sk_prot);
if (!newsk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(NULL, newsk);
sctp_copy_sock(newsk, sk, asoc);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
newsctp6sk = (struct sctp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newsctp6sk->inet6;
sctp_sk(newsk)->v4mapped = sctp_sk(sk)->v4mapped;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
/* Initialize sk's sport, dport, rcv_saddr and daddr for getsockname()
* and getpeername().
*/
sctp_v6_to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, newsk);
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(newsk);
if (newsk->sk_prot->init(newsk)) {
sk_common_release(newsk);
newsk = NULL;
}
out:
return newsk;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 29,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_CORE_DECLARE(conn_rec *) ap_create_slave_connection(conn_rec *c)
{
apr_pool_t *pool;
conn_slave_rec *new;
conn_rec *sc = (conn_rec *) apr_palloc(c->pool, sizeof(conn_rec));
apr_pool_create(&pool, c->pool);
apr_pool_tag(pool, "slave_conn");
memcpy(sc, c, sizeof(conn_rec));
sc->slaves = NULL;
sc->master = c;
sc->input_filters = NULL;
sc->output_filters = NULL;
sc->pool = pool;
new = apr_array_push(c->slaves);
new->c = sc;
return sc;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hns_gmac_get_stats(void *mac_drv, u64 *data)
{
u32 i;
u64 *buf = data;
struct mac_driver *drv = (struct mac_driver *)mac_drv;
struct mac_hw_stats *hw_stats = NULL;
hw_stats = &drv->mac_cb->hw_stats;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string); i++) {
buf[i] = DSAF_STATS_READ(hw_stats,
g_gmac_stats_string[i].offset);
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Location::href(USVStringOrTrustedURL& result) const {
result.SetUSVString(Url().StrippedForUseAsHref());
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_network(Bridge *br) {
assert(br);
if (br->macvlan == 0) // for bridge devices check network range or arp-scan and assign address
net_configure_sandbox_ip(br);
else if (br->ipsandbox) { // for macvlan check network range
char *rv = in_netrange(br->ipsandbox, br->ip, br->mask);
if (rv) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s", rv);
exit(1);
}
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDestroyStreamTextureCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size,
const gles2::DestroyStreamTextureCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint client_id = c.texture;
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfo(client_id);
if (info && info->IsStreamTexture()) {
if (!stream_texture_manager_)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
stream_texture_manager_->DestroyStreamTexture(info->service_id());
info->SetStreamTexture(false);
texture_manager()->SetInfoTarget(info, 0);
} else {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"glDestroyStreamTextureCHROMIUM: bad texture id.");
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nx842_crypto_compress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
struct nx842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct nx842_crypto_header *hdr;
unsigned int tmp_len = *dlen;
size_t lzodlen; /* needed for lzo */
int err;
*dlen = 0;
hdr = (struct nx842_crypto_header *)dst;
hdr->sentinel = NX842_SENTINEL; /* debug */
dst += sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
tmp_len -= sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
lzodlen = tmp_len;
if (likely(!nx842_uselzo)) {
err = nx842_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx->nx842_wmem);
if (likely(!err)) {
hdr->type = NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_842;
*dlen = tmp_len + sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
return 0;
}
/* hardware failed */
nx842_uselzo = 1;
/* set timer to check for hardware again in 1 second */
mod_timer(&failover_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(1000));
}
/* no hardware, use lzo */
err = lzo1x_1_compress(src, slen, dst, &lzodlen, ctx->nx842_wmem);
if (err != LZO_E_OK)
return -EINVAL;
hdr->type = NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_LZO;
*dlen = lzodlen + sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *dst_reg;
bool known = tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off);
s64 smin_val = off_reg->smin_value, smax_val = off_reg->smax_value,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
dst_reg = ®s[dst];
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (smin_val != smax_val))) {
print_verifier_state(env, env->cur_state);
verbose(env,
"verifier internal error: known but bad sbounds\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(known && (umin_val != umax_val))) {
print_verifier_state(env, env->cur_state);
verbose(env,
"verifier internal error: known but bad ubounds\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops on pointers produce (meaningless) scalars */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env,
"R%d 32-bit pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL prohibited, null-check it first\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on CONST_PTR_TO_MAP prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET_END) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_PACKET_END prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* In case of 'scalar += pointer', dst_reg inherits pointer type and id.
* The id may be overwritten later if we create a new variable offset.
*/
dst_reg->type = ptr_reg->type;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
*/
if (known && (ptr_reg->off + smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off + smin_val))) {
/* pointer += K. Accumulate it into fixed offset */
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off + smin_val;
dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. Note that off_reg->off
* == 0, since it's a scalar.
* dst_reg gets the pointer type and since some positive
* integer value was added to the pointer, give it a new 'id'
* if it's a PTR_TO_PACKET.
* this creates a new 'base' pointer, off_reg (variable) gets
* added into the variable offset, and we copy the fixed offset
* from ptr_reg.
*/
if (signed_add_overflows(smin_ptr, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(smax_ptr, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr + smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr + smax_val;
}
if (umin_ptr + umin_val < umin_ptr ||
umax_ptr + umax_val < umax_ptr) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr + umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr + umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
/* We don't allow subtraction from FP, because (according to
* test_verifier.c test "invalid fp arithmetic", JITs might not
* be able to deal with it.
*/
if (ptr_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d subtraction from stack pointer prohibited\n",
dst);
return -EACCES;
}
if (known && (ptr_reg->off - smin_val ==
(s64)(s32)(ptr_reg->off - smin_val))) {
/* pointer -= K. Subtract it from fixed offset */
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr;
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr;
dst_reg->var_off = ptr_reg->var_off;
dst_reg->id = ptr_reg->id;
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off - smin_val;
dst_reg->range = ptr_reg->range;
break;
}
/* A new variable offset is created. If the subtrahend is known
* nonnegative, then any reg->range we had before is still good.
*/
if (signed_sub_overflows(smin_ptr, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(smax_ptr, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = smin_ptr - smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value = smax_ptr - smin_val;
}
if (umin_ptr < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value = umin_ptr - umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value = umax_ptr - umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(ptr_reg->var_off, off_reg->var_off);
dst_reg->off = ptr_reg->off;
if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(ptr_reg)) {
dst_reg->id = ++env->id_gen;
/* something was added to pkt_ptr, set range to zero */
if (smin_val < 0)
dst_reg->range = 0;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
case BPF_OR:
case BPF_XOR:
/* bitwise ops on pointers are troublesome, prohibit for now.
* (However, in principle we could allow some cases, e.g.
* ptr &= ~3 which would reduce min_value by 3.)
*/
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d bitwise operator %s on pointer prohibited\n",
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
default:
/* other operators (e.g. MUL,LSH) produce non-pointer results */
if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks)
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic with %s operator prohibited\n",
dst, bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
}
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int regulator_count_voltages(struct regulator *regulator)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = regulator->rdev;
if (rdev->desc->n_voltages)
return rdev->desc->n_voltages;
if (!rdev->supply)
return -EINVAL;
return regulator_count_voltages(rdev->supply);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: auth_popup_close(AuthData *auth_data)
{
ewk_auth_request_unref(auth_data->request);
evas_object_del(auth_data->popup);
free(auth_data);
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_try_move_page(struct fuse_copy_state *cs, struct page **pagep)
{
int err;
struct page *oldpage = *pagep;
struct page *newpage;
struct pipe_buffer *buf = cs->pipebufs;
struct address_space *mapping;
pgoff_t index;
unlock_request(cs->fc, cs->req);
fuse_copy_finish(cs);
err = buf->ops->confirm(cs->pipe, buf);
if (err)
return err;
BUG_ON(!cs->nr_segs);
cs->currbuf = buf;
cs->len = buf->len;
cs->pipebufs++;
cs->nr_segs--;
if (cs->len != PAGE_SIZE)
goto out_fallback;
if (buf->ops->steal(cs->pipe, buf) != 0)
goto out_fallback;
newpage = buf->page;
if (WARN_ON(!PageUptodate(newpage)))
return -EIO;
ClearPageMappedToDisk(newpage);
if (fuse_check_page(newpage) != 0)
goto out_fallback_unlock;
mapping = oldpage->mapping;
index = oldpage->index;
/*
* This is a new and locked page, it shouldn't be mapped or
* have any special flags on it
*/
if (WARN_ON(page_mapped(oldpage)))
goto out_fallback_unlock;
if (WARN_ON(page_has_private(oldpage)))
goto out_fallback_unlock;
if (WARN_ON(PageDirty(oldpage) || PageWriteback(oldpage)))
goto out_fallback_unlock;
if (WARN_ON(PageMlocked(oldpage)))
goto out_fallback_unlock;
err = replace_page_cache_page(oldpage, newpage, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err) {
unlock_page(newpage);
return err;
}
page_cache_get(newpage);
if (!(buf->flags & PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LRU))
lru_cache_add_file(newpage);
err = 0;
spin_lock(&cs->fc->lock);
if (cs->req->aborted)
err = -ENOENT;
else
*pagep = newpage;
spin_unlock(&cs->fc->lock);
if (err) {
unlock_page(newpage);
page_cache_release(newpage);
return err;
}
unlock_page(oldpage);
page_cache_release(oldpage);
cs->len = 0;
return 0;
out_fallback_unlock:
unlock_page(newpage);
out_fallback:
cs->mapaddr = buf->ops->map(cs->pipe, buf, 1);
cs->buf = cs->mapaddr + buf->offset;
err = lock_request(cs->fc, cs->req);
if (err)
return err;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline unsigned int rfcomm_room(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc)
{
/* We can't let it be zero, because we don't get a callback
when tx_credits becomes nonzero, hence we'd never wake up */
return dlc->mtu * (dlc->tx_credits?:1);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_get_service_list_mutable(smartlist_t* substitute_service_list)
{
if (substitute_service_list) {
return substitute_service_list;
}
/* If no special service list is provided, then just use the global one. */
if (BUG(!rend_service_list)) {
/* No global HS list, which is a programmer error. */
return NULL;
}
return rend_service_list;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sideband_progress_pkt(git_pkt **out, const char *line, size_t len)
{
git_pkt_progress *pkt;
size_t alloclen;
line++;
len--;
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, sizeof(git_pkt_progress), len);
pkt = git__malloc(alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(pkt);
pkt->type = GIT_PKT_PROGRESS;
pkt->len = (int) len;
memcpy(pkt->data, line, len);
*out = (git_pkt *) pkt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 71,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CCLayerTreeHost::setNeedsCommitThenRedraw()
{
if (m_settings.enableCompositorThread) {
TRACE_EVENT("CCLayerTreeHost::setNeedsRedraw", this, 0);
m_proxy->setNeedsCommitThenRedraw();
} else
m_client->scheduleComposite();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_last_closed_stateid(struct nfs4_openowner *oo)
{
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(oo->oo_owner.so_client->net,
nfsd_net_id);
struct nfs4_ol_stateid *s;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
s = oo->oo_last_closed_stid;
if (s) {
list_del_init(&oo->oo_close_lru);
oo->oo_last_closed_stid = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
if (s)
nfs4_put_stid(&s->st_stid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unlink1(struct usbtest_dev *dev, int pipe, int size, int async)
{
struct urb *urb;
struct completion completion;
int retval = 0;
init_completion(&completion);
urb = simple_alloc_urb(testdev_to_usbdev(dev), pipe, size, 0);
if (!urb)
return -ENOMEM;
urb->context = &completion;
urb->complete = unlink1_callback;
if (usb_pipeout(urb->pipe)) {
simple_fill_buf(urb);
urb->transfer_flags |= URB_ZERO_PACKET;
}
/* keep the endpoint busy. there are lots of hc/hcd-internal
* states, and testing should get to all of them over time.
*
* FIXME want additional tests for when endpoint is STALLing
* due to errors, or is just NAKing requests.
*/
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (retval != 0) {
dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "submit fail %d\n", retval);
return retval;
}
/* unlinking that should always work. variable delay tests more
* hcd states and code paths, even with little other system load.
*/
msleep(jiffies % (2 * INTERRUPT_RATE));
if (async) {
while (!completion_done(&completion)) {
retval = usb_unlink_urb(urb);
if (retval == 0 && usb_pipein(urb->pipe))
retval = simple_check_buf(dev, urb);
switch (retval) {
case -EBUSY:
case -EIDRM:
/* we can't unlink urbs while they're completing
* or if they've completed, and we haven't
* resubmitted. "normal" drivers would prevent
* resubmission, but since we're testing unlink
* paths, we can't.
*/
ERROR(dev, "unlink retry\n");
continue;
case 0:
case -EINPROGRESS:
break;
default:
dev_err(&dev->intf->dev,
"unlink fail %d\n", retval);
return retval;
}
break;
}
} else
usb_kill_urb(urb);
wait_for_completion(&completion);
retval = urb->status;
simple_free_urb(urb);
if (async)
return (retval == -ECONNRESET) ? 0 : retval - 1000;
else
return (retval == -ENOENT || retval == -EPERM) ?
0 : retval - 2000;
}
Commit Message: usb: usbtest: fix NULL pointer dereference
If the usbtest driver encounters a device with an IN bulk endpoint but
no OUT bulk endpoint, it will try to dereference a NULL pointer
(out->desc.bEndpointAddress). The problem can be solved by adding a
missing test.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_mq_kick_requeue_list(struct request_queue *q)
{
kblockd_schedule_work(&q->requeue_work);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum s_alloc __visit_domain_allocation_hell(struct s_data *d,
const struct cpumask *cpu_map)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->domainspan, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_none;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->covered, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_domainspan;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->notcovered, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_covered;
/* Allocate the per-node list of sched groups */
d->sched_group_nodes = kcalloc(nr_node_ids,
sizeof(struct sched_group *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!d->sched_group_nodes) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Can not alloc sched group node list\n");
return sa_notcovered;
}
sched_group_nodes_bycpu[cpumask_first(cpu_map)] = d->sched_group_nodes;
#endif
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->nodemask, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_sched_group_nodes;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->this_sibling_map, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_nodemask;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->this_core_map, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_this_sibling_map;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->this_book_map, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_this_core_map;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->send_covered, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_this_book_map;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&d->tmpmask, GFP_KERNEL))
return sa_send_covered;
d->rd = alloc_rootdomain();
if (!d->rd) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "Cannot alloc root domain\n");
return sa_tmpmask;
}
return sa_rootdomain;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::removedFrom(ContainerNode* insertionPoint) {
if (m_hasElementsAssociatedByParser) {
Node& root = NodeTraversal::highestAncestorOrSelf(*this);
if (!m_associatedElementsAreDirty) {
FormAssociatedElement::List elements(associatedElements());
notifyFormRemovedFromTree(elements, root);
} else {
FormAssociatedElement::List elements;
collectAssociatedElements(
NodeTraversal::highestAncestorOrSelf(*insertionPoint), elements);
notifyFormRemovedFromTree(elements, root);
collectAssociatedElements(root, elements);
notifyFormRemovedFromTree(elements, root);
}
if (!m_imageElementsAreDirty) {
HeapVector<Member<HTMLImageElement>> images(imageElements());
notifyFormRemovedFromTree(images, root);
} else {
HeapVector<Member<HTMLImageElement>> images;
collectImageElements(
NodeTraversal::highestAncestorOrSelf(*insertionPoint), images);
notifyFormRemovedFromTree(images, root);
collectImageElements(root, images);
notifyFormRemovedFromTree(images, root);
}
}
document().formController().willDeleteForm(this);
HTMLElement::removedFrom(insertionPoint);
}
Commit Message: Enforce form-action CSP even when form.target is present.
BUG=630332
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2464123004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#429922}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 142,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acpi_os_sleep(u64 ms)
{
msleep(ms);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sector_t dm_get_size(struct mapped_device *md)
{
return get_capacity(md->disk);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sha256_transform(u32 *state, const u8 *input)
{
u32 a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, t1, t2;
u32 W[64];
int i;
/* load the input */
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
LOAD_OP(i, W, input);
/* now blend */
for (i = 16; i < 64; i++)
BLEND_OP(i, W);
/* load the state into our registers */
a=state[0]; b=state[1]; c=state[2]; d=state[3];
e=state[4]; f=state[5]; g=state[6]; h=state[7];
/* now iterate */
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0x428a2f98 + W[ 0];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0x71374491 + W[ 1];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0xb5c0fbcf + W[ 2];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0xe9b5dba5 + W[ 3];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0x3956c25b + W[ 4];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0x59f111f1 + W[ 5];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0x923f82a4 + W[ 6];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0xab1c5ed5 + W[ 7];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0xd807aa98 + W[ 8];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0x12835b01 + W[ 9];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0x243185be + W[10];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0x550c7dc3 + W[11];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0x72be5d74 + W[12];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0x80deb1fe + W[13];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0x9bdc06a7 + W[14];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0xc19bf174 + W[15];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0xe49b69c1 + W[16];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0xefbe4786 + W[17];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0x0fc19dc6 + W[18];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0x240ca1cc + W[19];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0x2de92c6f + W[20];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0x4a7484aa + W[21];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0x5cb0a9dc + W[22];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0x76f988da + W[23];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0x983e5152 + W[24];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0xa831c66d + W[25];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0xb00327c8 + W[26];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0xbf597fc7 + W[27];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0xc6e00bf3 + W[28];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0xd5a79147 + W[29];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0x06ca6351 + W[30];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0x14292967 + W[31];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0x27b70a85 + W[32];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0x2e1b2138 + W[33];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0x4d2c6dfc + W[34];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0x53380d13 + W[35];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0x650a7354 + W[36];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0x766a0abb + W[37];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0x81c2c92e + W[38];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0x92722c85 + W[39];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0xa2bfe8a1 + W[40];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0xa81a664b + W[41];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0xc24b8b70 + W[42];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0xc76c51a3 + W[43];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0xd192e819 + W[44];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0xd6990624 + W[45];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0xf40e3585 + W[46];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0x106aa070 + W[47];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0x19a4c116 + W[48];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0x1e376c08 + W[49];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0x2748774c + W[50];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0x34b0bcb5 + W[51];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0x391c0cb3 + W[52];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0x4ed8aa4a + W[53];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0x5b9cca4f + W[54];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0x682e6ff3 + W[55];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
t1 = h + e1(e) + Ch(e,f,g) + 0x748f82ee + W[56];
t2 = e0(a) + Maj(a,b,c); d+=t1; h=t1+t2;
t1 = g + e1(d) + Ch(d,e,f) + 0x78a5636f + W[57];
t2 = e0(h) + Maj(h,a,b); c+=t1; g=t1+t2;
t1 = f + e1(c) + Ch(c,d,e) + 0x84c87814 + W[58];
t2 = e0(g) + Maj(g,h,a); b+=t1; f=t1+t2;
t1 = e + e1(b) + Ch(b,c,d) + 0x8cc70208 + W[59];
t2 = e0(f) + Maj(f,g,h); a+=t1; e=t1+t2;
t1 = d + e1(a) + Ch(a,b,c) + 0x90befffa + W[60];
t2 = e0(e) + Maj(e,f,g); h+=t1; d=t1+t2;
t1 = c + e1(h) + Ch(h,a,b) + 0xa4506ceb + W[61];
t2 = e0(d) + Maj(d,e,f); g+=t1; c=t1+t2;
t1 = b + e1(g) + Ch(g,h,a) + 0xbef9a3f7 + W[62];
t2 = e0(c) + Maj(c,d,e); f+=t1; b=t1+t2;
t1 = a + e1(f) + Ch(f,g,h) + 0xc67178f2 + W[63];
t2 = e0(b) + Maj(b,c,d); e+=t1; a=t1+t2;
state[0] += a; state[1] += b; state[2] += c; state[3] += d;
state[4] += e; state[5] += f; state[6] += g; state[7] += h;
/* clear any sensitive info... */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = t1 = t2 = 0;
memzero_explicit(W, 64 * sizeof(u32));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_alg_agility_kdf(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *secret,
krb5_data *alg_oid,
krb5_const_principal party_u_info,
krb5_const_principal party_v_info,
krb5_enctype enctype,
krb5_data *as_req,
krb5_data *pk_as_rep,
krb5_keyblock *key_block)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
unsigned int reps = 0;
uint32_t counter = 1; /* Does this type work on Windows? */
size_t offset = 0;
size_t hash_len = 0;
size_t rand_len = 0;
size_t key_len = 0;
krb5_data random_data;
krb5_sp80056a_other_info other_info_fields;
krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info supp_pub_info_fields;
krb5_data *other_info = NULL;
krb5_data *supp_pub_info = NULL;
krb5_algorithm_identifier alg_id;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EVP_MD *(*EVP_func)(void);
/* initialize random_data here to make clean-up safe */
random_data.length = 0;
random_data.data = NULL;
/* allocate and initialize the key block */
key_block->magic = 0;
key_block->enctype = enctype;
if (0 != (retval = krb5_c_keylengths(context, enctype, &rand_len,
&key_len)))
goto cleanup;
random_data.length = rand_len;
key_block->length = key_len;
if (NULL == (key_block->contents = malloc(key_block->length))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
memset (key_block->contents, 0, key_block->length);
/* If this is anonymous pkinit, use the anonymous principle for party_u_info */
if (party_u_info && krb5_principal_compare_any_realm(context, party_u_info,
krb5_anonymous_principal()))
party_u_info = (krb5_principal)krb5_anonymous_principal();
if (0 != (retval = pkinit_alg_values(context, alg_oid, &hash_len, &EVP_func)))
goto cleanup;
/* 1. reps = keydatalen (K) / hash length (H) */
reps = key_block->length/hash_len;
/* ... and round up, if necessary */
if (key_block->length > (reps * hash_len))
reps++;
/* Allocate enough space in the random data buffer to hash directly into
* it, even if the last hash will make it bigger than the key length. */
if (NULL == (random_data.data = malloc(reps * hash_len))) {
retval = ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the ASN.1 octet string for "SuppPubInfo" */
supp_pub_info_fields.enctype = enctype;
supp_pub_info_fields.as_req = *as_req;
supp_pub_info_fields.pk_as_rep = *pk_as_rep;
if (0 != ((retval = encode_krb5_pkinit_supp_pub_info(&supp_pub_info_fields,
&supp_pub_info))))
goto cleanup;
/* Now encode the ASN.1 octet string for "OtherInfo" */
memset(&alg_id, 0, sizeof alg_id);
alg_id.algorithm = *alg_oid; /*alias*/
other_info_fields.algorithm_identifier = alg_id;
other_info_fields.party_u_info = (krb5_principal) party_u_info;
other_info_fields.party_v_info = (krb5_principal) party_v_info;
other_info_fields.supp_pub_info = *supp_pub_info;
if (0 != (retval = encode_krb5_sp80056a_other_info(&other_info_fields, &other_info)))
goto cleanup;
/* 2. Initialize a 32-bit, big-endian bit string counter as 1.
* 3. For i = 1 to reps by 1, do the following:
* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo).
* - Increment counter (modulo 2^32)
*/
for (counter = 1; counter <= reps; counter++) {
uint s = 0;
uint32_t be_counter = htonl(counter);
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* - Compute Hashi = H(counter || Z || OtherInfo). */
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx, EVP_func())) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestInit() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, &be_counter, 4) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, secret->data, secret->length) ||
!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other_info->data, other_info->length)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* 4. Set key = Hash1 || Hash2 || ... so that length of key is K bytes. */
if (!EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, (uint8_t *)random_data.data + offset, &s)) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL,
"Call to OpenSSL EVP_DigestUpdate() returned an error.");
retval = KRB5_CRYPTO_INTERNAL;
goto cleanup;
}
offset += s;
assert(s == hash_len);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
retval = krb5_c_random_to_key(context, enctype, &random_data,
key_block);
cleanup:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
/* If this has been an error, free the allocated key_block, if any */
if (retval) {
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, key_block);
}
/* free other allocated resources, either way */
if (random_data.data)
free(random_data.data);
krb5_free_data(context, other_info);
krb5_free_data(context, supp_pub_info);
return retval;
} /*pkinit_alg_agility_kdf() */
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
{
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/*
* if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
* permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
* then we don't care.
*/
if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
(u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
error("This private key will be ignored.");
return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: use sshbuf_allocate() to pre-allocate the buffer used for loading
keys. This avoids implicit realloc inside the buffer code, which
might theoretically leave fragments of the key on the heap. This
doesn't appear to happen in practice for normal sized keys, but
was observed for novelty oversize ones.
Pointed out by Jann Horn of Project Zero; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 72,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionServiceBackend::OnLoadSingleExtension(
const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension, bool prompt_for_plugins) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (frontend_.get())
frontend_->OnLoadSingleExtension(extension, prompt_for_plugins);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptd_blkcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct cryptd_blkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->child);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_vmx_check_io_bitmap_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
return 0;
if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->io_bitmap_a) ||
!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->io_bitmap_b))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 62,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: media::ResolutionChangePolicy>::ToMojom(media::ResolutionChangePolicy
input) {
switch (input) {
case media::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_RESOLUTION:
return media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_RESOLUTION;
case media::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_ASPECT_RATIO:
return media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_ASPECT_RATIO;
case media::ResolutionChangePolicy::ANY_WITHIN_LIMIT:
return media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::ANY_WITHIN_LIMIT;
}
NOTREACHED();
return media::mojom::ResolutionChangePolicy::FIXED_RESOLUTION;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <henryhsu@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 140,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int create_history_entry(krb5_context context,
krb5_keyblock *hist_key, int n_key_data,
krb5_key_data *key_data, osa_pw_hist_ent *hist_out)
{
int i;
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
krb5_keyblock key;
krb5_keysalt salt;
krb5_ui_2 kvno;
osa_pw_hist_ent hist;
hist_out->key_data = NULL;
hist_out->n_key_data = 0;
if (n_key_data < 0)
return EINVAL;
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
memset(&hist, 0, sizeof(hist));
if (n_key_data == 0)
goto cleanup;
hist.key_data = k5calloc(n_key_data, sizeof(krb5_key_data), &ret);
if (hist.key_data == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* We only want to store the most recent kvno, and key_data should already
* be sorted in descending order by kvno. */
kvno = key_data[0].key_data_kvno;
for (i = 0; i < n_key_data; i++) {
if (key_data[i].key_data_kvno < kvno)
break;
ret = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL,
&key_data[i], &key,
&salt);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
ret = krb5_dbe_encrypt_key_data(context, hist_key, &key, &salt,
key_data[i].key_data_kvno,
&hist.key_data[hist.n_key_data]);
if (ret)
goto cleanup;
hist.n_key_data++;
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
/* krb5_free_keysalt(context, &salt); */
}
*hist_out = hist;
hist.n_key_data = 0;
hist.key_data = NULL;
cleanup:
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
free_history_entry(context, &hist);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90 | 0 | 84,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncSocket::Close() {
if (handle_ == kInvalidHandle)
return true;
const BOOL result = CloseHandle(handle_);
handle_ = kInvalidHandle;
return result == TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HB_Error HB_GPOS_Clear_Features( HB_GPOSHeader* gpos )
{
HB_UShort i;
HB_UInt* properties;
if ( !gpos )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
gpos->FeatureList.ApplyCount = 0;
properties = gpos->LookupList.Properties;
for ( i = 0; i < gpos->LookupList.LookupCount; i++ )
properties[i] = 0;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tty_register_driver(struct tty_driver *driver)
{
int error;
int i;
dev_t dev;
struct device *d;
if (!driver->major) {
error = alloc_chrdev_region(&dev, driver->minor_start,
driver->num, driver->name);
if (!error) {
driver->major = MAJOR(dev);
driver->minor_start = MINOR(dev);
}
} else {
dev = MKDEV(driver->major, driver->minor_start);
error = register_chrdev_region(dev, driver->num, driver->name);
}
if (error < 0)
goto err;
if (driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_ALLOC) {
error = tty_cdev_add(driver, dev, 0, driver->num);
if (error)
goto err_unreg_char;
}
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
list_add(&driver->tty_drivers, &tty_drivers);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
if (!(driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_DEV)) {
for (i = 0; i < driver->num; i++) {
d = tty_register_device(driver, i, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(d)) {
error = PTR_ERR(d);
goto err_unreg_devs;
}
}
}
proc_tty_register_driver(driver);
driver->flags |= TTY_DRIVER_INSTALLED;
return 0;
err_unreg_devs:
for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
tty_unregister_device(driver, i);
mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
list_del(&driver->tty_drivers);
mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
err_unreg_char:
unregister_chrdev_region(dev, driver->num);
err:
return error;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunTwoGetTwoGetUserMediaWithDifferentContraints(
const std::string& constraints1,
const std::string& constraints2,
const std::string& expected_result) {
ASSERT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->InitializeAndWaitUntilReady());
GURL url(embedded_test_server()->GetURL("/media/getusermedia.html"));
NavigateToURL(shell(), url);
std::string command = "twoGetUserMedia(" + constraints1 + ',' +
constraints2 + ')';
EXPECT_EQ(expected_result, ExecuteJavascriptAndReturnResult(command));
}
Commit Message: Add tests for closing a frame within the scope of a getusermedia callback.
BUG=472617, 474370
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1073783003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#324633}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,383 |
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