instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sock_release(struct socket *sock)
{
if (sock->ops) {
struct module *owner = sock->ops->owner;
sock->ops->release(sock);
sock->ops = NULL;
module_put(owner);
}
if (rcu_dereference_protected(sock->wq, 1)->fasync_list)
printk(KERN_ERR "sock_release: fasync list not empty!\n");
percpu_sub(sockets_in_use, 1);
if (!sock->file) {
iput(SOCK_INODE(sock));
return;
}
sock->file = NULL;
}
Commit Message: sendmmsg/sendmsg: fix unsafe user pointer access
Dereferencing a user pointer directly from kernel-space without going
through the copy_from_user family of functions is a bad idea. Two of
such usages can be found in the sendmsg code path called from sendmmsg,
added by
commit c71d8ebe7a4496fb7231151cb70a6baa0cb56f9a upstream.
commit 5b47b8038f183b44d2d8ff1c7d11a5c1be706b34 in the 3.0-stable tree.
Usages are performed through memcmp() and memcpy() directly. Fix those
by using the already copied msg_sys structure instead of the __user *msg
structure. Note that msg_sys can be set to NULL by verify_compat_iovec()
or verify_iovec(), which requires additional NULL pointer checks.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
CC: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
CC: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool xml_tracking_changes(xmlNode * xml)
{
if(xml == NULL) {
return FALSE;
} else if(is_set(((xml_private_t *)xml->doc->_private)->flags, xpf_tracking)) {
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnAudioStreamAdded() {
++audio_stream_count_;
UpdateProcessPriority();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void impeg2d_next_code(dec_state_t *ps_dec, UWORD32 u4_start_code_val)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_stream);
while ((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != u4_start_code_val)
&& (ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset <= ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset))
{
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8) != 0)
{
/* Ignore stuffing bit errors. */
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 173,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: addrs_in_same_network_family(const tor_addr_t *a1,
const tor_addr_t *a2)
{
return 0 == tor_addr_compare_masked(a1, a2, 16, CMP_SEMANTIC);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void git_index_snapshot_release(git_vector *snap, git_index *index)
{
git_vector_free(snap);
git_atomic_dec(&index->readers);
git_index_free(index);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bdev_i_callback(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct inode *inode = container_of(head, struct inode, i_rcu);
struct bdev_inode *bdi = BDEV_I(inode);
kmem_cache_free(bdev_cachep, bdi);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpacts_pull(struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
size_t ofs;
ofs = ofpacts->size;
ofpbuf_pull(ofpacts, ofs);
return ofs;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IOSurfaceGpuMemoryBuffer* FromClientBuffer(ClientBuffer buffer) {
return reinterpret_cast<IOSurfaceGpuMemoryBuffer*>(buffer);
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MetricsWebContentsObserver::TestingObserver::~TestingObserver() {
if (observer_) {
observer_->RemoveTestingObserver(this);
observer_ = nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <sullivan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <bmcquade@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 140,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_exchange_id(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred,
u32 sp4_how)
{
nfs4_verifier verifier;
struct nfs41_exchange_id_args args = {
.verifier = &verifier,
.client = clp,
#ifdef CONFIG_NFS_V4_1_MIGRATION
.flags = EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER |
EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID |
EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_MIGR,
#else
.flags = EXCHGID4_FLAG_SUPP_MOVED_REFER |
EXCHGID4_FLAG_BIND_PRINC_STATEID,
#endif
};
struct nfs41_exchange_id_res res = {
0
};
int status;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_EXCHANGE_ID],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
nfs4_init_boot_verifier(clp, &verifier);
status = nfs4_init_uniform_client_string(clp);
if (status)
goto out;
dprintk("NFS call exchange_id auth=%s, '%s'\n",
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_auth->au_ops->au_name,
clp->cl_owner_id);
res.server_owner = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs41_server_owner),
GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(res.server_owner == NULL)) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
res.server_scope = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs41_server_scope),
GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(res.server_scope == NULL)) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out_server_owner;
}
res.impl_id = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfs41_impl_id), GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(res.impl_id == NULL)) {
status = -ENOMEM;
goto out_server_scope;
}
switch (sp4_how) {
case SP4_NONE:
args.state_protect.how = SP4_NONE;
break;
case SP4_MACH_CRED:
args.state_protect = nfs4_sp4_mach_cred_request;
break;
default:
/* unsupported! */
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
status = -EINVAL;
goto out_impl_id;
}
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
trace_nfs4_exchange_id(clp, status);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_check_cl_exchange_flags(res.flags);
if (status == 0)
status = nfs4_sp4_select_mode(clp, &res.state_protect);
if (status == 0) {
clp->cl_clientid = res.clientid;
clp->cl_exchange_flags = res.flags;
/* Client ID is not confirmed */
if (!(res.flags & EXCHGID4_FLAG_CONFIRMED_R)) {
clear_bit(NFS4_SESSION_ESTABLISHED,
&clp->cl_session->session_state);
clp->cl_seqid = res.seqid;
}
kfree(clp->cl_serverowner);
clp->cl_serverowner = res.server_owner;
res.server_owner = NULL;
/* use the most recent implementation id */
kfree(clp->cl_implid);
clp->cl_implid = res.impl_id;
res.impl_id = NULL;
if (clp->cl_serverscope != NULL &&
!nfs41_same_server_scope(clp->cl_serverscope,
res.server_scope)) {
dprintk("%s: server_scope mismatch detected\n",
__func__);
set_bit(NFS4CLNT_SERVER_SCOPE_MISMATCH, &clp->cl_state);
kfree(clp->cl_serverscope);
clp->cl_serverscope = NULL;
}
if (clp->cl_serverscope == NULL) {
clp->cl_serverscope = res.server_scope;
res.server_scope = NULL;
}
}
out_impl_id:
kfree(res.impl_id);
out_server_scope:
kfree(res.server_scope);
out_server_owner:
kfree(res.server_owner);
out:
if (clp->cl_implid != NULL)
dprintk("NFS reply exchange_id: Server Implementation ID: "
"domain: %s, name: %s, date: %llu,%u\n",
clp->cl_implid->domain, clp->cl_implid->name,
clp->cl_implid->date.seconds,
clp->cl_implid->date.nseconds);
dprintk("NFS reply exchange_id: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteCMYKImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
ssize_t
count,
y;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Allocate memory for pixels.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image_info->interlace != PartitionInterlace)
{
/*
Open output image file.
*/
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
}
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"CMYKA") == 0)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Convert MIFF to CMYK raster pixels.
*/
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"CMYKA") == 0) &&
(image->matte == MagickFalse))
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,ResetAlphaChannel);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
/*
No interlacing: CMYKCMYKCMYKCMYKCMYKCMYK...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case LineInterlace:
{
/*
Line interlacing: CCC...MMM...YYY...KKK...CCC...MMM...YYY...KKK...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
if (quantum_type == CMYKAQuantum)
{
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: CCCCCC...MMMMMM...YYYYYY...KKKKKK...
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,1,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,2,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,3,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,4,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (quantum_type == CMYKAQuantum)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,5,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image_info->interlace == PartitionInterlace)
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,6,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Partition interlacing: CCCCCC..., MMMMMM..., YYYYYY..., KKKKKK...
*/
AppendImageFormat("C",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,1,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("M",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,2,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Y",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,3,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("K",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,4,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (quantum_type == CMYKAQuantum)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("A",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,scene == 0 ? WriteBinaryBlobMode :
AppendBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,5,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,6,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void create_trace_options_dir(struct trace_array *tr)
{
struct dentry *t_options;
bool top_level = tr == &global_trace;
int i;
t_options = trace_options_init_dentry(tr);
if (!t_options)
return;
for (i = 0; trace_options[i]; i++) {
if (top_level ||
!((1 << i) & TOP_LEVEL_TRACE_FLAGS))
create_trace_option_core_file(tr, trace_options[i], i);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fips_expand_key_bits(BYTE* in, BYTE* out)
{
BYTE buf[21], c;
int i, b, p, r;
/* reverse every byte in the key */
for (i = 0; i < 21; i++)
buf[i] = fips_reverse_table[in[i]];
/* insert a zero-bit after every 7th bit */
for (i = 0, b = 0; i < 24; i++, b += 7)
{
p = b / 8;
r = b % 8;
if (r == 0)
{
out[i] = buf[p] & 0xfe;
}
else
{
/* c is accumulator */
c = buf[p] << r;
c |= buf[p + 1] >> (8 - r);
out[i] = c & 0xfe;
}
}
/* reverse every byte */
/* alter lsb so the byte has odd parity */
for (i = 0; i < 24; i++)
out[i] = fips_oddparity_table[fips_reverse_table[out[i]]];
}
Commit Message: security: add a NULL pointer check to fix a server crash.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CredentialManagerImpl::SendCredential(
const SendCredentialCallback& send_callback,
const CredentialInfo& info) {
DCHECK(pending_request_);
DCHECK(send_callback.Equals(pending_request_->send_callback()));
if (password_manager_util::IsLoggingActive(client_)) {
CredentialManagerLogger(client_->GetLogManager())
.LogSendCredential(GetLastCommittedURL(), info.type);
}
send_callback.Run(info);
pending_request_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 155,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "activityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setActivityLoggingAccessForAllWorldsLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_compress_usingDict(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
const void* src, size_t srcSize,
const void* dict, size_t dictSize,
int compressionLevel)
{
ZSTD_parameters const params = ZSTD_getParams(compressionLevel, srcSize + (!srcSize), dict ? dictSize : 0);
ZSTD_CCtx_params cctxParams = ZSTD_assignParamsToCCtxParams(cctx->requestedParams, params);
assert(params.fParams.contentSizeFlag == 1);
return ZSTD_compress_advanced_internal(cctx, dst, dstCapacity, src, srcSize, dict, dictSize, cctxParams);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetWebView(WebView* web_view) {
web_view_ = static_cast<WebViewImpl*>(web_view);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doContent(XML_Parser parser, int startTagLevel, const ENCODING *enc,
const char *s, const char *end, const char **nextPtr,
XML_Bool haveMore) {
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
*eventPP = s;
for (;;) {
const char *next = s; /* XmlContentTok doesn't always set the last arg */
int tok = XmlContentTok(enc, s, end, &next);
*eventEndPP = next;
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_TRAILING_CR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
*eventEndPP = end;
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, end);
/* We are at the end of the final buffer, should we check for
XML_SUSPENDED, XML_FINISHED?
*/
if (startTagLevel == 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
*nextPtr = end;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
if (startTagLevel > 0) {
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_ENTITY_REF: {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
XML_Char ch = (XML_Char)XmlPredefinedEntityName(
enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (ch) {
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &ch, 1);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* First, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity or default handler.
*/
if (! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs || dtd->standalone) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal)
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE;
} else if (! entity) {
if (parser->m_skippedEntityHandler)
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 0);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
if (! parser->m_defaultExpandInternalEntities) {
if (parser->m_skippedEntityHandler)
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, entity->name,
0);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
} else if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
const XML_Char *context;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
context = getContext(parser);
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
if (! context)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, context, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
case XML_TOK_START_TAG_NO_ATTS:
/* fall through */
case XML_TOK_START_TAG_WITH_ATTS: {
TAG *tag;
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Char *toPtr;
if (parser->m_freeTagList) {
tag = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = parser->m_freeTagList->parent;
} else {
tag = (TAG *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(TAG));
if (! tag)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
tag->buf = (char *)MALLOC(parser, INIT_TAG_BUF_SIZE);
if (! tag->buf) {
FREE(parser, tag);
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
tag->bufEnd = tag->buf + INIT_TAG_BUF_SIZE;
}
tag->bindings = NULL;
tag->parent = parser->m_tagStack;
parser->m_tagStack = tag;
tag->name.localPart = NULL;
tag->name.prefix = NULL;
tag->rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar;
tag->rawNameLength = XmlNameLength(enc, tag->rawName);
++parser->m_tagLevel;
{
const char *rawNameEnd = tag->rawName + tag->rawNameLength;
const char *fromPtr = tag->rawName;
toPtr = (XML_Char *)tag->buf;
for (;;) {
int bufSize;
int convLen;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res
= XmlConvert(enc, &fromPtr, rawNameEnd, (ICHAR **)&toPtr,
(ICHAR *)tag->bufEnd - 1);
convLen = (int)(toPtr - (XML_Char *)tag->buf);
if ((fromPtr >= rawNameEnd)
|| (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE)) {
tag->name.strLen = convLen;
break;
}
bufSize = (int)(tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) << 1;
{
char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize);
if (temp == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
tag->buf = temp;
tag->bufEnd = temp + bufSize;
toPtr = (XML_Char *)temp + convLen;
}
}
}
tag->name.str = (XML_Char *)tag->buf;
*toPtr = XML_T('\0');
result = storeAtts(parser, enc, s, &(tag->name), &(tag->bindings));
if (result)
return result;
if (parser->m_startElementHandler)
parser->m_startElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, tag->name.str,
(const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
}
case XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_NO_ATTS:
/* fall through */
case XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_WITH_ATTS: {
const char *rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar;
enum XML_Error result;
BINDING *bindings = NULL;
XML_Bool noElmHandlers = XML_TRUE;
TAG_NAME name;
name.str = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, rawName,
rawName + XmlNameLength(enc, rawName));
if (! name.str)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
result = storeAtts(parser, enc, s, &name, &bindings);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE) {
freeBindings(parser, bindings);
return result;
}
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (parser->m_startElementHandler) {
parser->m_startElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name.str,
(const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts);
noElmHandlers = XML_FALSE;
}
if (parser->m_endElementHandler) {
if (parser->m_startElementHandler)
*eventPP = *eventEndPP;
parser->m_endElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name.str);
noElmHandlers = XML_FALSE;
}
if (noElmHandlers && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
freeBindings(parser, bindings);
}
if ((parser->m_tagLevel == 0)
&& (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_FINISHED)) {
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
parser->m_processor = epilogProcessor;
else
return epilogProcessor(parser, next, end, nextPtr);
}
break;
case XML_TOK_END_TAG:
if (parser->m_tagLevel == startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
else {
int len;
const char *rawName;
TAG *tag = parser->m_tagStack;
parser->m_tagStack = tag->parent;
tag->parent = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = tag;
rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar * 2;
len = XmlNameLength(enc, rawName);
if (len != tag->rawNameLength
|| memcmp(tag->rawName, rawName, len) != 0) {
*eventPP = rawName;
return XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH;
}
--parser->m_tagLevel;
if (parser->m_endElementHandler) {
const XML_Char *localPart;
const XML_Char *prefix;
XML_Char *uri;
localPart = tag->name.localPart;
if (parser->m_ns && localPart) {
/* localPart and prefix may have been overwritten in
tag->name.str, since this points to the binding->uri
buffer which gets re-used; so we have to add them again
*/
uri = (XML_Char *)tag->name.str + tag->name.uriLen;
/* don't need to check for space - already done in storeAtts() */
while (*localPart)
*uri++ = *localPart++;
prefix = (XML_Char *)tag->name.prefix;
if (parser->m_ns_triplets && prefix) {
*uri++ = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
while (*prefix)
*uri++ = *prefix++;
}
*uri = XML_T('\0');
}
parser->m_endElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, tag->name.str);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
while (tag->bindings) {
BINDING *b = tag->bindings;
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg,
b->prefix->name);
tag->bindings = tag->bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
if ((parser->m_tagLevel == 0)
&& (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_FINISHED)) {
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
parser->m_processor = epilogProcessor;
else
return epilogProcessor(parser, next, end, nextPtr);
}
}
break;
case XML_TOK_CHAR_REF: {
int n = XmlCharRefNumber(enc, s);
if (n < 0)
return XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF;
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char buf[XML_ENCODE_MAX];
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, buf,
XmlEncode(n, (ICHAR *)buf));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
} break;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
case XML_TOK_DATA_NEWLINE:
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
case XML_TOK_CDATA_SECT_OPEN: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler)
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
/* BEGIN disabled code */
/* Suppose you doing a transformation on a document that involves
changing only the character data. You set up a defaultHandler
and a characterDataHandler. The defaultHandler simply copies
characters through. The characterDataHandler does the
transformation and writes the characters out escaping them as
necessary. This case will fail to work if we leave out the
following two lines (because & and < inside CDATA sections will
be incorrectly escaped).
However, now we have a start/endCdataSectionHandler, so it seems
easier to let the user deal with this.
*/
else if (0 && parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
0);
/* END disabled code */
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
result = doCdataSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = cdataSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
case XML_TOK_TRAILING_RSQB:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
XmlConvert(enc, &s, end, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
parser->m_characterDataHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
} else
parser->m_characterDataHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, (XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)end - (XML_Char *)s));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, end);
/* We are at the end of the final buffer, should we check for
XML_SUSPENDED, XML_FINISHED?
*/
if (startTagLevel == 0) {
*eventPP = end;
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
}
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel) {
*eventPP = end;
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
}
*nextPtr = end;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_DATA_CHARS: {
XML_CharacterDataHandler charDataHandler = parser->m_characterDataHandler;
if (charDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
for (;;) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res = XmlConvert(
enc, &s, next, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
*eventEndPP = s;
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
if ((convert_res == XML_CONVERT_COMPLETED)
|| (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE))
break;
*eventPP = s;
}
} else
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, (XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)next - (XML_Char *)s));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
} break;
case XML_TOK_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
break;
case XML_TOK_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
break;
default:
/* All of the tokens produced by XmlContentTok() have their own
* explicit cases, so this default is not strictly necessary.
* However it is a useful safety net, so we retain the code and
* simply exclude it from the coverage tests.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
*eventPP = s = next;
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:;
}
}
/* not reached */
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean android_net_wifi_killSupplicant(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jboolean p2pSupported)
{
return (::wifi_stop_supplicant(p2pSupported) == 0);
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ati_remote2_getkeycode(struct input_dev *idev,
struct input_keymap_entry *ke)
{
struct ati_remote2 *ar2 = input_get_drvdata(idev);
unsigned int mode;
int offset;
unsigned int index;
unsigned int scancode;
if (ke->flags & INPUT_KEYMAP_BY_INDEX) {
index = ke->index;
if (index >= ATI_REMOTE2_MODES *
ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table))
return -EINVAL;
mode = ke->index / ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table);
offset = ke->index % ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table);
scancode = (mode << 8) + ati_remote2_key_table[offset].hw_code;
} else {
if (input_scancode_to_scalar(ke, &scancode))
return -EINVAL;
mode = scancode >> 8;
if (mode > ATI_REMOTE2_PC)
return -EINVAL;
offset = ati_remote2_lookup(scancode & 0xff);
if (offset < 0)
return -EINVAL;
index = mode * ARRAY_SIZE(ati_remote2_key_table) + offset;
}
ke->keycode = ar2->keycode[mode][offset];
ke->len = sizeof(scancode);
memcpy(&ke->scancode, &scancode, sizeof(scancode));
ke->index = index;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::PruneOldestEntryIfFull() {
if (entries_.size() >= max_entry_count()) {
DCHECK_EQ(max_entry_count(), entries_.size());
DCHECK_GT(last_committed_entry_index_, 0);
RemoveEntryAtIndex(0);
NotifyPrunedEntries(this, true, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_last_output_frame(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx) {
RefCntBuffer *const frame_bufs = ctx->buffer_pool->frame_bufs;
if (ctx->frame_parallel_decode && ctx->last_show_frame >= 0) {
BufferPool *const pool = ctx->buffer_pool;
lock_buffer_pool(pool);
decrease_ref_count(ctx->last_show_frame, frame_bufs, pool);
unlock_buffer_pool(pool);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Start() {
animation_.SetSlideDuration(GetDuration());
animation_.SetTweenType(ui::Tween::EASE_OUT);
if (!animation_.IsShowing()) {
animation_.Reset();
animation_.Show();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int XfrmController::fillUserPolicyId(const XfrmSaInfo& record, XfrmDirection direction,
xfrm_userpolicy_id* usersp) {
fillXfrmSelector(record, &usersp->sel);
usersp->dir = static_cast<uint8_t>(direction);
return sizeof(*usersp);
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 162,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMethodBase::DispatchFabricatedKeyEventPostIME(EventType type,
KeyboardCode key_code,
int flags) const {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->DispatchFabricatedKeyEventPostIME(type, key_code, flags);
}
Commit Message: cleanup: Use IsTextInputTypeNone() in OnInputMethodChanged().
BUG=None
TEST=None
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8986010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116461 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page *new_page(struct page *page, unsigned long start, int **x)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long uninitialized_var(address);
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
while (vma) {
address = page_address_in_vma(page, vma);
if (address != -EFAULT)
break;
vma = vma->vm_next;
}
if (PageHuge(page)) {
BUG_ON(!vma);
return alloc_huge_page_noerr(vma, address, 1);
}
/*
* if !vma, alloc_page_vma() will use task or system default policy
*/
return alloc_page_vma(GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE | __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL,
vma, address);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy
I hit a use after free issue when executing trinity and repoduced it
with KASAN enabled. The related call trace is as follows.
BUG: KASan: use after free in SyS_get_mempolicy+0x3c8/0x960 at addr ffff8801f582d766
Read of size 2 by task syz-executor1/798
INFO: Allocated in mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160 age=3 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_alloc+0x768/0x970
kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e7/0x450
mpol_new.part.2+0x74/0x160
mpol_new+0x66/0x80
SyS_mbind+0x267/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Freed in __mpol_put+0x2b/0x40 age=4 cpu=1 pid=799
__slab_free+0x495/0x8e0
kmem_cache_free+0x2f3/0x4c0
__mpol_put+0x2b/0x40
SyS_mbind+0x383/0x9f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0009cb8dc0 objects=23 used=8 fp=0xffff8801f582de40 flags=0x200000000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff8801f582d760 @offset=5984 fp=0xffff8801f582d600
Bytes b4 ffff8801f582d750: ae 01 ff ff 00 00 00 00 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ........ZZZZZZZZ
Object ffff8801f582d760: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
Object ffff8801f582d770: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkk.
Redzone ffff8801f582d778: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........
Padding ffff8801f582d8b8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8801f582d600: fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8801f582d680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8801f582d700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fc
!shared memory policy is not protected against parallel removal by other
thread which is normally protected by the mmap_sem. do_get_mempolicy,
however, drops the lock midway while we can still access it later.
Early premature up_read is a historical artifact from times when
put_user was called in this path see https://lwn.net/Articles/124754/
but that is gone since 8bccd85ffbaf ("[PATCH] Implement sys_* do_*
layering in the memory policy layer."). but when we have the the
current mempolicy ref count model. The issue was introduced
accordingly.
Fix the issue by removing the premature release.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502950924-27521-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhong jiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lzh_decompress(struct kwajd_stream *lzh)
{
register unsigned int bit_buffer;
register int bits_left, i;
register unsigned short sym;
unsigned char *i_ptr, *i_end, lit_run = 0;
int j, pos = 0, len, offset, err;
unsigned int types[6];
/* reset global state */
INIT_BITS;
RESTORE_BITS;
memset(&lzh->window[0], LZSS_WINDOW_FILL, (size_t) LZSS_WINDOW_SIZE);
/* read 6 encoding types (for byte alignment) but only 5 are needed */
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) READ_BITS_SAFE(types[i], 4);
/* read huffman table symbol lengths and build huffman trees */
BUILD_TREE(MATCHLEN1, types[0]);
BUILD_TREE(MATCHLEN2, types[1]);
BUILD_TREE(LITLEN, types[2]);
BUILD_TREE(OFFSET, types[3]);
BUILD_TREE(LITERAL, types[4]);
while (!lzh->input_end) {
if (lit_run) READ_HUFFSYM_SAFE(MATCHLEN2, len);
else READ_HUFFSYM_SAFE(MATCHLEN1, len);
if (len > 0) {
len += 2;
lit_run = 0; /* not the end of a literal run */
READ_HUFFSYM_SAFE(OFFSET, j); offset = j << 6;
READ_BITS_SAFE(j, 6); offset |= j;
/* copy match as output and into the ring buffer */
while (len-- > 0) {
lzh->window[pos] = lzh->window[(pos+4096-offset) & 4095];
WRITE_BYTE;
pos++; pos &= 4095;
}
}
else {
READ_HUFFSYM_SAFE(LITLEN, len); len++;
lit_run = (len == 32) ? 0 : 1; /* end of a literal run? */
while (len-- > 0) {
READ_HUFFSYM_SAFE(LITERAL, j);
/* copy as output and into the ring buffer */
lzh->window[pos] = j;
WRITE_BYTE;
pos++; pos &= 4095;
}
}
}
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 79,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_enable_efer_bits(u64 mask)
{
efer_reserved_bits &= ~mask;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IdleTimeEstimator* RendererSchedulerImpl::GetIdleTimeEstimatorForTesting() {
return &main_thread_only().idle_time_estimator;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selftest (void)
{
const char *r;
if ( (r = selftest_basic_128 ())
|| (r = selftest_basic_192 ())
|| (r = selftest_basic_256 ()) )
return r;
if ( (r = selftest_ctr_128 ()) )
return r;
if ( (r = selftest_cbc_128 ()) )
return r;
if ( (r = selftest_cfb_128 ()) )
return r;
return r;
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 96,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHost* ConvertToRenderFrameHost(WebContents* web_contents) {
return web_contents->GetMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_info_hashtable (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *info_name,
const char *description, const char *args_description,
const char *output_description,
t_hook_callback_info_hashtable *callback,
void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_info_hashtable *new_hook_info_hashtable;
int priority;
const char *ptr_info_name;
if (!info_name || !info_name[0] || !callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_info_hashtable = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_info_hashtable));
if (!new_hook_info_hashtable)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (info_name, &priority, &ptr_info_name);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_INFO_HASHTABLE, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_info_hashtable;
new_hook_info_hashtable->callback = callback;
new_hook_info_hashtable->info_name = strdup ((ptr_info_name) ?
ptr_info_name : info_name);
new_hook_info_hashtable->description = strdup ((description) ? description : "");
new_hook_info_hashtable->args_description = strdup ((args_description) ?
args_description : "");
new_hook_info_hashtable->output_description = strdup ((output_description) ?
output_description : "");
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int find_sys_file(struct mschm_decompressor_p *self,
struct mschmd_sec_mscompressed *sec,
struct mschmd_file **f_ptr, const char *name)
{
struct mspack_system *sys = self->system;
struct mschmd_file result;
/* already loaded */
if (*f_ptr) return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
/* try using fast_find to find the file - return DATAFORMAT error if
* it fails, or successfully doesn't find the file */
if (chmd_fast_find((struct mschm_decompressor *) self, sec->base.chm,
name, &result, (int)sizeof(result)) || !result.section)
{
return MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
if (!(*f_ptr = (struct mschmd_file *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(result)))) {
return MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
/* copy result */
*(*f_ptr) = result;
(*f_ptr)->filename = (char *) name;
/* link file into sysfiles list */
(*f_ptr)->next = sec->base.chm->sysfiles;
sec->base.chm->sysfiles = *f_ptr;
return MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init genhd_device_init(void)
{
int error;
block_class.dev_kobj = sysfs_dev_block_kobj;
error = class_register(&block_class);
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
bdev_map = kobj_map_init(base_probe, &block_class_lock);
blk_dev_init();
register_blkdev(BLOCK_EXT_MAJOR, "blkext");
/* create top-level block dir */
if (!sysfs_deprecated)
block_depr = kobject_create_and_add("block", NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::cancelFocusAppearanceUpdate()
{
if (hasRareData())
elementRareData()->setNeedsFocusAppearanceUpdateSoonAfterAttach(false);
if (document()->focusedNode() == this)
document()->cancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init_mac80211_hwsim(void)
{
int i, err;
if (radios < 0 || radios > 100)
return -EINVAL;
if (channels < 1)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_init(&hwsim_radio_lock);
rhashtable_init(&hwsim_radios_rht, &hwsim_rht_params);
err = register_pernet_device(&hwsim_net_ops);
if (err)
return err;
err = platform_driver_register(&mac80211_hwsim_driver);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_pernet;
hwsim_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "mac80211_hwsim");
if (IS_ERR(hwsim_class)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hwsim_class);
goto out_unregister_driver;
}
err = hwsim_init_netlink();
if (err < 0)
goto out_unregister_driver;
for (i = 0; i < radios; i++) {
struct hwsim_new_radio_params param = { 0 };
param.channels = channels;
switch (regtest) {
case HWSIM_REGTEST_DIFF_COUNTRY:
if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(hwsim_alpha2s))
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[i];
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_DRIVER_REG_FOLLOW:
if (!i)
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[0];
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_STRICT_ALL:
param.reg_strict = true;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_DRIVER_REG_ALL:
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[0];
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_WORLD_ROAM:
if (i == 0)
param.regd = &hwsim_world_regdom_custom_01;
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_CUSTOM_WORLD:
param.regd = &hwsim_world_regdom_custom_01;
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_CUSTOM_WORLD_2:
if (i == 0)
param.regd = &hwsim_world_regdom_custom_01;
else if (i == 1)
param.regd = &hwsim_world_regdom_custom_02;
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_STRICT_FOLLOW:
if (i == 0) {
param.reg_strict = true;
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[0];
}
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_STRICT_AND_DRIVER_REG:
if (i == 0) {
param.reg_strict = true;
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[0];
} else if (i == 1) {
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[1];
}
break;
case HWSIM_REGTEST_ALL:
switch (i) {
case 0:
param.regd = &hwsim_world_regdom_custom_01;
break;
case 1:
param.regd = &hwsim_world_regdom_custom_02;
break;
case 2:
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[0];
break;
case 3:
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[1];
break;
case 4:
param.reg_strict = true;
param.reg_alpha2 = hwsim_alpha2s[2];
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
param.p2p_device = support_p2p_device;
param.use_chanctx = channels > 1;
err = mac80211_hwsim_new_radio(NULL, ¶m);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free_radios;
}
hwsim_mon = alloc_netdev(0, "hwsim%d", NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
hwsim_mon_setup);
if (hwsim_mon == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_radios;
}
rtnl_lock();
err = dev_alloc_name(hwsim_mon, hwsim_mon->name);
if (err < 0) {
rtnl_unlock();
goto out_free_radios;
}
err = register_netdevice(hwsim_mon);
if (err < 0) {
rtnl_unlock();
goto out_free_mon;
}
rtnl_unlock();
return 0;
out_free_mon:
free_netdev(hwsim_mon);
out_free_radios:
mac80211_hwsim_free();
out_unregister_driver:
platform_driver_unregister(&mac80211_hwsim_driver);
out_unregister_pernet:
unregister_pernet_device(&hwsim_net_ops);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebPluginDelegateProxy::SharedBitmap::~SharedBitmap() {}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ContextualSearchDelegate::BuildRequestUrl(std::string selection) {
if (!template_url_service_ ||
!template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider()) {
return std::string();
}
std::string selected_text(net::EscapeQueryParamValue(selection, true));
TemplateURL* template_url = template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_terms_args =
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs(base::string16());
int now_on_tap_version =
field_trial_->IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() ? kNowOnTapVersion : 0;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams params(
kContextualSearchRequestVersion, selected_text, std::string(),
now_on_tap_version);
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params = params;
std::string request(
template_url->contextual_search_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_terms_args,
template_url_service_->search_terms_data(),
NULL));
std::string replacement_url = field_trial_->GetResolverURLPrefix();
if (!replacement_url.empty()) {
size_t pos = request.find(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint);
if (pos != std::string::npos) {
request.replace(0, pos + strlen(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint),
replacement_url);
}
}
return request;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cac_final_iterator(list_t *list)
{
list_iterator_stop(list);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType CopyImageRegion(Image *destination,const Image *source, const size_t columns,const size_t rows,const ssize_t sx,const ssize_t sy,
const ssize_t dx,const ssize_t dy,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*source_view,
*destination_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
y;
if (columns == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
status=MagickTrue;
source_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(source,exception);
destination_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(destination,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(source,destination,rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) rows; y++)
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
register const Quantum
*restrict p;
register Quantum
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
/*
Transfer scanline.
*/
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(source_view,sx,sy+y,columns,1,exception);
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(destination_view,dx,dy+y,columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
if (GetPixelReadMask(source,p) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(destination,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(source);
q+=GetPixelChannels(destination);
continue;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(source); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel=GetPixelChannelChannel(source,i);
PixelTrait source_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(source,channel);
PixelTrait destination_traits=GetPixelChannelTraits(destination,
channel);
if ((source_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(destination_traits == UndefinedPixelTrait))
continue;
SetPixelChannel(destination,channel,p[i],q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(source);
q+=GetPixelChannels(destination);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(destination_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
destination_view=DestroyCacheView(destination_view);
source_view=DestroyCacheView(source_view);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateUnifiedStream(const url::Origin& security_origin) {
std::string output_id = GetNondefaultIdExpectedToPassPermissionsCheck();
std::string input_id = GetNondefaultInputId();
std::string hashed_output_id = MediaStreamManager::GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(
kSalt, url::Origin(GURL(kSecurityOrigin)), output_id);
audio_manager_->CreateDeviceAssociation(input_id, output_id);
int session_id = media_stream_manager_->audio_input_device_manager()->Open(
StreamDeviceInfo(MEDIA_DEVICE_AUDIO_CAPTURE, "Fake input device",
input_id));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
media::AudioParameters params(
media::AudioParameters::AUDIO_FAKE, media::CHANNEL_LAYOUT_STEREO,
media::AudioParameters::kAudioCDSampleRate, 16,
media::AudioParameters::kAudioCDSampleRate / 10);
EXPECT_CALL(*host_.get(),
OnDeviceAuthorized(kStreamId, media::OUTPUT_DEVICE_STATUS_OK, _,
hashed_output_id))
.Times(1);
EXPECT_CALL(*host_.get(), WasNotifiedOfCreation(kStreamId, _));
EXPECT_CALL(mirroring_manager_, AddDiverter(render_process_host_.GetID(),
kRenderFrameId, NotNull()))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
EXPECT_CALL(mirroring_manager_, RemoveDiverter(NotNull()))
.RetiresOnSaturation();
host_->OnRequestDeviceAuthorization(kStreamId, kRenderFrameId, session_id,
/*device id*/ std::string(),
security_origin);
auth_run_loop_.Run();
host_->OnCreateStream(kStreamId, kRenderFrameId, params);
SyncWithAudioThread();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_port_mod(struct ofconn *ofconn, const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofputil_port_mod pm;
struct ofport *port;
enum ofperr error;
error = reject_slave_controller(ofconn);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = ofputil_decode_port_mod(oh, &pm, false);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = port_mod_start(ofconn, &pm, &port);
if (!error) {
port_mod_finish(ofconn, &pm, port);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::CloseFile(const FilePath& file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
RunTaskOnUIThread(base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::CloseFileOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 116,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMPEG4Encoder::initEncParams() {
CHECK(mHandle != NULL);
memset(mHandle, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncControls));
CHECK(mEncParams != NULL);
memset(mEncParams, 0, sizeof(tagvideoEncOptions));
if (!PVGetDefaultEncOption(mEncParams, 0)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get default encoding parameters");
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mEncParams->encMode = mEncodeMode;
mEncParams->encWidth[0] = mWidth;
mEncParams->encHeight[0] = mHeight;
mEncParams->encFrameRate[0] = mFramerate >> 16; // mFramerate is in Q16 format
mEncParams->rcType = VBR_1;
mEncParams->vbvDelay = 5.0f;
mEncParams->profile_level = CORE_PROFILE_LEVEL2;
mEncParams->packetSize = 32;
mEncParams->rvlcEnable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->numLayers = 1;
mEncParams->timeIncRes = 1000;
mEncParams->tickPerSrc = ((int64_t)mEncParams->timeIncRes << 16) / mFramerate;
mEncParams->bitRate[0] = mBitrate;
mEncParams->iQuant[0] = 15;
mEncParams->pQuant[0] = 12;
mEncParams->quantType[0] = 0;
mEncParams->noFrameSkipped = PV_OFF;
if (mColorFormat != OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar || mInputDataIsMeta) {
free(mInputFrameData);
mInputFrameData = NULL;
if (((uint64_t)mWidth * mHeight) > ((uint64_t)INT32_MAX / 3)) {
ALOGE("b/25812794, Buffer size is too big.");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
mInputFrameData =
(uint8_t *) malloc((mWidth * mHeight * 3 ) >> 1);
CHECK(mInputFrameData != NULL);
}
if (mWidth % 16 != 0 || mHeight % 16 != 0) {
ALOGE("Video frame size %dx%d must be a multiple of 16",
mWidth, mHeight);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec < 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = -1;
} else if (mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec == 0) {
mEncParams->intraPeriod = 1; // All I frames
} else {
mEncParams->intraPeriod =
(mIDRFrameRefreshIntervalInSec * mFramerate) >> 16;
}
mEncParams->numIntraMB = 0;
mEncParams->sceneDetect = PV_ON;
mEncParams->searchRange = 16;
mEncParams->mv8x8Enable = PV_OFF;
mEncParams->gobHeaderInterval = 0;
mEncParams->useACPred = PV_ON;
mEncParams->intraDCVlcTh = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: SoftMPEG4: Check the buffer size before writing the reference frame.
Also prevent overflow in SoftMPEG4 and division by zero in SoftMPEG4Encoder.
Bug: 30033990
Change-Id: I7701f5fc54c2670587d122330e5dc851f64ed3c2
(cherry picked from commit 695123195034402ca76169b195069c28c30342d3)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::getSyncSettings(
AVSyncSettings* sync /* nonnull */, float* videoFps /* nonnull */)
{
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
if (p == 0) return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
status_t ret = p->getSyncSettings(sync, videoFps);
if (ret == NO_ERROR) {
ALOGV("[%d] getSyncSettings(%u, %u, %f, %f)",
mConnId, sync->mSource, sync->mAudioAdjustMode, sync->mTolerance, *videoFps);
} else {
ALOGV("[%d] getSyncSettings returned %d", mConnId, ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<base::Time>::Write(Message* m, const param_type& p) {
ParamTraits<int64>::Write(m, p.ToInternalValue());
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void syn_flood_warning(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
if (sysctl_tcp_syncookies)
printk(KERN_INFO
"TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port %d. "
"Sending cookies.\n", ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->dest));
else
#endif
printk(KERN_INFO
"TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port %d. "
"Dropping request.\n", ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->dest));
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dccp_v4_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)skb->data;
const u8 offset = iph->ihl << 2;
const struct dccp_hdr *dh = (struct dccp_hdr *)(skb->data + offset);
struct dccp_sock *dp;
struct inet_sock *inet;
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct sock *sk;
__u64 seq;
int err;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
if (skb->len < offset + sizeof(*dh) ||
skb->len < offset + __dccp_basic_hdr_len(dh)) {
ICMP_INC_STATS_BH(net, ICMP_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
sk = inet_lookup(net, &dccp_hashinfo,
iph->daddr, dh->dccph_dport,
iph->saddr, dh->dccph_sport, inet_iif(skb));
if (sk == NULL) {
ICMP_INC_STATS_BH(net, ICMP_MIB_INERRORS);
return;
}
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_TIME_WAIT) {
inet_twsk_put(inet_twsk(sk));
return;
}
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* If too many ICMPs get dropped on busy
* servers this needs to be solved differently.
*/
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_LOCKDROPPEDICMPS);
if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_CLOSED)
goto out;
dp = dccp_sk(sk);
seq = dccp_hdr_seq(dh);
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & ~(DCCPF_REQUESTING | DCCPF_LISTEN) &&
!between48(seq, dp->dccps_awl, dp->dccps_awh)) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
switch (type) {
case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
/* Just silently ignore these. */
goto out;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
err = EPROTO;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
if (code > NR_ICMP_UNREACH)
goto out;
if (code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) { /* PMTU discovery (RFC1191) */
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk))
dccp_do_pmtu_discovery(sk, iph, info);
goto out;
}
err = icmp_err_convert[code].errno;
break;
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
default:
goto out;
}
switch (sk->sk_state) {
struct request_sock *req , **prev;
case DCCP_LISTEN:
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk))
goto out;
req = inet_csk_search_req(sk, &prev, dh->dccph_dport,
iph->daddr, iph->saddr);
if (!req)
goto out;
/*
* ICMPs are not backlogged, hence we cannot get an established
* socket here.
*/
WARN_ON(req->sk);
if (seq != dccp_rsk(req)->dreq_iss) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(net, LINUX_MIB_OUTOFWINDOWICMPS);
goto out;
}
/*
* Still in RESPOND, just remove it silently.
* There is no good way to pass the error to the newly
* created socket, and POSIX does not want network
* errors returned from accept().
*/
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req, prev);
goto out;
case DCCP_REQUESTING:
case DCCP_RESPOND:
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
DCCP_INC_STATS_BH(DCCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
dccp_done(sk);
} else
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
goto out;
}
/* If we've already connected we will keep trying
* until we time out, or the user gives up.
*
* rfc1122 4.2.3.9 allows to consider as hard errors
* only PROTO_UNREACH and PORT_UNREACH (well, FRAG_FAILED too,
* but it is obsoleted by pmtu discovery).
*
* Note, that in modern internet, where routing is unreliable
* and in each dark corner broken firewalls sit, sending random
* errors ordered by their masters even this two messages finally lose
* their original sense (even Linux sends invalid PORT_UNREACHs)
*
* Now we are in compliance with RFCs.
* --ANK (980905)
*/
inet = inet_sk(sk);
if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk) && inet->recverr) {
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
} else /* Only an error on timeout */
sk->sk_err_soft = err;
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void S_AL_StreamDie( int stream )
{
if ((stream < 0) || (stream >= MAX_RAW_STREAMS))
return;
if(streamSourceHandles[stream] == -1)
return;
streamPlaying[stream] = qfalse;
qalSourceStop(streamSources[stream]);
S_AL_FreeStreamChannel(stream);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
vmcs_write32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
else
vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
}
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 81,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ScopedCommitStateResetter(RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host)
: render_frame_host_(render_frame_host), disabled_(false) {}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: T42_Open_Face( T42_Face face )
{
T42_LoaderRec loader;
T42_Parser parser;
T1_Font type1 = &face->type1;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
t42_loader_init( &loader, face );
parser = &loader.parser;
if ( FT_ALLOC( face->ttf_data, 12 ) )
goto Exit;
/* while parsing the font we always update `face->ttf_size' so that */
/* even in case of buggy data (which might lead to premature end of */
/* scanning without causing an error) the call to `FT_Open_Face' in */
/* `T42_Face_Init' passes the correct size */
face->ttf_size = 12;
error = t42_parser_init( parser,
face->root.stream,
memory,
psaux);
if ( error )
goto Exit;
error = t42_parse_dict( face, &loader,
parser->base_dict, parser->base_len );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( type1->font_type != 42 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: cannot handle FontType %d\n",
type1->font_type ));
error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
/* now, propagate the charstrings and glyphnames tables */
/* to the Type1 data */
type1->num_glyphs = loader.num_glyphs;
if ( !loader.charstrings.init )
{
FT_ERROR(( "T42_Open_Face: no charstrings array in face\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
loader.charstrings.init = 0;
type1->charstrings_block = loader.charstrings.block;
type1->charstrings = loader.charstrings.elements;
type1->charstrings_len = loader.charstrings.lengths;
/* we copy the glyph names `block' and `elements' fields; */
/* the `lengths' field must be released later */
type1->glyph_names_block = loader.glyph_names.block;
type1->glyph_names = (FT_String**)loader.glyph_names.elements;
loader.glyph_names.block = 0;
loader.glyph_names.elements = 0;
/* we must now build type1.encoding when we have a custom array */
if ( type1->encoding_type == T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY )
{
FT_Int charcode, idx, min_char, max_char;
FT_Byte* glyph_name;
/* OK, we do the following: for each element in the encoding */
/* table, look up the index of the glyph having the same name */
/* as defined in the CharStrings array. */
/* The index is then stored in type1.encoding.char_index, and */
/* the name in type1.encoding.char_name */
min_char = 0;
max_char = 0;
charcode = 0;
for ( ; charcode < loader.encoding_table.max_elems; charcode++ )
{
FT_Byte* char_name;
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = 0;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char *)".notdef";
char_name = loader.encoding_table.elements[charcode];
if ( char_name )
for ( idx = 0; idx < type1->num_glyphs; idx++ )
{
glyph_name = (FT_Byte*)type1->glyph_names[idx];
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)char_name,
(const char*)glyph_name ) == 0 )
{
type1->encoding.char_index[charcode] = (FT_UShort)idx;
type1->encoding.char_name [charcode] = (char*)glyph_name;
/* Change min/max encoded char only if glyph name is */
/* not /.notdef */
if ( ft_strcmp( (const char*)".notdef",
(const char*)glyph_name ) != 0 )
{
if ( charcode < min_char )
min_char = charcode;
if ( charcode >= max_char )
max_char = charcode + 1;
}
break;
}
}
}
type1->encoding.code_first = min_char;
type1->encoding.code_last = max_char;
type1->encoding.num_chars = loader.num_chars;
}
Exit:
t42_loader_done( &loader );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_FORM_CTR(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
proto_tree *subtree;
proto_item *item;
guint32 level;
subtree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_FORM_CTR, &item, "Form container");
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep, hf_form_level, &level);
switch(level) {
case 1:
offset = dissect_FORM_1(tvb, offset, pinfo, subtree, di, drep);
break;
default:
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, item, &ei_form_level, "Unknown form info level %d", level);
break;
}
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 52,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(getsockopt, int, fd, int, level, int, optname,
char __user *, optval, int __user *, optlen)
{
int err, fput_needed;
struct socket *sock;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock != NULL) {
err = security_socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname);
if (err)
goto out_put;
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
err =
sock_getsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval,
optlen);
else
err =
sock->ops->getsockopt(sock, level, optname, optval,
optlen);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dm_set_target_max_io_len(struct dm_target *ti, sector_t len)
{
if (len > UINT_MAX) {
DMERR("Specified maximum size of target IO (%llu) exceeds limit (%u)",
(unsigned long long)len, UINT_MAX);
ti->error = "Maximum size of target IO is too large";
return -EINVAL;
}
ti->max_io_len = (uint32_t) len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_kvfree(void *ptr)
{
if (is_vmalloc_addr(ptr))
vfree(ptr);
else
kfree(ptr);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rxrpc_krb5_decode_tagged_array(struct krb5_tagged_data **_td,
u8 *_n_elem,
u8 max_n_elem,
size_t max_elem_size,
const __be32 **_xdr,
unsigned int *_toklen)
{
struct krb5_tagged_data *td;
const __be32 *xdr = *_xdr;
unsigned int toklen = *_toklen, n_elem, loop;
int ret;
/* there must be at least one count */
if (toklen < 4)
return -EINVAL;
_enter(",,%u,%zu,{%x},%u",
max_n_elem, max_elem_size, ntohl(xdr[0]), toklen);
n_elem = ntohl(*xdr++);
toklen -= 4;
if (n_elem < 0 || n_elem > max_n_elem)
return -EINVAL;
*_n_elem = n_elem;
if (n_elem > 0) {
if (toklen <= (n_elem + 1) * 4)
return -EINVAL;
_debug("n_elem %d", n_elem);
td = kcalloc(n_elem, sizeof(struct krb5_tagged_data),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!td)
return -ENOMEM;
*_td = td;
for (loop = 0; loop < n_elem; loop++) {
ret = rxrpc_krb5_decode_tagged_data(&td[loop],
max_elem_size,
&xdr, &toklen);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
*_xdr = xdr;
*_toklen = toklen;
_leave(" = 0 [toklen=%u]", toklen);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Chapters::Atom::Init() {
m_string_uid = NULL;
m_uid = 0;
m_start_timecode = -1;
m_stop_timecode = -1;
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
m_displays_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
{
struct filename *filename = getname_kernel(name);
struct file *f = ERR_CAST(filename);
if (!IS_ERR(filename)) {
f = do_open_execat(AT_FDCWD, filename, 0);
putname(filename);
}
return f;
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::handleDownloadRequest(DownloadProxy* download)
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
QWebDownloadItem* downloadItem = new QWebDownloadItem();
downloadItem->d->downloadProxy = download;
q->connect(downloadItem->d, SIGNAL(receivedResponse(QWebDownloadItem*)), q, SLOT(_q_onReceivedResponseFromDownload(QWebDownloadItem*)));
context->downloadManager()->addDownload(download, downloadItem);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evutil_hex_char_to_int_(char c)
{
switch(c)
{
case '0': return 0;
case '1': return 1;
case '2': return 2;
case '3': return 3;
case '4': return 4;
case '5': return 5;
case '6': return 6;
case '7': return 7;
case '8': return 8;
case '9': return 9;
case 'A': case 'a': return 10;
case 'B': case 'b': return 11;
case 'C': case 'c': return 12;
case 'D': case 'd': return 13;
case 'E': case 'e': return 14;
case 'F': case 'f': return 15;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct o2nm_cluster *to_o2nm_cluster_from_node(struct o2nm_node *node)
{
/* through the first node_set .parent
* mycluster/nodes/mynode == o2nm_cluster->o2nm_node_group->o2nm_node */
return to_o2nm_cluster(node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 169,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned lodepng_color_mode_copy(LodePNGColorMode* dest, const LodePNGColorMode* source)
{
size_t i;
lodepng_color_mode_cleanup(dest);
*dest = *source;
if(source->palette)
{
dest->palette = (unsigned char*)malloc(1024);
if(!dest->palette && source->palettesize) return 83; /*alloc fail*/
for(i = 0; i < source->palettesize * 4; i++) dest->palette[i] = source->palette[i];
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordUMAStatistics(flags_ui::FlagsStorage* flags_storage) {
const std::set<std::string> switches =
FlagsStateSingleton::GetFlagsState()->GetSwitchesFromFlags(flags_storage);
const std::set<std::string> features =
FlagsStateSingleton::GetFlagsState()->GetFeaturesFromFlags(flags_storage);
ReportAboutFlagsHistogram("Launch.FlagsAtStartup", switches, features);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::GatherAndSaveSurroundingText(
const std::string& selection,
bool use_resolved_search_term,
content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool may_send_base_page_url) {
GatherSurroundingTextWithCallback(
selection, use_resolved_search_term, web_contents, may_send_base_page_url,
base::Bind(&ContextualSearchDelegate::SaveSurroundingText, AsWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Textfield::GetViewWidth() const {
return width();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTTPSOCSPTest()
: context_(true),
ev_test_policy_(
new ScopedTestEVPolicy(EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
kOCSPTestCertFingerprint,
kOCSPTestCertPolicy)) {
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 102,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetActiveUniform(GLuint program,
GLuint index,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* size,
GLenum* type,
char* name) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetActiveUniform(" << program
<< ", " << index << ", " << bufsize << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(length) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(size) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(type) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(name) << ", ");
if (bufsize < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetActiveUniform", "bufsize < 0");
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetActiveUniform");
bool success = share_group_->program_info_manager()->GetActiveUniform(
this, program, index, bufsize, length, size, type, name);
if (success) {
if (size) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" size: " << *size);
}
if (type) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" type: " << GLES2Util::GetStringEnum(*type));
}
if (name) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" name: " << name);
}
}
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::DestroyOutputBuffers() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
free_output_buffers_.clear();
if (output_buffer_map_.empty())
return;
if (output_streamon_) {
__u32 type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
IOCTL_OR_ERROR_RETURN(VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, &type);
output_streamon_ = false;
}
for (const auto& output_record : output_buffer_map_) {
device_->Munmap(output_record.address[0], output_record.length[0]);
}
struct v4l2_requestbuffers reqbufs;
memset(&reqbufs, 0, sizeof(reqbufs));
reqbufs.count = 0;
reqbufs.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
reqbufs.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_MMAP;
IOCTL_OR_LOG_ERROR(VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &reqbufs);
output_buffer_map_.clear();
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InterstitialPage* GetOfflineLoadPage() {
return InterstitialPage::GetInterstitialPage(contents());
}
Commit Message: Disable crashing OfflineLoadPageTest
TBR=jam@chromium.org
BUG=113219
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9358027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120977 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_msr_hyperv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 data)
{
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE: {
unsigned long addr;
if (!(data & HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE_ENABLE)) {
vcpu->arch.hv_vapic = data;
break;
}
addr = gfn_to_hva(vcpu->kvm, data >>
HV_X64_MSR_APIC_ASSIST_PAGE_ADDRESS_SHIFT);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return 1;
if (__clear_user((void __user *)addr, PAGE_SIZE))
return 1;
vcpu->arch.hv_vapic = data;
break;
}
case HV_X64_MSR_EOI:
return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_EOI, data);
case HV_X64_MSR_ICR:
return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_ICR, data);
case HV_X64_MSR_TPR:
return kvm_hv_vapic_msr_write(vcpu, APIC_TASKPRI, data);
default:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "HYPER-V unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x "
"data 0x%llx\n", msr, data);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_vorbis_tag_add_coverart (GstTagList * tags, const gchar * img_data_base64,
gint base64_len)
{
GstBuffer *img;
guchar *img_data;
gsize img_len;
guint save = 0;
gint state = 0;
if (base64_len < 2)
goto not_enough_data;
img_data = g_try_malloc0 (base64_len * 3 / 4);
if (img_data == NULL)
goto alloc_failed;
img_len = g_base64_decode_step (img_data_base64, base64_len, img_data,
&state, &save);
if (img_len == 0)
goto decode_failed;
img = gst_tag_image_data_to_image_buffer (img_data, img_len,
GST_TAG_IMAGE_TYPE_NONE);
if (img == NULL)
gst_tag_list_add (tags, GST_TAG_MERGE_APPEND,
GST_TAG_PREVIEW_IMAGE, img, NULL);
GST_TAG_PREVIEW_IMAGE, img, NULL);
gst_buffer_unref (img);
g_free (img_data);
return;
/* ERRORS */
{
GST_WARNING ("COVERART tag with too little base64-encoded data");
GST_WARNING ("COVERART tag with too little base64-encoded data");
return;
}
alloc_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't allocate enough memory to decode COVERART tag");
return;
}
decode_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't decode bas64 image data from COVERART tag");
g_free (img_data);
return;
}
convert_failed:
{
GST_WARNING ("Couldn't extract image or image type from COVERART tag");
g_free (img_data);
return;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 164,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DirectoryExists(const FilePath& path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
stat_wrapper_t file_info;
if (CallStat(path.value().c_str(), &file_info) == 0)
return S_ISDIR(file_info.st_mode);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_syncrestart(const char *tag, struct sync_reserve_list **reserve_listp, int re_alloc)
{
struct sync_reserve *res;
struct sync_reserve_list *l = *reserve_listp;
struct sync_msgid *msg;
int hash_size = l->hash_size;
struct partition_list *p, *pl = NULL;
for (res = l->head; res; res = res->next) {
for (msg = res->list->head; msg; msg = msg->next) {
if (!msg->fname) continue;
pl = partition_list_add(res->part, pl);
unlink(msg->fname);
}
}
sync_reserve_list_free(reserve_listp);
/* Remove all <partition>/sync./<pid> directories referred to above */
for (p=pl; p ; p = p->next) {
static char buf[MAX_MAILBOX_PATH];
snprintf(buf, MAX_MAILBOX_PATH, "%s/sync./%lu",
config_partitiondir(p->name), (unsigned long)getpid());
rmdir(buf);
/* and the archive partition too */
snprintf(buf, MAX_MAILBOX_PATH, "%s/sync./%lu",
config_archivepartitiondir(p->name), (unsigned long)getpid());
rmdir(buf);
}
partition_list_free(pl);
if (re_alloc) {
*reserve_listp = sync_reserve_list_create(hash_size);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK Restarting\r\n", tag);
}
else
*reserve_listp = NULL;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBCursor::RemoveCursorFromTransaction() {
if (transaction_)
transaction_->UnregisterOpenCursor(this);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uas_free_unsubmitted_urbs(struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd)
{
struct uas_cmd_info *cmdinfo;
if (!cmnd)
return;
cmdinfo = (void *)&cmnd->SCp;
if (cmdinfo->state & SUBMIT_CMD_URB)
usb_free_urb(cmdinfo->cmd_urb);
/* data urbs may have never gotten their submit flag set */
if (!(cmdinfo->state & DATA_IN_URB_INFLIGHT))
usb_free_urb(cmdinfo->data_in_urb);
if (!(cmdinfo->state & DATA_OUT_URB_INFLIGHT))
usb_free_urb(cmdinfo->data_out_urb);
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPageInternal(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params,
int page_number,
int page_count,
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
PdfMetafileSkia* metafile,
gfx::Size* page_size_in_dpi,
gfx::Rect* content_area_in_dpi) {
double css_scale_factor =
params.scale_factor >= kEpsilon ? params.scale_factor : 1.0f;
gfx::Size original_page_size = params.page_size;
PageSizeMargins page_layout_in_points;
ComputePageLayoutInPointsForCss(frame, page_number, params,
ignore_css_margins_, &css_scale_factor,
&page_layout_in_points);
gfx::Size page_size;
gfx::Rect content_area;
GetPageSizeAndContentAreaFromPageLayout(page_layout_in_points, &page_size,
&content_area);
if (page_size_in_dpi)
*page_size_in_dpi = original_page_size;
if (content_area_in_dpi) {
*content_area_in_dpi =
gfx::Rect(0, 0, page_size_in_dpi->width(), page_size_in_dpi->height());
}
gfx::Rect canvas_area =
params.display_header_footer ? gfx::Rect(page_size) : content_area;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
float webkit_page_shrink_factor = frame->GetPrintPageShrink(page_number);
float scale_factor = css_scale_factor * webkit_page_shrink_factor;
#else
float scale_factor = css_scale_factor;
#endif
cc::PaintCanvas* canvas =
metafile->GetVectorCanvasForNewPage(page_size, canvas_area, scale_factor);
if (!canvas)
return;
MetafileSkiaWrapper::SetMetafileOnCanvas(canvas, metafile);
if (params.display_header_footer) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
const float fudge_factor = 1;
#else
const float fudge_factor = kPrintingMinimumShrinkFactor;
#endif
PrintHeaderAndFooter(canvas, page_number + 1, page_count, *frame,
scale_factor / fudge_factor, page_layout_in_points,
params);
}
float webkit_scale_factor = RenderPageContent(
frame, page_number, canvas_area, content_area, scale_factor, canvas);
DCHECK_GT(webkit_scale_factor, 0.0f);
bool ret = metafile->FinishPage();
DCHECK(ret);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 149,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ConnectionInfoPopupAndroid::SetSelectedTab(
WebsiteSettingsUI::TabId tab_id) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShellContentBrowserClient::IsHandledURL(const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false;
DCHECK_EQ(url.scheme(), base::StringToLowerASCII(url.scheme()));
static const char* const kProtocolList[] = {
url::kBlobScheme,
url::kFileSystemScheme,
kChromeUIScheme,
kChromeDevToolsScheme,
url::kDataScheme,
url::kFileScheme,
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kProtocolList); ++i) {
if (url.scheme() == kProtocolList[i])
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double BiquadDSPKernel::tailTime() const
{
return MaxBiquadDelayTime;
}
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bta_av_avrc_sdp_cback(UNUSED_ATTR uint16_t status) {
BT_HDR* p_msg = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR));
p_msg->event = BTA_AV_SDP_AVRC_DISC_EVT;
bta_sys_sendmsg(p_msg);
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt::SetWebstoreData(
const std::string& localized_user_count,
bool show_user_count,
double average_rating,
int rating_count) {
CHECK(AllowWebstoreData(type_));
localized_user_count_ = localized_user_count;
show_user_count_ = show_user_count;
average_rating_ = average_rating;
rating_count_ = rating_count;
has_webstore_data_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 131,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlBufGetAllocationScheme(xmlBufPtr buf) {
if (buf == NULL) {
#ifdef DEBUG_BUFFER
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlBufGetAllocationScheme: buf == NULL\n");
#endif
return(-1);
}
return(buf->alloc);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void FS_CheckPak0( void )
{
searchpath_t *path;
pack_t *curpack;
qboolean founddemo = qfalse;
unsigned int foundPak = 0;
for( path = fs_searchpaths; path; path = path->next )
{
const char* pakBasename = path->pack->pakBasename;
if(!path->pack)
continue;
curpack = path->pack;
if(!Q_stricmpn( curpack->pakGamename, "demomain", MAX_OSPATH )
&& !Q_stricmpn( pakBasename, "pak0", MAX_OSPATH ))
{
if(curpack->checksum == DEMO_PAK0_CHECKSUM)
founddemo = qtrue;
}
else if(!Q_stricmpn( curpack->pakGamename, BASEGAME, MAX_OSPATH )
&& strlen(pakBasename) == 4 && !Q_stricmpn( pakBasename, "pak", 3 )
&& pakBasename[3] >= '0' && pakBasename[3] <= '0' + NUM_ID_PAKS - 1)
{
if( curpack->checksum != pak_checksums[pakBasename[3]-'0'] )
{
if(pakBasename[3] == '0')
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASEGAME "/pak0.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-copy pak0.pk3 from your\n"
"legitimate RTCW CDROM.\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->checksum );
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, NULL);
}
/*
else
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: " BASEGAME "/pak%d.pk3 is present but its checksum (%u)\n"
"is not correct. Please re-install the point release\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
pakBasename[3]-'0', curpack->checksum );
}
*/
}
foundPak |= 1<<(pakBasename[3]-'0');
}
else
{
int index;
for(index = 0; index < ARRAY_LEN(pak_checksums); index++)
{
if(curpack->checksum == pak_checksums[index])
{
Com_Printf("\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: %s is renamed pak file %s%cpak%d.pk3\n"
"Running in standalone mode won't work\n"
"Please rename, or remove this file\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n",
curpack->pakFilename, BASEGAME, PATH_SEP, index);
foundPak |= 0x80000000;
}
}
}
}
if(!foundPak && Q_stricmp(com_basegame->string, BASEGAME))
{
Cvar_Set("com_standalone", "1");
}
else
Cvar_Set("com_standalone", "0");
if(!com_standalone->integer)
{
if(!(foundPak & 0x01))
{
if(founddemo)
{
Com_Printf( "\n\n"
"**************************************************\n"
"WARNING: It looks like you're using pak0.pk3\n"
"from the demo. This may work fine, but it is not\n"
"guaranteed or supported.\n"
"**************************************************\n\n\n" );
foundPak |= 0x01;
}
}
}
if(!com_standalone->integer && (foundPak & 0x01) != 0x01)
{
char errorText[MAX_STRING_CHARS] = "";
if((foundPak & 0x01) != 0x01)
{
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
"\n\n\"pak0.pk3\" is missing. Please copy it\n"
"from your legitimate RTCW CDROM.\n\n");
}
Q_strcat(errorText, sizeof(errorText),
va("Also check that your iortcw executable is in\n"
"the correct place and that every file\n"
"in the \"%s\" directory is present and readable.\n\n", BASEGAME));
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "%s", errorText);
}
if(!founddemo)
FS_CheckMPPaks();
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::StartPluginIme() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PromoResourceService::ScheduleNotification(double promo_start,
double promo_end) {
if (promo_start > 0 && promo_end > 0) {
const int64 ms_until_start =
static_cast<int64>((base::Time::FromDoubleT(
promo_start) - base::Time::Now()).InMilliseconds());
const int64 ms_until_end =
static_cast<int64>((base::Time::FromDoubleT(
promo_end) - base::Time::Now()).InMilliseconds());
if (ms_until_start > 0) {
PostNotification(ms_until_start);
} else if (ms_until_end > 0) {
if (ms_until_start <= 0) {
PostNotification(0);
}
PostNotification(ms_until_end);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void V8LazyEventListenerToString(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8SetReturnValue(info, V8HiddenValue::getHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), V8HiddenValue::toStringString(info.GetIsolate())));
}
Commit Message: Turn a bunch of ASSERTs into graceful failures when compiling listeners
BUG=456192
R=yangguo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/906193002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189796 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 129,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaPlayerService::Client::setVolume(float leftVolume, float rightVolume)
{
ALOGV("[%d] setVolume(%f, %f)", mConnId, leftVolume, rightVolume);
sp<MediaPlayerBase> p = getPlayer();
{
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
if (p != 0 && p->hardwareOutput()) {
MediaPlayerHWInterface* hwp =
reinterpret_cast<MediaPlayerHWInterface*>(p.get());
return hwp->setVolume(leftVolume, rightVolume);
} else {
if (mAudioOutput != 0) mAudioOutput->setVolume(leftVolume, rightVolume);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::IsShowing() {
return window_->IsVisible();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::requestFileSystemAccessInternal(ExecutionContext* context, const Closure& allowed, const Closure& denied)
{
if (!client()) {
denied();
return;
}
if (!context->isDocument()) {
if (!client()->requestFileSystemAccessSync(context)) {
denied();
return;
}
allowed();
return;
}
client()->requestFileSystemAccessAsync(context, PermissionCallbacks::create(allowed, denied));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static FilterEncodingNode* FLTGetTopBBOX(FilterEncodingNode *psNode)
{
int nCount = 0;
FilterEncodingNode* psTopBBOX = NULL;
FLTGetTopBBOXInternal(psNode, &psTopBBOX, &nCount);
return psTopBBOX;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __tty_hangup(struct tty_struct *tty, int exit_session)
{
struct file *cons_filp = NULL;
struct file *filp, *f = NULL;
struct tty_file_private *priv;
int closecount = 0, n;
int refs;
if (!tty)
return;
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
if (redirect && file_tty(redirect) == tty) {
f = redirect;
redirect = NULL;
}
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
tty_lock(tty);
if (test_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags)) {
tty_unlock(tty);
return;
}
/* inuse_filps is protected by the single tty lock,
this really needs to change if we want to flush the
workqueue with the lock held */
check_tty_count(tty, "tty_hangup");
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
/* This breaks for file handles being sent over AF_UNIX sockets ? */
list_for_each_entry(priv, &tty->tty_files, list) {
filp = priv->file;
if (filp->f_op->write == redirected_tty_write)
cons_filp = filp;
if (filp->f_op->write != tty_write)
continue;
closecount++;
__tty_fasync(-1, filp, 0); /* can't block */
filp->f_op = &hung_up_tty_fops;
}
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
refs = tty_signal_session_leader(tty, exit_session);
/* Account for the p->signal references we killed */
while (refs--)
tty_kref_put(tty);
tty_ldisc_hangup(tty);
spin_lock_irq(&tty->ctrl_lock);
clear_bit(TTY_THROTTLED, &tty->flags);
clear_bit(TTY_DO_WRITE_WAKEUP, &tty->flags);
put_pid(tty->session);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
tty->session = NULL;
tty->pgrp = NULL;
tty->ctrl_status = 0;
spin_unlock_irq(&tty->ctrl_lock);
/*
* If one of the devices matches a console pointer, we
* cannot just call hangup() because that will cause
* tty->count and state->count to go out of sync.
* So we just call close() the right number of times.
*/
if (cons_filp) {
if (tty->ops->close)
for (n = 0; n < closecount; n++)
tty->ops->close(tty, cons_filp);
} else if (tty->ops->hangup)
tty->ops->hangup(tty);
/*
* We don't want to have driver/ldisc interactions beyond
* the ones we did here. The driver layer expects no
* calls after ->hangup() from the ldisc side. However we
* can't yet guarantee all that.
*/
set_bit(TTY_HUPPED, &tty->flags);
tty_unlock(tty);
if (f)
fput(f);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionBrowserTest::UnloadExtension(const std::string& extension_id) {
ExtensionService* service = extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(
profile())->extension_service();
service->UnloadExtension(extension_id,
extensions::UnloadedExtensionReason::DISABLE);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 151,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SendCaptureEntirePageJSONRequest(
AutomationMessageSender* sender,
int browser_index,
int tab_index,
const FilePath& path,
std::string* error_msg) {
DictionaryValue dict;
dict.SetString("command", "CaptureEntirePage");
dict.SetInteger("windex", browser_index);
dict.SetInteger("tab_index", tab_index);
dict.SetString("path", path.value());
DictionaryValue reply_dict;
return SendAutomationJSONRequest(sender, dict, &reply_dict, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string DevToolsDataSource::GetMimeType(const std::string& path) const {
return GetMimeTypeForPath(path);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoftAVC::setNumCores() {
ivdext_ctl_set_num_cores_ip_t s_set_cores_ip;
ivdext_ctl_set_num_cores_op_t s_set_cores_op;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
s_set_cores_ip.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_set_cores_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVDEXT_CMD_CTL_SET_NUM_CORES;
s_set_cores_ip.u4_num_cores = MIN(mNumCores, CODEC_MAX_NUM_CORES);
s_set_cores_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_ctl_set_num_cores_ip_t);
s_set_cores_op.u4_size = sizeof(ivdext_ctl_set_num_cores_op_t);
status = ivdec_api_function(
mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_set_cores_ip, (void *)&s_set_cores_op);
if (IV_SUCCESS != status) {
ALOGE("Error in setting number of cores: 0x%x",
s_set_cores_op.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OutdatedPluginInfoBarDelegate::~OutdatedPluginInfoBarDelegate() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OutdatedPluginInfobar.Closed"));
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 97,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setDeferredMultiBulkLength(client *c, void *node, long length) {
listNode *ln = (listNode*)node;
robj *len, *next;
/* Abort when *node is NULL (see addDeferredMultiBulkLength). */
if (node == NULL) return;
len = listNodeValue(ln);
len->ptr = sdscatprintf(sdsempty(),"*%ld\r\n",length);
len->encoding = OBJ_ENCODING_RAW; /* in case it was an EMBSTR. */
c->reply_bytes += sdsZmallocSize(len->ptr);
if (ln->next != NULL) {
next = listNodeValue(ln->next);
/* Only glue when the next node is non-NULL (an sds in this case) */
if (next->ptr != NULL) {
c->reply_bytes -= sdsZmallocSize(len->ptr);
c->reply_bytes -= getStringObjectSdsUsedMemory(next);
len->ptr = sdscatlen(len->ptr,next->ptr,sdslen(next->ptr));
c->reply_bytes += sdsZmallocSize(len->ptr);
listDelNode(c->reply,ln->next);
}
}
asyncCloseClientOnOutputBufferLimitReached(c);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ClassAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_class_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ClassAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,608 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.