instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AsyncFileSystemChromium::move(const KURL& sourcePath, const KURL& destinationPath, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
m_webFileSystem->move(sourcePath, destinationPath, new WebKit::WebFileSystemCallbacksImpl(callbacks));
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnNetworkConnectionChanged(
net::NetworkChangeNotifier::ConnectionType type,
double max_bandwidth_mbps) {
bool online = type != net::NetworkChangeNotifier::CONNECTION_NONE;
WebNetworkStateNotifier::SetOnLine(online);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.NetworkStateChanged(online);
WebNetworkStateNotifier::SetWebConnection(
NetConnectionTypeToWebConnectionType(type), max_bandwidth_mbps);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
{
BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
BIGNUM *m, *blind, *blindm, *tmp;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB;
DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
int noredo = 0;
if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
goto err;
}
s = BN_new();
if (s == NULL)
goto err;
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
redo:
if ((dsa->kinv == NULL) || (dsa->r == NULL)) {
if (!DSA_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r))
goto err;
} else {
kinv = dsa->kinv;
dsa->kinv = NULL;
r = dsa->r;
dsa->r = NULL;
noredo = 1;
}
if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
/*
* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
* BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
* 4.2
*/
dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* The normal signature calculation is:
*
* s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod q
*
* We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
*
* s := blind^-1 * k^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod q
*/
/* Generate a blinding value */
do {
if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1, -1, 0))
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(blind));
BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, r, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* blindm := blind * m mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
goto err;
/* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
goto err;
/*
* Redo if r or s is zero as required by FIPS 186-3: this is very
* unlikely.
*/
if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_zero(s)) {
if (noredo) {
reason = DSA_R_NEED_NEW_SETUP_VALUES;
goto err;
}
goto redo;
}
ret = DSA_SIG_new();
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
ret->r = r;
ret->s = s;
err:
if (ret == NULL) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason);
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
}
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 15,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetDestroyed() {
widget_count_--;
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,185
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cdrom_media_erasable(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi)
{
disc_information di;
int ret;
ret = cdrom_get_disc_info(cdi, &di);
if (ret < 0 || ret < offsetof(typeof(di), n_first_track))
return -1;
return di.erasable;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 76,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NotifyReply(webkit_glue::WebIntentReplyType reply_type,
const string16& data) {
notified_reply_type_ = reply_type;
notified_data_ = data;
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized member in ctor.
TBR=darin@chromium.org
R=jhawkins@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10377180
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137606 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NICK_REC *nicklist_find_unique(CHANNEL_REC *channel, const char *nick,
void *id)
{
NICK_REC *rec;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_CHANNEL(channel), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(nick != NULL, NULL);
rec = g_hash_table_lookup(channel->nicks, nick);
while (rec != NULL && rec->unique_id != id)
rec = rec->next;
return rec;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_aggregation_extension(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_, proto_tree *tree, int offset, int data_len)
{
proto_tree *ftree;
ptvcursor_t *csr;
ftree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, data_len, ett_aggregation_extension, NULL, "Aggregation Extension");
add_ppi_field_header(tvb, ftree, &offset);
data_len -= 4; /* Subtract field header length */
if (data_len != PPI_AGGREGATION_EXTENSION_LEN) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(ftree, pinfo, &ei_ppi_invalid_length, tvb, offset, data_len, "Invalid length: %u", data_len);
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
}
csr = ptvcursor_new(ftree, tvb, offset);
ptvcursor_add(csr, hf_aggregation_extension_interface_id, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN); /* Last */
ptvcursor_free(csr);
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Chapters::~Chapters()
{
while (m_editions_count > 0)
{
Edition& e = m_editions[--m_editions_count];
e.Clear();
}
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct sigqueue *sigqueue_alloc(void)
{
struct sigqueue *q = __sigqueue_alloc(-1, current, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
if (q)
q->flags |= SIGQUEUE_PREALLOC;
return q;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 31,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Debugger::stepOutOfFunction()
{
DCHECK(isPaused());
DCHECK(!m_executionState.IsEmpty());
v8::HandleScope handleScope(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { m_executionState };
callDebuggerMethod(stepOutV8MethodName, 1, argv);
continueProgram();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void drive_machine(conn *c) {
bool stop = false;
int sfd, flags = 1;
socklen_t addrlen;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int nreqs = settings.reqs_per_event;
int res;
assert(c != NULL);
while (!stop) {
switch(c->state) {
case conn_listening:
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
if ((sfd = accept(c->sfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
/* these are transient, so don't log anything */
stop = true;
} else if (errno == EMFILE) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Too many open connections\n");
accept_new_conns(false);
stop = true;
} else {
perror("accept()");
stop = true;
}
break;
}
if ((flags = fcntl(sfd, F_GETFL, 0)) < 0 ||
fcntl(sfd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) {
perror("setting O_NONBLOCK");
close(sfd);
break;
}
dispatch_conn_new(sfd, conn_new_cmd, EV_READ | EV_PERSIST,
DATA_BUFFER_SIZE, tcp_transport);
stop = true;
break;
case conn_waiting:
if (!update_event(c, EV_READ | EV_PERSIST)) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't update event\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_read);
stop = true;
break;
case conn_read:
res = IS_UDP(c->transport) ? try_read_udp(c) : try_read_network(c);
switch (res) {
case READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED:
conn_set_state(c, conn_waiting);
break;
case READ_DATA_RECEIVED:
conn_set_state(c, conn_parse_cmd);
break;
case READ_ERROR:
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
case READ_MEMORY_ERROR: /* Failed to allocate more memory */
/* State already set by try_read_network */
break;
}
break;
case conn_parse_cmd :
if (try_read_command(c) == 0) {
/* wee need more data! */
conn_set_state(c, conn_waiting);
}
break;
case conn_new_cmd:
/* Only process nreqs at a time to avoid starving other
connections */
--nreqs;
if (nreqs >= 0) {
reset_cmd_handler(c);
} else {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.conn_yields++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (c->rbytes > 0) {
/* We have already read in data into the input buffer,
so libevent will most likely not signal read events
on the socket (unless more data is available. As a
hack we should just put in a request to write data,
because that should be possible ;-)
*/
if (!update_event(c, EV_WRITE | EV_PERSIST)) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't update event\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
}
}
stop = true;
}
break;
case conn_nread:
if (c->rlbytes == 0) {
complete_nread(c);
break;
}
/* first check if we have leftovers in the conn_read buffer */
if (c->rbytes > 0) {
int tocopy = c->rbytes > c->rlbytes ? c->rlbytes : c->rbytes;
if (c->ritem != c->rcurr) {
memmove(c->ritem, c->rcurr, tocopy);
}
c->ritem += tocopy;
c->rlbytes -= tocopy;
c->rcurr += tocopy;
c->rbytes -= tocopy;
if (c->rlbytes == 0) {
break;
}
}
/* now try reading from the socket */
res = read(c->sfd, c->ritem, c->rlbytes);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (c->rcurr == c->ritem) {
c->rcurr += res;
}
c->ritem += res;
c->rlbytes -= res;
break;
}
if (res == 0) { /* end of stream */
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
if (res == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
if (!update_event(c, EV_READ | EV_PERSIST)) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't update event\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
stop = true;
break;
}
/* otherwise we have a real error, on which we close the connection */
if (settings.verbose > 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to read, and not due to blocking:\n"
"errno: %d %s \n"
"rcurr=%lx ritem=%lx rbuf=%lx rlbytes=%d rsize=%d\n",
errno, strerror(errno),
(long)c->rcurr, (long)c->ritem, (long)c->rbuf,
(int)c->rlbytes, (int)c->rsize);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
case conn_swallow:
/* we are reading sbytes and throwing them away */
if (c->sbytes == 0) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_new_cmd);
break;
}
/* first check if we have leftovers in the conn_read buffer */
if (c->rbytes > 0) {
int tocopy = c->rbytes > c->sbytes ? c->sbytes : c->rbytes;
c->sbytes -= tocopy;
c->rcurr += tocopy;
c->rbytes -= tocopy;
break;
}
/* now try reading from the socket */
res = read(c->sfd, c->rbuf, c->rsize > c->sbytes ? c->sbytes : c->rsize);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->sbytes -= res;
break;
}
if (res == 0) { /* end of stream */
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
if (res == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) {
if (!update_event(c, EV_READ | EV_PERSIST)) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't update event\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
stop = true;
break;
}
/* otherwise we have a real error, on which we close the connection */
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to read, and not due to blocking\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
case conn_write:
/*
* We want to write out a simple response. If we haven't already,
* assemble it into a msgbuf list (this will be a single-entry
* list for TCP or a two-entry list for UDP).
*/
if (c->iovused == 0 || (IS_UDP(c->transport) && c->iovused == 1)) {
if (add_iov(c, c->wcurr, c->wbytes) != 0) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't build response\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
}
/* fall through... */
case conn_mwrite:
if (IS_UDP(c->transport) && c->msgcurr == 0 && build_udp_headers(c) != 0) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to build UDP headers\n");
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
break;
}
switch (transmit(c)) {
case TRANSMIT_COMPLETE:
if (c->state == conn_mwrite) {
while (c->ileft > 0) {
item *it = *(c->icurr);
assert((it->it_flags & ITEM_SLABBED) == 0);
item_remove(it);
c->icurr++;
c->ileft--;
}
while (c->suffixleft > 0) {
char *suffix = *(c->suffixcurr);
cache_free(c->thread->suffix_cache, suffix);
c->suffixcurr++;
c->suffixleft--;
}
/* XXX: I don't know why this wasn't the general case */
if(c->protocol == binary_prot) {
conn_set_state(c, c->write_and_go);
} else {
conn_set_state(c, conn_new_cmd);
}
} else if (c->state == conn_write) {
if (c->write_and_free) {
free(c->write_and_free);
c->write_and_free = 0;
}
conn_set_state(c, c->write_and_go);
} else {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected state %d\n", c->state);
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
}
break;
case TRANSMIT_INCOMPLETE:
case TRANSMIT_HARD_ERROR:
break; /* Continue in state machine. */
case TRANSMIT_SOFT_ERROR:
stop = true;
break;
}
break;
case conn_closing:
if (IS_UDP(c->transport))
conn_cleanup(c);
else
conn_close(c);
stop = true;
break;
case conn_max_state:
assert(false);
break;
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char *skb_put(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned char *tmp = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
SKB_LINEAR_ASSERT(skb);
skb->tail += len;
skb->len += len;
if (unlikely(skb->tail > skb->end))
skb_over_panic(skb, len, __builtin_return_address(0));
return tmp;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void computeOverlayOffset(ut64 offset, ut64 size, ut64 file_size, ut64* largest_offset, ut64* largest_size) {
if (offset + size <= file_size && offset + size > (*largest_offset + *largest_size)) {
*largest_offset = offset;
*largest_size = size;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setChildWebFrameClient(WebFrameClient* client) { m_client = client; }
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DevToolsUIBindings::~DevToolsUIBindings() {
for (const auto& pair : pending_requests_)
delete pair.first;
if (agent_host_.get())
agent_host_->DetachClient(this);
for (IndexingJobsMap::const_iterator jobs_it(indexing_jobs_.begin());
jobs_it != indexing_jobs_.end(); ++jobs_it) {
jobs_it->second->Stop();
}
indexing_jobs_.clear();
SetDevicesUpdatesEnabled(false);
DevToolsUIBindingsList* instances = g_instances.Pointer();
DevToolsUIBindingsList::iterator it(
std::find(instances->begin(), instances->end(), this));
DCHECK(it != instances->end());
instances->erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Improve sanitization of remoteFrontendUrl in DevTools
This change ensures that the decoded remoteFrontendUrl parameter cannot
contain any single quote in its value. As of this commit, none of the
permitted query params in SanitizeFrontendQueryParam can contain single
quotes.
Note that the existing SanitizeEndpoint function does not explicitly
check for single quotes. This is fine since single quotes in the query
string are already URL-encoded and the values validated by
SanitizeEndpoint are not url-decoded elsewhere.
BUG=798163
TEST=Manually, see https://crbug.com/798163#c1
TEST=./unit_tests --gtest_filter=DevToolsUIBindingsTest.SanitizeFrontendURL
Change-Id: I5a08e8ce6f1abc2c8d2a0983fef63e1e194cd242
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/846979
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#527250}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::RequestPpapiBrokerPermission(
WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& url,
const base::FilePath& plugin_path,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
if (profile->IsGuestSession()) {
callback.Run(false);
return true;
}
TabSpecificContentSettings* tab_content_settings =
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents);
HostContentSettingsMap* content_settings =
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
ContentSetting setting = content_settings->GetContentSetting(
url, url, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PPAPI_BROKER, std::string());
if (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ASK) {
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("PPAPI.BrokerInfobarDisplayed"));
content::PluginService* plugin_service =
content::PluginService::GetInstance();
content::WebPluginInfo plugin;
bool success = plugin_service->GetPluginInfoByPath(plugin_path, &plugin);
DCHECK(success);
std::unique_ptr<PluginMetadata> plugin_metadata(
PluginFinder::GetInstance()->GetPluginMetadata(plugin));
PepperBrokerInfoBarDelegate::Create(
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents), url,
plugin_metadata->name(), content_settings, tab_content_settings,
callback);
return true;
}
bool allowed = (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW);
base::RecordAction(allowed
? base::UserMetricsAction("PPAPI.BrokerSettingAllow")
: base::UserMetricsAction("PPAPI.BrokerSettingDeny"));
tab_content_settings->SetPepperBrokerAllowed(allowed);
callback.Run(allowed);
return true;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t SampleTable::CompositionDeltaLookup::getCompositionTimeOffset(
uint32_t sampleIndex) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
if (mDeltaEntries == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (sampleIndex < mCurrentEntrySampleIndex) {
mCurrentDeltaEntry = 0;
mCurrentEntrySampleIndex = 0;
}
while (mCurrentDeltaEntry < mNumDeltaEntries) {
uint32_t sampleCount = mDeltaEntries[2 * mCurrentDeltaEntry];
if (sampleIndex < mCurrentEntrySampleIndex + sampleCount) {
return mDeltaEntries[2 * mCurrentDeltaEntry + 1];
}
mCurrentEntrySampleIndex += sampleCount;
++mCurrentDeltaEntry;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int av_lockmgr_register(int (*cb)(void **mutex, enum AVLockOp op))
{
if (lockmgr_cb) {
lockmgr_cb(&codec_mutex, AV_LOCK_DESTROY);
lockmgr_cb(&avformat_mutex, AV_LOCK_DESTROY);
lockmgr_cb = NULL;
codec_mutex = NULL;
avformat_mutex = NULL;
}
if (cb) {
void *new_codec_mutex = NULL;
void *new_avformat_mutex = NULL;
int err;
if (err = cb(&new_codec_mutex, AV_LOCK_CREATE)) {
return err > 0 ? AVERROR_UNKNOWN : err;
}
if (err = cb(&new_avformat_mutex, AV_LOCK_CREATE)) {
cb(&new_codec_mutex, AV_LOCK_DESTROY);
return err > 0 ? AVERROR_UNKNOWN : err;
}
lockmgr_cb = cb;
codec_mutex = new_codec_mutex;
avformat_mutex = new_avformat_mutex;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 66,960
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
{
unsigned int mtu;
s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
/* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
mtu =
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
NULL);
if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
s->d1->mtu = mtu;
}
if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
/* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_asymm_operate(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
size_t num_params, const void *src_data, size_t src_len,
void *dst_data, uint64_t *dst_len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
uint64_t dlen64;
size_t dlen;
struct tee_obj *o;
void *label = NULL;
size_t label_len = 0;
size_t n;
int salt_len;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) src_data, src_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_svc_copy_from_user(&dlen64, dst_len, sizeof(dlen64));
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
dlen = dlen64;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(
utc,
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_READ | TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t) dst_data, dlen);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * num_params);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, num_params, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_RSA_NOPAD:
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_encrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsanopad_decrypt(o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
} else {
/*
* We will panic because "the mode is not compatible
* with the function"
*/
res = TEE_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
break;
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_V1_5:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSAES_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1_SHA512:
for (n = 0; n < num_params; n++) {
if (params[n].attributeID == TEE_ATTR_RSA_OAEP_LABEL) {
label = params[n].content.ref.buffer;
label_len = params[n].content.ref.length;
break;
}
}
if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_ENCRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_encrypt(cs->algo, o->attr,
label, label_len,
src_data, src_len,
dst_data, &dlen);
} else if (cs->mode == TEE_MODE_DECRYPT) {
res = crypto_acipher_rsaes_decrypt(
cs->algo, o->attr, label, label_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
}
break;
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_RSASSA_NA1)
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5:
#endif
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_MD5:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_V1_5_SHA512:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA256:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA384:
case TEE_ALG_RSASSA_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1_SHA512:
if (cs->mode != TEE_MODE_SIGN) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
salt_len = pkcs1_get_salt_len(params, num_params, src_len);
res = crypto_acipher_rsassa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, salt_len,
src_data, src_len, dst_data,
&dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA1:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA224:
case TEE_ALG_DSA_SHA256:
res = crypto_acipher_dsa_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P192:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P224:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P256:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P384:
case TEE_ALG_ECDSA_P521:
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_sign(cs->algo, o->attr, src_data,
src_len, dst_data, &dlen);
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
break;
}
out:
free(params);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS || res == TEE_ERROR_SHORT_BUFFER) {
TEE_Result res2;
dlen64 = dlen;
res2 = tee_svc_copy_to_user(dst_len, &dlen64, sizeof(*dst_len));
if (res2 != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res2;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DefaultTabHandler::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContentsWrapper* old_contents,
TabContentsWrapper* new_contents,
int index) {
delegate_->AsBrowser()->TabReplacedAt(tab_strip_model, old_contents,
new_contents, index);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ahash_op_unaligned(struct ahash_request *req,
int (*op)(struct ahash_request *))
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
unsigned int ds = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
struct ahash_request_priv *priv;
int err;
priv = kmalloc(sizeof(*priv) + ahash_align_buffer_size(ds, alignmask),
(req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) ?
GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->result = req->result;
priv->complete = req->base.complete;
priv->data = req->base.data;
req->result = PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)priv->ubuf, alignmask + 1);
req->base.complete = ahash_op_unaligned_done;
req->base.data = req;
req->priv = priv;
err = op(req);
ahash_op_unaligned_finish(req, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,242
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::stepAttributeChanged()
{
updateInnerTextValue();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool csum_and_copy_from_iter_full(void *addr, size_t bytes, __wsum *csum,
struct iov_iter *i)
{
char *to = addr;
__wsum sum, next;
size_t off = 0;
sum = *csum;
if (unlikely(i->type & ITER_PIPE)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return false;
}
if (unlikely(i->count < bytes))
return false;
iterate_all_kinds(i, bytes, v, ({
int err = 0;
next = csum_and_copy_from_user(v.iov_base,
(to += v.iov_len) - v.iov_len,
v.iov_len, 0, &err);
if (err)
return false;
sum = csum_block_add(sum, next, off);
off += v.iov_len;
0;
}), ({
char *p = kmap_atomic(v.bv_page);
next = csum_partial_copy_nocheck(p + v.bv_offset,
(to += v.bv_len) - v.bv_len,
v.bv_len, 0);
kunmap_atomic(p);
sum = csum_block_add(sum, next, off);
off += v.bv_len;
}),({
next = csum_partial_copy_nocheck(v.iov_base,
(to += v.iov_len) - v.iov_len,
v.iov_len, 0);
sum = csum_block_add(sum, next, off);
off += v.iov_len;
})
)
*csum = sum;
iov_iter_advance(i, bytes);
return true;
}
Commit Message: fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 68,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stbl_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_SampleTableBox *ptr = (GF_SampleTableBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, stbl_AddBox);
if (e) return e;
if (!ptr->SyncSample)
ptr->no_sync_found = 1;
ptr->nb_sgpd_in_stbl = gf_list_count(ptr->sampleGroupsDescription);
ptr->nb_other_boxes_in_stbl = gf_list_count(ptr->other_boxes);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BluetoothSocketAsyncApiFunction::BluetoothSocketAsyncApiFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xml_apply_patchset_v1(xmlNode *xml, xmlNode *patchset, bool check_version)
{
int rc = pcmk_ok;
int root_nodes_seen = 0;
char *version = crm_element_value_copy(xml, XML_ATTR_CRM_VERSION);
xmlNode *child_diff = NULL;
xmlNode *added = find_xml_node(patchset, "diff-added", FALSE);
xmlNode *removed = find_xml_node(patchset, "diff-removed", FALSE);
xmlNode *old = copy_xml(xml);
crm_trace("Substraction Phase");
for (child_diff = __xml_first_child(removed); child_diff != NULL;
child_diff = __xml_next(child_diff)) {
CRM_CHECK(root_nodes_seen == 0, rc = FALSE);
if (root_nodes_seen == 0) {
__subtract_xml_object(xml, child_diff);
}
root_nodes_seen++;
}
if (root_nodes_seen > 1) {
crm_err("(-) Diffs cannot contain more than one change set... saw %d", root_nodes_seen);
rc = -ENOTUNIQ;
}
root_nodes_seen = 0;
crm_trace("Addition Phase");
if (rc == pcmk_ok) {
xmlNode *child_diff = NULL;
for (child_diff = __xml_first_child(added); child_diff != NULL;
child_diff = __xml_next(child_diff)) {
CRM_CHECK(root_nodes_seen == 0, rc = FALSE);
if (root_nodes_seen == 0) {
__add_xml_object(NULL, xml, child_diff);
}
root_nodes_seen++;
}
}
if (root_nodes_seen > 1) {
crm_err("(+) Diffs cannot contain more than one change set... saw %d", root_nodes_seen);
rc = -ENOTUNIQ;
}
purge_diff_markers(xml); /* Purge prior to checking the digest */
free_xml(old);
free(version);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::installPerContextEnabledProperties(v8::Handle<v8::Object> instanceTemplate, TestObject* impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Local<v8::Object> prototypeTemplate = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(instanceTemplate->GetPrototype());
if (ContextFeatures::featureNameEnabled(impl->document())) {
static const V8DOMConfiguration::AttributeConfiguration attributeConfiguration =\
{"enabledPerContextAttr", TestObjectV8Internal::enabledPerContextAttrAttributeGetterCallback, TestObjectV8Internal::enabledPerContextAttrAttributeSetterCallback, 0, 0, 0, static_cast<v8::AccessControl>(v8::DEFAULT), static_cast<v8::PropertyAttribute>(v8::None), 0 /* on instance */};
V8DOMConfiguration::installAttribute(instanceTemplate, prototypeTemplate, attributeConfiguration, isolate);
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline double Permutate(const ssize_t n,const ssize_t k)
{
double
r;
register ssize_t
i;
r=1.0;
for (i=k+1; i <= n; i++)
r*=i;
for (i=1; i <= (n-k); i++)
r/=i;
return(r);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,016
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RAnalBlock *r_anal_bb_get_failbb(RAnalFunction *fcn, RAnalBlock *bb) {
RListIter *iter;
RAnalBlock *b;
if (bb->fail == UT64_MAX) {
return NULL;
}
if (bb->failbb) {
return bb->failbb;
}
r_list_foreach (fcn->bbs, iter, b) {
if (b->addr == bb->fail) {
bb->failbb = b;
b->prev = bb;
return b;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int ReadProfileMSBLong(unsigned char **p,size_t *length)
{
unsigned int
value;
if (*length < 4)
return(0);
value=ReadProfileLong(MSBEndian,*p);
(*length)-=4;
*p+=4;
return(value);
}
Commit Message: Fixed SEGV reported in https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/130
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ProcessKeyboardEventAck(int type, bool processed) {
if (key_queue_.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Got a KeyEvent back from the renderer but we "
<< "don't seem to have sent it to the renderer!";
} else if (key_queue_.front().type != type) {
LOG(ERROR) << "We seem to have a different key type sent from "
<< "the renderer. (" << key_queue_.front().type << " vs. "
<< type << "). Ignoring event.";
key_queue_.clear();
suppress_next_char_events_ = false;
} else {
NativeWebKeyboardEvent front_item = key_queue_.front();
key_queue_.pop_front();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (!is_hidden_ && view_->PostProcessEventForPluginIme(front_item))
return;
#endif
if (delegate_ && !processed && !is_hidden_ && !front_item.skip_in_browser) {
delegate_->HandleKeyboardEvent(front_item);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::DestroyBrowser() {
GetWidget()->RemoveObserver(this);
frame_->CloseNow();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didLoseWebGLContext(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
int arb_robustness_status_code) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidLose3DContext(
GURL(frame->top()->securityOrigin().toString()),
THREE_D_API_TYPE_WEBGL,
arb_robustness_status_code));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer2_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition;
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u",
asString(index), index, portString(portIndex), portIndex);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = NULL;
OMX_U8* bufferHandle = const_cast<OMX_U8*>(
reinterpret_cast<const OMX_U8*>(graphicBuffer->handle));
err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle,
&header,
portIndex,
bufferMeta,
def.nBufferSize,
bufferHandle);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pBuffer, bufferHandle);
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer2, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u@%p", def.nBufferSize, bufferHandle));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u32 exit_code = svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
if (!is_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE))
vcpu->arch.cr0 = svm->vmcb->save.cr0;
if (npt_enabled)
vcpu->arch.cr3 = svm->vmcb->save.cr3;
if (unlikely(svm->nested.exit_required)) {
nested_svm_vmexit(svm);
svm->nested.exit_required = false;
return 1;
}
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
int vmexit;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(svm->vmcb->save.rip, exit_code,
svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1,
svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2,
svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info,
svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err,
KVM_ISA_SVM);
vmexit = nested_svm_exit_special(svm);
if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_CONTINUE)
vmexit = nested_svm_exit_handled(svm);
if (vmexit == NESTED_EXIT_DONE)
return 1;
}
svm_complete_interrupts(svm);
if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_ERR) {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
kvm_run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= svm->vmcb->control.exit_code;
pr_err("KVM: FAILED VMRUN WITH VMCB:\n");
dump_vmcb(vcpu);
return 0;
}
if (is_external_interrupt(svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info) &&
exit_code != SVM_EXIT_EXCP_BASE + PF_VECTOR &&
exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NPF && exit_code != SVM_EXIT_TASK_SWITCH &&
exit_code != SVM_EXIT_INTR && exit_code != SVM_EXIT_NMI)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unexpected exit_int_info 0x%x "
"exit_code 0x%x\n",
__func__, svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info,
exit_code);
if (exit_code >= ARRAY_SIZE(svm_exit_handlers)
|| !svm_exit_handlers[exit_code]) {
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
kvm_run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = exit_code;
return 0;
}
return svm_exit_handlers[exit_code](svm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnUpdateViewportIntersectionOnUI(const gfx::Rect& viewport_intersection,
const gfx::Rect& compositing_rect,
bool occluded_or_obscured) {
viewport_intersection_ = viewport_intersection;
compositing_rect_ = compositing_rect;
occluded_or_obscured_ = occluded_or_obscured;
msg_received_ = true;
if (run_loop_)
run_loop_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 143,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long sock_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sock *sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int pid, err;
struct net *net;
sock = file->private_data;
sk = sock->sk;
net = sock_net(sk);
if (cmd >= SIOCDEVPRIVATE && cmd <= (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15)) {
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
} else
#ifdef CONFIG_WEXT_CORE
if (cmd >= SIOCIWFIRST && cmd <= SIOCIWLAST) {
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
} else
#endif
switch (cmd) {
case FIOSETOWN:
case SIOCSPGRP:
err = -EFAULT;
if (get_user(pid, (int __user *)argp))
break;
f_setown(sock->file, pid, 1);
err = 0;
break;
case FIOGETOWN:
case SIOCGPGRP:
err = put_user(f_getown(sock->file),
(int __user *)argp);
break;
case SIOCGIFBR:
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!br_ioctl_hook)
request_module("bridge");
mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
if (br_ioctl_hook)
err = br_ioctl_hook(net, cmd, argp);
mutex_unlock(&br_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!vlan_ioctl_hook)
request_module("8021q");
mutex_lock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
if (vlan_ioctl_hook)
err = vlan_ioctl_hook(net, argp);
mutex_unlock(&vlan_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCADDDLCI:
case SIOCDELDLCI:
err = -ENOPKG;
if (!dlci_ioctl_hook)
request_module("dlci");
mutex_lock(&dlci_ioctl_mutex);
if (dlci_ioctl_hook)
err = dlci_ioctl_hook(cmd, argp);
mutex_unlock(&dlci_ioctl_mutex);
break;
case SIOCGSKNS:
err = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
break;
err = open_related_ns(&net->ns, get_net_ns);
break;
default:
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, arg);
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smb_errstr(int class, int num)
{
static char ret[128];
int i, j;
ret[0] = 0;
for (i = 0; err_classes[i].class; i++)
if (err_classes[i].code == class) {
if (err_classes[i].err_msgs) {
const err_code_struct *err = err_classes[i].err_msgs;
for (j = 0; err[j].name; j++)
if (num == err[j].code) {
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s - %s (%s)",
err_classes[i].class, err[j].name, err[j].message);
return ret;
}
}
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s - %d", err_classes[i].class, num);
return ret;
}
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "ERROR: Unknown error (%d,%d)", class, num);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document* AXObject::getDocument() const {
FrameView* frameView = documentFrameView();
if (!frameView)
return 0;
return frameView->frame().document();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vhost_net_flush_vq(struct vhost_net *n, int index)
{
vhost_poll_flush(n->poll + index);
vhost_poll_flush(&n->vqs[index].vq.poll);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 30,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeScrollOffset(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
render_view_->didChangeScrollOffset(frame);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0,
unsigned int *offsets)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask */
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct ipt_entry *e = entry0 + pos;
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)ipt_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS))
return 0;
e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((unconditional(e) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1)
return 0;
/* Return: backtrack through the last
big jump. */
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_INET_NUMHOOKS);
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = entry0 + pos;
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = entry0 + pos + size;
if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
return 0;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
/* This a jump; chase it. */
if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos,
newinfo->number))
return 0;
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
return 0;
}
e = entry0 + newpos;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next: ;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QQmlComponent* OxideQQuickWebView::alertDialog() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
return d->alert_dialog_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int addr_contains(IPAddressOrRanges *parent,
IPAddressOrRanges *child, int length)
{
unsigned char p_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], p_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
unsigned char c_min[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN], c_max[ADDR_RAW_BUF_LEN];
int p, c;
if (child == NULL || parent == child)
return 1;
if (parent == NULL)
return 0;
p = 0;
for (c = 0; c < sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(child); c++) {
if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(child, c),
c_min, c_max, length))
return -1;
for (;; p++) {
if (p >= sk_IPAddressOrRange_num(parent))
return 0;
if (!extract_min_max(sk_IPAddressOrRange_value(parent, p),
p_min, p_max, length))
return 0;
if (memcmp(p_max, c_max, length) < 0)
continue;
if (memcmp(p_min, c_min, length) > 0)
return 0;
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid out-of-bounds read
Fixes CVE 2017-3735
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4276)
(cherry picked from commit b23171744b01e473ebbfd6edad70c1c3825ffbcd)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBlock::checkPositionedObjectsNeedLayout()
{
if (!gPositionedDescendantsMap)
return;
if (TrackedRendererListHashSet* positionedDescendantSet = positionedObjects()) {
TrackedRendererListHashSet::const_iterator end = positionedDescendantSet->end();
for (TrackedRendererListHashSet::const_iterator it = positionedDescendantSet->begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RenderBox* currBox = *it;
ASSERT(!currBox->needsLayout());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lz4_decompress_crypto(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
int err;
size_t tmp_len = *dlen;
size_t __slen = slen;
err = lz4_decompress_unknownoutputsize(src, __slen, dst, &tmp_len);
if (err < 0)
return -EINVAL;
*dlen = tmp_len;
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int s6x0_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
int num)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = i2c_get_adapdata(adap);
struct usb_device *udev;
int len, i, j, ret;
if (!d)
return -ENODEV;
udev = d->udev;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&d->i2c_mutex) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
switch (msg[j].addr) {
case (DW2102_RC_QUERY): {
u8 ibuf[5];
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb8, 0, 0,
ibuf, 5, DW210X_READ_MSG);
memcpy(msg[j].buf, ibuf + 3, 2);
break;
}
case (DW2102_VOLTAGE_CTRL): {
u8 obuf[2];
obuf[0] = 1;
obuf[1] = msg[j].buf[1];/* off-on */
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0x8a, 0, 0,
obuf, 2, DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
obuf[0] = 3;
obuf[1] = msg[j].buf[0];/* 13v-18v */
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0x8a, 0, 0,
obuf, 2, DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
break;
}
case (DW2102_LED_CTRL): {
u8 obuf[2];
obuf[0] = 5;
obuf[1] = msg[j].buf[0];
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0x8a, 0, 0,
obuf, 2, DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
break;
}
/*case 0x55: cx24116
case 0x6a: stv0903
case 0x68: ds3000, stv0903, rs2000
case 0x60: ts2020, stv6110, stb6100
case 0xa0: eeprom */
default: {
if (msg[j].flags == I2C_M_RD) {
/* read registers */
u8 ibuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (msg[j].len > sizeof(ibuf)) {
warn("i2c rd: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[j].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0x91, 0, 0,
ibuf, msg[j].len,
DW210X_READ_MSG);
memcpy(msg[j].buf, ibuf, msg[j].len);
break;
} else if ((msg[j].buf[0] == 0xb0) &&
(msg[j].addr == 0x68)) {
/* write firmware */
u8 obuf[19];
obuf[0] = (msg[j].len > 16 ?
18 : msg[j].len + 1);
obuf[1] = msg[j].addr << 1;
obuf[2] = msg[j].buf[0];
len = msg[j].len - 1;
i = 1;
do {
memcpy(obuf + 3, msg[j].buf + i,
(len > 16 ? 16 : len));
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0x80, 0, 0,
obuf, (len > 16 ? 16 : len) + 3,
DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
i += 16;
len -= 16;
} while (len > 0);
} else if (j < (num - 1)) {
/* write register addr before read */
u8 obuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (2 + msg[j].len > sizeof(obuf)) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[j].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
obuf[0] = msg[j + 1].len;
obuf[1] = (msg[j].addr << 1);
memcpy(obuf + 2, msg[j].buf, msg[j].len);
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev,
le16_to_cpu(udev->descriptor.idProduct) ==
0x7500 ? 0x92 : 0x90, 0, 0,
obuf, msg[j].len + 2,
DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
break;
} else {
/* write registers */
u8 obuf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
if (2 + msg[j].len > sizeof(obuf)) {
warn("i2c wr: len=%d is too big!\n",
msg[j].len);
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto unlock;
}
obuf[0] = msg[j].len + 1;
obuf[1] = (msg[j].addr << 1);
memcpy(obuf + 2, msg[j].buf, msg[j].len);
dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0x80, 0, 0,
obuf, msg[j].len + 2,
DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
ret = num;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,778
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: otp_return_padata(krb5_context context, krb5_pa_data *padata,
krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_kdc_rep *reply, krb5_keyblock *encrypting_key,
krb5_pa_data **send_pa_out, krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock, krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq)
{
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = NULL;
if (padata->length == 0)
return 0;
/* Get the armor key. */
armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
if (!armor_key) {
com_err("otp", ENOENT, "No armor key found when returning padata");
return ENOENT;
}
/* Replace the reply key with the FAST armor key. */
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, encrypting_key);
return krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(context, armor_key, encrypting_key);
}
Commit Message: Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
CVE-2015-2694:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
password.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8160 (new)
target_version: 1.13.2
tags: pullup
subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int ret, needed_blocks;
handle_t *handle;
int retries = 0;
struct page *page;
pgoff_t index;
unsigned from, to;
trace_ext4_write_begin(inode, pos, len, flags);
/*
* Reserve one block more for addition to orphan list in case
* we allocate blocks but write fails for some reason
*/
needed_blocks = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode) + 1;
index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT;
from = pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
to = from + len;
if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA)) {
ret = ext4_try_to_write_inline_data(mapping, inode, pos, len,
flags, pagep);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 1)
return 0;
}
/*
* grab_cache_page_write_begin() can take a long time if the
* system is thrashing due to memory pressure, or if the page
* is being written back. So grab it first before we start
* the transaction handle. This also allows us to allocate
* the page (if needed) without using GFP_NOFS.
*/
retry_grab:
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
unlock_page(page);
retry_journal:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE, needed_blocks);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
put_page(page);
return PTR_ERR(handle);
}
lock_page(page);
if (page->mapping != mapping) {
/* The page got truncated from under us */
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
goto retry_grab;
}
/* In case writeback began while the page was unlocked */
wait_for_stable_page(page);
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
ret = ext4_block_write_begin(page, pos, len,
ext4_get_block_unwritten);
else
ret = ext4_block_write_begin(page, pos, len,
ext4_get_block);
#else
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
ret = __block_write_begin(page, pos, len,
ext4_get_block_unwritten);
else
ret = __block_write_begin(page, pos, len, ext4_get_block);
#endif
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page),
from, to, NULL,
do_journal_get_write_access);
}
if (ret) {
unlock_page(page);
/*
* __block_write_begin may have instantiated a few blocks
* outside i_size. Trim these off again. Don't need
* i_size_read because we hold i_mutex.
*
* Add inode to orphan list in case we crash before
* truncate finishes
*/
if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (pos + len > inode->i_size) {
ext4_truncate_failed_write(inode);
/*
* If truncate failed early the inode might
* still be on the orphan list; we need to
* make sure the inode is removed from the
* orphan list in that case.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(NULL, inode);
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry_journal;
put_page(page);
return ret;
}
*pagep = page;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 67,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::SetChannel(int channel) {
extensions::SetCurrentChannel(static_cast<version_info::Channel>(channel));
if (extensions::feature_util::ExtensionServiceWorkersEnabled()) {
blink::WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsAllowingServiceWorkers(
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(extensions::kExtensionScheme));
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *SmushImages(const Image *images,
const MagickBooleanType stack,const ssize_t offset,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SmushImageTag "Smush/Image"
CacheView
*smush_view;
const Image
*image;
Image
*smush_image;
MagickBooleanType
matte,
proceed,
status;
MagickOffsetType
n;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register const Image
*next;
size_t
height,
number_images,
width;
ssize_t
x_offset,
y_offset;
/*
Compute maximum area of smushed area.
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=images;
matte=image->matte;
number_images=1;
width=image->columns;
height=image->rows;
next=GetNextImageInList(image);
for ( ; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
if (next->matte != MagickFalse)
matte=MagickTrue;
number_images++;
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
if (next->columns > width)
width=next->columns;
height+=next->rows;
if (next->previous != (Image *) NULL)
height+=offset;
continue;
}
width+=next->columns;
if (next->previous != (Image *) NULL)
width+=offset;
if (next->rows > height)
height=next->rows;
}
/*
Smush images.
*/
smush_image=CloneImage(image,width,height,MagickTrue,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(smush_image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&smush_image->exception);
smush_image=DestroyImage(smush_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
smush_image->matte=matte;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(smush_image);
status=MagickTrue;
x_offset=0;
y_offset=0;
smush_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(smush_image,exception);
for (n=0; n < (MagickOffsetType) number_images; n++)
{
SetGeometry(smush_image,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,&geometry);
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
x_offset-=geometry.x;
y_offset-=SmushYGap(smush_image,image,offset,exception);
}
else
{
x_offset-=SmushXGap(smush_image,image,offset,exception);
y_offset-=geometry.y;
}
status=CompositeImage(smush_image,OverCompositeOp,image,x_offset,y_offset);
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,SmushImageTag,n,number_images);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
if (stack == MagickFalse)
{
x_offset+=(ssize_t) image->columns;
y_offset=0;
}
else
{
x_offset=0;
y_offset+=(ssize_t) image->rows;
}
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (stack == MagickFalse)
smush_image->columns=(size_t) x_offset;
else
smush_image->rows=(size_t) y_offset;
smush_view=DestroyCacheView(smush_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
smush_image=DestroyImage(smush_image);
return(smush_image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 64,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u32 h264bsdDecode(storage_t *pStorage, u8 *byteStrm, u32 len, u32 picId,
u32 *readBytes)
{
/* Variables */
u32 tmp, ppsId, spsId;
i32 picOrderCnt;
nalUnit_t nalUnit;
seqParamSet_t seqParamSet;
picParamSet_t picParamSet;
strmData_t strm;
u32 accessUnitBoundaryFlag = HANTRO_FALSE;
u32 picReady = HANTRO_FALSE;
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
ASSERT(byteStrm);
ASSERT(len);
ASSERT(readBytes);
/* if previous buffer was not finished and same pointer given -> skip NAL
* unit extraction */
if (pStorage->prevBufNotFinished && byteStrm == pStorage->prevBufPointer)
{
strm = pStorage->strm[0];
strm.pStrmCurrPos = strm.pStrmBuffStart;
strm.strmBuffReadBits = strm.bitPosInWord = 0;
*readBytes = pStorage->prevBytesConsumed;
}
else
{
tmp = h264bsdExtractNalUnit(byteStrm, len, &strm, readBytes);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("BYTE_STREAM");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
/* store stream */
pStorage->strm[0] = strm;
pStorage->prevBytesConsumed = *readBytes;
pStorage->prevBufPointer = byteStrm;
}
pStorage->prevBufNotFinished = HANTRO_FALSE;
tmp = h264bsdDecodeNalUnit(&strm, &nalUnit);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("NAL_UNIT");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
/* Discard unspecified, reserved, SPS extension and auxiliary picture slices */
if(nalUnit.nalUnitType == 0 || nalUnit.nalUnitType >= 13)
{
DEBUG(("DISCARDED NAL (UNSPECIFIED, REGISTERED, SPS ext or AUX slice)\n"));
return(H264BSD_RDY);
}
tmp = h264bsdCheckAccessUnitBoundary(
&strm,
&nalUnit,
pStorage,
&accessUnitBoundaryFlag);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("ACCESS UNIT BOUNDARY CHECK");
if (tmp == PARAM_SET_ERROR)
return(H264BSD_PARAM_SET_ERROR);
else
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if ( accessUnitBoundaryFlag )
{
DEBUG(("Access unit boundary\n"));
/* conceal if picture started and param sets activated */
if (pStorage->picStarted && pStorage->activeSps != NULL)
{
DEBUG(("CONCEALING..."));
/* return error if second phase of
* initialization is not completed */
if (pStorage->pendingActivation)
{
EPRINT("Pending activation not completed");
return (H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if (!pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit)
{
pStorage->currImage->data =
h264bsdAllocateDpbImage(pStorage->dpb);
h264bsdInitRefPicList(pStorage->dpb);
tmp = h264bsdConceal(pStorage, pStorage->currImage, P_SLICE);
}
else
tmp = h264bsdConceal(pStorage, pStorage->currImage,
pStorage->sliceHeader->sliceType);
picReady = HANTRO_TRUE;
/* current NAL unit should be decoded on next activation -> set
* readBytes to 0 */
*readBytes = 0;
pStorage->prevBufNotFinished = HANTRO_TRUE;
DEBUG(("...DONE\n"));
}
else
{
pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit = HANTRO_FALSE;
}
pStorage->skipRedundantSlices = HANTRO_FALSE;
}
if (!picReady)
{
switch (nalUnit.nalUnitType)
{
case NAL_SEQ_PARAM_SET:
DEBUG(("SEQ PARAM SET\n"));
tmp = h264bsdDecodeSeqParamSet(&strm, &seqParamSet);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("SEQ_PARAM_SET");
FREE(seqParamSet.offsetForRefFrame);
FREE(seqParamSet.vuiParameters);
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
tmp = h264bsdStoreSeqParamSet(pStorage, &seqParamSet);
break;
case NAL_PIC_PARAM_SET:
DEBUG(("PIC PARAM SET\n"));
tmp = h264bsdDecodePicParamSet(&strm, &picParamSet);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("PIC_PARAM_SET");
FREE(picParamSet.runLength);
FREE(picParamSet.topLeft);
FREE(picParamSet.bottomRight);
FREE(picParamSet.sliceGroupId);
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
tmp = h264bsdStorePicParamSet(pStorage, &picParamSet);
break;
case NAL_CODED_SLICE_IDR:
DEBUG(("IDR "));
/* fall through */
case NAL_CODED_SLICE:
DEBUG(("SLICE HEADER\n"));
/* picture successfully finished and still decoding same old
* access unit -> no need to decode redundant slices */
if (pStorage->skipRedundantSlices)
return(H264BSD_RDY);
pStorage->picStarted = HANTRO_TRUE;
if (h264bsdIsStartOfPicture(pStorage))
{
pStorage->numConcealedMbs = 0;
pStorage->currentPicId = picId;
tmp = h264bsdCheckPpsId(&strm, &ppsId);
ASSERT(tmp == HANTRO_OK);
/* store old activeSpsId and return headers ready
* indication if activeSps changes */
spsId = pStorage->activeSpsId;
tmp = h264bsdActivateParamSets(pStorage, ppsId,
IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(&nalUnit) ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("Param set activation");
pStorage->activePpsId = MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS;
pStorage->activePps = NULL;
pStorage->activeSpsId = MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAM_SETS;
pStorage->activeSps = NULL;
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_FALSE;
if(tmp == MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR)
{
return H264BSD_MEMALLOC_ERROR;
}
else
return(H264BSD_PARAM_SET_ERROR);
}
if (spsId != pStorage->activeSpsId)
{
seqParamSet_t *oldSPS = NULL;
seqParamSet_t *newSPS = pStorage->activeSps;
u32 noOutputOfPriorPicsFlag = 1;
if(pStorage->oldSpsId < MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAM_SETS)
{
oldSPS = pStorage->sps[pStorage->oldSpsId];
}
*readBytes = 0;
pStorage->prevBufNotFinished = HANTRO_TRUE;
if(nalUnit.nalUnitType == NAL_CODED_SLICE_IDR)
{
tmp =
h264bsdCheckPriorPicsFlag(&noOutputOfPriorPicsFlag,
&strm, newSPS,
pStorage->activePps,
nalUnit.nalUnitType);
}
else
{
tmp = HANTRO_NOK;
}
if((tmp != HANTRO_OK) ||
(noOutputOfPriorPicsFlag != 0) ||
(pStorage->dpb->noReordering) ||
(oldSPS == NULL) ||
(oldSPS->picWidthInMbs != newSPS->picWidthInMbs) ||
(oldSPS->picHeightInMbs != newSPS->picHeightInMbs) ||
(oldSPS->maxDpbSize != newSPS->maxDpbSize))
{
pStorage->dpb->flushed = 0;
}
else
{
h264bsdFlushDpb(pStorage->dpb);
}
pStorage->oldSpsId = pStorage->activeSpsId;
return(H264BSD_HDRS_RDY);
}
}
/* return error if second phase of
* initialization is not completed */
if (pStorage->pendingActivation)
{
EPRINT("Pending activation not completed");
return (H264BSD_ERROR);
}
tmp = h264bsdDecodeSliceHeader(&strm, pStorage->sliceHeader + 1,
pStorage->activeSps, pStorage->activePps, &nalUnit);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("SLICE_HEADER");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if (h264bsdIsStartOfPicture(pStorage))
{
if (!IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(&nalUnit))
{
tmp = h264bsdCheckGapsInFrameNum(pStorage->dpb,
pStorage->sliceHeader[1].frameNum,
nalUnit.nalRefIdc != 0 ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE,
pStorage->activeSps->
gapsInFrameNumValueAllowedFlag);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("Gaps in frame num");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
}
pStorage->currImage->data =
h264bsdAllocateDpbImage(pStorage->dpb);
}
/* store slice header to storage if successfully decoded */
pStorage->sliceHeader[0] = pStorage->sliceHeader[1];
pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit = HANTRO_TRUE;
pStorage->prevNalUnit[0] = nalUnit;
h264bsdComputeSliceGroupMap(pStorage,
pStorage->sliceHeader->sliceGroupChangeCycle);
h264bsdInitRefPicList(pStorage->dpb);
tmp = h264bsdReorderRefPicList(pStorage->dpb,
&pStorage->sliceHeader->refPicListReordering,
pStorage->sliceHeader->frameNum,
pStorage->sliceHeader->numRefIdxL0Active);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("Reordering");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
DEBUG(("SLICE DATA, FIRST %d\n",
pStorage->sliceHeader->firstMbInSlice));
tmp = h264bsdDecodeSliceData(&strm, pStorage,
pStorage->currImage, pStorage->sliceHeader);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("SLICE_DATA");
h264bsdMarkSliceCorrupted(pStorage,
pStorage->sliceHeader->firstMbInSlice);
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if (h264bsdIsEndOfPicture(pStorage))
{
picReady = HANTRO_TRUE;
pStorage->skipRedundantSlices = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
break;
case NAL_SEI:
DEBUG(("SEI MESSAGE, NOT DECODED"));
break;
default:
DEBUG(("NOT IMPLEMENTED YET %d\n",nalUnit.nalUnitType));
}
}
if (picReady)
{
h264bsdFilterPicture(pStorage->currImage, pStorage->mb);
h264bsdResetStorage(pStorage);
picOrderCnt = h264bsdDecodePicOrderCnt(pStorage->poc,
pStorage->activeSps, pStorage->sliceHeader, pStorage->prevNalUnit);
if (pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit)
{
if (pStorage->prevNalUnit->nalRefIdc)
{
tmp = h264bsdMarkDecRefPic(pStorage->dpb,
&pStorage->sliceHeader->decRefPicMarking,
pStorage->currImage, pStorage->sliceHeader->frameNum,
picOrderCnt,
IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(pStorage->prevNalUnit) ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE,
pStorage->currentPicId, pStorage->numConcealedMbs);
}
/* non-reference picture, just store for possible display
* reordering */
else
{
tmp = h264bsdMarkDecRefPic(pStorage->dpb, NULL,
pStorage->currImage, pStorage->sliceHeader->frameNum,
picOrderCnt,
IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(pStorage->prevNalUnit) ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE,
pStorage->currentPicId, pStorage->numConcealedMbs);
}
}
pStorage->picStarted = HANTRO_FALSE;
pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit = HANTRO_FALSE;
return(H264BSD_PIC_RDY);
}
else
return(H264BSD_RDY);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GBool Splash::pathAllOutside(SplashPath *path) {
SplashCoord xMin1, yMin1, xMax1, yMax1;
SplashCoord xMin2, yMin2, xMax2, yMax2;
SplashCoord x, y;
int xMinI, yMinI, xMaxI, yMaxI;
int i;
xMin1 = xMax1 = path->pts[0].x;
yMin1 = yMax1 = path->pts[0].y;
for (i = 1; i < path->length; ++i) {
if (path->pts[i].x < xMin1) {
xMin1 = path->pts[i].x;
} else if (path->pts[i].x > xMax1) {
xMax1 = path->pts[i].x;
}
if (path->pts[i].y < yMin1) {
yMin1 = path->pts[i].y;
} else if (path->pts[i].y > yMax1) {
yMax1 = path->pts[i].y;
}
}
transform(state->matrix, xMin1, yMin1, &x, &y);
xMin2 = xMax2 = x;
yMin2 = yMax2 = y;
transform(state->matrix, xMin1, yMax1, &x, &y);
if (x < xMin2) {
xMin2 = x;
} else if (x > xMax2) {
xMax2 = x;
}
if (y < yMin2) {
yMin2 = y;
} else if (y > yMax2) {
yMax2 = y;
}
transform(state->matrix, xMax1, yMin1, &x, &y);
if (x < xMin2) {
xMin2 = x;
} else if (x > xMax2) {
xMax2 = x;
}
if (y < yMin2) {
yMin2 = y;
} else if (y > yMax2) {
yMax2 = y;
}
transform(state->matrix, xMax1, yMax1, &x, &y);
if (x < xMin2) {
xMin2 = x;
} else if (x > xMax2) {
xMax2 = x;
}
if (y < yMin2) {
yMin2 = y;
} else if (y > yMax2) {
yMax2 = y;
}
xMinI = splashFloor(xMin2);
yMinI = splashFloor(yMin2);
xMaxI = splashFloor(xMax2);
yMaxI = splashFloor(yMax2);
return state->clip->testRect(xMinI, yMinI, xMaxI, yMaxI) ==
splashClipAllOutside;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext4_inc_count(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
inc_nlink(inode);
if (is_dx(inode) && inode->i_nlink > 1) {
/* limit is 16-bit i_links_count */
if (inode->i_nlink >= EXT4_LINK_MAX || inode->i_nlink == 2) {
set_nlink(inode, 1);
EXT4_SET_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_DIR_NLINK);
}
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ram_migration_cancel(void *opaque)
{
migration_end();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wanxl_pci_remove_one(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
card_t *card = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < card->n_ports; i++) {
unregister_hdlc_device(card->ports[i].dev);
free_netdev(card->ports[i].dev);
}
/* unregister and free all host resources */
if (card->irq)
free_irq(card->irq, card);
wanxl_reset(card);
for (i = 0; i < RX_QUEUE_LENGTH; i++)
if (card->rx_skbs[i]) {
pci_unmap_single(card->pdev,
card->status->rx_descs[i].address,
BUFFER_LENGTH, PCI_DMA_FROMDEVICE);
dev_kfree_skb(card->rx_skbs[i]);
}
if (card->plx)
iounmap(card->plx);
if (card->status)
pci_free_consistent(pdev, sizeof(card_status_t),
card->status, card->status_address);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
kfree(card);
}
Commit Message: wanxl: fix info leak in ioctl
The wanxl_ioctl() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void commitCompleteOnCCThread(CCLayerTreeHostImpl*)
{
m_numCommits++;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init pf_init(void)
{ /* preliminary initialisation */
struct pf_unit *pf;
int unit;
if (disable)
return -EINVAL;
pf_init_units();
if (pf_detect())
return -ENODEV;
pf_busy = 0;
if (register_blkdev(major, name)) {
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++)
put_disk(pf->disk);
return -EBUSY;
}
for (pf = units, unit = 0; unit < PF_UNITS; pf++, unit++) {
struct gendisk *disk = pf->disk;
if (!pf->present)
continue;
disk->private_data = pf;
add_disk(disk);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 169,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_stream_gobble(jas_stream_t *stream, int n)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_getc(stream) == EOF) {
return n - m;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 73,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t CameraService::validateConnect(int cameraId,
/*inout*/
int& clientUid) const {
int callingPid = getCallingPid();
if (clientUid == USE_CALLING_UID) {
clientUid = getCallingUid();
} else {
if (callingPid != getpid()) {
ALOGE("CameraService::connect X (pid %d) rejected (don't trust clientUid)",
callingPid);
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
}
if (!mModule) {
ALOGE("Camera HAL module not loaded");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (cameraId < 0 || cameraId >= mNumberOfCameras) {
ALOGE("CameraService::connect X (pid %d) rejected (invalid cameraId %d).",
callingPid, cameraId);
return -ENODEV;
}
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
property_get("sys.secpolicy.camera.disabled", value, "0");
if (strcmp(value, "1") == 0) {
ALOGI("Camera is disabled. connect X (pid %d) rejected", callingPid);
return -EACCES;
}
ICameraServiceListener::Status currentStatus = getStatus(cameraId);
if (currentStatus == ICameraServiceListener::STATUS_NOT_PRESENT) {
ALOGI("Camera is not plugged in,"
" connect X (pid %d) rejected", callingPid);
return -ENODEV;
} else if (currentStatus == ICameraServiceListener::STATUS_ENUMERATING) {
ALOGI("Camera is enumerating,"
" connect X (pid %d) rejected", callingPid);
return -EBUSY;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetState(IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetState");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
gpu::CommandBuffer::State state = command_buffer_->GetState();
if (state.error == gpu::error::kLostContext &&
gfx::GLContext::LosesAllContextsOnContextLost())
channel_->LoseAllContexts();
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetState::WriteReplyParams(reply_message, state);
} else {
DLOG(ERROR) << "no command_buffer.";
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameFetchContext::~FrameFetchContext() {
document_loader_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsElementEditable(const blink::WebInputElement& element) {
return element.isEnabled() && !element.isReadOnly();
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message &msg) {
if (!renderer_initialized())
return false;
if (owner_delegate_ && owner_delegate_->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderWidgetHostImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_RenderProcessGone, OnRenderProcessGone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(FrameHostMsg_HittestData, OnHittestData)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_Close, OnClose)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_UpdateScreenRects_ACK,
OnUpdateScreenRectsAck)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_RequestSetBounds, OnRequestSetBounds)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_SetTooltipText, OnSetTooltipText)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_SetCursor, OnSetCursor)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_AutoscrollStart, OnAutoscrollStart)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_AutoscrollFling, OnAutoscrollFling)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_AutoscrollEnd, OnAutoscrollEnd)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_TextInputStateChanged,
OnTextInputStateChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_LockMouse, OnLockMouse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_UnlockMouse, OnUnlockMouse)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_SelectionBoundsChanged,
OnSelectionBoundsChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_FocusedNodeTouched, OnFocusedNodeTouched)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragHostMsg_StartDragging, OnStartDragging)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DragHostMsg_UpdateDragCursor, OnUpdateDragCursor)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_ForceRedrawComplete, OnForceRedrawComplete)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewHostMsg_FrameSwapMessages,
OnFrameSwapMessagesReceived)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
if (!handled && input_router_ && input_router_->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
if (!handled && view_ && view_->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CreateWindowForRequest(const FrameLoadRequest& request,
LocalFrame& opener_frame,
NavigationPolicy policy) {
DCHECK(request.GetResourceRequest().RequestorOrigin() ||
(opener_frame.GetDocument() &&
opener_frame.GetDocument()->Url().IsEmpty()));
if (opener_frame.GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (opener_frame.GetDocument() &&
opener_frame.GetDocument()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxPopups))
return;
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyCurrentTab)
policy = kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
WebWindowFeatures features;
features.noopener = request.GetShouldSetOpener() == kNeverSetOpener;
bool created;
Frame* new_frame =
CreateWindowHelper(opener_frame, opener_frame, opener_frame, request,
features, policy, created);
if (!new_frame)
return;
if (request.GetShouldSendReferrer() == kMaybeSendReferrer) {
if (new_frame->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(new_frame)->GetDocument()->SetReferrerPolicy(
opener_frame.GetDocument()->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
FrameLoadRequest new_request(nullptr, request.GetResourceRequest());
new_request.SetForm(request.Form());
if (new_frame->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(new_frame)->Loader().Load(new_request);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: filter_push(fz_context *ctx, pdf_filter_processor *p)
{
filter_gstate *gstate = p->gstate;
filter_gstate *new_gstate = fz_malloc_struct(ctx, filter_gstate);
*new_gstate = *gstate;
new_gstate->pushed = 0;
new_gstate->next = gstate;
p->gstate = new_gstate;
pdf_keep_font(ctx, new_gstate->pending.text.font);
pdf_keep_font(ctx, new_gstate->sent.text.font);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 1,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bits_image_fetch_untransformed_32 (pixman_iter_t * iter,
const uint32_t *mask)
{
pixman_image_t *image = iter->image;
int x = iter->x;
int y = iter->y;
int width = iter->width;
uint32_t * buffer = iter->buffer;
if (image->common.repeat == PIXMAN_REPEAT_NONE)
{
bits_image_fetch_untransformed_repeat_none (
&image->bits, FALSE, x, y, width, buffer);
}
else
{
bits_image_fetch_untransformed_repeat_normal (
&image->bits, FALSE, x, y, width, buffer);
}
iter->y++;
return buffer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestingAutomationProvider::SetMute(DictionaryValue* args,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
AutomationJSONReply reply(this, reply_message);
bool mute;
if (!args->GetBoolean("mute", &mute)) {
reply.SendError("Invalid or missing args.");
return;
}
chromeos::AudioHandler* audio_handler = chromeos::AudioHandler::GetInstance();
if (!audio_handler) {
reply.SendError("AudioHandler not initialized.");
return;
}
audio_handler->SetMuted(mute);
reply.SendSuccess(NULL);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct vmcb *get_host_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
if (is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu))
return svm->nested.hsave;
else
return svm->vmcb;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::readMetaData() {
if (mInitCheck != NO_INIT) {
return mInitCheck;
}
off64_t offset = 0;
status_t err;
bool sawMoovOrSidx = false;
while (!(sawMoovOrSidx && (mMdatFound || mMoofFound))) {
off64_t orig_offset = offset;
err = parseChunk(&offset, 0);
if (err != OK && err != UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
break;
} else if (offset <= orig_offset) {
ALOGE("did not advance: %lld->%lld", (long long)orig_offset, (long long)offset);
err = ERROR_MALFORMED;
break;
} else if (err == UNKNOWN_ERROR) {
sawMoovOrSidx = true;
}
}
if (mInitCheck == OK) {
if (mHasVideo) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(
kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_MPEG4);
} else {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "audio/mp4");
}
} else {
mInitCheck = err;
}
CHECK_NE(err, (status_t)NO_INIT);
uint64_t psshsize = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
psshsize += 20 + mPssh[i].datalen;
}
if (psshsize > 0 && psshsize <= UINT32_MAX) {
char *buf = (char*)malloc(psshsize);
if (!buf) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
char *ptr = buf;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPssh.size(); i++) {
memcpy(ptr, mPssh[i].uuid, 20); // uuid + length
memcpy(ptr + 20, mPssh[i].data, mPssh[i].datalen);
ptr += (20 + mPssh[i].datalen);
}
mFileMetaData->setData(kKeyPssh, 'pssh', buf, psshsize);
free(buf);
}
return mInitCheck;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::OnLifecycleUnitStateChanged(
LifecycleUnitState last_state,
LifecycleUnitStateChangeReason reason) {
DCHECK(IsValidStateChange(last_state, GetState(), reason))
<< "Cannot transition TabLifecycleUnit state from " << last_state
<< " to " << GetState() << " with reason " << reason;
const bool was_discarded = IsDiscardedOrPendingDiscard(last_state);
const bool is_discarded = IsDiscardedOrPendingDiscard(GetState());
if (was_discarded != is_discarded) {
for (auto& observer : *observers_)
observer.OnDiscardedStateChange(GetWebContents(), is_discarded);
}
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vp8_decode_block_coeffs_internal(VP56RangeCoder *r,
int16_t block[16],
uint8_t probs[16][3][NUM_DCT_TOKENS - 1],
int i, uint8_t *token_prob,
int16_t qmul[2])
{
return decode_block_coeffs_internal(r, block, probs, i,
token_prob, qmul, ff_zigzag_scan, IS_VP8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 64,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int av_get_audio_frame_duration(AVCodecContext *avctx, int frame_bytes)
{
return get_audio_frame_duration(avctx->codec_id, avctx->sample_rate,
avctx->channels, avctx->block_align,
avctx->codec_tag, avctx->bits_per_coded_sample,
avctx->bit_rate, avctx->extradata, avctx->frame_size,
frame_bytes);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 66,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gtco_setup_caps(struct input_dev *inputdev)
{
struct gtco *device = input_get_drvdata(inputdev);
/* Which events */
inputdev->evbit[0] = BIT_MASK(EV_KEY) | BIT_MASK(EV_ABS) |
BIT_MASK(EV_MSC);
/* Misc event menu block */
inputdev->mscbit[0] = BIT_MASK(MSC_SCAN) | BIT_MASK(MSC_SERIAL) |
BIT_MASK(MSC_RAW);
/* Absolute values based on HID report info */
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_X, device->min_X, device->max_X,
0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_Y, device->min_Y, device->max_Y,
0, 0);
/* Proximity */
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_DISTANCE, 0, 1, 0, 0);
/* Tilt & pressure */
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_X, device->mintilt_X,
device->maxtilt_X, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_Y, device->mintilt_Y,
device->maxtilt_Y, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_PRESSURE, device->minpressure,
device->maxpressure, 0, 0);
/* Transducer */
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_MISC, 0, 0xFF, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious
descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in
the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface
before using it.
Also let's fix a minor coding style issue.
The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public
Red Hat Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 55,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: l_strnstart(const char *tstr1, u_int tl1, const char *str2, u_int l2)
{
if (tl1 > l2)
return 0;
return (strncmp(tstr1, str2, tl1) == 0 ? 1 : 0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_MIAP( INS_ARG )
{
Int cvtEntry, point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
cvtEntry = (Int)args[1];
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp0.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( args[1], CUR.cvtSize ) )
{
/* Ignore these errors, abort the instruction
* and continue. This restores the FreeType
* behaviour when pedantic_hinting is false. For bug
* #689471, see also Ins_SHC above and bug #688501.
*/
return;
}
/* Undocumented: */
/* */
/* The behaviour of an MIAP instruction is quite */
/* different when used in the twilight zone. */
/* */
/* First, no control value cutin test is performed */
/* as it would fail anyway. Second, the original */
/* point, i.e. (org_x,org_y) of zp0.point, is set */
/* to the absolute, unrounded distance found in */
/* the CVT. */
/* */
/* This is used in the CVT programs of the Microsoft */
/* fonts Arial, Times, etc., in order to re-adjust */
/* some key font heights. It allows the use of the */
/* IP instruction in the twilight zone, which */
/* otherwise would be "illegal" according to the */
/* specs :) */
/* */
/* We implement it with a special sequence for the */
/* twilight zone. This is a bad hack, but it seems */
/* to work. */
distance = CUR_Func_read_cvt( cvtEntry );
DBG_PRINT3(" cvtEntry=%d point=%d distance=%d", cvtEntry, point, distance);
if ( CUR.GS.gep0 == 0 ) /* If in twilight zone */
{
CUR.zp0.org_x[point] = MulDiv_Round( CUR.GS.freeVector.x,
distance, 0x4000L );
CUR.zp0.cur_x[point] = CUR.zp0.org_x[point];
CUR.zp0.org_y[point] = MulDiv_Round( CUR.GS.freeVector.y,
distance, 0x4000L );
CUR.zp0.cur_y[point] = CUR.zp0.org_y[point];
}
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp0.cur_x[point],
CUR.zp0.cur_y[point] );
if ( (CUR.opcode & 1) != 0 ) /* rounding and control cutin flag */
{
if ( ABS(distance - org_dist) > CUR.GS.control_value_cutin )
distance = org_dist;
distance = CUR_Func_round( distance, CUR.metrics.compensations[0] );
}
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp0, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
CUR.GS.rp1 = point;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::setProperty(const String&, const String&, const String&, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kill_something_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, pid_t pid)
{
int ret;
if (pid > 0) {
rcu_read_lock();
ret = kill_pid_info(sig, info, find_vpid(pid));
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
if (pid != -1) {
ret = __kill_pgrp_info(sig, info,
pid ? find_vpid(-pid) : task_pgrp(current));
} else {
int retval = 0, count = 0;
struct task_struct * p;
for_each_process(p) {
if (task_pid_vnr(p) > 1 &&
!same_thread_group(p, current)) {
int err = group_send_sig_info(sig, info, p);
++count;
if (err != -EPERM)
retval = err;
}
}
ret = count ? retval : -ESRCH;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::InitX11Window(
const Widget::InitParams& params) {
unsigned long attribute_mask = CWBackPixel | CWBitGravity;
XSetWindowAttributes swa;
memset(&swa, 0, sizeof(swa));
swa.background_pixmap = x11::None;
swa.bit_gravity = NorthWestGravity;
int background_color;
const views::LinuxUI* linux_ui = views::LinuxUI::instance();
if (linux_ui && content_window()) {
ui::NativeTheme::ColorId target_color;
switch (params.type) {
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_BUBBLE:
target_color = ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_BubbleBackground;
break;
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_TOOLTIP:
target_color = ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_TooltipBackground;
break;
default:
target_color = ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_WindowBackground;
break;
}
ui::NativeTheme* theme = linux_ui->GetNativeTheme(content_window());
background_color = theme->GetSystemColor(target_color);
} else {
background_color = WhitePixel(xdisplay_, DefaultScreen(xdisplay_));
}
swa.background_pixel = background_color;
XAtom window_type;
switch (params.type) {
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_MENU:
swa.override_redirect = x11::True;
window_type = gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_WINDOW_TYPE_MENU");
break;
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_TOOLTIP:
swa.override_redirect = x11::True;
window_type = gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_WINDOW_TYPE_TOOLTIP");
break;
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_POPUP:
swa.override_redirect = x11::True;
window_type = gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_WINDOW_TYPE_NOTIFICATION");
break;
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_DRAG:
swa.override_redirect = x11::True;
window_type = gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_WINDOW_TYPE_DND");
break;
default:
window_type = gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_WINDOW_TYPE_NORMAL");
break;
}
if (!activatable_)
swa.override_redirect = x11::True;
override_redirect_ = swa.override_redirect == x11::True;
if (override_redirect_)
attribute_mask |= CWOverrideRedirect;
bool enable_transparent_visuals;
switch (params.opacity) {
case Widget::InitParams::OPAQUE_WINDOW:
enable_transparent_visuals = false;
break;
case Widget::InitParams::TRANSLUCENT_WINDOW:
enable_transparent_visuals = true;
break;
case Widget::InitParams::INFER_OPACITY:
default:
enable_transparent_visuals = params.type == Widget::InitParams::TYPE_DRAG;
}
Visual* visual = CopyFromParent;
int depth = CopyFromParent;
Colormap colormap = CopyFromParent;
ui::XVisualManager::GetInstance()->ChooseVisualForWindow(
enable_transparent_visuals, &visual, &depth, &colormap,
&use_argb_visual_);
if (colormap != CopyFromParent) {
attribute_mask |= CWColormap;
swa.colormap = colormap;
}
attribute_mask |= CWBorderPixel;
swa.border_pixel = 0;
bounds_in_pixels_ = ToPixelRect(params.bounds);
bounds_in_pixels_.set_size(AdjustSize(bounds_in_pixels_.size()));
xwindow_ = XCreateWindow(xdisplay_, x_root_window_, bounds_in_pixels_.x(),
bounds_in_pixels_.y(), bounds_in_pixels_.width(),
bounds_in_pixels_.height(),
0, // border width
depth, InputOutput, visual, attribute_mask, &swa);
if (ui::PlatformEventSource::GetInstance())
ui::PlatformEventSource::GetInstance()->AddPlatformEventDispatcher(this);
open_windows().push_front(xwindow_);
long event_mask = ButtonPressMask | ButtonReleaseMask | FocusChangeMask |
KeyPressMask | KeyReleaseMask |
EnterWindowMask | LeaveWindowMask |
ExposureMask | VisibilityChangeMask |
StructureNotifyMask | PropertyChangeMask |
PointerMotionMask;
xwindow_events_ =
std::make_unique<ui::XScopedEventSelector>(xwindow_, event_mask);
XFlush(xdisplay_);
if (ui::IsXInput2Available())
ui::TouchFactory::GetInstance()->SetupXI2ForXWindow(xwindow_);
XAtom protocols[2];
protocols[0] = gfx::GetAtom("WM_DELETE_WINDOW");
protocols[1] = gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_PING");
XSetWMProtocols(xdisplay_, xwindow_, protocols, 2);
XSetWMProperties(xdisplay_, xwindow_, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 0, nullptr,
nullptr, nullptr);
static_assert(sizeof(long) >= sizeof(pid_t),
"pid_t should not be larger than long");
long pid = getpid();
XChangeProperty(xdisplay_, xwindow_, gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_PID"), XA_CARDINAL,
32, PropModeReplace, reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&pid),
1);
XChangeProperty(xdisplay_, xwindow_, gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_WINDOW_TYPE"),
XA_ATOM, 32, PropModeReplace,
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(&window_type), 1);
if ((params.type == Widget::InitParams::TYPE_POPUP ||
params.type == Widget::InitParams::TYPE_BUBBLE) &&
!params.force_show_in_taskbar) {
window_properties_.insert(gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_STATE_SKIP_TASKBAR"));
}
is_always_on_top_ = params.keep_on_top;
if (is_always_on_top_)
window_properties_.insert(gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_STATE_ABOVE"));
workspace_ = base::nullopt;
if (params.visible_on_all_workspaces) {
window_properties_.insert(gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_STATE_STICKY"));
ui::SetIntProperty(xwindow_, "_NET_WM_DESKTOP", "CARDINAL", kAllDesktops);
} else if (!params.workspace.empty()) {
int workspace;
if (base::StringToInt(params.workspace, &workspace))
ui::SetIntProperty(xwindow_, "_NET_WM_DESKTOP", "CARDINAL", workspace);
}
if (!params.wm_class_name.empty() || !params.wm_class_class.empty()) {
ui::SetWindowClassHint(
xdisplay_, xwindow_, params.wm_class_name, params.wm_class_class);
}
const char* wm_role_name = nullptr;
if (!params.wm_role_name.empty()) {
wm_role_name = params.wm_role_name.c_str();
} else {
switch (params.type) {
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_POPUP:
wm_role_name = kX11WindowRolePopup;
break;
case Widget::InitParams::TYPE_BUBBLE:
wm_role_name = kX11WindowRoleBubble;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (wm_role_name)
ui::SetWindowRole(xdisplay_, xwindow_, std::string(wm_role_name));
if (params.remove_standard_frame) {
ui::SetHideTitlebarWhenMaximizedProperty(xwindow_,
ui::HIDE_TITLEBAR_WHEN_MAXIMIZED);
}
if (views::LinuxUI::instance() &&
views::LinuxUI::instance()->PreferDarkTheme()) {
const unsigned char kDarkGtkThemeVariant[] = "dark";
XChangeProperty(xdisplay_, xwindow_, gfx::GetAtom("_GTK_THEME_VARIANT"),
gfx::GetAtom("UTF8_STRING"), 8, PropModeReplace,
kDarkGtkThemeVariant, base::size(kDarkGtkThemeVariant) - 1);
}
ui::SetIntProperty(xwindow_, "_NET_WM_BYPASS_COMPOSITOR", "CARDINAL", 2);
if (params.parent && params.parent->GetHost()) {
XID parent_xid =
params.parent->GetHost()->GetAcceleratedWidget();
window_parent_ = GetHostForXID(parent_xid);
DCHECK(window_parent_);
window_parent_->window_children_.insert(this);
}
gfx::ImageSkia* window_icon =
ViewsDelegate::GetInstance()
? ViewsDelegate::GetInstance()->GetDefaultWindowIcon()
: nullptr;
if (window_icon) {
SetWindowIcons(gfx::ImageSkia(), *window_icon);
}
CreateCompositor(viz::FrameSinkId(),
params.type == Widget::InitParams::TYPE_TOOLTIP);
OnAcceleratedWidgetAvailable();
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_FlushMemory(void)
{
CL_ClearMemory(qfalse);
CL_StartHunkUsers(qfalse);
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncManager::TriggerOnNotificationStateChangeForTest(
bool notifications_enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
data_->OnNotificationStateChange(notifications_enabled);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm) && apic_x2apic_mode(vcpu->arch.apic)) {
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic;
else
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic;
} else {
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode;
else
msr_bitmap = vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy;
}
vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(msr_bitmap));
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long vhost_dev_alloc_iovecs(struct vhost_dev *dev)
{
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
vq = dev->vqs[i];
vq->indirect = kmalloc(sizeof *vq->indirect * UIO_MAXIOV,
GFP_KERNEL);
vq->log = kmalloc(sizeof *vq->log * UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
vq->heads = kmalloc(sizeof *vq->heads * UIO_MAXIOV, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vq->indirect || !vq->log || !vq->heads)
goto err_nomem;
}
return 0;
err_nomem:
for (; i >= 0; --i)
vhost_vq_free_iovecs(dev->vqs[i]);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* receiving_widget) {
if (receiving_widget != GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return receiving_widget;
WebContentsImpl* focused_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_contents->interstitial_page_->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
FrameTreeNode* focused_frame = nullptr;
if (focused_contents->browser_plugin_guest_ &&
!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_contents)) {
focused_frame = frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
} else {
focused_frame = GetFocusedWebContents()->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
}
if (!focused_frame)
return receiving_widget;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = focused_frame->current_frame_host()->GetView();
if (!view)
return nullptr;
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 144,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeRenderProcessObserver::OnClearCache(bool on_navigation) {
if (on_navigation) {
clear_cache_pending_ = true;
} else {
WebCache::clear();
}
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationEntryImpl::RestoreType ControllerRestoreTypeToEntryType(
NavigationController::RestoreType type) {
switch (type) {
case NavigationController::RESTORE_CURRENT_SESSION:
return NavigationEntryImpl::RESTORE_CURRENT_SESSION;
case NavigationController::RESTORE_LAST_SESSION_EXITED_CLEANLY:
return NavigationEntryImpl::RESTORE_LAST_SESSION_EXITED_CLEANLY;
case NavigationController::RESTORE_LAST_SESSION_CRASHED:
return NavigationEntryImpl::RESTORE_LAST_SESSION_CRASHED;
}
NOTREACHED();
return NavigationEntryImpl::RESTORE_CURRENT_SESSION;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
err = -ENOMEM;
/*
* If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
* of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
* avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
* for the guest, etc.
*/
if (enable_pml) {
vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!vmx->pml_pg)
goto uninit_vcpu;
}
vmx->guest_msrs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) * sizeof(vmx->guest_msrs[0])
> PAGE_SIZE);
if (!vmx->guest_msrs)
goto free_pml;
err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
if (err < 0)
goto free_msrs;
msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0;
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
vmx_vcpu_setup(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
put_cpu();
if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu)) {
err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (nested) {
nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmx->nested.msrs,
kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu));
vmx->nested.vpid02 = allocate_vpid();
}
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
/*
* Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
* or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
*/
vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
vmx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);
free_pml:
vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
uninit_vcpu:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
free_vcpu:
free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
struct sk_buff *head;
u32 start, end;
if (!skb)
return;
start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
end = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
head = skb;
for (;;) {
struct sk_buff *next = NULL;
if (!skb_queue_is_last(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb))
next = skb_queue_next(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
skb = next;
/* Segment is terminated when we see gap or when
* we are at the end of all the queue. */
if (!skb ||
after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end) ||
before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, start)) {
tcp_collapse(sk, &tp->out_of_order_queue,
head, skb, start, end);
head = skb;
if (!skb)
break;
/* Start new segment */
start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
end = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
} else {
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, start))
start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
if (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, end))
end = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
}
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 51,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean webkitWebViewBaseQueryTooltip(GtkWidget* widget, gint x, gint y, gboolean keyboardMode, GtkTooltip* tooltip)
{
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget)->priv;
if (keyboardMode) {
notImplemented();
return FALSE;
}
if (priv->tooltipText.length() <= 0)
return FALSE;
gtk_tooltip_set_text(tooltip, priv->tooltipText.data());
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long hi3660_stub_clk_round_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, unsigned long rate,
unsigned long *prate)
{
/*
* LPM3 handles rate rounding so just return whatever
* rate is requested.
*/
return rate;
}
Commit Message: clk: hisilicon: hi3660：Fix potential NULL dereference in hi3660_stub_clk_probe()
platform_get_resource() may return NULL, add proper check to
avoid potential NULL dereferencing.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Fixes: 4f16f7ff3bc0 ("clk: hisilicon: Add support for Hi3660 stub clocks")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 83,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutRect RenderBlock::columnRectAt(ColumnInfo* colInfo, unsigned index) const
{
ASSERT(hasColumns() && gColumnInfoMap->get(this) == colInfo);
LayoutUnit colLogicalWidth = colInfo->desiredColumnWidth();
LayoutUnit colLogicalHeight = colInfo->columnHeight();
LayoutUnit colLogicalTop = borderBefore() + paddingBefore();
LayoutUnit colLogicalLeft = logicalLeftOffsetForContent();
LayoutUnit colGap = columnGap();
if (colInfo->progressionAxis() == ColumnInfo::InlineAxis) {
if (style()->isLeftToRightDirection())
colLogicalLeft += index * (colLogicalWidth + colGap);
else
colLogicalLeft += contentLogicalWidth() - colLogicalWidth - index * (colLogicalWidth + colGap);
} else {
colLogicalTop += index * (colLogicalHeight + colGap);
}
if (isHorizontalWritingMode())
return LayoutRect(colLogicalLeft, colLogicalTop, colLogicalWidth, colLogicalHeight);
return LayoutRect(colLogicalTop, colLogicalLeft, colLogicalHeight, colLogicalWidth);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OMXNodeInstance::onEvent(
OMX_EVENTTYPE event, OMX_U32 arg1, OMX_U32 arg2) {
const char *arg1String = "??";
const char *arg2String = "??";
ADebug::Level level = ADebug::kDebugInternalState;
switch (event) {
case OMX_EventCmdComplete:
arg1String = asString((OMX_COMMANDTYPE)arg1);
switch (arg1) {
case OMX_CommandStateSet:
arg2String = asString((OMX_STATETYPE)arg2);
level = ADebug::kDebugState;
break;
case OMX_CommandFlush:
case OMX_CommandPortEnable:
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
bumpDebugLevel_l(2 /* numInputBuffers */, 2 /* numOutputBuffers */);
}
default:
arg2String = portString(arg2);
}
break;
case OMX_EventError:
arg1String = asString((OMX_ERRORTYPE)arg1);
level = ADebug::kDebugLifeCycle;
break;
case OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged:
arg2String = asString((OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)arg2);
default:
arg1String = portString(arg1);
}
CLOGI_(level, onEvent, "%s(%x), %s(%x), %s(%x)",
asString(event), event, arg1String, arg1, arg2String, arg2);
const sp<GraphicBufferSource>& bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL
&& event == OMX_EventCmdComplete
&& arg1 == OMX_CommandStateSet
&& arg2 == OMX_StateExecuting) {
bufferSource->omxExecuting();
}
if (event == OMX_EventCmdComplete
&& arg1 == OMX_CommandStateSet
&& arg2 == OMX_StateLoaded) {
mSailed = false;
}
}
Commit Message: IOMX: do not clear buffer if it's allocated by component
The component might depends on their buffers to be initialized
in certain ways to work. Don't clear unless we're allocating it.
bug: 31586647
Change-Id: Ia0a125797e414998ef0cd8ce03672f5b1e0bbf7a
(cherry picked from commit ea76573aa276f51950007217a97903c4fe64f685)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 163,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sha256_sparc64_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len)
{
struct sha256_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
unsigned int partial = sctx->count % SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
/* Handle the fast case right here */
if (partial + len < SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE) {
sctx->count += len;
memcpy(sctx->buf + partial, data, len);
} else
__sha256_sparc64_update(sctx, data, len, partial);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::MaybeInterceptAsStream(
net::URLRequest* request,
network::ResourceResponse* response,
std::string* payload) {
payload->clear();
const std::string& mime_type = response->head.mime_type;
GURL origin;
if (!delegate_ || !delegate_->ShouldInterceptResourceAsStream(
request, mime_type, &origin, payload)) {
return nullptr;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
StreamContext* stream_context =
GetStreamContextForResourceContext(info->GetContext());
auto handler = std::make_unique<StreamResourceHandler>(
request, stream_context->registry(), origin, false);
info->set_is_stream(true);
auto stream_info = std::make_unique<StreamInfo>();
stream_info->handle = handler->stream()->CreateHandle();
stream_info->original_url = request->url();
stream_info->mime_type = mime_type;
if (response->head.headers.get()) {
stream_info->response_headers =
base::MakeRefCounted<net::HttpResponseHeaders>(
response->head.headers->raw_headers());
}
delegate_->OnStreamCreated(request, std::move(stream_info));
return std::move(handler);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 152,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int phar_file_action(phar_archive_data *phar, phar_entry_info *info, char *mime_type, int code, char *entry, int entry_len, char *arch, char *basename, char *ru, int ru_len) /* {{{ */
{
char *name = NULL, buf[8192];
const char *cwd;
zend_syntax_highlighter_ini syntax_highlighter_ini;
sapi_header_line ctr = {0};
size_t got;
zval dummy;
int name_len;
zend_file_handle file_handle;
zend_op_array *new_op_array;
zval result;
php_stream *fp;
zend_off_t position;
switch (code) {
case PHAR_MIME_PHPS:
efree(basename);
/* highlight source */
if (entry[0] == '/') {
name_len = spprintf(&name, 4096, "phar://%s%s", arch, entry);
} else {
name_len = spprintf(&name, 4096, "phar://%s/%s", arch, entry);
}
php_get_highlight_struct(&syntax_highlighter_ini);
highlight_file(name, &syntax_highlighter_ini);
efree(name);
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
efree(arch);
#endif
zend_bailout();
case PHAR_MIME_OTHER:
/* send headers, output file contents */
efree(basename);
ctr.line_len = spprintf(&(ctr.line), 0, "Content-type: %s", mime_type);
sapi_header_op(SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE, &ctr);
efree(ctr.line);
ctr.line_len = spprintf(&(ctr.line), 0, "Content-length: %u", info->uncompressed_filesize);
sapi_header_op(SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE, &ctr);
efree(ctr.line);
if (FAILURE == sapi_send_headers()) {
zend_bailout();
}
/* prepare to output */
fp = phar_get_efp(info, 1);
if (!fp) {
char *error;
if (!phar_open_jit(phar, info, &error)) {
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
return -1;
}
fp = phar_get_efp(info, 1);
}
position = 0;
phar_seek_efp(info, 0, SEEK_SET, 0, 1);
do {
got = php_stream_read(fp, buf, MIN(8192, info->uncompressed_filesize - position));
if (got > 0) {
PHPWRITE(buf, got);
position += got;
if (position == (zend_off_t) info->uncompressed_filesize) {
break;
}
}
} while (1);
zend_bailout();
case PHAR_MIME_PHP:
if (basename) {
phar_mung_server_vars(arch, entry, entry_len, basename, ru_len);
efree(basename);
}
if (entry[0] == '/') {
name_len = spprintf(&name, 4096, "phar://%s%s", arch, entry);
} else {
name_len = spprintf(&name, 4096, "phar://%s/%s", arch, entry);
}
file_handle.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FILENAME;
file_handle.handle.fd = 0;
file_handle.filename = name;
file_handle.opened_path = NULL;
file_handle.free_filename = 0;
PHAR_G(cwd) = NULL;
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = 0;
ZVAL_NULL(&dummy);
if (zend_hash_str_add(&EG(included_files), name, name_len, &dummy) != NULL) {
if ((cwd = zend_memrchr(entry, '/', entry_len))) {
PHAR_G(cwd_init) = 1;
if (entry == cwd) {
/* root directory */
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = 0;
PHAR_G(cwd) = NULL;
} else if (entry[0] == '/') {
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = cwd - (entry + 1);
PHAR_G(cwd) = estrndup(entry + 1, PHAR_G(cwd_len));
} else {
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = cwd - entry;
PHAR_G(cwd) = estrndup(entry, PHAR_G(cwd_len));
}
}
new_op_array = zend_compile_file(&file_handle, ZEND_REQUIRE);
if (!new_op_array) {
zend_hash_str_del(&EG(included_files), name, name_len);
}
zend_destroy_file_handle(&file_handle);
} else {
efree(name);
new_op_array = NULL;
}
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
efree(arch);
#endif
if (new_op_array) {
ZVAL_UNDEF(&result);
zend_try {
zend_execute(new_op_array, &result);
if (PHAR_G(cwd)) {
efree(PHAR_G(cwd));
PHAR_G(cwd) = NULL;
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = 0;
}
PHAR_G(cwd_init) = 0;
efree(name);
destroy_op_array(new_op_array);
efree(new_op_array);
zval_ptr_dtor(&result);
} zend_catch {
if (PHAR_G(cwd)) {
efree(PHAR_G(cwd));
PHAR_G(cwd) = NULL;
PHAR_G(cwd_len) = 0;
}
PHAR_G(cwd_init) = 0;
efree(name);
} zend_end_try();
zend_bailout();
}
return PHAR_MIME_PHP;
}
return -1;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zip_read_mac_metadata(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
struct zip_entry *rsrc)
{
struct zip *zip = (struct zip *)a->format->data;
unsigned char *metadata, *mp;
int64_t offset = archive_filter_bytes(&a->archive, 0);
size_t remaining_bytes, metadata_bytes;
ssize_t hsize;
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK, eof;
switch(rsrc->compression) {
case 0: /* No compression. */
if (rsrc->uncompressed_size != rsrc->compressed_size) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Malformed OS X metadata entry: inconsistent size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
case 8: /* Deflate compression. */
#endif
break;
default: /* Unsupported compression. */
/* Return a warning. */
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unsupported ZIP compression method (%s)",
compression_name(rsrc->compression));
/* We can't decompress this entry, but we will
* be able to skip() it and try the next entry. */
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (rsrc->uncompressed_size > (4 * 1024 * 1024)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Mac metadata is too large: %jd > 4M bytes",
(intmax_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (rsrc->compressed_size > (4 * 1024 * 1024)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Mac metadata is too large: %jd > 4M bytes",
(intmax_t)rsrc->compressed_size);
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
metadata = malloc((size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size);
if (metadata == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Mac metadata");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (offset < rsrc->local_header_offset)
__archive_read_consume(a, rsrc->local_header_offset - offset);
else if (offset != rsrc->local_header_offset) {
__archive_read_seek(a, rsrc->local_header_offset, SEEK_SET);
}
hsize = zip_get_local_file_header_size(a, 0);
__archive_read_consume(a, hsize);
remaining_bytes = (size_t)rsrc->compressed_size;
metadata_bytes = (size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size;
mp = metadata;
eof = 0;
while (!eof && remaining_bytes) {
const unsigned char *p;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
size_t bytes_used;
p = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (p == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated ZIP file header");
ret = ARCHIVE_WARN;
goto exit_mac_metadata;
}
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > remaining_bytes)
bytes_avail = remaining_bytes;
switch(rsrc->compression) {
case 0: /* No compression. */
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > metadata_bytes)
bytes_avail = metadata_bytes;
memcpy(mp, p, bytes_avail);
bytes_used = (size_t)bytes_avail;
metadata_bytes -= bytes_used;
mp += bytes_used;
if (metadata_bytes == 0)
eof = 1;
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
case 8: /* Deflate compression. */
{
int r;
ret = zip_deflate_init(a, zip);
if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK)
goto exit_mac_metadata;
zip->stream.next_in =
(Bytef *)(uintptr_t)(const void *)p;
zip->stream.avail_in = (uInt)bytes_avail;
zip->stream.total_in = 0;
zip->stream.next_out = mp;
zip->stream.avail_out = (uInt)metadata_bytes;
zip->stream.total_out = 0;
r = inflate(&zip->stream, 0);
switch (r) {
case Z_OK:
break;
case Z_STREAM_END:
eof = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Out of memory for ZIP decompression");
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
goto exit_mac_metadata;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"ZIP decompression failed (%d)", r);
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
goto exit_mac_metadata;
}
bytes_used = zip->stream.total_in;
metadata_bytes -= zip->stream.total_out;
mp += zip->stream.total_out;
break;
}
#endif
default:
bytes_used = 0;
break;
}
__archive_read_consume(a, bytes_used);
remaining_bytes -= bytes_used;
}
archive_entry_copy_mac_metadata(entry, metadata,
(size_t)rsrc->uncompressed_size - metadata_bytes);
exit_mac_metadata:
__archive_read_seek(a, offset, SEEK_SET);
zip->decompress_init = 0;
free(metadata);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 90,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool llc_listener_match(const struct llc_sap *sap,
const struct llc_addr *laddr,
const struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
return sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN &&
llc->laddr.lsap == laddr->lsap &&
ether_addr_equal(llc->laddr.mac, laddr->mac);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 68,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool UnpackAPIPermissions(const std::vector<std::string>& permissions_input,
const PermissionSet& required_permissions,
const PermissionSet& optional_permissions,
UnpackPermissionSetResult* result,
std::string* error) {
PermissionsInfo* info = PermissionsInfo::GetInstance();
APIPermissionSet apis;
for (const auto& permission_str : permissions_input) {
size_t delimiter = permission_str.find(kDelimiter);
if (delimiter != std::string::npos) {
base::StringPiece permission_piece(permission_str);
std::unique_ptr<APIPermission> permission = UnpackPermissionWithArguments(
permission_piece.substr(0, delimiter),
permission_piece.substr(delimiter + 1), permission_str, error);
if (!permission)
return false;
apis.insert(std::move(permission));
} else {
const APIPermissionInfo* permission_info =
info->GetByName(permission_str);
if (!permission_info) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(kUnknownPermissionError,
permission_str);
return false;
}
apis.insert(permission_info->id());
}
}
for (const auto* api_permission : apis) {
if (required_permissions.apis().count(api_permission->id())) {
result->required_apis.insert(api_permission->id());
continue;
}
if (!optional_permissions.apis().count(api_permission->id())) {
result->unlisted_apis.insert(api_permission->id());
continue;
}
if (!api_permission->info()->supports_optional()) {
result->unsupported_optional_apis.insert(api_permission->id());
continue;
}
result->optional_apis.insert(api_permission->id());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 153,443
|
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