instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateLeapYear (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
double year;
year = exsltDateYear(dateTime);
if (xmlXPathIsNaN(year))
return xmlXPathNewFloat(xmlXPathNAN);
if (IS_LEAP((long)year))
return xmlXPathNewBoolean(1);
return xmlXPathNewBoolean(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init hardlockup_panic_setup(char *str)
{
if (!strncmp(str, "panic", 5))
hardlockup_panic = 1;
else if (!strncmp(str, "nopanic", 7))
hardlockup_panic = 0;
else if (!strncmp(str, "0", 1))
watchdog_enabled = 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static toff_t tiff_seekproc(thandle_t clientdata, toff_t offset, int from)
{
tiff_handle *th = (tiff_handle *)clientdata;
gdIOCtx *ctx = th->ctx;
int result;
switch(from) {
default:
case SEEK_SET:
/* just use offset */
break;
case SEEK_END:
/* invert offset, so that it is from start, not end as supplied */
offset = th->size + offset;
break;
case SEEK_CUR:
/* add current position to translate it to 'from start',
* not from durrent as supplied
*/
offset += th->pos;
break;
}
/* now, move pos in both io context and buf */
if((result = (ctx->seek)(ctx, offset))) {
th->pos = offset;
}
return result ? offset : (toff_t)-1;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_utc(struct user_ta_ctx *utc)
{
struct user_ta_elf *elf;
tee_pager_rem_uta_areas(utc);
TAILQ_FOREACH(elf, &utc->elfs, link)
release_ta_memory_by_mobj(elf->mobj_code);
release_ta_memory_by_mobj(utc->mobj_stack);
release_ta_memory_by_mobj(utc->mobj_exidx);
/*
* Close sessions opened by this TA
* Note that tee_ta_close_session() removes the item
* from the utc->open_sessions list.
*/
while (!TAILQ_EMPTY(&utc->open_sessions)) {
tee_ta_close_session(TAILQ_FIRST(&utc->open_sessions),
&utc->open_sessions, KERN_IDENTITY);
}
vm_info_final(utc);
mobj_free(utc->mobj_stack);
mobj_free(utc->mobj_exidx);
free_elfs(&utc->elfs);
/* Free cryp states created by this TA */
tee_svc_cryp_free_states(utc);
/* Close cryp objects opened by this TA */
tee_obj_close_all(utc);
/* Free emums created by this TA */
tee_svc_storage_close_all_enum(utc);
free(utc);
}
Commit Message: core: clear the entire TA area
Previously we cleared (memset to zero) the size corresponding to code
and data segments, however the allocation for the TA is made on the
granularity of the memory pool, meaning that we did not clear all memory
and because of that we could potentially leak code and data of a
previous loaded TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0006: "Potential disclosure of previously loaded TA
code and data"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 86,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::DisabledAttributeChanged() {
EventDispatchForbiddenScope event_forbidden;
ListedElement::DisabledAttributeChanged();
if (LayoutObject* o = GetLayoutObject())
o->InvalidateIfControlStateChanged(kEnabledControlState);
if (AXObjectCache* cache = GetDocument().ExistingAXObjectCache())
cache->CheckedStateChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 136,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionGlobalError::AddExternalExtension(const std::string& id) {
external_extension_ids_->insert(id);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageInfo::OnChangePasswordButtonPressed(
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING)
DCHECK(password_protection_service_);
DCHECK(safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE ||
safe_browsing_status_ ==
SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD_REUSE);
password_protection_service_->OnUserAction(
web_contents,
safe_browsing_status_ == SAFE_BROWSING_STATUS_SIGN_IN_PASSWORD_REUSE
? PasswordReuseEvent::SIGN_IN_PASSWORD
: PasswordReuseEvent::ENTERPRISE_PASSWORD,
safe_browsing::WarningUIType::PAGE_INFO,
safe_browsing::WarningAction::CHANGE_PASSWORD);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 1 | 172,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit Object(Object* next) : next_(next) {}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PasswordAutofillAgent::PasswordValueGatekeeper::~PasswordValueGatekeeper() {
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_vs_genl_dump_services(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int idx = 0, i;
int start = cb->args[0];
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct net *net = skb_sknet(skb);
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_table[i], s_list) {
if (++idx <= start || !net_eq(svc->net, net))
continue;
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_service(skb, svc, cb) < 0) {
idx--;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[i], f_list) {
if (++idx <= start || !net_eq(svc->net, net))
continue;
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_service(skb, svc, cb) < 0) {
idx--;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
}
nla_put_failure:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fill_small_buf(__le16 smb2_command, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, void *buf,
unsigned int *total_len)
{
struct smb2_sync_pdu *spdu = (struct smb2_sync_pdu *)buf;
/* lookup word count ie StructureSize from table */
__u16 parmsize = smb2_req_struct_sizes[le16_to_cpu(smb2_command)];
/*
* smaller than SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE but bigger than fixed area of
* largest operations (Create)
*/
memset(buf, 0, 256);
smb2_hdr_assemble(&spdu->sync_hdr, smb2_command, tcon);
spdu->StructureSize2 = cpu_to_le16(parmsize);
*total_len = parmsize + sizeof(struct smb2_sync_hdr);
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_register_protosw(struct inet_protosw *p)
{
struct list_head *lh;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
int protocol = p->protocol;
struct list_head *last_perm;
spin_lock_bh(&inetsw_lock);
if (p->type >= SOCK_MAX)
goto out_illegal;
/* If we are trying to override a permanent protocol, bail. */
last_perm = &inetsw[p->type];
list_for_each(lh, &inetsw[p->type]) {
answer = list_entry(lh, struct inet_protosw, list);
/* Check only the non-wild match. */
if ((INET_PROTOSW_PERMANENT & answer->flags) == 0)
break;
if (protocol == answer->protocol)
goto out_permanent;
last_perm = lh;
}
/* Add the new entry after the last permanent entry if any, so that
* the new entry does not override a permanent entry when matched with
* a wild-card protocol. But it is allowed to override any existing
* non-permanent entry. This means that when we remove this entry, the
* system automatically returns to the old behavior.
*/
list_add_rcu(&p->list, last_perm);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&inetsw_lock);
return;
out_permanent:
pr_err("Attempt to override permanent protocol %d\n", protocol);
goto out;
out_illegal:
pr_err("Ignoring attempt to register invalid socket type %d\n",
p->type);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fuse_copy_finish(struct fuse_copy_state *cs)
{
if (cs->currbuf) {
struct pipe_buffer *buf = cs->currbuf;
if (cs->write)
buf->len = PAGE_SIZE - cs->len;
cs->currbuf = NULL;
} else if (cs->pg) {
if (cs->write) {
flush_dcache_page(cs->pg);
set_page_dirty_lock(cs->pg);
}
put_page(cs->pg);
}
cs->pg = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HarfBuzzShaper::setDrawRange(int from, int to)
{
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(from >= 0);
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(to <= m_run.length());
m_fromIndex = from;
m_toIndex = to;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCopyTexImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLenum internal_format,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border) {
DCHECK(!ShouldDeferReads());
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCopyTexImage2D", "unknown texture for target");
return;
}
Texture* texture = texture_ref->texture();
if (texture->IsImmutable()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glCopyTexImage2D", "texture is immutable");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->ValidForTarget(target, level, width, height, 1) ||
border != 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glCopyTexImage2D", "dimensions out of range");
return;
}
if (!texture_manager()->ValidateFormatAndTypeCombination(
state_.GetErrorState(), "glCopyTexImage2D", internal_format,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE)) {
return;
}
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFrameBufferInternalFormat();
uint32 channels_exist = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(read_format);
uint32 channels_needed = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(internal_format);
if ((channels_needed & channels_exist) != channels_needed) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glCopyTexImage2D", "incompatible format");
return;
}
if ((channels_needed & (GLES2Util::kDepth | GLES2Util::kStencil)) != 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glCopyTexImage2D", "can not be used with depth or stencil textures");
return;
}
uint32 estimated_size = 0;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, height, internal_format, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, state_.unpack_alignment,
&estimated_size, NULL, NULL)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glCopyTexImage2D", "dimensions too large");
return;
}
if (!EnsureGPUMemoryAvailable(estimated_size)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glCopyTexImage2D", "out of memory");
return;
}
if (!CheckBoundFramebuffersValid("glCopyTexImage2D")) {
return;
}
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER("glCopyTexImage2D");
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
gfx::Size size = GetBoundReadFrameBufferSize();
if (texture->IsAttachedToFramebuffer()) {
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
}
GLint copyX = 0;
GLint copyY = 0;
GLint copyWidth = 0;
GLint copyHeight = 0;
Clip(x, width, size.width(), ©X, ©Width);
Clip(y, height, size.height(), ©Y, ©Height);
if (copyX != x ||
copyY != y ||
copyWidth != width ||
copyHeight != height) {
if (!ClearLevel(
texture->service_id(), texture->target(),
target, level, internal_format, internal_format, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE,
width, height, texture->IsImmutable())) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glCopyTexImage2D", "dimensions too big");
return;
}
if (copyHeight > 0 && copyWidth > 0) {
GLint dx = copyX - x;
GLint dy = copyY - y;
GLint destX = dx;
GLint destY = dy;
ScopedModifyPixels modify(texture_ref);
glCopyTexSubImage2D(target, level,
destX, destY, copyX, copyY,
copyWidth, copyHeight);
}
} else {
ScopedModifyPixels modify(texture_ref);
glCopyTexImage2D(target, level, internal_format,
copyX, copyY, copyWidth, copyHeight, border);
}
GLenum error = LOCAL_PEEK_GL_ERROR("glCopyTexImage2D");
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(
texture_ref, target, level, internal_format, width, height, 1,
border, internal_format, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_compressBlock(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx, void* dst, size_t dstCapacity, const void* src, size_t srcSize)
{
size_t const blockSizeMax = ZSTD_getBlockSize(cctx);
if (srcSize > blockSizeMax) return ERROR(srcSize_wrong);
return ZSTD_compressContinue_internal(cctx, dst, dstCapacity, src, srcSize, 0 /* frame mode */, 0 /* last chunk */);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ovl_entry *ovl_alloc_entry(void)
{
return kzalloc(sizeof(struct ovl_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int thread_cpu_nsleep(const clockid_t which_clock, int flags,
struct timespec *rqtp, struct timespec __user *rmtp)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeGenerateFreshDenseArray(uint32_t length)
{
append(GenerateFreshDenseArrayTag);
doWriteUint32(length);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Reverb_free(ReverbContext *pContext){
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
LVREV_ControlParams_st params; /* Control Parameters */
LVREV_MemoryTable_st MemTab;
/* Free the algorithm memory */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetMemoryTable(pContext->hInstance,
&MemTab,
LVM_NULL);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVM_GetMemoryTable", "Reverb_free")
for (int i=0; i<LVM_NR_MEMORY_REGIONS; i++){
if (MemTab.Region[i].Size != 0){
if (MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress != NULL){
ALOGV("\tfree() - START freeing %" PRIu32 " bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
free(MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
ALOGV("\tfree() - END freeing %" PRIu32 " bytes for region %u at %p\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}else{
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : free() - trying to free with NULL pointer %" PRIu32 " bytes "
"for region %u at %p ERROR\n",
MemTab.Region[i].Size, i, MemTab.Region[i].pBaseAddress);
}
}
}
} /* end Reverb_free */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = current_cred();
child_cred = __task_cred(child);
if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
goto out;
if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteSuggestionsReturned(
const std::vector<base::string16>& result) {
autofill_manager_->autocomplete_history_manager_->SendSuggestions(&result);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t net_tx_pkt_fetch_fragment(struct NetTxPkt *pkt,
int *src_idx, size_t *src_offset, struct iovec *dst, int *dst_idx)
{
size_t fetched = 0;
struct iovec *src = pkt->vec;
*dst_idx = NET_TX_PKT_FRAGMENT_HEADER_NUM;
while (fetched < IP_FRAG_ALIGN_SIZE(pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size)) {
/* no more place in fragment iov */
if (*dst_idx == NET_MAX_FRAG_SG_LIST) {
break;
}
/* no more data in iovec */
if (*src_idx == (pkt->payload_frags + NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG)) {
break;
}
dst[*dst_idx].iov_base = src[*src_idx].iov_base + *src_offset;
dst[*dst_idx].iov_len = MIN(src[*src_idx].iov_len - *src_offset,
IP_FRAG_ALIGN_SIZE(pkt->virt_hdr.gso_size) - fetched);
*src_offset += dst[*dst_idx].iov_len;
fetched += dst[*dst_idx].iov_len;
if (*src_offset == src[*src_idx].iov_len) {
*src_offset = 0;
(*src_idx)++;
}
(*dst_idx)++;
}
return fetched;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 8,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_handle_auth_mechname(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
AsyncRead *obj = &link->async_read;
RedsSASL *sasl = &link->stream->sasl;
sasl->mechname[sasl->len] = '\0';
spice_info("Got client mechname '%s' check against '%s'",
sasl->mechname, sasl->mechlist);
if (strncmp(sasl->mechlist, sasl->mechname, sasl->len) == 0) {
if (sasl->mechlist[sasl->len] != '\0' &&
sasl->mechlist[sasl->len] != ',') {
spice_info("One %d", sasl->mechlist[sasl->len]);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
} else {
char *offset = strstr(sasl->mechlist, sasl->mechname);
spice_info("Two %p", offset);
if (!offset) {
reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
return;
}
spice_info("Two '%s'", offset);
if (offset[-1] != ',' ||
(offset[sasl->len] != '\0'&&
offset[sasl->len] != ',')) {
reds_send_link_error(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_INVALID_DATA);
return;
}
}
free(sasl->mechlist);
sasl->mechlist = spice_strdup(sasl->mechname);
spice_info("Validated mechname '%s'", sasl->mechname);
obj->now = (uint8_t *)&sasl->len;
obj->end = obj->now + sizeof(uint32_t);
obj->done = reds_handle_auth_startlen;
async_read_handler(0, 0, &link->async_read);
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gd_error(const char *format, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, format);
_gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, format, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_poll(struct file *filp, poll_table * wait)
{
__poll_t res = 0;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
int count = 0;
unsigned long iflags;
sfp = filp->private_data;
if (!sfp)
return EPOLLERR;
sdp = sfp->parentdp;
if (!sdp)
return EPOLLERR;
poll_wait(filp, &sfp->read_wait, wait);
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
/* if any read waiting, flag it */
if ((0 == res) && (1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
res = EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++count;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
res |= EPOLLHUP;
else if (!sfp->cmd_q) {
if (0 == count)
res |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
} else if (count < SG_MAX_QUEUE)
res |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_poll: res=0x%x\n", (__force u32) res));
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect()
This shall help avoid copying uninitialized memory to the userspace when
calling ioctl(fd, SG_IO) with an empty command.
Reported-by: syzbot+7d26fc1eea198488deab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 75,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewImpl::~RenderViewImpl() {
history_page_ids_.clear();
if (decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_)
shared_popup_counter_->data--;
while (!file_chooser_completions_.empty()) {
if (file_chooser_completions_.front()->completion) {
file_chooser_completions_.front()->completion->didChooseFile(
WebVector<WebString>());
}
file_chooser_completions_.pop_front();
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
while (!fake_plugin_window_handles_.empty()) {
DCHECK(*fake_plugin_window_handles_.begin());
DestroyFakePluginWindowHandle(*fake_plugin_window_handles_.begin());
}
#endif
#ifndef NDEBUG
ViewMap* views = g_view_map.Pointer();
for (ViewMap::iterator it = views->begin(); it != views->end(); ++it)
DCHECK_NE(this, it->second) << "Failed to call Close?";
#endif
media_stream_impl_ = NULL;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, RenderViewGone());
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, OnDestruct());
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __poll_t sock_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct socket *sock = file->private_data;
__poll_t events = poll_requested_events(wait), mask = 0;
if (sock->ops->poll) {
sock_poll_busy_loop(sock, events);
mask = sock->ops->poll(file, sock, wait);
} else if (sock->ops->poll_mask) {
sock_poll_wait(file, sock_get_poll_head(file, events), wait);
mask = sock->ops->poll_mask(sock, events);
}
return mask | sock_poll_busy_flag(sock);
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight(LayoutUnit logicalHeight, LayoutUnit logicalTop, LogicalExtentComputedValues& computedValues) const
{
computedValues.m_extent = logicalHeight;
computedValues.m_position = logicalTop;
if (isTableCell() || (isInline() && !isReplaced()))
return;
Length h;
if (isOutOfFlowPositioned())
computePositionedLogicalHeight(computedValues);
else {
RenderBlock* cb = containingBlock();
bool hasPerpendicularContainingBlock = cb->isHorizontalWritingMode() != isHorizontalWritingMode();
if (!hasPerpendicularContainingBlock) {
bool shouldFlipBeforeAfter = cb->style()->writingMode() != style()->writingMode();
computeBlockDirectionMargins(cb,
shouldFlipBeforeAfter ? computedValues.m_margins.m_after : computedValues.m_margins.m_before,
shouldFlipBeforeAfter ? computedValues.m_margins.m_before : computedValues.m_margins.m_after);
}
if (isTable()) {
if (hasPerpendicularContainingBlock) {
bool shouldFlipBeforeAfter = shouldFlipBeforeAfterMargins(cb->style(), style());
computeInlineDirectionMargins(cb, containingBlockLogicalWidthForContent(), computedValues.m_extent,
shouldFlipBeforeAfter ? computedValues.m_margins.m_after : computedValues.m_margins.m_before,
shouldFlipBeforeAfter ? computedValues.m_margins.m_before : computedValues.m_margins.m_after);
}
return;
}
bool inHorizontalBox = parent()->isDeprecatedFlexibleBox() && parent()->style()->boxOrient() == HORIZONTAL;
bool stretching = parent()->style()->boxAlign() == BSTRETCH;
bool treatAsReplaced = shouldComputeSizeAsReplaced() && (!inHorizontalBox || !stretching);
bool checkMinMaxHeight = false;
if (hasOverrideHeight() && parent()->isFlexibleBoxIncludingDeprecated())
h = Length(overrideLogicalContentHeight(), Fixed);
else if (treatAsReplaced)
h = Length(computeReplacedLogicalHeight(), Fixed);
else {
h = style()->logicalHeight();
checkMinMaxHeight = true;
}
if (h.isAuto() && inHorizontalBox && toRenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox(parent())->isStretchingChildren()) {
h = Length(parentBox()->contentLogicalHeight() - marginBefore() - marginAfter() - borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight(), Fixed);
checkMinMaxHeight = false;
}
LayoutUnit heightResult;
if (checkMinMaxHeight) {
heightResult = computeLogicalHeightUsing(style()->logicalHeight(), computedValues.m_extent - borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
if (heightResult == -1)
heightResult = computedValues.m_extent;
heightResult = constrainLogicalHeightByMinMax(heightResult, computedValues.m_extent - borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight());
} else {
ASSERT(h.isFixed());
heightResult = h.value() + borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
}
computedValues.m_extent = heightResult;
if (hasPerpendicularContainingBlock) {
bool shouldFlipBeforeAfter = shouldFlipBeforeAfterMargins(cb->style(), style());
computeInlineDirectionMargins(cb, containingBlockLogicalWidthForContent(), heightResult,
shouldFlipBeforeAfter ? computedValues.m_margins.m_after : computedValues.m_margins.m_before,
shouldFlipBeforeAfter ? computedValues.m_margins.m_before : computedValues.m_margins.m_after);
}
}
bool paginatedContentNeedsBaseHeight = document().printing() && h.isPercent()
&& (isDocumentElement() || (isBody() && document().documentElement()->renderer()->style()->logicalHeight().isPercent())) && !isInline();
if (stretchesToViewport() || paginatedContentNeedsBaseHeight) {
LayoutUnit margins = collapsedMarginBefore() + collapsedMarginAfter();
LayoutUnit visibleHeight = viewLogicalHeightForPercentages();
if (isDocumentElement())
computedValues.m_extent = max(computedValues.m_extent, visibleHeight - margins);
else {
LayoutUnit marginsBordersPadding = margins + parentBox()->marginBefore() + parentBox()->marginAfter() + parentBox()->borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
computedValues.m_extent = max(computedValues.m_extent, visibleHeight - marginsBordersPadding);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ci_hdrc_host_init(struct ci13xxx *ci)
{
struct ci_role_driver *rdrv;
if (!hw_read(ci, CAP_DCCPARAMS, DCCPARAMS_HC))
return -ENXIO;
rdrv = devm_kzalloc(ci->dev, sizeof(struct ci_role_driver), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rdrv)
return -ENOMEM;
rdrv->start = host_start;
rdrv->stop = host_stop;
rdrv->irq = host_irq;
rdrv->name = "host";
ci->roles[CI_ROLE_HOST] = rdrv;
ehci_init_driver(&ci_ehci_hc_driver, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usb: chipidea: Allow disabling streaming not only in udc mode
When running a scp transfer using a USB/Ethernet adapter the following crash
happens:
$ scp test.tar.gz fabio@192.168.1.100:/home/fabio
fabio@192.168.1.100's password:
test.tar.gz 0% 0 0.0KB/s --:-- ETA
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: at net/sched/sch_generic.c:255 dev_watchdog+0x2cc/0x2f0()
NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth0 (asix): transmit queue 0 timed out
Modules linked in:
Backtrace:
[<80011c94>] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x10c) from [<804d3a5c>] (dump_stack+0x18/0x1c)
r6:000000ff r5:80412388 r4:80685dc0 r3:80696cc0
[<804d3a44>] (dump_stack+0x0/0x1c) from [<80021868>]
(warn_slowpath_common+0x54/0x6c)
[<80021814>] (warn_slowpath_common+0x0/0x6c) from [<80021924>]
(warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x40)
...
Setting SDIS (Stream Disable Mode- bit 4 of USBMODE register) fixes the problem.
However, in current code CI13XXX_DISABLE_STREAMING flag is only set in udc mode,
so allow disabling streaming also in host mode.
Tested on a mx6qsabrelite board.
Suggested-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
unsigned int credits;
handle_t *handle;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
/*
* There is a possibility that we're either freeing the inode
* or it's a completely new inode. In those cases we might not
* have i_mutex locked because it's not necessary.
*/
if (!(inode->i_state & (I_NEW|I_FREEING)))
WARN_ON(!inode_is_locked(inode));
trace_ext4_truncate_enter(inode);
if (!ext4_can_truncate(inode))
return;
ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
if (inode->i_size == 0 && !test_opt(inode->i_sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DA_ALLOC_CLOSE);
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
int has_inline = 1;
ext4_inline_data_truncate(inode, &has_inline);
if (has_inline)
return;
}
/* If we zero-out tail of the page, we have to create jinode for jbd2 */
if (inode->i_size & (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1)) {
if (ext4_inode_attach_jinode(inode) < 0)
return;
}
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
credits = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
else
credits = ext4_blocks_for_truncate(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_TRUNCATE, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, PTR_ERR(handle));
return;
}
if (inode->i_size & (inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
/*
* We add the inode to the orphan list, so that if this
* truncate spans multiple transactions, and we crash, we will
* resume the truncate when the filesystem recovers. It also
* marks the inode dirty, to catch the new size.
*
* Implication: the file must always be in a sane, consistent
* truncatable state while each transaction commits.
*/
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
if (ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))
ext4_ext_truncate(handle, inode);
else
ext4_ind_truncate(handle, inode);
up_write(&ei->i_data_sem);
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_evict_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
trace_ext4_truncate_exit(inode);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <Weller.Huang@cn.bosch.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 67,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsSession::AddHandler(
std::unique_ptr<protocol::DevToolsDomainHandler> handler) {
handler->Wire(dispatcher_.get());
handler->SetRenderer(process_, host_);
handlers_[handler->name()] = std::move(handler);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void BeginPassHook(unsigned int /*pass*/) {
psnr_ = kMaxPsnr;
nframes_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteDPXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
const char
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
DPXInfo
dpx;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
horizontal_factor,
vertical_factor,
y;
size_t
extent;
time_t
seconds;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
horizontal_factor=4;
vertical_factor=4;
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->sampling_factor,&geometry_info);
horizontal_factor=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
vertical_factor=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
vertical_factor=horizontal_factor;
if ((horizontal_factor != 1) && (horizontal_factor != 2) &&
(horizontal_factor != 4) && (vertical_factor != 1) &&
(vertical_factor != 2) && (vertical_factor != 4))
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedSamplingFactor");
}
if ((image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace) &&
((horizontal_factor == 2) || (vertical_factor == 2)))
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
image->columns++;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Write file header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&dpx,0,sizeof(dpx));
offset=0;
dpx.file.magic=0x53445058U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.magic);
dpx.file.image_offset=0x2000U;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"dpx:user-data");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
if (GetStringInfoLength(profile) > 1048576)
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
dpx.file.image_offset+=(unsigned int) GetStringInfoLength(profile);
dpx.file.image_offset=(((dpx.file.image_offset+0x2000-1)/0x2000)*0x2000);
}
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.image_offset);
(void) strncpy(dpx.file.version,"V2.0",sizeof(dpx.file.version)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) &dpx.file.version);
dpx.file.file_size=(unsigned int) (4U*image->columns*image->rows+
dpx.file.image_offset);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.file_size);
dpx.file.ditto_key=1U; /* new frame */
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.ditto_key);
dpx.file.generic_size=0x00000680U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.generic_size);
dpx.file.industry_size=0x00000180U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.industry_size);
dpx.file.user_size=0;
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
dpx.file.user_size+=(unsigned int) GetStringInfoLength(profile);
dpx.file.user_size=(((dpx.file.user_size+0x2000-1)/0x2000)*0x2000);
}
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.user_size);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:file.filename");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.file.filename,value,sizeof(dpx.file.filename)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.filename),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.filename);
seconds=time((time_t *) NULL);
(void) FormatMagickTime(seconds,sizeof(dpx.file.timestamp),
dpx.file.timestamp);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.timestamp),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.timestamp);
(void) strncpy(dpx.file.creator,GetMagickVersion((size_t *) NULL),
sizeof(dpx.file.creator)-1);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:file.creator");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.file.creator,value,sizeof(dpx.file.creator)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.creator),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.creator);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:file.project");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.file.project,value,sizeof(dpx.file.project)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.project),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.project);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:file.copyright");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.file.copyright,value,sizeof(dpx.file.copyright)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.copyright),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.copyright);
dpx.file.encrypt_key=(~0U);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.file.encrypt_key);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.file.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.file.reserve);
/*
Write image header.
*/
switch (image->orientation)
{
default:
case TopLeftOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=0; break;
case TopRightOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=1; break;
case BottomLeftOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=2; break;
case BottomRightOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=3; break;
case LeftTopOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=4; break;
case RightTopOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=5; break;
case LeftBottomOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=6; break;
case RightBottomOrientation: dpx.image.orientation=7; break;
}
offset+=WriteBlobShort(image,dpx.image.orientation);
dpx.image.number_elements=1;
offset+=WriteBlobShort(image,dpx.image.number_elements);
if ((image->columns != (unsigned int) image->columns) ||
(image->rows != (unsigned int) image->rows))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
{
dpx.image.image_element[i].data_sign=0U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].data_sign);
dpx.image.image_element[i].low_data=0U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].low_data);
dpx.image.image_element[i].low_quantity=0.0f;
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].low_quantity);
dpx.image.image_element[i].high_data=0U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].high_data);
dpx.image.image_element[i].high_quantity=0.0f;
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].high_quantity);
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=0;
if (i == 0)
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case Rec601YCbCrColorspace:
case Rec709YCbCrColorspace:
case YCbCrColorspace:
{
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=CbYCr444ComponentType;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=CbYCrA4444ComponentType;
break;
}
default:
{
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=RGBComponentType;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=RGBAComponentType;
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(image->matte == MagickFalse) &&
(IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor=LumaComponentType;
break;
}
}
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].descriptor);
dpx.image.image_element[i].transfer_characteristic=0;
if (image->colorspace == LogColorspace)
dpx.image.image_element[0].transfer_characteristic=
PrintingDensityColorimetric;
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,
dpx.image.image_element[i].transfer_characteristic);
dpx.image.image_element[i].colorimetric=0;
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].colorimetric);
dpx.image.image_element[i].bit_size=0;
if (i == 0)
dpx.image.image_element[i].bit_size=(unsigned char) image->depth;
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].bit_size);
dpx.image.image_element[i].packing=0;
if ((image->depth == 10) || (image->depth == 12))
dpx.image.image_element[i].packing=1;
offset+=WriteBlobShort(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].packing);
dpx.image.image_element[i].encoding=0;
offset+=WriteBlobShort(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].encoding);
dpx.image.image_element[i].data_offset=0U;
if (i == 0)
dpx.image.image_element[i].data_offset=dpx.file.image_offset;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].data_offset);
dpx.image.image_element[i].end_of_line_padding=0U;
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.image.image_element[i].end_of_line_padding);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,
dpx.image.image_element[i].end_of_image_padding);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.image.image_element[i].description),
(unsigned char *) dpx.image.image_element[i].description);
}
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.image.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.image.reserve);
/*
Write orientation header.
*/
if ((image->rows != image->magick_rows) ||
(image->columns != image->magick_columns))
{
/*
These properties are not valid if image size changed.
*/
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.x_offset");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.y_offset");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.x_center");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.y_center");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.x_size");
(void) DeleteImageProperty(image,"dpx:orientation.y_size");
}
dpx.orientation.x_offset=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.x_offset");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.orientation.x_offset=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.orientation.x_offset);
dpx.orientation.y_offset=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.y_offset");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.orientation.y_offset=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.orientation.y_offset);
dpx.orientation.x_center=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.x_center");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.orientation.x_center=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.orientation.x_center);
dpx.orientation.y_center=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.y_center");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.orientation.y_center=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.orientation.y_center);
dpx.orientation.x_size=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.x_size");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.orientation.x_size=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.orientation.x_size);
dpx.orientation.y_size=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.y_size");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.orientation.y_size=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.orientation.y_size);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.filename");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.orientation.filename,value,
sizeof(dpx.orientation.filename)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.filename),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.filename);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.timestamp),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.timestamp);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.device");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.orientation.device,value,
sizeof(dpx.orientation.device)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.device),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.device);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.serial");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.orientation.serial,value,
sizeof(dpx.orientation.serial)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.serial),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.serial);
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
dpx.orientation.border[i]=0;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.border");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
dpx.orientation.border[0]=(unsigned short) (geometry_info.rho+0.5);
dpx.orientation.border[1]=(unsigned short) (geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
dpx.orientation.border[2]=(unsigned short) (geometry_info.xi+0.5);
dpx.orientation.border[3]=(unsigned short) (geometry_info.psi+0.5);
}
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
offset+=WriteBlobShort(image,dpx.orientation.border[i]);
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[i]=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:orientation.aspect_ratio");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[0]=(unsigned int) (geometry_info.rho+0.5);
dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[1]=(unsigned int) (geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.orientation.aspect_ratio[i]);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.orientation.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.orientation.reserve);
/*
Write film header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.id,0,sizeof(dpx.film.id));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.id");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.id,value,sizeof(dpx.film.id)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.id),(unsigned char *) dpx.film.id);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.type,0,sizeof(dpx.film.type));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.type");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.type,value,sizeof(dpx.film.type)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.type),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.type);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.offset,0,sizeof(dpx.film.offset));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.offset");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.offset,value,sizeof(dpx.film.offset)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.offset),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.offset);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.prefix,0,sizeof(dpx.film.prefix));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.prefix");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.prefix,value,sizeof(dpx.film.prefix)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.prefix),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.prefix);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.count,0,sizeof(dpx.film.count));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.count");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.count,value,sizeof(dpx.film.count)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.count),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.count);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.format,0,sizeof(dpx.film.format));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.format");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.format,value,sizeof(dpx.film.format)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.format),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.format);
dpx.film.frame_position=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.frame_position");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.film.frame_position=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.film.frame_position);
dpx.film.sequence_extent=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.sequence_extent");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.film.sequence_extent=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.film.sequence_extent);
dpx.film.held_count=0U;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.held_count");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.film.held_count=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.film.held_count);
dpx.film.frame_rate=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.frame_rate");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.film.frame_rate=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.film.frame_rate);
dpx.film.shutter_angle=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.shutter_angle");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.film.shutter_angle=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.film.shutter_angle);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(dpx.film.frame_id,0,sizeof(dpx.film.frame_id));
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.frame_id");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.frame_id,value,sizeof(dpx.film.frame_id)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.frame_id),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.frame_id);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:film.slate");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.film.slate,value,sizeof(dpx.film.slate)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.slate),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.slate);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.film.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.film.reserve);
/*
Write television header.
*/
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.time.code");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.time_code=StringToTimeCode(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.television.time_code);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.user.bits");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.user_bits=StringToTimeCode(value);
offset+=WriteBlobLong(image,dpx.television.user_bits);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.interlace");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.interlace=(unsigned char) StringToLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.television.interlace);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.field_number");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.field_number=(unsigned char) StringToLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.television.field_number);
dpx.television.video_signal=0;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.video_signal");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.video_signal=(unsigned char) StringToLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.television.video_signal);
dpx.television.padding=0;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.padding");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.padding=(unsigned char) StringToLong(value);
offset+=WriteBlobByte(image,dpx.television.padding);
dpx.television.horizontal_sample_rate=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,
"dpx:television.horizontal_sample_rate");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.horizontal_sample_rate=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.horizontal_sample_rate);
dpx.television.vertical_sample_rate=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.vertical_sample_rate");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.vertical_sample_rate=StringToDouble(value,
(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.vertical_sample_rate);
dpx.television.frame_rate=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.frame_rate");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.frame_rate=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.frame_rate);
dpx.television.time_offset=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.time_offset");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.time_offset=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.time_offset);
dpx.television.gamma=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.gamma");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.gamma);
dpx.television.black_level=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.black_level");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.black_level=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.black_level);
dpx.television.black_gain=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.black_gain");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.black_gain=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.black_gain);
dpx.television.break_point=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.break_point");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.break_point=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.break_point);
dpx.television.white_level=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.white_level");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.white_level=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.white_level);
dpx.television.integration_times=0.0f;
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:television.integration_times");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
dpx.television.integration_times=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
offset+=WriteBlobFloat(image,dpx.television.integration_times);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.television.reserve),(unsigned char *)
dpx.television.reserve);
/*
Write user header.
*/
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"dpx:user.id");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) strncpy(dpx.user.id,value,sizeof(dpx.user.id)-1);
offset+=WriteBlob(image,sizeof(dpx.user.id),(unsigned char *) dpx.user.id);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
offset+=WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(profile));
while (offset < (MagickOffsetType) dpx.image.image_element[0].data_offset)
{
count=WriteBlobByte(image,0x00);
if (count != 1)
{
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
offset+=count;
}
/*
Convert pixel packets to DPX raster image.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
SetQuantumQuantum(quantum_info,32);
SetQuantumPack(quantum_info,dpx.image.image_element[0].packing == 0 ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
if (image->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace)
{
quantum_type=CbYCrQuantum;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
quantum_type=CbYCrAQuantum;
if ((horizontal_factor == 2) || (vertical_factor == 2))
quantum_type=CbYCrYQuantum;
}
extent=GetBytesPerRow(image->columns,image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4UL : 3UL,
image->depth,MagickTrue);
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) && (image->matte == MagickFalse) &&
(IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
extent=GetBytesPerRow(image->columns,1UL,image->depth,MagickTrue);
}
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
(void) ExportQuantumPixels(image,(const CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,&image->exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport signed int ReadBlobMSBSignedLong(Image *image)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
quantum.unsigned_value=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pcd_command(struct pcd_unit *cd, char *cmd, int dlen, char *fun)
{
pi_connect(cd->pi);
write_reg(cd, 6, 0xa0 + 0x10 * cd->drive);
if (pcd_wait(cd, IDE_BUSY | IDE_DRQ, 0, fun, "before command")) {
pi_disconnect(cd->pi);
return -1;
}
write_reg(cd, 4, dlen % 256);
write_reg(cd, 5, dlen / 256);
write_reg(cd, 7, 0xa0); /* ATAPI packet command */
if (pcd_wait(cd, IDE_BUSY, IDE_DRQ, fun, "command DRQ")) {
pi_disconnect(cd->pi);
return -1;
}
if (read_reg(cd, 2) != 1) {
printk("%s: %s: command phase error\n", cd->name, fun);
pi_disconnect(cd->pi);
return -1;
}
pi_write_block(cd->pi, cmd, 12);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameSelection::FrameSelection(LocalFrame& frame)
: frame_(frame),
layout_selection_(LayoutSelection::Create(*this)),
selection_editor_(SelectionEditor::Create(frame)),
granularity_(TextGranularity::kCharacter),
x_pos_for_vertical_arrow_navigation_(NoXPosForVerticalArrowNavigation()),
focused_(frame.GetPage() &&
frame.GetPage()->GetFocusController().FocusedFrame() == frame),
frame_caret_(new FrameCaret(frame, *selection_editor_)) {}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_image_writecmpt2(jas_image_t *image, int cmptno, jas_image_coord_t x,
jas_image_coord_t y, jas_image_coord_t width, jas_image_coord_t height,
long *buf)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
jas_image_coord_t i;
jas_image_coord_t j;
long v;
long *bufptr;
if (cmptno < 0 || cmptno >= image->numcmpts_)
goto error;
cmpt = image->cmpts_[cmptno];
if (x < 0 || x >= cmpt->width_ || y < 0 || y >= cmpt->height_ ||
width < 0 || height < 0 || x + width > cmpt->width_ ||
y + height > cmpt->height_)
goto error;
bufptr = buf;
for (i = 0; i < height; ++i) {
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, (cmpt->width_ * (y + i) + x)
* cmpt->cps_, SEEK_SET) < 0)
goto error;
for (j = 0; j < width; ++j) {
v = *bufptr++;
if (putint(cmpt->stream_, cmpt->sgnd_, cmpt->prec_, v))
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void write_dict(bytearray_t * bplist, node_t* node, hashtable_t* ref_table, uint8_t ref_size)
{
node_t* cur = NULL;
uint64_t i = 0;
uint64_t size = node_n_children(node) / 2;
uint8_t marker = BPLIST_DICT | (size < 15 ? size : 0xf);
byte_array_append(bplist, &marker, sizeof(uint8_t));
if (size >= 15) {
write_int(bplist, size);
}
for (i = 0, cur = node_first_child(node); cur && i < size; cur = node_next_sibling(node_next_sibling(cur)), i++) {
uint64_t idx1 = *(uint64_t *) (hash_table_lookup(ref_table, cur));
idx1 = be64toh(idx1);
byte_array_append(bplist, (uint8_t*)&idx1 + (sizeof(uint64_t) - ref_size), ref_size);
}
for (i = 0, cur = node_first_child(node); cur && i < size; cur = node_next_sibling(node_next_sibling(cur)), i++) {
uint64_t idx2 = *(uint64_t *) (hash_table_lookup(ref_table, cur->next));
idx2 = be64toh(idx2);
byte_array_append(bplist, (uint8_t*)&idx2 + (sizeof(uint64_t) - ref_size), ref_size);
}
}
Commit Message: bplist: Fix data range check for string/data/dict/array nodes
Passing a size of 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF to parse_string_node() might result
in a memcpy with a size of -1, leading to undefined behavior.
This commit makes sure that the actual node data (which depends on the size)
is in the range start_of_object..start_of_object+size.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 68,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nci_add_new_protocol(struct nci_dev *ndev,
struct nfc_target *target,
__u8 rf_protocol,
__u8 rf_tech_and_mode,
void *params)
{
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfca_poll *nfca_poll;
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcb_poll *nfcb_poll;
struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcf_poll *nfcf_poll;
__u32 protocol;
if (rf_protocol == NCI_RF_PROTOCOL_T2T)
protocol = NFC_PROTO_MIFARE_MASK;
else if (rf_protocol == NCI_RF_PROTOCOL_ISO_DEP)
protocol = NFC_PROTO_ISO14443_MASK;
else if (rf_protocol == NCI_RF_PROTOCOL_T3T)
protocol = NFC_PROTO_FELICA_MASK;
else
protocol = 0;
if (!(protocol & ndev->poll_prots)) {
pr_err("the target found does not have the desired protocol\n");
return -EPROTO;
}
if (rf_tech_and_mode == NCI_NFC_A_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE) {
nfca_poll = (struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfca_poll *)params;
target->sens_res = nfca_poll->sens_res;
target->sel_res = nfca_poll->sel_res;
target->nfcid1_len = nfca_poll->nfcid1_len;
if (target->nfcid1_len > 0) {
memcpy(target->nfcid1, nfca_poll->nfcid1,
target->nfcid1_len);
}
} else if (rf_tech_and_mode == NCI_NFC_B_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE) {
nfcb_poll = (struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcb_poll *)params;
target->sensb_res_len = nfcb_poll->sensb_res_len;
if (target->sensb_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(target->sensb_res, nfcb_poll->sensb_res,
target->sensb_res_len);
}
} else if (rf_tech_and_mode == NCI_NFC_F_PASSIVE_POLL_MODE) {
nfcf_poll = (struct rf_tech_specific_params_nfcf_poll *)params;
target->sensf_res_len = nfcf_poll->sensf_res_len;
if (target->sensf_res_len > 0) {
memcpy(target->sensf_res, nfcf_poll->sensf_res,
target->sensf_res_len);
}
} else {
pr_err("unsupported rf_tech_and_mode 0x%x\n", rf_tech_and_mode);
return -EPROTO;
}
target->supported_protocols |= protocol;
pr_debug("protocol 0x%x\n", protocol);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFC: Prevent multiple buffer overflows in NCI
Fix multiple remotely-exploitable stack-based buffer overflows due to
the NCI code pulling length fields directly from incoming frames and
copying too much data into statically-sized arrays.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Ilan Elias <ilane@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean Region_isEmpty(JNIEnv* env, jobject region) {
bool result = GetSkRegion(env, region)->isEmpty();
return boolTojboolean(result);
}
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cuse_gendev_release(struct device *dev)
{
kfree(dev);
}
Commit Message: cuse: fix memory leak
The problem is that fuse_dev_alloc() acquires an extra reference to cc.fc,
and the original ref count is never dropped.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: cc080e9e9be1 ("fuse: introduce per-instance fuse_dev structure")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 58,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState() {
if (!frame_->GetPage() || !GetDocumentLoader() ||
!GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem() || in_restore_scroll_) {
return;
}
base::AutoReset<bool> in_restore_scroll(&in_restore_scroll_, true);
RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState(
GetDocumentLoader()->LoadType(), false /* is_same_document */,
GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem()->GetViewState(),
GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem()->ScrollRestorationType());
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainSetMemoryFlags(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned long memory,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "memory=%lu, flags=%x", memory, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonZeroArgGoto(memory, error);
if (virMemoryMaxValue(true) / 1024 <= memory) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OVERFLOW, _("input too large: %lu"),
memory);
goto error;
}
if (conn->driver->domainSetMemoryFlags) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainSetMemoryFlags(domain, memory, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && !(dh->meth->flags & DH_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD)
&& !(dh->flags & DH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
DHerr(DH_F_DH_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD);
return 0;
}
#endif
return dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 15,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Editor::CanDHTMLCut() {
GetFrame().GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
return !IsInPasswordField(GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree()
.Start()) &&
!DispatchCPPEvent(EventTypeNames::beforecut, kDataTransferNumb);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::writeBoolVector(const std::unique_ptr<std::vector<bool>>& val)
{
return writeNullableTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeBool);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TemplateURL::SetPrepopulateId(int id) {
data_.prepopulate_id = id;
const bool prepopulated = id > 0;
for (TemplateURLRef& ref : url_refs_)
ref.prepopulated_ = prepopulated;
suggestions_url_ref_.prepopulated_ = prepopulated;
instant_url_ref_.prepopulated_ = prepopulated;
image_url_ref_.prepopulated_ = prepopulated;
new_tab_url_ref_.prepopulated_ = prepopulated;
contextual_search_url_ref_.prepopulated_ = prepopulated;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BIGNUM *BN_copy(BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
{
int i;
BN_ULONG *A;
const BN_ULONG *B;
bn_check_top(b);
if (a == b) return(a);
if (bn_wexpand(a,b->top) == NULL) return(NULL);
#if 1
A=a->d;
B=b->d;
for (i=b->top>>2; i>0; i--,A+=4,B+=4)
{
BN_ULONG a0,a1,a2,a3;
a0=B[0]; a1=B[1]; a2=B[2]; a3=B[3];
A[0]=a0; A[1]=a1; A[2]=a2; A[3]=a3;
}
switch (b->top&3)
{
case 3: A[2]=B[2];
case 2: A[1]=B[1];
case 1: A[0]=B[0];
case 0: ; /* ultrix cc workaround, see comments in bn_expand_internal */
}
#else
memcpy(a->d,b->d,sizeof(b->d[0])*b->top);
#endif
a->top=b->top;
a->neg=b->neg;
bn_check_top(a);
return(a);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionTabUtil::GetDefaultTab(Browser* browser,
WebContents** contents,
int* tab_id) {
DCHECK(browser);
DCHECK(contents);
*contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser);
if (*contents) {
if (tab_id)
*tab_id = GetTabId(*contents);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 116,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_hex_str(const char *digest, size_t digest_len, char **signature) /* {{{ */
{
int pos = -1;
size_t len = 0;
*signature = (char*)safe_pemalloc(digest_len, 2, 1, PHAR_G(persist));
for (; len < digest_len; ++len) {
(*signature)[++pos] = hexChars[((const unsigned char *)digest)[len] >> 4];
(*signature)[++pos] = hexChars[((const unsigned char *)digest)[len] & 0x0F];
}
(*signature)[++pos] = '\0';
return pos;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_disable_fragments(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int val;
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = (sctp_sk(sk)->disable_fragments == 1);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmctl, int, shmid, int, cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *, buf)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
int err, version;
struct ipc_namespace *ns;
if (cmd < 0 || shmid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
version = ipc_parse_version(&cmd);
ns = current->nsproxy->ipc_ns;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_INFO:
case SHM_INFO:
case SHM_STAT:
case IPC_STAT:
return shmctl_nolock(ns, shmid, cmd, version, buf);
case IPC_RMID:
case IPC_SET:
return shmctl_down(ns, shmid, cmd, buf, version);
case SHM_LOCK:
case SHM_UNLOCK:
{
struct file *shm_file;
rcu_read_lock();
shp = shm_obtain_object_check(ns, shmid);
if (IS_ERR(shp)) {
err = PTR_ERR(shp);
goto out_unlock1;
}
audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
err = security_shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
if (err)
goto out_unlock1;
ipc_lock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
kuid_t euid = current_euid();
err = -EPERM;
if (!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.uid) &&
!uid_eq(euid, shp->shm_perm.cuid))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK && !rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK))
goto out_unlock0;
}
shm_file = shp->shm_file;
if (is_file_hugepages(shm_file))
goto out_unlock0;
if (cmd == SHM_LOCK) {
struct user_struct *user = current_user();
err = shmem_lock(shm_file, 1, user);
if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED)) {
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = user;
}
goto out_unlock0;
}
/* SHM_UNLOCK */
if (!(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED))
goto out_unlock0;
shmem_lock(shm_file, 0, shp->mlock_user);
shp->shm_perm.mode &= ~SHM_LOCKED;
shp->mlock_user = NULL;
get_file(shm_file);
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
rcu_read_unlock();
shmem_unlock_mapping(shm_file->f_mapping);
fput(shm_file);
return err;
}
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
out_unlock0:
ipc_unlock_object(&shp->shm_perm);
out_unlock1:
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 165,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_seq_dispatch_event(struct snd_seq_event_cell *cell, int atomic, int hop)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client;
int result;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!cell))
return -EINVAL;
client = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(cell->event.source.client);
if (client == NULL) {
snd_seq_cell_free(cell); /* release this cell */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (cell->event.type == SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NOTE) {
/* NOTE event:
* the event cell is re-used as a NOTE-OFF event and
* enqueued again.
*/
struct snd_seq_event tmpev, *ev;
/* reserve this event to enqueue note-off later */
tmpev = cell->event;
tmpev.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NOTEON;
result = snd_seq_deliver_event(client, &tmpev, atomic, hop);
/*
* This was originally a note event. We now re-use the
* cell for the note-off event.
*/
ev = &cell->event;
ev->type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NOTEOFF;
ev->flags |= SNDRV_SEQ_PRIORITY_HIGH;
/* add the duration time */
switch (ev->flags & SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_STAMP_MASK) {
case SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_STAMP_TICK:
ev->time.tick += ev->data.note.duration;
break;
case SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_STAMP_REAL:
/* unit for duration is ms */
ev->time.time.tv_nsec += 1000000 * (ev->data.note.duration % 1000);
ev->time.time.tv_sec += ev->data.note.duration / 1000 +
ev->time.time.tv_nsec / 1000000000;
ev->time.time.tv_nsec %= 1000000000;
break;
}
ev->data.note.velocity = ev->data.note.off_velocity;
/* Now queue this cell as the note off event */
if (snd_seq_enqueue_event(cell, atomic, hop) < 0)
snd_seq_cell_free(cell); /* release this cell */
} else {
/* Normal events:
* event cell is freed after processing the event
*/
result = snd_seq_deliver_event(client, &cell->event, atomic, hop);
snd_seq_cell_free(cell);
}
snd_seq_client_unlock(client);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DoubleOrStringAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "doubleOrStringAttribute");
DoubleOrString cpp_value;
V8DoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, cpp_value, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNotNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setDoubleOrStringAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sk_buff *napi_frags_skb(struct napi_struct *napi)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = napi->skb;
struct ethhdr *eth;
unsigned int hlen;
unsigned int off;
napi->skb = NULL;
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb_gro_reset_offset(skb);
off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off + sizeof(*eth);
eth = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
eth = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!eth)) {
napi_reuse_skb(napi, skb);
skb = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(*eth));
/*
* This works because the only protocols we care about don't require
* special handling. We'll fix it up properly at the end.
*/
skb->protocol = eth->h_proto;
out:
return skb;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNmToken++;
#endif
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (c == 0) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge token, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
}
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
if ((max > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
return(buffer);
}
}
if (len == 0)
return(NULL);
if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken");
return(NULL);
}
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct pt_regs *save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs)
{
struct tss_struct *tss;
struct pt_regs *ret;
unsigned long tmp;
/*
* This gets called from entry.S with interrupts disabled, but
* from process context. Enable interrupts here, before trying
* to access user space.
*/
local_irq_enable();
if (!current->thread.vm86_info) {
printk("no vm86_info: BAD\n");
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | current->thread.v86mask);
tmp = copy_vm86_regs_to_user(¤t->thread.vm86_info->regs, regs);
tmp += put_user(current->thread.screen_bitmap, ¤t->thread.vm86_info->screen_bitmap);
if (tmp) {
printk("vm86: could not access userspace vm86_info\n");
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
tss = &per_cpu(init_tss, get_cpu());
current->thread.sp0 = current->thread.saved_sp0;
current->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
load_sp0(tss, ¤t->thread);
current->thread.saved_sp0 = 0;
put_cpu();
ret = KVM86->regs32;
ret->fs = current->thread.saved_fs;
set_user_gs(ret, current->thread.saved_gs);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_protocol_from_ofp_version(enum ofp_version version)
{
return rightmost_1bit(ofputil_protocols_from_ofp_version(version));
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setValueAsDate(double value, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
m_inputType->setValueAsDate(value, ec);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::HighEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAsAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_highEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAs_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
UseCounter::Count(CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()), WebFeature::kTestAttributeHighEntropy);
test_object_v8_internal::HighEntropyAttributeWithMeasureAsAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL GetWebUIURL(std::string host) {
return GURL(std::string(kChromeUIScheme) + "://" + host);
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnGetDeviceSuccess(
RequestDeviceCallback callback,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRequestDeviceOptionsPtr options,
const std::string& device_address) {
device_chooser_controller_.reset();
const device::BluetoothDevice* const device =
GetAdapter()->GetDevice(device_address);
if (device == nullptr) {
DVLOG(1) << "Device " << device_address << " no longer in adapter";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(UMARequestDeviceOutcome::CHOSEN_DEVICE_VANISHED);
std::move(callback).Run(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::CHOSEN_DEVICE_VANISHED,
nullptr /* device */);
return;
}
const WebBluetoothDeviceId device_id =
allowed_devices().AddDevice(device_address, options);
DVLOG(1) << "Device: " << device->GetNameForDisplay();
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothDevicePtr device_ptr =
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothDevice::New();
device_ptr->id = device_id;
device_ptr->name = device->GetName();
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(UMARequestDeviceOutcome::SUCCESS);
std::move(callback).Run(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::SUCCESS,
std::move(device_ptr));
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_encode_packet_in_private(const struct ofputil_packet_in_private *pin,
enum ofputil_protocol protocol,
enum nx_packet_in_format packet_in_format)
{
enum ofp_version version = ofputil_protocol_to_ofp_version(protocol);
struct ofpbuf *msg;
switch (packet_in_format) {
case NXPIF_STANDARD:
switch (protocol) {
case OFPUTIL_P_OF10_STD:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF10_STD_TID:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF10_NXM:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF10_NXM_TID:
msg = ofputil_encode_ofp10_packet_in(&pin->public);
break;
case OFPUTIL_P_OF11_STD:
msg = ofputil_encode_ofp11_packet_in(&pin->public);
break;
case OFPUTIL_P_OF12_OXM:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF13_OXM:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF14_OXM:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF15_OXM:
case OFPUTIL_P_OF16_OXM:
msg = ofputil_encode_ofp12_packet_in(&pin->public, version);
break;
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
break;
case NXPIF_NXT_PACKET_IN:
msg = ofputil_encode_nx_packet_in(&pin->public, version);
break;
case NXPIF_NXT_PACKET_IN2:
return ofputil_encode_nx_packet_in2(pin, version,
pin->public.packet_len);
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
ofpbuf_put(msg, pin->public.packet, pin->public.packet_len);
ofpmsg_update_length(msg);
return msg;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionRegistry::RemoveBlacklisted(const std::string& id) {
return blacklisted_extensions_.Remove(id);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnCompositingLockStateChanged(
ui::Compositor* compositor) {
if (!compositor->IsLocked() && can_lock_compositor_ == YES_DID_LOCK) {
can_lock_compositor_ = NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TimeTicks TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit::GetLastFocusedTime()
const {
return last_focused_time_;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dummy_set_flag(struct trace_array *tr, u32 old_flags, u32 bit, int set)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetIgnoreInputEvents(bool ignore_input_events) {
ignore_input_events_ = ignore_input_events;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseStringEntityRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar ** str) {
xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *ptr;
xmlChar cur;
xmlEntityPtr ent = NULL;
if ((str == NULL) || (*str == NULL))
return(NULL);
ptr = *str;
cur = *ptr;
if (cur != '&')
return(NULL);
ptr++;
name = xmlParseStringName(ctxt, &ptr);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseStringEntityRef: no name\n");
*str = ptr;
return(NULL);
}
if (*ptr != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(NULL);
}
ptr++;
/*
* Predefined entities override any extra definition
*/
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) == 0) {
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if (ent != NULL) {
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(ent);
}
}
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Ask first SAX for entity resolution, otherwise try the
* entities which may have stored in the parser context.
*/
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL)
ent = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((ent == NULL) && (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX))
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if ((ent == NULL) && (ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
ent = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(name);
return(NULL);
}
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", the
* Name given in the entity reference must match that in an
* entity declaration, except that well-formed documents
* need not declare any of the following entities: amp, lt,
* gt, apos, quot.
* The declaration of a parameter entity must precede any
* reference to it.
* Similarly, the declaration of a general entity must
* precede any reference to it which appears in a default
* value in an attribute-list declaration. Note that if
* entities are declared in the external subset or in
* external parameter entities, a non-validating processor
* is not obligated to read and process their declarations;
* for such documents, the rule that an entity must be
* declared is a well-formedness constraint only if
* standalone='yes'.
*/
if (ent == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
} else {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n",
name);
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, ent, 0);
/* TODO ? check regressions ctxt->valid = 0; */
}
/*
* [ WFC: Parsed Entity ]
* An entity reference must not contain the name of an
* unparsed entity
*/
else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNPARSED_ENTITY,
"Entity reference to unparsed entity %s\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No External Entity References ]
* Attribute values cannot contain direct or indirect
* entity references to external entities.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_EXTERNAL,
"Attribute references external entity '%s'\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No < in Attribute Values ]
* The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or
* indirectly in an attribute value (other than "<") must
* not contain a <.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent != NULL) && (ent->content != NULL) &&
(ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(xmlStrchr(ent->content, '<'))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE,
"'<' in entity '%s' is not allowed in attributes values\n",
name);
}
/*
* Internal check, no parameter entities here ...
*/
else {
switch (ent->etype) {
case XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
case XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_PARAMETER,
"Attempt to reference the parameter entity '%s'\n",
name);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: No Recursion ]
* A parsed entity must not contain a recursive reference
* to itself, either directly or indirectly.
* Done somewhere else
*/
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(ent);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
{
struct inode *inode;
if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
return 0;
inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
* otherwise, it must be a safe source.
*/
if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) || inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return 0;
audit_log_link_denied("linkat", link);
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: diskfile_recv(struct iperf_stream *sp)
{
int r;
r = sp->rcv2(sp);
if (r > 0) {
(void) write(sp->diskfile_fd, sp->buffer, r);
(void) fsync(sp->diskfile_fd);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetNonAttributeValueByUserEdit(
const String& sanitized_value) {
SetValueBeforeFirstUserEditIfNotSet();
SetNonAttributeValue(sanitized_value);
CheckIfValueWasReverted(sanitized_value);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_from_url(struct playlist *pls, struct segment *seg,
uint8_t *buf, int buf_size,
enum ReadFromURLMode mode)
{
int ret;
/* limit read if the segment was only a part of a file */
if (seg->size >= 0)
buf_size = FFMIN(buf_size, seg->size - pls->cur_seg_offset);
if (mode == READ_COMPLETE) {
ret = avio_read(pls->input, buf, buf_size);
if (ret != buf_size)
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Could not read complete segment.\n");
} else
ret = avio_read(pls->input, buf, buf_size);
if (ret > 0)
pls->cur_seg_offset += ret;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaControlsHeaderView::SetAppIcon(const gfx::ImageSkia& img) {
app_icon_view_->SetImage(img);
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdpdr_send_client_name_request(void)
{
/* DR_CORE_CLIENT_NAME_REQ */
STREAM s;
struct stream name = { 0 };
if (NULL == g_rdpdr_clientname)
{
g_rdpdr_clientname = g_hostname;
}
s_realloc(&name, 512 * 4);
s_reset(&name);
out_utf16s(&name, g_rdpdr_clientname);
s_mark_end(&name);
s = channel_init(rdpdr_channel, 16 + s_length(&name));
out_uint16_le(s, RDPDR_CTYP_CORE);
out_uint16_le(s, PAKID_CORE_CLIENT_NAME);
out_uint32_le(s, 1); /* UnicodeFlag */
out_uint32_le(s, 0); /* CodePage */
out_uint32_le(s, s_length(&name)); /* ComputerNameLen */
out_stream(s, &name);
s_mark_end(s);
channel_send(s, rdpdr_channel);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usb_cm106_write_int_reg(struct usb_device *dev, int reg, u16 value)
{
u8 buf[4];
buf[0] = 0x20;
buf[1] = value & 0xff;
buf[2] = (value >> 8) & 0xff;
buf[3] = reg;
return snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0), USB_REQ_SET_CONFIGURATION,
USB_DIR_OUT | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT,
0, 0, &buf, 4);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LYHandleFIG(HTStructured * me, const BOOL *present,
STRING2PTR value,
int isobject,
int imagemap,
const char *id,
const char *src,
int convert,
int start,
BOOL *intern_flag GCC_UNUSED)
{
if (start == TRUE) {
me->inFIG = TRUE;
if (me->inA) {
SET_SKIP_STACK(HTML_A);
HTML_end_element(me, HTML_A, NULL);
}
if (!isobject) {
LYEnsureDoubleSpace(me);
LYResetParagraphAlignment(me);
me->inFIGwithP = TRUE;
} else {
me->inFIGwithP = FALSE;
HTML_put_character(me, ' '); /* space char may be ignored */
}
if (non_empty(id)) {
if (present && convert) {
CHECK_ID(HTML_FIG_ID);
} else
LYHandleID(me, id);
}
me->in_word = NO;
me->inP = FALSE;
if (clickable_images && non_empty(src)) {
char *href = NULL;
StrAllocCopy(href, src);
CHECK_FOR_INTERN(*intern_flag, href);
LYLegitimizeHREF(me, &href, TRUE, TRUE);
if (*href) {
me->CurrentA = HTAnchor_findChildAndLink(me->node_anchor, /* Parent */
NULL, /* Tag */
href, /* Addresss */
INTERN_CHK(*intern_flag)); /* Type */
HText_beginAnchor(me->text, me->inUnderline, me->CurrentA);
if (me->inBoldH == FALSE)
HText_appendCharacter(me->text, LY_BOLD_START_CHAR);
HTML_put_string(me, (isobject
? (imagemap
? "(IMAGE)"
: "(OBJECT)")
: "[FIGURE]"));
if (me->inBoldH == FALSE)
HText_appendCharacter(me->text, LY_BOLD_END_CHAR);
HText_endAnchor(me->text, 0);
HTML_put_character(me, '-');
HTML_put_character(me, ' '); /* space char may be ignored */
me->in_word = NO;
}
FREE(href);
}
} else { /* handle end tag */
if (me->inFIGwithP) {
LYEnsureDoubleSpace(me);
} else {
HTML_put_character(me, ' '); /* space char may be ignored */
}
LYResetParagraphAlignment(me);
me->inFIGwithP = FALSE;
me->inFIG = FALSE;
change_paragraph_style(me, me->sp->style); /* Often won't really change */
if (me->List_Nesting_Level >= 0) {
UPDATE_STYLE;
HText_NegateLineOne(me->text);
}
}
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<ExecutableMemoryHandle> ExecutableAllocator::allocate(JSGlobalData& globalData, size_t sizeInBytes, void* ownerUID, JITCompilationEffort effort)
{
RefPtr<ExecutableMemoryHandle> result = allocator->allocate(sizeInBytes, ownerUID);
if (!result) {
if (effort == JITCompilationCanFail)
return result;
releaseExecutableMemory(globalData);
result = allocator->allocate(sizeInBytes, ownerUID);
if (!result)
CRASH();
}
return result.release();
}
Commit Message: Add missing sys/mman.h include on Mac
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98089
Patch by Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> on 2013-01-16
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
The madvise function and MADV_FREE constant require sys/mman.h.
* jit/ExecutableAllocatorFixedVMPool.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139926 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpeg2000_decode_tile(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000Tile *tile,
AVFrame *picture)
{
int compno, reslevelno, bandno;
int x, y;
uint8_t *line;
Jpeg2000T1Context t1;
/* Loop on tile components */
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = tile->comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = tile->codsty + compno;
/* Loop on resolution levels */
for (reslevelno = 0; reslevelno < codsty->nreslevels2decode; reslevelno++) {
Jpeg2000ResLevel *rlevel = comp->reslevel + reslevelno;
/* Loop on bands */
for (bandno = 0; bandno < rlevel->nbands; bandno++) {
int nb_precincts, precno;
Jpeg2000Band *band = rlevel->band + bandno;
int cblkno = 0, bandpos;
bandpos = bandno + (reslevelno > 0);
if (band->coord[0][0] == band->coord[0][1] ||
band->coord[1][0] == band->coord[1][1])
continue;
nb_precincts = rlevel->num_precincts_x * rlevel->num_precincts_y;
/* Loop on precincts */
for (precno = 0; precno < nb_precincts; precno++) {
Jpeg2000Prec *prec = band->prec + precno;
/* Loop on codeblocks */
for (cblkno = 0; cblkno < prec->nb_codeblocks_width * prec->nb_codeblocks_height; cblkno++) {
int x, y;
Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk = prec->cblk + cblkno;
decode_cblk(s, codsty, &t1, cblk,
cblk->coord[0][1] - cblk->coord[0][0],
cblk->coord[1][1] - cblk->coord[1][0],
bandpos);
x = cblk->coord[0][0];
y = cblk->coord[1][0];
if (codsty->transform == FF_DWT97)
dequantization_float(x, y, cblk, comp, &t1, band);
else
dequantization_int(x, y, cblk, comp, &t1, band);
} /* end cblk */
} /*end prec */
} /* end band */
} /* end reslevel */
/* inverse DWT */
ff_dwt_decode(&comp->dwt, codsty->transform == FF_DWT97 ? (void*)comp->f_data : (void*)comp->i_data);
} /*end comp */
/* inverse MCT transformation */
if (tile->codsty[0].mct)
mct_decode(s, tile);
if (s->cdef[0] < 0) {
for (x = 0; x < s->ncomponents; x++)
s->cdef[x] = x + 1;
if ((s->ncomponents & 1) == 0)
s->cdef[s->ncomponents-1] = 0;
}
if (s->precision <= 8) {
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = tile->comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = tile->codsty + compno;
float *datap = comp->f_data;
int32_t *i_datap = comp->i_data;
int cbps = s->cbps[compno];
int w = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][1] - s->image_offset_x;
int planar = !!picture->data[2];
int pixelsize = planar ? 1 : s->ncomponents;
int plane = 0;
if (planar)
plane = s->cdef[compno] ? s->cdef[compno]-1 : (s->ncomponents-1);
y = tile->comp[compno].coord[1][0] - s->image_offset_y;
line = picture->data[plane] + y * picture->linesize[plane];
for (; y < tile->comp[compno].coord[1][1] - s->image_offset_y; y += s->cdy[compno]) {
uint8_t *dst;
x = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][0] - s->image_offset_x;
dst = line + x * pixelsize + compno*!planar;
if (codsty->transform == FF_DWT97) {
for (; x < w; x += s->cdx[compno]) {
int val = lrintf(*datap) + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
*dst = val << (8 - cbps);
datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
} else {
for (; x < w; x += s->cdx[compno]) {
int val = *i_datap + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
*dst = val << (8 - cbps);
i_datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
}
line += picture->linesize[plane];
}
}
} else {
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = tile->comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = tile->codsty + compno;
float *datap = comp->f_data;
int32_t *i_datap = comp->i_data;
uint16_t *linel;
int cbps = s->cbps[compno];
int w = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][1] - s->image_offset_x;
int planar = !!picture->data[2];
int pixelsize = planar ? 1 : s->ncomponents;
int plane = 0;
if (planar)
plane = s->cdef[compno] ? s->cdef[compno]-1 : (s->ncomponents-1);
y = tile->comp[compno].coord[1][0] - s->image_offset_y;
linel = (uint16_t *)picture->data[plane] + y * (picture->linesize[plane] >> 1);
for (; y < tile->comp[compno].coord[1][1] - s->image_offset_y; y += s->cdy[compno]) {
uint16_t *dst;
x = tile->comp[compno].coord[0][0] - s->image_offset_x;
dst = linel + (x * pixelsize + compno*!planar);
if (codsty->transform == FF_DWT97) {
for (; x < w; x += s-> cdx[compno]) {
int val = lrintf(*datap) + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
/* align 12 bit values in little-endian mode */
*dst = val << (16 - cbps);
datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
} else {
for (; x < w; x += s-> cdx[compno]) {
int val = *i_datap + (1 << (cbps - 1));
/* DC level shift and clip see ISO 15444-1:2002 G.1.2 */
val = av_clip(val, 0, (1 << cbps) - 1);
/* align 12 bit values in little-endian mode */
*dst = val << (16 - cbps);
i_datap++;
dst += pixelsize;
}
}
linel += picture->linesize[plane] >> 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: jpeg2000: check log2_cblk dimensions
Fixes out of array access
Fixes Ticket2895
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <ami_stuff@o2.pl>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::AppendBlankPages(int num_pages) {
DCHECK_NE(num_pages, 0);
if (!doc_)
return;
selection_.clear();
pending_pages_.clear();
while (pages_.size() > 1) {
pages_.pop_back();
FPDFPage_Delete(doc_, pages_.size());
}
std::vector<pp::Rect> page_rects;
pp::Size page_size = GetPageSize(0);
page_size.Enlarge(kPageShadowLeft + kPageShadowRight,
kPageShadowTop + kPageShadowBottom);
pp::Size old_document_size = document_size_;
document_size_ = pp::Size(page_size.width(), 0);
for (int i = 0; i < num_pages; ++i) {
if (i != 0) {
document_size_.Enlarge(0, kPageSeparatorThickness);
}
pp::Rect rect(pp::Point(0, document_size_.height()), page_size);
page_rects.push_back(rect);
document_size_.Enlarge(0, page_size.height());
}
for (int i = 1; i < num_pages; ++i) {
pp::Rect page_rect(page_rects[i]);
page_rect.Inset(kPageShadowLeft, kPageShadowTop, kPageShadowRight,
kPageShadowBottom);
double width_in_points =
ConvertUnitDouble(page_rect.width(), kPixelsPerInch, kPointsPerInch);
double height_in_points =
ConvertUnitDouble(page_rect.height(), kPixelsPerInch, kPointsPerInch);
FPDF_PAGE temp_page =
FPDFPage_New(doc_, i, width_in_points, height_in_points);
FPDF_ClosePage(temp_page);
pages_.push_back(std::make_unique<PDFiumPage>(this, i, page_rect, true));
}
CalculateVisiblePages();
if (document_size_ != old_document_size)
client_->DocumentSizeUpdated(document_size_);
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassthroughResources::PassthroughResources() : texture_object_map(nullptr) {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum act_return http_action_set_req_line(struct act_rule *rule, struct proxy *px,
struct session *sess, struct stream *s, int flags)
{
struct chunk *replace;
enum act_return ret = ACT_RET_ERR;
replace = alloc_trash_chunk();
if (!replace)
goto leave;
/* If we have to create a query string, prepare a '?'. */
if (rule->arg.http.action == 2)
replace->str[replace->len++] = '?';
replace->len += build_logline(s, replace->str + replace->len, replace->size - replace->len,
&rule->arg.http.logfmt);
http_replace_req_line(rule->arg.http.action, replace->str, replace->len, px, s);
ret = ACT_RET_CONT;
leave:
free_trash_chunk(replace);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SessionService::SortTabsBasedOnVisualOrderAndPrune(
std::map<int, SessionWindow*>* windows,
std::vector<SessionWindow*>* valid_windows) {
std::map<int, SessionWindow*>::iterator i = windows->begin();
while (i != windows->end()) {
if (i->second->tabs.empty() || i->second->is_constrained ||
!should_track_changes_for_browser_type(
static_cast<Browser::Type>(i->second->type))) {
delete i->second;
windows->erase(i++);
} else {
std::sort(i->second->tabs.begin(), i->second->tabs.end(),
&TabVisualIndexSortFunction);
if (valid_windows->empty()) {
valid_windows->push_back(i->second);
} else {
valid_windows->insert(
std::upper_bound(valid_windows->begin(), valid_windows->end(),
i->second, &WindowOrderSortFunction),
i->second);
}
++i;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioInputDeviceManager* MediaStreamManager::audio_input_device_manager() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DCHECK(audio_input_device_manager_.get());
return audio_input_device_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pimv2_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, enum pimv2_addrtype at, int silent)
{
int af;
int len, hdrlen;
ND_TCHECK(bp[0]);
if (pimv2_addr_len == 0) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[1]);
switch (bp[0]) {
case 1:
af = AF_INET;
len = sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case 2:
af = AF_INET6;
len = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (bp[1] != 0)
return -1;
hdrlen = 2;
} else {
switch (pimv2_addr_len) {
case sizeof(struct in_addr):
af = AF_INET;
break;
case sizeof(struct in6_addr):
af = AF_INET6;
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
len = pimv2_addr_len;
hdrlen = 0;
}
bp += hdrlen;
switch (at) {
case pimv2_unicast:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], len);
if (af == AF_INET) {
if (!silent)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp)));
}
else if (af == AF_INET6) {
if (!silent)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp)));
}
return hdrlen + len;
case pimv2_group:
case pimv2_source:
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], len + 2);
if (af == AF_INET) {
if (!silent) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, bp + 2)));
if (bp[1] != 32)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", bp[1]));
}
}
else if (af == AF_INET6) {
if (!silent) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, bp + 2)));
if (bp[1] != 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", bp[1]));
}
}
if (bp[0] && !silent) {
if (at == pimv2_group) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(0x%02x)", bp[0]));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s%s%s",
bp[0] & 0x04 ? "S" : "",
bp[0] & 0x02 ? "W" : "",
bp[0] & 0x01 ? "R" : ""));
if (bp[0] & 0xf8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+0x%02x", bp[0] & 0xf8));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
}
return hdrlen + 2 + len;
default:
return -1;
}
trunc:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13030/PIM: Redo bounds checks and add length checks.
Use ND_TCHECK macros to do bounds checking, and add length checks before
the bounds checks.
Add a bounds check that the review process found was missing.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update one test output file to reflect the changes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_unwrap(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_unwrap(minor_status,
context_handle,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_state,
qop_state);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 1 | 166,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int write_name_extension(git_index *index, git_filebuf *file)
{
git_buf name_buf = GIT_BUF_INIT;
git_vector *out = &index->names;
git_index_name_entry *conflict_name;
struct index_extension extension;
size_t i;
int error = 0;
git_vector_foreach(out, i, conflict_name) {
if ((error = create_name_extension_data(&name_buf, conflict_name)) < 0)
goto done;
}
memset(&extension, 0x0, sizeof(struct index_extension));
memcpy(&extension.signature, INDEX_EXT_CONFLICT_NAME_SIG, 4);
extension.extension_size = (uint32_t)name_buf.size;
error = write_extension(file, &extension, &name_buf);
git_buf_free(&name_buf);
done:
return error;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nsPluginInstance::shut()
{
gnash::log_debug("Gnash plugin shutting down");
if (_streamfd != -1) {
if (close(_streamfd) == -1) {
perror("closing _streamfd");
} else {
_streamfd = -1;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<InputHandler*> InputHandler::ForAgentHost(
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* host) {
return DevToolsSession::HandlersForAgentHost<InputHandler>(
host, Input::Metainfo::domainName);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline uint32_t clipf_c_one(uint32_t a, uint32_t mini,
uint32_t maxi, uint32_t maxisign)
{
if(a > mini) return mini;
else if((a^(1U<<31)) > maxisign) return maxi;
else return a;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __set_cpus_allowed_ptr(struct task_struct *p,
const struct cpumask *new_mask, bool check)
{
const struct cpumask *cpu_valid_mask = cpu_active_mask;
unsigned int dest_cpu;
struct rq_flags rf;
struct rq *rq;
int ret = 0;
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &rf);
if (p->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
/*
* Kernel threads are allowed on online && !active CPUs
*/
cpu_valid_mask = cpu_online_mask;
}
/*
* Must re-check here, to close a race against __kthread_bind(),
* sched_setaffinity() is not guaranteed to observe the flag.
*/
if (check && (p->flags & PF_NO_SETAFFINITY)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (cpumask_equal(&p->cpus_allowed, new_mask))
goto out;
if (!cpumask_intersects(new_mask, cpu_valid_mask)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
do_set_cpus_allowed(p, new_mask);
if (p->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
/*
* For kernel threads that do indeed end up on online &&
* !active we want to ensure they are strict per-cpu threads.
*/
WARN_ON(cpumask_intersects(new_mask, cpu_online_mask) &&
!cpumask_intersects(new_mask, cpu_active_mask) &&
p->nr_cpus_allowed != 1);
}
/* Can the task run on the task's current CPU? If so, we're done */
if (cpumask_test_cpu(task_cpu(p), new_mask))
goto out;
dest_cpu = cpumask_any_and(cpu_valid_mask, new_mask);
if (task_running(rq, p) || p->state == TASK_WAKING) {
struct migration_arg arg = { p, dest_cpu };
/* Need help from migration thread: drop lock and wait. */
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &rf);
stop_one_cpu(cpu_of(rq), migration_cpu_stop, &arg);
tlb_migrate_finish(p->mm);
return 0;
} else if (task_on_rq_queued(p)) {
/*
* OK, since we're going to drop the lock immediately
* afterwards anyway.
*/
lockdep_unpin_lock(&rq->lock, rf.cookie);
rq = move_queued_task(rq, p, dest_cpu);
lockdep_repin_lock(&rq->lock, rf.cookie);
}
out:
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &rf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,476 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(urldecode)
{
char *in_str, *out_str;
int in_str_len, out_str_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &in_str,
&in_str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
out_str = estrndup(in_str, in_str_len);
out_str_len = php_url_decode(out_str, in_str_len);
RETURN_STRINGL(out_str, out_str_len, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderViewForInitialEmptyDocument() {
return CreateRenderViewForRenderManager(
GetRenderViewHost(), MSG_ROUTING_NONE, MSG_ROUTING_NONE,
frame_tree_.root()->devtools_frame_token(),
frame_tree_.root()->current_replication_state());
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetDataRowColDbl(cmsHANDLE hIT8, int row, int col, cmsFloat64Number Val)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
char Buff[256];
_cmsAssert(hIT8 != NULL);
snprintf(Buff, 255, it8->DoubleFormatter, Val);
return SetData(it8, row, col, Buff);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_init_blkcipher_ops_sync(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct blkcipher_tfm *crt = &tfm->crt_blkcipher;
struct blkcipher_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_blkcipher;
unsigned long align = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(tfm) + 1;
unsigned long addr;
crt->setkey = setkey;
crt->encrypt = alg->encrypt;
crt->decrypt = alg->decrypt;
addr = (unsigned long)crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
addr = ALIGN(addr, align);
addr += ALIGN(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_ctxsize, align);
crt->iv = (void *)addr;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_skip_buddy(struct sched_entity *se)
{
for_each_sched_entity(se)
cfs_rq_of(se)->skip = se;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rds_recv_incoming(struct rds_connection *conn, struct in6_addr *saddr,
struct in6_addr *daddr,
struct rds_incoming *inc, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct rds_sock *rs = NULL;
struct sock *sk;
unsigned long flags;
struct rds_conn_path *cp;
inc->i_conn = conn;
inc->i_rx_jiffies = jiffies;
if (conn->c_trans->t_mp_capable)
cp = inc->i_conn_path;
else
cp = &conn->c_path[0];
rdsdebug("conn %p next %llu inc %p seq %llu len %u sport %u dport %u "
"flags 0x%x rx_jiffies %lu\n", conn,
(unsigned long long)cp->cp_next_rx_seq,
inc,
(unsigned long long)be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence),
be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len),
be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sport),
be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_dport),
inc->i_hdr.h_flags,
inc->i_rx_jiffies);
/*
* Sequence numbers should only increase. Messages get their
* sequence number as they're queued in a sending conn. They
* can be dropped, though, if the sending socket is closed before
* they hit the wire. So sequence numbers can skip forward
* under normal operation. They can also drop back in the conn
* failover case as previously sent messages are resent down the
* new instance of a conn. We drop those, otherwise we have
* to assume that the next valid seq does not come after a
* hole in the fragment stream.
*
* The headers don't give us a way to realize if fragments of
* a message have been dropped. We assume that frags that arrive
* to a flow are part of the current message on the flow that is
* being reassembled. This means that senders can't drop messages
* from the sending conn until all their frags are sent.
*
* XXX we could spend more on the wire to get more robust failure
* detection, arguably worth it to avoid data corruption.
*/
if (be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence) < cp->cp_next_rx_seq &&
(inc->i_hdr.h_flags & RDS_FLAG_RETRANSMITTED)) {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_old_seq);
goto out;
}
cp->cp_next_rx_seq = be64_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sequence) + 1;
if (rds_sysctl_ping_enable && inc->i_hdr.h_dport == 0) {
if (inc->i_hdr.h_sport == 0) {
rdsdebug("ignore ping with 0 sport from %pI6c\n",
saddr);
goto out;
}
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_ping);
rds_send_pong(cp, inc->i_hdr.h_sport);
/* if this is a handshake ping, start multipath if necessary */
if (RDS_HS_PROBE(be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_sport),
be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_dport))) {
rds_recv_hs_exthdrs(&inc->i_hdr, cp->cp_conn);
rds_start_mprds(cp->cp_conn);
}
goto out;
}
if (be16_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_dport) == RDS_FLAG_PROBE_PORT &&
inc->i_hdr.h_sport == 0) {
rds_recv_hs_exthdrs(&inc->i_hdr, cp->cp_conn);
/* if this is a handshake pong, start multipath if necessary */
rds_start_mprds(cp->cp_conn);
wake_up(&cp->cp_conn->c_hs_waitq);
goto out;
}
rs = rds_find_bound(daddr, inc->i_hdr.h_dport, conn->c_bound_if);
if (!rs) {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_no_sock);
goto out;
}
/* Process extension headers */
rds_recv_incoming_exthdrs(inc, rs);
/* We can be racing with rds_release() which marks the socket dead. */
sk = rds_rs_to_sk(rs);
/* serialize with rds_release -> sock_orphan */
write_lock_irqsave(&rs->rs_recv_lock, flags);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
rdsdebug("adding inc %p to rs %p's recv queue\n", inc, rs);
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_queued);
rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta(rs, sk, inc->i_conn->c_lcong,
be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len),
inc->i_hdr.h_dport);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP))
inc->i_rx_tstamp = ktime_get_real();
rds_inc_addref(inc);
inc->i_rx_lat_trace[RDS_MSG_RX_END] = local_clock();
list_add_tail(&inc->i_item, &rs->rs_recv_queue);
__rds_wake_sk_sleep(sk);
} else {
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_dead_sock);
}
write_unlock_irqrestore(&rs->rs_recv_lock, flags);
out:
if (rs)
rds_sock_put(rs);
}
Commit Message: net/rds: Fix info leak in rds6_inc_info_copy()
The rds6_inc_info_copy() function has a couple struct members which
are leaking stack information. The ->tos field should hold actual
information and the ->flags field needs to be zeroed out.
Fixes: 3eb450367d08 ("rds: add type of service(tos) infrastructure")
Fixes: b7ff8b1036f0 ("rds: Extend RDS API for IPv6 support")
Reported-by: 黄ID蝴蝶 <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ka-Cheong Poon <ka-cheong.poon@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 87,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_nvram_read_be32(struct tg3 *tp, u32 offset, __be32 *val)
{
u32 v;
int res = tg3_nvram_read(tp, offset, &v);
if (!res)
*val = cpu_to_be32(v);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HttpBridge::RequestContextGetter::GetURLRequestContext() {
if (!context_) {
net::URLRequestContext* baseline_context =
baseline_context_getter_->GetURLRequestContext();
context_ = new RequestContext(baseline_context);
baseline_context_getter_ = NULL;
}
if (is_user_agent_set())
context_->set_user_agent(user_agent_);
return context_;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,128 |
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