instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
{
*n = r->n;
*e = r->e;
*d = r->d;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker() const {
if (data_source_)
return data_source_->DidGetOpaqueResponseViaServiceWorker();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 154,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ims_pcu_read_ofn_config(struct ims_pcu *pcu, u8 addr, u8 *data)
{
int error;
s16 result;
error = ims_pcu_execute_command(pcu, OFN_GET_CONFIG,
&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (error)
return error;
result = (s16)get_unaligned_le16(pcu->cmd_buf + OFN_REG_RESULT_OFFSET);
if (result < 0)
return -EIO;
/* We only need LSB */
*data = pcu->cmd_buf[OFN_REG_RESULT_OFFSET];
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestMultiBufferDataProvider* data_provider() {
return multibuffer()->GetProvider();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *xfrm_state_netlink(struct sk_buff *in_skb,
struct xfrm_state *x, u32 seq)
{
struct xfrm_dump_info info;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
info.in_skb = in_skb;
info.out_skb = skb;
info.nlmsg_seq = seq;
info.nlmsg_flags = 0;
err = dump_one_state(x, 0, &info);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
return skb;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth()
copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.
Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool hid_hiddev(struct hid_device *hdev)
{
return !!hid_match_id(hdev, hid_hiddev_list);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static journal_t *ext4_get_journal(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned int journal_inum)
{
struct inode *journal_inode;
journal_t *journal;
BUG_ON(!ext4_has_feature_journal(sb));
journal_inode = ext4_get_journal_inode(sb, journal_inum);
if (!journal_inode)
return NULL;
journal = jbd2_journal_init_inode(journal_inode);
if (!journal) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Could not load journal inode");
iput(journal_inode);
return NULL;
}
journal->j_private = sb;
ext4_init_journal_params(sb, journal);
return journal;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockAudioMirroringManager() {}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usbmidi_detect_endpoints(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
struct snd_usb_midi_endpoint_info *endpoint,
int max_endpoints)
{
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct usb_host_interface *hostif;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *intfd;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd;
int i, out_eps = 0, in_eps = 0;
if (USB_ID_VENDOR(umidi->usb_id) == 0x0582)
snd_usbmidi_switch_roland_altsetting(umidi);
if (endpoint[0].out_ep || endpoint[0].in_ep)
return 0;
intf = umidi->iface;
if (!intf || intf->num_altsetting < 1)
return -ENOENT;
hostif = intf->cur_altsetting;
intfd = get_iface_desc(hostif);
for (i = 0; i < intfd->bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
epd = get_endpoint(hostif, i);
if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(epd) &&
!usb_endpoint_xfer_int(epd))
continue;
if (out_eps < max_endpoints &&
usb_endpoint_dir_out(epd)) {
endpoint[out_eps].out_ep = usb_endpoint_num(epd);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(epd))
endpoint[out_eps].out_interval = epd->bInterval;
++out_eps;
}
if (in_eps < max_endpoints &&
usb_endpoint_dir_in(epd)) {
endpoint[in_eps].in_ep = usb_endpoint_num(epd);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(epd))
endpoint[in_eps].in_interval = epd->bInterval;
++in_eps;
}
}
return (out_eps || in_eps) ? 0 : -ENOENT;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXObject::supportsActiveDescendant() const {
switch (ariaRoleAttribute()) {
case ComboBoxRole:
case GridRole:
case GroupRole:
case ListBoxRole:
case MenuRole:
case MenuBarRole:
case RadioGroupRole:
case RowRole:
case SearchBoxRole:
case TabListRole:
case TextFieldRole:
case ToolbarRole:
case TreeRole:
case TreeGridRole:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ipv6_chk_same_addr(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *addr,
struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned int hash = inet6_addr_hash(addr);
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
hlist_for_each_entry(ifp, &inet6_addr_lst[hash], addr_lst) {
if (!net_eq(dev_net(ifp->idev->dev), net))
continue;
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&ifp->addr, addr)) {
if (dev == NULL || ifp->idev->dev == dev)
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mnt_drop_write(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
__mnt_drop_write(mnt);
sb_end_write(mnt->mnt_sb);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmcraid_netlink_init(void)
{
int result;
result = genl_register_family(&pmcraid_event_family);
if (result)
return result;
pmcraid_info("registered NETLINK GENERIC group: %d\n",
pmcraid_event_family.id);
return result;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dm_deleting_md(struct mapped_device *md)
{
return test_bit(DMF_DELETING, &md->flags);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct inet6_dev *addrconf_add_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct inet6_dev *idev;
ASSERT_RTNL();
idev = ipv6_find_idev(dev);
if (!idev)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
if (idev->cnf.disable_ipv6)
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
/* Add default multicast route */
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))
addrconf_add_mroute(dev);
return idev;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record(HFS_INFO * hfs, TSK_OFF_T off,
hfs_file_folder * record)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = (TSK_FS_INFO *) & (hfs->fs_info);
ssize_t cnt;
char rec_type[2];
memset(record, 0, sizeof(hfs_file_folder));
cnt = tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, off, rec_type, 2, 0);
if (cnt != 2) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: Error reading record type from catalog offset %"
PRIuOFF " (header)", off);
return 1;
}
if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, rec_type) == HFS_FOLDER_RECORD) {
cnt =
tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, off, (char *) record,
sizeof(hfs_folder), 0);
if (cnt != sizeof(hfs_folder)) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: Error reading catalog offset %"
PRIuOFF " (folder)", off);
return 1;
}
}
else if (tsk_getu16(fs->endian, rec_type) == HFS_FILE_RECORD) {
cnt =
tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, off, (char *) record,
sizeof(hfs_file), 0);
if (cnt != sizeof(hfs_file)) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: Error reading catalog offset %"
PRIuOFF " (file)", off);
return 1;
}
}
else {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_read_file_folder_record: unexpected record type %"
PRIu16, tsk_getu16(fs->endian, rec_type));
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void imdct_step3_inner_s_loop_ld654(int n, float *e, int i_off, float *A, int base_n)
{
int a_off = base_n >> 3;
float A2 = A[0+a_off];
float *z = e + i_off;
float *base = z - 16 * n;
while (z > base) {
float k00,k11;
k00 = z[-0] - z[-8];
k11 = z[-1] - z[-9];
z[-0] = z[-0] + z[-8];
z[-1] = z[-1] + z[-9];
z[-8] = k00;
z[-9] = k11 ;
k00 = z[ -2] - z[-10];
k11 = z[ -3] - z[-11];
z[ -2] = z[ -2] + z[-10];
z[ -3] = z[ -3] + z[-11];
z[-10] = (k00+k11) * A2;
z[-11] = (k11-k00) * A2;
k00 = z[-12] - z[ -4]; // reverse to avoid a unary negation
k11 = z[ -5] - z[-13];
z[ -4] = z[ -4] + z[-12];
z[ -5] = z[ -5] + z[-13];
z[-12] = k11;
z[-13] = k00;
k00 = z[-14] - z[ -6]; // reverse to avoid a unary negation
k11 = z[ -7] - z[-15];
z[ -6] = z[ -6] + z[-14];
z[ -7] = z[ -7] + z[-15];
z[-14] = (k00+k11) * A2;
z[-15] = (k00-k11) * A2;
iter_54(z);
iter_54(z-8);
z -= 16;
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ctryfinally(JF, js_Ast *trystm, js_Ast *finallystm)
{
int L1;
L1 = emitjump(J, F, OP_TRY);
{
/* if we get here, we have caught an exception in the try block */
cstm(J, F, finallystm); /* inline finally block */
emit(J, F, OP_THROW); /* rethrow exception */
}
label(J, F, L1);
cstm(J, F, trystm);
emit(J, F, OP_ENDTRY);
cstm(J, F, finallystm);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm6_tunnel_err(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_skb_parm *opt,
u8 type, u8 code, int offset, __be32 info)
{
/* xfrm6_tunnel native err handling */
switch (type) {
case ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH:
switch (code) {
case ICMPV6_NOROUTE:
case ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED:
case ICMPV6_NOT_NEIGHBOUR:
case ICMPV6_ADDR_UNREACH:
case ICMPV6_PORT_UNREACH:
default:
break;
}
break;
case ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG:
break;
case ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED:
switch (code) {
case ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT:
break;
case ICMPV6_EXC_FRAGTIME:
default:
break;
}
break;
case ICMPV6_PARAMPROB:
switch (code) {
case ICMPV6_HDR_FIELD: break;
case ICMPV6_UNK_NEXTHDR: break;
case ICMPV6_UNK_OPTION: break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StubOfflinePageModel::GetPagesByClientIds(
const std::vector<ClientId>& client_ids,
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xen_pcibios_err_to_errno(int err)
{
switch (err) {
case PCIBIOS_SUCCESSFUL:
return XEN_PCI_ERR_success;
case PCIBIOS_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
return XEN_PCI_ERR_dev_not_found;
case PCIBIOS_BAD_REGISTER_NUMBER:
return XEN_PCI_ERR_invalid_offset;
case PCIBIOS_FUNC_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return XEN_PCI_ERR_not_implemented;
case PCIBIOS_SET_FAILED:
return XEN_PCI_ERR_access_denied;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register
Otherwise the guest can abuse that control to cause e.g. PCIe
Unsupported Request responses by disabling memory and/or I/O decoding
and subsequently causing (CPU side) accesses to the respective address
ranges, which (depending on system configuration) may be fatal to the
host.
Note that to alter any of the bits collected together as
PCI_COMMAND_GUEST permissive mode is now required to be enabled
globally or on the specific device.
This is CVE-2015-2150 / XSA-120.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2cap_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct l2cap_chan *chan = l2cap_pi(sk)->chan;
struct bt_security sec;
struct bt_power pwr;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_L2CAP)
return l2cap_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_CONN_ORIENTED &&
chan->chan_type != L2CAP_CHAN_RAW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
memset(&sec, 0, sizeof(sec));
if (chan->conn)
sec.level = chan->conn->hcon->sec_level;
else
sec.level = chan->sec_level;
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED)
sec.key_size = chan->conn->hcon->enc_key_size;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_FLUSHABLE:
if (put_user(test_bit(FLAG_FLUSHABLE, &chan->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_POWER:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM
&& sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
pwr.force_active = test_bit(FLAG_FORCE_ACTIVE, &chan->flags);
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(pwr));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &pwr, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_CHANNEL_POLICY:
if (!enable_hs) {
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
if (put_user(chan->chan_policy, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response EmulationHandler::SetEmitTouchEventsForMouse(
bool enabled,
Maybe<std::string> configuration) {
touch_emulation_enabled_ = enabled;
touch_emulation_configuration_ = configuration.fromMaybe("");
UpdateTouchEventEmulationState();
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int checkColumnOverlap(IdList *pIdList, ExprList *pEList){
int e;
if( pIdList==0 || NEVER(pEList==0) ) return 1;
for(e=0; e<pEList->nExpr; e++){
if( sqlite3IdListIndex(pIdList, pEList->a[e].zName)>=0 ) return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewTest::TearDown() {
GetMainFrame()->collectGarbage();
GetMainFrame()->collectGarbage();
ProcessPendingMessages();
render_thread_->SendCloseMessage();
view_ = NULL;
mock_process_.reset();
msg_loop_.RunAllPending();
WebKit::shutdown();
mock_keyboard_.reset();
platform_->PlatformUninitialize();
platform_.reset();
params_.reset();
command_line_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,520 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RootWindow* RootWindowHostLinux::GetRootWindow() {
return root_window_;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dcbnl_notify(struct net_device *dev, int event, int cmd,
u32 seq, u32 portid, int dcbx_ver)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
const struct dcbnl_rtnl_ops *ops = dev->dcbnl_ops;
int err;
if (!ops)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = dcbnl_newmsg(event, cmd, portid, seq, 0, &nlh);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
if (dcbx_ver == DCB_CAP_DCBX_VER_IEEE)
err = dcbnl_ieee_fill(skb, dev);
else
err = dcbnl_cee_fill(skb, dev);
if (err < 0) {
/* Report error to broadcast listeners */
nlmsg_free(skb);
rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_DCB, err);
} else {
/* End nlmsg and notify broadcast listeners */
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_DCB, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_notify_parent_cldstop(struct task_struct *tsk, int why)
{
struct siginfo info;
unsigned long flags;
struct task_struct *parent;
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
if (task_ptrace(tsk))
parent = tsk->parent;
else {
tsk = tsk->group_leader;
parent = tsk->real_parent;
}
info.si_signo = SIGCHLD;
info.si_errno = 0;
/*
* see comment in do_notify_parent() abot the following 3 lines
*/
rcu_read_lock();
info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, parent->nsproxy->pid_ns);
info.si_uid = __task_cred(tsk)->uid;
rcu_read_unlock();
info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->utime);
info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tsk->stime);
info.si_code = why;
switch (why) {
case CLD_CONTINUED:
info.si_status = SIGCONT;
break;
case CLD_STOPPED:
info.si_status = tsk->signal->group_exit_code & 0x7f;
break;
case CLD_TRAPPED:
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code & 0x7f;
break;
default:
BUG();
}
sighand = parent->sighand;
spin_lock_irqsave(&sighand->siglock, flags);
if (sighand->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN &&
!(sighand->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_NOCLDSTOP))
__group_send_sig_info(SIGCHLD, &info, parent);
/*
* Even if SIGCHLD is not generated, we must wake up wait4 calls.
*/
__wake_up_parent(tsk, parent);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sighand->siglock, flags);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderCreateGlyphSet(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderCreateGlyphSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->gsid);
swapl(&stuff->format);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InstallPromptPermissions() {
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 131,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ProcessBlockedRequestsForRoute(
int child_id,
int route_id,
bool cancel_requests) {
BlockedLoadersMap::iterator iter = blocked_loaders_map_.find(
std::pair<int, int>(child_id, route_id));
if (iter == blocked_loaders_map_.end()) {
return;
}
BlockedLoadersList* loaders = iter->second;
blocked_loaders_map_.erase(iter);
for (BlockedLoadersList::iterator loaders_iter = loaders->begin();
loaders_iter != loaders->end(); ++loaders_iter) {
linked_ptr<ResourceLoader> loader = *loaders_iter;
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
if (cancel_requests) {
IncrementOutstandingRequestsMemoryCost(-1 * info->memory_cost(),
info->GetChildID());
} else {
StartLoading(info, loader);
}
}
delete loaders;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RequestDeviceAuthorizationWithBadOrigin(const std::string& device_id) {
int session_id = 0;
host_->OnRequestDeviceAuthorization(kStreamId, kRenderFrameId, session_id,
device_id,
url::Origin(GURL(kBadSecurityOrigin)));
SyncWithAudioThread();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::OnExtensionInstalled(const Extension* extension) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
scoped_refptr<const Extension> scoped_extension(extension);
const std::string& id = extension->id();
bool initial_enable = IsExtensionEnabled(id);
PendingExtensionInfo pending_extension_info;
if (pending_extension_manager()->GetById(id, &pending_extension_info)) {
pending_extension_manager()->Remove(id);
if (!pending_extension_info.ShouldAllowInstall(*extension)) {
LOG(WARNING)
<< "ShouldAllowInstall() returned false for "
<< id << " of type " << extension->GetType()
<< " and update URL " << extension->update_url().spec()
<< "; not installing";
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NotificationType::EXTENSION_INSTALL_NOT_ALLOWED,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
Details<const Extension>(extension));
if (!BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableFunction(&extension_file_util::DeleteFile,
extension->path(), true)))
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
} else {
if (IsExternalExtensionUninstalled(id)) {
initial_enable = true;
}
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.InstallType",
extension->GetType(), 100);
RecordPermissionMessagesHistogram(
extension, "Extensions.Permissions_Install");
ShownSectionsHandler::OnExtensionInstalled(profile_->GetPrefs(), extension);
extension_prefs_->OnExtensionInstalled(
extension, initial_enable ? Extension::ENABLED : Extension::DISABLED);
if (Extension::ShouldAlwaysAllowFileAccess(Extension::LOAD) &&
!extension_prefs_->HasAllowFileAccessSetting(id)) {
extension_prefs_->SetAllowFileAccess(id, true);
}
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NotificationType::EXTENSION_INSTALLED,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
Details<const Extension>(extension));
AddExtension(scoped_extension);
}
Commit Message: Unrevert: Show the install dialog for the initial load of an unpacked extension
with plugins.
First landing broke some browser tests.
BUG=83273
TEST=in the extensions managmenet page, with developer mode enabled, Load an unpacked extension on an extension with NPAPI plugins. You should get an install dialog.
TBR=mihaip
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87738 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void trim_quote(std::wstring* string) {
std::wstring::size_type pos1 = string->find_first_not_of(L'"');
std::wstring::size_type pos2 = string->find_last_not_of(L'"');
if (std::wstring::npos == pos1 || std::wstring::npos == pos2)
(*string) = L"";
else
(*string) = string->substr(pos1, pos2 + 1);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostManager::CleanUpNavigation() {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_) {
bool was_loading = speculative_render_frame_host_->is_loading();
DiscardUnusedFrame(UnsetSpeculativeRenderFrameHost());
if (was_loading)
frame_tree_node_->DidStopLoading();
}
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int m_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = m->private;
struct mount *r = list_entry(v, struct mount, mnt_list);
return p->show(m, &r->mnt);
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RequestNavigationWithParameters(
FrameTreeNode* node,
const GURL& url,
const Referrer& referrer,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams load_params(url);
load_params.frame_tree_node_id = node->frame_tree_node_id();
load_params.referrer = referrer;
load_params.transition_type = transition_type;
controller().LoadURLWithParams(load_params);
return controller().GetPendingEntry()->GetUniqueID();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __apic_test_and_clear_vector(int vec, void *bitmap)
{
return __test_and_clear_bit(VEC_POS(vec), (bitmap) + REG_POS(vec));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2_load(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t l2_offset,
uint64_t **l2_table)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int ret;
ret = qcow2_cache_get(bs, s->l2_table_cache, l2_offset, (void**) l2_table);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fastcall __lock_page_nosync(struct page *page)
{
DEFINE_WAIT_BIT(wait, &page->flags, PG_locked);
__wait_on_bit_lock(page_waitqueue(page), &wait, __sleep_on_page_lock,
TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cached_v_origin(hb_font_t *font, void *font_data, hb_codepoint_t glyph,
hb_position_t *x, hb_position_t *y, void *user_data)
{
FT_Face face = font_data;
struct ass_shaper_metrics_data *metrics_priv = user_data;
GlyphMetricsHashValue *metrics = get_cached_metrics(metrics_priv, face, 0, glyph);
if (!metrics)
return false;
*x = metrics->metrics.horiBearingX - metrics->metrics.vertBearingX;
*y = metrics->metrics.horiBearingY - (-metrics->metrics.vertBearingY);
ass_cache_dec_ref(metrics);
return true;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void edge_bulk_out_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
int status = urb->status;
struct tty_struct *tty;
edge_port->ep_write_urb_in_use = 0;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err_console(port, "%s - nonzero write bulk status "
"received: %d\n", __func__, status);
}
/* send any buffered data */
tty = tty_port_tty_get(&port->port);
edge_send(tty);
tty_kref_put(tty);
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 33,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::HandlePepperImeCommit(const base::string16& text) {
if (text.empty())
return;
if (!IsPepperAcceptingCompositionEvents()) {
base::i18n::UTF16CharIterator iterator(&text);
int32_t i = 0;
while (iterator.Advance()) {
blink::WebKeyboardEvent char_event(blink::WebInputEvent::kChar,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
ui::EventTimeForNow());
char_event.windows_key_code = text[i];
char_event.native_key_code = text[i];
const int32_t char_start = i;
for (; i < iterator.array_pos(); ++i) {
char_event.text[i - char_start] = text[i];
char_event.unmodified_text[i - char_start] = text[i];
}
if (GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->GetWebWidget())
GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->GetWebWidget()->HandleInputEvent(
blink::WebCoalescedInputEvent(char_event));
}
} else {
focused_pepper_plugin_->HandleCompositionEnd(text);
focused_pepper_plugin_->HandleTextInput(text);
}
pepper_composition_text_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(osf_writev, unsigned long, fd,
const struct iovec __user *, vector, unsigned long, count)
{
if (unlikely(personality(current->personality) == PER_OSF4))
if (osf_fix_iov_len(vector, count))
return -EFAULT;
return sys_writev(fd, vector, count);
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int graydomain(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
ptr[0] = 0;
ptr[1] = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *buf)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FPSContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int64_t delta;
int i, ret;
s->frames_in++;
/* discard frames until we get the first timestamp */
if (s->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (buf->pts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (s->start_time != DBL_MAX && s->start_time != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
double first_pts = s->start_time * AV_TIME_BASE;
first_pts = FFMIN(FFMAX(first_pts, INT64_MIN), INT64_MAX);
s->first_pts = s->pts = av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
inlink->time_base);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Set first pts to (in:%"PRId64" out:%"PRId64")\n",
s->first_pts, av_rescale_q(first_pts, AV_TIME_BASE_Q,
outlink->time_base));
} else {
s->first_pts = s->pts = buf->pts;
}
} else {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Discarding initial frame(s) with no "
"timestamp.\n");
av_frame_free(&buf);
s->drop++;
}
return 0;
}
/* now wait for the next timestamp */
if (buf->pts == AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
return write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
}
/* number of output frames */
delta = av_rescale_q_rnd(buf->pts - s->pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base, s->rounding);
if (delta < 1) {
/* drop the frame and everything buffered except the first */
AVFrame *tmp;
int drop = av_fifo_size(s->fifo)/sizeof(AVFrame*);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Dropping %d frame(s).\n", drop);
s->drop += drop;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), NULL);
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, tmp);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
/* can output >= 1 frames */
for (i = 0; i < delta; i++) {
AVFrame *buf_out;
av_fifo_generic_read(s->fifo, &buf_out, sizeof(buf_out), NULL);
/* duplicate the frame if needed */
if (!av_fifo_size(s->fifo) && i < delta - 1) {
AVFrame *dup = av_frame_clone(buf_out);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Duplicating frame.\n");
if (dup)
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, dup);
else
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (ret < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf_out);
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->dup++;
}
buf_out->pts = av_rescale_q(s->first_pts, inlink->time_base,
outlink->time_base) + s->frames_out;
if ((ret = ff_filter_frame(outlink, buf_out)) < 0) {
av_frame_free(&buf);
return ret;
}
s->frames_out++;
}
flush_fifo(s->fifo);
ret = write_to_fifo(s->fifo, buf);
s->pts = s->first_pts + av_rescale_q(s->frames_out, outlink->time_base, inlink->time_base);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avfilter/vf_fps: make sure the fifo is not empty before using it
Fixes Ticket2905
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: skip_sfx(struct archive_read *a)
{
const void *h;
const char *p, *q;
size_t skip, total;
ssize_t bytes, window;
total = 0;
window = 4096;
while (total + window <= (1024 * 128)) {
h = __archive_read_ahead(a, window, &bytes);
if (h == NULL) {
/* Remaining bytes are less than window. */
window >>= 1;
if (window < 0x40)
goto fatal;
continue;
}
if (bytes < 0x40)
goto fatal;
p = h;
q = p + bytes;
/*
* Scan ahead until we find something that looks
* like the RAR header.
*/
while (p + 7 < q) {
if (memcmp(p, RAR_SIGNATURE, 7) == 0) {
skip = p - (const char *)h;
__archive_read_consume(a, skip);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
p += 0x10;
}
skip = p - (const char *)h;
__archive_read_consume(a, skip);
total += skip;
}
fatal:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Couldn't find out RAR header");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: opj_pi_iterator_t *opj_pi_initialise_encode(const opj_image_t *p_image,
opj_cp_t *p_cp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
J2K_T2_MODE p_t2_mode)
{
OPJ_UINT32 numcomps = p_image->numcomps;
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
OPJ_UINT32 compno, resno;
/* to store w, h, dx and dy fro all components and resolutions*/
OPJ_UINT32 * l_tmp_data;
OPJ_UINT32 ** l_tmp_ptr;
/* encoding prameters to set*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_res;
OPJ_UINT32 l_max_prec;
OPJ_INT32 l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1;
OPJ_UINT32 l_dx_min, l_dy_min;
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
OPJ_UINT32 l_step_p, l_step_c, l_step_r, l_step_l ;
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_stride;
/* pointers*/
opj_pi_iterator_t *l_pi = 00;
opj_tcp_t *l_tcp = 00;
const opj_tccp_t *l_tccp = 00;
opj_pi_comp_t *l_current_comp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
OPJ_UINT32 * l_encoding_value_ptr = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_cp != 00);
assert(p_image != 00);
assert(p_tile_no < p_cp->tw * p_cp->th);
/* initializations*/
l_tcp = &p_cp->tcps[p_tile_no];
l_bound = l_tcp->numpocs + 1;
l_data_stride = 4 * OPJ_J2K_MAXRLVLS;
l_tmp_data = (OPJ_UINT32*)opj_malloc(
l_data_stride * numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (! l_tmp_data) {
return 00;
}
l_tmp_ptr = (OPJ_UINT32**)opj_malloc(
numcomps * sizeof(OPJ_UINT32 *));
if (! l_tmp_ptr) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
return 00;
}
/* memory allocation for pi*/
l_pi = opj_pi_create(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no);
if (!l_pi) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
return 00;
}
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_data;
/* update pointer array*/
for (compno = 0; compno < numcomps; ++compno) {
l_tmp_ptr[compno] = l_encoding_value_ptr;
l_encoding_value_ptr += l_data_stride;
}
/* get encoding parameters*/
opj_get_all_encoding_parameters(p_image, p_cp, p_tile_no, &l_tx0, &l_tx1,
&l_ty0, &l_ty1, &l_dx_min, &l_dy_min, &l_max_prec, &l_max_res, l_tmp_ptr);
/* step calculations*/
l_step_p = 1;
l_step_c = l_max_prec * l_step_p;
l_step_r = numcomps * l_step_c;
l_step_l = l_max_res * l_step_r;
/* set values for first packet iterator*/
l_pi->tp_on = (OPJ_BYTE)p_cp->m_specific_param.m_enc.m_tp_on;
l_current_pi = l_pi;
/* memory allocation for include*/
l_current_pi->include_size = l_tcp->numlayers * l_step_l;
l_current_pi->include = (OPJ_INT16*) opj_calloc(l_current_pi->include_size,
sizeof(OPJ_INT16));
if (!l_current_pi->include) {
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
opj_pi_destroy(l_pi, l_bound);
return 00;
}
/* special treatment for the first packet iterator*/
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;
l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for (compno = 0; compno < numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
++l_current_pi;
for (pino = 1 ; pino < l_bound ; ++pino) {
l_current_comp = l_current_pi->comps;
l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_current_pi->tx0 = l_tx0;
l_current_pi->ty0 = l_ty0;
l_current_pi->tx1 = l_tx1;
l_current_pi->ty1 = l_ty1;
l_current_pi->dx = l_dx_min;
l_current_pi->dy = l_dy_min;
l_current_pi->step_p = l_step_p;
l_current_pi->step_c = l_step_c;
l_current_pi->step_r = l_step_r;
l_current_pi->step_l = l_step_l;
/* allocation for components and number of components has already been calculated by opj_pi_create */
for (compno = 0; compno < numcomps; ++compno) {
opj_pi_resolution_t *l_res = l_current_comp->resolutions;
l_encoding_value_ptr = l_tmp_ptr[compno];
l_current_comp->dx = l_img_comp->dx;
l_current_comp->dy = l_img_comp->dy;
/* resolutions have already been initialized */
for (resno = 0; resno < l_current_comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
l_res->pdx = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pdy = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->pw = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
l_res->ph = *(l_encoding_value_ptr++);
++l_res;
}
++l_current_comp;
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
}
/* special treatment*/
l_current_pi->include = (l_current_pi - 1)->include;
l_current_pi->include_size = (l_current_pi - 1)->include_size;
++l_current_pi;
}
opj_free(l_tmp_data);
l_tmp_data = 00;
opj_free(l_tmp_ptr);
l_tmp_ptr = 00;
if (l_tcp->POC && (OPJ_IS_CINEMA(p_cp->rsiz) || p_t2_mode == FINAL_PASS)) {
opj_pi_update_encode_poc_and_final(p_cp, p_tile_no, l_tx0, l_tx1, l_ty0, l_ty1,
l_max_prec, l_max_res, l_dx_min, l_dy_min);
} else {
opj_pi_update_encode_not_poc(p_cp, numcomps, p_tile_no, l_tx0, l_tx1,
l_ty0, l_ty1, l_max_prec, l_max_res, l_dx_min, l_dy_min);
}
return l_pi;
}
Commit Message: [OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 92,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebSocketJob::OnAuthRequired(
SocketStream* socket, AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnAuthRequired(socket, auth_info);
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 98,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
{
u32 uninitialized_var(curval);
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)))
return -EFAULT;
/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void build_skb_flow_key(struct flowi4 *fl4, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
int oif = skb->dev->ifindex;
u8 tos = RT_TOS(iph->tos);
u8 prot = iph->protocol;
u32 mark = skb->mark;
__build_flow_key(fl4, sk, iph, oif, tos, prot, mark, 0);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<URLLoaderWrapper> PDFiumEngine::CreateURLLoader() {
return std::make_unique<URLLoaderWrapperImpl>(GetPluginInstance(),
client_->CreateURLLoader());
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::renderbufferStorageMultisample(
GLenum target,
GLsizei samples,
GLenum internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
const char* function_name = "renderbufferStorageMultisample";
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (target != GL_RENDERBUFFER) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid target");
return;
}
if (!renderbuffer_binding_ || !renderbuffer_binding_->Object()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"no bound renderbuffer");
return;
}
if (!ValidateSize("renderbufferStorage", width, height))
return;
if (samples < 0) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "samples < 0");
return;
}
RenderbufferStorageImpl(target, samples, internalformat, width, height,
function_name);
ApplyStencilTest();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DoubleAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "doubleAttribute");
double cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLDouble>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setDoubleAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: V8StackTraceImpl* V8Debugger::currentAsyncCallChain()
{
if (!m_currentStacks.size())
return nullptr;
return m_currentStacks.back().get();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetEditableSelectionOffsets(int start, int end) {
base::AutoReset<bool> handling_select_range(&handling_select_range_, true);
DCHECK(!handling_ime_event_);
handling_ime_event_ = true;
webview()->setEditableSelectionOffsets(start, end);
handling_ime_event_ = false;
UpdateTextInputState(DO_NOT_SHOW_IME);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_info_drive_ata_smart (Device *device)
{
gboolean ata_smart_is_available;
ata_smart_is_available = FALSE;
if (device->priv->device_is_drive && g_udev_device_has_property (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_ATA_SMART_IS_AVAILABLE"))
ata_smart_is_available = g_udev_device_get_property_as_boolean (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_ATA_SMART_IS_AVAILABLE");
device_set_drive_ata_smart_is_available (device, ata_smart_is_available);
/* NOTE: we don't collect ATA SMART data here, we only set whether the device is ATA SMART capable;
* collecting data is done in separate routines, see the
* device_drive_ata_smart_refresh_data() function for details.
*/
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnableFileChooser(bool enable) {
file_activity_observer_->EnableFileChooser(enable);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_do_pam_account(void)
{
Buffer m;
u_int ret;
char *msg;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
buffer_init(&m);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
ret = buffer_get_int(&m);
msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg));
free(msg);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Don't resend username to PAM; it already has it.
Pointed out by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int PC4500_readrid(struct airo_info *ai, u16 rid, void *pBuf, int len, int lock)
{
u16 status;
int rc = SUCCESS;
if (lock) {
if (down_interruptible(&ai->sem))
return ERROR;
}
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags)) {
Cmd cmd;
Resp rsp;
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(cmd));
memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.valid = 1;
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.len = RIDSIZE;
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.rid = 0;
ai->config_desc.rid_desc.host_addr = ai->ridbus;
cmd.cmd = CMD_ACCESS;
cmd.parm0 = rid;
memcpy_toio(ai->config_desc.card_ram_off,
&ai->config_desc.rid_desc, sizeof(Rid));
rc = issuecommand(ai, &cmd, &rsp);
if (rsp.status & 0x7f00)
rc = rsp.rsp0;
if (!rc)
memcpy(pBuf, ai->config_desc.virtual_host_addr, len);
goto done;
} else {
if ((status = PC4500_accessrid(ai, rid, CMD_ACCESS))!=SUCCESS) {
rc = status;
goto done;
}
if (bap_setup(ai, rid, 0, BAP1) != SUCCESS) {
rc = ERROR;
goto done;
}
bap_read(ai, pBuf, 2, BAP1);
len = min(len, (int)le16_to_cpu(*(__le16*)pBuf)) - 2;
if ( len <= 2 ) {
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name,
"Rid %x has a length of %d which is too short",
(int)rid, (int)len );
rc = ERROR;
goto done;
}
rc = bap_read(ai, ((__le16*)pBuf)+1, len, BAP1);
}
done:
if (lock)
up(&ai->sem);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void imap_expunge_mailbox(struct ImapData *idata)
{
struct Header *h = NULL;
int cacheno;
short old_sort;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
idata->hcache = imap_hcache_open(idata, NULL);
#endif
old_sort = Sort;
Sort = SORT_ORDER;
mutt_sort_headers(idata->ctx, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < idata->ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
h = idata->ctx->hdrs[i];
if (h->index == INT_MAX)
{
mutt_debug(2, "Expunging message UID %u.\n", HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
h->active = false;
idata->ctx->size -= h->content->length;
imap_cache_del(idata, h);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
imap_hcache_del(idata, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid);
#endif
/* free cached body from disk, if necessary */
cacheno = HEADER_DATA(h)->uid % IMAP_CACHE_LEN;
if (idata->cache[cacheno].uid == HEADER_DATA(h)->uid &&
idata->cache[cacheno].path)
{
unlink(idata->cache[cacheno].path);
FREE(&idata->cache[cacheno].path);
}
mutt_hash_int_delete(idata->uid_hash, HEADER_DATA(h)->uid, h);
imap_free_header_data((struct ImapHeaderData **) &h->data);
}
else
{
h->index = i;
/* NeoMutt has several places where it turns off h->active as a
* hack. For example to avoid FLAG updates, or to exclude from
* imap_exec_msgset.
*
* Unfortunately, when a reopen is allowed and the IMAP_EXPUNGE_PENDING
* flag becomes set (e.g. a flag update to a modified header),
* this function will be called by imap_cmd_finish().
*
* The mx_update_tables() will free and remove these "inactive" headers,
* despite that an EXPUNGE was not received for them.
* This would result in memory leaks and segfaults due to dangling
* pointers in the msn_index and uid_hash.
*
* So this is another hack to work around the hacks. We don't want to
* remove the messages, so make sure active is on.
*/
h->active = true;
}
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
imap_hcache_close(idata);
#endif
/* We may be called on to expunge at any time. We can't rely on the caller
* to always know to rethread */
mx_update_tables(idata->ctx, false);
Sort = old_sort;
mutt_sort_headers(idata->ctx, 1);
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NetworkThrottleManagerImpl::ThrottleImpl::ThrottleImpl(
bool blocked,
RequestPriority priority,
NetworkThrottleManager::ThrottleDelegate* delegate,
NetworkThrottleManagerImpl* manager,
ThrottleListQueuePointer queue_pointer)
: state_(blocked ? State::BLOCKED : State::OUTSTANDING),
priority_(priority),
delegate_(delegate),
manager_(manager),
queue_pointer_(queue_pointer) {
DCHECK(delegate);
if (!blocked)
start_time_ = manager->tick_clock_->NowTicks();
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 156,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init inode_init(void)
{
/* inode slab cache */
inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("inode_cache",
sizeof(struct inode),
0,
(SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT),
init_once);
/* Hash may have been set up in inode_init_early */
if (!hashdist)
return;
inode_hashtable =
alloc_large_system_hash("Inode-cache",
sizeof(struct hlist_head),
ihash_entries,
14,
HASH_ZERO,
&i_hash_shift,
&i_hash_mask,
0,
0);
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageScale(const gdImagePtr src, const unsigned int new_width, const unsigned int new_height)
{
gdImagePtr im_scaled = NULL;
if (src == NULL || src->interpolation_id < 0 || src->interpolation_id > GD_METHOD_COUNT) {
return 0;
}
switch (src->interpolation_id) {
/*Special cases, optimized implementations */
case GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleNearestNeighbour(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BILINEAR_FIXED:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBilinear(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
case GD_BICUBIC_FIXED:
im_scaled = gdImageScaleBicubicFixed(src, new_width, new_height);
break;
/* generic */
default:
if (src->interpolation == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
im_scaled = gdImageScaleTwoPass(src, src->sx, src->sy, new_width, new_height);
break;
}
return im_scaled;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 58,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void amd_gpio_irq_unmask(struct irq_data *d)
{
u32 pin_reg;
unsigned long flags;
struct gpio_chip *gc = irq_data_get_irq_chip_data(d);
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
pin_reg |= BIT(INTERRUPT_MASK_OFF);
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + (d->hwirq)*4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,166 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unlink_heap_page(mrb_gc *gc, mrb_heap_page *page)
{
if (page->prev)
page->prev->next = page->next;
if (page->next)
page->next->prev = page->prev;
if (gc->heaps == page)
gc->heaps = page->next;
page->prev = NULL;
page->next = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testIpFour() {
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("01.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("001.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("00.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("000.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("256.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("300.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("1111.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("-1.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("0.0.0.");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("0.0.0.0.");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("0.0.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL("0.0..0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_FAIL(".0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_PASS("255.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_PASS("0.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_PASS("1.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_PASS("2.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_PASS("3.0.0.0");
URI_TEST_IP_FOUR_PASS("30.0.0.0");
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_hwclock_to_timestamp(struct tg3 *tp, u64 hwclock,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *timestamp)
{
memset(timestamp, 0, sizeof(struct skb_shared_hwtstamps));
timestamp->hwtstamp = ns_to_ktime((hwclock & TG3_TSTAMP_MASK) +
tp->ptp_adjust);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(const node_t *node)
{
/* XXXX Oh hm. What if some day in the future there are link handshake
* versions that aren't 3 but which are ed25519 */
if (! node_get_ed25519_id(node))
return 0;
if (node->ri) {
const char *protos = node->ri->protocol_list;
if (protos == NULL)
return 0;
return protocol_list_supports_protocol(protos, PRT_LINKAUTH, 3);
}
if (node->rs) {
return node->rs->supports_ed25519_link_handshake;
}
tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow when handling MPEG4 tx3g atom
When the sum of the 'size' and 'chunk_size' variables is larger than 2^32,
an integer overflow occurs. Using the result value to allocate memory
leads to an undersized buffer allocation and later a potentially
exploitable heap corruption condition. Ensure that integer overflow does
not occur.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: Id050a36b33196864bdd98b5ea24241f95a0b5d1f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::FinalizePrintReadyDocument() {
DCHECK(!is_print_ready_metafile_sent_);
print_preview_context_.FinalizePrintReadyDocument();
PdfMetafileSkia* metafile = print_preview_context_.metafile();
uint32 buf_size = metafile->GetDataSize();
DCHECK_GT(buf_size, 0u);
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewDocument_Params preview_params;
preview_params.data_size = buf_size;
preview_params.document_cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
preview_params.expected_pages_count =
print_preview_context_.total_page_count();
preview_params.modifiable = print_preview_context_.IsModifiable();
preview_params.preview_request_id =
print_pages_params_->params.preview_request_id;
if (!CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem(metafile,
&(preview_params.metafile_data_handle))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CopyMetafileDataToSharedMem failed";
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_COPY_FAILED);
return false;
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = true;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_MetafileReadyForPrinting(routing_id(), preview_params));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_to_interval_list(struct iperf_stream_result * rp, struct iperf_interval_results * new)
{
struct iperf_interval_results *irp;
irp = (struct iperf_interval_results *) malloc(sizeof(struct iperf_interval_results));
memcpy(irp, new, sizeof(struct iperf_interval_results));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&rp->interval_results, irp, irlistentries);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_ret_t krb5_copy_key_data_contents(context, from, to)
krb5_context context;
krb5_key_data *from, *to;
{
int i, idx;
*to = *from;
idx = (from->key_data_ver == 1 ? 1 : 2);
for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) {
if ( from->key_data_length[i] ) {
to->key_data_contents[i] = malloc(from->key_data_length[i]);
if (to->key_data_contents[i] == NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < idx; i++) {
if (to->key_data_contents[i]) {
memset(to->key_data_contents[i], 0,
to->key_data_length[i]);
free(to->key_data_contents[i]);
}
}
return ENOMEM;
}
memcpy(to->key_data_contents[i], from->key_data_contents[i],
from->key_data_length[i]);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Null pointer deref in kadmind [CVE-2012-1013]
The fix for #6626 could cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer if
a create-principal request contains no password but does contain the
KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag (e.g. "addprinc -randkey -allow_tix
name"). Only clients authorized to create principals can trigger the
bug. Fix the bug by testing for a null password in check_1_6_dummy.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: Minor style change and commit message]
ticket: 7152
target_version: 1.10.2
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<StylePropertySet> CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::copy() const
{
return copyPropertiesInSet(computedProperties, numComputedProperties);
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cxusb_d680_dmb_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
int n;
/* Select required USB configuration */
if (usb_set_interface(d->udev, 0, 0) < 0)
err("set interface failed");
/* Unblock all USB pipes */
usb_clear_halt(d->udev,
usb_sndbulkpipe(d->udev, d->props.generic_bulk_ctrl_endpoint));
usb_clear_halt(d->udev,
usb_rcvbulkpipe(d->udev, d->props.generic_bulk_ctrl_endpoint));
usb_clear_halt(d->udev,
usb_rcvbulkpipe(d->udev, d->props.adapter[0].fe[0].stream.endpoint));
/* Drain USB pipes to avoid hang after reboot */
for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) {
cxusb_d680_dmb_drain_message(d);
cxusb_d680_dmb_drain_video(d);
msleep(200);
}
/* Reset the tuner */
if (cxusb_d680_dmb_gpio_tuner(d, 0x07, 0) < 0) {
err("clear tuner gpio failed");
return -EIO;
}
msleep(100);
if (cxusb_d680_dmb_gpio_tuner(d, 0x07, 1) < 0) {
err("set tuner gpio failed");
return -EIO;
}
msleep(100);
/* Attach frontend */
adap->fe_adap[0].fe = dvb_attach(lgs8gxx_attach, &d680_lgs8gl5_cfg, &d->i2c_adap);
if (adap->fe_adap[0].fe == NULL)
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
if (pending_entry_index_ == -1)
delete pending_entry_;
pending_entry_ = NULL;
pending_entry_index_ = -1;
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct ip_sf_list *igmp_mcf_get_first(struct seq_file *seq)
{
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
struct ip_sf_list *psf = NULL;
struct ip_mc_list *im = NULL;
struct igmp_mcf_iter_state *state = igmp_mcf_seq_private(seq);
state->idev = NULL;
state->im = NULL;
for_each_netdev_rcu(net, state->dev) {
struct in_device *idev;
idev = __in_dev_get_rcu(state->dev);
if (unlikely(idev == NULL))
continue;
im = rcu_dereference(idev->mc_list);
if (likely(im != NULL)) {
spin_lock_bh(&im->lock);
psf = im->sources;
if (likely(psf != NULL)) {
state->im = im;
state->idev = idev;
break;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&im->lock);
}
}
return psf;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result tee_svc_copy_to_user(void *uaddr, const void *kaddr, size_t len)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *s;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&s);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_mmu_check_access_rights(to_user_ta_ctx(s->ctx),
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_WRITE |
TEE_MEMORY_ACCESS_ANY_OWNER,
(uaddr_t)uaddr, len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
memcpy(uaddr, kaddr, len);
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScrollAnchor::Clear() {
LayoutObject* layout_object =
anchor_object_ ? anchor_object_ : ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller_);
PaintLayer* layer = nullptr;
if (LayoutObject* parent = layout_object->Parent())
layer = parent->EnclosingLayer();
while (layer) {
if (PaintLayerScrollableArea* scrollable_area =
layer->GetScrollableArea()) {
ScrollAnchor* anchor = scrollable_area->GetScrollAnchor();
DCHECK(anchor);
anchor->ClearSelf();
}
layer = layer->Parent();
}
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID: | 0 | 136,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::removeViewportConstrainedObject(RenderObject* object)
{
if (m_viewportConstrainedObjects && m_viewportConstrainedObjects->contains(object)) {
m_viewportConstrainedObjects->remove(object);
if (Page* page = m_frame->page()) {
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrollingCoordinator = page->scrollingCoordinator())
scrollingCoordinator->frameViewFixedObjectsDidChange(this);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_vs_set_timeout(struct ip_vs_timeout_user *u)
{
IP_VS_DBG(2, "Setting timeout tcp:%d tcpfin:%d udp:%d\n",
u->tcp_timeout,
u->tcp_fin_timeout,
u->udp_timeout);
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP
if (u->tcp_timeout) {
ip_vs_protocol_tcp.timeout_table[IP_VS_TCP_S_ESTABLISHED]
= u->tcp_timeout * HZ;
}
if (u->tcp_fin_timeout) {
ip_vs_protocol_tcp.timeout_table[IP_VS_TCP_S_FIN_WAIT]
= u->tcp_fin_timeout * HZ;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP
if (u->udp_timeout) {
ip_vs_protocol_udp.timeout_table[IP_VS_UDP_S_NORMAL]
= u->udp_timeout * HZ;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShelfLayoutManager::IsShelfWindow(aura::Window* window) {
if (!window)
return false;
return (launcher_widget() &&
launcher_widget()->GetNativeWindow()->Contains(window)) ||
(status_ && status_->GetNativeWindow()->Contains(window));
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual int32_t setHeap(const sp<IMemoryHeap> &heap) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(ICrypto::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(heap));
status_t err = remote()->transact(SET_HEAP, data, &reply);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return -1;
}
int32_t seqNum;
if (reply.readInt32(&seqNum) != NO_ERROR) {
return -1;
}
return seqNum;
}
Commit Message: Fix information disclosure in mediadrmserver
Test:POC provided in bug
Bug:79218474
Change-Id: Iba12c07a5e615f8ed234b01ac53e3559ba9ac12e
(cherry picked from commit c1bf68a8d1321d7cdf7da6933f0b89b171d251c6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool FileStream::fillBuf() {
int n;
bufPos += bufEnd - buf;
bufPtr = bufEnd = buf;
if (limited && bufPos >= start + length) {
return gFalse;
}
if (limited && bufPos + fileStreamBufSize > start + length) {
n = start + length - bufPos;
} else {
n = fileStreamBufSize;
}
n = fread(buf, 1, n, f);
bufEnd = buf + n;
if (bufPtr >= bufEnd) {
return gFalse;
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int insert_inode_locked4(struct inode *inode, unsigned long hashval,
int (*test)(struct inode *, void *), void *data)
{
struct inode *old = inode_insert5(inode, hashval, test, NULL, data);
if (old != inode) {
iput(old);
return -EBUSY;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories
sgid directories have special semantics, making newly created files in
the directory belong to the group of the directory, and newly created
subdirectories will also become sgid. This is historically used for
group-shared directories.
But group directories writable by non-group members should not imply
that such non-group members can magically join the group, so make sure
to clear the sgid bit on non-directories for non-members (but remember
that sgid without group execute means "mandatory locking", just to
confuse things even more).
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 79,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfs_init_cinfo(struct nfs_commit_info *cinfo,
struct inode *inode,
struct nfs_direct_req *dreq)
{
if (dreq)
nfs_init_cinfo_from_dreq(cinfo, dreq);
else
nfs_init_cinfo_from_inode(cinfo, inode);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t mem_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return mem_rw(file, buf, count, ppos, 0);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutomationProviderBookmarkModelObserver(
AutomationProvider* provider,
IPC::Message* reply_message,
BookmarkModel* model,
bool use_json_interface)
: automation_provider_(provider->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message),
model_(model),
use_json_interface_(use_json_interface) {
model_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hb_buffer_create (unsigned int pre_alloc_size)
{
hb_buffer_t *buffer;
if (!HB_OBJECT_DO_CREATE (hb_buffer_t, buffer))
return &_hb_buffer_nil;
if (pre_alloc_size)
hb_buffer_ensure(buffer, pre_alloc_size);
buffer->unicode = &_hb_unicode_funcs_nil;
return buffer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 164,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackTexture::Destroy() {
if (image_) {
DCHECK(texture_ref_);
ScopedTextureBinder binder(&decoder_->state_, decoder_->error_state_.get(),
id(), Target());
DestroyNativeGpuMemoryBuffer(true);
}
if (texture_ref_) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackTexture::Destroy",
decoder_->error_state_.get());
texture_ref_ = nullptr;
}
memory_tracker_.TrackMemFree(bytes_allocated_);
bytes_allocated_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 GetClipboardText(ui::ClipboardType type) {
base::string16 text;
ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread()->ReadText(type, &text);
return text;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbStore_x4a4 (FbBits *bits, const CARD32 *values, int x, int width, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
int i;
CARD8 *pixel = ((CARD8 *) bits) + x;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
WRITE(pixel++, READ(values + i) >> 28);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SupervisedUserService::AccessRequestsEnabled() {
return FindEnabledPermissionRequestCreator(0) < permissions_creators_.size();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_declare_property_bool(zend_class_entry *ce, const char *name, int name_length, long value, int access_type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *property;
if (ce->type & ZEND_INTERNAL_CLASS) {
ALLOC_PERMANENT_ZVAL(property);
} else {
ALLOC_ZVAL(property);
}
INIT_PZVAL(property);
ZVAL_BOOL(property, value);
return zend_declare_property(ce, name, name_length, property, access_type TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BTM_SendKeypressNotif(BD_ADDR bd_addr, tBTM_SP_KEY_TYPE type)
{
/* This API only make sense between PASSKEY_REQ and SP complete */
if (btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_KEY_ENTRY)
btsnd_hcic_send_keypress_notif (bd_addr, type);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ReadonlyEventTargetAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_readonlyEventTargetAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReadonlyEventTargetAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void P2PQuicStreamImpl::OnDataAvailable() {
sequencer()->MarkConsumed(sequencer()->ReadableBytes());
if (sequencer()->IsClosed()) {
OnFinRead();
}
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PaintLayerScrollableArea::VerticalScrollbarStart(int min_x,
int max_x) const {
if (GetLayoutBox()->ShouldPlaceBlockDirectionScrollbarOnLogicalLeft())
return min_x + GetLayoutBox()->BorderLeft().ToInt();
return max_x - GetLayoutBox()->BorderRight().ToInt() -
VerticalScrollbar()->ScrollbarThickness();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init parse_id(char *id)
{
unsigned int vendor_id = 0, device_id = 0, flags = 0, i = 0;
char *token, *name = NULL;
if ((token = strsep(&id, ":")) != NULL)
name = token;
/* name now points to a null terminated string*/
if ((token = strsep(&id, ":")) != NULL)
vendor_id = simple_strtoul(token, NULL, 16);
if ((token = strsep(&id, ":")) != NULL)
device_id = simple_strtoul(token, NULL, 16);
flags = simple_strtoul(id, NULL, 16);
pr_info("%s: new device %s, vendor ID 0x%04x, device ID 0x%04x, flags: 0x%x\n",
driver_name, name, vendor_id, device_id, flags);
if (vendor_id > 0x10000 || vendor_id == 0)
return;
if (device_id > 0x10000 || device_id == 0)
return;
for (i = 0; usb_dev_id[i].name; i++);
usb_dev_id[i].name = name;
usb_dev_id[i].vendor = vendor_id;
usb_dev_id[i].device = device_id;
usb_dev_id[i].private = flags;
pegasus_ids[i].match_flags = USB_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_DEVICE;
pegasus_ids[i].idVendor = vendor_id;
pegasus_ids[i].idProduct = device_id;
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mark_reg_not_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
{
if (WARN_ON(regno >= MAX_BPF_REG)) {
verbose(env, "mark_reg_not_init(regs, %u)\n", regno);
/* Something bad happened, let's kill all regs */
for (regno = 0; regno < MAX_BPF_REG; regno++)
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
return;
}
__mark_reg_not_init(regs + regno);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,149 |
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