instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mif_device *ip6mr_vif_seq_idx(struct net *net,
struct ipmr_vif_iter *iter,
loff_t pos)
{
struct mr6_table *mrt = iter->mrt;
for (iter->ct = 0; iter->ct < mrt->maxvif; ++iter->ct) {
if (!MIF_EXISTS(mrt, iter->ct))
continue;
if (pos-- == 0)
return &mrt->vif6_table[iter->ct];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Touch> Document::createTouch(DOMWindow* window, EventTarget* target, int identifier, double pageX, double pageY, double screenX, double screenY, double radiusX, double radiusY, float rotationAngle, float force) const
{
if (!std::isfinite(pageX))
pageX = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(pageY))
pageY = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(screenX))
screenX = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(screenY))
screenY = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(radiusX))
radiusX = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(radiusY))
radiusY = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(rotationAngle))
rotationAngle = 0;
if (!std::isfinite(force))
force = 0;
LocalFrame* frame = window && window->isLocalDOMWindow() ? toLocalDOMWindow(window)->frame() : this->frame();
return Touch::create(frame, target, identifier, FloatPoint(screenX, screenY), FloatPoint(pageX, pageY), FloatSize(radiusX, radiusY), rotationAngle, force);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int perf_pmu_register(struct pmu *pmu, const char *name, int type)
{
int cpu, ret;
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_disable_count = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!pmu->pmu_disable_count)
goto unlock;
pmu->type = -1;
if (!name)
goto skip_type;
pmu->name = name;
if (type < 0) {
type = idr_alloc(&pmu_idr, pmu, PERF_TYPE_MAX, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (type < 0) {
ret = type;
goto free_pdc;
}
}
pmu->type = type;
if (pmu_bus_running) {
ret = pmu_dev_alloc(pmu);
if (ret)
goto free_idr;
}
skip_type:
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = find_pmu_context(pmu->task_ctx_nr);
if (pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto got_cpu_context;
ret = -ENOMEM;
pmu->pmu_cpu_context = alloc_percpu(struct perf_cpu_context);
if (!pmu->pmu_cpu_context)
goto free_dev;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
__perf_event_init_context(&cpuctx->ctx);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.mutex, &cpuctx_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&cpuctx->ctx.lock, &cpuctx_lock);
cpuctx->ctx.pmu = pmu;
__perf_mux_hrtimer_init(cpuctx, cpu);
cpuctx->unique_pmu = pmu;
}
got_cpu_context:
if (!pmu->start_txn) {
if (pmu->pmu_enable) {
/*
* If we have pmu_enable/pmu_disable calls, install
* transaction stubs that use that to try and batch
* hardware accesses.
*/
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_start_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_commit_txn;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_cancel_txn;
} else {
pmu->start_txn = perf_pmu_nop_txn;
pmu->commit_txn = perf_pmu_nop_int;
pmu->cancel_txn = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
}
if (!pmu->pmu_enable) {
pmu->pmu_enable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
pmu->pmu_disable = perf_pmu_nop_void;
}
if (!pmu->event_idx)
pmu->event_idx = perf_event_idx_default;
list_add_rcu(&pmu->entry, &pmus);
atomic_set(&pmu->exclusive_cnt, 0);
ret = 0;
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
return ret;
free_dev:
device_del(pmu->dev);
put_device(pmu->dev);
free_idr:
if (pmu->type >= PERF_TYPE_MAX)
idr_remove(&pmu_idr, pmu->type);
free_pdc:
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_disable_count);
goto unlock;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ip_may_fragment(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return unlikely((ip_hdr(skb)->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) == 0) ||
skb->ignore_df;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_required_caps (void)
{
struct __user_cap_header_struct hdr = { _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, 0 };
struct __user_cap_data_struct data[2] = { { 0 } };
/* Drop all non-require capabilities */
data[0].effective = REQUIRED_CAPS_0;
data[0].permitted = REQUIRED_CAPS_0;
data[0].inheritable = 0;
data[1].effective = REQUIRED_CAPS_1;
data[1].permitted = REQUIRED_CAPS_1;
data[1].inheritable = 0;
if (capset (&hdr, data) < 0)
die_with_error ("capset failed");
}
Commit Message: Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 69,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PreservePSDOpacityMask(Image *image,LayerInfo* layer_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*key;
RandomInfo
*random_info;
StringInfo
*key_info;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" preserving opacity mask");
random_info=AcquireRandomInfo();
key_info=GetRandomKey(random_info,2+1);
key=(char *) GetStringInfoDatum(key_info);
key[8]=(char ) layer_info->mask.background;
key[9]='\0';
layer_info->mask.image->page.x+=layer_info->page.x;
layer_info->mask.image->page.y+=layer_info->page.y;
(void) SetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,(const char *) key,
layer_info->mask.image,exception);
(void) SetImageArtifact(layer_info->image,"psd:opacity-mask",
(const char *) key);
key_info=DestroyStringInfo(key_info);
random_info=DestroyRandomInfo(random_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 91,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::dump(String8& dump) {
AutoMutex _l(mLock);
dump.append("Input Dispatcher State:\n");
dumpDispatchStateLocked(dump);
if (!mLastANRState.isEmpty()) {
dump.append("\nInput Dispatcher State at time of last ANR:\n");
dump.append(mLastANRState);
}
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::SetAdapter(const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path) {
DCHECK(!IsPresent());
object_path_ = object_path;
VLOG(1) << object_path_.value() << ": using adapter.";
SetDefaultAdapterName();
BluetoothAdapterClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
PresentChanged(true);
if (properties->powered.value())
PoweredChanged(true);
if (properties->discoverable.value())
DiscoverableChanged(true);
if (properties->discovering.value())
DiscoveringChanged(true);
std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath> device_paths =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothDeviceClient()->
GetDevicesForAdapter(object_path_);
for (std::vector<dbus::ObjectPath>::iterator iter = device_paths.begin();
iter != device_paths.end(); ++iter) {
BluetoothDeviceChromeOS* device_chromeos =
new BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(this, *iter);
devices_[device_chromeos->GetAddress()] = device_chromeos;
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
DeviceAdded(this, device_chromeos));
}
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_ClearPakReferences( int flags ) {
searchpath_t *search;
if ( !flags ) {
flags = -1;
}
for ( search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next ) {
if ( search->pack ) {
search->pack->referenced &= ~flags;
}
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanAccessPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
const GURL& top_frame_url,
int tab_id,
int process_id,
std::string* error) const {
return CanRunOnPage(extension,
document_url,
top_frame_url,
tab_id,
process_id,
active_permissions()->explicit_hosts(),
error);
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static js_Ast *arguments(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *head, *tail;
if (J->lookahead == ')')
return NULL;
head = tail = LIST(assignment(J, 0));
while (jsP_accept(J, ',')) {
tail = tail->b = LIST(assignment(J, 0));
}
return jsP_list(head);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 11,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_br_process_link_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
tSMP_STATUS status = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (!smp_calculate_long_term_key_from_link_key(p_cb)) {
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s: failed", __func__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &status);
return;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: LTK derivation from LK successfully completed",
__func__);
smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(p_cb);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, false);
smp_br_select_next_key(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void variadicDoubleMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::variadicDoubleMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabSpecificContentSettings::IsContentBlocked(
ContentSettingsType content_type) const {
DCHECK(content_type != CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION)
<< "Geolocation settings handled by ContentSettingGeolocationImageModel";
DCHECK(content_type != CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS)
<< "Notifications settings handled by "
<< "ContentSettingsNotificationsImageModel";
if (content_type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_IMAGES ||
content_type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_JAVASCRIPT ||
content_type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS ||
content_type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES ||
content_type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_POPUPS ||
content_type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIXEDSCRIPT)
return content_blocked_[content_type];
return false;
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyElements(Handle<FixedArrayBase> source, ElementsKind source_kind,
Handle<FixedArrayBase> destination, int size) {
Subclass::CopyElementsImpl(*source, 0, *destination, source_kind, 0,
kPackedSizeNotKnown, size);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err esds_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ESDBox *p;
p = (GF_ESDBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "MPEG4ESDescriptorBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->desc) {
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_OD_DUMP
gf_odf_dump_desc((GF_Descriptor *) p->desc, trace, 1, GF_TRUE);
#else
fprintf(trace, "<!-- Object Descriptor Dumping disabled in this build of GPAC -->\n");
#endif
} else if (p->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<!--INVALID MP4 FILE: ESD not present in MPEG Sample Description or corrupted-->\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("MPEG4ESDescriptorBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_compress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs, int flush, IOBUF a )
{
int rc;
int zrc;
unsigned n;
do {
zs->next_out = BYTEF_CAST (zfx->outbuf);
zs->avail_out = zfx->outbufsize;
if( DBG_FILTER )
log_debug("enter deflate: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, flush=%d\n",
(unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out, flush );
zrc = deflate( zs, flush );
if( zrc == Z_STREAM_END && flush == Z_FINISH )
;
else if( zrc != Z_OK ) {
if( zs->msg )
log_fatal("zlib deflate problem: %s\n", zs->msg );
else
log_fatal("zlib deflate problem: rc=%d\n", zrc );
}
n = zfx->outbufsize - zs->avail_out;
if( DBG_FILTER )
log_debug("leave deflate: "
"avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, n=%u, zrc=%d\n",
(unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out,
(unsigned)n, zrc );
if( (rc=iobuf_write( a, zfx->outbuf, n )) ) {
log_debug("deflate: iobuf_write failed\n");
return rc;
}
} while( zs->avail_in || (flush == Z_FINISH && zrc != Z_STREAM_END) );
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_match_id(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
struct xfs_eofblocks *eofb)
{
if ((eofb->eof_flags & XFS_EOF_FLAGS_UID) &&
!uid_eq(VFS_I(ip)->i_uid, eofb->eof_uid))
return 0;
if ((eofb->eof_flags & XFS_EOF_FLAGS_GID) &&
!gid_eq(VFS_I(ip)->i_gid, eofb->eof_gid))
return 0;
if ((eofb->eof_flags & XFS_EOF_FLAGS_PRID) &&
xfs_get_projid(ip) != eofb->eof_prid)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ieee802_11_radio_avs_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
return ieee802_11_avs_radio_print(ndo, p, h->len, h->caplen);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TransientElement* AddTransientParent(UiElementName name,
UiElementName parent_name,
int timeout_seconds,
bool animate_opacity,
UiScene* scene) {
auto element = base::MakeUnique<SimpleTransientElement>(
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(timeout_seconds));
TransientElement* to_return = element.get();
element->SetName(name);
element->SetVisible(false);
element->set_hit_testable(false);
if (animate_opacity)
element->SetTransitionedProperties({OPACITY});
scene->AddUiElement(parent_name, std::move(element));
return to_return;
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <cjgrant@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: record_byte_getter(Gif_Reader *grr)
{
if (grr->pos < grr->length)
return grr->v[grr->pos++];
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Prepend(int pos, int size) {
target_.Prepend(data_, data_->data() + kDataSize - pos - size, size);
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~WorkerCreationObserver() {}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PlatformSensorLinux::~PlatformSensorLinux() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
polling_thread_task_runner_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, sensor_reader_.release());
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OobeUI::AddScreenHandler(BaseScreenHandler* handler) {
web_ui()->AddMessageHandler(handler);
handlers_.push_back(handler);
}
Commit Message: One polymer_config.js to rule them all.
R=michaelpg@chromium.org,fukino@chromium.org,mfoltz@chromium.org
BUG=425626
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1224783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#337882}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void account_freq_event(void)
{
if (tick_nohz_full_enabled())
account_freq_event_nohz();
else
atomic_inc(&nr_freq_events);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tpacket_destruct_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(skb->sk);
void *ph;
BUG_ON(skb == NULL);
if (likely(po->tx_ring.pg_vec)) {
ph = skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg;
BUG_ON(__packet_get_status(po, ph) != TP_STATUS_SENDING);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&po->tx_ring.pending) == 0);
atomic_dec(&po->tx_ring.pending);
__packet_set_status(po, ph, TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE);
}
sock_wfree(skb);
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
cache_filename[MaxTextExtent],
id[MaxTextExtent],
keyword[MaxTextExtent],
*options;
const unsigned char
*p;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
int
c;
LinkedListInfo
*profiles;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickStatusType
flags;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
length;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned int
signature;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
*id='\0';
(void) ResetMagickMemory(keyword,0,sizeof(keyword));
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Decode image header; header terminates one character beyond a ':'.
*/
profiles=(LinkedListInfo *) NULL;
length=MaxTextExtent;
options=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
signature=GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL);
image->depth=8;
image->compression=NoCompression;
while ((isgraph(c) != MagickFalse) && (c != (int) ':'))
{
register char
*p;
if (c == (int) '{')
{
char
*comment;
/*
Read comment-- any text between { }.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; comment != (char *) NULL; p++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '\\')
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
else
if ((c == EOF) || (c == (int) '}'))
break;
if ((size_t) (p-comment+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=(char) c;
}
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
*p='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
if (isalnum(c) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Get the keyword.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
p=keyword;
do
{
if (c == (int) '=')
break;
if ((size_t) (p-keyword) < (MaxTextExtent-1))
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while (c != EOF);
*p='\0';
p=options;
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '=')
{
/*
Get the keyword value.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while ((c != (int) '}') && (c != EOF))
{
if ((size_t) (p-options+1) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
options=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(options,length+
MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*options));
if (options == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=options+strlen(options);
}
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == '\\')
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == (int) '}')
{
*p++=(char) c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
}
if (*options != '{')
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
break;
}
if (options == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
*p='\0';
if (*options == '{')
(void) CopyMagickString(options,options+1,strlen(options));
/*
Assign a value to the specified keyword.
*/
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'b':
case 'B':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->background_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"border-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->border_color,
exception);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'c':
case 'C':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"class") == 0)
{
ssize_t
storage_class;
storage_class=ParseCommandOption(MagickClassOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (storage_class < 0)
break;
image->storage_class=(ClassType) storage_class;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colors") == 0)
{
image->colors=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"colorspace") == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (colorspace < 0)
break;
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) colorspace;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"compression") == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (compression < 0)
break;
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"columns") == 0)
{
image->columns=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'd':
case 'D':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"delay") == 0)
{
image->delay=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"depth") == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"dispose") == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (dispose < 0)
break;
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'e':
case 'E':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"endian") == 0)
{
ssize_t
endian;
endian=ParseCommandOption(MagickEndianOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (endian < 0)
break;
image->endian=(EndianType) endian;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"error") == 0)
{
image->error.mean_error_per_pixel=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'g':
case 'G':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gamma") == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"green-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'i':
case 'I':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(id,options,MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"iterations") == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'm':
case 'M':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick-signature") == 0)
{
signature=(unsigned int) StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"matte-color") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorDatabase(options,&image->matte_color,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"maximum-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_maximum_error=StringToDouble(
options,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mean-error") == 0)
{
image->error.normalized_mean_error=StringToDouble(options,
(char **) NULL);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"montage") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image->montage,options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'o':
case 'O':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"opaque") == 0)
{
ssize_t
matte;
matte=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (matte < 0)
break;
image->matte=(MagickBooleanType) matte;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"orientation") == 0)
{
ssize_t
orientation;
orientation=ParseCommandOption(MagickOrientationOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (orientation < 0)
break;
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"page") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pixel-intensity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (intensity < 0)
break;
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
break;
}
if ((LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile:",8) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(keyword,"profile-",8) == 0))
{
if (profiles == (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
profiles=NewLinkedList(0);
(void) AppendValueToLinkedList(profiles,
AcquireString(keyword+8));
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,(size_t)
StringToLong(options));
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProfile(image,keyword+8,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'q':
case 'Q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image->quality=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'r':
case 'R':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"red-primary") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rendering-intent") == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,
MagickFalse,options);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
break;
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"resolution") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"rows") == 0)
{
image->rows=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 's':
case 'S':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"scene") == 0)
{
image->scene=StringToUnsignedLong(options);
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 't':
case 'T':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"ticks-per-second") == 0)
{
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) StringToLong(options);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"tile-offset") == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(options);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"type") == 0)
{
ssize_t
type;
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickTypeOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (type < 0)
break;
image->type=(ImageType) type;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'u':
case 'U':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"units") == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,
options);
if (units < 0)
break;
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
case 'w':
case 'W':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"white-point") == 0)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(options,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=
image->chromaticity.white_point.x;
break;
}
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,keyword,options);
break;
}
}
}
else
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
while (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) c)) != 0)
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
options=DestroyString(options);
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
/*
Verify that required image information is defined.
*/
if ((LocaleCompare(id,"MagickCache") != 0) ||
(image->storage_class == UndefinedClass) ||
(image->compression == UndefinedCompression) || (image->columns == 0) ||
(image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (signature != GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL))
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"IncompatibleAPI");
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
register char
*p;
/*
Image directory.
*/
length=MaxTextExtent;
image->directory=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
p=image->directory;
do
{
*p='\0';
if ((strlen(image->directory)+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
/*
Allocate more memory for the image directory.
*/
length<<=1;
image->directory=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(image->directory,
length+MaxTextExtent,sizeof(*image->directory));
if (image->directory == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=image->directory+strlen(image->directory);
}
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
*p++=(char) c;
} while (c != (int) '\0');
}
if (profiles != (LinkedListInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
register unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read image profiles.
*/
ResetLinkedListIterator(profiles);
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
while (name != (const char *) NULL)
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
(void) ReadBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(profile),p);
}
name=(const char *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(profiles);
}
profiles=DestroyLinkedList(profiles,RelinquishMagickMemory);
}
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickFalse);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
/*
Create image colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->colors != 0)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*colormap;
/*
Read image colormap from file.
*/
packet_size=(size_t) (3UL*depth/8UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
packet_size*sizeof(*colormap));
if (colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) (packet_size*image->colors))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
p=colormap;
switch (depth)
{
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageDepthNotSupported");
case 8:
{
unsigned char
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushCharPixel(p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
unsigned short
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleShortToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
unsigned int
pixel;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&pixel);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleLongToQuantum(pixel);
}
break;
}
}
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
/*
Attach persistent pixel cache.
*/
status=PersistPixelCache(image,cache_filename,MagickTrue,&offset,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(CacheError,"UnableToPersistPixelCache");
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
do
{
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
} while ((isgraph(c) == MagickFalse) && (c != EOF));
if (c != EOF)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (c != EOF);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 1 | 168,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void purge_persistent_gnt(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring)
{
struct persistent_gnt *persistent_gnt;
struct rb_node *n;
unsigned int num_clean, total;
bool scan_used = false, clean_used = false;
struct rb_root *root;
if (ring->persistent_gnt_c < xen_blkif_max_pgrants ||
(ring->persistent_gnt_c == xen_blkif_max_pgrants &&
!ring->blkif->vbd.overflow_max_grants)) {
goto out;
}
if (work_busy(&ring->persistent_purge_work)) {
pr_alert_ratelimited("Scheduled work from previous purge is still busy, cannot purge list\n");
goto out;
}
num_clean = (xen_blkif_max_pgrants / 100) * LRU_PERCENT_CLEAN;
num_clean = ring->persistent_gnt_c - xen_blkif_max_pgrants + num_clean;
num_clean = min(ring->persistent_gnt_c, num_clean);
if ((num_clean == 0) ||
(num_clean > (ring->persistent_gnt_c - atomic_read(&ring->persistent_gnt_in_use))))
goto out;
/*
* At this point, we can assure that there will be no calls
* to get_persistent_grant (because we are executing this code from
* xen_blkif_schedule), there can only be calls to put_persistent_gnt,
* which means that the number of currently used grants will go down,
* but never up, so we will always be able to remove the requested
* number of grants.
*/
total = num_clean;
pr_debug("Going to purge %u persistent grants\n", num_clean);
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&ring->persistent_purge_list));
root = &ring->persistent_gnts;
purge_list:
foreach_grant_safe(persistent_gnt, n, root, node) {
BUG_ON(persistent_gnt->handle ==
BLKBACK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (clean_used) {
clear_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_WAS_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
continue;
}
if (test_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags))
continue;
if (!scan_used &&
(test_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_WAS_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags)))
continue;
rb_erase(&persistent_gnt->node, root);
list_add(&persistent_gnt->remove_node,
&ring->persistent_purge_list);
if (--num_clean == 0)
goto finished;
}
/*
* If we get here it means we also need to start cleaning
* grants that were used since last purge in order to cope
* with the requested num
*/
if (!scan_used && !clean_used) {
pr_debug("Still missing %u purged frames\n", num_clean);
scan_used = true;
goto purge_list;
}
finished:
if (!clean_used) {
pr_debug("Finished scanning for grants to clean, removing used flag\n");
clean_used = true;
goto purge_list;
}
ring->persistent_gnt_c -= (total - num_clean);
ring->blkif->vbd.overflow_max_grants = 0;
/* We can defer this work */
schedule_work(&ring->persistent_purge_work);
pr_debug("Purged %u/%u\n", (total - num_clean), total);
out:
return;
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::FloatAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_floatAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::FloatAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_remove_unlisted_guards_after_days(void)
{
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
"guard-remove-unlisted-guards-after-days",
DFLT_REMOVE_UNLISTED_GUARDS_AFTER_DAYS,
1, 365*10);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~Logger() {}
Commit Message: MidiManagerUsb should not trust indices provided by renderer.
MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData takes |port_index| parameter. As it is
provided by a renderer possibly under the control of an attacker, we must
validate the given index before using it.
BUG=456516
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/907793002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#315303}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double FakePlatformSensor::GetMinimumSupportedFrequency() {
return 1.0;
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_info_drive_similar_devices (Device *device)
{
GList *devices;
GList *l;
GPtrArray *p;
p = g_ptr_array_new ();
if (!device->priv->device_is_drive)
goto out;
/* We need non-empty SERIAL and WWN for this to work */
if ((device->priv->drive_serial == NULL || strlen (device->priv->drive_serial) == 0) ||
(device->priv->drive_wwn == NULL || strlen (device->priv->drive_wwn) == 0))
goto out;
/* TODO: this might be slow - if so, use a hash on the Daemon class */
devices = daemon_local_get_all_devices (device->priv->daemon);
for (l = devices; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
Device *d = DEVICE (l->data);
if (!d->priv->device_is_drive)
continue;
if (d == device)
continue;
#if 0
g_debug ("looking at %s:\n"
" %s\n"
" %s\n"
" %s\n"
" %s\n",
d->priv->device_file,
d->priv->drive_serial,
device->priv->drive_serial,
d->priv->drive_wwn,
device->priv->drive_wwn);
#endif
/* current policy is that *both* SERIAL and WWN must match */
if (g_strcmp0 (d->priv->drive_serial, device->priv->drive_serial) == 0 &&
g_strcmp0 (d->priv->drive_wwn, device->priv->drive_wwn) == 0)
{
g_ptr_array_add (p, d->priv->object_path);
/* ensure that the device we added also exists in its own drive_similar_devices property */
if (!ptr_array_has_string (d->priv->drive_similar_devices, device->priv->object_path))
{
update_info_in_idle (d);
}
else
{
}
}
}
out:
g_ptr_array_add (p, NULL);
device_set_drive_similar_devices (device, (GStrv) p->pdata);
g_ptr_array_free (p, TRUE);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long ion_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct ion_client *client = filp->private_data;
struct ion_device *dev = client->dev;
struct ion_handle *cleanup_handle = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int dir;
union {
struct ion_fd_data fd;
struct ion_allocation_data allocation;
struct ion_handle_data handle;
struct ion_custom_data custom;
} data;
dir = ion_ioctl_dir(cmd);
if (_IOC_SIZE(cmd) > sizeof(data))
return -EINVAL;
if (dir & _IOC_WRITE)
if (copy_from_user(&data, (void __user *)arg, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
switch (cmd) {
case ION_IOC_ALLOC:
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
handle = ion_alloc(client, data.allocation.len,
data.allocation.align,
data.allocation.heap_id_mask,
data.allocation.flags);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
data.allocation.handle = handle->id;
cleanup_handle = handle;
break;
}
case ION_IOC_FREE:
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
handle = ion_handle_get_by_id(client, data.handle.handle);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
ion_free(client, handle);
ion_handle_put(handle);
break;
}
case ION_IOC_SHARE:
case ION_IOC_MAP:
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
handle = ion_handle_get_by_id(client, data.handle.handle);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
data.fd.fd = ion_share_dma_buf_fd(client, handle);
ion_handle_put(handle);
if (data.fd.fd < 0)
ret = data.fd.fd;
break;
}
case ION_IOC_IMPORT:
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
handle = ion_import_dma_buf_fd(client, data.fd.fd);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
else
data.handle.handle = handle->id;
break;
}
case ION_IOC_SYNC:
{
ret = ion_sync_for_device(client, data.fd.fd);
break;
}
case ION_IOC_CUSTOM:
{
if (!dev->custom_ioctl)
return -ENOTTY;
ret = dev->custom_ioctl(client, data.custom.cmd,
data.custom.arg);
break;
}
default:
return -ENOTTY;
}
if (dir & _IOC_READ) {
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &data, _IOC_SIZE(cmd))) {
if (cleanup_handle)
ion_free(client, cleanup_handle);
return -EFAULT;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 166,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(SoapServer, addSoapHeader)
{
soapServicePtr service;
zval *fault;
soapHeader **p;
SOAP_SERVER_BEGIN_CODE();
FETCH_THIS_SERVICE(service);
if (!service || !service->soap_headers_ptr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The SoapServer::addSoapHeader function may be called only during SOAP request processing");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "O", &fault, soap_header_class_entry) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
p = service->soap_headers_ptr;
while (*p != NULL) {
p = &(*p)->next;
}
*p = emalloc(sizeof(soapHeader));
memset(*p, 0, sizeof(soapHeader));
ZVAL_NULL(&(*p)->function_name);
(*p)->retval = *fault;
zval_copy_ctor(&(*p)->retval);
SOAP_SERVER_END_CODE();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsUInt32Number mywcslen(const wchar_t *s)
{
const wchar_t *p;
p = s;
while (*p)
p++;
return (cmsUInt32Number)(p - s);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sp<IHDCP> MediaPlayerService::makeHDCP(bool createEncryptionModule) {
return new HDCP(createEncryptionModule);
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int MemStream::getChars(int nChars, Guchar *buffer) {
int n;
if (nChars <= 0) {
return 0;
}
if (bufEnd - bufPtr < nChars) {
n = (int)(bufEnd - bufPtr);
} else {
n = nChars;
}
memcpy(buffer, bufPtr, n);
bufPtr += n;
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ft_glyphslot_alloc_bitmap( FT_GlyphSlot slot,
FT_ULong size )
{
FT_Memory memory = FT_FACE_MEMORY( slot->face );
FT_Error error;
if ( slot->internal->flags & FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP )
FT_FREE( slot->bitmap.buffer );
else
slot->internal->flags |= FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
(void)FT_ALLOC( slot->bitmap.buffer, size );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: c_next (struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return c_start(m, pos);
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ctr_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
int err, first, rounds = 6 + ctx->key_length / 4;
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
int blocks;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_virt_block(desc, &walk, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
first = 1;
kernel_neon_begin();
while ((blocks = (walk.nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE))) {
aes_ctr_encrypt(walk.dst.virt.addr, walk.src.virt.addr,
(u8 *)ctx->key_enc, rounds, blocks, walk.iv,
first);
first = 0;
nbytes -= blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
if (nbytes && nbytes == walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
break;
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk,
walk.nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
if (nbytes) {
u8 *tdst = walk.dst.virt.addr + blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
u8 *tsrc = walk.src.virt.addr + blocks * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
u8 __aligned(8) tail[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
/*
* Minimum alignment is 8 bytes, so if nbytes is <= 8, we need
* to tell aes_ctr_encrypt() to only read half a block.
*/
blocks = (nbytes <= 8) ? -1 : 1;
aes_ctr_encrypt(tail, tsrc, (u8 *)ctx->key_enc, rounds,
blocks, walk.iv, first);
memcpy(tdst, tail, nbytes);
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, &walk, 0);
}
kernel_neon_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::SetBluetoothMockDataSet(const std::string& name) {
content::SetBluetoothMockDataSetForTesting(name);
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::PluginsLoaded(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
const std::vector<WebPluginInfo>& plugins) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output;
if (!context_.FindEnabledPlugin(params.render_view_id, params.url,
params.top_origin_url, params.mime_type,
&output.status, &output.plugin,
&output.actual_mime_type)) {
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
return;
}
PluginFinder::Get(base::Bind(&PluginInfoMessageFilter::GotPluginFinder, this,
params, reply_msg, output));
}
Commit Message: Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 173,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs, *dst_reg, *src_reg;
struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg = NULL, off_reg = {0};
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
dst_reg = ®s[insn->dst_reg];
src_reg = NULL;
if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE)
ptr_reg = dst_reg;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
src_reg = ®s[insn->src_reg];
if (src_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
if (dst_reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
/* Combining two pointers by any ALU op yields
* an arbitrary scalar. Disallow all math except
* pointer subtraction
*/
if (opcode == BPF_SUB && env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
return 0;
}
verbose(env, "R%d pointer %s pointer prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg,
bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
return -EACCES;
} else {
/* scalar += pointer
* This is legal, but we have to reverse our
* src/dest handling in computing the range
*/
return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
src_reg, dst_reg);
}
} else if (ptr_reg) {
/* pointer += scalar */
return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
dst_reg, src_reg);
}
} else {
/* Pretend the src is a reg with a known value, since we only
* need to be able to read from this state.
*/
off_reg.type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(&off_reg, insn->imm);
src_reg = &off_reg;
if (ptr_reg) /* pointer += K */
return adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(env, insn,
ptr_reg, src_reg);
}
/* Got here implies adding two SCALAR_VALUEs */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr_reg)) {
print_verifier_state(env, state);
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: unexpected ptr_reg\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (WARN_ON(!src_reg)) {
print_verifier_state(env, state);
verbose(env, "verifier internal error: no src_reg\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageColorTransparent (gdImagePtr im, int color)
{
if (color < 0) {
return;
}
if (!im->trueColor) {
if((color < -1) || (color >= gdMaxColors)) {
return;
}
if (im->transparent != -1) {
im->alpha[im->transparent] = gdAlphaOpaque;
}
if (color != -1) {
im->alpha[color] = gdAlphaTransparent;
}
}
im->transparent = color;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tty_driver_remove_tty(struct tty_driver *driver,
struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (driver->ops->remove)
driver->ops->remove(driver, tty);
else
driver->ttys[tty->index] = NULL;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_io_bus_register_dev(struct kvm *kvm, enum kvm_bus bus_idx, gpa_t addr,
int len, struct kvm_io_device *dev)
{
int i;
struct kvm_io_bus *new_bus, *bus;
struct kvm_io_range range;
bus = kvm_get_bus(kvm, bus_idx);
if (!bus)
return -ENOMEM;
/* exclude ioeventfd which is limited by maximum fd */
if (bus->dev_count - bus->ioeventfd_count > NR_IOBUS_DEVS - 1)
return -ENOSPC;
new_bus = kmalloc(sizeof(*bus) + ((bus->dev_count + 1) *
sizeof(struct kvm_io_range)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_bus)
return -ENOMEM;
range = (struct kvm_io_range) {
.addr = addr,
.len = len,
.dev = dev,
};
for (i = 0; i < bus->dev_count; i++)
if (kvm_io_bus_cmp(&bus->range[i], &range) > 0)
break;
memcpy(new_bus, bus, sizeof(*bus) + i * sizeof(struct kvm_io_range));
new_bus->dev_count++;
new_bus->range[i] = range;
memcpy(new_bus->range + i + 1, bus->range + i,
(bus->dev_count - i) * sizeof(struct kvm_io_range));
rcu_assign_pointer(kvm->buses[bus_idx], new_bus);
synchronize_srcu_expedited(&kvm->srcu);
kfree(bus);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 91,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UpdateWaitHandles(LPHANDLE *handles_ptr, LPDWORD count,
HANDLE io_event, HANDLE exit_event, list_item_t *threads)
{
static DWORD size = 10;
static LPHANDLE handles = NULL;
DWORD pos = 0;
if (handles == NULL)
{
handles = malloc(size * sizeof(HANDLE));
*handles_ptr = handles;
if (handles == NULL)
{
return ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY;
}
}
handles[pos++] = io_event;
if (!threads)
{
handles[pos++] = exit_event;
}
while (threads)
{
if (pos == size)
{
LPHANDLE tmp;
size += 10;
tmp = realloc(handles, size * sizeof(HANDLE));
if (tmp == NULL)
{
size -= 10;
*count = pos;
return ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY;
}
handles = tmp;
*handles_ptr = handles;
}
handles[pos++] = threads->data;
threads = threads->next;
}
*count = pos;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::vector<NavigationType>& navigation_types() {
return navigation_types_;
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_format_rar_read_data_skip(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct rar *rar;
int64_t bytes_skipped;
int ret;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
if (rar->bytes_unconsumed > 0) {
/* Consume as much as the decompressor actually used. */
__archive_read_consume(a, rar->bytes_unconsumed);
rar->bytes_unconsumed = 0;
}
if (rar->bytes_remaining > 0) {
bytes_skipped = __archive_read_consume(a, rar->bytes_remaining);
if (bytes_skipped < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* Compressed data to skip must be read from each header in a multivolume
* archive.
*/
if (rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME && rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
{
ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
return ret;
return archive_read_format_rar_read_data_skip(a);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Range* Document::caretRangeFromPoint(int x, int y) {
if (GetLayoutViewItem().IsNull())
return nullptr;
HitTestResult result = HitTestInDocument(this, x, y);
PositionWithAffinity position_with_affinity = result.GetPosition();
if (position_with_affinity.IsNull())
return nullptr;
Position range_compliant_position =
position_with_affinity.GetPosition().ParentAnchoredEquivalent();
return Range::CreateAdjustedToTreeScope(*this, range_compliant_position);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_io_bus_sort_cmp(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
return kvm_io_bus_cmp(p1, p2);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CheckClientDownloadRequest::CheckClientDownloadRequest(
download::DownloadItem* item,
CheckDownloadCallback callback,
DownloadProtectionService* service,
scoped_refptr<SafeBrowsingDatabaseManager> database_manager,
scoped_refptr<BinaryFeatureExtractor> binary_feature_extractor)
: CheckClientDownloadRequestBase(
item->GetURL(),
item->GetTargetFilePath(),
item->GetFullPath(),
item->GetTabUrl(),
item->GetTabReferrerUrl(),
content::DownloadItemUtils::GetBrowserContext(item),
std::move(callback),
service,
std::move(database_manager),
std::move(binary_feature_extractor)),
item_(item) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
item_->AddObserver(this);
DVLOG(2) << "Starting SafeBrowsing download check for: "
<< item_->DebugString(true);
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_guard_confirmed(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard)
{
if (BUG(guard->confirmed_on_date && guard->confirmed_idx >= 0))
return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
if (BUG(smartlist_contains(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, guard)))
return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
const int GUARD_LIFETIME = get_guard_lifetime();
guard->confirmed_on_date = randomize_time(approx_time(), GUARD_LIFETIME/10);
log_info(LD_GUARD, "Marking %s as a confirmed guard (index %d)",
entry_guard_describe(guard),
gs->next_confirmed_idx);
guard->confirmed_idx = gs->next_confirmed_idx++;
smartlist_add(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, guard);
gs->primary_guards_up_to_date = 0;
entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(gs);
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __hid_request(struct hid_device *hid, struct hid_report *report,
int reqtype)
{
char *buf;
int ret;
int len;
buf = hid_alloc_report_buf(report, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return;
len = hid_report_len(report);
if (reqtype == HID_REQ_SET_REPORT)
hid_output_report(report, buf);
ret = hid->ll_driver->raw_request(hid, report->id, buf, len,
report->type, reqtype);
if (ret < 0) {
dbg_hid("unable to complete request: %d\n", ret);
goto out;
}
if (reqtype == HID_REQ_GET_REPORT)
hid_input_report(hid, report->type, buf, ret, 0);
out:
kfree(buf);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ut64 getmainsymbol(ELFOBJ *bin) {
struct r_bin_elf_symbol_t *symbol;
int i;
if (!(symbol = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_symbols) (bin))) {
return UT64_MAX;
}
for (i = 0; !symbol[i].last; i++) {
if (!strcmp (symbol[i].name, "main")) {
ut64 paddr = symbol[i].offset;
return Elf_(r_bin_elf_p2v) (bin, paddr);
}
}
return UT64_MAX;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void CorrectPhaseLHS(const size_t width,const size_t height,
double *fourier_pixels)
{
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) (width/2L); x++)
fourier_pixels[y*width+x]*=(-1.0);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,882 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::UpdateZoomLevel(double zoom_level) {
webview()->HidePopups();
SetZoomLevel(zoom_level);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(PharFileInfo, getMetadata)
{
PHAR_ENTRY_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata) {
if (entry_obj->ent.entry->is_persistent) {
zval *ret;
char *buf = estrndup((char *) entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata, entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata_len);
/* assume success, we would have failed before */
phar_parse_metadata(&buf, &ret, entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata_len TSRMLS_CC);
efree(buf);
RETURN_ZVAL(ret, 0, 1);
}
RETURN_ZVAL(entry_obj->ent.entry->metadata, 1, 0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
char *input_string = PG_GETARG_CSTRING(0);
#ifdef NOT_USED
Oid typelem = PG_GETARG_OID(1);
#endif
int32 atttypmod = PG_GETARG_INT32(2);
VarBit *result; /* The resulting bit string */
char *sp; /* pointer into the character string */
bits8 *r; /* pointer into the result */
int len, /* Length of the whole data structure */
bitlen, /* Number of bits in the bit string */
slen; /* Length of the input string */
bool bit_not_hex; /* false = hex string true = bit string */
int bc;
bits8 x = 0;
/* Check that the first character is a b or an x */
if (input_string[0] == 'b' || input_string[0] == 'B')
{
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else if (input_string[0] == 'x' || input_string[0] == 'X')
{
bit_not_hex = false;
sp = input_string + 1;
}
else
{
/*
* Otherwise it's binary. This allows things like cast('1001' as bit)
* to work transparently.
*/
bit_not_hex = true;
sp = input_string;
}
slen = strlen(sp);
/* Determine bitlength from input string */
if (bit_not_hex)
bitlen = slen;
else
bitlen = slen * 4;
/*
* Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make
* sure that the bitstring fits.
*/
if (atttypmod <= 0)
atttypmod = bitlen;
else if (bitlen != atttypmod)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
errmsg("bit string length %d does not match type bit(%d)",
bitlen, atttypmod)));
len = VARBITTOTALLEN(atttypmod);
/* set to 0 so that *r is always initialised and string is zero-padded */
result = (VarBit *) palloc0(len);
SET_VARSIZE(result, len);
VARBITLEN(result) = atttypmod;
r = VARBITS(result);
if (bit_not_hex)
{
/* Parse the bit representation of the string */
/* We know it fits, as bitlen was compared to atttypmod */
x = HIGHBIT;
for (; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp == '1')
*r |= x;
else if (*sp != '0')
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid binary digit",
*sp)));
x >>= 1;
if (x == 0)
{
x = HIGHBIT;
r++;
}
}
}
else
{
/* Parse the hex representation of the string */
for (bc = 0; *sp; sp++)
{
if (*sp >= '0' && *sp <= '9')
x = (bits8) (*sp - '0');
else if (*sp >= 'A' && *sp <= 'F')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'A') + 10;
else if (*sp >= 'a' && *sp <= 'f')
x = (bits8) (*sp - 'a') + 10;
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_TEXT_REPRESENTATION),
errmsg("\"%c\" is not a valid hexadecimal digit",
*sp)));
if (bc)
{
*r++ |= x;
bc = 0;
}
else
{
*r = x << 4;
bc = 1;
}
}
}
PG_RETURN_VARBIT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 166,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Gif_FullReadRecord(const Gif_Record *gifrec, int read_flags,
const char* landmark, Gif_ReadErrorHandler h)
{
Gif_Reader grr;
if (!gifrec) return 0;
make_data_reader(&grr, gifrec->data, gifrec->length);
if (read_flags & GIF_READ_CONST_RECORD)
read_flags |= GIF_READ_COMPRESSED;
return read_gif(&grr, read_flags, landmark, h);
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_send(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
StringInfoData buf;
pq_begintypsend(&buf);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, circle->center.x);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, circle->center.y);
pq_sendfloat8(&buf, circle->radius);
PG_RETURN_BYTEA_P(pq_endtypsend(&buf));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLSelectElement::hasPlaceholderLabelOption() const
{
if (multiple() || size() > 1)
return false;
int listIndex = optionToListIndex(0);
ASSERT(listIndex >= 0);
if (listIndex < 0)
return false;
return !listIndex && toHTMLOptionElement(listItems()[listIndex])->value().isEmpty();
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::DidSelectSuggestion(
const base::string16& value,
int identifier) {
ClearPreviewedForm();
if (identifier > 0)
FillAutofillFormData(identifier, true);
else if (identifier == POPUP_ITEM_ID_AUTOCOMPLETE_ENTRY)
driver_->RendererShouldPreviewFieldWithValue(value);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::DispatchProtocolMessage(
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host, const std::string& message) {
DCHECK(agent_host == agent_host_.get());
if (!EventRouter::Get(profile_))
return;
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> result = base::JSONReader::Read(message);
if (!result || !result->is_dict())
return;
base::DictionaryValue* dictionary =
static_cast<base::DictionaryValue*>(result.get());
int id;
if (!dictionary->GetInteger("id", &id)) {
std::string method_name;
if (!dictionary->GetString("method", &method_name))
return;
OnEvent::Params params;
base::DictionaryValue* params_value;
if (dictionary->GetDictionary("params", ¶ms_value))
params.additional_properties.Swap(params_value);
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> args(
OnEvent::Create(debuggee_, method_name, params));
auto event =
std::make_unique<Event>(events::DEBUGGER_ON_EVENT, OnEvent::kEventName,
std::move(args), profile_);
EventRouter::Get(profile_)
->DispatchEventToExtension(extension_id_, std::move(event));
} else {
DebuggerSendCommandFunction* function = pending_requests_[id].get();
if (!function)
return;
function->SendResponseBody(dictionary);
pending_requests_.erase(id);
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_revision(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
unsigned char buffer[3];
int ret;
/* Get a couple of the ATMega Firmware values */
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_ID, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
buffer, 3, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
atusb->fw_ver_maj = buffer[0];
atusb->fw_ver_min = buffer[1];
atusb->fw_hw_type = buffer[2];
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware: major: %u, minor: %u, hardware type: %u\n",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min, atusb->fw_hw_type);
}
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 2) {
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware version (%u.%u) predates our first public release.",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min);
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Please update to version 0.2 or newer");
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit serpent_sse2_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_algs(serpent_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(serpent_algs));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncSocket::~SyncSocket() {
Close();
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 110,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform2fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLfloat>& v) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform2fv(location, v);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const hci_hal_t *hci_hal_h4_get_interface() {
vendor = vendor_get_interface();
return &interface;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t userfaultfd_ctx_read(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, int no_wait,
struct uffd_msg *msg)
{
ssize_t ret;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *uwq;
/*
* Handling fork event requires sleeping operations, so
* we drop the event_wqh lock, then do these ops, then
* lock it back and wake up the waiter. While the lock is
* dropped the ewq may go away so we keep track of it
* carefully.
*/
LIST_HEAD(fork_event);
struct userfaultfd_ctx *fork_nctx = NULL;
/* always take the fd_wqh lock before the fault_pending_wqh lock */
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->fd_wqh, &wait);
for (;;) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_lock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
uwq = find_userfault(ctx);
if (uwq) {
/*
* Use a seqcount to repeat the lockless check
* in wake_userfault() to avoid missing
* wakeups because during the refile both
* waitqueue could become empty if this is the
* only userfault.
*/
write_seqcount_begin(&ctx->refile_seq);
/*
* The fault_pending_wqh.lock prevents the uwq
* to disappear from under us.
*
* Refile this userfault from
* fault_pending_wqh to fault_wqh, it's not
* pending anymore after we read it.
*
* Use list_del() by hand (as
* userfaultfd_wake_function also uses
* list_del_init() by hand) to be sure nobody
* changes __remove_wait_queue() to use
* list_del_init() in turn breaking the
* !list_empty_careful() check in
* handle_userfault(). The uwq->wq.head list
* must never be empty at any time during the
* refile, or the waitqueue could disappear
* from under us. The "wait_queue_head_t"
* parameter of __remove_wait_queue() is unused
* anyway.
*/
list_del(&uwq->wq.entry);
add_wait_queue(&ctx->fault_wqh, &uwq->wq);
write_seqcount_end(&ctx->refile_seq);
/* careful to always initialize msg if ret == 0 */
*msg = uwq->msg;
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
uwq = find_userfault_evt(ctx);
if (uwq) {
*msg = uwq->msg;
if (uwq->msg.event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
fork_nctx = (struct userfaultfd_ctx *)
(unsigned long)
uwq->msg.arg.reserved.reserved1;
list_move(&uwq->wq.entry, &fork_event);
/*
* fork_nctx can be freed as soon as
* we drop the lock, unless we take a
* reference on it.
*/
userfaultfd_ctx_get(fork_nctx);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
userfaultfd_event_complete(ctx, uwq);
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
ret = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (no_wait) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
schedule();
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
}
__remove_wait_queue(&ctx->fd_wqh, &wait);
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->fd_wqh.lock);
if (!ret && msg->event == UFFD_EVENT_FORK) {
ret = resolve_userfault_fork(ctx, fork_nctx, msg);
spin_lock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
if (!list_empty(&fork_event)) {
/*
* The fork thread didn't abort, so we can
* drop the temporary refcount.
*/
userfaultfd_ctx_put(fork_nctx);
uwq = list_first_entry(&fork_event,
typeof(*uwq),
wq.entry);
/*
* If fork_event list wasn't empty and in turn
* the event wasn't already released by fork
* (the event is allocated on fork kernel
* stack), put the event back to its place in
* the event_wq. fork_event head will be freed
* as soon as we return so the event cannot
* stay queued there no matter the current
* "ret" value.
*/
list_del(&uwq->wq.entry);
__add_wait_queue(&ctx->event_wqh, &uwq->wq);
/*
* Leave the event in the waitqueue and report
* error to userland if we failed to resolve
* the userfault fork.
*/
if (likely(!ret))
userfaultfd_event_complete(ctx, uwq);
} else {
/*
* Here the fork thread aborted and the
* refcount from the fork thread on fork_nctx
* has already been released. We still hold
* the reference we took before releasing the
* lock above. If resolve_userfault_fork
* failed we've to drop it because the
* fork_nctx has to be freed in such case. If
* it succeeded we'll hold it because the new
* uffd references it.
*/
if (ret)
userfaultfd_ctx_put(fork_nctx);
}
spin_unlock(&ctx->event_wqh.lock);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Document::queryCommandValue(const String& commandName)
{
return command(this, commandName).value();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lvm2_lv_create_data_ref (CreateLvm2LVData *data)
{
data->refcount++;
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static handle_t *start_transaction(struct inode *inode)
{
handle_t *result;
result = ext4_journal_start(inode, blocks_for_truncate(inode));
if (!IS_ERR(result))
return result;
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, PTR_ERR(result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct sock *icmp_xmit_lock(struct net *net)
{
struct sock *sk;
local_bh_disable();
sk = icmp_sk(net);
if (unlikely(!spin_trylock(&sk->sk_lock.slock))) {
/* This can happen if the output path signals a
* dst_link_failure() for an outgoing ICMP packet.
*/
local_bh_enable();
return NULL;
}
return sk;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hid_device_release(struct device *dev)
{
struct hid_device *hid = to_hid_device(dev);
hid_close_report(hid);
kfree(hid->dev_rdesc);
kfree(hid);
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ToggleEncodingAutoDetect() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("AutoDetectChange"));
encoding_auto_detect_.SetValue(!encoding_auto_detect_.GetValue());
if (encoding_auto_detect_.GetValue()) {
TabContents* contents = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (contents)
contents->ResetOverrideEncoding();
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PPB_Widget_Impl::GetLocation(PP_Rect* location) {
*location = location_;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SiteInstanceImpl::LockToOriginIfNeeded() {
DCHECK(HasSite());
process_->SetIsUsed();
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
auto lock_state = policy->CheckOriginLock(process_->GetID(), lock_url());
if (ShouldLockToOrigin(GetBrowserContext(), site_)) {
CHECK(!process_->IsForGuestsOnly());
switch (lock_state) {
case CheckOriginLockResult::NO_LOCK: {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "SiteInstanceImpl::LockToOrigin", "site id",
id_, "lock", lock_url().possibly_invalid_spec());
process_->LockToOrigin(lock_url());
break;
}
case CheckOriginLockResult::HAS_WRONG_LOCK:
base::debug::SetCrashKeyString(bad_message::GetRequestedSiteURLKey(),
site_.spec());
base::debug::SetCrashKeyString(
bad_message::GetKilledProcessOriginLockKey(),
policy->GetOriginLock(process_->GetID()).spec());
CHECK(false) << "Trying to lock a process to " << lock_url()
<< " but the process is already locked to "
<< policy->GetOriginLock(process_->GetID());
break;
case CheckOriginLockResult::HAS_EQUAL_LOCK:
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
} else {
if (lock_state != CheckOriginLockResult::NO_LOCK) {
base::debug::SetCrashKeyString(bad_message::GetRequestedSiteURLKey(),
site_.spec());
base::debug::SetCrashKeyString(
bad_message::GetKilledProcessOriginLockKey(),
policy->GetOriginLock(process_->GetID()).spec());
CHECK(false) << "Trying to commit non-isolated site " << site_
<< " in process locked to "
<< policy->GetOriginLock(process_->GetID());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& XMLHttpRequest::interfaceName() const
{
return eventNames().interfaceForXMLHttpRequest;
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SlopeLimiting(cmsToneCurve* g)
{
int BeginVal, EndVal;
int AtBegin = (int) floor((cmsFloat64Number) g ->nEntries * 0.02 + 0.5); // Cutoff at 2%
int AtEnd = g ->nEntries - AtBegin - 1; // And 98%
cmsFloat64Number Val, Slope, beta;
int i;
if (cmsIsToneCurveDescending(g)) {
BeginVal = 0xffff; EndVal = 0;
}
else {
BeginVal = 0; EndVal = 0xffff;
}
Val = g ->Table16[AtBegin];
Slope = (Val - BeginVal) / AtBegin;
beta = Val - Slope * AtBegin;
for (i=0; i < AtBegin; i++)
g ->Table16[i] = _cmsQuickSaturateWord(i * Slope + beta);
Val = g ->Table16[AtEnd];
Slope = (EndVal - Val) / AtBegin; // AtBegin holds the X interval, which is same in both cases
beta = Val - Slope * AtEnd;
for (i = AtEnd; i < (int) g ->nEntries; i++)
g ->Table16[i] = _cmsQuickSaturateWord(i * Slope + beta);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport DrawInfo *DestroyDrawInfo(DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
if (draw_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (draw_info->primitive != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->primitive=DestroyString(draw_info->primitive);
if (draw_info->text != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->text=DestroyString(draw_info->text);
if (draw_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->geometry=DestroyString(draw_info->geometry);
if (draw_info->fill_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
draw_info->fill_pattern=DestroyImage(draw_info->fill_pattern);
if (draw_info->stroke_pattern != (Image *) NULL)
draw_info->stroke_pattern=DestroyImage(draw_info->stroke_pattern);
if (draw_info->font != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->font=DestroyString(draw_info->font);
if (draw_info->metrics != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->metrics=DestroyString(draw_info->metrics);
if (draw_info->family != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->family=DestroyString(draw_info->family);
if (draw_info->encoding != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->encoding=DestroyString(draw_info->encoding);
if (draw_info->density != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->density=DestroyString(draw_info->density);
if (draw_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->server_name=(char *)
RelinquishMagickMemory(draw_info->server_name);
if (draw_info->dash_pattern != (double *) NULL)
draw_info->dash_pattern=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
draw_info->dash_pattern);
if (draw_info->gradient.stops != (StopInfo *) NULL)
draw_info->gradient.stops=(StopInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
draw_info->gradient.stops);
if (draw_info->clip_mask != (char *) NULL)
draw_info->clip_mask=DestroyString(draw_info->clip_mask);
draw_info->signature=(~MagickCoreSignature);
draw_info=(DrawInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(draw_info);
return(draw_info);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_Parse(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, int len, int isFinal) {
if ((parser == NULL) || (len < 0) || ((s == NULL) && (len != 0))) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_SUSPENDED;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
case XML_FINISHED:
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_FINISHED;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
case XML_INITIALIZED:
if (parser->m_parentParser == NULL && ! startParsing(parser)) {
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
/* fall through */
default:
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_PARSING;
}
if (len == 0) {
parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer = (XML_Bool)isFinal;
if (! isFinal)
return XML_STATUS_OK;
parser->m_positionPtr = parser->m_bufferPtr;
parser->m_parseEndPtr = parser->m_bufferEnd;
/* If data are left over from last buffer, and we now know that these
data are the final chunk of input, then we have to check them again
to detect errors based on that fact.
*/
parser->m_errorCode
= parser->m_processor(parser, parser->m_bufferPtr,
parser->m_parseEndPtr, &parser->m_bufferPtr);
if (parser->m_errorCode == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
/* It is hard to be certain, but it seems that this case
* cannot occur. This code is cleaning up a previous parse
* with no new data (since len == 0). Changing the parsing
* state requires getting to execute a handler function, and
* there doesn't seem to be an opportunity for that while in
* this circumstance.
*
* Given the uncertainty, we retain the code but exclude it
* from coverage tests.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
XmlUpdatePosition(parser->m_encoding, parser->m_positionPtr,
parser->m_bufferPtr, &parser->m_position);
parser->m_positionPtr = parser->m_bufferPtr;
return XML_STATUS_SUSPENDED;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
case XML_INITIALIZED:
case XML_PARSING:
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_FINISHED;
/* fall through */
default:
return XML_STATUS_OK;
}
}
parser->m_eventEndPtr = parser->m_eventPtr;
parser->m_processor = errorProcessor;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
#ifndef XML_CONTEXT_BYTES
else if (parser->m_bufferPtr == parser->m_bufferEnd) {
const char *end;
int nLeftOver;
enum XML_Status result;
/* Detect overflow (a+b > MAX <==> b > MAX-a) */
if (len > ((XML_Size)-1) / 2 - parser->m_parseEndByteIndex) {
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_eventPtr = parser->m_eventEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_processor = errorProcessor;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
parser->m_parseEndByteIndex += len;
parser->m_positionPtr = s;
parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer = (XML_Bool)isFinal;
parser->m_errorCode
= parser->m_processor(parser, s, parser->m_parseEndPtr = s + len, &end);
if (parser->m_errorCode != XML_ERROR_NONE) {
parser->m_eventEndPtr = parser->m_eventPtr;
parser->m_processor = errorProcessor;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
} else {
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
result = XML_STATUS_SUSPENDED;
break;
case XML_INITIALIZED:
case XML_PARSING:
if (isFinal) {
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_FINISHED;
return XML_STATUS_OK;
}
/* fall through */
default:
result = XML_STATUS_OK;
}
}
XmlUpdatePosition(parser->m_encoding, parser->m_positionPtr, end,
&parser->m_position);
nLeftOver = s + len - end;
if (nLeftOver) {
if (parser->m_buffer == NULL
|| nLeftOver > parser->m_bufferLim - parser->m_buffer) {
/* avoid _signed_ integer overflow */
char *temp = NULL;
const int bytesToAllocate = (int)((unsigned)len * 2U);
if (bytesToAllocate > 0) {
temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, parser->m_buffer, bytesToAllocate);
}
if (temp == NULL) {
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
parser->m_eventPtr = parser->m_eventEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_processor = errorProcessor;
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
}
parser->m_buffer = temp;
parser->m_bufferLim = parser->m_buffer + bytesToAllocate;
}
memcpy(parser->m_buffer, end, nLeftOver);
}
parser->m_bufferPtr = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_bufferEnd = parser->m_buffer + nLeftOver;
parser->m_positionPtr = parser->m_bufferPtr;
parser->m_parseEndPtr = parser->m_bufferEnd;
parser->m_eventPtr = parser->m_bufferPtr;
parser->m_eventEndPtr = parser->m_bufferPtr;
return result;
}
#endif /* not defined XML_CONTEXT_BYTES */
else {
void *buff = XML_GetBuffer(parser, len);
if (buff == NULL)
return XML_STATUS_ERROR;
else {
memcpy(buff, s, len);
return XML_ParseBuffer(parser, len, isFinal);
}
}
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebBluetoothServiceImpl::WebBluetoothServiceImpl(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothServiceRequest request)
: WebContentsObserver(WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host)),
connected_devices_(new FrameConnectedBluetoothDevices(render_frame_host)),
render_frame_host_(render_frame_host),
binding_(this, std::move(request)),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
CHECK(web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Ensure device choosers are closed on navigation
The requestDevice() IPCs can race with navigation. This change ensures
that choosers are closed on navigation and adds browser tests to
exercise this for Web Bluetooth and WebUSB.
Bug: 723503
Change-Id: I66760161220e17bd2be9309cca228d161fe76e9c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1099961
Commit-Queue: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Wasserman <msw@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Yasskin <jyasskin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#569900}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 155,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Resource OutOfProcessInstance::PrintPages(
const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev* page_ranges,
uint32_t page_range_count) {
if (!print_settings_.is_printing)
return pp::Resource();
print_settings_.print_pages_called_ = true;
return engine_->PrintPages(page_ranges, page_range_count,
print_settings_.pepper_print_settings);
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath ExtensionBrowserTest::PackExtensionWithOptions(
const base::FilePath& dir_path,
const base::FilePath& crx_path,
const base::FilePath& pem_path,
const base::FilePath& pem_out_path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
if (!base::PathExists(dir_path)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Extension dir not found: " << dir_path.value();
return base::FilePath();
}
if (!base::PathExists(pem_path) && pem_out_path.empty()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Must specify a PEM file or PEM output path";
return base::FilePath();
}
std::unique_ptr<ExtensionCreator> creator(new ExtensionCreator());
if (!creator->Run(dir_path,
crx_path,
pem_path,
pem_out_path,
ExtensionCreator::kOverwriteCRX)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "ExtensionCreator::Run() failed: "
<< creator->error_message();
return base::FilePath();
}
if (!base::PathExists(crx_path)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << crx_path.value() << " was not created.";
return base::FilePath();
}
return crx_path;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Update navigations across hypothetical extension extents
Update code to treat navigations across hypothetical extension extents
(e.g. for nonexistent extensions) the same as we do for navigations
crossing installed extension extents.
Bug: 598265
Change-Id: Ibdf2f563ce1fd108ead279077901020a24de732b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/617180
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#495779}
CWE ID: | 0 | 151,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MaybeHandle<Object> ArrayConstructInitializeElements(Handle<JSArray> array,
Arguments* args) {
if (args->length() == 0) {
JSArray::Initialize(array, JSArray::kPreallocatedArrayElements);
return array;
} else if (args->length() == 1 && args->at(0)->IsNumber()) {
uint32_t length;
if (!args->at(0)->ToArrayLength(&length)) {
return ThrowArrayLengthRangeError(array->GetIsolate());
}
if (length > 0 && length < JSArray::kInitialMaxFastElementArray) {
ElementsKind elements_kind = array->GetElementsKind();
JSArray::Initialize(array, length, length);
if (!IsFastHoleyElementsKind(elements_kind)) {
elements_kind = GetHoleyElementsKind(elements_kind);
JSObject::TransitionElementsKind(array, elements_kind);
}
} else if (length == 0) {
JSArray::Initialize(array, JSArray::kPreallocatedArrayElements);
} else {
JSArray::Initialize(array, 0);
JSArray::SetLength(array, length);
}
return array;
}
Factory* factory = array->GetIsolate()->factory();
int number_of_elements = args->length();
JSObject::EnsureCanContainElements(
array, args, 0, number_of_elements, ALLOW_CONVERTED_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS);
ElementsKind elements_kind = array->GetElementsKind();
Handle<FixedArrayBase> elms;
if (IsFastDoubleElementsKind(elements_kind)) {
elms = Handle<FixedArrayBase>::cast(
factory->NewFixedDoubleArray(number_of_elements));
} else {
elms = Handle<FixedArrayBase>::cast(
factory->NewFixedArrayWithHoles(number_of_elements));
}
switch (elements_kind) {
case FAST_HOLEY_SMI_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_SMI_ELEMENTS: {
Handle<FixedArray> smi_elms = Handle<FixedArray>::cast(elms);
for (int entry = 0; entry < number_of_elements; entry++) {
smi_elms->set(entry, (*args)[entry], SKIP_WRITE_BARRIER);
}
break;
}
case FAST_HOLEY_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_ELEMENTS: {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
WriteBarrierMode mode = elms->GetWriteBarrierMode(no_gc);
Handle<FixedArray> object_elms = Handle<FixedArray>::cast(elms);
for (int entry = 0; entry < number_of_elements; entry++) {
object_elms->set(entry, (*args)[entry], mode);
}
break;
}
case FAST_HOLEY_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS:
case FAST_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS: {
Handle<FixedDoubleArray> double_elms =
Handle<FixedDoubleArray>::cast(elms);
for (int entry = 0; entry < number_of_elements; entry++) {
double_elms->set(entry, (*args)[entry]->Number());
}
break;
}
default:
UNREACHABLE();
break;
}
array->set_elements(*elms);
array->set_length(Smi::FromInt(number_of_elements));
return array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_service_private_key_exists(const rend_service_t *service)
{
char *private_key_path = rend_service_path(service, private_key_fname);
const file_status_t private_key_status = file_status(private_key_path);
tor_free(private_key_path);
/* Only non-empty regular private key files could have been used before.
* fstatus can be FN_ERROR if the service directory does not exist, in that
* case, there is obviously no private key. */
return private_key_status == FN_FILE;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContainerNode::detach()
{
detachChildren();
clearChildNeedsStyleRecalc();
Node::detach();
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FTC_SNode_Free( FTC_SNode snode,
FTC_Cache cache )
{
ftc_snode_free( FTC_NODE( snode ), cache );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsFocused() {
return GetRenderWidgetHost()->is_focused() &&
frame_tree_->GetFocusedFrame() &&
(frame_tree_->GetFocusedFrame() == frame_tree_node() ||
frame_tree_->GetFocusedFrame()->IsDescendantOf(frame_tree_node()));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_init_filter_functions_neon(png_structp pp, unsigned int bpp)
{
/* The switch statement is compiled in for ARM_NEON_API, the call to
* png_have_neon is compiled in for ARM_NEON_CHECK. If both are defined
* the check is only performed if the API has not set the NEON option on
* or off explicitly. In this case the check controls what happens.
*
* If the CHECK is not compiled in and the option is UNSET the behavior prior
* to 1.6.7 was to use the NEON code - this was a bug caused by having the
* wrong order of the 'ON' and 'default' cases. UNSET now defaults to OFF,
* as documented in png.h
*/
#ifdef PNG_ARM_NEON_API_SUPPORTED
switch ((pp->options >> PNG_ARM_NEON) & 3)
{
case PNG_OPTION_UNSET:
/* Allow the run-time check to execute if it has been enabled -
* thus both API and CHECK can be turned on. If it isn't supported
* this case will fall through to the 'default' below, which just
* returns.
*/
#endif /* PNG_ARM_NEON_API_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_ARM_NEON_CHECK_SUPPORTED
{
static volatile sig_atomic_t no_neon = -1; /* not checked */
if (no_neon < 0)
no_neon = !png_have_neon(pp);
if (no_neon)
return;
}
#ifdef PNG_ARM_NEON_API_SUPPORTED
break;
#endif
#endif /* PNG_ARM_NEON_CHECK_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_ARM_NEON_API_SUPPORTED
default: /* OFF or INVALID */
return;
case PNG_OPTION_ON:
/* Option turned on */
break;
}
#endif
/* IMPORTANT: any new external functions used here must be declared using
* PNG_INTERNAL_FUNCTION in ../pngpriv.h. This is required so that the
* 'prefix' option to configure works:
*
* ./configure --with-libpng-prefix=foobar_
*
* Verify you have got this right by running the above command, doing a build
* and examining pngprefix.h; it must contain a #define for every external
* function you add. (Notice that this happens automatically for the
* initialization function.)
*/
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_UP-1] = png_read_filter_row_up_neon;
if (bpp == 3)
{
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB-1] = png_read_filter_row_sub3_neon;
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG-1] = png_read_filter_row_avg3_neon;
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH-1] =
png_read_filter_row_paeth3_neon;
}
else if (bpp == 4)
{
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_SUB-1] = png_read_filter_row_sub4_neon;
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_AVG-1] = png_read_filter_row_avg4_neon;
pp->read_filter[PNG_FILTER_VALUE_PAETH-1] =
png_read_filter_row_paeth4_neon;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ldm_parse_vmdb (const u8 *data, struct vmdb *vm)
{
BUG_ON (!data || !vm);
if (MAGIC_VMDB != get_unaligned_be32(data)) {
ldm_crit ("Cannot find the VMDB, database may be corrupt.");
return false;
}
vm->ver_major = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x12);
vm->ver_minor = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x14);
if ((vm->ver_major != 4) || (vm->ver_minor != 10)) {
ldm_error ("Expected VMDB version %d.%d, got %d.%d. "
"Aborting.", 4, 10, vm->ver_major, vm->ver_minor);
return false;
}
vm->vblk_size = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
if (vm->vblk_size == 0) {
ldm_error ("Illegal VBLK size");
return false;
}
vm->vblk_offset = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x0C);
vm->last_vblk_seq = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x04);
ldm_debug ("Parsed VMDB successfully.");
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,326 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateStyle() {
DCHECK(!View()->ShouldThrottleRendering());
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN0("blink,blink_style", "Document::updateStyle");
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE(V8PerIsolateData::MainThreadIsolate(),
RuntimeCallStats::CounterId::kUpdateStyle);
double start_time = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
unsigned initial_element_count = GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount();
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInStyleRecalc);
StyleRecalcChange change = kNoChange;
if (GetStyleChangeType() >= kSubtreeStyleChange)
change = kForce;
NthIndexCache nth_index_cache(*this);
if (change == kForce) {
has_nodes_with_placeholder_style_ = false;
scoped_refptr<ComputedStyle> viewport_style =
StyleResolver::StyleForViewport(*this);
StyleRecalcChange local_change = ComputedStyle::StylePropagationDiff(
viewport_style.get(), GetLayoutViewItem().Style());
if (local_change != kNoChange)
GetLayoutViewItem().SetStyle(std::move(viewport_style));
}
ClearNeedsStyleRecalc();
ClearNeedsReattachLayoutTree();
StyleResolver& resolver = EnsureStyleResolver();
bool should_record_stats;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED("blink,blink_style", &should_record_stats);
GetStyleEngine().SetStatsEnabled(should_record_stats);
if (Element* document_element = documentElement()) {
if (document_element->ShouldCallRecalcStyle(change)) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink,blink_style", "Document::recalcStyle");
Element* viewport_defining = ViewportDefiningElement();
document_element->RecalcStyle(change);
if (viewport_defining != ViewportDefiningElement())
ViewportDefiningElementDidChange();
}
GetStyleEngine().MarkForWhitespaceReattachment();
PropagateStyleToViewport();
if (document_element->NeedsReattachLayoutTree() ||
document_element->ChildNeedsReattachLayoutTree()) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink,blink_style", "Document::rebuildLayoutTree");
WhitespaceAttacher whitespace_attacher;
document_element->RebuildLayoutTree(whitespace_attacher);
}
}
GetStyleEngine().ClearWhitespaceReattachSet();
View()->UpdateCountersAfterStyleChange();
View()->RecalcOverflowAfterStyleChange();
ClearChildNeedsStyleRecalc();
ClearChildNeedsReattachLayoutTree();
DCHECK(!NeedsStyleRecalc());
DCHECK(!ChildNeedsStyleRecalc());
DCHECK(!NeedsReattachLayoutTree());
DCHECK(!ChildNeedsReattachLayoutTree());
DCHECK(InStyleRecalc());
DCHECK_EQ(GetStyleResolver(), &resolver);
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean);
if (should_record_stats) {
TRACE_EVENT_END2(
"blink,blink_style", "Document::updateStyle", "resolverAccessCount",
GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount() - initial_element_count,
"counters", GetStyleEngine().Stats()->ToTracedValue());
} else {
TRACE_EVENT_END1(
"blink,blink_style", "Document::updateStyle", "resolverAccessCount",
GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount() - initial_element_count);
}
double update_duration_seconds = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime() - start_time;
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(CustomCountHistogram, update_histogram,
("Style.UpdateTime", 0, 10000000, 50));
update_histogram.Count(update_duration_seconds * 1000 * 1000);
CSSTiming::From(*this).RecordUpdateDuration(update_duration_seconds);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 146,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::GLSurfaceHandle RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::GetCompositingSurface() {
if (compositing_surface_ == gfx::kNullPluginWindow) {
GtkNativeViewManager* manager = GtkNativeViewManager::GetInstance();
gfx::NativeViewId view_id = GetNativeViewId();
if (!manager->GetPermanentXIDForId(&compositing_surface_, view_id)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Can't find XID for view id " << view_id;
}
}
return gfx::GLSurfaceHandle(compositing_surface_, true);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,941 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __rpc_add_wait_queue(struct rpc_wait_queue *queue, struct rpc_task *task)
{
BUG_ON (RPC_IS_QUEUED(task));
if (RPC_IS_PRIORITY(queue))
__rpc_add_wait_queue_priority(queue, task);
else if (RPC_IS_SWAPPER(task))
list_add(&task->u.tk_wait.list, &queue->tasks[0]);
else
list_add_tail(&task->u.tk_wait.list, &queue->tasks[0]);
task->tk_waitqueue = queue;
queue->qlen++;
rpc_set_queued(task);
dprintk("RPC: %5u added to queue %p \"%s\"\n",
task->tk_pid, queue, rpc_qname(queue));
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> objMethodWithArgsCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.objMethodWithArgs");
if (args.Length() < 3)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, intArg, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, strArg, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
return toV8(imp->objMethodWithArgs(intArg, strArg, objArg), args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: srcip_matches(struct sockaddr *srcaddr, struct sockaddr *rhs)
{
switch (srcaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
return (rhs->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC);
case AF_INET: {
struct sockaddr_in *saddr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)srcaddr;
struct sockaddr_in *vaddr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)rhs;
return (saddr4->sin_addr.s_addr == vaddr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
}
case AF_INET6: {
struct sockaddr_in6 *saddr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)srcaddr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *vaddr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&rhs;
return ipv6_addr_equal(&saddr6->sin6_addr, &vaddr6->sin6_addr);
}
default:
WARN_ON(1);
return false; /* don't expect to be here */
}
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,520 |
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