instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aiptek_get_report(struct aiptek *aiptek,
unsigned char report_type,
unsigned char report_id, void *buffer, int size)
{
return usb_control_msg(aiptek->usbdev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(aiptek->usbdev, 0),
USB_REQ_GET_REPORT,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE |
USB_DIR_IN, (report_type << 8) + report_id,
aiptek->ifnum, buffer, size, 5000);
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::EndedPlayback(LoopCondition loop_condition) const {
double dur = duration();
if (std::isnan(dur))
return false;
if (ready_state_ < kHaveMetadata)
return false;
double now = CurrentPlaybackPosition();
if (GetDirectionOfPlayback() == kForward) {
return dur > 0 && now >= dur &&
(loop_condition == LoopCondition::kIgnored || !Loop());
}
DCHECK_EQ(GetDirectionOfPlayback(), kBackward);
return now <= EarliestPossiblePosition();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ieee80211_tx_h_ps_buf(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tx->skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)tx->skb->data;
if (unlikely(tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_PS_BUFFERED))
return TX_CONTINUE;
/* only deauth, disassoc and action are bufferable MMPDUs */
if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_deauth(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_disassoc(hdr->frame_control) &&
!ieee80211_is_action(hdr->frame_control)) {
if (tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_UNICAST)
info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_NO_PS_BUFFER;
return TX_CONTINUE;
}
if (tx->flags & IEEE80211_TX_UNICAST)
return ieee80211_tx_h_unicast_ps_buf(tx);
else
return ieee80211_tx_h_multicast_ps_buf(tx);
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 35,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntPoint FrameView::convertFromContainingView(const IntPoint& parentPoint) const
{
if (const ScrollView* parentScrollView = toScrollView(parent())) {
if (parentScrollView->isFrameView()) {
const FrameView* parentView = toFrameView(parentScrollView);
RenderPart* renderer = m_frame->ownerRenderer();
if (!renderer)
return parentPoint;
IntPoint point = parentView->convertToRenderer(*renderer, parentPoint);
point.move(-renderer->borderLeft() - renderer->paddingLeft(),
-renderer->borderTop() - renderer->paddingTop());
return point;
}
return Widget::convertFromContainingView(parentPoint);
}
return parentPoint;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,816 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShellSurface::CanMinimize() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init nfc_llcp_sock_init(void)
{
return nfc_proto_register(&llcp_nfc_proto);
}
Commit Message: NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM(
GLenum target, GLsizei width, GLsizei height,
GLuint io_surface_id, GLuint plane) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() != gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopGL) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM", "only supported on desktop GL.");
return;
}
if (target != GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM",
"requires TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB target");
return;
}
TextureRef* texture_ref =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTargetUnlessDefault(&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM", "no rectangle texture bound");
return;
}
IOSurfaceRef surface = IOSurfaceLookup(io_surface_id);
if (!surface) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM", "no IOSurface with the given ID");
return;
}
ReleaseIOSurfaceForTexture(texture_ref->service_id());
texture_to_io_surface_map_.insert(
std::make_pair(texture_ref->service_id(), surface));
CGLContextObj context =
static_cast<CGLContextObj>(context_->GetHandle());
CGLError err = CGLTexImageIOSurface2D(
context,
target,
GL_RGBA,
width,
height,
GL_BGRA,
GL_UNSIGNED_INT_8_8_8_8_REV,
surface,
plane);
if (err != kCGLNoError) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM", "error in CGLTexImageIOSurface2D");
return;
}
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(
texture_ref, target, 0, GL_RGBA, width, height, 1, 0,
GL_BGRA, GL_UNSIGNED_INT_8_8_8_8_REV, true);
#else
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glTexImageIOSurface2DCHROMIUM", "not supported.");
#endif
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserMainParts::~BrowserMainParts() {}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dw210x_read_mac_address(struct dvb_usb_device *d, u8 mac[6])
{
int i;
u8 ibuf[] = {0, 0};
u8 eeprom[256], eepromline[16];
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
if (dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb6, 0xa0 , i, ibuf, 2, DW210X_READ_MSG) < 0) {
err("read eeprom failed.");
return -1;
} else {
eepromline[i%16] = ibuf[0];
eeprom[i] = ibuf[0];
}
if ((i % 16) == 15) {
deb_xfer("%02x: ", i - 15);
debug_dump(eepromline, 16, deb_xfer);
}
}
memcpy(mac, eeprom + 8, 6);
return 0;
};
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[mchehab@osg.samsung.com: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationProvider::OnChannelConnected(int pid) {
is_connected_ = true;
LOG(INFO) << "Testing channel connected, sending hello message";
channel_->Send(new AutomationMsg_Hello(GetProtocolVersion()));
if (initial_loads_complete_)
Send(new AutomationMsg_InitialLoadsComplete());
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_get_station(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
struct station_info sinfo;
struct sk_buff *msg;
u8 *mac_addr = NULL;
int err;
memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MAC])
return -EINVAL;
mac_addr = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MAC]);
if (!rdev->ops->get_station)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
err = rdev->ops->get_station(&rdev->wiphy, dev, mac_addr, &sinfo);
if (err)
return err;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!msg)
return -ENOMEM;
if (nl80211_send_station(msg, info->snd_pid, info->snd_seq, 0,
dev, mac_addr, &sinfo) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
return genlmsg_reply(msg, info);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spawn_reactor_thread(reactor_t *reactor) {
int ret = pthread_create(&thread, NULL, reactor_thread, reactor);
EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetQuicMaxTimeOnNonDefaultNetworkSeconds(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
int value;
if (base::StringToInt(
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params,
"max_time_on_non_default_network_seconds"),
&value)) {
return value;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 152,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void syn_flood_warning(const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const char *msg;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
if (sysctl_tcp_syncookies)
msg = "Sending cookies";
else
#endif
msg = "Dropping request";
pr_info("TCP: Possible SYN flooding on port %d. %s.\n",
ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->dest), msg);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_do_peeloff(struct sock *sk, sctp_assoc_t id, struct socket **sockp)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, id);
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct socket *sock;
int err = 0;
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
/* If there is a thread waiting on more sndbuf space for
* sending on this asoc, it cannot be peeled.
*/
if (waitqueue_active(&asoc->wait))
return -EBUSY;
/* An association cannot be branched off from an already peeled-off
* socket, nor is this supported for tcp style sockets.
*/
if (!sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Create a new socket. */
err = sock_create(sk->sk_family, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_SCTP, &sock);
if (err < 0)
return err;
sctp_copy_sock(sock->sk, sk, asoc);
/* Make peeled-off sockets more like 1-1 accepted sockets.
* Set the daddr and initialize id to something more random
*/
sp->pf->to_sk_daddr(&asoc->peer.primary_addr, sk);
/* Populate the fields of the newsk from the oldsk and migrate the
* asoc to the newsk.
*/
sctp_sock_migrate(sk, sock->sk, asoc, SCTP_SOCKET_UDP_HIGH_BANDWIDTH);
*sockp = sock;
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 167,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsValid(const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params) {
return !params.content_size.IsEmpty() && !params.page_size.IsEmpty() &&
!params.printable_area.IsEmpty() && params.document_cookie &&
params.dpi && params.margin_top >= 0 && params.margin_left >= 0 &&
params.dpi > kMinDpi && params.document_cookie != 0;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::SetCachedBackgroundColor(SkColor color) {
cached_background_color_ = color;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_tag(blkid_cache cache, blkid_dev dev, char **cp)
{
char *name = NULL;
char *value = NULL;
int ret;
if (!cache || !dev)
return -BLKID_ERR_PARAM;
if ((ret = parse_token(&name, &value, cp)) <= 0 /* &&
(ret = parse_xml(&name, &value, cp)) <= 0 */)
return ret;
/* Some tags are stored directly in the device struct */
if (!strcmp(name, "DEVNO"))
dev->bid_devno = STRTOULL(value, 0, 0);
else if (!strcmp(name, "PRI"))
dev->bid_pri = strtol(value, 0, 0);
else if (!strcmp(name, "TIME")) {
char *end = NULL;
dev->bid_time = STRTOULL(value, &end, 0);
if (end && *end == '.')
dev->bid_utime = STRTOULL(end + 1, 0, 0);
} else
ret = blkid_set_tag(dev, name, value, strlen(value));
DBG(READ, ul_debug(" tag: %s=\"%s\"", name, value));
return ret < 0 ? ret : 1;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 74,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp7_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
return vp78_decode_frame(avctx, data, got_frame, avpkt, IS_VP7);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sd_source_dispatch (GSource *source,
GSourceFunc callback,
gpointer user_data)
{
SdSource *sd_source = (SdSource *)source;
gboolean ret;
g_warn_if_fail (callback != NULL);
ret = (*callback) (user_data);
sd_login_monitor_flush (sd_source->monitor);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
bool varlen_map_access = env->varlen_map_value_access;
struct bpf_reg_state *rold, *rcur;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) {
rold = &old->regs[i];
rcur = &cur->regs[i];
if (memcmp(rold, rcur, sizeof(*rold)) == 0)
continue;
/* If the ranges were not the same, but everything else was and
* we didn't do a variable access into a map then we are a-ok.
*/
if (!varlen_map_access &&
memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetofend(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0)
continue;
/* If we didn't map access then again we don't care about the
* mismatched range values and it's ok if our old type was
* UNKNOWN and we didn't go to a NOT_INIT'ed reg.
*/
if (rold->type == NOT_INIT ||
(!varlen_map_access && rold->type == UNKNOWN_VALUE &&
rcur->type != NOT_INIT))
continue;
if (rold->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && rcur->type == PTR_TO_PACKET &&
compare_ptrs_to_packet(rold, rcur))
continue;
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_STACK; i++) {
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID)
continue;
if (old->stack_slot_type[i] != cur->stack_slot_type[i])
/* Ex: old explored (safe) state has STACK_SPILL in
* this stack slot, but current has has STACK_MISC ->
* this verifier states are not equivalent,
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
if (i % BPF_REG_SIZE)
continue;
if (memcmp(&old->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
&cur->spilled_regs[i / BPF_REG_SIZE],
sizeof(old->spilled_regs[0])))
/* when explored and current stack slot types are
* the same, check that stored pointers types
* are the same as well.
* Ex: explored safe path could have stored
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -8}
* but current path has stored:
* (bpf_reg_state) {.type = PTR_TO_STACK, .imm = -16}
* such verifier states are not equivalent.
* return false to continue verification of this path
*/
return false;
else
continue;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 65,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE bool jspeParseFunctionCallBrackets() {
assert(!JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE);
JSP_MATCH('(');
while (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE && lex->tk != ')') {
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_ARROW_FUNCTION) {
jsvUnLock(jspeArrowFunction(0, 0));
}
#endif
if (lex->tk!=')') JSP_MATCH(',');
}
if (!JSP_SHOULDNT_PARSE) JSP_MATCH(')');
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_DEBUG_RECIRC(char *arg OVS_UNUSED, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
ofpact_put_DEBUG_RECIRC(ofpacts);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_authenc_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *authenc = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_authenc_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
struct authenc_request_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
struct crypto_ablkcipher *enc = ctx->enc;
struct scatterlist *dst = req->dst;
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
struct ablkcipher_request *abreq = (void *)(areq_ctx->tail
+ ctx->reqoff);
u8 *iv = (u8 *)abreq - crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(enc);
int err;
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, enc);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, aead_request_flags(req),
crypto_authenc_encrypt_done, req);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, req->src, dst, cryptlen, req->iv);
memcpy(iv, req->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc));
err = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(abreq);
if (err)
return err;
return crypto_authenc_genicv(req, iv, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_get(struct fd f)
{
if (!f.file)
return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
if (f.file->f_op != &bpf_prog_fops) {
fdput(f);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
return f.file->private_data;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int f2fs_shrink_extent_tree(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int nr_shrink)
{
struct extent_tree *et, *next;
struct extent_node *en;
unsigned int node_cnt = 0, tree_cnt = 0;
int remained;
if (!test_opt(sbi, EXTENT_CACHE))
return 0;
if (!atomic_read(&sbi->total_zombie_tree))
goto free_node;
if (!mutex_trylock(&sbi->extent_tree_lock))
goto out;
/* 1. remove unreferenced extent tree */
list_for_each_entry_safe(et, next, &sbi->zombie_list, list) {
if (atomic_read(&et->node_cnt)) {
write_lock(&et->lock);
node_cnt += __free_extent_tree(sbi, et);
write_unlock(&et->lock);
}
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, atomic_read(&et->node_cnt));
list_del_init(&et->list);
radix_tree_delete(&sbi->extent_tree_root, et->ino);
kmem_cache_free(extent_tree_slab, et);
atomic_dec(&sbi->total_ext_tree);
atomic_dec(&sbi->total_zombie_tree);
tree_cnt++;
if (node_cnt + tree_cnt >= nr_shrink)
goto unlock_out;
cond_resched();
}
mutex_unlock(&sbi->extent_tree_lock);
free_node:
/* 2. remove LRU extent entries */
if (!mutex_trylock(&sbi->extent_tree_lock))
goto out;
remained = nr_shrink - (node_cnt + tree_cnt);
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
for (; remained > 0; remained--) {
if (list_empty(&sbi->extent_list))
break;
en = list_first_entry(&sbi->extent_list,
struct extent_node, list);
et = en->et;
if (!write_trylock(&et->lock)) {
/* refresh this extent node's position in extent list */
list_move_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
continue;
}
list_del_init(&en->list);
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
__detach_extent_node(sbi, et, en);
write_unlock(&et->lock);
node_cnt++;
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
unlock_out:
mutex_unlock(&sbi->extent_tree_lock);
out:
trace_f2fs_shrink_extent_tree(sbi, node_cnt, tree_cnt);
return node_cnt + tree_cnt;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::RemoveProviderHost(int provider_id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
providers_->erase(provider_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_pkt_parse_line(
git_pkt **head, const char *line, const char **out, size_t bufflen)
{
int ret;
int32_t len;
/* Not even enough for the length */
if (bufflen > 0 && bufflen < PKT_LEN_SIZE)
return GIT_EBUFS;
len = parse_len(line);
if (len < 0) {
/*
* If we fail to parse the length, it might be because the
* server is trying to send us the packfile already.
*/
if (bufflen >= 4 && !git__prefixcmp(line, "PACK")) {
giterr_clear();
*out = line;
return pack_pkt(head);
}
return (int)len;
}
/*
* If we were given a buffer length, then make sure there is
* enough in the buffer to satisfy this line
*/
if (bufflen > 0 && bufflen < (size_t)len)
return GIT_EBUFS;
/*
* The length has to be exactly 0 in case of a flush
* packet or greater than PKT_LEN_SIZE, as the decoded
* length includes its own encoded length of four bytes.
*/
if (len != 0 && len < PKT_LEN_SIZE)
return GIT_ERROR;
line += PKT_LEN_SIZE;
/*
* The Git protocol does not specify empty lines as part
* of the protocol. Not knowing what to do with an empty
* line, we should return an error upon hitting one.
*/
if (len == PKT_LEN_SIZE) {
giterr_set_str(GITERR_NET, "Invalid empty packet");
return GIT_ERROR;
}
if (len == 0) { /* Flush pkt */
*out = line;
return flush_pkt(head);
}
len -= PKT_LEN_SIZE; /* the encoded length includes its own size */
if (*line == GIT_SIDE_BAND_DATA)
ret = data_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (*line == GIT_SIDE_BAND_PROGRESS)
ret = sideband_progress_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (*line == GIT_SIDE_BAND_ERROR)
ret = sideband_error_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ACK"))
ret = ack_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "NAK"))
ret = nak_pkt(head);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ERR "))
ret = err_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (*line == '#')
ret = comment_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ok"))
ret = ok_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "ng"))
ret = ng_pkt(head, line, len);
else if (!git__prefixcmp(line, "unpack"))
ret = unpack_pkt(head, line, len);
else
ret = ref_pkt(head, line, len);
*out = line + len;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: fix potential OOB-read when processing ng packet
OSS-fuzz has reported a potential out-of-bounds read when processing a
"ng" smart packet:
==1==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x6310000249c0 at pc 0x000000493a92 bp 0x7ffddc882cd0 sp 0x7ffddc882480
READ of size 65529 at 0x6310000249c0 thread T0
SCARINESS: 26 (multi-byte-read-heap-buffer-overflow)
#0 0x493a91 in __interceptor_strchr.part.35 /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:673
#1 0x813960 in ng_pkt libgit2/src/transports/smart_pkt.c:320:14
#2 0x810f79 in git_pkt_parse_line libgit2/src/transports/smart_pkt.c:478:9
#3 0x82c3c9 in git_smart__store_refs libgit2/src/transports/smart_protocol.c:47:12
#4 0x6373a2 in git_smart__connect libgit2/src/transports/smart.c:251:15
#5 0x57688f in git_remote_connect libgit2/src/remote.c:708:15
#6 0x52e59b in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /src/download_refs_fuzzer.cc:145:9
#7 0x52ef3f in ExecuteFilesOnyByOne(int, char**) /src/libfuzzer/afl/afl_driver.cpp:301:5
#8 0x52f4ee in main /src/libfuzzer/afl/afl_driver.cpp:339:12
#9 0x7f6c910db82f in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-Cl5G7W/glibc-2.23/csu/libc-start.c:291
#10 0x41d518 in _start
When parsing an "ng" packet, we keep track of both the current position
as well as the remaining length of the packet itself. But instead of
taking care not to exceed the length, we pass the current pointer's
position to `strchr`, which will search for a certain character until
hitting NUL. It is thus possible to create a crafted packet which
doesn't contain a NUL byte to trigger an out-of-bounds read.
Fix the issue by instead using `memchr`, passing the remaining length as
restriction. Furthermore, verify that we actually have enough bytes left
to produce a match at all.
OSS-Fuzz-Issue: 9406
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool run_called() const { return run_called_; }
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void migration_bitmap_sync(void)
{
RAMBlock *block;
uint64_t num_dirty_pages_init = migration_dirty_pages;
MigrationState *s = migrate_get_current();
static int64_t start_time;
static int64_t bytes_xfer_prev;
static int64_t num_dirty_pages_period;
int64_t end_time;
int64_t bytes_xfer_now;
static uint64_t xbzrle_cache_miss_prev;
static uint64_t iterations_prev;
bitmap_sync_count++;
if (!bytes_xfer_prev) {
bytes_xfer_prev = ram_bytes_transferred();
}
if (!start_time) {
start_time = qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME);
}
trace_migration_bitmap_sync_start();
address_space_sync_dirty_bitmap(&address_space_memory);
QTAILQ_FOREACH(block, &ram_list.blocks, next) {
migration_bitmap_sync_range(block->mr->ram_addr, block->length);
}
trace_migration_bitmap_sync_end(migration_dirty_pages
- num_dirty_pages_init);
num_dirty_pages_period += migration_dirty_pages - num_dirty_pages_init;
end_time = qemu_clock_get_ms(QEMU_CLOCK_REALTIME);
/* more than 1 second = 1000 millisecons */
if (end_time > start_time + 1000) {
if (migrate_auto_converge()) {
/* The following detection logic can be refined later. For now:
Check to see if the dirtied bytes is 50% more than the approx.
amount of bytes that just got transferred since the last time we
were in this routine. If that happens >N times (for now N==4)
we turn on the throttle down logic */
bytes_xfer_now = ram_bytes_transferred();
if (s->dirty_pages_rate &&
(num_dirty_pages_period * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE >
(bytes_xfer_now - bytes_xfer_prev)/2) &&
(dirty_rate_high_cnt++ > 4)) {
trace_migration_throttle();
mig_throttle_on = true;
dirty_rate_high_cnt = 0;
}
bytes_xfer_prev = bytes_xfer_now;
} else {
mig_throttle_on = false;
}
if (migrate_use_xbzrle()) {
if (iterations_prev != 0) {
acct_info.xbzrle_cache_miss_rate =
(double)(acct_info.xbzrle_cache_miss -
xbzrle_cache_miss_prev) /
(acct_info.iterations - iterations_prev);
}
iterations_prev = acct_info.iterations;
xbzrle_cache_miss_prev = acct_info.xbzrle_cache_miss;
}
s->dirty_pages_rate = num_dirty_pages_period * 1000
/ (end_time - start_time);
s->dirty_bytes_rate = s->dirty_pages_rate * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
start_time = end_time;
num_dirty_pages_period = 0;
s->dirty_sync_count = bitmap_sync_count;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RestoreColorMask() {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ContextGL()->ColorMask(color_mask_[0], color_mask_[1], color_mask_[2],
color_mask_[3]);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l_read_publickey (lua_State *L) {
FILE *fd;
char c;
const char* publickeyfile = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
luaL_Buffer publickey_data;
fd = fopen(publickeyfile, "r");
if (!fd)
return luaL_error(L, "Error reading file");
luaL_buffinit(L, &publickey_data);
while (fread(&c, 1, 1, fd) && c!= '\r' && c != '\n' && c != ' ') {
continue;
}
while (fread(&c, 1, 1, fd) && c!= '\r' && c != '\n' && c != ' ') {
luaL_addchar(&publickey_data, c);
}
fclose(fd);
lua_getglobal(L, "require");
lua_pushstring(L, "base64");
lua_call(L, 1, 1);
lua_getfield(L, -1, "dec");
luaL_pushresult(&publickey_data);
lua_call(L, 1, 1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 93,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct perf_event_map *ultra3_event_map(int event_id)
{
return &ultra3_perfmon_event_map[event_id];
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mode_list(struct cpio *cpio)
{
struct archive *a;
struct archive_entry *entry;
int r;
a = archive_read_new();
if (a == NULL)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "Couldn't allocate archive object");
archive_read_support_filter_all(a);
archive_read_support_format_all(a);
if (cpio->passphrase != NULL)
r = archive_read_add_passphrase(a, cpio->passphrase);
else
r = archive_read_set_passphrase_callback(a, cpio,
&passphrase_callback);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "%s", archive_error_string(a));
if (archive_read_open_filename(a, cpio->filename,
cpio->bytes_per_block))
lafe_errc(1, archive_errno(a),
"%s", archive_error_string(a));
for (;;) {
r = archive_read_next_header(a, &entry);
if (r == ARCHIVE_EOF)
break;
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
lafe_errc(1, archive_errno(a),
"%s", archive_error_string(a));
}
if (archive_match_path_excluded(cpio->matching, entry))
continue;
if (cpio->verbose)
list_item_verbose(cpio, entry);
else
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", archive_entry_pathname(entry));
}
r = archive_read_close(a);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
lafe_errc(1, 0, "%s", archive_error_string(a));
if (!cpio->quiet) {
int64_t blocks = (archive_filter_bytes(a, 0) + 511)
/ 512;
fprintf(stderr, "%lu %s\n", (unsigned long)blocks,
blocks == 1 ? "block" : "blocks");
}
archive_read_free(a);
exit(0);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_id_hasher (void const *entry, size_t table_size)
{
file_id const *e = entry;
size_t i = e->ino + e->dev;
return i % table_size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 5,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void registerURL(const char* url, const char* file, const char* mimeType)
{
registerMockedURLLoad(KURL(m_baseUrl, url), WebString::fromUTF8(file), m_folder, WebString::fromUTF8(mimeType));
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull(void) {cJSON *item=cJSON_New_Item();if(item)item->type=cJSON_NULL;return item;}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pp::Rect PDFiumEngine::GetScreenRect(const pp::Rect& rect) const {
pp::Rect rv;
int right =
static_cast<int>(ceil(rect.right() * current_zoom_ - position_.x()));
int bottom =
static_cast<int>(ceil(rect.bottom() * current_zoom_ - position_.y()));
rv.set_x(static_cast<int>(rect.x() * current_zoom_ - position_.x()));
rv.set_y(static_cast<int>(rect.y() * current_zoom_ - position_.y()));
rv.set_width(right - rv.x());
rv.set_height(bottom - rv.y());
return rv;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragIPv4TooLargeTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* Create a fragment that would extend past the max allowable size
* for an IPv4 packet. */
p = BuildTestPacket(1, 8183, 0, 'A', 71);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (!ENGINE_ISSET_EVENT(p, IPV4_FRAG_PKT_TOO_LARGE))
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should have
* been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 1 | 168,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_counters(const struct ebt_counter *oldcounters,
struct ebt_counter *counters, unsigned int nentries)
{
int i, cpu;
struct ebt_counter *counter_base;
/* counters of cpu 0 */
memcpy(counters, oldcounters,
sizeof(struct ebt_counter) * nentries);
/* add other counters to those of cpu 0 */
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
if (cpu == 0)
continue;
counter_base = COUNTER_BASE(oldcounters, nentries, cpu);
for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++) {
counters[i].pcnt += counter_base[i].pcnt;
counters[i].bcnt += counter_base[i].bcnt;
}
}
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 84,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int in_set_parameters(struct audio_stream *stream, const char *kvpairs)
{
UNUSED(stream);
UNUSED(kvpairs);
FNLOG();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: URLPatternSet PermissionsData::GetEffectiveHostPermissions() const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
URLPatternSet effective_hosts =
active_permissions_unsafe_->effective_hosts().Clone();
for (const auto& val : tab_specific_permissions_)
effective_hosts.AddPatterns(val.second->effective_hosts());
return effective_hosts;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 153,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AccessType GetExtensionAccess(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& url,
int tab_id) {
bool allowed_script = IsAllowedScript(extension, url, tab_id);
bool allowed_capture = extension->permissions_data()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
url, tab_id, nullptr);
if (allowed_script && allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_AND_CAPTURE;
if (allowed_script)
return ALLOWED_SCRIPT_ONLY;
if (allowed_capture)
return ALLOWED_CAPTURE_ONLY;
return DISALLOWED;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void H264DPB::GetLongTermRefPicsAppending(H264Picture::PtrVector& out) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < pics_.size(); ++i) {
H264Picture* pic = pics_[i];
if (pic->ref && pic->long_term)
out.push_back(pic);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool cookie_check_timestamp(struct tcp_options_received *tcp_opt, bool *ecn_ok)
{
/* echoed timestamp, lowest bits contain options */
u32 options = tcp_opt->rcv_tsecr & TSMASK;
if (!tcp_opt->saw_tstamp) {
tcp_clear_options(tcp_opt);
return true;
}
if (!sysctl_tcp_timestamps)
return false;
tcp_opt->sack_ok = (options >> 4) & 0x1;
*ecn_ok = (options >> 5) & 1;
if (*ecn_ok && !sysctl_tcp_ecn)
return false;
if (tcp_opt->sack_ok && !sysctl_tcp_sack)
return false;
if ((options & 0xf) == 0xf)
return true; /* no window scaling */
tcp_opt->wscale_ok = 1;
tcp_opt->snd_wscale = options & 0xf;
return sysctl_tcp_window_scaling != 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib3fv(GLuint index,
const volatile GLfloat* v) {
GLfloat t[4] = { v[0], v[1], v[2], 1.0f, };
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttrib3fv", index, t)) {
state_.SetGenericVertexAttribBaseType(
index, SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT);
api()->glVertexAttrib3fvFn(index, t);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_proc_setclientid(struct nfs_client *clp, u32 program,
unsigned short port, struct rpc_cred *cred,
struct nfs4_setclientid_res *res)
{
nfs4_verifier sc_verifier;
struct nfs4_setclientid setclientid = {
.sc_verifier = &sc_verifier,
.sc_prog = program,
.sc_clnt = clp,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETCLIENTID],
.rpc_argp = &setclientid,
.rpc_resp = res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = clp->cl_rpcclient,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_setclientid_ops,
.callback_data = &setclientid,
.flags = RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT,
};
int status;
/* nfs_client_id4 */
nfs4_init_boot_verifier(clp, &sc_verifier);
if (test_bit(NFS_CS_MIGRATION, &clp->cl_flags))
status = nfs4_init_uniform_client_string(clp);
else
status = nfs4_init_nonuniform_client_string(clp);
if (status)
goto out;
/* cb_client4 */
setclientid.sc_netid_len =
nfs4_init_callback_netid(clp,
setclientid.sc_netid,
sizeof(setclientid.sc_netid));
setclientid.sc_uaddr_len = scnprintf(setclientid.sc_uaddr,
sizeof(setclientid.sc_uaddr), "%s.%u.%u",
clp->cl_ipaddr, port >> 8, port & 255);
dprintk("NFS call setclientid auth=%s, '%s'\n",
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_auth->au_ops->au_name,
clp->cl_owner_id);
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
status = PTR_ERR(task);
goto out;
}
status = task->tk_status;
if (setclientid.sc_cred) {
clp->cl_acceptor = rpcauth_stringify_acceptor(setclientid.sc_cred);
put_rpccred(setclientid.sc_cred);
}
rpc_put_task(task);
out:
trace_nfs4_setclientid(clp, status);
dprintk("NFS reply setclientid: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void conditionalMethod1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueString(info, imp->conditionalMethod1(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FlagsState::reset() {
needs_restart_ = false;
flags_switches_.clear();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_zip_free_entry(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
zip_read_rsrc *zr_rsrc = (zip_read_rsrc *) rsrc->ptr;
if (zr_rsrc) {
if (zr_rsrc->zf) {
if (zr_rsrc->zf->za) {
zip_fclose(zr_rsrc->zf);
} else {
if (zr_rsrc->zf->src)
zip_source_free(zr_rsrc->zf->src);
free(zr_rsrc->zf);
}
zr_rsrc->zf = NULL;
}
efree(zr_rsrc);
rsrc->ptr = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_init_locked(struct inode *inode, void *opaque)
{
struct nfs_find_desc *desc = (struct nfs_find_desc *)opaque;
struct nfs_fattr *fattr = desc->fattr;
set_nfs_fileid(inode, fattr->fileid);
nfs_copy_fh(NFS_FH(inode), desc->fh);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_io_fileno(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value io)
{
struct mrb_io *fptr;
fptr = (struct mrb_io *)mrb_get_datatype(mrb, io, &mrb_io_type);
return mrb_fixnum_value(fptr->fd);
}
Commit Message: Fix `use after free in File#initilialize_copy`; fix #4001
The bug and the fix were reported by https://hackerone.com/pnoltof
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 83,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
a.perm & 07777 : 0777;
debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
r = mkdir(name, mode);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __f2fs_commit_super(struct buffer_head *bh,
struct f2fs_super_block *super)
{
lock_buffer(bh);
if (super)
memcpy(bh->b_data + F2FS_SUPER_OFFSET, super, sizeof(*super));
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
set_buffer_dirty(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
/* it's rare case, we can do fua all the time */
return __sync_dirty_buffer(bh, REQ_SYNC | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_FUA);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | 0 | 63,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mountstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mountstats_op);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *M_fs_path_join(const char *p1, const char *p2, M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
M_buf_t *buf;
char sep;
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* If p2 is an absolute path we can't properly join it to another path... */
if (M_fs_path_isabs(p2, sys_type))
return M_strdup(p2);
buf = M_buf_create();
sep = M_fs_path_get_system_sep(sys_type);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p1);
/* Only put a sep if we have two parts and we really need the sep (p1 doesn't end with a sep). */
if (p1 != NULL && *p1 != '\0' && p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0' && p1[M_str_len(p1)-1] != sep)
M_buf_add_byte(buf, (unsigned char)sep);
/* Don't add nothing if we have nothing. */
if (p2 != NULL && *p2 != '\0')
M_buf_add_str(buf, p2);
return M_buf_finish_str(buf, NULL);
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 79,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_file_request(struct httpd *env, struct client *clt, char *path,
struct stat *st)
{
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct media_type *media;
const char *errstr = NULL;
int fd = -1, ret, code = 500;
if ((ret = server_file_method(clt)) != 0) {
code = ret;
goto abort;
}
if ((ret = server_file_modified_since(clt->clt_descreq, st)) != -1)
return (ret);
/* Now open the file, should be readable or we have another problem */
if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
goto abort;
media = media_find_config(env, srv_conf, path);
ret = server_response_http(clt, 200, media, st->st_size,
MINIMUM(time(NULL), st->st_mtim.tv_sec));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
goto fail;
case 0:
/* Connection is already finished */
close(fd);
goto done;
default:
break;
}
clt->clt_fd = fd;
if (clt->clt_srvbev != NULL)
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_srvbev);
clt->clt_srvbev_throttled = 0;
clt->clt_srvbev = bufferevent_new(clt->clt_fd, server_read,
server_write, server_file_error, clt);
if (clt->clt_srvbev == NULL) {
errstr = "failed to allocate file buffer event";
goto fail;
}
/* Adjust read watermark to the socket output buffer size */
bufferevent_setwatermark(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ, 0,
clt->clt_sndbufsiz);
bufferevent_settimeout(clt->clt_srvbev,
srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec, srv_conf->timeout.tv_sec);
bufferevent_enable(clt->clt_srvbev, EV_READ);
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ);
done:
server_reset_http(clt);
return (0);
fail:
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_bev);
clt->clt_bev = NULL;
abort:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
if (errstr == NULL)
errstr = strerror(errno);
server_abort_http(clt, code, errstr);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 68,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ipv6_packet_init(void)
{
dev_add_pack(&ipv6_packet_type);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isInPageLinkTarget() const {
if (!m_node || !m_node->isElementNode())
return false;
Element* element = toElement(m_node);
if (element->containingShadowRoot())
return false;
if (isHTMLAnchorElement(element)) {
HTMLAnchorElement* htmlElement = toHTMLAnchorElement(element);
return htmlElement->hasName() || htmlElement->hasID();
}
if (element->hasID() && (isLandmarkRelated() || isHTMLDivElement(element)))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContentSecurityPolicy::ContentSecurityPolicy()
: execution_context_(nullptr),
override_inline_style_allowed_(false),
script_hash_algorithms_used_(kContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmNone),
style_hash_algorithms_used_(kContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmNone),
sandbox_mask_(0),
treat_as_public_address_(false),
require_safe_types_(false),
insecure_request_policy_(kLeaveInsecureRequestsAlone) {}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct fuse_req *get_reserved_req(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct file *file)
{
struct fuse_req *req = NULL;
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
do {
wait_event(fc->reserved_req_waitq, ff->reserved_req);
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
if (ff->reserved_req) {
req = ff->reserved_req;
ff->reserved_req = NULL;
get_file(file);
req->stolen_file = file;
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
} while (!req);
return req;
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
handle_t *handle;
loff_t new_size;
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
int retries = 0;
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int credits, blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
/* We only support the FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE mode */
if (mode & ~FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* currently supporting (pre)allocate mode for extent-based
* files _only_
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
trace_ext4_fallocate_enter(inode, offset, len, mode);
map.m_lblk = offset >> blkbits;
/*
* We can't just convert len to max_blocks because
* If blocksize = 4096 offset = 3072 and len = 2048
*/
max_blocks = (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(len + offset, blkbits) >> blkbits)
- map.m_lblk;
/*
* credits to insert 1 extent into extent tree
*/
credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, (len + offset));
if (ret) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks, ret);
return ret;
}
retry:
while (ret >= 0 && ret < max_blocks) {
map.m_lblk = map.m_lblk + ret;
map.m_len = max_blocks = max_blocks - ret;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
break;
}
ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, &map,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNINIT_EXT);
if (ret <= 0) {
#ifdef EXT4FS_DEBUG
WARN_ON(ret <= 0);
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ext4_ext_map_blocks "
"returned error inode#%lu, block=%u, "
"max_blocks=%u", __func__,
inode->i_ino, map.m_lblk, max_blocks);
#endif
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
break;
}
if ((map.m_lblk + ret) >= (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(offset + len,
blkbits) >> blkbits))
new_size = offset + len;
else
new_size = (map.m_lblk + ret) << blkbits;
ext4_falloc_update_inode(inode, mode, new_size,
(map.m_flags & EXT4_MAP_NEW));
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret2)
break;
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries)) {
ret = 0;
goto retry;
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks,
ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret);
return ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void check_request_for_cacheability(struct stream *s, struct channel *chn)
{
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
char *p1, *p2;
char *cur_ptr, *cur_end, *cur_next;
int pragma_found;
int cc_found;
int cur_idx;
if ((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE|TX_CACHE_IGNORE)) == TX_CACHE_IGNORE)
return; /* nothing more to do here */
cur_idx = 0;
pragma_found = cc_found = 0;
cur_next = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr;
int val;
cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx];
cur_ptr = cur_next;
cur_end = cur_ptr + cur_hdr->len;
cur_next = cur_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1;
/* We have one full header between cur_ptr and cur_end, and the
* next header starts at cur_next.
*/
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Pragma", 6);
if (val) {
if ((cur_end - (cur_ptr + val) >= 8) &&
strncasecmp(cur_ptr + val, "no-cache", 8) == 0) {
pragma_found = 1;
continue;
}
}
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Cache-control", 13);
if (!val)
continue;
p2 = p1;
while (p2 < cur_end && *p2 != '=' && *p2 != ',' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p2))
p2++;
/* we have a complete value between p1 and p2. We don't check the
* values after max-age, max-stale nor min-fresh, we simply don't
* use the cache when they're specified.
*/
if (((p2 - p1 == 7) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-age", 7) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-cache", 8) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-stale", 9) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "min-fresh", 9) == 0)) {
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
continue;
}
if ((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-store", 8) == 0) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
continue;
}
}
/* RFC7234#5.4:
* When the Cache-Control header field is also present and
* understood in a request, Pragma is ignored.
* When the Cache-Control header field is not present in a
* request, caches MUST consider the no-cache request
* pragma-directive as having the same effect as if
* "Cache-Control: no-cache" were present.
*/
if (!cc_found && pragma_found)
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 164,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TimeDelta IndexedDBTransaction::GetInactivityTimeout() const {
return base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(kInactivityTimeoutPeriodSeconds);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::LazyOpen(bool create_if_needed) {
if (db_)
return true;
if (is_disabled_)
return false;
bool use_in_memory_db = db_file_path_.empty();
if (!create_if_needed &&
(use_in_memory_db || !base::PathExists(db_file_path_))) {
return false;
}
db_.reset(new sql::Database);
meta_table_.reset(new sql::MetaTable);
db_->set_histogram_tag("AppCache");
bool opened = false;
if (use_in_memory_db) {
opened = db_->OpenInMemory();
} else if (!base::CreateDirectory(db_file_path_.DirName())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create appcache directory.";
} else {
opened = db_->Open(db_file_path_);
if (opened)
db_->Preload();
}
if (!opened || !db_->QuickIntegrityCheck() || !EnsureDatabaseVersion()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open the appcache database.";
AppCacheHistograms::CountInitResult(
AppCacheHistograms::SQL_DATABASE_ERROR);
if (!use_in_memory_db && DeleteExistingAndCreateNewDatabase())
return true;
Disable();
return false;
}
AppCacheHistograms::CountInitResult(AppCacheHistograms::INIT_OK);
was_corruption_detected_ = false;
db_->set_error_callback(base::BindRepeating(
&AppCacheDatabase::OnDatabaseError, base::Unretained(this)));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IW_INLINE void put_raw_sample_8(struct iw_context *ctx, double s,
int x, int y, int channel)
{
iw_byte tmpui8;
tmpui8 = (iw_byte)(0.5+s);
ctx->img2.pixels[y*ctx->img2.bpr + ctx->img2_numchannels*x + channel] = tmpui8;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int padlock_sha256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
u8 buf[4];
return padlock_sha256_finup(desc, buf, 0, out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaTask::DeleteSoon() {
MessageLoop::current()->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, this);
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SpdyProxyClientSocket::IsUsingSpdy() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLHeadElement* Document::head() const
{
Node* de = documentElement();
if (!de)
return 0;
return Traversal<HTMLHeadElement>::firstChild(*de);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jas_icctxt_destroy(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval)
{
jas_icctxt_t *txt = &attrval->data.txt;
if (txt->string) {
jas_free(txt->string);
txt->string = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CallCompositorWithSuccess(mojom::PdfCompositorPtr ptr) {
auto handle = CreateMSKPInSharedMemory();
ASSERT_TRUE(handle.IsValid());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle buffer_handle =
mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle(handle, handle.GetSize(), true);
ASSERT_TRUE(buffer_handle->is_valid());
EXPECT_CALL(*this, CallbackOnSuccess(testing::_)).Times(1);
ptr->CompositePdf(std::move(buffer_handle),
base::BindOnce(&PdfCompositorServiceTest::OnCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
run_loop_->Run();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_fin(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
/* Move to CLOSE_WAIT */
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE_WAIT);
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.pingpong = 1;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
case TCP_CLOSING:
/* Received a retransmission of the FIN, do
* nothing.
*/
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
/* RFC793: Remain in the LAST-ACK state. */
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
/* This case occurs when a simultaneous close
* happens, we must ack the received FIN and
* enter the CLOSING state.
*/
tcp_send_ack(sk);
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSING);
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
/* Received a FIN -- send ACK and enter TIME_WAIT. */
tcp_send_ack(sk);
tcp_time_wait(sk, TCP_TIME_WAIT, 0);
break;
default:
/* Only TCP_LISTEN and TCP_CLOSE are left, in these
* cases we should never reach this piece of code.
*/
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Impossible, sk->sk_state=%d\n",
__func__, sk->sk_state);
break;
}
/* It _is_ possible, that we have something out-of-order _after_ FIN.
* Probably, we should reset in this case. For now drop them.
*/
__skb_queue_purge(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
if (tcp_is_sack(tp))
tcp_sack_reset(&tp->rx_opt);
sk_mem_reclaim(sk);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
/* Do not send POLL_HUP for half duplex close. */
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSE)
sk_wake_async(sk, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_HUP);
else
sk_wake_async(sk, SOCK_WAKE_WAITD, POLL_IN);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::HidePopup() {
if (autofill_agent_)
autofill_agent_->GetAutofillDriver()->HidePopup();
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 137,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *bastard, unsigned seq)
{
struct mount *mnt;
if (read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq))
return 1;
if (bastard == NULL)
return 0;
mnt = real_mount(bastard);
mnt_add_count(mnt, 1);
if (likely(!read_seqretry(&mount_lock, seq)))
return 0;
if (bastard->mnt_flags & MNT_SYNC_UMOUNT) {
mnt_add_count(mnt, -1);
return 1;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_set_closestateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd4_close *close)
{
put_stateid(cstate, &close->cl_stateid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void blk_mq_delay_work_fn(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx;
hctx = container_of(work, struct blk_mq_hw_ctx, delay_work.work);
if (test_and_clear_bit(BLK_MQ_S_STOPPED, &hctx->state))
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 86,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Frame* LocalFrameClientImpl::FirstChild() const {
return ToCoreFrame(web_frame_->FirstChild());
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadOneJNGImage(MngInfo *mng_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info, ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*alpha_image,
*color_image,
*image,
*jng_image;
ImageInfo
*alpha_image_info,
*color_image_info;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
int
unique_filenames;
ssize_t
y;
MagickBooleanType
status;
png_uint_32
jng_height,
jng_width;
png_byte
jng_color_type,
jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method,
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth,
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method;
register const PixelPacket
*s;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
unsigned int
read_JSEP,
reading_idat;
size_t
length;
jng_alpha_compression_method=0;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=8;
jng_color_type=0;
jng_height=0;
jng_width=0;
alpha_image=(Image *) NULL;
color_image=(Image *) NULL;
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *) NULL;
unique_filenames=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneJNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" AcquireNextImage()");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
/*
Signature bytes have already been read.
*/
read_JSEP=MagickFalse;
reading_idat=MagickFalse;
for (;;)
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
unsigned char
*chunk;
unsigned int
count;
/*
Read a new JNG chunk.
*/
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(unsigned int) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading JNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX || count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 16)
{
jng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
jng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if ((jng_width == 0) || (jng_height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"NegativeOrZeroImageSize");
jng_color_type=p[8];
jng_image_sample_depth=p[9];
jng_image_compression_method=p[10];
jng_image_interlace_method=p[11];
image->interlace=jng_image_interlace_method != 0 ? PNGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
jng_alpha_sample_depth=p[12];
jng_alpha_compression_method=p[13];
jng_alpha_filter_method=p[14];
jng_alpha_interlace_method=p[15];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_width: %16lu, jng_height: %16lu\n"
" jng_color_type: %16d, jng_image_sample_depth: %3d\n"
" jng_image_compression_method:%3d",
(unsigned long) jng_width, (unsigned long) jng_height,
jng_color_type, jng_image_sample_depth,
jng_image_compression_method);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_image_interlace_method: %3d"
" jng_alpha_sample_depth: %3d",
jng_image_interlace_method,
jng_alpha_sample_depth);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" jng_alpha_compression_method:%3d\n"
" jng_alpha_filter_method: %3d\n"
" jng_alpha_interlace_method: %3d",
jng_alpha_compression_method,
jng_alpha_filter_method,
jng_alpha_interlace_method);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((reading_idat == MagickFalse) && (read_JSEP == MagickFalse) &&
((memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0) ||
(memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0)))
{
/*
o create color_image
o open color_blob, attached to color_image
o if (color type has alpha)
open alpha_blob, attached to alpha_image
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating color_blob.");
color_image_info=(ImageInfo *)AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetImageInfo(color_image_info);
color_image=AcquireImage(color_image_info);
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(color_image_info,color_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((image_info->ping == MagickFalse) && (jng_color_type >= 12))
{
alpha_image_info=(ImageInfo *)
AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (alpha_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
GetImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
alpha_image=AcquireImage(alpha_image_info);
if (alpha_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Creating alpha_blob.");
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames++;
status=OpenBlob(alpha_image_info,alpha_image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
unsigned char
data[18];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing IHDR chunk to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,8,(const unsigned char *)
"\211PNG\r\n\032\n");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,13L);
PNGType(data,mng_IHDR);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IHDR,13L);
PNGLong(data+4,jng_width);
PNGLong(data+8,jng_height);
data[12]=jng_alpha_sample_depth;
data[13]=0; /* color_type gray */
data[14]=0; /* compression method 0 */
data[15]=0; /* filter_method 0 */
data[16]=0; /* interlace_method 0 */
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,17,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,17));
}
}
reading_idat=MagickTrue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JDAT,4) == 0)
{
/* Copy chunk to color_image->blob */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAT chunk data to color_blob.");
if (length != 0)
{
(void) WriteBlob(color_image,length,chunk);
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
}
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IDAT,4) == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
/* Copy IDAT header and chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying IDAT chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,(size_t) length);
PNGType(data,mng_IDAT);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IDAT,length);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,
crc32(crc32(0,data,4),chunk,(uInt) length));
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_JDAA,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_JdAA,4) == 0))
{
/* Copy chunk data to alpha_image->blob */
if (alpha_image != NULL && image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying JDAA chunk data to alpha_blob.");
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,length,chunk);
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_JSEP,4) == 0)
{
read_JSEP=MagickTrue;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 2)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=image->background_color.red;
image->background_color.blue=image->background_color.red;
}
if (length == 6)
{
image->background_color.red=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[1]);
image->background_color.green=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[3]);
image->background_color.blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(p[5]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
image->gamma=((float) mng_get_long(p))*0.00001;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 32)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[12]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[16]);
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[20]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[24]);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[28]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 1)
{
image->rendering_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
image->gamma=1.000f/2.200f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=0.6400f;
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=0.3300f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=0.3000f;
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=0.6000f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=0.1500f;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=0.0600f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=0.3127f;
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=0.3290f;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_oFFs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(p);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] != 0)
{
image->page.x/=10000;
image->page.y/=10000;
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
image->x_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(p);
image->y_resolution=(double) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
if ((int) p[8] == PNG_RESOLUTION_METER)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->x_resolution=image->x_resolution/100.0f;
image->y_resolution=image->y_resolution/100.0f;
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if 0
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#endif
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4))
continue;
break;
}
/* IEND found */
/*
Finish up reading image data:
o read main image from color_blob.
o close color_blob.
o if (color_type has alpha)
if alpha_encoding is PNG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadPNG
if alpha_encoding is JPEG
read secondary image from alpha_blob via ReadJPEG
o close alpha_blob.
o copy intensity of secondary image into
opacity samples of main image.
o destroy the secondary image.
*/
if (color_image_info == (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
assert(color_image == (Image *) NULL);
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (color_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
assert(alpha_image == (Image *) NULL);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) SeekBlob(color_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading jng_image from color_blob.");
assert(color_image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(color_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",
color_image->filename);
color_image_info->ping=MagickFalse; /* To do: avoid this */
jng_image=ReadImage(color_image_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(color_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
color_image=DestroyImage(color_image);
color_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(color_image_info);
if (jng_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Copying jng_image pixels to main image.");
image->columns=jng_width;
image->rows=jng_height;
length=image->columns*sizeof(PixelPacket);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,s,length);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
{
if (jng_color_type >= 12)
{
if (jng_alpha_compression_method == 0)
{
png_byte
data[5];
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,0x00000000L);
PNGType(data,mng_IEND);
LogPNGChunk(logging,mng_IEND,0L);
(void) WriteBlob(alpha_image,4,data);
(void) WriteBlobMSBULong(alpha_image,crc32(0,data,4));
}
(void) SeekBlob(alpha_image,0,SEEK_SET);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading opacity from alpha_blob.");
(void) FormatLocaleString(alpha_image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"%s",alpha_image->filename);
jng_image=ReadImage(alpha_image_info,exception);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
s=GetVirtualPixels(jng_image,0,y,image->columns,1,
&image->exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
SetPixelOpacity(q,QuantumRange-
GetPixelRed(s));
else
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns; x != 0; x--,q++,s++)
{
SetPixelAlpha(q,GetPixelRed(s));
if (GetPixelOpacity(q) != OpaqueOpacity)
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(alpha_image->filename);
unique_filenames--;
alpha_image=DestroyImage(alpha_image);
alpha_image_info=DestroyImageInfo(alpha_image_info);
if (jng_image != (Image *) NULL)
jng_image=DestroyImage(jng_image);
}
}
/* Read the JNG image. */
if (mng_info->mng_type == 0)
{
mng_info->mng_width=jng_width;
mng_info->mng_height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.width == 0 && image->page.height == 0)
{
image->page.width=jng_width;
image->page.height=jng_height;
}
if (image->page.x == 0 && image->page.y == 0)
{
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[mng_info->object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
else
{
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[mng_info->object_id];
}
mng_info->image_found++;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,2*TellBlob(image),
2*GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage(); unique_filenames=%d",unique_filenames);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/549
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 1 | 167,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_siocgstampns(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timespec kts;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&kts);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timespec(up, &kts);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static boolean parse_declaration( struct translate_ctx *ctx )
{
struct tgsi_full_declaration decl;
uint file;
struct parsed_dcl_bracket brackets[2];
int num_brackets;
uint writemask;
const char *cur, *cur2;
uint advance;
boolean is_vs_input;
if (!eat_white( &ctx->cur )) {
report_error( ctx, "Syntax error" );
return FALSE;
}
if (!parse_register_dcl( ctx, &file, brackets, &num_brackets))
return FALSE;
if (!parse_opt_writemask( ctx, &writemask ))
return FALSE;
decl = tgsi_default_full_declaration();
decl.Declaration.File = file;
decl.Declaration.UsageMask = writemask;
if (num_brackets == 1) {
decl.Range.First = brackets[0].first;
decl.Range.Last = brackets[0].last;
} else {
decl.Range.First = brackets[1].first;
decl.Range.Last = brackets[1].last;
decl.Declaration.Dimension = 1;
decl.Dim.Index2D = brackets[0].first;
}
is_vs_input = (file == TGSI_FILE_INPUT &&
ctx->processor == TGSI_PROCESSOR_VERTEX);
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',') {
cur2 = cur;
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur2, "ARRAY" )) {
int arrayid;
if (*cur2 != '(') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `('" );
return FALSE;
}
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (!parse_int( &cur2, &arrayid )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `,'" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 != ')') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `)'" );
return FALSE;
}
cur2++;
decl.Declaration.Array = 1;
decl.Array.ArrayID = arrayid;
ctx->cur = cur = cur2;
}
}
if (*cur == ',' && !is_vs_input) {
uint i, j;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (file == TGSI_FILE_RESOURCE) {
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_texture_names[i])) {
decl.Resource.Resource = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT) {
report_error(ctx, "Expected texture target");
return FALSE;
}
cur2 = cur;
eat_opt_white(&cur2);
while (*cur2 == ',') {
cur2++;
eat_opt_white(&cur2);
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur2, "RAW")) {
decl.Resource.Raw = 1;
} else if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur2, "WR")) {
decl.Resource.Writable = 1;
} else {
break;
}
cur = cur2;
eat_opt_white(&cur2);
}
ctx->cur = cur;
} else if (file == TGSI_FILE_SAMPLER_VIEW) {
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_texture_names[i])) {
decl.SamplerView.Resource = i;
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_TEXTURE_COUNT) {
report_error(ctx, "Expected texture target");
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur != ',') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `,'" );
return FALSE;
}
++cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (j = 0; j < 4; ++j) {
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_RETURN_TYPE_COUNT; ++i) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_return_type_names[i])) {
switch (j) {
case 0:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeX = i;
break;
case 1:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeY = i;
break;
case 2:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeZ = i;
break;
case 3:
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeW = i;
break;
default:
assert(0);
}
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_RETURN_TYPE_COUNT) {
if (j == 0 || j > 2) {
report_error(ctx, "Expected type name");
return FALSE;
}
break;
} else {
cur2 = cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 == ',') {
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
cur = cur2;
continue;
} else
break;
}
}
if (j < 4) {
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeY =
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeZ =
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeW =
decl.SamplerView.ReturnTypeX;
}
ctx->cur = cur;
} else {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, "LOCAL")) {
decl.Declaration.Local = 1;
ctx->cur = cur;
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',') {
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_SEMANTIC_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole(&cur, tgsi_semantic_names[i])) {
uint index;
cur2 = cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 == '[') {
cur2++;
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (!parse_uint( &cur2, &index )) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected literal integer" );
return FALSE;
}
eat_opt_white( &cur2 );
if (*cur2 != ']') {
report_error( ctx, "Expected `]'" );
return FALSE;
}
cur2++;
decl.Semantic.Index = index;
cur = cur2;
}
decl.Declaration.Semantic = 1;
decl.Semantic.Name = i;
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',' && !is_vs_input) {
uint i;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_INTERPOLATE_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_interpolate_names[i] )) {
decl.Declaration.Interpolate = 1;
decl.Interp.Interpolate = i;
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
if (i == TGSI_INTERPOLATE_COUNT) {
report_error( ctx, "Expected semantic or interpolate attribute" );
return FALSE;
}
}
cur = ctx->cur;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
if (*cur == ',' && !is_vs_input) {
uint i;
cur++;
eat_opt_white( &cur );
for (i = 0; i < TGSI_INTERPOLATE_LOC_COUNT; i++) {
if (str_match_nocase_whole( &cur, tgsi_interpolate_locations[i] )) {
decl.Interp.Location = i;
ctx->cur = cur;
break;
}
}
}
advance = tgsi_build_full_declaration(
&decl,
ctx->tokens_cur,
ctx->header,
(uint) (ctx->tokens_end - ctx->tokens_cur) );
if (advance == 0)
return FALSE;
ctx->tokens_cur += advance;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JNI_ChromeFeatureList_GetFieldTrialParamByFeature(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& jfeature_name,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& jparam_name) {
const base::Feature* feature =
FindFeatureExposedToJava(ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jfeature_name));
const std::string& param_name = ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jparam_name);
const std::string& param_value =
base::GetFieldTrialParamValueByFeature(*feature, param_name);
return ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, param_value);
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 137,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct segmented_address addr,
void *data,
unsigned int size)
{
int rc;
ulong linear;
rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <zhangxiaohan1@huawei.com>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScreenLayoutObserver::ScreenLayoutObserver() {
ShellPort::Get()->AddDisplayObserver(this);
UpdateDisplayInfo(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Avoid Showing rotation change notification when source is accelerometer
BUG=717252
TEST=Manually rotate device with accelerometer and observe there's no notification
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2853113005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469058}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 129,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGElement::ClearAnimatedAttribute(const QualifiedName& attribute) {
ForSelfAndInstances(this, [&attribute](SVGElement* element) {
if (SVGAnimatedPropertyBase* animated_property =
element->PropertyFromAttribute(attribute))
animated_property->AnimationEnded();
});
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct domain_device *sas_ex_discover_expander(
struct domain_device *parent, int phy_id)
{
struct sas_expander_device *parent_ex = rphy_to_expander_device(parent->rphy);
struct ex_phy *phy = &parent->ex_dev.ex_phy[phy_id];
struct domain_device *child = NULL;
struct sas_rphy *rphy;
struct sas_expander_device *edev;
struct asd_sas_port *port;
int res;
if (phy->routing_attr == DIRECT_ROUTING) {
SAS_DPRINTK("ex %016llx:0x%x:D <--> ex %016llx:0x%x is not "
"allowed\n",
SAS_ADDR(parent->sas_addr), phy_id,
SAS_ADDR(phy->attached_sas_addr),
phy->attached_phy_id);
return NULL;
}
child = sas_alloc_device();
if (!child)
return NULL;
phy->port = sas_port_alloc(&parent->rphy->dev, phy_id);
/* FIXME: better error handling */
BUG_ON(sas_port_add(phy->port) != 0);
switch (phy->attached_dev_type) {
case SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE:
rphy = sas_expander_alloc(phy->port,
SAS_EDGE_EXPANDER_DEVICE);
break;
case SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE:
rphy = sas_expander_alloc(phy->port,
SAS_FANOUT_EXPANDER_DEVICE);
break;
default:
rphy = NULL; /* shut gcc up */
BUG();
}
port = parent->port;
child->rphy = rphy;
get_device(&rphy->dev);
edev = rphy_to_expander_device(rphy);
child->dev_type = phy->attached_dev_type;
kref_get(&parent->kref);
child->parent = parent;
child->port = port;
child->iproto = phy->attached_iproto;
child->tproto = phy->attached_tproto;
memcpy(child->sas_addr, phy->attached_sas_addr, SAS_ADDR_SIZE);
sas_hash_addr(child->hashed_sas_addr, child->sas_addr);
sas_ex_get_linkrate(parent, child, phy);
edev->level = parent_ex->level + 1;
parent->port->disc.max_level = max(parent->port->disc.max_level,
edev->level);
sas_init_dev(child);
sas_fill_in_rphy(child, rphy);
sas_rphy_add(rphy);
spin_lock_irq(&parent->port->dev_list_lock);
list_add_tail(&child->dev_list_node, &parent->port->dev_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&parent->port->dev_list_lock);
res = sas_discover_expander(child);
if (res) {
sas_rphy_delete(rphy);
spin_lock_irq(&parent->port->dev_list_lock);
list_del(&child->dev_list_node);
spin_unlock_irq(&parent->port->dev_list_lock);
sas_put_device(child);
return NULL;
}
list_add_tail(&child->siblings, &parent->ex_dev.children);
return child;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: chenqilin <chenqilin2@huawei.com>
CC: chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_full_page_plugin() const { return is_full_page_plugin_; }
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateSecurityOrigin(RefPtr<SecurityOrigin> origin) {
SetSecurityOrigin(std::move(origin));
DidUpdateSecurityOrigin();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::BoundFramebufferHasDepthAttachment() {
Framebuffer* framebuffer = GetBoundDrawFramebuffer();
if (framebuffer) {
return framebuffer->HasDepthAttachment();
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_depth_format_ != 0;
}
return back_buffer_has_depth_;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::SigninAndShowSyncConfirmationUI() {
signin_manager_->OnExternalSigninCompleted(account_info_.email);
signin_metrics::LogSigninAccessPointCompleted(signin_access_point_,
signin_promo_action_);
signin_metrics::LogSigninReason(signin_reason_);
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Signin_Signin_Succeed"));
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* sync_service = GetProfileSyncService();
if (sync_service) {
sync_blocker_ = sync_service->GetSetupInProgressHandle();
bool is_enterprise_user =
!policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::IsNonEnterpriseUser(
account_info_.email);
if (is_enterprise_user &&
SyncStartupTracker::GetSyncServiceState(profile_) ==
SyncStartupTracker::SYNC_STARTUP_PENDING) {
sync_startup_tracker_.reset(new SyncStartupTracker(profile_, this));
return;
}
}
ShowSyncConfirmationUI();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static QUEUE* uv__process_queue(uv_loop_t* loop, int pid) {
assert(pid > 0);
return loop->process_handles + pid % ARRAY_SIZE(loop->process_handles);
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
if (psig == NULL)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0)
{
idx <<= 1;
if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
return 0;
psig += idx;
if (rhash)
*rhash = psig[0];
if (rsig)
*rsig = psig[1];
tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
}
return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xmlrpc_generic_error(int code, const char *string)
{
char buf[1024];
const char *ss;
mowgli_string_t *s = mowgli_string_create();
char *s2;
int len;
if (xmlrpc.encode)
{
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"%s\" ?>\r\n<methodResponse>\r\n", xmlrpc.encode);
}
else
{
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\r\n<methodResponse>\r\n");
}
s->append(s, buf, strlen(buf));
ss = " <fault>\r\n <value>\r\n <struct>\r\n <member>\r\n <name>faultCode</name>\r\n <value><int>";
s->append(s, ss, strlen(ss));
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d", code);
s->append(s, buf, strlen(buf));
ss = "</int></value>\r\n </member>\r\n <member>\r\n <name>faultString</name>\r\n <value><string>";
s->append(s, ss, strlen(ss));
xmlrpc_append_char_encode(s, string);
ss = "</string></value>\r\n </member>\r\n </struct>\r\n </value>\r\n </fault>\r\n</methodResponse>",
s->append(s, ss, strlen(ss));
len = s->pos;
if (xmlrpc.httpheader)
{
char *header = xmlrpc_write_header(len);
s2 = smalloc(strlen(header) + len + 1);
strcpy(s2, header);
memcpy(s2 + strlen(header), s->str, len);
xmlrpc.setbuffer(s2, len + strlen(header));
free(header);
free(s2);
}
else
xmlrpc.setbuffer(s->str, len);
s->destroy(s);
}
Commit Message: Do not copy more bytes than were allocated
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void correct_endian_cmd_submit(struct usbip_header_cmd_submit *pdu,
int send)
{
if (send) {
pdu->transfer_flags = cpu_to_be32(pdu->transfer_flags);
cpu_to_be32s(&pdu->transfer_buffer_length);
cpu_to_be32s(&pdu->start_frame);
cpu_to_be32s(&pdu->number_of_packets);
cpu_to_be32s(&pdu->interval);
} else {
pdu->transfer_flags = be32_to_cpu(pdu->transfer_flags);
be32_to_cpus(&pdu->transfer_buffer_length);
be32_to_cpus(&pdu->start_frame);
be32_to_cpus(&pdu->number_of_packets);
be32_to_cpus(&pdu->interval);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void hwsim_clear_sta_magic(struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
struct hwsim_sta_priv *sp = (void *)sta->drv_priv;
sp->magic = 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct hash_alg_common *ahash_attr_alg(struct rtattr *rta, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
alg = crypto_attr_alg2(rta, &crypto_ahash_type, type, mask);
return IS_ERR(alg) ? ERR_CAST(alg) : __crypto_hash_alg_common(alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
bool pumping_events = false;
if (msg->is_sync()) {
if (msg->is_caller_pumping_messages()) {
pumping_events = true;
}
}
bool suspend_webkit_shared_timer = true; // default value
std::swap(suspend_webkit_shared_timer, suspend_webkit_shared_timer_);
bool notify_webkit_of_modal_loop = true; // default value
std::swap(notify_webkit_of_modal_loop, notify_webkit_of_modal_loop_);
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
int render_view_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
#endif
if (pumping_events) {
if (suspend_webkit_shared_timer)
webkit_platform_support_->SuspendSharedTimer();
if (notify_webkit_of_modal_loop)
WebView::willEnterModalLoop();
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
RenderViewImpl* render_view =
RenderViewImpl::FromRoutingID(msg->routing_id());
if (render_view) {
render_view_id = msg->routing_id();
PluginChannelHost::Broadcast(
new PluginMsg_SignalModalDialogEvent(render_view_id));
}
#endif
}
bool rv = ChildThread::Send(msg);
if (pumping_events) {
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
if (render_view_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
PluginChannelHost::Broadcast(
new PluginMsg_ResetModalDialogEvent(render_view_id));
}
#endif
if (notify_webkit_of_modal_loop)
WebView::didExitModalLoop();
if (suspend_webkit_shared_timer)
webkit_platform_support_->ResumeSharedTimer();
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<network::ResourceRequest> CreateResourceRequest(
NavigationRequestInfo* request_info,
int frame_tree_node_id,
bool allow_download) {
auto new_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
new_request->method = request_info->common_params.method;
new_request->url = request_info->common_params.url;
new_request->site_for_cookies = request_info->site_for_cookies;
net::RequestPriority net_priority = net::HIGHEST;
if (!request_info->is_main_frame &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kLowPriorityIframes)) {
net_priority = net::LOWEST;
}
new_request->priority = net_priority;
new_request->render_frame_id = frame_tree_node_id;
new_request->request_initiator = request_info->begin_params->initiator_origin;
new_request->referrer = request_info->common_params.referrer.url;
new_request->referrer_policy = Referrer::ReferrerPolicyForUrlRequest(
request_info->common_params.referrer.policy);
new_request->headers.AddHeadersFromString(
request_info->begin_params->headers);
std::string accept_value = network::kFrameAcceptHeader;
if (signed_exchange_utils::ShouldAdvertiseAcceptHeader(
url::Origin::Create(request_info->common_params.url))) {
DCHECK(!accept_value.empty());
accept_value.append(kAcceptHeaderSignedExchangeSuffix);
}
new_request->headers.SetHeader(network::kAcceptHeader, accept_value);
new_request->resource_type = request_info->is_main_frame
? RESOURCE_TYPE_MAIN_FRAME
: RESOURCE_TYPE_SUB_FRAME;
if (request_info->is_main_frame)
new_request->update_first_party_url_on_redirect = true;
int load_flags = request_info->begin_params->load_flags;
if (request_info->is_main_frame)
load_flags |= net::LOAD_MAIN_FRAME_DEPRECATED;
DCHECK(!(load_flags & net::LOAD_IGNORE_LIMITS));
new_request->load_flags = load_flags;
new_request->request_body = request_info->common_params.post_data.get();
new_request->report_raw_headers = request_info->report_raw_headers;
new_request->allow_download = allow_download;
new_request->enable_load_timing = true;
new_request->fetch_request_mode = network::mojom::FetchRequestMode::kNavigate;
new_request->fetch_credentials_mode =
network::mojom::FetchCredentialsMode::kInclude;
new_request->fetch_redirect_mode = network::mojom::FetchRedirectMode::kManual;
new_request->fetch_request_context_type =
static_cast<int>(request_info->begin_params->request_context_type);
new_request->upgrade_if_insecure = request_info->upgrade_if_insecure;
new_request->throttling_profile_id = request_info->devtools_frame_token;
return new_request;
}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_get_memory_usage(const struct ofproto *ofproto, struct simap *usage)
{
const struct oftable *table;
unsigned int n_rules;
simap_increase(usage, "ports", hmap_count(&ofproto->ports));
n_rules = 0;
OFPROTO_FOR_EACH_TABLE (table, ofproto) {
n_rules += table->n_flows;
}
simap_increase(usage, "rules", n_rules);
if (ofproto->ofproto_class->get_memory_usage) {
ofproto->ofproto_class->get_memory_usage(ofproto, usage);
}
connmgr_get_memory_usage(ofproto->connmgr, usage);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dcbnl_ieee_notify(struct net_device *dev, int event, int cmd,
u32 seq, u32 portid)
{
return dcbnl_notify(dev, event, cmd, seq, portid, DCB_CAP_DCBX_VER_IEEE);
}
Commit Message: dcbnl: fix various netlink info leaks
The dcb netlink interface leaks stack memory in various places:
* perm_addr[] buffer is only filled at max with 12 of the 32 bytes but
copied completely,
* no in-kernel driver fills all fields of an IEEE 802.1Qaz subcommand,
so we're leaking up to 58 bytes for ieee_ets structs, up to 136 bytes
for ieee_pfc structs, etc.,
* the same is true for CEE -- no in-kernel driver fills the whole
struct,
Prevent all of the above stack info leaks by properly initializing the
buffers/structures involved.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,103 |
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