instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::FinalizeModelLoad() {
is_loaded_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("OfflinePages.Model.FinalLoadSuccessful",
store_->state() == StoreState::LOADED);
for (Observer& observer : observers_)
observer.OfflinePageModelLoaded(this);
for (const auto& delayed_task : delayed_tasks_)
delayed_task.Run();
delayed_tasks_.clear();
PostClearStorageIfNeededTask(true /* delayed */);
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE );
}
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6mr_rule_fill(struct fib_rule *rule, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct fib_rule_hdr *frh)
{
frh->dst_len = 0;
frh->src_len = 0;
frh->tos = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::OnContextLost() {
context_lost_reason_ = convertReason(
command_buffer_->GetLastState().context_lost_reason);
if (context_lost_callback_) {
context_lost_callback_->onContextLost();
}
if (attributes_.shareResources)
ClearSharedContexts();
if (ShouldUseSwapClient())
swap_client_->OnViewContextSwapBuffersAborted();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::didStopLoading() {
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params = print_pages_params_.get();
DCHECK(params != NULL);
PrintPages(*params, print_web_view_->mainFrame(), NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindBufferBase(GLenum target, GLuint index,
GLuint client_id) {
BindIndexedBufferImpl(target, index, client_id, 0, 0,
kBindBufferBase, "glBindBufferBase");
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void return_to_32bit(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs16, int retval)
{
struct pt_regs *regs32;
regs32 = save_v86_state(regs16);
regs32->ax = retval;
__asm__ __volatile__("movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
"movl %1,%%ebp\n\t"
"jmp resume_userspace"
: : "r" (regs32), "r" (current_thread_info()));
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockNetworkTransaction::RunCallback(const CompletionCallback& callback,
int result) {
callback.Run(result);
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OnAllowDatabase(int render_view_id,
const GURL& origin_url,
const GURL& top_origin_url,
const string16& name,
const string16& display_name,
bool* allowed) {
*allowed = cookie_settings_->IsSettingCookieAllowed(origin_url,
top_origin_url);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&TabSpecificContentSettings::WebDatabaseAccessed,
render_process_id_, render_view_id, origin_url, name, display_name,
!*allowed));
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* HTMLFrameOwnerElement::getSVGDocument(
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
Document* doc = contentDocument();
if (doc && doc->IsSVGDocument())
return doc;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithExceptionCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithException");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
{
imp->methodWithException(ec);
if (UNLIKELY(ec))
goto fail;
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
fail:
V8Proxy::setDOMException(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,576 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_cgroup_precharge_mc(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long precharge = mem_cgroup_count_precharge(mm);
VM_BUG_ON(mc.moving_task);
mc.moving_task = current;
return mem_cgroup_do_precharge(precharge);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(addFromString)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *this = getThis();
char *buffer, *name;
int buffer_len, name_len;
ze_zip_object *ze_obj;
struct zip_source *zs;
int pos = 0;
int cur_idx;
if (!this) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, this);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&name, &name_len, &buffer, &buffer_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ze_obj = (ze_zip_object*) zend_object_store_get_object(this TSRMLS_CC);
if (ze_obj->buffers_cnt) {
ze_obj->buffers = (char **)erealloc(ze_obj->buffers, sizeof(char *) * (ze_obj->buffers_cnt+1));
pos = ze_obj->buffers_cnt++;
} else {
ze_obj->buffers = (char **)emalloc(sizeof(char *));
ze_obj->buffers_cnt++;
pos = 0;
}
ze_obj->buffers[pos] = (char *)emalloc(buffer_len + 1);
memcpy(ze_obj->buffers[pos], buffer, buffer_len + 1);
zs = zip_source_buffer(intern, ze_obj->buffers[pos], buffer_len, 0);
if (zs == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
cur_idx = zip_name_locate(intern, (const char *)name, 0);
/* TODO: fix _zip_replace */
if (cur_idx >= 0) {
if (zip_delete(intern, cur_idx) == -1) {
goto fail;
}
}
if (zip_add(intern, name, zs) != -1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
fail:
zip_source_free(zs);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileImplIOData::LazyInitializeInternal(
ProfileParams* profile_params) const {
clear_local_state_on_exit_ = profile_params->clear_local_state_on_exit;
ChromeURLRequestContext* main_context = main_request_context();
ChromeURLRequestContext* extensions_context = extensions_request_context();
media_request_context_ = new ChromeURLRequestContext;
IOThread* const io_thread = profile_params->io_thread;
IOThread::Globals* const io_thread_globals = io_thread->globals();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
bool record_mode = chrome::kRecordModeEnabled &&
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kRecordMode);
bool playback_mode = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kPlaybackMode);
ApplyProfileParamsToContext(main_context);
ApplyProfileParamsToContext(media_request_context_);
ApplyProfileParamsToContext(extensions_context);
if (http_server_properties_manager_.get())
http_server_properties_manager_->InitializeOnIOThread();
main_context->set_transport_security_state(transport_security_state());
media_request_context_->set_transport_security_state(
transport_security_state());
extensions_context->set_transport_security_state(transport_security_state());
main_context->set_net_log(io_thread->net_log());
media_request_context_->set_net_log(io_thread->net_log());
extensions_context->set_net_log(io_thread->net_log());
main_context->set_network_delegate(network_delegate());
media_request_context_->set_network_delegate(network_delegate());
main_context->set_http_server_properties(http_server_properties());
media_request_context_->set_http_server_properties(http_server_properties());
main_context->set_host_resolver(
io_thread_globals->host_resolver.get());
media_request_context_->set_host_resolver(
io_thread_globals->host_resolver.get());
main_context->set_cert_verifier(
io_thread_globals->cert_verifier.get());
media_request_context_->set_cert_verifier(
io_thread_globals->cert_verifier.get());
main_context->set_http_auth_handler_factory(
io_thread_globals->http_auth_handler_factory.get());
media_request_context_->set_http_auth_handler_factory(
io_thread_globals->http_auth_handler_factory.get());
main_context->set_fraudulent_certificate_reporter(
fraudulent_certificate_reporter());
media_request_context_->set_fraudulent_certificate_reporter(
fraudulent_certificate_reporter());
main_context->set_proxy_service(proxy_service());
media_request_context_->set_proxy_service(proxy_service());
scoped_refptr<net::CookieStore> cookie_store = NULL;
net::OriginBoundCertService* origin_bound_cert_service = NULL;
if (record_mode || playback_mode) {
cookie_store = new net::CookieMonster(
NULL, profile_params->cookie_monster_delegate);
origin_bound_cert_service = new net::OriginBoundCertService(
new net::DefaultOriginBoundCertStore(NULL));
}
if (!cookie_store) {
DCHECK(!lazy_params_->cookie_path.empty());
scoped_refptr<SQLitePersistentCookieStore> cookie_db =
new SQLitePersistentCookieStore(
lazy_params_->cookie_path,
lazy_params_->restore_old_session_cookies);
cookie_db->SetClearLocalStateOnExit(
profile_params->clear_local_state_on_exit);
cookie_store =
new net::CookieMonster(cookie_db.get(),
profile_params->cookie_monster_delegate);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableRestoreSessionState))
cookie_store->GetCookieMonster()->SetPersistSessionCookies(true);
}
net::CookieMonster* extensions_cookie_store =
new net::CookieMonster(
new SQLitePersistentCookieStore(
lazy_params_->extensions_cookie_path,
lazy_params_->restore_old_session_cookies), NULL);
const char* schemes[] = {chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme,
chrome::kExtensionScheme};
extensions_cookie_store->SetCookieableSchemes(schemes, 2);
main_context->set_cookie_store(cookie_store);
media_request_context_->set_cookie_store(cookie_store);
extensions_context->set_cookie_store(extensions_cookie_store);
if (!origin_bound_cert_service) {
DCHECK(!lazy_params_->origin_bound_cert_path.empty());
scoped_refptr<SQLiteOriginBoundCertStore> origin_bound_cert_db =
new SQLiteOriginBoundCertStore(lazy_params_->origin_bound_cert_path);
origin_bound_cert_db->SetClearLocalStateOnExit(
profile_params->clear_local_state_on_exit);
origin_bound_cert_service = new net::OriginBoundCertService(
new net::DefaultOriginBoundCertStore(origin_bound_cert_db.get()));
}
set_origin_bound_cert_service(origin_bound_cert_service);
main_context->set_origin_bound_cert_service(origin_bound_cert_service);
media_request_context_->set_origin_bound_cert_service(
origin_bound_cert_service);
net::HttpCache::DefaultBackend* main_backend =
new net::HttpCache::DefaultBackend(
net::DISK_CACHE,
lazy_params_->cache_path,
lazy_params_->cache_max_size,
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::CACHE));
net::HttpCache* main_cache = new net::HttpCache(
main_context->host_resolver(),
main_context->cert_verifier(),
main_context->origin_bound_cert_service(),
main_context->transport_security_state(),
main_context->proxy_service(),
"", // pass empty ssl_session_cache_shard to share the SSL session cache
main_context->ssl_config_service(),
main_context->http_auth_handler_factory(),
main_context->network_delegate(),
main_context->http_server_properties(),
main_context->net_log(),
main_backend);
net::HttpCache::DefaultBackend* media_backend =
new net::HttpCache::DefaultBackend(
net::MEDIA_CACHE, lazy_params_->media_cache_path,
lazy_params_->media_cache_max_size,
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::CACHE));
net::HttpNetworkSession* main_network_session = main_cache->GetSession();
net::HttpCache* media_cache =
new net::HttpCache(main_network_session, media_backend);
if (record_mode || playback_mode) {
main_cache->set_mode(
record_mode ? net::HttpCache::RECORD : net::HttpCache::PLAYBACK);
}
main_http_factory_.reset(main_cache);
media_http_factory_.reset(media_cache);
main_context->set_http_transaction_factory(main_cache);
media_request_context_->set_http_transaction_factory(media_cache);
ftp_factory_.reset(
new net::FtpNetworkLayer(io_thread_globals->host_resolver.get()));
main_context->set_ftp_transaction_factory(ftp_factory_.get());
main_context->set_chrome_url_data_manager_backend(
chrome_url_data_manager_backend());
main_context->set_job_factory(job_factory());
media_request_context_->set_job_factory(job_factory());
extensions_context->set_job_factory(job_factory());
job_factory()->AddInterceptor(
new chrome_browser_net::ConnectInterceptor(predictor_.get()));
lazy_params_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char *dir_name,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
struct path path;
int retval = 0;
int mnt_flags = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (!dir_name || !*dir_name || !memchr(dir_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
if (data_page)
((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = kern_path(dir_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &path,
type_page, flags, data_page);
if (retval)
goto dput_out;
if (!may_mount())
return -EPERM;
/* Default to relatime unless overriden */
if (!(flags & MS_NOATIME))
mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
/* Separate the per-mountpoint flags */
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
data_page);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page);
dput_out:
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::RuntimeCallStatsCounterAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE(info.GetIsolate(), RuntimeCallStats::CounterId::kRuntimeCallStatsCounterAttribute_Setter);
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::RuntimeCallStatsCounterAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContextState::RestoreVertexAttribValues() const {
for (size_t attrib = 0; attrib < vertex_attrib_manager->num_attribs();
++attrib) {
switch (attrib_values[attrib].type()) {
case SHADER_VARIABLE_FLOAT:
{
GLfloat v[4];
attrib_values[attrib].GetValues(v);
api()->glVertexAttrib4fvFn(attrib, v);
}
break;
case SHADER_VARIABLE_INT:
{
GLint v[4];
attrib_values[attrib].GetValues(v);
api()->glVertexAttribI4ivFn(attrib, v);
}
break;
case SHADER_VARIABLE_UINT:
{
GLuint v[4];
attrib_values[attrib].GetValues(v);
api()->glVertexAttribI4uivFn(attrib, v);
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 150,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlBufWriteQuotedString(xmlBufPtr buf, const xmlChar *string) {
const xmlChar *cur, *base;
if ((buf == NULL) || (buf->error))
return(-1);
CHECK_COMPAT(buf)
if (buf->alloc == XML_BUFFER_ALLOC_IMMUTABLE)
return(-1);
if (xmlStrchr(string, '\"')) {
if (xmlStrchr(string, '\'')) {
#ifdef DEBUG_BUFFER
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"xmlBufWriteQuotedString: string contains quote and double-quotes !\n");
#endif
xmlBufCCat(buf, "\"");
base = cur = string;
while(*cur != 0){
if(*cur == '"'){
if (base != cur)
xmlBufAdd(buf, base, cur - base);
xmlBufAdd(buf, BAD_CAST """, 6);
cur++;
base = cur;
}
else {
cur++;
}
}
if (base != cur)
xmlBufAdd(buf, base, cur - base);
xmlBufCCat(buf, "\"");
}
else{
xmlBufCCat(buf, "\'");
xmlBufCat(buf, string);
xmlBufCCat(buf, "\'");
}
} else {
xmlBufCCat(buf, "\"");
xmlBufCat(buf, string);
xmlBufCCat(buf, "\"");
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ext2_quota_read(struct super_block *sb, int type, char *data,
size_t len, loff_t off)
{
struct inode *inode = sb_dqopt(sb)->files[type];
sector_t blk = off >> EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
int err = 0;
int offset = off & (sb->s_blocksize - 1);
int tocopy;
size_t toread;
struct buffer_head tmp_bh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
loff_t i_size = i_size_read(inode);
if (off > i_size)
return 0;
if (off+len > i_size)
len = i_size-off;
toread = len;
while (toread > 0) {
tocopy = sb->s_blocksize - offset < toread ?
sb->s_blocksize - offset : toread;
tmp_bh.b_state = 0;
tmp_bh.b_size = sb->s_blocksize;
err = ext2_get_block(inode, blk, &tmp_bh, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (!buffer_mapped(&tmp_bh)) /* A hole? */
memset(data, 0, tocopy);
else {
bh = sb_bread(sb, tmp_bh.b_blocknr);
if (!bh)
return -EIO;
memcpy(data, bh->b_data+offset, tocopy);
brelse(bh);
}
offset = 0;
toread -= tocopy;
data += tocopy;
blk++;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 94,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_irda *addr = (struct sockaddr_irda *) uaddr;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
int err;
pr_debug("%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_irda))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
#ifdef CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA
/* Special care for Ultra sockets */
if ((sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IRDAPROTO_ULTRA)) {
self->pid = addr->sir_lsap_sel;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (self->pid & 0x80) {
pr_debug("%s(), extension in PID not supp!\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
err = irda_open_lsap(self, self->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
/* Pretend we are connected */
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA */
self->ias_obj = irias_new_object(addr->sir_name, jiffies);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (self->ias_obj == NULL)
goto out;
err = irda_open_tsap(self, addr->sir_lsap_sel, addr->sir_name);
if (err < 0) {
irias_delete_object(self->ias_obj);
self->ias_obj = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Register with LM-IAS */
irias_add_integer_attrib(self->ias_obj, "IrDA:TinyTP:LsapSel",
self->stsap_sel, IAS_KERNEL_ATTR);
irias_insert_object(self->ias_obj);
err = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void airo_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev) {
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
if ((dev->flags ^ ai->flags) & IFF_PROMISC) {
change_bit(FLAG_PROMISC, &ai->flags);
if (down_trylock(&ai->sem) != 0) {
set_bit(JOB_PROMISC, &ai->jobs);
wake_up_interruptible(&ai->thr_wait);
} else
airo_set_promisc(ai);
}
if ((dev->flags&IFF_ALLMULTI) || !netdev_mc_empty(dev)) {
/* Turn on multicast. (Should be already setup...) */
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rt_del_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt)
{
if (!list_empty(&rt->rt_uncached)) {
struct uncached_list *ul = rt->rt_uncached_list;
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_del(&rt->rt_uncached);
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: path_n_le(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *p1 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
PATH *p2 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(p1->npts <= p2->npts);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool trap_debug32(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
if (p->is_write) {
vcpu_cp14(vcpu, r->reg) = p->regval;
vcpu->arch.debug_flags |= KVM_ARM64_DEBUG_DIRTY;
} else {
p->regval = vcpu_cp14(vcpu, r->reg);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequest::CanMakePaymentCallback(bool can_make_payment) {
if (!spec_ || CanMakePaymentQueryFactory::GetInstance()
->GetForContext(web_contents_->GetBrowserContext())
->CanQuery(top_level_origin_, frame_origin_,
spec_->stringified_method_data())) {
RespondToCanMakePaymentQuery(can_make_payment, false);
} else if (OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(frame_origin_)) {
RespondToCanMakePaymentQuery(can_make_payment, true);
} else {
client_->OnCanMakePayment(
mojom::CanMakePaymentQueryResult::QUERY_QUOTA_EXCEEDED);
}
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnCanMakePaymentReturned();
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Blocked() {
PolicyMap policies;
policies.Set(
key::kRestoreOnStartup, POLICY_LEVEL_MANDATORY, POLICY_SCOPE_USER,
POLICY_SOURCE_CLOUD,
std::make_unique<base::Value>(SessionStartupPref::kPrefValueLast),
nullptr);
auto urls = std::make_unique<base::Value>(base::Value::Type::LIST);
for (const auto* url_string : kRestoredURLs)
urls->GetList().emplace_back(url_string);
policies.Set(key::kURLBlacklist, POLICY_LEVEL_MANDATORY, POLICY_SCOPE_USER,
POLICY_SOURCE_CLOUD, std::move(urls), nullptr);
provider_.UpdateChromePolicy(policies);
blocked_ = true;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kRestoredURLs); ++i)
expected_urls_.emplace_back(kRestoredURLs[i]);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SavePackage::Finish() {
if (canceled())
return;
wait_state_ = SUCCESSFUL;
finished_ = true;
RecordSavePackageEvent(SAVE_PACKAGE_FINISHED);
if (wrote_to_completed_file_) {
RecordSavePackageEvent(SAVE_PACKAGE_WRITE_TO_COMPLETED);
}
if (wrote_to_failed_file_) {
RecordSavePackageEvent(SAVE_PACKAGE_WRITE_TO_FAILED);
}
SaveIDList save_ids;
for (SaveUrlItemMap::iterator it = saved_failed_items_.begin();
it != saved_failed_items_.end(); ++it)
save_ids.push_back(it->second->save_id());
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SaveFileManager::RemoveSavedFileFromFileMap,
file_manager_,
save_ids));
if (download_) {
if (download_->IsInProgress()) {
if (save_type_ != SAVE_PAGE_TYPE_AS_MHTML) {
download_->UpdateProgress(all_save_items_count_, CurrentSpeed(), "");
download_->OnAllDataSaved(DownloadItem::kEmptyFileHash);
}
download_->MarkAsComplete();
}
FinalizeDownloadEntry();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDFiumEngine::MouseDownState::MouseDownState(
const PDFiumPage::Area& area,
const PDFiumPage::LinkTarget& target)
: area_(area), target_(target) {}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReverbSetDensity(ReverbContext *pContext, int16_t level){
LVREV_ControlParams_st ActiveParams; /* Current control Parameters */
LVREV_ReturnStatus_en LvmStatus=LVREV_SUCCESS; /* Function call status */
/* Get the current settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_GetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_GetControlParameters", "ReverbSetDensity")
ActiveParams.RoomSize = (LVM_INT16)(((level * 99) / 1000) + 1);
/* Activate the initial settings */
LvmStatus = LVREV_SetControlParameters(pContext->hInstance, &ActiveParams);
LVM_ERROR_CHECK(LvmStatus, "LVREV_SetControlParameters", "ReverbSetDensity")
pContext->SavedDensity = level;
return;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebKit::WebBlobRegistry* TestWebKitPlatformSupport::blobRegistry() {
return blob_registry_.get();
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::download(const Platform::NetworkRequest& request)
{
vector<const char*> headers;
Platform::NetworkRequest::HeaderList& list = request.getHeaderListRef();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < list.size(); i++) {
headers.push_back(list[i].first.c_str());
headers.push_back(list[i].second.c_str());
}
d->load(request.getUrlRef(), BlackBerry::Platform::String::emptyString(), "GET", Platform::NetworkRequest::UseProtocolCachePolicy, 0, 0, headers.empty() ? 0 : &headers[0], headers.size(), false, false, true, "", request.getSuggestedSaveName().c_str());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual WebGLId createShader(WGC3Denum) { return 1; }
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMenuList::listBoxSelectItem(int listIndex, bool allowMultiplySelections, bool shift, bool fireOnChangeNow)
{
toHTMLSelectElement(node())->listBoxSelectItem(listIndex, allowMultiplySelections, shift, fireOnChangeNow);
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long vhost_net_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct vhost_net *n = f->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
u64 __user *featurep = argp;
struct vhost_vring_file backend;
u64 features;
int r;
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_NET_SET_BACKEND:
if (copy_from_user(&backend, argp, sizeof backend))
return -EFAULT;
return vhost_net_set_backend(n, backend.index, backend.fd);
case VHOST_GET_FEATURES:
features = VHOST_NET_FEATURES;
if (copy_to_user(featurep, &features, sizeof features))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_SET_FEATURES:
if (copy_from_user(&features, featurep, sizeof features))
return -EFAULT;
if (features & ~VHOST_NET_FEATURES)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return vhost_net_set_features(n, features);
case VHOST_RESET_OWNER:
return vhost_net_reset_owner(n);
case VHOST_SET_OWNER:
return vhost_net_set_owner(n);
default:
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_ioctl(&n->dev, ioctl, argp);
if (r == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
r = vhost_vring_ioctl(&n->dev, ioctl, argp);
else
vhost_net_flush(n);
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 30,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bnep_net_set_mc_list(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_MC_FILTER
struct bnep_session *s = netdev_priv(dev);
struct sock *sk = s->sock->sk;
struct bnep_set_filter_req *r;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int size;
BT_DBG("%s mc_count %d", dev->name, netdev_mc_count(dev));
size = sizeof(*r) + (BNEP_MAX_MULTICAST_FILTERS + 1) * ETH_ALEN * 2;
skb = alloc_skb(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb) {
BT_ERR("%s Multicast list allocation failed", dev->name);
return;
}
r = (void *) skb->data;
__skb_put(skb, sizeof(*r));
r->type = BNEP_CONTROL;
r->ctrl = BNEP_FILTER_MULTI_ADDR_SET;
if (dev->flags & (IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI)) {
u8 start[ETH_ALEN] = { 0x01 };
/* Request all addresses */
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), start, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), dev->broadcast, ETH_ALEN);
r->len = htons(ETH_ALEN * 2);
} else {
struct netdev_hw_addr *ha;
int i, len = skb->len;
if (dev->flags & IFF_BROADCAST) {
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), dev->broadcast, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), dev->broadcast, ETH_ALEN);
}
/* FIXME: We should group addresses here. */
i = 0;
netdev_for_each_mc_addr(ha, dev) {
if (i == BNEP_MAX_MULTICAST_FILTERS)
break;
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), ha->addr, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(__skb_put(skb, ETH_ALEN), ha->addr, ETH_ALEN);
i++;
}
r->len = htons(skb->len - len);
}
skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
wake_up_interruptible(sk_sleep(sk));
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm)
{
gfn_t fn;
u16 data = 0;
int idx, r;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
fn = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, fn++, &data,
TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, sizeof(u16));
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn++, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
data = ~0;
r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, fn, &data,
RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 2 * PAGE_SIZE - 1,
sizeof(u8));
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
return r;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScreenSaverSetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xScreenSaverSetAttributesReq);
DrawablePtr pDraw;
WindowPtr pParent;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
ScreenSaverScreenPrivatePtr pPriv = 0;
ScreenSaverAttrPtr pAttr = 0;
int ret, len, class, bw, depth;
unsigned long visual;
int idepth, ivisual;
Bool fOK;
DepthPtr pDepth;
WindowOptPtr ancwopt;
unsigned int *pVlist;
unsigned long *values = 0;
unsigned long tmask, imask;
unsigned long val;
Pixmap pixID;
PixmapPtr pPixmap;
Cursor cursorID;
CursorPtr pCursor;
Colormap cmap;
ColormapPtr pCmap;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xScreenSaverSetAttributesReq);
ret = dixLookupDrawable(&pDraw, stuff->drawable, client, 0,
DixGetAttrAccess);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
pScreen = pDraw->pScreen;
pParent = pScreen->root;
ret = XaceHook(XACE_SCREENSAVER_ACCESS, client, pScreen, DixSetAttrAccess);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
len = stuff->length - bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xScreenSaverSetAttributesReq));
if (Ones(stuff->mask) != len)
return BadLength;
if (!stuff->width || !stuff->height) {
client->errorValue = 0;
return BadValue;
}
switch (class = stuff->c_class) {
case CopyFromParent:
case InputOnly:
case InputOutput:
break;
default:
client->errorValue = class;
return BadValue;
}
bw = stuff->borderWidth;
depth = stuff->depth;
visual = stuff->visualID;
/* copied directly from CreateWindow */
if (class == CopyFromParent)
class = pParent->drawable.class;
if ((class != InputOutput) && (class != InputOnly)) {
client->errorValue = class;
return BadValue;
}
if ((class != InputOnly) && (pParent->drawable.class == InputOnly))
return BadMatch;
if ((class == InputOnly) && ((bw != 0) || (depth != 0)))
return BadMatch;
if ((class == InputOutput) && (depth == 0))
depth = pParent->drawable.depth;
ancwopt = pParent->optional;
if (!ancwopt)
ancwopt = FindWindowWithOptional(pParent)->optional;
if (visual == CopyFromParent)
visual = ancwopt->visual;
/* Find out if the depth and visual are acceptable for this Screen */
if ((visual != ancwopt->visual) || (depth != pParent->drawable.depth)) {
fOK = FALSE;
for (idepth = 0; idepth < pScreen->numDepths; idepth++) {
pDepth = (DepthPtr) &pScreen->allowedDepths[idepth];
if ((depth == pDepth->depth) || (depth == 0)) {
for (ivisual = 0; ivisual < pDepth->numVids; ivisual++) {
if (visual == pDepth->vids[ivisual]) {
fOK = TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
}
if (fOK == FALSE)
return BadMatch;
}
if (((stuff->mask & (CWBorderPixmap | CWBorderPixel)) == 0) &&
(class != InputOnly) && (depth != pParent->drawable.depth)) {
return BadMatch;
}
if (((stuff->mask & CWColormap) == 0) &&
(class != InputOnly) &&
((visual != ancwopt->visual) || (ancwopt->colormap == None))) {
return BadMatch;
}
/* end of errors from CreateWindow */
pPriv = GetScreenPrivate(pScreen);
if (pPriv && pPriv->attr) {
if (pPriv->attr->client != client)
return BadAccess;
}
if (!pPriv) {
pPriv = MakeScreenPrivate(pScreen);
if (!pPriv)
return FALSE;
}
pAttr = New(ScreenSaverAttrRec);
if (!pAttr) {
ret = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
/* over allocate for override redirect */
pAttr->values = values = xallocarray(len + 1, sizeof(unsigned long));
if (!values) {
ret = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
pAttr->screen = pScreen;
pAttr->client = client;
pAttr->x = stuff->x;
pAttr->y = stuff->y;
pAttr->width = stuff->width;
pAttr->height = stuff->height;
pAttr->borderWidth = stuff->borderWidth;
pAttr->class = stuff->c_class;
pAttr->depth = depth;
pAttr->visual = visual;
pAttr->colormap = None;
pAttr->pCursor = NullCursor;
pAttr->pBackgroundPixmap = NullPixmap;
pAttr->pBorderPixmap = NullPixmap;
/*
* go through the mask, checking the values,
* looking up pixmaps and cursors and hold a reference
* to them.
*/
pAttr->mask = tmask = stuff->mask | CWOverrideRedirect;
pVlist = (unsigned int *) (stuff + 1);
while (tmask) {
imask = lowbit(tmask);
tmask &= ~imask;
switch (imask) {
case CWBackPixmap:
pixID = (Pixmap) * pVlist;
if (pixID == None) {
*values++ = None;
}
else if (pixID == ParentRelative) {
if (depth != pParent->drawable.depth) {
ret = BadMatch;
goto PatchUp;
}
*values++ = ParentRelative;
}
else {
ret =
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pPixmap, pixID,
RT_PIXMAP, client, DixReadAccess);
if (ret == Success) {
if ((pPixmap->drawable.depth != depth) ||
(pPixmap->drawable.pScreen != pScreen)) {
ret = BadMatch;
goto PatchUp;
}
pAttr->pBackgroundPixmap = pPixmap;
pPixmap->refcnt++;
pAttr->mask &= ~CWBackPixmap;
}
else {
client->errorValue = pixID;
goto PatchUp;
}
}
break;
case CWBackPixel:
*values++ = (CARD32) *pVlist;
break;
case CWBorderPixmap:
pixID = (Pixmap) * pVlist;
if (pixID == CopyFromParent) {
if (depth != pParent->drawable.depth) {
ret = BadMatch;
goto PatchUp;
}
*values++ = CopyFromParent;
}
else {
ret =
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pPixmap, pixID,
RT_PIXMAP, client, DixReadAccess);
if (ret == Success) {
if ((pPixmap->drawable.depth != depth) ||
(pPixmap->drawable.pScreen != pScreen)) {
ret = BadMatch;
goto PatchUp;
}
pAttr->pBorderPixmap = pPixmap;
pPixmap->refcnt++;
pAttr->mask &= ~CWBorderPixmap;
}
else {
client->errorValue = pixID;
goto PatchUp;
}
}
break;
case CWBorderPixel:
*values++ = (CARD32) *pVlist;
break;
case CWBitGravity:
val = (CARD8) *pVlist;
if (val > StaticGravity) {
ret = BadValue;
client->errorValue = val;
goto PatchUp;
}
*values++ = val;
break;
case CWWinGravity:
val = (CARD8) *pVlist;
if (val > StaticGravity) {
ret = BadValue;
client->errorValue = val;
goto PatchUp;
}
*values++ = val;
break;
case CWBackingStore:
val = (CARD8) *pVlist;
if ((val != NotUseful) && (val != WhenMapped) && (val != Always)) {
ret = BadValue;
client->errorValue = val;
goto PatchUp;
}
*values++ = val;
break;
case CWBackingPlanes:
*values++ = (CARD32) *pVlist;
break;
case CWBackingPixel:
*values++ = (CARD32) *pVlist;
break;
case CWSaveUnder:
val = (BOOL) * pVlist;
if ((val != xTrue) && (val != xFalse)) {
ret = BadValue;
client->errorValue = val;
goto PatchUp;
}
*values++ = val;
break;
case CWEventMask:
*values++ = (CARD32) *pVlist;
break;
case CWDontPropagate:
*values++ = (CARD32) *pVlist;
break;
case CWOverrideRedirect:
if (!(stuff->mask & CWOverrideRedirect))
pVlist--;
else {
val = (BOOL) * pVlist;
if ((val != xTrue) && (val != xFalse)) {
ret = BadValue;
client->errorValue = val;
goto PatchUp;
}
}
*values++ = xTrue;
break;
case CWColormap:
cmap = (Colormap) * pVlist;
ret = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCmap, cmap, RT_COLORMAP,
client, DixUseAccess);
if (ret != Success) {
client->errorValue = cmap;
goto PatchUp;
}
if (pCmap->pVisual->vid != visual || pCmap->pScreen != pScreen) {
ret = BadMatch;
goto PatchUp;
}
pAttr->colormap = cmap;
pAttr->mask &= ~CWColormap;
break;
case CWCursor:
cursorID = (Cursor) * pVlist;
if (cursorID == None) {
*values++ = None;
}
else {
ret = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCursor, cursorID,
RT_CURSOR, client, DixUseAccess);
if (ret != Success) {
client->errorValue = cursorID;
goto PatchUp;
}
pAttr->pCursor = RefCursor(pCursor);
pAttr->mask &= ~CWCursor;
}
break;
default:
ret = BadValue;
client->errorValue = stuff->mask;
goto PatchUp;
}
pVlist++;
}
if (pPriv->attr)
FreeScreenAttr(pPriv->attr);
pPriv->attr = pAttr;
pAttr->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
if (!AddResource(pAttr->resource, AttrType, (void *) pAttr))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
PatchUp:
FreeAttrs(pAttr);
bail:
CheckScreenPrivate(pScreen);
if (pAttr)
free(pAttr->values);
free(pAttr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_INI_MH(OnUpdateSerializer) /* {{{ */
{
const ps_serializer *tmp;
SESSION_CHECK_ACTIVE_STATE;
tmp = _php_find_ps_serializer(new_value TSRMLS_CC);
if (PG(modules_activated) && !tmp) {
int err_type;
if (stage == ZEND_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME) {
err_type = E_WARNING;
} else {
err_type = E_ERROR;
}
/* Do not output error when restoring ini options. */
if (stage != ZEND_INI_STAGE_DEACTIVATE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, err_type, "Cannot find serialization handler '%s'", new_value);
}
return FAILURE;
}
PS(serializer) = tmp;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintJobWorker::PrintJobWorker(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
PrintJobWorkerOwner* owner)
: owner_(owner), thread_("Printing_Worker"), weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(owner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
printing_context_delegate_ = base::MakeUnique<PrintingContextDelegate>(
render_process_id, render_frame_id);
printing_context_ = PrintingContext::Create(printing_context_delegate_.get());
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void destroy_segment_manager(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct f2fs_sm_info *sm_info = SM_I(sbi);
if (!sm_info)
return;
destroy_flush_cmd_control(sbi, true);
destroy_discard_cmd_control(sbi);
destroy_dirty_segmap(sbi);
destroy_curseg(sbi);
destroy_free_segmap(sbi);
destroy_sit_info(sbi);
sbi->sm_info = NULL;
kfree(sm_info);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ShellMainDelegate::ZygoteForked() {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableCrashReporter)) {
std::string process_type =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kProcessType);
breakpad::InitCrashReporter(process_type);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventListener* Document::getWindowAttributeEventListener(const AtomicString& eventType, DOMWrapperWorld* isolatedWorld)
{
DOMWindow* domWindow = this->domWindow();
if (!domWindow)
return 0;
return domWindow->getAttributeEventListener(eventType, isolatedWorld);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::bindTexture(GLenum target,
WebGLTexture* texture) {
bool deleted;
if (!CheckObjectToBeBound("bindTexture", texture, deleted))
return;
if (deleted) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindTexture",
"attempt to bind a deleted texture");
return;
}
if (texture && texture->GetTarget() && texture->GetTarget() != target) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "bindTexture",
"textures can not be used with multiple targets");
return;
}
if (target == GL_TEXTURE_2D) {
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture2d_binding_ =
TraceWrapperMember<WebGLTexture>(this, texture);
} else if (target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP) {
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture_cube_map_binding_ =
TraceWrapperMember<WebGLTexture>(this, texture);
} else if (IsWebGL2OrHigher() && target == GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY) {
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture2d_array_binding_ =
TraceWrapperMember<WebGLTexture>(this, texture);
} else if (IsWebGL2OrHigher() && target == GL_TEXTURE_3D) {
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture3d_binding_ =
TraceWrapperMember<WebGLTexture>(this, texture);
} else {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "bindTexture", "invalid target");
return;
}
ContextGL()->BindTexture(target, ObjectOrZero(texture));
if (texture) {
texture->SetTarget(target);
one_plus_max_non_default_texture_unit_ =
max(active_texture_unit_ + 1, one_plus_max_non_default_texture_unit_);
} else {
if (one_plus_max_non_default_texture_unit_ == active_texture_unit_ + 1) {
FindNewMaxNonDefaultTextureUnit();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long calc_load_fold_active(struct rq *this_rq)
{
long nr_active, delta = 0;
nr_active = this_rq->nr_running;
nr_active += (long) this_rq->nr_uninterruptible;
if (nr_active != this_rq->calc_load_active) {
delta = nr_active - this_rq->calc_load_active;
this_rq->calc_load_active = nr_active;
}
return delta;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,355 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Read_CVT( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_ULong idx )
{
return exc->cvt[idx];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrame::ScheduleVisualUpdateUnlessThrottled() {
if (ShouldThrottleRendering())
return;
GetPage()->Animator().ScheduleVisualUpdate(this);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HashTable *php_zip_get_properties(zval *object)/* {{{ */
{
ze_zip_object *obj;
HashTable *props;
zip_prop_handler *hnd;
zend_string *key;
obj = Z_ZIP_P(object);
props = zend_std_get_properties(object);
if (obj->prop_handler == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_PTR(obj->prop_handler, key, hnd) {
zval *ret, val;
ret = php_zip_property_reader(obj, hnd, &val);
if (ret == NULL) {
ret = &EG(uninitialized_zval);
}
zend_hash_update(props, key, ret);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
return props;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int cpu;
if (mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex))
return -EINTR;
cpu = get_cpu();
preempt_notifier_register(&vcpu->preempt_notifier);
kvm_arch_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
put_cpu();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(image_content_);
visitor->Trace(image_resource_for_image_document_);
visitor->Trace(element_);
visitor->Trace(decode_requests_);
}
Commit Message: service worker: Disable interception when OBJECT/EMBED uses ImageLoader.
Per the specification, service worker should not intercept requests for
OBJECT/EMBED elements.
R=kinuko
Bug: 771933
Change-Id: Ia6da6107dc5c68aa2c2efffde14bd2c51251fbd4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/927303
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#538027}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_path(notify_script_t *script)
{
size_t filename_len;
size_t file_len;
size_t path_len;
char *file = script->args[0];
struct stat buf;
int ret;
int ret_val = ENOENT;
int sgid_num;
gid_t *sgid_list = NULL;
const char *subp;
bool got_eacces = false;
const char *p;
/* We check the simple case first. */
if (*file == '\0')
return ENOENT;
filename_len = strlen(file);
if (filename_len >= PATH_MAX) {
ret_val = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto exit1;
}
/* Don't search when it contains a slash. */
if (strchr (file, '/') != NULL) {
ret_val = 0;
goto exit1;
}
/* Get the path if we haven't already done so, and if that doesn't
* exist, use CS_PATH */
if (!path) {
path = getenv ("PATH");
if (!path) {
size_t cs_path_len;
path = MALLOC(cs_path_len = confstr(_CS_PATH, NULL, 0));
confstr(_CS_PATH, path, cs_path_len);
path_is_malloced = true;
}
}
/* Although GLIBC does not enforce NAME_MAX, we set it as the maximum
size to avoid unbounded stack allocation. Same applies for
PATH_MAX. */
file_len = strnlen (file, NAME_MAX + 1);
path_len = strnlen (path, PATH_MAX - 1) + 1;
if (file_len > NAME_MAX) {
ret_val = ENAMETOOLONG;
goto exit1;
}
/* Set file access to the relevant uid/gid */
if (script->gid) {
if (setegid(script->gid)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to set egid to %d (%m)", script->gid);
ret_val = EACCES;
goto exit1;
}
/* Get our supplementary groups */
sgid_num = getgroups(0, NULL);
sgid_list = MALLOC(((size_t)sgid_num + 1) * sizeof(gid_t));
sgid_num = getgroups(sgid_num, sgid_list);
sgid_list[sgid_num++] = 0;
/* Clear the supplementary group list */
if (setgroups(1, &script->gid)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to set supplementary gids (%m)");
ret_val = EACCES;
goto exit;
}
}
if (script->uid && seteuid(script->uid)) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to set euid to %d (%m)", script->uid);
ret_val = EACCES;
goto exit;
}
for (p = path; ; p = subp)
{
char buffer[path_len + file_len + 1];
subp = strchrnul (p, ':');
/* PATH is larger than PATH_MAX and thus potentially larger than
the stack allocation. */
if (subp >= p + path_len) {
/* There are no more paths, bail out. */
if (*subp == '\0') {
ret_val = ENOENT;
goto exit;
}
/* Otherwise skip to next one. */
continue;
}
/* Use the current path entry, plus a '/' if nonempty, plus the file to execute. */
char *pend = mempcpy (buffer, p, (size_t)(subp - p));
*pend = '/';
memcpy (pend + (p < subp), file, file_len + 1);
ret = stat (buffer, &buf);
if (!ret) {
if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode))
errno = EACCES;
else if (!is_executable(&buf, script->uid, script->gid)) {
errno = EACCES;
} else {
/* Success */
log_message(LOG_INFO, "WARNING - script `%s` resolved by path search to `%s`. Please specify full path.", script->args[0], buffer);
/* Copy the found file name, and any parameters */
replace_cmd_name(script, buffer);
ret_val = 0;
got_eacces = false;
goto exit;
}
}
switch (errno)
{
case ENOEXEC:
case EACCES:
/* Record that we got a 'Permission denied' error. If we end
up finding no executable we can use, we want to diagnose
that we did find one but were denied access. */
if (!ret)
got_eacces = true;
case ENOENT:
case ESTALE:
case ENOTDIR:
/* Those errors indicate the file is missing or not executable
by us, in which case we want to just try the next path
directory. */
case ENODEV:
case ETIMEDOUT:
/* Some strange filesystems like AFS return even
stranger error numbers. They cannot reasonably mean
anything else so ignore those, too. */
break;
default:
/* Some other error means we found an executable file, but
something went wrong accessing it; return the error to our
caller. */
ret_val = -1;
goto exit;
}
if (*subp++ == '\0')
break;
}
exit:
/* Restore root euid/egid */
if (script->uid && seteuid(0))
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to restore euid after script search (%m)");
if (script->gid) {
if (setegid(0))
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to restore egid after script search (%m)");
/* restore supplementary groups */
if (sgid_list) {
if (setgroups((size_t)sgid_num, sgid_list))
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to restore supplementary groups after script search (%m)");
FREE(sgid_list);
}
}
exit1:
/* We tried every element and none of them worked. */
if (got_eacces) {
/* At least one failure was due to permissions, so report that error. */
return EACCES;
}
return ret_val;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_sidr_rep_handler(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
struct ib_cm_event *ib_event)
{
struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = cm_id->context;
struct rdma_cm_event event;
struct ib_cm_sidr_rep_event_param *rep = &ib_event->param.sidr_rep_rcvd;
int ret = 0;
if (cma_disable_callback(id_priv, RDMA_CM_CONNECT))
return 0;
memset(&event, 0, sizeof event);
switch (ib_event->event) {
case IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_ERROR:
event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_UNREACHABLE;
event.status = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
case IB_CM_SIDR_REP_RECEIVED:
event.param.ud.private_data = ib_event->private_data;
event.param.ud.private_data_len = IB_CM_SIDR_REP_PRIVATE_DATA_SIZE;
if (rep->status != IB_SIDR_SUCCESS) {
event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_UNREACHABLE;
event.status = ib_event->param.sidr_rep_rcvd.status;
break;
}
ret = cma_set_qkey(id_priv, rep->qkey);
if (ret) {
event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_ERROR;
event.status = ret;
break;
}
ib_init_ah_from_path(id_priv->id.device, id_priv->id.port_num,
id_priv->id.route.path_rec,
&event.param.ud.ah_attr);
event.param.ud.qp_num = rep->qpn;
event.param.ud.qkey = rep->qkey;
event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ESTABLISHED;
event.status = 0;
break;
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "RDMA CMA: unexpected IB CM event: %d\n",
ib_event->event);
goto out;
}
ret = id_priv->id.event_handler(&id_priv->id, &event);
if (ret) {
/* Destroy the CM ID by returning a non-zero value. */
id_priv->cm_id.ib = NULL;
cma_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_DESTROYING);
mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
rdma_destroy_id(&id_priv->id);
return ret;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dispatchInts (Parcel &p, RequestInfo *pRI) {
int32_t count;
status_t status;
size_t datalen;
int *pInts;
status = p.readInt32 (&count);
if (status != NO_ERROR || count <= 0) {
goto invalid;
}
datalen = sizeof(int) * count;
pInts = (int *)calloc(count, sizeof(int));
if (pInts == NULL) {
RLOGE("Memory allocation failed for request %s", requestToString(pRI->pCI->requestNumber));
return;
}
startRequest;
for (int i = 0 ; i < count ; i++) {
int32_t t;
status = p.readInt32(&t);
pInts[i] = (int)t;
appendPrintBuf("%s%d,", printBuf, t);
if (status != NO_ERROR) {
free(pInts);
goto invalid;
}
}
removeLastChar;
closeRequest;
printRequest(pRI->token, pRI->pCI->requestNumber);
CALL_ONREQUEST(pRI->pCI->requestNumber, const_cast<int *>(pInts),
datalen, pRI, pRI->socket_id);
#ifdef MEMSET_FREED
memset(pInts, 0, datalen);
#endif
free(pInts);
return;
invalid:
invalidCommandBlock(pRI);
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult DataPipeProducerDispatcher::CloseNoLock() {
lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (is_closed_ || in_transit_)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
is_closed_ = true;
ring_buffer_mapping_ = base::WritableSharedMemoryMapping();
shared_ring_buffer_ = base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion();
watchers_.NotifyClosed();
if (!transferred_) {
base::AutoUnlock unlock(lock_);
node_controller_->ClosePort(control_port_);
}
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RAnalValue *anal_fill_reg_ref(RAnal *anal, int reg, st64 size){
RAnalValue *ret = anal_fill_ai_rg (anal, reg);
ret->memref = size;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int register_asymmetric_key_parser(struct asymmetric_key_parser *parser)
{
struct asymmetric_key_parser *cursor;
int ret;
down_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
list_for_each_entry(cursor, &asymmetric_key_parsers, link) {
if (strcmp(cursor->name, parser->name) == 0) {
pr_err("Asymmetric key parser '%s' already registered\n",
parser->name);
ret = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
}
list_add_tail(&parser->link, &asymmetric_key_parsers);
pr_notice("Asymmetric key parser '%s' registered\n", parser->name);
ret = 0;
out:
up_write(&asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PreProcessingLib_Create(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
int32_t sessionId,
int32_t ioId,
effect_handle_t *pInterface)
{
ALOGV("EffectCreate: uuid: %08x session %d IO: %d", uuid->timeLow, sessionId, ioId);
int status;
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
preproc_session_t *session;
uint32_t procId;
if (PreProc_Init() != 0) {
return sInitStatus;
}
desc = PreProc_GetDescriptor(uuid);
if (desc == NULL) {
ALOGW("EffectCreate: fx not found uuid: %08x", uuid->timeLow);
return -EINVAL;
}
procId = UuidToProcId(&desc->type);
session = PreProc_GetSession(procId, sessionId, ioId);
if (session == NULL) {
ALOGW("EffectCreate: no more session available");
return -EINVAL;
}
status = Session_CreateEffect(session, procId, pInterface);
if (status < 0 && session->createdMsk == 0) {
session->io = 0;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_http_first_req(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
smp->data.type = SMP_T_BOOL;
smp->data.u.sint = !(smp->strm->txn->flags & TX_NOT_FIRST);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MovedToPoint(const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& mouse_event,
const gfx::Point& center) {
return mouse_event.globalX == center.x() &&
mouse_event.globalY == center.y();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jpc_pchg_destroy(jpc_pchg_t *pchg)
{
jas_free(pchg);
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 70,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void loaded_vmcs_init(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
{
vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched)
vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetRemovalMask() {
return remover_->GetLastUsedRemovalMask();
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 154,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RequestFrame(WebContents* web_contents) {
DCHECK(web_contents);
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget())
->ScheduleComposite();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long ppp_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct ppp_file *pf;
struct ppp *ppp;
int err = -EFAULT, val, val2, i;
struct ppp_idle idle;
struct npioctl npi;
int unit, cflags;
struct slcompress *vj;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *p = argp;
mutex_lock(&ppp_mutex);
pf = file->private_data;
if (!pf) {
err = ppp_unattached_ioctl(current->nsproxy->net_ns,
pf, file, cmd, arg);
goto out;
}
if (cmd == PPPIOCDETACH) {
/*
* We have to be careful here... if the file descriptor
* has been dup'd, we could have another process in the
* middle of a poll using the same file *, so we had
* better not free the interface data structures -
* instead we fail the ioctl. Even in this case, we
* shut down the interface if we are the owner of it.
* Actually, we should get rid of PPPIOCDETACH, userland
* (i.e. pppd) could achieve the same effect by closing
* this fd and reopening /dev/ppp.
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (pf->kind == INTERFACE) {
ppp = PF_TO_PPP(pf);
rtnl_lock();
if (file == ppp->owner)
unregister_netdevice(ppp->dev);
rtnl_unlock();
}
if (atomic_long_read(&file->f_count) < 2) {
ppp_release(NULL, file);
err = 0;
} else
pr_warn("PPPIOCDETACH file->f_count=%ld\n",
atomic_long_read(&file->f_count));
goto out;
}
if (pf->kind == CHANNEL) {
struct channel *pch;
struct ppp_channel *chan;
pch = PF_TO_CHANNEL(pf);
switch (cmd) {
case PPPIOCCONNECT:
if (get_user(unit, p))
break;
err = ppp_connect_channel(pch, unit);
break;
case PPPIOCDISCONN:
err = ppp_disconnect_channel(pch);
break;
default:
down_read(&pch->chan_sem);
chan = pch->chan;
err = -ENOTTY;
if (chan && chan->ops->ioctl)
err = chan->ops->ioctl(chan, cmd, arg);
up_read(&pch->chan_sem);
}
goto out;
}
if (pf->kind != INTERFACE) {
/* can't happen */
pr_err("PPP: not interface or channel??\n");
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ppp = PF_TO_PPP(pf);
switch (cmd) {
case PPPIOCSMRU:
if (get_user(val, p))
break;
ppp->mru = val;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCSFLAGS:
if (get_user(val, p))
break;
ppp_lock(ppp);
cflags = ppp->flags & ~val;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK
if (!(ppp->flags & SC_MULTILINK) && (val & SC_MULTILINK))
ppp->nextseq = 0;
#endif
ppp->flags = val & SC_FLAG_BITS;
ppp_unlock(ppp);
if (cflags & SC_CCP_OPEN)
ppp_ccp_closed(ppp);
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCGFLAGS:
val = ppp->flags | ppp->xstate | ppp->rstate;
if (put_user(val, p))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCSCOMPRESS:
err = ppp_set_compress(ppp, arg);
break;
case PPPIOCGUNIT:
if (put_user(ppp->file.index, p))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCSDEBUG:
if (get_user(val, p))
break;
ppp->debug = val;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCGDEBUG:
if (put_user(ppp->debug, p))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCGIDLE:
idle.xmit_idle = (jiffies - ppp->last_xmit) / HZ;
idle.recv_idle = (jiffies - ppp->last_recv) / HZ;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &idle, sizeof(idle)))
break;
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCSMAXCID:
if (get_user(val, p))
break;
val2 = 15;
if ((val >> 16) != 0) {
val2 = val >> 16;
val &= 0xffff;
}
vj = slhc_init(val2+1, val+1);
if (IS_ERR(vj)) {
err = PTR_ERR(vj);
break;
}
ppp_lock(ppp);
if (ppp->vj)
slhc_free(ppp->vj);
ppp->vj = vj;
ppp_unlock(ppp);
err = 0;
break;
case PPPIOCGNPMODE:
case PPPIOCSNPMODE:
if (copy_from_user(&npi, argp, sizeof(npi)))
break;
err = proto_to_npindex(npi.protocol);
if (err < 0)
break;
i = err;
if (cmd == PPPIOCGNPMODE) {
err = -EFAULT;
npi.mode = ppp->npmode[i];
if (copy_to_user(argp, &npi, sizeof(npi)))
break;
} else {
ppp->npmode[i] = npi.mode;
/* we may be able to transmit more packets now (??) */
netif_wake_queue(ppp->dev);
}
err = 0;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_FILTER
case PPPIOCSPASS:
{
struct sock_filter *code;
err = get_filter(argp, &code);
if (err >= 0) {
struct bpf_prog *pass_filter = NULL;
struct sock_fprog_kern fprog = {
.len = err,
.filter = code,
};
err = 0;
if (fprog.filter)
err = bpf_prog_create(&pass_filter, &fprog);
if (!err) {
ppp_lock(ppp);
if (ppp->pass_filter)
bpf_prog_destroy(ppp->pass_filter);
ppp->pass_filter = pass_filter;
ppp_unlock(ppp);
}
kfree(code);
}
break;
}
case PPPIOCSACTIVE:
{
struct sock_filter *code;
err = get_filter(argp, &code);
if (err >= 0) {
struct bpf_prog *active_filter = NULL;
struct sock_fprog_kern fprog = {
.len = err,
.filter = code,
};
err = 0;
if (fprog.filter)
err = bpf_prog_create(&active_filter, &fprog);
if (!err) {
ppp_lock(ppp);
if (ppp->active_filter)
bpf_prog_destroy(ppp->active_filter);
ppp->active_filter = active_filter;
ppp_unlock(ppp);
}
kfree(code);
}
break;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_FILTER */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK
case PPPIOCSMRRU:
if (get_user(val, p))
break;
ppp_recv_lock(ppp);
ppp->mrru = val;
ppp_recv_unlock(ppp);
err = 0;
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK */
default:
err = -ENOTTY;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&ppp_mutex);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response StorageHandler::Disable() {
if (cache_storage_observer_) {
BrowserThread::DeleteSoon(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
cache_storage_observer_.release());
}
if (indexed_db_observer_) {
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> observer_task_runner =
indexed_db_observer_->TaskRunner();
observer_task_runner->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE,
std::move(indexed_db_observer_));
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebMediaPlayerMS::HasSingleSecurityOrigin() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 172,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ContextualSearchFieldTrial::GetIntParamValueOrDefault(
const std::string& name,
const int default_value,
bool* is_value_cached,
int* cached_value) {
if (!*is_value_cached) {
*is_value_cached = true;
std::string param_string = GetSwitch(name);
if (param_string.empty())
param_string = GetParam(name);
int param_int;
if (!param_string.empty() && base::StringToInt(param_string, ¶m_int))
*cached_value = param_int;
else
*cached_value = default_value;
}
return *cached_value;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::doAppend(const QString& newLine, bool rtl, bool self)
{
if (m_rememberLineDirtyBit)
appendRememberLine();
if (!self && m_chatWin)
m_chatWin->activateTabNotification(m_tabNotification);
int scrollMax = Preferences::self()->scrollbackMax();
if (scrollMax != 0)
{
bool atBottom = (verticalScrollBar()->value() == verticalScrollBar()->maximum());
document()->setMaximumBlockCount(atBottom ? scrollMax : document()->maximumBlockCount() + 1);
}
doRawAppend(newLine, rtl);
if (!m_autoTextToSend.isEmpty() && m_server)
{
QString sendText = m_server->parseWildcards(m_autoTextToSend,m_server->getNickname(), QString(), QString(), QString(), QString());
m_autoTextToSend.clear();
emit autoText(sendText);
}
else
{
m_autoTextToSend.clear();
}
if (!m_lastStatusText.isEmpty())
emit clearStatusBarTempText();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init printk_late_init(void)
{
struct console *con;
for_each_console(con) {
if (!keep_bootcon && con->flags & CON_BOOT) {
printk(KERN_INFO "turn off boot console %s%d\n",
con->name, con->index);
unregister_console(con);
}
}
hotcpu_notifier(console_cpu_notify, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: printk: fix buffer overflow when calling log_prefix function from call_console_drivers
This patch corrects a buffer overflow in kernels from 3.0 to 3.4 when calling
log_prefix() function from call_console_drivers().
This bug existed in previous releases but has been revealed with commit
162a7e7500f9664636e649ba59defe541b7c2c60 (2.6.39 => 3.0) that made changes
about how to allocate memory for early printk buffer (use of memblock_alloc).
It disappears with commit 7ff9554bb578ba02166071d2d487b7fc7d860d62 (3.4 => 3.5)
that does a refactoring of printk buffer management.
In log_prefix(), the access to "p[0]", "p[1]", "p[2]" or
"simple_strtoul(&p[1], &endp, 10)" may cause a buffer overflow as this
function is called from call_console_drivers by passing "&LOG_BUF(cur_index)"
where the index must be masked to do not exceed the buffer's boundary.
The trick is to prepare in call_console_drivers() a buffer with the necessary
data (PRI field of syslog message) to be safely evaluated in log_prefix().
This patch can be applied to stable kernel branches 3.0.y, 3.2.y and 3.4.y.
Without this patch, one can freeze a server running this loop from shell :
$ export DUMMY=`cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc '12345AZERTYUIOPQSDFGHJKLMWXCVBNazertyuiopqsdfghjklmwxcvbn' | head -c255`
$ while true do ; echo $DUMMY > /dev/kmsg ; done
The "server freeze" depends on where memblock_alloc does allocate printk buffer :
if the buffer overflow is inside another kernel allocation the problem may not
be revealed, else the server may hangs up.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre SIMON <Alexandre.Simon@univ-lorraine.fr>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebView* CreatedWebView() const { return web_view_helper_.GetWebView(); }
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DisplayItemClient& TestPaintArtifact::Client(size_t i) const {
return *dummy_clients_[i];
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncManager::SyncInternal::SetDecryptionPassphrase(
const KeyParams& key_params,
bool nigori_has_explicit_passphrase,
bool is_explicit,
bool user_provided,
Cryptographer* cryptographer,
std::string *bootstrap_token) {
if (!cryptographer->has_pending_keys()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Attempt to set decryption passphrase failed because there "
<< "were no pending keys.";
return false;
}
if (!nigori_has_explicit_passphrase) {
if (!is_explicit) {
if (!user_provided) {
if (cryptographer->DecryptPendingKeys(key_params)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit internal passphrase accepted for decryption.";
cryptographer->GetBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token);
return true;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit internal passphrase failed to decrypt, adding "
<< "anyways as default passphrase and persisting via "
<< "bootstrap token.";
Cryptographer temp_cryptographer;
temp_cryptographer.AddKey(key_params);
temp_cryptographer.GetBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token);
cryptographer->AddKey(key_params);
return false;
}
} else { // user_provided == true
if (cryptographer->is_initialized()) {
Cryptographer temp_cryptographer;
temp_cryptographer.SetPendingKeys(cryptographer->GetPendingKeys());
if (temp_cryptographer.DecryptPendingKeys(key_params)) {
sync_pb::EncryptedData encrypted;
cryptographer->GetKeys(&encrypted);
if (temp_cryptographer.CanDecrypt(encrypted)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit user provided passphrase accepted for "
<< "decryption, overwriting default.";
cryptographer->DecryptPendingKeys(key_params);
cryptographer->GetBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token);
return true;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit user provided passphrase accepted for "
<< "decryption, restoring implicit internal passphrase "
<< "as default.";
std::string bootstrap_token_from_current_key;
cryptographer->GetBootstrapToken(
&bootstrap_token_from_current_key);
cryptographer->DecryptPendingKeys(key_params);
cryptographer->AddKeyFromBootstrapToken(
bootstrap_token_from_current_key);
return true;
}
}
} else if (cryptographer->DecryptPendingKeys(key_params)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit user provided passphrase accepted, initializing"
<< " cryptographer.";
return true;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit user provided passphrase failed to decrypt.";
return false;
}
} // user_provided
} else { // is_explicit == true
DVLOG(1) << "Explicit passphrase failed to decrypt because nigori had "
<< "implicit passphrase.";
return false;
} // is_explicit
} else { // nigori_has_explicit_passphrase == true
if (!is_explicit) {
DVLOG(1) << "Implicit passphrase rejected because nigori had explicit "
<< "passphrase.";
return false;
} else { // is_explicit == true
if (cryptographer->DecryptPendingKeys(key_params)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Explicit passphrase accepted for decryption.";
cryptographer->GetBootstrapToken(bootstrap_token);
return true;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Explicit passphrase failed to decrypt.";
return false;
}
} // is_explicit
} // nigori_has_explicit_passphrase
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,845 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(ScopedSharedBufferHandle handle,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* memory_handle,
size_t* size,
bool* read_only) {
if (!handle.is_valid())
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
MojoPlatformHandle platform_handle;
platform_handle.struct_size = sizeof(MojoPlatformHandle);
MojoPlatformSharedBufferHandleFlags flags;
size_t num_bytes;
MojoSharedBufferGuid mojo_guid;
MojoResult result = MojoUnwrapPlatformSharedBufferHandle(
handle.release().value(), &platform_handle, &num_bytes, &mojo_guid,
&flags);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
if (size)
*size = num_bytes;
if (read_only)
*read_only = flags & MOJO_PLATFORM_SHARED_BUFFER_HANDLE_FLAG_READ_ONLY;
base::UnguessableToken guid =
base::UnguessableToken::Deserialize(mojo_guid.high, mojo_guid.low);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_MACH_PORT);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
static_cast<mach_port_t>(platform_handle.value), num_bytes, guid);
#elif defined(OS_FUCHSIA)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FUCHSIA_HANDLE);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
static_cast<zx_handle_t>(platform_handle.value), num_bytes, guid);
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_FILE_DESCRIPTOR);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
base::FileDescriptor(static_cast<int>(platform_handle.value), false),
num_bytes, guid);
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK_EQ(platform_handle.type, MOJO_PLATFORM_HANDLE_TYPE_WINDOWS_HANDLE);
*memory_handle = base::SharedMemoryHandle(
reinterpret_cast<HANDLE>(platform_handle.value), num_bytes, guid);
#endif
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::BooleanMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_booleanMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::BooleanMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: correlation_coefficient(double sxx, double syy, double sxy)
{
double coe, tmp;
tmp = sxx * syy;
if (tmp < Tiny)
tmp = Tiny;
coe = sxy / sqrt(tmp);
if (coe > 1.)
return 1.;
if (coe < -1.)
return -1.;
return coe;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnJavaScriptExecuteRequestForTests(
const base::string16& jscript,
int id,
bool notify_result,
bool has_user_gesture) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_tracing", "OnJavaScriptExecuteRequestForTests",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
std::unique_ptr<blink::WebScopedUserGesture> gesture(
has_user_gesture ? new blink::WebScopedUserGesture(frame_) : nullptr);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(blink::MainThreadIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Value> result = frame_->ExecuteScriptAndReturnValue(
WebScriptSource(WebString::FromUTF16(jscript)));
HandleJavascriptExecutionResult(jscript, id, notify_result, result);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~PanelWindowResizerTextDirectionTest() {}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dmxProcRenderFreeGlyphSet(ClientPtr client)
{
GlyphSetPtr glyphSet;
REQUEST(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderFreeGlyphSetReq);
dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &glyphSet,
stuff->glyphset, GlyphSetType,
client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (glyphSet && glyphSet->refcnt == 1) {
dmxGlyphPrivPtr glyphPriv = DMX_GET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dmxNumScreens; i++) {
DMXScreenInfo *dmxScreen = &dmxScreens[i];
if (dmxScreen->beDisplay) {
if (dmxBEFreeGlyphSet(screenInfo.screens[i], glyphSet))
dmxSync(dmxScreen, FALSE);
}
}
MAXSCREENSFREE(glyphPriv->glyphSets);
free(glyphPriv);
DMX_SET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet, NULL);
}
return dmxSaveRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::CopySelectionIfNeeded(
const WebPreferences& preferences,
const base::Closure& on_ready) {
on_ready_ = on_ready;
if (should_print_selection_only_) {
CopySelection(preferences);
} else {
CallOnReady();
}
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderViewImpl::runFileChooser(
const WebKit::WebFileChooserParams& params,
WebFileChooserCompletion* chooser_completion) {
if (is_hidden())
return false;
content::FileChooserParams ipc_params;
if (params.directory)
ipc_params.mode = content::FileChooserParams::OpenFolder;
else if (params.multiSelect)
ipc_params.mode = content::FileChooserParams::OpenMultiple;
else if (params.saveAs)
ipc_params.mode = content::FileChooserParams::Save;
else
ipc_params.mode = content::FileChooserParams::Open;
ipc_params.title = params.title;
ipc_params.default_file_name =
webkit_glue::WebStringToFilePath(params.initialValue);
ipc_params.accept_types.reserve(params.acceptMIMETypes.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < params.acceptMIMETypes.size(); ++i)
ipc_params.accept_types.push_back(params.acceptMIMETypes[i]);
return ScheduleFileChooser(ipc_params, chooser_completion);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib4f(
GLuint index, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1, GLfloat v2, GLfloat v3) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_.GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttrib4f: index out of range");
return;
}
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 value;
value.v[0] = v0;
value.v[1] = v1;
value.v[2] = v2;
value.v[3] = v3;
info->set_value(value);
glVertexAttrib4f(index, v0, v1, v2, v3);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntSize PaintLayerScrollableArea::MinimumScrollOffsetInt() const {
return ToIntSize(-ScrollOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool NeedsPaintOffsetTranslationForScrollbars(
const LayoutBoxModelObject& object) {
if (auto* area = object.GetScrollableArea()) {
if (area->HorizontalScrollbar() || area->VerticalScrollbar())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_SetNotationDeclHandler(XML_Parser parser, XML_NotationDeclHandler handler) {
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_notationDeclHandler = handler;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_next_page( VipsForeignLoadGif *gif )
{
GifRecordType record;
gboolean have_read_frame;
have_read_frame = FALSE;
do {
if( DGifGetRecordType( gif->file, &record ) == GIF_ERROR ) {
vips_foreign_load_gif_error( gif );
return( -1 );
}
switch( record ) {
case IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE:
VIPS_DEBUG_MSG( "vips_foreign_load_gif_next_page: "
"IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE\n" );
if( DGifGetImageDesc( gif->file ) == GIF_ERROR ) {
vips_foreign_load_gif_error( gif );
return( -1 );
}
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_render( gif ) )
return( -1 );
have_read_frame = TRUE;
break;
case EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE:
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_extension( gif ) )
return( -1 );
break;
case TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE:
VIPS_DEBUG_MSG( "vips_foreign_load_gif_next_page: "
"TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE\n" );
gif->eof = TRUE;
break;
case SCREEN_DESC_RECORD_TYPE:
VIPS_DEBUG_MSG( "vips_foreign_load_gif_next_page: "
"SCREEN_DESC_RECORD_TYPE\n" );
break;
case UNDEFINED_RECORD_TYPE:
VIPS_DEBUG_MSG( "vips_foreign_load_gif_next_page: "
"UNDEFINED_RECORD_TYPE\n" );
break;
default:
break;
}
} while( !have_read_frame &&
!gif->eof );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pf_start(struct pf_unit *pf, int cmd, int b, int c)
{
int i;
char io_cmd[12] = { cmd, pf->lun << 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
io_cmd[5 - i] = b & 0xff;
b = b >> 8;
}
io_cmd[8] = c & 0xff;
io_cmd[7] = (c >> 8) & 0xff;
i = pf_command(pf, io_cmd, c * 512, "start i/o");
mdelay(1);
return i;
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 88,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sc_card_driver * sc_get_rtecp_driver(void)
{
if (iso_ops == NULL)
iso_ops = sc_get_iso7816_driver()->ops;
rtecp_ops = *iso_ops;
rtecp_ops.match_card = rtecp_match_card;
rtecp_ops.init = rtecp_init;
/* read_binary */
rtecp_ops.write_binary = NULL;
/* update_binary */
rtecp_ops.read_record = NULL;
rtecp_ops.write_record = NULL;
rtecp_ops.append_record = NULL;
rtecp_ops.update_record = NULL;
rtecp_ops.select_file = rtecp_select_file;
rtecp_ops.get_response = NULL;
/* get_challenge */
rtecp_ops.verify = rtecp_verify;
rtecp_ops.logout = rtecp_logout;
/* restore_security_env */
/* set_security_env */
rtecp_ops.decipher = rtecp_decipher;
rtecp_ops.compute_signature = rtecp_compute_signature;
rtecp_ops.change_reference_data = rtecp_change_reference_data;
rtecp_ops.reset_retry_counter = rtecp_reset_retry_counter;
rtecp_ops.create_file = rtecp_create_file;
/* delete_file */
rtecp_ops.list_files = rtecp_list_files;
/* check_sw */
rtecp_ops.card_ctl = rtecp_card_ctl;
/* process_fci */
rtecp_ops.construct_fci = rtecp_construct_fci;
rtecp_ops.pin_cmd = NULL;
return &rtecp_drv;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int uvesafb_is_valid_mode(struct fb_videomode *mode,
struct fb_info *info)
{
if (info->monspecs.gtf) {
fb_videomode_to_var(&info->var, mode);
if (fb_validate_mode(&info->var, info))
return 0;
}
if (uvesafb_vbe_find_mode(info->par, mode->xres, mode->yres, 8,
UVESAFB_EXACT_RES) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation
cmap->len can get close to INT_MAX/2, allowing for an integer overflow in
allocation. This uses kmalloc_array() instead to catch the condition.
Reported-by: Dr Silvio Cesare of InfoSect <silvio.cesare@gmail.com>
Fixes: 8bdb3a2d7df48 ("uvesafb: the driver core")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string PDFiumEngine::GetMetadata(const std::string& key) {
return GetDocumentMetadata(doc(), key);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bin_info(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr) {
int i, j, v;
char str[R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE];
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (r->bin);
RBinFile *bf = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
if (!bf) {
return false;
}
RBinObject *obj = bf->o;
const char *compiled = NULL;
bool havecode;
if (!bf || !info || !obj) {
if (mode & R_MODE_JSON) {
r_cons_printf ("{}");
}
return false;
}
havecode = is_executable (obj) | (obj->entries != NULL);
compiled = get_compile_time (bf->sdb);
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_config_set (r->config, "file.type", info->rclass);
r_config_set (r->config, "cfg.bigendian",
info->big_endian ? "true" : "false");
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "fs")) {
} else {
if (info->lang) {
r_config_set (r->config, "bin.lang", info->lang);
}
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.os", info->os);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "pe")) {
r_config_set (r->config, "anal.cpp.abi", "msvc");
} else {
r_config_set (r->config, "anal.cpp.abi", "itanium");
}
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.arch", info->arch);
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.cpu", info->cpu);
}
r_config_set (r->config, "anal.arch", info->arch);
snprintf (str, R_FLAG_NAME_SIZE, "%i", info->bits);
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.bits", str);
r_config_set (r->config, "asm.dwarf",
(R_BIN_DBG_STRIPPED & info->dbg_info) ? "false" : "true");
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) {
r_config_set_i (r->config, "asm.pcalign", v);
}
}
r_core_anal_type_init (r);
r_core_anal_cc_init (r);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("arch %s\n", info->arch);
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
r_cons_printf ("cpu %s\n", info->cpu);
}
r_cons_printf ("bits %d\n", info->bits);
r_cons_printf ("os %s\n", info->os);
r_cons_printf ("endian %s\n", info->big_endian? "big": "little");
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MIN_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("minopsz %d\n", v);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MAX_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("maxopsz %d\n", v);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("pcalign %d\n", v);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
if (info->type && !strcmp (info->type, "fs")) {
r_cons_printf ("e file.type=fs\n");
r_cons_printf ("m /root %s 0\n", info->arch);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("e cfg.bigendian=%s\n"
"e asm.bits=%i\n"
"e asm.dwarf=%s\n",
r_str_bool (info->big_endian),
info->bits,
r_str_bool (R_BIN_DBG_STRIPPED &info->dbg_info));
if (info->lang && *info->lang) {
r_cons_printf ("e bin.lang=%s\n", info->lang);
}
if (info->rclass && *info->rclass) {
r_cons_printf ("e file.type=%s\n",
info->rclass);
}
if (info->os) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.os=%s\n", info->os);
}
if (info->arch) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.arch=%s\n", info->arch);
}
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.cpu=%s\n", info->cpu);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) {
r_cons_printf ("e asm.pcalign=%d\n", v);
}
}
} else {
char *tmp_buf;
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{");
}
pair_str ("arch", info->arch, mode, false);
if (info->cpu && *info->cpu) {
pair_str ("cpu", info->cpu, mode, false);
}
pair_ut64x ("baddr", r_bin_get_baddr (r->bin), mode, false);
pair_ut64 ("binsz", r_bin_get_size (r->bin), mode, false);
pair_str ("bintype", info->rclass, mode, false);
pair_int ("bits", info->bits, mode, false);
pair_bool ("canary", info->has_canary, mode, false);
if (info->has_retguard != -1) {
pair_bool ("retguard", info->has_retguard, mode, false);
}
pair_str ("class", info->bclass, mode, false);
if (info->actual_checksum) {
/* computed checksum */
pair_str ("cmp.csum", info->actual_checksum, mode, false);
}
pair_str ("compiled", compiled, mode, false);
pair_str ("compiler", info->compiler, mode, false);
pair_bool ("crypto", info->has_crypto, mode, false);
pair_str ("dbg_file", info->debug_file_name, mode, false);
pair_str ("endian", info->big_endian ? "big" : "little", mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "mdmp")) {
tmp_buf = sdb_get (bf->sdb, "mdmp.flags", 0);
if (tmp_buf) {
pair_str ("flags", tmp_buf, mode, false);
free (tmp_buf);
}
}
pair_bool ("havecode", havecode, mode, false);
if (info->claimed_checksum) {
/* checksum specified in header */
pair_str ("hdr.csum", info->claimed_checksum, mode, false);
}
pair_str ("guid", info->guid, mode, false);
pair_str ("intrp", info->intrp, mode, false);
pair_ut64x ("laddr", laddr, mode, false);
pair_str ("lang", info->lang, mode, false);
pair_bool ("linenum", R_BIN_DBG_LINENUMS & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
pair_bool ("lsyms", R_BIN_DBG_SYMS & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
pair_str ("machine", info->machine, mode, false);
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MAX_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("maxopsz", v, mode, false);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_MIN_OP_SIZE);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("minopsz", v, mode, false);
}
pair_bool ("nx", info->has_nx, mode, false);
pair_str ("os", info->os, mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "pe")) {
pair_bool ("overlay", info->pe_overlay, mode, false);
}
v = r_anal_archinfo (r->anal, R_ANAL_ARCHINFO_ALIGN);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("pcalign", v, mode, false);
}
pair_bool ("pic", info->has_pi, mode, false);
pair_bool ("relocs", R_BIN_DBG_RELOCS & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
Sdb *sdb_info = sdb_ns (obj->kv, "info", false);
tmp_buf = sdb_get (sdb_info, "elf.relro", 0);
if (tmp_buf) {
pair_str ("relro", tmp_buf, mode, false);
free (tmp_buf);
}
pair_str ("rpath", info->rpath, mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "pe")) {
pair_bool ("signed", info->signature, mode, false);
}
pair_bool ("sanitiz", info->has_sanitizers, mode, false);
pair_bool ("static", r_bin_is_static (r->bin), mode, false);
if (info->rclass && !strcmp (info->rclass, "mdmp")) {
v = sdb_num_get (bf->sdb, "mdmp.streams", 0);
if (v != -1) {
pair_int ("streams", v, mode, false);
}
}
pair_bool ("stripped", R_BIN_DBG_STRIPPED & info->dbg_info, mode, false);
pair_str ("subsys", info->subsystem, mode, false);
pair_bool ("va", info->has_va, mode, true);
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (",\"checksums\":{");
for (i = 0; info->sum[i].type; i++) {
RBinHash *h = &info->sum[i];
ut64 hash = r_hash_name_to_bits (h->type);
RHash *rh = r_hash_new (true, hash);
ut8 *tmp = R_NEWS (ut8, h->to);
if (!tmp) {
return false;
}
r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, h->from, tmp, h->to);
int len = r_hash_calculate (rh, hash, tmp, h->to);
free (tmp);
if (len < 1) {
eprintf ("Invalid checksum length\n");
}
r_hash_free (rh);
r_cons_printf ("%s\"%s\":{\"hex\":\"", i?",": "", h->type);
for (j = 0; j < h->len; j++) {
r_cons_printf ("%02x", h->buf[j]);
}
r_cons_printf ("\"}");
}
r_cons_printf ("}");
} else {
for (i = 0; info->sum[i].type; i++) {
RBinHash *h = &info->sum[i];
ut64 hash = r_hash_name_to_bits (h->type);
RHash *rh = r_hash_new (true, hash);
ut8 *tmp = R_NEWS (ut8, h->to);
if (!tmp) {
return false;
}
r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, h->from, tmp, h->to);
int len = r_hash_calculate (rh, hash, tmp, h->to);
free (tmp);
if (len < 1) {
eprintf ("Invalid wtf\n");
}
r_hash_free (rh);
r_cons_printf ("%s %d-%dc ", h->type, h->from, h->to+h->from);
for (j = 0; j < h->len; j++) {
r_cons_printf ("%02x", h->buf[j]);
}
r_cons_newline ();
}
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("}");
}
}
const char *dir_prefix = r_config_get (r->config, "dir.prefix");
char *spath = sdb_fmt ("%s/"R2_SDB_FCNSIGN"/spec.sdb", dir_prefix);
if (r_file_exists (spath)) {
sdb_concat_by_path (r->anal->sdb_fmts, spath);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 96,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CommandsIssuedQuery::Process() {
NOTREACHED();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hcom_client_send_data
(
IN p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t p_hdl,
IN int timeout_s,
IN hsm_com_datagram_t *data,
OUT hsm_com_datagram_t *res
)
{
if(p_hdl->client_state == HSM_COM_C_STATE_CT)
return unix_sck_send_data(p_hdl, timeout_s, data, res);
return HSM_COM_NOT_CONNECTED;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void traverse_for_entities(
const char *old,
size_t oldlen,
char *ret, /* should have allocated TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(olden) */
size_t *retlen,
int all,
int flags,
const entity_ht *inv_map,
enum entity_charset charset)
{
const char *p,
*lim;
char *q;
int doctype = flags & ENT_HTML_DOC_TYPE_MASK;
lim = old + oldlen; /* terminator address */
assert(*lim == '\0');
for (p = old, q = ret; p < lim;) {
unsigned code, code2 = 0;
const char *next = NULL; /* when set, next > p, otherwise possible inf loop */
/* Shift JIS, Big5 and HKSCS use multi-byte encodings where an
* ASCII range byte can be part of a multi-byte sequence.
* However, they start at 0x40, therefore if we find a 0x26 byte,
* we're sure it represents the '&' character. */
/* assumes there are no single-char entities */
if (p[0] != '&' || (p + 3 >= lim)) {
*(q++) = *(p++);
continue;
}
/* now p[3] is surely valid and is no terminator */
/* numerical entity */
if (p[1] == '#') {
next = &p[2];
if (process_numeric_entity(&next, &code) == FAILURE)
goto invalid_code;
/* If we're in htmlspecialchars_decode, we're only decoding entities
* that represent &, <, >, " and '. Is this one of them? */
if (!all && (code > 63U ||
stage3_table_be_apos_00000[code].data.ent.entity == NULL))
goto invalid_code;
/* are we allowed to decode this entity in this document type?
* HTML 5 is the only that has a character that cannot be used in
* a numeric entity but is allowed literally (U+000D). The
* unoptimized version would be ... || !numeric_entity_is_allowed(code) */
if (!unicode_cp_is_allowed(code, doctype) ||
(doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5 && code == 0x0D))
goto invalid_code;
} else {
const char *start;
size_t ent_len;
next = &p[1];
start = next;
if (process_named_entity_html(&next, &start, &ent_len) == FAILURE)
goto invalid_code;
if (resolve_named_entity_html(start, ent_len, inv_map, &code, &code2) == FAILURE) {
if (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_XHTML && ent_len == 4 && start[0] == 'a'
&& start[1] == 'p' && start[2] == 'o' && start[3] == 's') {
/* uses html4 inv_map, which doesn't include apos;. This is a
* hack to support it */
code = (unsigned) '\'';
} else {
goto invalid_code;
}
}
}
assert(*next == ';');
if (((code == '\'' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_SINGLE)) ||
(code == '"' && !(flags & ENT_HTML_QUOTE_DOUBLE)))
/* && code2 == '\0' always true for current maps */)
goto invalid_code;
/* UTF-8 doesn't need mapping (ISO-8859-1 doesn't either, but
* the call is needed to ensure the codepoint <= U+00FF) */
if (charset != cs_utf_8) {
/* replace unicode code point */
if (map_from_unicode(code, charset, &code) == FAILURE || code2 != 0)
goto invalid_code; /* not representable in target charset */
}
q += write_octet_sequence(q, charset, code);
if (code2) {
q += write_octet_sequence(q, charset, code2);
}
/* jump over the valid entity; may go beyond size of buffer; np */
p = next + 1;
continue;
invalid_code:
for (; p < next; p++) {
*(q++) = *p;
}
}
*q = '\0';
*retlen = (size_t)(q - ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_EQ( FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = ( args[0] == args[1] );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline static char xml_decode_iso_8859_1(unsigned short c)
{
return (char)(c > 0xff ? '?' : c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void notify_cmos_timer(void) { }
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::Router(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = args.Data().As<v8::Object>();
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
v8::Local<v8::Value> handler_function_value;
v8::Local<v8::Value> feature_name_value;
if (!GetPrivate(context, data, kHandlerFunction, &handler_function_value) ||
handler_function_value->IsUndefined() ||
!GetPrivate(context, data, kFeatureName, &feature_name_value) ||
!feature_name_value->IsString()) {
ScriptContext* script_context =
ScriptContextSet::GetContextByV8Context(context);
console::Error(script_context ? script_context->GetRenderFrame() : nullptr,
"Extension view no longer exists");
return;
}
if (content::WorkerThread::GetCurrentId() == 0) {
ScriptContext* script_context =
ScriptContextSet::GetContextByV8Context(context);
v8::Local<v8::String> feature_name_string =
feature_name_value->ToString(context).ToLocalChecked();
std::string feature_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(feature_name_string);
if (script_context &&
!feature_name.empty() &&
!script_context->GetAvailability(feature_name).is_available()) {
return;
}
}
CHECK(handler_function_value->IsExternal());
static_cast<HandlerFunction*>(
handler_function_value.As<v8::External>()->Value())->Run(args);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,430 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_destroy_id(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_destroy_id cmd;
struct rdma_ucm_destroy_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret = 0;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&mut);
ctx = _ucma_find_context(cmd.id, file);
if (!IS_ERR(ctx))
idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut);
ctx->destroying = 1;
mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut);
flush_workqueue(ctx->file->close_wq);
/* At this point it's guaranteed that there is no inflight
* closing task */
mutex_lock(&mut);
if (!ctx->closing) {
mutex_unlock(&mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
wait_for_completion(&ctx->comp);
rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id);
} else {
mutex_unlock(&mut);
}
resp.events_reported = ucma_free_ctx(ctx);
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(unsigned long)cmd.response,
&resp, sizeof(resp)))
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppListController::ShowAppList(Profile* requested_profile) {
DCHECK(requested_profile);
ScopedKeepAlive show_app_list_keepalive;
content::BrowserThread::PostBlockingPoolTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(SetDidRunForNDayActiveStats));
if (win8::IsSingleWindowMetroMode()) {
chrome::AppMetroInfoBarDelegateWin::Create(
requested_profile,
chrome::AppMetroInfoBarDelegateWin::SHOW_APP_LIST,
std::string());
return;
}
InvalidatePendingProfileLoads();
if (IsAppListVisible() && (requested_profile == profile())) {
current_view_->GetWidget()->Show();
current_view_->GetWidget()->Activate();
return;
}
SaveProfilePathToLocalState(requested_profile->GetPath());
DismissAppList();
PopulateViewFromProfile(requested_profile);
DCHECK(current_view_);
EnsureHaveKeepAliveForView();
gfx::Point cursor = gfx::Screen::GetNativeScreen()->GetCursorScreenPoint();
UpdateArrowPositionAndAnchorPoint(cursor);
current_view_->GetWidget()->Show();
current_view_->GetWidget()->GetTopLevelWidget()->UpdateWindowIcon();
current_view_->GetWidget()->Activate();
RecordAppListLaunch();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 113,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ppp_sock_fprog_ioctl_trans(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct sock_fprog32 __user *u_fprog32)
{
struct sock_fprog __user *u_fprog64 = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct sock_fprog));
void __user *fptr64;
u32 fptr32;
u16 flen;
if (get_user(flen, &u_fprog32->len) ||
get_user(fptr32, &u_fprog32->filter))
return -EFAULT;
fptr64 = compat_ptr(fptr32);
if (put_user(flen, &u_fprog64->len) ||
put_user(fptr64, &u_fprog64->filter))
return -EFAULT;
if (cmd == PPPIOCSPASS32)
cmd = PPPIOCSPASS;
else
cmd = PPPIOCSACTIVE;
return sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) u_fprog64);
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripGtk::DropInfo::CreateContainer() {
container = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_POPUP);
SetContainerColorMap();
gtk_widget_set_app_paintable(container, TRUE);
g_signal_connect(container, "expose-event",
G_CALLBACK(OnExposeEventThunk), this);
gtk_widget_add_events(container, GDK_STRUCTURE_MASK);
gtk_window_move(GTK_WINDOW(container), 0, 0);
gtk_window_resize(GTK_WINDOW(container),
drop_indicator_width, drop_indicator_height);
gtk_widget_show_all(container);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,071 |
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