instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
{
if (s->method == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
return(0);
}
if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
{
SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
s->session=NULL;
}
s->error=0;
s->hit=0;
s->shutdown=0;
#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
* needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
/* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
* the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
#else
if (s->renegotiate)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
#endif
s->type=0;
s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
s->version=s->method->version;
s->client_version=s->version;
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
#if 0
s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
#endif
if (s->init_buf != NULL)
{
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
}
ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
s->first_packet=0;
#if 1
/* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
* so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
{
s->method->ssl_free(s);
s->method=s->ctx->method;
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
return(0);
}
else
#endif
s->method->ssl_clear(s);
return(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlock::availableLogicalWidth() const
{
if (hasColumns())
return desiredColumnWidth();
return RenderBox::availableLogicalWidth();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct attr *bgp_attr_default_set(struct attr *attr, uint8_t origin)
{
memset(attr, 0, sizeof(struct attr));
attr->origin = origin;
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN);
attr->aspath = aspath_empty();
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH);
attr->weight = BGP_ATTR_DEFAULT_WEIGHT;
attr->tag = 0;
attr->label_index = BGP_INVALID_LABEL_INDEX;
attr->label = MPLS_INVALID_LABEL;
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP);
attr->mp_nexthop_len = IPV6_MAX_BYTELEN;
return attr;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 91,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gcry_cipher_gcm_tag (gcry_cipher_hd_t c,
byte * outbuf, size_t outbuflen, int check)
{
if (!(is_tag_length_valid (outbuflen) || outbuflen >= GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN))
return GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH;
if (c->u_mode.gcm.datalen_over_limits)
return GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH;
if (!c->marks.tag)
{
u32 bitlengths[2][2];
if (!c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_fn)
return GPG_ERR_INV_STATE;
/* aad length */
bitlengths[0][1] = be_bswap32(c->u_mode.gcm.aadlen[0] << 3);
bitlengths[0][0] = be_bswap32((c->u_mode.gcm.aadlen[0] >> 29) |
(c->u_mode.gcm.aadlen[1] << 3));
/* data length */
bitlengths[1][1] = be_bswap32(c->u_mode.gcm.datalen[0] << 3);
bitlengths[1][0] = be_bswap32((c->u_mode.gcm.datalen[0] >> 29) |
(c->u_mode.gcm.datalen[1] << 3));
/* Finalize data-stream. */
do_ghash_buf(c, c->u_mode.gcm.u_tag.tag, NULL, 0, 1);
c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_aad_finalized = 1;
c->u_mode.gcm.ghash_data_finalized = 1;
/* Add bitlengths to tag. */
do_ghash_buf(c, c->u_mode.gcm.u_tag.tag, (byte*)bitlengths,
GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN, 1);
cipher_block_xor (c->u_mode.gcm.u_tag.tag, c->u_mode.gcm.tagiv,
c->u_mode.gcm.u_tag.tag, GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
c->marks.tag = 1;
wipememory (bitlengths, sizeof (bitlengths));
wipememory (c->u_mode.gcm.macbuf, GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
wipememory (c->u_mode.gcm.tagiv, GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN);
wipememory (c->u_mode.gcm.aadlen, sizeof (c->u_mode.gcm.aadlen));
wipememory (c->u_mode.gcm.datalen, sizeof (c->u_mode.gcm.datalen));
}
if (!check)
{
if (outbuflen > GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN)
outbuflen = GCRY_GCM_BLOCK_LEN;
/* NB: We already checked that OUTBUF is large enough to hold
* the result or has valid truncated length. */
memcpy (outbuf, c->u_mode.gcm.u_tag.tag, outbuflen);
}
else
{
/* OUTBUFLEN gives the length of the user supplied tag in OUTBUF
* and thus we need to compare its length first. */
if (!is_tag_length_valid (outbuflen)
|| !buf_eq_const (outbuf, c->u_mode.gcm.u_tag.tag, outbuflen))
return GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 89,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wc_ecc_shared_secret_gen_sync(ecc_key* private_key, ecc_point* point,
byte* out, word32* outlen, ecc_curve_spec* curve)
{
int err;
#ifndef WOLFSSL_SP_MATH
ecc_point* result = NULL;
word32 x = 0;
#endif
mp_int* k = &private_key->k;
#ifdef HAVE_ECC_CDH
mp_int k_lcl;
/* if cofactor flag has been set */
if (private_key->flags & WC_ECC_FLAG_COFACTOR) {
mp_digit cofactor = (mp_digit)private_key->dp->cofactor;
/* only perform cofactor calc if not equal to 1 */
if (cofactor != 1) {
k = &k_lcl;
if (mp_init(k) != MP_OKAY)
return MEMORY_E;
/* multiply cofactor times private key "k" */
err = mp_mul_d(&private_key->k, cofactor, k);
if (err != MP_OKAY) {
mp_clear(k);
return err;
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef WOLFSSL_HAVE_SP_ECC
#ifndef WOLFSSL_SP_NO_256
if (private_key->idx != ECC_CUSTOM_IDX &&
ecc_sets[private_key->idx].id == ECC_SECP256R1) {
err = sp_ecc_secret_gen_256(k, point, out, outlen, private_key->heap);
}
else
#endif
#endif
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SP_MATH
{
err = WC_KEY_SIZE_E;
(void)curve;
}
#else
{
/* make new point */
result = wc_ecc_new_point_h(private_key->heap);
if (result == NULL) {
#ifdef HAVE_ECC_CDH
if (k == &k_lcl)
mp_clear(k);
#endif
return MEMORY_E;
}
err = wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(k, point, result, curve->Af, curve->prime, 1,
private_key->heap);
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
x = mp_unsigned_bin_size(curve->prime);
if (*outlen < x) {
err = BUFFER_E;
}
}
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
XMEMSET(out, 0, x);
err = mp_to_unsigned_bin(result->x,out +
(x - mp_unsigned_bin_size(result->x)));
}
*outlen = x;
wc_ecc_del_point_h(result, private_key->heap);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ECC_CDH
if (k == &k_lcl)
mp_clear(k);
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SavePackage::InternalInit() {
ResourceDispatcherHostImpl* rdh = ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::Get();
if (!rdh) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
file_manager_ = rdh->save_file_manager();
DCHECK(file_manager_);
download_manager_ = static_cast<DownloadManagerImpl*>(
BrowserContext::GetDownloadManager(
web_contents()->GetBrowserContext()));
DCHECK(download_manager_);
RecordSavePackageEvent(SAVE_PACKAGE_STARTED);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pngquant_error rwpng_write_image_init(rwpng_png_image *mainprog_ptr, png_structpp png_ptr_p, png_infopp info_ptr_p, int fast_compression)
{
/* could also replace libpng warning-handler (final NULL), but no need: */
*png_ptr_p = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, mainprog_ptr, rwpng_error_handler, NULL);
if (!(*png_ptr_p)) {
return LIBPNG_INIT_ERROR; /* out of memory */
}
*info_ptr_p = png_create_info_struct(*png_ptr_p);
if (!(*info_ptr_p)) {
png_destroy_write_struct(png_ptr_p, NULL);
return LIBPNG_INIT_ERROR; /* out of memory */
}
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-writing
* libpng function, unless an alternate error handler was installed--
* but compatible error handlers must either use longjmp() themselves
* (as in this program) or exit immediately, so here we go: */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_write_struct(png_ptr_p, info_ptr_p);
return LIBPNG_INIT_ERROR; /* libpng error (via longjmp()) */
}
png_set_compression_level(*png_ptr_p, fast_compression ? Z_BEST_SPEED : Z_BEST_COMPRESSION);
png_set_compression_mem_level(*png_ptr_p, fast_compression ? 9 : 5); // judging by optipng results, smaller mem makes libpng compress slightly better
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int h2c_snd_settings(struct h2c *h2c)
{
struct buffer *res;
char buf_data[100]; // enough for 15 settings
struct chunk buf;
int ret;
if (h2c_mux_busy(h2c, NULL)) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MBUSY;
return 0;
}
res = h2_get_buf(h2c, &h2c->mbuf);
if (!res) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_MUX_MALLOC;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MROOM;
return 0;
}
chunk_init(&buf, buf_data, sizeof(buf_data));
chunk_memcpy(&buf,
"\x00\x00\x00" /* length : 0 for now */
"\x04\x00" /* type : 4 (settings), flags : 0 */
"\x00\x00\x00\x00", /* stream ID : 0 */
9);
if (h2_settings_header_table_size != 4096) {
char str[6] = "\x00\x01"; /* header_table_size */
write_n32(str + 2, h2_settings_header_table_size);
chunk_memcat(&buf, str, 6);
}
if (h2_settings_initial_window_size != 65535) {
char str[6] = "\x00\x04"; /* initial_window_size */
write_n32(str + 2, h2_settings_initial_window_size);
chunk_memcat(&buf, str, 6);
}
if (h2_settings_max_concurrent_streams != 0) {
char str[6] = "\x00\x03"; /* max_concurrent_streams */
/* Note: 0 means "unlimited" for haproxy's config but not for
* the protocol, so never send this value!
*/
write_n32(str + 2, h2_settings_max_concurrent_streams);
chunk_memcat(&buf, str, 6);
}
if (global.tune.bufsize != 16384) {
char str[6] = "\x00\x05"; /* max_frame_size */
/* note: similarly we could also emit MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE to
* match bufsize - rewrite size, but at the moment it seems
* that clients don't take care of it.
*/
write_n32(str + 2, global.tune.bufsize);
chunk_memcat(&buf, str, 6);
}
h2_set_frame_size(buf.str, buf.len - 9);
ret = bo_istput(res, ist2(buf.str, buf.len));
if (unlikely(ret <= 0)) {
if (!ret) {
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_MUX_MFULL;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_DEM_MROOM;
return 0;
}
else {
h2c_error(h2c, H2_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int path_has_protocol(const char *path)
{
const char *p;
#ifdef _WIN32
if (is_windows_drive(path) ||
is_windows_drive_prefix(path)) {
return 0;
}
p = path + strcspn(path, ":/\\");
#else
p = path + strcspn(path, ":/");
#endif
return *p == ':';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int saved_dst_type = ctxt->dst.type;
ctxt->mem_read.pos = 0;
/* LOCK prefix is allowed only with some instructions */
if (ctxt->lock_prefix && (!(ctxt->d & Lock) || ctxt->dst.type != OP_MEM)) {
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
goto done;
}
if ((ctxt->d & SrcMask) == SrcMemFAddr && ctxt->src.type != OP_MEM) {
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
goto done;
}
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(No64|Undefined|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm|Priv|Prot|String))) {
if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & No64)) ||
(ctxt->d & Undefined)) {
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
goto done;
}
if (((ctxt->d & (Sse|Mmx)) && ((ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_EM)))
|| ((ctxt->d & Sse) && !(ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR))) {
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
goto done;
}
if ((ctxt->d & (Sse|Mmx)) && (ops->get_cr(ctxt, 0) & X86_CR0_TS)) {
rc = emulate_nm(ctxt);
goto done;
}
if (ctxt->d & Mmx) {
rc = flush_pending_x87_faults(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Now that we know the fpu is exception safe, we can fetch
* operands from it.
*/
fetch_possible_mmx_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src);
fetch_possible_mmx_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2);
if (!(ctxt->d & Mov))
fetch_possible_mmx_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst);
}
if (unlikely(ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && ctxt->intercept) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
/* Instruction can only be executed in protected mode */
if ((ctxt->d & Prot) && ctxt->mode < X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16) {
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
goto done;
}
/* Privileged instruction can be executed only in CPL=0 */
if ((ctxt->d & Priv) && ops->cpl(ctxt)) {
if (ctxt->d & PrivUD)
rc = emulate_ud(ctxt);
else
rc = emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
goto done;
}
/* Do instruction specific permission checks */
if (ctxt->d & CheckPerm) {
rc = ctxt->check_perm(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
if (unlikely(ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String)) {
/* All REP prefixes have the same first termination condition */
if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0) {
string_registers_quirk(ctxt);
ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
goto done;
}
}
}
if ((ctxt->src.type == OP_MEM) && !(ctxt->d & NoAccess)) {
rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->src.addr.mem,
ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->src.bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
ctxt->src.orig_val64 = ctxt->src.val64;
}
if (ctxt->src2.type == OP_MEM) {
rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->src2.addr.mem,
&ctxt->src2.val, ctxt->src2.bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
if ((ctxt->d & DstMask) == ImplicitOps)
goto special_insn;
if ((ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM) && !(ctxt->d & Mov)) {
/* optimisation - avoid slow emulated read if Mov */
rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->dst.addr.mem,
&ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->dst.bytes);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
if (!(ctxt->d & NoWrite) &&
rc == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT &&
ctxt->exception.vector == PF_VECTOR)
ctxt->exception.error_code |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
goto done;
}
}
/* Copy full 64-bit value for CMPXCHG8B. */
ctxt->dst.orig_val64 = ctxt->dst.val64;
special_insn:
if (unlikely(ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String))
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_RF;
else
ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
if (ctxt->execute) {
if (ctxt->d & Fastop) {
void (*fop)(struct fastop *) = (void *)ctxt->execute;
rc = fastop(ctxt, fop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
goto writeback;
}
rc = ctxt->execute(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
goto writeback;
}
if (ctxt->opcode_len == 2)
goto twobyte_insn;
else if (ctxt->opcode_len == 3)
goto threebyte_insn;
switch (ctxt->b) {
case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* jcc (short) */
if (test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags))
rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
break;
case 0x8d: /* lea r16/r32, m */
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.addr.mem.ea;
break;
case 0x90 ... 0x97: /* nop / xchg reg, rax */
if (ctxt->dst.addr.reg == reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX))
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
else
rc = em_xchg(ctxt);
break;
case 0x98: /* cbw/cwde/cdqe */
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2: ctxt->dst.val = (s8)ctxt->dst.val; break;
case 4: ctxt->dst.val = (s16)ctxt->dst.val; break;
case 8: ctxt->dst.val = (s32)ctxt->dst.val; break;
}
break;
case 0xcc: /* int3 */
rc = emulate_int(ctxt, 3);
break;
case 0xcd: /* int n */
rc = emulate_int(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
break;
case 0xce: /* into */
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_OF)
rc = emulate_int(ctxt, 4);
break;
case 0xe9: /* jmp rel */
case 0xeb: /* jmp rel short */
rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE; /* Disable writeback. */
break;
case 0xf4: /* hlt */
ctxt->ops->halt(ctxt);
break;
case 0xf5: /* cmc */
/* complement carry flag from eflags reg */
ctxt->eflags ^= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
break;
case 0xf8: /* clc */
ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_CF;
break;
case 0xf9: /* stc */
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_CF;
break;
case 0xfc: /* cld */
ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_DF;
break;
case 0xfd: /* std */
ctxt->eflags |= X86_EFLAGS_DF;
break;
default:
goto cannot_emulate;
}
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
writeback:
if (ctxt->d & SrcWrite) {
BUG_ON(ctxt->src.type == OP_MEM || ctxt->src.type == OP_MEM_STR);
rc = writeback(ctxt, &ctxt->src);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
if (!(ctxt->d & NoWrite)) {
rc = writeback(ctxt, &ctxt->dst);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
}
/*
* restore dst type in case the decoding will be reused
* (happens for string instruction )
*/
ctxt->dst.type = saved_dst_type;
if ((ctxt->d & SrcMask) == SrcSI)
string_addr_inc(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI, &ctxt->src);
if ((ctxt->d & DstMask) == DstDI)
string_addr_inc(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI, &ctxt->dst);
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && (ctxt->d & String)) {
unsigned int count;
struct read_cache *r = &ctxt->io_read;
if ((ctxt->d & SrcMask) == SrcSI)
count = ctxt->src.count;
else
count = ctxt->dst.count;
register_address_increment(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX, -count);
if (!string_insn_completed(ctxt)) {
/*
* Re-enter guest when pio read ahead buffer is empty
* or, if it is not used, after each 1024 iteration.
*/
if ((r->end != 0 || reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) & 0x3ff) &&
(r->end == 0 || r->end != r->pos)) {
/*
* Reset read cache. Usually happens before
* decode, but since instruction is restarted
* we have to do it here.
*/
ctxt->mem_read.end = 0;
writeback_registers(ctxt);
return EMULATION_RESTART;
}
goto done; /* skip rip writeback */
}
ctxt->eflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_RF;
}
ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
done:
if (rc == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
WARN_ON(ctxt->exception.vector > 0x1f);
ctxt->have_exception = true;
}
if (rc == X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED)
return EMULATION_INTERCEPTED;
if (rc == X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
writeback_registers(ctxt);
return (rc == X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
twobyte_insn:
switch (ctxt->b) {
case 0x09: /* wbinvd */
(ctxt->ops->wbinvd)(ctxt);
break;
case 0x08: /* invd */
case 0x0d: /* GrpP (prefetch) */
case 0x18: /* Grp16 (prefetch/nop) */
case 0x1f: /* nop */
break;
case 0x20: /* mov cr, reg */
ctxt->dst.val = ops->get_cr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg);
break;
case 0x21: /* mov from dr to reg */
ops->get_dr(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_reg, &ctxt->dst.val);
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* cmov */
if (test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags))
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.val;
else if (ctxt->op_bytes != 4)
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE; /* no writeback */
break;
case 0x80 ... 0x8f: /* jnz rel, etc*/
if (test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags))
rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val);
break;
case 0x90 ... 0x9f: /* setcc r/m8 */
ctxt->dst.val = test_cc(ctxt->b, ctxt->eflags);
break;
case 0xb6 ... 0xb7: /* movzx */
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
ctxt->dst.val = (ctxt->src.bytes == 1) ? (u8) ctxt->src.val
: (u16) ctxt->src.val;
break;
case 0xbe ... 0xbf: /* movsx */
ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes;
ctxt->dst.val = (ctxt->src.bytes == 1) ? (s8) ctxt->src.val :
(s16) ctxt->src.val;
break;
default:
goto cannot_emulate;
}
threebyte_insn:
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
goto writeback;
cannot_emulate:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 47,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvlan_port_destroy(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct macvlan_port *port = macvlan_port_get(dev);
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_MACVLAN_PORT;
netdev_rx_handler_unregister(dev);
kfree_rcu(port, rcu);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_d_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
stream_t *ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD8 *pu1_vld_buf;
WORD16 i2_dc_diff;
UWORD32 u4_frame_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
u4_frame_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_blk_pos;
WORD16 i2_dc_val;
UWORD32 u4_dst_x_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
UWORD32 u4_dst_y_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * u4_frame_width;
UWORD8 *pu1_vld_buf8 = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
UWORD32 u4_dst_wd = u4_frame_width;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Discard the Macroblock stuffing in case of MPEG-1 stream */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_STUFFING_CODE_LEN) == MB_STUFFING_CODE)
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,MB_STUFFING_CODE_LEN);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush 2 bits from bitstream [MB_Type and MacroBlockAddrIncrement]*/
/*------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 1) != 0x01)
{
/* Ignore and continue decoding. */
}
/* Process LUMA blocks of the MB */
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
u4_blk_pos = (u4_y_offset * u4_dst_wd) + u4_x_offset;
pu1_vld_buf = pu1_vld_buf8 + u4_blk_pos;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_luma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
}
/* Process U block of the MB */
u4_dst_x_offset >>= 1;
u4_dst_y_offset >>= 2;
u4_dst_wd >>= 1;
pu1_vld_buf = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_chroma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
/* Process V block of the MB */
pu1_vld_buf = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_dst_x_offset + u4_dst_y_offset;
i2_dc_diff = impeg2d_get_chroma_dc_diff(ps_stream);
i2_dc_val = ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] + i2_dc_diff;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = i2_dc_val;
i2_dc_val = CLIP_U8(i2_dc_val);
ps_dec->pf_memset_8bit_8x8_block(pu1_vld_buf, i2_dc_val, u4_dst_wd);
/* Common MB processing Steps */
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
/* Flush end of macro block */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,1);
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}/* End of impeg2d_dec_d_slice() */
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 173,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::ChromeDestroyed() {
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 1 | 166,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::AcquireDispatchersForTransit(
const MojoHandle* handles,
size_t num_handles,
std::vector<Dispatcher::DispatcherInTransit>* dispatchers) {
base::AutoLock lock(handles_->GetLock());
MojoResult rv = handles_->BeginTransit(handles, num_handles, dispatchers);
if (rv != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
handles_->CancelTransit(*dispatchers);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool smb1cli_conn_server_lockread(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
return conn->smb1.server.lockread;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct usb_request *hidg_alloc_ep_req(struct usb_ep *ep,
unsigned length)
{
return alloc_ep_req(ep, length);
}
Commit Message: USB: gadget: f_hid: fix deadlock in f_hidg_write()
In f_hidg_write() the write_spinlock is acquired before calling
usb_ep_queue() which causes a deadlock when dummy_hcd is being used.
This is because dummy_queue() callbacks into f_hidg_req_complete() which
tries to acquire the same spinlock. This is (part of) the backtrace when
the deadlock occurs:
0xffffffffc06b1410 in f_hidg_req_complete
0xffffffffc06a590a in usb_gadget_giveback_request
0xffffffffc06cfff2 in dummy_queue
0xffffffffc06a4b96 in usb_ep_queue
0xffffffffc06b1eb6 in f_hidg_write
0xffffffff8127730b in __vfs_write
0xffffffff812774d1 in vfs_write
0xffffffff81277725 in SYSC_write
Fix this by releasing the write_spinlock before calling usb_ep_queue()
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.11+
Fixes: 749494b6bdbb ("usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Move IN request allocation to set_alt()")
Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 96,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseArena::makeConsistentForGC() {
clearFreeLists();
ASSERT(isConsistentForGC());
for (BasePage* page = m_firstPage; page; page = page->next()) {
page->markAsUnswept();
page->invalidateObjectStartBitmap();
}
CHECK(!m_firstUnsweptPage);
HeapCompact* heapCompactor = getThreadState()->heap().compaction();
if (!heapCompactor->isCompactingArena(arenaIndex()))
return;
BasePage* nextPage = m_firstPage;
while (nextPage) {
if (!nextPage->isLargeObjectPage())
heapCompactor->addCompactingPage(nextPage);
nextPage = nextPage->next();
}
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual int WritePacketToWire(QuicPacketSequenceNumber number,
const QuicEncryptedPacket& packet,
bool resend,
int* error) {
QuicFramer framer(QuicDecrypter::Create(kNULL),
QuicEncrypter::Create(kNULL));
FramerVisitorCapturingAcks visitor;
framer.set_visitor(&visitor);
EXPECT_TRUE(framer.ProcessPacket(IPEndPoint(), IPEndPoint(), packet));
header_ = *visitor.header();
return packet.length();
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized access in QuicConnectionHelperTest
BUG=159928
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11360153
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166708 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __mem_cgroup_uncharge_common(struct page *page, enum charge_type ctype)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = NULL;
unsigned int nr_pages = 1;
struct page_cgroup *pc;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return NULL;
if (PageSwapCache(page))
return NULL;
if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
nr_pages <<= compound_order(page);
VM_BUG_ON(!PageTransHuge(page));
}
/*
* Check if our page_cgroup is valid
*/
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(page);
if (unlikely(!PageCgroupUsed(pc)))
return NULL;
lock_page_cgroup(pc);
memcg = pc->mem_cgroup;
if (!PageCgroupUsed(pc))
goto unlock_out;
switch (ctype) {
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_MAPPED:
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_DROP:
/* See mem_cgroup_prepare_migration() */
if (page_mapped(page) || PageCgroupMigration(pc))
goto unlock_out;
break;
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_SWAPOUT:
if (!PageAnon(page)) { /* Shared memory */
if (page->mapping && !page_is_file_cache(page))
goto unlock_out;
} else if (page_mapped(page)) /* Anon */
goto unlock_out;
break;
default:
break;
}
mem_cgroup_charge_statistics(memcg, PageCgroupCache(pc), -nr_pages);
ClearPageCgroupUsed(pc);
/*
* pc->mem_cgroup is not cleared here. It will be accessed when it's
* freed from LRU. This is safe because uncharged page is expected not
* to be reused (freed soon). Exception is SwapCache, it's handled by
* special functions.
*/
unlock_page_cgroup(pc);
/*
* even after unlock, we have memcg->res.usage here and this memcg
* will never be freed.
*/
memcg_check_events(memcg, page);
if (do_swap_account && ctype == MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_SWAPOUT) {
mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(memcg, true);
mem_cgroup_get(memcg);
}
if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg))
mem_cgroup_do_uncharge(memcg, nr_pages, ctype);
return memcg;
unlock_out:
unlock_page_cgroup(pc);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *totl_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TOTLBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TOTL);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCreateIOParserCtxt(xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax, void *user_data,
xmlInputReadCallback ioread, xmlInputCloseCallback ioclose,
void *ioctx, xmlCharEncoding enc) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlParserInputPtr inputStream;
xmlParserInputBufferPtr buf;
if (ioread == NULL) return(NULL);
buf = xmlParserInputBufferCreateIO(ioread, ioclose, ioctx, enc);
if (buf == NULL) {
if (ioclose != NULL)
ioclose(ioctx);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
if (ctxt == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserInputBuffer(buf);
return(NULL);
}
if (sax != NULL) {
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax != (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &xmlDefaultSAXHandler)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
xmlFree(ctxt->sax);
ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (ctxt->sax == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
memset(ctxt->sax, 0, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
if (sax->initialized == XML_SAX2_MAGIC)
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandler));
else
memcpy(ctxt->sax, sax, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
if (user_data != NULL)
ctxt->userData = user_data;
}
inputStream = xmlNewIOInputStream(ctxt, buf, enc);
if (inputStream == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(NULL);
}
inputPush(ctxt, inputStream);
return(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtecp_change_reference_data(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int type,
int ref_qualifier, const u8 *old, size_t oldlen,
const u8 *newref, size_t newlen, int *tries_left)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rsf_length[2], *buf, *buf_end, *p;
size_t val_length, buf_length, max_transmit_length;
int transmits_num, r;
assert(card && card->ctx && newref);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"newlen = %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u\n", newlen);
if (newlen > 0xFFFF)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
if (type == SC_AC_CHV && old && oldlen != 0)
{
r = sc_verify(card, type, ref_qualifier, old, oldlen, tries_left);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "Verify old pin failed");
}
max_transmit_length = sc_get_max_send_size(card);
assert(max_transmit_length > 2);
/*
* (2 + sizeof(rsf_length) + newlen) - total length of data we need to transfer,
* (max_transmit_length - 2) - amount of useful data we can transfer in one transmit (2 bytes for 0xA5 tag)
*/
transmits_num = (2 + sizeof(rsf_length) + newlen) / (max_transmit_length - 2) + 1;
/* buffer length = size of 0x80 TLV + size of RSF-file + (size of Tag and Length)*(number of APDUs) */
buf_length = (2 + sizeof(rsf_length)) + newlen + 2*(transmits_num);
p = buf = (u8 *)malloc(buf_length);
if (buf == NULL)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
buf_end = buf + buf_length;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0x24, 0x01, ref_qualifier);
/* put 0x80 TLV */
rsf_length[0] = (newlen >> 8) & 0xFF;
rsf_length[1] = newlen & 0xFF;
assert(buf_end - p >= (int)(2 + sizeof(rsf_length)));
sc_asn1_put_tag(0x80, rsf_length, sizeof(rsf_length), p, buf_end - p, &p);
/* put 0xA5 TLVs (one or more); each transmit must begin with 0xA5 TLV */
while (newlen)
{
assert(buf_end - p >= (int)(newlen + 2));
if ((p - buf) % max_transmit_length + newlen + 2 > max_transmit_length)
val_length = max_transmit_length - (p - buf) % max_transmit_length - 2;
else
val_length = newlen;
/* not using sc_asn1_put_tag(...) because rtecp do not support asn1 properly (when val_length > 127) */
*p++ = 0xA5;
*p++ = (u8)val_length;
assert(val_length <= newlen);
memcpy(p, newref, val_length);
p += val_length;
newref += val_length;
newlen -= val_length;
if (newlen)
apdu.flags |= SC_APDU_FLAGS_CHAINING;
}
apdu.lc = p - buf;
apdu.data = buf;
apdu.datalen = p - buf;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
sc_mem_clear(buf, buf_length);
free(buf);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _PUBLIC_ bool strequal_m(const char *s1, const char *s2)
{
return strcasecmp_m(s1,s2) == 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::close(ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError, "Imported document doesn't support close().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support close().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use close().");
return;
}
close();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pop_fetch_message(struct Context *ctx, struct Message *msg, int msgno)
{
void *uidl = NULL;
char buf[LONG_STRING];
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct Progress progressbar;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct PopCache *cache = NULL;
struct Header *h = ctx->hdrs[msgno];
unsigned short bcache = 1;
/* see if we already have the message in body cache */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_get(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(h->data));
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
/*
* see if we already have the message in our cache in
* case $message_cachedir is unset
*/
cache = &pop_data->cache[h->index % POP_CACHE_LEN];
if (cache->path)
{
if (cache->index == h->index)
{
/* yes, so just return a pointer to the message */
msg->fp = fopen(cache->path, "r");
if (msg->fp)
return 0;
mutt_perror(cache->path);
return -1;
}
else
{
/* clear the previous entry */
unlink(cache->path);
FREE(&cache->path);
}
}
while (true)
{
if (pop_reconnect(ctx) < 0)
return -1;
/* verify that massage index is correct */
if (h->refno < 0)
{
mutt_error(
_("The message index is incorrect. Try reopening the mailbox."));
return -1;
}
mutt_progress_init(&progressbar, _("Fetching message..."), MUTT_PROGRESS_SIZE,
NetInc, h->content->length + h->content->offset - 1);
/* see if we can put in body cache; use our cache as fallback */
msg->fp = mutt_bcache_put(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(h->data));
if (!msg->fp)
{
/* no */
bcache = 0;
mutt_mktemp(path, sizeof(path));
msg->fp = mutt_file_fopen(path, "w+");
if (!msg->fp)
{
mutt_perror(path);
return -1;
}
}
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "RETR %d\r\n", h->refno);
const int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, buf, &progressbar, fetch_message, msg->fp);
if (ret == 0)
break;
mutt_file_fclose(&msg->fp);
/* if RETR failed (e.g. connection closed), be sure to remove either
* the file in bcache or from POP's own cache since the next iteration
* of the loop will re-attempt to put() the message */
if (!bcache)
unlink(path);
if (ret == -2)
{
mutt_error("%s", pop_data->err_msg);
return -1;
}
if (ret == -3)
{
mutt_error(_("Can't write message to temporary file!"));
return -1;
}
}
/* Update the header information. Previously, we only downloaded a
* portion of the headers, those required for the main display.
*/
if (bcache)
mutt_bcache_commit(pop_data->bcache, cache_id(h->data));
else
{
cache->index = h->index;
cache->path = mutt_str_strdup(path);
}
rewind(msg->fp);
uidl = h->data;
/* we replace envelop, key in subj_hash has to be updated as well */
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_delete(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_remove(ctx, h);
mutt_env_free(&h->env);
h->env = mutt_rfc822_read_header(msg->fp, h, 0, 0);
if (ctx->subj_hash && h->env->real_subj)
mutt_hash_insert(ctx->subj_hash, h->env->real_subj, h);
mutt_label_hash_add(ctx, h);
h->data = uidl;
h->lines = 0;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
while (!feof(msg->fp))
{
ctx->hdrs[msgno]->lines++;
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), msg->fp);
}
h->content->length = ftello(msg->fp) - h->content->offset;
/* This needs to be done in case this is a multipart message */
if (!WithCrypto)
h->security = crypt_query(h->content);
mutt_clear_error();
rewind(msg->fp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure UID in fetch_uidl
CWE ID: CWE-824 | 0 | 79,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void booleanAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::booleanAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::SubmitSlice(
const H264PPS* pps,
const H264SliceHeader* slice_hdr,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_list0,
const H264Picture::Vector& ref_pic_list1,
const scoped_refptr<H264Picture>& pic,
const uint8_t* data,
size_t size) {
VASliceParameterBufferH264 slice_param;
memset(&slice_param, 0, sizeof(slice_param));
slice_param.slice_data_size = slice_hdr->nalu_size;
slice_param.slice_data_offset = 0;
slice_param.slice_data_flag = VA_SLICE_DATA_FLAG_ALL;
slice_param.slice_data_bit_offset = slice_hdr->header_bit_size;
#define SHDRToSP(a) slice_param.a = slice_hdr->a
SHDRToSP(first_mb_in_slice);
slice_param.slice_type = slice_hdr->slice_type % 5;
SHDRToSP(direct_spatial_mv_pred_flag);
SHDRToSP(num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1);
SHDRToSP(num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1);
SHDRToSP(cabac_init_idc);
SHDRToSP(slice_qp_delta);
SHDRToSP(disable_deblocking_filter_idc);
SHDRToSP(slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2);
SHDRToSP(slice_beta_offset_div2);
if (((slice_hdr->IsPSlice() || slice_hdr->IsSPSlice()) &&
pps->weighted_pred_flag) ||
(slice_hdr->IsBSlice() && pps->weighted_bipred_idc == 1)) {
SHDRToSP(luma_log2_weight_denom);
SHDRToSP(chroma_log2_weight_denom);
SHDRToSP(luma_weight_l0_flag);
SHDRToSP(luma_weight_l1_flag);
SHDRToSP(chroma_weight_l0_flag);
SHDRToSP(chroma_weight_l1_flag);
for (int i = 0; i <= slice_param.num_ref_idx_l0_active_minus1; ++i) {
slice_param.luma_weight_l0[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.luma_weight[i];
slice_param.luma_offset_l0[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.luma_offset[i];
for (int j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
slice_param.chroma_weight_l0[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.chroma_weight[i][j];
slice_param.chroma_offset_l0[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l0.chroma_offset[i][j];
}
}
if (slice_hdr->IsBSlice()) {
for (int i = 0; i <= slice_param.num_ref_idx_l1_active_minus1; ++i) {
slice_param.luma_weight_l1[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.luma_weight[i];
slice_param.luma_offset_l1[i] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.luma_offset[i];
for (int j = 0; j < 2; ++j) {
slice_param.chroma_weight_l1[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.chroma_weight[i][j];
slice_param.chroma_offset_l1[i][j] =
slice_hdr->pred_weight_table_l1.chroma_offset[i][j];
}
}
}
}
static_assert(
arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList0) == arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList1),
"Invalid RefPicList sizes");
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList0); ++i) {
InitVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList0[i]);
InitVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList1[i]);
}
for (size_t i = 0;
i < ref_pic_list0.size() && i < arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList0);
++i) {
if (ref_pic_list0[i])
FillVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList0[i], ref_pic_list0[i]);
}
for (size_t i = 0;
i < ref_pic_list1.size() && i < arraysize(slice_param.RefPicList1);
++i) {
if (ref_pic_list1[i])
FillVAPicture(&slice_param.RefPicList1[i], ref_pic_list1[i]);
}
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VASliceParameterBufferType,
sizeof(slice_param), &slice_param))
return false;
void* non_const_ptr = const_cast<uint8_t*>(data);
return vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VASliceDataBufferType, size,
non_const_ptr);
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 172,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vlan_dev_stop(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vlan_dev_info *vlan = vlan_dev_info(dev);
struct net_device *real_dev = vlan->real_dev;
dev_mc_unsync(real_dev, dev);
dev_uc_unsync(real_dev, dev);
if (dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI)
dev_set_allmulti(real_dev, -1);
if (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC)
dev_set_promiscuity(real_dev, -1);
if (compare_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr, real_dev->dev_addr))
dev_uc_del(real_dev, dev->dev_addr);
netif_carrier_off(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GDataCacheMetadataMap::CheckIfMd5Matches(
const std::string& md5,
const GDataCache::CacheEntry& cache_entry) {
if (cache_entry.IsDirty()) {
return true;
} else if (cache_entry.IsPinned() && cache_entry.md5.empty()) {
return true;
} else if (md5.empty()) {
return true;
} else if (md5 == cache_entry.md5) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_Do_form(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, const char *name, pdf_xobject *xobj, pdf_obj *page_resources)
{
pdf_run_xobject(ctx, (pdf_run_processor*)proc, xobj, page_resources, &fz_identity, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::processGPUEvent(const GPUEvent& event)
{
if (InspectorController* ic = inspectorController())
ic->processGPUEvent(event.timestamp, event.phase, event.foreign, event.usedGPUMemoryBytes, event.limitGPUMemoryBytes);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SplashPath *Splash::makeStrokePath(SplashPath *path, GBool flatten) {
SplashPath *pathIn, *pathOut;
SplashCoord w, d, dx, dy, wdx, wdy, dxNext, dyNext, wdxNext, wdyNext;
SplashCoord crossprod, dotprod, miter, m;
GBool first, last, closed;
int subpathStart, next, i;
int left0, left1, left2, right0, right1, right2, join0, join1, join2;
int leftFirst, rightFirst, firstPt;
if (flatten) {
pathIn = flattenPath(path, state->matrix, state->flatness);
if (state->lineDashLength > 0) {
pathOut = makeDashedPath(pathIn);
delete pathIn;
pathIn = pathOut;
}
} else {
pathIn = path;
}
subpathStart = 0; // make gcc happy
closed = gFalse; // make gcc happy
left0 = left1 = right0 = right1 = join0 = join1 = 0; // make gcc happy
leftFirst = rightFirst = firstPt = 0; // make gcc happy
pathOut = new SplashPath();
w = state->lineWidth;
for (i = 0; i < pathIn->length - 1; ++i) {
if (pathIn->flags[i] & splashPathLast) {
continue;
}
if ((first = pathIn->flags[i] & splashPathFirst)) {
subpathStart = i;
closed = pathIn->flags[i] & splashPathClosed;
}
last = pathIn->flags[i+1] & splashPathLast;
d = splashDist(pathIn->pts[i].x, pathIn->pts[i].y,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x, pathIn->pts[i+1].y);
if (d == 0) {
dx = 0;
dy = 1;
} else {
d = (SplashCoord)1 / d;
dx = d * (pathIn->pts[i+1].x - pathIn->pts[i].x);
dy = d * (pathIn->pts[i+1].y - pathIn->pts[i].y);
}
wdx = (SplashCoord)0.5 * w * dx;
wdy = (SplashCoord)0.5 * w * dy;
next = last ? subpathStart + 1 : i + 2;
d = splashDist(pathIn->pts[i+1].x, pathIn->pts[i+1].y,
pathIn->pts[next].x, pathIn->pts[next].y);
if (d == 0) {
dxNext = 0;
dyNext = 1;
} else {
d = (SplashCoord)1 / d;
dxNext = d * (pathIn->pts[next].x - pathIn->pts[i+1].x);
dyNext = d * (pathIn->pts[next].y - pathIn->pts[i+1].y);
}
wdxNext = (SplashCoord)0.5 * w * dxNext;
wdyNext = (SplashCoord)0.5 * w * dyNext;
pathOut->moveTo(pathIn->pts[i].x - wdy, pathIn->pts[i].y + wdx);
if (i == subpathStart) {
firstPt = pathOut->length - 1;
}
if (first && !closed) {
switch (state->lineCap) {
case splashLineCapButt:
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i].x + wdy, pathIn->pts[i].y - wdx);
break;
case splashLineCapRound:
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i].x - wdy - bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i].y + wdx - bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].x - wdx - bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdy + bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i].x - wdx,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdy);
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i].x - wdx + bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdy - bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i].x + wdy - bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdx - bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].x + wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdx);
break;
case splashLineCapProjecting:
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i].x - wdx - wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].y + wdx - wdy);
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i].x - wdx + wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdx - wdy);
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i].x + wdy,
pathIn->pts[i].y - wdx);
break;
}
} else {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i].x + wdy, pathIn->pts[i].y - wdx);
}
left2 = pathOut->length - 1;
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdy, pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdx);
if (last && !closed) {
switch (state->lineCap) {
case splashLineCapButt:
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy, pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx);
break;
case splashLineCapRound:
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdy + bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdx + bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdx + bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdy - bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdy);
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdx - bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdy + bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy + bezierCircle * wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx + bezierCircle * wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx);
break;
case splashLineCapProjecting:
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdy + wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdx + wdy);
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy + wdx,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx + wdy);
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx);
break;
}
} else {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy, pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx);
}
right2 = pathOut->length - 1;
pathOut->close();
join2 = pathOut->length;
if (!last || closed) {
crossprod = dx * dyNext - dy * dxNext;
dotprod = -(dx * dxNext + dy * dyNext);
if (dotprod > 0.99999) {
miter = (state->miterLimit + 1) * (state->miterLimit + 1);
m = 0;
} else {
miter = (SplashCoord)2 / ((SplashCoord)1 - dotprod);
if (miter < 1) {
miter = 1;
}
m = splashSqrt(miter - 1);
}
if (state->lineJoin == splashLineJoinRound) {
pathOut->moveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y);
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x + bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w);
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x - (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x - (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y);
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x - bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - (SplashCoord)0.5 * w);
pathOut->curveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - bezierCircle2 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].x + (SplashCoord)0.5 * w,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y);
} else {
pathOut->moveTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x, pathIn->pts[i+1].y);
if (crossprod < 0) {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdyNext,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdxNext);
if (state->lineJoin == splashLineJoinMiter &&
splashSqrt(miter) <= state->miterLimit) {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy + wdx * m,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx + wdy * m);
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx);
} else {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x - wdy, pathIn->pts[i+1].y + wdx);
}
} else {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdy,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdx);
if (state->lineJoin == splashLineJoinMiter &&
splashSqrt(miter) <= state->miterLimit) {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdy + wdx * m,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdx + wdy * m);
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdyNext,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdxNext);
} else {
pathOut->lineTo(pathIn->pts[i+1].x + wdyNext,
pathIn->pts[i+1].y - wdxNext);
}
}
}
pathOut->close();
}
if (state->strokeAdjust) {
if (i >= subpathStart + 1) {
if (i >= subpathStart + 2) {
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1, left0 + 1, right0);
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1, join0, left2);
} else {
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1, firstPt, left2);
}
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1, right2 + 1, right2 + 1);
}
left0 = left1;
left1 = left2;
right0 = right1;
right1 = right2;
join0 = join1;
join1 = join2;
if (i == subpathStart) {
leftFirst = left2;
rightFirst = right2;
}
if (last) {
if (i >= subpathStart + 2) {
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1, left0 + 1, right0);
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1,
join0, pathOut->length - 1);
} else {
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1,
firstPt, pathOut->length - 1);
}
if (closed) {
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1, firstPt, leftFirst);
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(left1, right1,
rightFirst + 1, rightFirst + 1);
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(leftFirst, rightFirst,
left1 + 1, right1);
pathOut->addStrokeAdjustHint(leftFirst, rightFirst,
join1, pathOut->length - 1);
}
}
}
}
if (pathIn != path) {
delete pathIn;
}
return pathOut;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::DisconnectWebContents() {
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_releasepage(struct page *page, gfp_t gfp_flags)
{
if (PageWriteback(page) || PageDirty(page))
return 0;
return __btrfs_releasepage(page, gfp_flags & GFP_NOFS);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coolkey_free_private_data(coolkey_private_data_t *priv)
{
list_t *l = &priv->objects_list;
sc_cardctl_coolkey_object_t *o;
/* Clean up the allocated memory in the items */
list_iterator_start(l);
while (list_iterator_hasnext(l)) {
o = (sc_cardctl_coolkey_object_t *)list_iterator_next(l);
free(o->data);
o->data = NULL;
}
list_iterator_stop(l);
list_destroy(&priv->objects_list);
if (priv->token_name) {
free(priv->token_name);
}
free(priv);
return;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImageBitmap::ImageBitmap(HTMLImageElement* image,
Optional<IntRect> cropRect,
Document* document,
const ImageBitmapOptions& options) {
RefPtr<Image> input = image->cachedImage()->getImage();
ParsedOptions parsedOptions =
parseOptions(options, cropRect, image->bitmapSourceSize());
if (dstBufferSizeHasOverflow(parsedOptions))
return;
if (options.colorSpaceConversion() == "none") {
m_image = cropImage(input.get(), parsedOptions, PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceIgnored);
} else {
m_image = cropImage(input.get(), parsedOptions, PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceApplied);
}
if (!m_image)
return;
sk_sp<SkImage> skImage = m_image->imageForCurrentFrame();
SkPixmap pixmap;
if (!skImage->isTextureBacked() && !skImage->peekPixels(&pixmap)) {
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface =
SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(skImage->width(), skImage->height());
surface->getCanvas()->drawImage(skImage, 0, 0);
m_image = StaticBitmapImage::create(surface->makeImageSnapshot());
}
if (!m_image)
return;
m_image->setOriginClean(
!image->wouldTaintOrigin(document->getSecurityOrigin()));
m_image->setPremultiplied(parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha);
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 140,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_layoutreturn_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutreturn *lrp = calldata;
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (nfs41_setup_sequence(lrp->clp->cl_session, &lrp->args.seq_args,
&lrp->res.seq_res, 0, task))
return;
rpc_call_start(task);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~CompositorSwapClient() {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void list_xtr_archs(RBin *bin, int mode) {
RBinFile *binfile = r_bin_cur (bin);
if (binfile->xtr_data) {
RListIter *iter_xtr;
RBinXtrData *xtr_data;
int bits, i = 0;
char *arch, *machine;
r_list_foreach (binfile->xtr_data, iter_xtr, xtr_data) {
if (!xtr_data || !xtr_data->metadata ||
!xtr_data->metadata->arch) {
continue;
}
arch = xtr_data->metadata->arch;
machine = xtr_data->metadata->machine;
bits = xtr_data->metadata->bits;
switch (mode) {
case 'q':
bin->cb_printf ("%s\n", arch);
break;
case 'j':
bin->cb_printf (
"%s{\"arch\":\"%s\",\"bits\":%d,"
"\"offset\":%" PFMT64d
",\"size\":\"%" PFMT64d
",\"machine\":\"%s\"}",
i++ ? "," : "", arch, bits,
xtr_data->offset, xtr_data->size,
machine);
break;
default:
bin->cb_printf ("%03i 0x%08" PFMT64x
" %" PFMT64d " %s_%i %s\n",
i++, xtr_data->offset,
xtr_data->size, arch, bits,
machine);
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers");
OMX_STRING nativeBufferName = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeANWBufferInMetadata");
MetadataBufferType negotiatedType;
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bStoreMetaData = enable;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, nativeBufferName, &index);
OMX_ERRORTYPE xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
name = nativeBufferName; // set name for debugging
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
CLOGW("component does not support metadata mode; using fallback");
} else if (xerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, xerr, "%s", name);
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d type=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, negotiatedType);
}
negotiatedType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
} else {
if (!enable) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
mMetadataType[portIndex] = negotiatedType;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(storeMetaDataInBuffers, "%s:%u negotiated %s:%d",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, asString(negotiatedType), negotiatedType);
if (type != NULL) {
*type = negotiatedType;
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_resolve_ib_dev(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv)
{
struct cma_device *cma_dev, *cur_dev;
struct sockaddr_ib *addr;
union ib_gid gid, sgid, *dgid;
u16 pkey, index;
u8 p;
int i;
cma_dev = NULL;
addr = (struct sockaddr_ib *) cma_dst_addr(id_priv);
dgid = (union ib_gid *) &addr->sib_addr;
pkey = ntohs(addr->sib_pkey);
list_for_each_entry(cur_dev, &dev_list, list) {
if (rdma_node_get_transport(cur_dev->device->node_type) != RDMA_TRANSPORT_IB)
continue;
for (p = 1; p <= cur_dev->device->phys_port_cnt; ++p) {
if (ib_find_cached_pkey(cur_dev->device, p, pkey, &index))
continue;
for (i = 0; !ib_get_cached_gid(cur_dev->device, p, i, &gid); i++) {
if (!memcmp(&gid, dgid, sizeof(gid))) {
cma_dev = cur_dev;
sgid = gid;
id_priv->id.port_num = p;
goto found;
}
if (!cma_dev && (gid.global.subnet_prefix ==
dgid->global.subnet_prefix)) {
cma_dev = cur_dev;
sgid = gid;
id_priv->id.port_num = p;
}
}
}
}
if (!cma_dev)
return -ENODEV;
found:
cma_attach_to_dev(id_priv, cma_dev);
addr = (struct sockaddr_ib *) cma_src_addr(id_priv);
memcpy(&addr->sib_addr, &sgid, sizeof sgid);
cma_translate_ib(addr, &id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_scalar(void *state, char *token, JsonTokenType tokentype)
{
GetState *_state = (GetState *) state;
int lex_level = _state->lex->lex_level;
/* Check for whole-object match */
if (lex_level == 0 && _state->npath == 0)
{
if (_state->normalize_results && tokentype == JSON_TOKEN_STRING)
{
/* we want the de-escaped string */
_state->next_scalar = true;
}
else if (_state->normalize_results && tokentype == JSON_TOKEN_NULL)
{
_state->tresult = (text *) NULL;
}
else
{
/*
* This is a bit hokey: we will suppress whitespace after the
* scalar token, but not whitespace before it. Probably not worth
* doing our own space-skipping to avoid that.
*/
char *start = _state->lex->input;
int len = _state->lex->prev_token_terminator - start;
_state->tresult = cstring_to_text_with_len(start, len);
}
}
if (_state->next_scalar)
{
/* a de-escaped text value is wanted, so supply it */
_state->tresult = cstring_to_text(token);
/* make sure the next call to get_scalar doesn't overwrite it */
_state->next_scalar = false;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dbus_g_proxy_manager_filter (DBusConnection *connection,
DBusMessage *message,
void *user_data)
{
DBusGProxyManager *manager;
if (dbus_message_get_type (message) != DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_SIGNAL)
return DBUS_HANDLER_RESULT_NOT_YET_HANDLED;
manager = user_data;
dbus_g_proxy_manager_ref (manager);
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_LOCAL,
"Disconnected"))
{
/* Destroy all the proxies, quite possibly resulting in unreferencing
* the proxy manager and the connection as well.
*/
GSList *all;
GSList *tmp;
all = dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (manager);
tmp = all;
while (tmp != NULL)
{
DBusGProxy *proxy;
proxy = DBUS_G_PROXY (tmp->data);
UNLOCK_MANAGER (manager);
dbus_g_proxy_destroy (proxy);
g_object_unref (G_OBJECT (proxy));
LOCK_MANAGER (manager);
tmp = tmp->next;
}
g_slist_free (all);
#ifndef G_DISABLE_CHECKS
if (manager->proxy_lists != NULL)
g_warning ("Disconnection emitted \"destroy\" on all DBusGProxy, but somehow new proxies were created in response to one of those destroy signals. This will cause a memory leak.");
#endif
}
else
{
char *tri;
GSList *full_list;
GSList *owned_names;
GSList *tmp;
const char *sender;
/* First we handle NameOwnerChanged internally */
if (dbus_message_is_signal (message,
DBUS_INTERFACE_DBUS,
"NameOwnerChanged"))
{
DBusError derr;
dbus_error_init (&derr);
if (!dbus_message_get_args (message,
&derr,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&name,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&prev_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_STRING,
&new_owner,
DBUS_TYPE_INVALID))
{
/* Ignore this error */
dbus_error_free (&derr);
}
else if (manager->owner_names != NULL)
{
dbus_g_proxy_manager_replace_name_owner (manager, name, prev_owner, new_owner);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 164,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetImageChannelKurtosis(const Image *image,
const ChannelType channel,double *kurtosis,double *skewness,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
double
area,
mean,
standard_deviation,
sum_squares,
sum_cubes,
sum_fourth_power;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
*kurtosis=0.0;
*skewness=0.0;
area=0.0;
mean=0.0;
standard_deviation=0.0;
sum_squares=0.0;
sum_cubes=0.0;
sum_fourth_power=0.0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((channel & RedChannel) != 0)
{
mean+=GetPixelRed(p);
sum_squares+=(double) GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p);
sum_cubes+=(double) GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p);
sum_fourth_power+=(double) GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p)*
GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p);
area++;
}
if ((channel & GreenChannel) != 0)
{
mean+=GetPixelGreen(p);
sum_squares+=(double) GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p);
sum_cubes+=(double) GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p)*
GetPixelGreen(p);
sum_fourth_power+=(double) GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p)*
GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p);
area++;
}
if ((channel & BlueChannel) != 0)
{
mean+=GetPixelBlue(p);
sum_squares+=(double) GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p);
sum_cubes+=(double) GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p);
sum_fourth_power+=(double) GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p)*
GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p);
area++;
}
if ((channel & OpacityChannel) != 0)
{
mean+=GetPixelAlpha(p);
sum_squares+=(double) GetPixelOpacity(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p);
sum_cubes+=(double) GetPixelOpacity(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p)*
GetPixelAlpha(p);
sum_fourth_power+=(double) GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p)*
GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p);
area++;
}
if (((channel & IndexChannel) != 0) &&
(image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace))
{
double
index;
index=(double) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
mean+=index;
sum_squares+=index*index;
sum_cubes+=index*index*index;
sum_fourth_power+=index*index*index*index;
area++;
}
p++;
}
}
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
return(MagickFalse);
if (area != 0.0)
{
mean/=area;
sum_squares/=area;
sum_cubes/=area;
sum_fourth_power/=area;
}
standard_deviation=sqrt(sum_squares-(mean*mean));
if (standard_deviation != 0.0)
{
*kurtosis=sum_fourth_power-4.0*mean*sum_cubes+6.0*mean*mean*sum_squares-
3.0*mean*mean*mean*mean;
*kurtosis/=standard_deviation*standard_deviation*standard_deviation*
standard_deviation;
*kurtosis-=3.0;
*skewness=sum_cubes-3.0*mean*sum_squares+2.0*mean*mean*mean;
*skewness/=standard_deviation*standard_deviation*standard_deviation;
}
return(y == (ssize_t) image->rows ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_pre_pic_dec_proc(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 u4_get_disp;
pic_buf_t *ps_disp_pic;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
u4_get_disp = 0;
ps_disp_pic = NULL;
/* Field Picture */
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb = (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size + 31) >> 5;
if(ps_dec->u2_num_flds_decoded == 0)
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
u4_get_disp = 1;
ps_pic_buf = impeg2_buf_mgr_get_next_free(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, &ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id);
if (NULL == ps_pic_buf)
{
return IMPEG2D_NO_FREE_BUF_ERR;
}
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_pic_buf->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_inp_ts;
ps_pic_buf->e_pic_type = ps_dec->e_pic_type;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_y = ps_pic_buf->pu1_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_u = ps_pic_buf->pu1_u;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_v = ps_pic_buf->pu1_v;
}
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == TOP_FIELD)
{
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = TOP;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = BOTTOM;
}
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 1;
ps_dec->u2_fld_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u2_frm_pic = 0;
ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back = gas_impeg2d_func_fld_fw_or_bk;
ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct = gas_impeg2d_func_fld_bi_direct;
}
/* Frame Picture */
else
{
pic_buf_t *ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb = (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size + 15) >> 4;
u4_get_disp = 1;
ps_pic_buf = impeg2_buf_mgr_get_next_free(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, &ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id);
if (NULL == ps_pic_buf)
{
return IMPEG2D_NO_FREE_BUF_ERR;
}
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
impeg2_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mg, ps_dec->i4_cur_buf_id, BUF_MGR_REF);
ps_pic_buf->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_inp_ts;
ps_pic_buf->e_pic_type = ps_dec->e_pic_type;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_pic_buf;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_y = ps_pic_buf->pu1_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_u = ps_pic_buf->pu1_u;
ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf.pu1_v = ps_pic_buf->pu1_v;
if(ps_dec->u2_frame_pred_frame_dct == 0)
{
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 1;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 1;
}
else
{
ps_dec->u2_read_dct_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_read_motion_type = 0;
ps_dec->u2_motion_type = 2;
ps_dec->u2_field_dct = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_fld_parity = TOP;
ps_dec->u2_fld_pic = 0;
ps_dec->u2_frm_pic = 1;
ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back = gas_impeg2d_func_frm_fw_or_bk;
ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct = gas_impeg2d_func_frm_bi_direct;
}
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left = ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb * ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb;
if(u4_get_disp)
{
if(ps_dec->u4_num_frames_decoded > 1)
{
ps_disp_pic = impeg2_disp_mgr_get(&ps_dec->s_disp_mgr, &ps_dec->i4_disp_buf_id);
}
ps_dec->ps_disp_pic = ps_disp_pic;
if(ps_disp_pic)
{
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_y_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_y;
if(IV_YUV_420P == ps_dec->i4_chromaFormat)
{
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_u;
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = ps_disp_pic->pu1_v;
}
else
{
UWORD8 *pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[1];
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_u_buf = pu1_buf;
pu1_buf = ps_dec->as_disp_buffers[ps_disp_pic->i4_buf_id].pu1_bufs[2];
ps_dec->ps_disp_frm_buf->pv_v_buf = pu1_buf;
}
}
}
}
switch(ps_dec->e_pic_type)
{
case I_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_i_slice;
break;
}
case D_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_d_slice;
break;
}
case P_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice;
ps_dec->pu2_mb_type = gau2_impeg2d_p_mb_type;
break;
}
case B_PIC:
{
ps_dec->pf_decode_slice = impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice;
ps_dec->pu2_mb_type = gau2_impeg2d_b_mb_type;
break;
}
default:
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_PIC_TYPE;
}
/*************************************************************************/
/* Set the reference pictures */
/*************************************************************************/
/* Error resilience: If forward and backward pictures are going to be NULL*/
/* then assign both to the current */
/* if one of them NULL then we will assign the non null to the NULL one */
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == P_PIC)
{
if (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y)
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
}
if (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1].pu1_y)
{
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
}
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
{
if((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
impeg2d_get_bottom_field_buf(&ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf, &ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1],
ps_dec->u2_frame_width);
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if ((NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
else if ((NULL == ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0].pu1_y) && (NULL != ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0].pu1_y))
{
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
}
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[FORW][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[0][1];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[BACK][TOP] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][0];
ps_dec->as_ref_buf[BACK][BOTTOM] = ps_dec->as_recent_fld[1][1];
}
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 161,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void **dbg_userword(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
{
BUG_ON(!(cachep->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER));
return (void **)(objp + cachep->size - BYTES_PER_WORD);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
return 0;
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
{
if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
rdata->packet = s->packet;
rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
item->data = rdata;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
(s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
s->packet = NULL;
s->packet_length = 0;
memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return(0);
}
/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source
of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_setup_flow_control(struct tg3 *tp, u32 lcladv, u32 rmtadv)
{
u8 autoneg;
u8 flowctrl = 0;
u32 old_rx_mode = tp->rx_mode;
u32 old_tx_mode = tp->tx_mode;
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_PHYLIB))
autoneg = tp->mdio_bus->phy_map[TG3_PHY_MII_ADDR]->autoneg;
else
autoneg = tp->link_config.autoneg;
if (autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE && tg3_flag(tp, PAUSE_AUTONEG)) {
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_ANY_SERDES)
flowctrl = tg3_resolve_flowctrl_1000X(lcladv, rmtadv);
else
flowctrl = mii_resolve_flowctrl_fdx(lcladv, rmtadv);
} else
flowctrl = tp->link_config.flowctrl;
tp->link_config.active_flowctrl = flowctrl;
if (flowctrl & FLOW_CTRL_RX)
tp->rx_mode |= RX_MODE_FLOW_CTRL_ENABLE;
else
tp->rx_mode &= ~RX_MODE_FLOW_CTRL_ENABLE;
if (old_rx_mode != tp->rx_mode)
tw32_f(MAC_RX_MODE, tp->rx_mode);
if (flowctrl & FLOW_CTRL_TX)
tp->tx_mode |= TX_MODE_FLOW_CTRL_ENABLE;
else
tp->tx_mode &= ~TX_MODE_FLOW_CTRL_ENABLE;
if (old_tx_mode != tp->tx_mode)
tw32_f(MAC_TX_MODE, tp->tx_mode);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MockConnectionVisitor::~MockConnectionVisitor() {
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
{
ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if (ret < 0) return -1;
if (ret == 0)
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
}
#endif
ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
#endif
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsHANDLE CMSEXPORT cmsDictAlloc(cmsContext ContextID)
{
_cmsDICT* dict = (_cmsDICT*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(_cmsDICT));
if (dict == NULL) return NULL;
dict ->ContextID = ContextID;
return (cmsHANDLE) dict;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 40,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebstoreBindings::WebstoreBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("Install",
base::Bind(&WebstoreBindings::Install, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 172,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lz4_decompress(const unsigned char *src, size_t *src_len,
unsigned char *dest, size_t actual_dest_len)
{
int ret = -1;
int input_len = 0;
input_len = lz4_uncompress(src, dest, actual_dest_len);
if (input_len < 0)
goto exit_0;
*src_len = input_len;
return 0;
exit_0:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: lz4: ensure length does not wrap
Given some pathologically compressed data, lz4 could possibly decide to
wrap a few internal variables, causing unknown things to happen. Catch
this before the wrapping happens and abort the decompression.
Reported-by: "Don A. Bailey" <donb@securitymouse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void intra_predict(VP8Context *s, VP8ThreadData *td, uint8_t *dst[3],
VP8Macroblock *mb, int mb_x, int mb_y, int is_vp7)
{
int x, y, mode, nnz;
uint32_t tr;
/* for the first row, we need to run xchg_mb_border to init the top edge
* to 127 otherwise, skip it if we aren't going to deblock */
if (mb_y && (s->deblock_filter || !mb_y) && td->thread_nr == 0)
xchg_mb_border(s->top_border[mb_x + 1], dst[0], dst[1], dst[2],
s->linesize, s->uvlinesize, mb_x, mb_y, s->mb_width,
s->filter.simple, 1);
if (mb->mode < MODE_I4x4) {
mode = check_intra_pred8x8_mode_emuedge(mb->mode, mb_x, mb_y, is_vp7);
s->hpc.pred16x16[mode](dst[0], s->linesize);
} else {
uint8_t *ptr = dst[0];
uint8_t *intra4x4 = mb->intra4x4_pred_mode_mb;
const uint8_t lo = is_vp7 ? 128 : 127;
const uint8_t hi = is_vp7 ? 128 : 129;
uint8_t tr_top[4] = { lo, lo, lo, lo };
uint8_t *tr_right = ptr - s->linesize + 16;
if (mb_y && mb_x == s->mb_width - 1) {
tr = tr_right[-1] * 0x01010101u;
tr_right = (uint8_t *) &tr;
}
if (mb->skip)
AV_ZERO128(td->non_zero_count_cache);
for (y = 0; y < 4; y++) {
uint8_t *topright = ptr + 4 - s->linesize;
for (x = 0; x < 4; x++) {
int copy = 0;
ptrdiff_t linesize = s->linesize;
uint8_t *dst = ptr + 4 * x;
LOCAL_ALIGNED(4, uint8_t, copy_dst, [5 * 8]);
if ((y == 0 || x == 3) && mb_y == 0) {
topright = tr_top;
} else if (x == 3)
topright = tr_right;
mode = check_intra_pred4x4_mode_emuedge(intra4x4[x], mb_x + x,
mb_y + y, ©, is_vp7);
if (copy) {
dst = copy_dst + 12;
linesize = 8;
if (!(mb_y + y)) {
copy_dst[3] = lo;
AV_WN32A(copy_dst + 4, lo * 0x01010101U);
} else {
AV_COPY32(copy_dst + 4, ptr + 4 * x - s->linesize);
if (!(mb_x + x)) {
copy_dst[3] = hi;
} else {
copy_dst[3] = ptr[4 * x - s->linesize - 1];
}
}
if (!(mb_x + x)) {
copy_dst[11] =
copy_dst[19] =
copy_dst[27] =
copy_dst[35] = hi;
} else {
copy_dst[11] = ptr[4 * x - 1];
copy_dst[19] = ptr[4 * x + s->linesize - 1];
copy_dst[27] = ptr[4 * x + s->linesize * 2 - 1];
copy_dst[35] = ptr[4 * x + s->linesize * 3 - 1];
}
}
s->hpc.pred4x4[mode](dst, topright, linesize);
if (copy) {
AV_COPY32(ptr + 4 * x, copy_dst + 12);
AV_COPY32(ptr + 4 * x + s->linesize, copy_dst + 20);
AV_COPY32(ptr + 4 * x + s->linesize * 2, copy_dst + 28);
AV_COPY32(ptr + 4 * x + s->linesize * 3, copy_dst + 36);
}
nnz = td->non_zero_count_cache[y][x];
if (nnz) {
if (nnz == 1)
s->vp8dsp.vp8_idct_dc_add(ptr + 4 * x,
td->block[y][x], s->linesize);
else
s->vp8dsp.vp8_idct_add(ptr + 4 * x,
td->block[y][x], s->linesize);
}
topright += 4;
}
ptr += 4 * s->linesize;
intra4x4 += 4;
}
}
mode = check_intra_pred8x8_mode_emuedge(mb->chroma_pred_mode,
mb_x, mb_y, is_vp7);
s->hpc.pred8x8[mode](dst[1], s->uvlinesize);
s->hpc.pred8x8[mode](dst[2], s->uvlinesize);
if (mb_y && (s->deblock_filter || !mb_y) && td->thread_nr == 0)
xchg_mb_border(s->top_border[mb_x + 1], dst[0], dst[1], dst[2],
s->linesize, s->uvlinesize, mb_x, mb_y, s->mb_width,
s->filter.simple, 0);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *tee_svc_find_type_props(
TEE_ObjectType obj_type)
{
size_t n;
for (n = 0; n < ARRAY_SIZE(tee_cryp_obj_props); n++) {
if (tee_cryp_obj_props[n].obj_type == obj_type)
return tee_cryp_obj_props + n;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetWindowAttributeEventListener(const AtomicString& event_type,
EventListener* listener) {
LocalDOMWindow* dom_window = domWindow();
if (!dom_window)
return;
dom_window->SetAttributeEventListener(event_type, listener);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<RenderStyle> StyleResolver::styleForElement(Element* element, RenderStyle* defaultParent, StyleSharingBehavior sharingBehavior,
RuleMatchingBehavior matchingBehavior, RenderRegion* regionForStyling)
{
ASSERT(document().frame());
ASSERT(documentSettings());
if (sharingBehavior == AllowStyleSharing && !element->document().haveStylesheetsLoaded() && !element->renderer()) {
if (!s_styleNotYetAvailable) {
s_styleNotYetAvailable = RenderStyle::create().leakRef();
s_styleNotYetAvailable->setDisplay(NONE);
s_styleNotYetAvailable->font().update(m_fontSelector);
}
element->document().setHasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle();
return s_styleNotYetAvailable;
}
didAccess();
if (element == document().documentElement())
resetDirectionAndWritingModeOnDocument(document());
StyleResolverState state(document(), element, defaultParent, regionForStyling);
if (sharingBehavior == AllowStyleSharing && !state.distributedToInsertionPoint() && state.parentStyle()) {
SharedStyleFinder styleFinder(state.elementContext(), m_features, m_siblingRuleSet.get(), m_uncommonAttributeRuleSet.get(), *this);
if (RefPtr<RenderStyle> sharedStyle = styleFinder.findSharedStyle())
return sharedStyle.release();
}
if (state.parentStyle()) {
state.setStyle(RenderStyle::create());
state.style()->inheritFrom(state.parentStyle(), isAtShadowBoundary(element) ? RenderStyle::AtShadowBoundary : RenderStyle::NotAtShadowBoundary);
} else {
state.setStyle(defaultStyleForElement());
state.setParentStyle(RenderStyle::clone(state.style()));
}
if (state.distributedToInsertionPoint()) {
if (Element* parent = element->parentElement()) {
if (RenderStyle* styleOfShadowHost = parent->renderStyle())
state.style()->setUserModify(styleOfShadowHost->userModify());
}
}
state.fontBuilder().initForStyleResolve(state.document(), state.style(), state.useSVGZoomRules());
if (element->isLink()) {
state.style()->setIsLink(true);
EInsideLink linkState = state.elementLinkState();
if (linkState != NotInsideLink) {
bool forceVisited = InspectorInstrumentation::forcePseudoState(element, CSSSelector::PseudoVisited);
if (forceVisited)
linkState = InsideVisitedLink;
}
state.style()->setInsideLink(linkState);
}
bool needsCollection = false;
CSSDefaultStyleSheets::ensureDefaultStyleSheetsForElement(element, needsCollection);
if (needsCollection) {
collectFeatures();
m_inspectorCSSOMWrappers.reset();
}
{
ElementRuleCollector collector(state.elementContext(), m_selectorFilter, state.style());
collector.setRegionForStyling(regionForStyling);
if (matchingBehavior == MatchOnlyUserAgentRules)
matchUARules(collector);
else
matchAllRules(state, collector, matchingBehavior != MatchAllRulesExcludingSMIL);
applyMatchedProperties(state, collector.matchedResult(), element);
addContentAttrValuesToFeatures(state.contentAttrValues(), m_features);
}
{
StyleAdjuster adjuster(state.cachedUAStyle(), m_document.inQuirksMode());
adjuster.adjustRenderStyle(state.style(), state.parentStyle(), element);
}
if (element->hasTagName(bodyTag))
document().textLinkColors().setTextColor(state.style()->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyColor));
setAnimationUpdateIfNeeded(state, *element);
return state.takeStyle();
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::SyncInternal::UpdateCryptographerAndNigoriCallback(
const std::string& chrome_version,
const base::Closure& done_callback,
const std::string& session_name) {
if (!directory()->initial_sync_ended_for_type(syncable::NIGORI)) {
done_callback.Run(); // Should only happen during first time sync.
return;
}
bool success = false;
{
WriteTransaction trans(FROM_HERE, GetUserShare());
Cryptographer* cryptographer = trans.GetCryptographer();
WriteNode node(&trans);
if (node.InitByTagLookup(kNigoriTag) == sync_api::BaseNode::INIT_OK) {
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics nigori(node.GetNigoriSpecifics());
Cryptographer::UpdateResult result = cryptographer->Update(nigori);
if (result == Cryptographer::NEEDS_PASSPHRASE) {
sync_pb::EncryptedData pending_keys;
if (cryptographer->has_pending_keys())
pending_keys = cryptographer->GetPendingKeys();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(SyncManager::Observer, observers_,
OnPassphraseRequired(sync_api::REASON_DECRYPTION,
pending_keys));
}
bool contains_this_device = false;
for (int i = 0; i < nigori.device_information_size(); ++i) {
const sync_pb::DeviceInformation& device_information =
nigori.device_information(i);
if (device_information.cache_guid() == directory()->cache_guid()) {
if (device_information.chrome_version() != chrome_version) {
sync_pb::DeviceInformation* mutable_device_information =
nigori.mutable_device_information(i);
mutable_device_information->set_chrome_version(
chrome_version);
}
contains_this_device = true;
}
}
if (!contains_this_device) {
sync_pb::DeviceInformation* device_information =
nigori.add_device_information();
device_information->set_cache_guid(directory()->cache_guid());
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
device_information->set_platform("ChromeOS");
#elif defined(OS_LINUX)
device_information->set_platform("Linux");
#elif defined(OS_MACOSX)
device_information->set_platform("Mac");
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
device_information->set_platform("Windows");
#endif
device_information->set_name(session_name);
device_information->set_chrome_version(chrome_version);
}
UpdateNigoriEncryptionState(cryptographer, &node);
NotifyCryptographerState(cryptographer);
allstatus_.SetEncryptedTypes(cryptographer->GetEncryptedTypes());
success = cryptographer->is_ready();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
if (success)
RefreshEncryption();
done_callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_do_close(struct nfs4_state *state, gfp_t gfp_mask, int wait)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kzalloc(sizeof(*calldata), gfp_mask);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
nfs41_init_sequence(&calldata->arg.seq_args, &calldata->res.seq_res, 1);
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid, gfp_mask);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.fmode = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->roc = pnfs_roc(state->inode);
nfs_sb_active(calldata->inode->i_sb);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rle8_write_unc(struct rle_context *rlectx)
{
size_t i;
iw_byte dstbuf[2];
if(rlectx->unc_len<1) return;
if(rlectx->unc_len>=3 && (rlectx->unc_len&1)) {
iw_set_error(rlectx->ctx,"Internal: RLE encode error 4");
return;
}
if(rlectx->unc_len>254) {
iw_set_error(rlectx->ctx,"Internal: RLE encode error 5");
return;
}
if(rlectx->unc_len<3) {
for(i=0;i<rlectx->unc_len;i++) {
dstbuf[0] = 0x01; // count
dstbuf[1] = rlectx->srcrow[i+rlectx->pending_data_start]; // value
iwbmp_write(rlectx->wctx,dstbuf,2);
rlectx->total_bytes_written+=2;
}
}
else {
dstbuf[0] = 0x00;
dstbuf[1] = (iw_byte)rlectx->unc_len;
iwbmp_write(rlectx->wctx,dstbuf,2);
rlectx->total_bytes_written+=2;
iwbmp_write(rlectx->wctx,&rlectx->srcrow[rlectx->pending_data_start],rlectx->unc_len);
rlectx->total_bytes_written+=rlectx->unc_len;
if(rlectx->unc_len&0x1) {
dstbuf[0] = 0x00;
iwbmp_write(rlectx->wctx,dstbuf,1);
rlectx->total_bytes_written+=1;
}
}
rlectx->pending_data_start+=rlectx->unc_len;
rlectx->unc_len=0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pipe_iov_copy_to_user(struct iovec *iov, const void *from, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_to_user_inatomic(iov->iov_base, from, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(iov->iov_base, from, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
from += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: switch pipe_read() to copy_page_to_iter()
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 1 | 169,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DeviceManagerImpl::GetDevices(EnumerationOptionsPtr options,
const GetDevicesCallback& callback) {
auto filters = options->filters.To<std::vector<UsbDeviceFilter>>();
auto get_devices_callback = base::Bind(&DeviceManagerImpl::OnGetDevices,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), callback);
service_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GetDevicesOnServiceThread, filters, get_devices_callback,
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()));
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::ImeCancelComposition() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger())
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObject.activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttr", 0, 0, "Getter");
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedInIsolatedWorldsAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void patch_byte(X86CPU *cpu, target_ulong addr, uint8_t byte)
{
cpu_memory_rw_debug(CPU(cpu), addr, &byte, 1, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compute_dh(unsigned char *buf, int size, BIGNUM *server_pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int len, pad;
len = DH_compute_key(buf, server_pub_key, dh);
assert(len >= 0 && len <= size);
if (len < size) {
pad = size - len;
memmove(buf + pad, buf, len);
memset(buf, 0, pad);
}
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void perf_swevent_put_recursion_context(int rctx)
{
struct swevent_htable *swhash = this_cpu_ptr(&swevent_htable);
put_recursion_context(swhash->recursion, rctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sctp_sock *sp;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p\n", __func__, sk);
/* Release our hold on the endpoint. */
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
/* This could happen during socket init, thus we bail out
* early, since the rest of the below is not setup either.
*/
if (sp->ep == NULL)
return;
if (sp->do_auto_asconf) {
sp->do_auto_asconf = 0;
list_del(&sp->auto_asconf_list);
}
sctp_endpoint_free(sp->ep);
local_bh_disable();
percpu_counter_dec(&sctp_sockets_allocated);
sock_prot_inuse_add(sock_net(sk), sk->sk_prot, -1);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_dummy_context(struct inode *inode)
{
return DUMMY_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb));
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
int force_complete)
{
char *headers, *p;
size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen;
int crlf_offset;
check();
if (!buf->head)
return 0;
crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4);
if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen ||
(crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) {
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long.");
return -1;
} else if (crlf_offset < 0) {
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet.");
return 0;
}
/* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first
* chunk. */
if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4)
buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4, 0);
headerlen = crlf_offset + 4;
headers = buf->head->data;
bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen;
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen);
if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) {
log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
(int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1);
return -1;
}
if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) {
log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
(int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1);
return -1;
}
#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH);
if (p) {
int i;
i = atoi(p+strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH));
if (i < 0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is less than zero; it looks like "
"someone is trying to crash us.");
return -1;
}
contentlen = i;
/* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen);
if (bodylen < contentlen) {
if (!force_complete) {
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet.");
return 0; /* not all there yet */
}
}
if (bodylen > contentlen) {
bodylen = contentlen;
log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen);
}
}
/* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */
if (headers_out) {
*headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1);
fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf);
(*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */
}
if (body_out) {
tor_assert(body_used);
*body_used = bodylen;
*body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1);
fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf);
(*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */
}
check();
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int imap_check_mailbox(struct Context *ctx, int force)
{
return imap_check(ctx->data, force);
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void red_channel_unref(RedChannel *channel)
{
if (!--channel->refs) {
if (channel->local_caps.num_common_caps) {
free(channel->local_caps.common_caps);
}
if (channel->local_caps.num_caps) {
free(channel->local_caps.caps);
}
free(channel);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
{
int ret, mode;
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx);
if ((mode == EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE || mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
&& !enc) {
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
ret = HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
# endif
} else
#endif
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) bsaes_cbc_encrypt;
} else
#endif
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
ret = vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else
#endif
{
ret = AES_set_decrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
}
} else
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
ret = HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = NULL;
# ifdef HWAES_cbc_encrypt
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
dat->stream.cbc = (cbc128_f) HWAES_cbc_encrypt;
else
# endif
# ifdef HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) HWAES_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
else
# endif
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
} else
#endif
#ifdef BSAES_CAPABLE
if (BSAES_CAPABLE && mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE) {
ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) bsaes_ctr32_encrypt_blocks;
} else
#endif
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
ret = vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) vpaes_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
} else
#endif
{
ret = AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
&dat->ks.ks);
dat->block = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
dat->stream.cbc = mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE ?
(cbc128_f) AES_cbc_encrypt : NULL;
#ifdef AES_CTR_ASM
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE)
dat->stream.ctr = (ctr128_f) AES_ctr32_encrypt;
#endif
}
if (ret < 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_AES_KEY_SETUP_FAILED);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 69,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ib_uverbs_event_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct ib_uverbs_event_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_uverbs_event *entry, *tmp;
int closed_already = 0;
mutex_lock(&file->uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
spin_lock_irq(&file->lock);
closed_already = file->is_closed;
file->is_closed = 1;
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &file->event_list, list) {
if (entry->counter)
list_del(&entry->obj_list);
kfree(entry);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&file->lock);
if (!closed_already) {
list_del(&file->list);
if (file->is_async)
ib_unregister_event_handler(&file->uverbs_file->
event_handler);
}
mutex_unlock(&file->uverbs_file->device->lists_mutex);
kref_put(&file->uverbs_file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_file);
kref_put(&file->ref, ib_uverbs_release_event_file);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::ConnectionOpened() {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
indexed_db_context_->ConnectionOpened(origin_, connection_.get());
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t support_device_change_show(struct device_driver *dd, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", support_device_change);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netdev_upper_dev_unlink(struct net_device *dev,
struct net_device *upper_dev)
{
struct netdev_notifier_changeupper_info changeupper_info;
ASSERT_RTNL();
changeupper_info.upper_dev = upper_dev;
changeupper_info.master = netdev_master_upper_dev_get(dev) == upper_dev;
changeupper_info.linking = false;
call_netdevice_notifiers_info(NETDEV_PRECHANGEUPPER, dev,
&changeupper_info.info);
__netdev_adjacent_dev_unlink_neighbour(dev, upper_dev);
call_netdevice_notifiers_info(NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER, dev,
&changeupper_info.info);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct tgid_iter next_tgid(struct pid_namespace *ns, struct tgid_iter iter)
{
struct pid *pid;
if (iter.task)
put_task_struct(iter.task);
rcu_read_lock();
retry:
iter.task = NULL;
pid = find_ge_pid(iter.tgid, ns);
if (pid) {
iter.tgid = pid_nr_ns(pid, ns);
iter.task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
/* What we to know is if the pid we have find is the
* pid of a thread_group_leader. Testing for task
* being a thread_group_leader is the obvious thing
* todo but there is a window when it fails, due to
* the pid transfer logic in de_thread.
*
* So we perform the straight forward test of seeing
* if the pid we have found is the pid of a thread
* group leader, and don't worry if the task we have
* found doesn't happen to be a thread group leader.
* As we don't care in the case of readdir.
*/
if (!iter.task || !has_group_leader_pid(iter.task)) {
iter.tgid += 1;
goto retry;
}
get_task_struct(iter.task);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return iter;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Address NormalPageArena::lazySweepPages(size_t allocationSize,
size_t gcInfoIndex) {
ASSERT(!hasCurrentAllocationArea());
AutoReset<bool> isLazySweeping(&m_isLazySweeping, true);
Address result = nullptr;
while (m_firstUnsweptPage) {
BasePage* page = m_firstUnsweptPage;
if (page->isEmpty()) {
page->unlink(&m_firstUnsweptPage);
page->removeFromHeap();
} else {
page->sweep();
page->unlink(&m_firstUnsweptPage);
page->link(&m_firstPage);
page->markAsSwept();
result = allocateFromFreeList(allocationSize, gcInfoIndex);
if (result)
break;
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OutOfProcessInstance::DidOpenPreview(int32_t result) {
if (result == PP_OK) {
preview_engine_.reset(PDFEngine::Create(new PreviewModeClient(this)));
preview_engine_->HandleDocumentLoad(embed_preview_loader_);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent leaking PDF data cross-origin
BUG=520422
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1311973002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#345267}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Label::SetElideInMiddle(bool elide_in_middle) {
DCHECK(!elide_in_middle || !is_multi_line_);
if (elide_in_middle != elide_in_middle_) {
elide_in_middle_ = elide_in_middle;
text_size_valid_ = false;
PreferredSizeChanged();
SchedulePaint();
}
}
Commit Message: wstring: remove wstring version of SplitString
Retry of r84336.
BUG=23581
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6930047
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@84355 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(exif_tagname)
{
long tag;
char *szTemp;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &tag) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
szTemp = exif_get_tagname(tag, NULL, 0, tag_table_IFD TSRMLS_CC);
if (tag < 0 || !szTemp || !szTemp[0]) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRING(szTemp, 1)
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TestInterfaceOrNullAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "testInterfaceOrNullAttribute");
TestInterfaceImplementation* cpp_value = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value);
if (!cpp_value && !IsUndefinedOrNull(v8_value)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("The provided value is not of type 'TestInterface'.");
return;
}
impl->setTestInterfaceOrNullAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int luaD_poscall (lua_State *L, StkId firstResult) {
StkId res;
int wanted, i;
CallInfo *ci;
if (L->hookmask & LUA_MASKRET)
firstResult = callrethooks(L, firstResult);
ci = L->ci--;
res = ci->func; /* res == final position of 1st result */
wanted = ci->nresults;
L->base = (ci - 1)->base; /* restore base */
L->savedpc = (ci - 1)->savedpc; /* restore savedpc */
/* move results to correct place */
for (i = wanted; i != 0 && firstResult < L->top; i--)
setobjs2s(L, res++, firstResult++);
while (i-- > 0)
setnilvalue(res++);
L->top = res;
return (wanted - LUA_MULTRET); /* 0 iff wanted == LUA_MULTRET */
}
Commit Message: disable loading lua bytecode
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long do_get_mempolicy(int *policy, nodemask_t *nmask,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags)
{
int err;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = NULL;
struct mempolicy *pol = current->mempolicy;
if (flags &
~(unsigned long)(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR|MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & MPOL_F_MEMS_ALLOWED) {
if (flags & (MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR))
return -EINVAL;
*policy = 0; /* just so it's initialized */
task_lock(current);
*nmask = cpuset_current_mems_allowed;
task_unlock(current);
return 0;
}
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
/*
* Do NOT fall back to task policy if the
* vma/shared policy at addr is NULL. We
* want to return MPOL_DEFAULT in this case.
*/
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = find_vma_intersection(mm, addr, addr+1);
if (!vma) {
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return -EFAULT;
}
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->get_policy)
pol = vma->vm_ops->get_policy(vma, addr);
else
pol = vma->vm_policy;
} else if (addr)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pol)
pol = &default_policy; /* indicates default behavior */
if (flags & MPOL_F_NODE) {
if (flags & MPOL_F_ADDR) {
err = lookup_node(addr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
*policy = err;
} else if (pol == current->mempolicy &&
pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE) {
*policy = current->il_next;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
} else {
*policy = pol == &default_policy ? MPOL_DEFAULT :
pol->mode;
/*
* Internal mempolicy flags must be masked off before exposing
* the policy to userspace.
*/
*policy |= (pol->flags & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS);
}
if (vma) {
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
vma = NULL;
}
err = 0;
if (nmask) {
if (mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)) {
*nmask = pol->w.user_nodemask;
} else {
task_lock(current);
get_policy_nodemask(pol, nmask);
task_unlock(current);
}
}
out:
mpol_cond_put(pol);
if (vma)
up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 67,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Notification::title() const
{
return m_data.title;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs_page *nfs_try_to_update_request(struct inode *inode,
struct page *page,
unsigned int offset,
unsigned int bytes)
{
struct nfs_page *req;
unsigned int rqend;
unsigned int end;
int error;
if (!PagePrivate(page))
return NULL;
end = offset + bytes;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
for (;;) {
req = nfs_page_find_request_locked(NFS_I(inode), page);
if (req == NULL)
goto out_unlock;
rqend = req->wb_offset + req->wb_bytes;
/*
* Tell the caller to flush out the request if
* the offsets are non-contiguous.
* Note: nfs_flush_incompatible() will already
* have flushed out requests having wrong owners.
*/
if (offset > rqend
|| end < req->wb_offset)
goto out_flushme;
if (nfs_lock_request(req))
break;
/* The request is locked, so wait and then retry */
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
error = nfs_wait_on_request(req);
nfs_release_request(req);
if (error != 0)
goto out_err;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
}
/* Okay, the request matches. Update the region */
if (offset < req->wb_offset) {
req->wb_offset = offset;
req->wb_pgbase = offset;
}
if (end > rqend)
req->wb_bytes = end - req->wb_offset;
else
req->wb_bytes = rqend - req->wb_offset;
out_unlock:
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
if (req)
nfs_clear_request_commit(req);
return req;
out_flushme:
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
nfs_release_request(req);
error = nfs_wb_page(inode, page);
out_err:
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~Trans4x4DCT() {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dvb_usbv2_resume(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
dev_dbg(&d->udev->dev, "%s:\n", __func__);
return dvb_usbv2_resume_common(d);
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-v2: avoid use-after-free
I ran into a stack frame size warning because of the on-stack copy of
the USB device structure:
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c: In function 'dvb_usbv2_disconnect':
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/dvb_usb_core.c:1029:1: error: the frame size of 1104 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Werror=frame-larger-than=]
Copying a device structure like this is wrong for a number of other reasons
too aside from the possible stack overflow. One of them is that the
dev_info() call will print the name of the device later, but AFAICT
we have only copied a pointer to the name earlier and the actual name
has been freed by the time it gets printed.
This removes the on-stack copy of the device and instead copies the
device name using kstrdup(). I'm ignoring the possible failure here
as both printk() and kfree() are able to deal with NULL pointers.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::DidOverscroll(gfx::Vector2dF accumulated_overscroll,
gfx::Vector2dF latest_overscroll_delta,
gfx::Vector2dF current_fling_velocity) {
const float physical_pixel_scale = dip_scale_ * page_scale_factor_;
if (accumulated_overscroll == latest_overscroll_delta)
overscroll_rounding_error_ = gfx::Vector2dF();
gfx::Vector2dF scaled_overscroll_delta =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(latest_overscroll_delta, physical_pixel_scale);
gfx::Vector2d rounded_overscroll_delta = gfx::ToRoundedVector2d(
scaled_overscroll_delta + overscroll_rounding_error_);
overscroll_rounding_error_ =
scaled_overscroll_delta - rounded_overscroll_delta;
gfx::Vector2dF fling_velocity_pixels =
gfx::ScaleVector2d(current_fling_velocity, physical_pixel_scale);
client_->DidOverscroll(rounded_overscroll_delta, fling_velocity_pixels);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void CopyBlob(Image *source,Image *destination)
{
ssize_t
i;
unsigned char
*buffer;
ssize_t
count,
length;
buffer=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMaxBufferExtent,
sizeof(*buffer));
if (buffer != (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
i=0;
while ((length=ReadBlob(source,MagickMaxBufferExtent,buffer)) != 0)
{
count=0;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i+=count)
{
count=WriteBlob(destination,(size_t) (length-i),buffer+i);
if (count <= 0)
break;
}
if (i < (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
buffer=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsBMP(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if ((LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BA",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"BM",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"IC",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"PI",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CI",2) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"CP",2) == 0))
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lrw_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct camellia_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[CAMELLIA_AESNI_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
struct crypt_priv crypt_ctx = {
.ctx = &ctx->camellia_ctx,
.fpu_enabled = false,
};
struct lrw_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.table_ctx = &ctx->lrw_table,
.crypt_ctx = &crypt_ctx,
.crypt_fn = decrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = lrw_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
camellia_fpu_end(crypt_ctx.fpu_enabled);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::getPollInterval()
{
return m_pollInterval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~AutomationProviderBookmarkModelObserver() {
model_->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isodate17(const unsigned char *v)
{
struct tm tm;
int offset;
time_t t;
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
tm.tm_year = (v[0] - '0') * 1000 + (v[1] - '0') * 100
+ (v[2] - '0') * 10 + (v[3] - '0')
- 1900;
tm.tm_mon = (v[4] - '0') * 10 + (v[5] - '0');
tm.tm_mday = (v[6] - '0') * 10 + (v[7] - '0');
tm.tm_hour = (v[8] - '0') * 10 + (v[9] - '0');
tm.tm_min = (v[10] - '0') * 10 + (v[11] - '0');
tm.tm_sec = (v[12] - '0') * 10 + (v[13] - '0');
/* v[16] is the signed timezone offset, in 1/4-hour increments. */
offset = ((const signed char *)v)[16];
if (offset > -48 && offset < 52) {
tm.tm_hour -= offset / 4;
tm.tm_min -= (offset % 4) * 15;
}
t = time_from_tm(&tm);
if (t == (time_t)-1)
return ((time_t)0);
return (t);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::BufferSubData(GLenum target,
GLintptr offset,
GLsizeiptr size,
const void* data) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glBufferSubData("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringBufferTarget(target) << ", "
<< offset << ", " << size << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(data) << ")");
BufferSubDataHelper(target, offset, size, data);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 a_copy_to_user(void *to, const void *from, u32 n)
{
return(copy_to_user(to, from, n));
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lockd_unregister_notifiers(void)
{
unregister_inetaddr_notifier(&lockd_inetaddr_notifier);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
unregister_inet6addr_notifier(&lockd_inet6addr_notifier);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,206 |
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