instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGraphicsContext3D* RenderViewImpl::createGraphicsContext3D(
const WebGraphicsContext3D::Attributes& attributes,
bool direct) {
if (!webview())
return NULL;
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessWebGL)) {
return webkit::gpu::WebGraphicsContext3DInProcessImpl::CreateForWebView(
attributes, direct);
} else {
int surface = direct ? surface_id() : 0;
GURL url;
if (webview()->mainFrame())
url = GURL(webview()->mainFrame()->document().url());
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DSwapBuffersClient> swap_client;
if (direct)
swap_client = AsWeakPtr();
scoped_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl> context(
new WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl(
surface, url, RenderThreadImpl::current(), swap_client));
if (!context->Initialize(attributes))
return NULL;
context_is_web_graphics_context_3d_command_buffer_impl_ = true;
return context.release();
}
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_queue_client(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_queue_client *info = arg;
int err;
if (info->used >= 0) {
err = snd_seq_queue_use(info->queue, client->number, info->used);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return snd_seq_ioctl_get_queue_client(client, arg);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::FocusLocationBar() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("FocusLocation"));
window_->SetFocusToLocationBar(true);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileStream::close() {
if (saved) {
#if HAVE_FSEEKO
fseeko(f, savePos, SEEK_SET);
#elif HAVE_FSEEK64
fseek64(f, savePos, SEEK_SET);
#else
fseek(f, savePos, SEEK_SET);
#endif
saved = gFalse;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btrfs_retry_endio_nocsum(struct bio *bio)
{
struct btrfs_retry_complete *done = bio->bi_private;
struct bio_vec *bvec;
int i;
if (bio->bi_error)
goto end;
done->uptodate = 1;
bio_for_each_segment_all(bvec, bio, i)
clean_io_failure(done->inode, done->start, bvec->bv_page, 0);
end:
complete(&done->done);
bio_put(bio);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: coolkey_pin_cmd(sc_card_t *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
int r;
coolkey_private_data_t * priv = COOLKEY_DATA(card);
size_t rbuflen;
u8 *rbuf;
/* COOLKEY uses a separate pin from the card pin, managed by the applet.
* if we successfully log into coolkey, we will get a nonce, which we append
* to our APDUs to authenticate the apdu to the card. This allows coolkey to
* maintain separate per application login states without the application
* having to cache the pin */
switch (data->cmd) {
case SC_PIN_CMD_GET_INFO:
if (priv->nonce_valid) {
data->pin1.logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_LOGGED_IN;
} else {
data->pin1.logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_LOGGED_OUT;
/* coolkey retries is 100. It's unlikely the pin is block.
* instead, coolkey slows down the login command exponentially
*/
data->pin1.tries_left = 0xf;
}
if (tries_left) {
*tries_left = data->pin1.tries_left;
}
r = SC_SUCCESS;
break;
case SC_PIN_CMD_UNBLOCK:
case SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE:
/* these 2 commands are currently reserved for TPS */
default:
r = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
break;
case SC_PIN_CMD_VERIFY:
/* coolkey applet supports multiple pins, but TPS currently only uses one.
* just support the one pin for now (we need an array of nonces to handle
* multiple pins) */
/* coolkey only supports unpadded ascii pins, so no need to format the pin */
rbuflen = sizeof(priv->nonce);
rbuf = &priv->nonce[0];
r = coolkey_apdu_io(card, COOLKEY_CLASS, COOLKEY_INS_VERIFY_PIN,
data->pin_reference, 0, data->pin1.data, data->pin1.len,
&rbuf, &rbuflen, NULL, 0);
if (r < 0) {
break;
}
priv->nonce_valid = 1;
r = SC_SUCCESS;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void didNavigate()
{
if (s_instance && s_instance->m_running)
PageScriptDebugServer::shared().continueProgram();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int readlink_and_make_absolute_root(const char *root, const char *path, char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL, *t = NULL;
const char *full;
int r;
full = prefix_roota(root, path);
r = readlink_malloc(full, &target);
if (r < 0)
return r;
t = file_in_same_dir(path, target);
if (!t)
return -ENOMEM;
*ret = t;
t = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 71,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __iget(struct inode *inode)
{
atomic_inc(&inode->i_count);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagerotate)
{
zval *SIM;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
double degrees;
long color;
long ignoretransparent = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdl|l", &SIM, °rees, &color, &ignoretransparent) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
im_dst = gdImageRotateInterpolated(im_src, (float)degrees, color);
if (im_dst != NULL) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im_dst, le_gd);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SelectionPin(IRCView *doc) : pos(0), anc(0), d(doc)
{
if (d->textCursor().hasSelection())
{
int end = d->document()->rootFrame()->lastPosition();
d->document()->lastBlock();
pos = d->textCursor().position();
anc = d->textCursor().anchor();
if (pos != end && anc != end)
anc = pos = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ManagementAPIDelegate* ExtensionsAPIClient::CreateManagementAPIDelegate()
const {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::releaseBackForwardEntry(BackForwardId id) const
{
HistoryItem* item = historyItemFromBackForwardId(id);
ASSERT(item);
item->deref();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ati_remote2_complete_key(struct urb *urb)
{
struct ati_remote2 *ar2 = urb->context;
int r;
switch (urb->status) {
case 0:
usb_mark_last_busy(ar2->udev);
ati_remote2_input_key(ar2);
break;
case -ENOENT:
case -EILSEQ:
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
dev_dbg(&ar2->intf[1]->dev,
"%s(): urb status = %d\n", __func__, urb->status);
return;
default:
usb_mark_last_busy(ar2->udev);
dev_err(&ar2->intf[1]->dev,
"%s(): urb status = %d\n", __func__, urb->status);
}
r = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r)
dev_err(&ar2->intf[1]->dev,
"%s(): usb_submit_urb() = %d\n", __func__, r);
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::CreateView(mojom::CreateViewParamsPtr params) {
CompositorDependencies* compositor_deps = this;
is_scroll_animator_enabled_ = params->web_preferences.enable_scroll_animator;
RenderViewImpl::Create(compositor_deps, std::move(params),
RenderWidget::ShowCallback());
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fat_str_replace (char *str,
char replacement)
{
gboolean success;
int i;
success = FALSE;
for (i = 0; str[i] != '\0'; i++)
{
if (strchr (FAT_FORBIDDEN_CHARACTERS, str[i]) ||
str[i] < 32)
{
success = TRUE;
str[i] = replacement;
}
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err cslg_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *ptr = (GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *)s;
ptr->size += 20;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadUserScriptHelper(const DictionaryValue* content_script,
int definition_index,
string16* error,
UserScript* result) {
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kRunAt)) {
std::string run_location;
if (!content_script->GetString(keys::kRunAt, &run_location)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidRunAt,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (run_location == values::kRunAtDocumentStart) {
result->set_run_location(UserScript::DOCUMENT_START);
} else if (run_location == values::kRunAtDocumentEnd) {
result->set_run_location(UserScript::DOCUMENT_END);
} else if (run_location == values::kRunAtDocumentIdle) {
result->set_run_location(UserScript::DOCUMENT_IDLE);
} else {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidRunAt,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
}
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kAllFrames)) {
bool all_frames = false;
if (!content_script->GetBoolean(keys::kAllFrames, &all_frames)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidAllFrames, base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
result->set_match_all_frames(all_frames);
}
const ListValue* matches = NULL;
if (!content_script->GetList(keys::kMatches, &matches)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidMatches,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (matches->GetSize() == 0) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidMatchCount,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < matches->GetSize(); ++j) {
std::string match_str;
if (!matches->GetString(j, &match_str)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(j),
errors::kExpectString);
return false;
}
URLPattern pattern(UserScript::kValidUserScriptSchemes);
if (CanExecuteScriptEverywhere())
pattern.SetValidSchemes(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = pattern.Parse(match_str);
if (parse_result != URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(j),
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
if (pattern.MatchesScheme(chrome::kFileScheme) &&
!CanExecuteScriptEverywhere()) {
wants_file_access_ = true;
if (!(creation_flags_ & ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS)) {
pattern.SetValidSchemes(
pattern.valid_schemes() & ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE);
}
}
result->add_url_pattern(pattern);
}
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kExcludeMatches)) { // optional
const ListValue* exclude_matches = NULL;
if (!content_script->GetList(keys::kExcludeMatches, &exclude_matches)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidExcludeMatches,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
for (size_t j = 0; j < exclude_matches->GetSize(); ++j) {
std::string match_str;
if (!exclude_matches->GetString(j, &match_str)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidExcludeMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(j),
errors::kExpectString);
return false;
}
URLPattern pattern(UserScript::kValidUserScriptSchemes);
if (CanExecuteScriptEverywhere())
pattern.SetValidSchemes(URLPattern::SCHEME_ALL);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = pattern.Parse(match_str);
if (parse_result != URLPattern::PARSE_SUCCESS) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidExcludeMatch,
base::IntToString(definition_index), base::IntToString(j),
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
result->add_exclude_url_pattern(pattern);
}
}
if (!LoadGlobsHelper(content_script, definition_index, keys::kIncludeGlobs,
error, &UserScript::add_glob, result)) {
return false;
}
if (!LoadGlobsHelper(content_script, definition_index, keys::kExcludeGlobs,
error, &UserScript::add_exclude_glob, result)) {
return false;
}
const ListValue* js = NULL;
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kJs) &&
!content_script->GetList(keys::kJs, &js)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidJsList,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
const ListValue* css = NULL;
if (content_script->HasKey(keys::kCss) &&
!content_script->GetList(keys::kCss, &css)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::
FormatErrorMessageUTF16(errors::kInvalidCssList,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (((js ? js->GetSize() : 0) + (css ? css->GetSize() : 0)) == 0) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kMissingFile,
base::IntToString(definition_index));
return false;
}
if (js) {
for (size_t script_index = 0; script_index < js->GetSize();
++script_index) {
const Value* value;
std::string relative;
if (!js->Get(script_index, &value) || !value->GetAsString(&relative)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidJs,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(script_index));
return false;
}
GURL url = GetResourceURL(relative);
ExtensionResource resource = GetResource(relative);
result->js_scripts().push_back(UserScript::File(
resource.extension_root(), resource.relative_path(), url));
}
}
if (css) {
for (size_t script_index = 0; script_index < css->GetSize();
++script_index) {
const Value* value;
std::string relative;
if (!css->Get(script_index, &value) || !value->GetAsString(&relative)) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessageUTF16(
errors::kInvalidCss,
base::IntToString(definition_index),
base::IntToString(script_index));
return false;
}
GURL url = GetResourceURL(relative);
ExtensionResource resource = GetResource(relative);
result->css_scripts().push_back(UserScript::File(
resource.extension_root(), resource.relative_path(), url));
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleReadPixels(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::ReadPixels& c) {
GLint x = c.x;
GLint y = c.y;
GLsizei width = c.width;
GLsizei height = c.height;
GLenum format = c.format;
GLenum type = c.type;
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
typedef gles2::ReadPixels::Result Result;
uint32 pixels_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, height, format, type, pack_alignment_, &pixels_size, NULL, NULL)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
void* pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<void*>(
c.pixels_shm_id, c.pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!pixels || !result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (!validators_->read_pixel_format.IsValid(format)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glReadPixels", format, "format");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->pixel_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glReadPixels", type, "type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width == 0 || height == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
gfx::Size max_size = GetBoundReadFrameBufferSize();
GLint max_x;
GLint max_y;
if (!SafeAdd(x, width, &max_x) || !SafeAdd(y, height, &max_y)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckBoundFramebuffersValid("glReadPixels")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
CopyRealGLErrorsToWrapper();
ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
if (x < 0 || y < 0 || max_x > max_size.width() || max_y > max_size.height()) {
uint32 temp_size;
uint32 unpadded_row_size;
uint32 padded_row_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, 2, format, type, pack_alignment_, &temp_size,
&unpadded_row_size, &padded_row_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLint dest_x_offset = std::max(-x, 0);
uint32 dest_row_offset;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
dest_x_offset, 1, format, type, pack_alignment_, &dest_row_offset, NULL,
NULL)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
int8* dst = static_cast<int8*>(pixels);
GLint read_x = std::max(0, x);
GLint read_end_x = std::max(0, std::min(max_size.width(), max_x));
GLint read_width = read_end_x - read_x;
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
GLint ry = y + yy;
memset(dst, 0, unpadded_row_size);
if (ry >= 0 && ry < max_size.height() && read_width > 0) {
glReadPixels(
read_x, ry, read_width, 1, format, type, dst + dest_row_offset);
}
dst += padded_row_size;
}
} else {
glReadPixels(x, y, width, height, format, type, pixels);
}
GLenum error = PeekGLError();
if (error == GL_NO_ERROR) {
*result = true;
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFrameBufferInternalFormat();
uint32 channels_exist = GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(read_format);
if ((channels_exist & 0x0008) == 0 &&
!feature_info_->feature_flags().disable_workarounds) {
uint32 temp_size;
uint32 unpadded_row_size;
uint32 padded_row_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, 2, format, type, pack_alignment_, &temp_size,
&unpadded_row_size, &padded_row_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glReadPixels", "dimensions out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (type != GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE) {
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glReadPixels",
"unsupported readPixel format");
return error::kNoError;
}
switch (format) {
case GL_RGBA:
case GL_BGRA_EXT:
case GL_ALPHA: {
int offset = (format == GL_ALPHA) ? 0 : 3;
int step = (format == GL_ALPHA) ? 1 : 4;
uint8* dst = static_cast<uint8*>(pixels) + offset;
for (GLint yy = 0; yy < height; ++yy) {
uint8* end = dst + unpadded_row_size;
for (uint8* d = dst; d < end; d += step) {
*d = 255;
}
dst += padded_row_size;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 170,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON_bool) cJSON_IsNull(const cJSON * const item)
{
if (item == NULL)
{
return false;
}
return (item->type & 0xFF) == cJSON_NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 87,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseNotationType(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEnumerationPtr ret = NULL, last = NULL, cur, tmp;
if (RAW != '(') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
SHRINK;
do {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"Name expected in NOTATION declaration\n");
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
tmp = ret;
while (tmp != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(name, tmp->name)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_DTD_DUP_TOKEN,
"standalone: attribute notation value token %s duplicated\n",
name, NULL);
if (!xmlDictOwns(ctxt->dict, name))
xmlFree((xmlChar *) name);
break;
}
tmp = tmp->next;
}
if (tmp == NULL) {
cur = xmlCreateEnumeration(name);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) ret = last = cur;
else {
last->next = cur;
last = cur;
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
} while (RAW == '|');
if (RAW != ')') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
xmlFreeEnumeration(ret);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct cfs_rq *group_cfs_rq(struct sched_entity *grp)
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void vm_exit_controls_reset_shadow(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
vmx->vm_exit_controls_shadow = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::addToPastNamesMap(Node* element, const AtomicString& pastName)
{
if (pastName.isEmpty())
return;
if (!m_pastNamesMap)
m_pastNamesMap = adoptPtr(new PastNamesMap);
m_pastNamesMap->set(pastName.impl(), element);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::Hide() {
WasHidden();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxSubpath::close() {
if (x[n-1] != x[0] || y[n-1] != y[0]) {
lineTo(x[0], y[0]);
}
closed = gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int piv_select_file(sc_card_t *card, const sc_path_t *in_path,
sc_file_t **file_out)
{
piv_private_data_t * priv = PIV_DATA(card);
int r;
int i;
const u8 *path;
int pathlen;
sc_file_t *file = NULL;
u8 * rbuf = NULL;
size_t rbuflen = 0;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
path = in_path->value;
pathlen = in_path->len;
/* only support single EF in current application */
/*
* PIV emulates files, and only does so because sc_pkcs15_* uses
* select_file and read_binary. The emulation adds path emulated structures
* so piv_select_file will find it.
* there is no dir. Only direct access to emulated files
* thus opensc-tool and opensc-explorer can not read the emulated files
*/
if (memcmp(path, "\x3F\x00", 2) == 0) {
if (pathlen > 2) {
path += 2;
pathlen -= 2;
}
}
i = piv_find_obj_by_containerid(card, path);
if (i < 0)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
/*
* pkcs15 will use a 2 byte path or a 4 byte path
* with cece added to path to request only the cert from the cert obj
* PIV "Container ID" is used as the path, and are two bytes long
*/
priv->return_only_cert = (pathlen == 4 && path[2] == 0xce && path[3] == 0xce);
priv->selected_obj = i;
priv->rwb_state = -1;
/* make it look like the file was found. */
/* We don't want to read it now unless we need the length */
if (file_out) {
/* we need to read it now, to get length into cache */
r = piv_get_cached_data(card, i, &rbuf, &rbuflen);
if (r < 0)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND);
/* get the cert or the pub key out and into the cache too */
if (priv->return_only_cert || piv_objects[i].flags & PIV_OBJECT_TYPE_PUBKEY) {
r = piv_cache_internal_data(card, i);
if (r < 0)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
file = sc_file_new();
if (file == NULL)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
file->path = *in_path;
/* this could be like the FCI */
file->type = SC_FILE_TYPE_DF;
file->shareable = 0;
file->ef_structure = 0;
if (priv->return_only_cert)
file->size = priv->obj_cache[i].internal_obj_len;
else
file->size = priv->obj_cache[i].obj_len;
file->id = (piv_objects[i].containerid[0]<<8) + piv_objects[i].containerid[1];
*file_out = file;
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parsewccres(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint32_t *dp, int verbose)
{
int er;
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
return (0);
return parse_wcc_data(ndo, dp, verbose) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rtadv_process_solicit (struct interface *ifp)
{
struct zebra_vrf *zvrf = vrf_info_lookup (ifp->vrf_id);
zlog_info ("Router solicitation received on %s vrf %u", ifp->name, zvrf->vrf_id);
rtadv_send_packet (zvrf->rtadv.sock, ifp);
}
Commit Message: zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::haveStylesheetsLoaded() const
{
return !m_styleSheetCollection->hasPendingSheets() || m_ignorePendingStylesheets;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mmtimer_disable_int(long nasid, int comparator)
{
switch (comparator) {
case 0:
nasid == -1 ? HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC1_INT_ENABLE),
0UL) : REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, SH_RTC1_INT_ENABLE, 0UL);
break;
case 1:
nasid == -1 ? HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC2_INT_ENABLE),
0UL) : REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, SH_RTC2_INT_ENABLE, 0UL);
break;
case 2:
nasid == -1 ? HUB_S((u64 *)LOCAL_MMR_ADDR(SH_RTC3_INT_ENABLE),
0UL) : REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, SH_RTC3_INT_ENABLE, 0UL);
break;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunMigrationTest(const MigrationList& migration_list,
TriggerMethod trigger_method) {
ASSERT_TRUE(ShouldRunMigrationTest());
bool do_test_without_notifications =
(trigger_method != TRIGGER_NOTIFICATION && num_clients() == 1);
if (do_test_without_notifications) {
DisableNotifications();
}
for (MigrationList::const_iterator it = migration_list.begin();
it != migration_list.end(); ++it) {
TriggerMigrationDoneError(*it);
}
for (MigrationList::const_iterator it = migration_list.begin();
it != migration_list.end(); ++it) {
TriggerMigration(*it, trigger_method);
AwaitMigration(*it);
}
if (!do_test_without_notifications) {
AwaitQuiescence();
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_display(struct display *dp)
/* called once after the first read to update all the info, original_pp and
* original_ip must have been filled in.
*/
{
png_structp pp;
png_infop ip;
/* Now perform the initial read with a 0 tranform. */
read_png(dp, &dp->original_file, "original read", 0/*no transform*/);
/* Move the result to the 'original' fields */
dp->original_pp = pp = dp->read_pp, dp->read_pp = NULL;
dp->original_ip = ip = dp->read_ip, dp->read_ip = NULL;
dp->original_rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rowbytes == 0)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_rowbytes returned 0");
dp->chunks = png_get_valid(pp, ip, 0xffffffff);
if ((dp->chunks & PNG_INFO_IDAT) == 0) /* set by png_read_png */
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not set IDAT flag");
dp->original_rows = png_get_rows(pp, ip);
if (dp->original_rows == NULL)
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_read_png did not create row buffers");
if (!png_get_IHDR(pp, ip,
&dp->width, &dp->height, &dp->bit_depth, &dp->color_type,
&dp->interlace_method, &dp->compression_method, &dp->filter_method))
display_log(dp, LIBPNG_BUG, "png_get_IHDR failed");
/* 'active' transforms are discovered based on the original image format;
* running one active transform can activate others. At present the code
* does not attempt to determine the closure.
*/
{
png_uint_32 chunks = dp->chunks;
int active = 0, inactive = 0;
int ct = dp->color_type;
int bd = dp->bit_depth;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
int transform = transform_info[i].transform;
if ((transform_info[i].valid_chunks == 0 ||
(transform_info[i].valid_chunks & chunks) != 0) &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_required & ct) ==
transform_info[i].color_mask_required &&
(transform_info[i].color_mask_absent & ct) == 0 &&
(transform_info[i].bit_depths & bd) != 0 &&
(transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
active |= transform;
else if ((transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R) != 0)
inactive |= transform;
}
/* Some transforms appear multiple times in the table; the 'active' status
* is the logical OR of these and the inactive status must be adjusted to
* take this into account.
*/
inactive &= ~active;
dp->active_transforms = active;
dp->ignored_transforms = inactive; /* excluding write-only transforms */
if (active == 0)
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "bad transform table");
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void icmp_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct iphdr *iph;
struct icmphdr *icmph;
int hash, protocol;
const struct net_protocol *ipprot;
u32 info = 0;
struct net *net;
net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
/*
* Incomplete header ?
* Only checks for the IP header, there should be an
* additional check for longer headers in upper levels.
*/
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)))
goto out_err;
icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
if (iph->ihl < 5) /* Mangled header, drop. */
goto out_err;
if (icmph->type == ICMP_DEST_UNREACH) {
switch (icmph->code & 15) {
case ICMP_NET_UNREACH:
case ICMP_HOST_UNREACH:
case ICMP_PROT_UNREACH:
case ICMP_PORT_UNREACH:
break;
case ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED:
if (ipv4_config.no_pmtu_disc) {
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ICMP: %pI4: fragmentation needed and DF set.\n",
&iph->daddr);
} else {
info = ip_rt_frag_needed(net, iph,
ntohs(icmph->un.frag.mtu),
skb->dev);
if (!info)
goto out;
}
break;
case ICMP_SR_FAILED:
LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "ICMP: %pI4: Source Route Failed.\n",
&iph->daddr);
break;
default:
break;
}
if (icmph->code > NR_ICMP_UNREACH)
goto out;
} else if (icmph->type == ICMP_PARAMETERPROB)
info = ntohl(icmph->un.gateway) >> 24;
/*
* Throw it at our lower layers
*
* RFC 1122: 3.2.2 MUST extract the protocol ID from the passed
* header.
* RFC 1122: 3.2.2.1 MUST pass ICMP unreach messages to the
* transport layer.
* RFC 1122: 3.2.2.2 MUST pass ICMP time expired messages to
* transport layer.
*/
/*
* Check the other end isn't violating RFC 1122. Some routers send
* bogus responses to broadcast frames. If you see this message
* first check your netmask matches at both ends, if it does then
* get the other vendor to fix their kit.
*/
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses &&
inet_addr_type(net, iph->daddr) == RTN_BROADCAST) {
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_WARNING "%pI4 sent an invalid ICMP "
"type %u, code %u "
"error to a broadcast: %pI4 on %s\n",
&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
icmph->type, icmph->code,
&iph->daddr,
skb->dev->name);
goto out;
}
/* Checkin full IP header plus 8 bytes of protocol to
* avoid additional coding at protocol handlers.
*/
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, iph->ihl * 4 + 8))
goto out;
iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
protocol = iph->protocol;
/*
* Deliver ICMP message to raw sockets. Pretty useless feature?
*/
raw_icmp_error(skb, protocol, info);
hash = protocol & (MAX_INET_PROTOS - 1);
rcu_read_lock();
ipprot = rcu_dereference(inet_protos[hash]);
if (ipprot && ipprot->err_handler)
ipprot->err_handler(skb, info);
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
return;
out_err:
ICMP_INC_STATS_BH(net, ICMP_MIB_INERRORS);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LocalFrame::ShouldClose() {
return loader_.ShouldClose();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: linux_lvm2_vg_remove_pv_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
dbus_g_method_return (context);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error removing PV for LVM2 Volume Group: vgreduce exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::updateHoverActiveState(const HitTestRequest& request, Element* innerElement)
{
ASSERT(!request.readOnly());
if (request.active() && m_frame)
m_frame->eventHandler().notifyElementActivated();
Element* innerElementInDocument = innerElement;
while (innerElementInDocument && innerElementInDocument->document() != this) {
innerElementInDocument->document().updateHoverActiveState(request, innerElementInDocument);
innerElementInDocument = innerElementInDocument->document().ownerElement();
}
Element* oldActiveElement = activeHoverElement();
if (oldActiveElement && !request.active()) {
for (Node* node = oldActiveElement; node; node = ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*node)) {
ASSERT(!node->isTextNode());
node->setActive(false);
m_userActionElements.setInActiveChain(node, false);
}
setActiveHoverElement(nullptr);
} else {
Element* newActiveElement = innerElementInDocument;
if (!oldActiveElement && newActiveElement && !newActiveElement->isDisabledFormControl() && request.active() && !request.touchMove()) {
for (Node* node = newActiveElement; node; node = ComposedTreeTraversal::parent(*node)) {
ASSERT(!node->isTextNode());
m_userActionElements.setInActiveChain(node, true);
}
setActiveHoverElement(newActiveElement);
}
}
bool allowActiveChanges = !oldActiveElement && activeHoverElement();
bool mustBeInActiveChain = request.active() && request.move();
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> oldHoverNode = hoverNode();
Node* newHoverNode = innerElementInDocument;
while (newHoverNode && !newHoverNode->layoutObject())
newHoverNode = newHoverNode->parentOrShadowHostNode();
setHoverNode(newHoverNode);
LayoutObject* oldHoverObj = oldHoverNode ? oldHoverNode->layoutObject() : 0;
LayoutObject* newHoverObj = newHoverNode ? newHoverNode->layoutObject() : 0;
LayoutObject* ancestor = nearestCommonHoverAncestor(oldHoverObj, newHoverObj);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> ancestorNode(ancestor ? ancestor->node() : 0);
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<Node>, 32> nodesToRemoveFromChain;
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<Node>, 32> nodesToAddToChain;
if (oldHoverObj != newHoverObj) {
if (oldHoverNode && !oldHoverObj) {
for (Node* node = oldHoverNode.get(); node; node = node->parentNode()) {
if (!mustBeInActiveChain || (node->isElementNode() && toElement(node)->inActiveChain()))
nodesToRemoveFromChain.append(node);
}
}
for (LayoutObject* curr = oldHoverObj; curr && curr != ancestor; curr = curr->hoverAncestor()) {
if (curr->node() && !curr->isText() && (!mustBeInActiveChain || curr->node()->inActiveChain()))
nodesToRemoveFromChain.append(curr->node());
}
}
for (LayoutObject* curr = newHoverObj; curr; curr = curr->hoverAncestor()) {
if (curr->node() && !curr->isText() && (!mustBeInActiveChain || curr->node()->inActiveChain()))
nodesToAddToChain.append(curr->node());
}
size_t removeCount = nodesToRemoveFromChain.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < removeCount; ++i) {
nodesToRemoveFromChain[i]->setHovered(false);
}
bool sawCommonAncestor = false;
size_t addCount = nodesToAddToChain.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < addCount; ++i) {
if (ancestorNode && nodesToAddToChain[i] == ancestorNode)
sawCommonAncestor = true;
if (allowActiveChanges)
nodesToAddToChain[i]->setActive(true);
if (!sawCommonAncestor || nodesToAddToChain[i] == m_hoverNode) {
nodesToAddToChain[i]->setHovered(true);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DynamicMetadataProvider::init()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347 | 0 | 1,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_dirent_csum_set(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent)
{
struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t;
if (!EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
return;
t = get_dirent_tail(inode, dirent);
if (!t) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "metadata_csum set but no space in dir "
"leaf for checksum. Please run e2fsck -D.");
return;
}
t->det_checksum = ext4_dirent_csum(inode, dirent,
(void *)t - (void *)dirent);
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_DELTAP( INS_ARG )
{
FT_ULong k, nump;
FT_UShort A;
FT_ULong C;
FT_Long B;
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_UNPATENTED_HINTING
/* Delta hinting is covered by US Patent 5159668. */
if ( CUR.face->unpatented_hinting )
{
FT_Long n = args[0] * 2;
if ( CUR.args < n )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Too_Few_Arguments;
return;
}
CUR.args -= n;
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
return;
}
#endif
nump = (FT_ULong)args[0]; /* some points theoretically may occur more
than once, thus UShort isn't enough */
for ( k = 1; k <= nump; k++ )
{
if ( CUR.args < 2 )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Too_Few_Arguments;
return;
}
CUR.args -= 2;
A = (FT_UShort)CUR.stack[CUR.args + 1];
B = CUR.stack[CUR.args];
/* XXX: Because some popular fonts contain some invalid DeltaP */
/* instructions, we simply ignore them when the stacked */
/* point reference is off limit, rather than returning an */
/* error. As a delta instruction doesn't change a glyph */
/* in great ways, this shouldn't be a problem. */
if ( !BOUNDS( A, CUR.zp0.n_points ) )
{
C = ( (FT_ULong)B & 0xF0 ) >> 4;
switch ( CUR.opcode )
{
case 0x5D:
break;
case 0x71:
C += 16;
break;
case 0x72:
C += 32;
break;
}
C += CUR.GS.delta_base;
if ( CURRENT_Ppem() == (FT_Long)C )
{
B = ( (FT_ULong)B & 0xF ) - 8;
if ( B >= 0 )
B++;
B = B * 64 / ( 1L << CUR.GS.delta_shift );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp0, A, B );
}
}
else
if ( CUR.pedantic_hinting )
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
}
CUR.new_top = CUR.args;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,094 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct sk_buff *frag;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info*)skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk ? inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
struct ipv6hdr *tmp_hdr;
struct frag_hdr *fh;
unsigned int mtu, hlen, left, len;
__be32 frag_id = 0;
int ptr, offset = 0, err=0;
u8 *prevhdr, nexthdr = 0;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
mtu = ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb);
/* We must not fragment if the socket is set to force MTU discovery
* or if the skb it not generated by a local socket.
*/
if (!skb->local_df && skb->len > mtu) {
skb->dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (np && np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
mtu -= hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (skb_has_frag_list(skb)) {
int first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
struct sk_buff *frag2;
if (first_len - hlen > mtu ||
((first_len - hlen) & 7) ||
skb_cloned(skb))
goto slow_path;
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag) {
/* Correct geometry. */
if (frag->len > mtu ||
((frag->len & 7) && frag->next) ||
skb_headroom(frag) < hlen)
goto slow_path_clean;
/* Partially cloned skb? */
if (skb_shared(frag))
goto slow_path_clean;
BUG_ON(frag->sk);
if (skb->sk) {
frag->sk = skb->sk;
frag->destructor = sock_wfree;
}
skb->truesize -= frag->truesize;
}
err = 0;
offset = 0;
frag = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(skb);
/* BUILD HEADER */
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
tmp_hdr = kmemdup(skb_network_header(skb), hlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!tmp_hdr) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
return -ENOMEM;
}
__skb_pull(skb, hlen);
fh = (struct frag_hdr*)__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(skb, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
memcpy(skb_network_header(skb), tmp_hdr, hlen);
ipv6_select_ident(fh);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(IP6_MF);
frag_id = fh->identification;
first_len = skb_pagelen(skb);
skb->data_len = first_len - skb_headlen(skb);
skb->len = first_len;
ipv6_hdr(skb)->payload_len = htons(first_len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
for (;;) {
/* Prepare header of the next frame,
* before previous one went down. */
if (frag) {
frag->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_reset_transport_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr*)__skb_push(frag, sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
__skb_push(frag, hlen);
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
memcpy(skb_network_header(frag), tmp_hdr,
hlen);
offset += skb->len - hlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (frag->next != NULL)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
fh->identification = frag_id;
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len =
htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
}
err = output(skb);
if(!err)
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
if (err || !frag)
break;
skb = frag;
frag = skb->next;
skb->next = NULL;
}
kfree(tmp_hdr);
if (err == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return 0;
}
while (frag) {
skb = frag->next;
kfree_skb(frag);
frag = skb;
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(&rt->dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
dst_release(&rt->dst);
return err;
slow_path_clean:
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag2) {
if (frag2 == frag)
break;
frag2->sk = NULL;
frag2->destructor = NULL;
skb->truesize += frag2->truesize;
}
}
slow_path:
left = skb->len - hlen; /* Space per frame */
ptr = hlen; /* Where to start from */
/*
* Fragment the datagram.
*/
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
/*
* Keep copying data until we run out.
*/
while(left > 0) {
len = left;
/* IF: it doesn't fit, use 'mtu' - the data space left */
if (len > mtu)
len = mtu;
/* IF: we are not sending up to and including the packet end
then align the next start on an eight byte boundary */
if (len < left) {
len &= ~7;
}
/*
* Allocate buffer.
*/
if ((frag = alloc_skb(len+hlen+sizeof(struct frag_hdr)+LL_ALLOCATED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev), GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
NETDEBUG(KERN_INFO "IPv6: frag: no memory for new fragment!\n");
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
/*
* Set up data on packet
*/
ip6_copy_metadata(frag, skb);
skb_reserve(frag, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev));
skb_put(frag, len + hlen + sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(frag);
fh = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(frag) + hlen);
frag->transport_header = (frag->network_header + hlen +
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
/*
* Charge the memory for the fragment to any owner
* it might possess
*/
if (skb->sk)
skb_set_owner_w(frag, skb->sk);
/*
* Copy the packet header into the new buffer.
*/
skb_copy_from_linear_data(skb, skb_network_header(frag), hlen);
/*
* Build fragment header.
*/
fh->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fh->reserved = 0;
if (!frag_id) {
ipv6_select_ident(fh);
frag_id = fh->identification;
} else
fh->identification = frag_id;
/*
* Copy a block of the IP datagram.
*/
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, ptr, skb_transport_header(frag), len))
BUG();
left -= len;
fh->frag_off = htons(offset);
if (left > 0)
fh->frag_off |= htons(IP6_MF);
ipv6_hdr(frag)->payload_len = htons(frag->len -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
ptr += len;
offset += len;
/*
* Put this fragment into the sending queue.
*/
err = output(frag);
if (err)
goto fail;
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGCREATES);
}
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGOKS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
fail:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb)),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
inet->nodefrag = 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
if (net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
inet->inet_id = 0;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = sk->sk_prot->backlog_rcv;
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_all = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically
* shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
/* Add to protocol hash chains. */
err = sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
if (err) {
sk_common_release(sk);
goto out;
}
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err)
sk_common_release(sk);
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void mnt_inc_writers(struct mount *mnt)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
this_cpu_inc(mnt->mnt_pcp->mnt_writers);
#else
mnt->mnt_writers++;
#endif
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ui::WindowShowState ConvertToWindowShowState(windows::WindowState state) {
switch (state) {
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_NORMAL:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_DOCKED:
return ui::SHOW_STATE_NORMAL;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_MINIMIZED:
return ui::SHOW_STATE_MINIMIZED;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED:
return ui::SHOW_STATE_MAXIMIZED;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN:
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_LOCKED_FULLSCREEN:
return ui::SHOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN;
case windows::WINDOW_STATE_NONE:
return ui::SHOW_STATE_DEFAULT;
}
NOTREACHED();
return ui::SHOW_STATE_DEFAULT;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::disableMouseEvents()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
q->setAcceptedMouseButtons(Qt::NoButton);
q->setAcceptHoverEvents(false);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SocketStream::AllowCertErrorForReconnection(SSLConfig* ssl_config) {
DCHECK(ssl_config);
SSLClientSocket* ssl_socket = static_cast<SSLClientSocket*>(socket_.get());
SSLInfo ssl_info;
ssl_socket->GetSSLInfo(&ssl_info);
if (ssl_info.cert.get() == NULL ||
ssl_config->IsAllowedBadCert(ssl_info.cert.get(), NULL)) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
SSLConfig::CertAndStatus bad_cert;
if (!X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(ssl_info.cert->os_cert_handle(),
&bad_cert.der_cert)) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
bad_cert.cert_status = ssl_info.cert_status;
ssl_config->allowed_bad_certs.push_back(bad_cert);
socket_->Disconnect();
socket_.reset();
next_state_ = STATE_TCP_CONNECT;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: setFieldsEntry(struct rx_call *call,
afs_int32 id,
afs_int32 mask, /* specify which fields to update */
afs_int32 flags, afs_int32 ngroups, afs_int32 nusers,
afs_int32 spare1, afs_int32 spare2, afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
afs_int32 pos;
struct prentry tentry;
afs_int32 tflags;
if (mask == 0)
return 0; /* no-op */
code = Initdb();
if (code)
return code;
if (id == ANYUSERID || id == AUTHUSERID || id == ANONYMOUSID)
return PRPERM;
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTrans(dbase, UBIK_WRITETRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKWRITE);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = WhoIsThis(call, tt, cid);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
pos = FindByID(tt, id);
if (!pos)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRNOENT);
code = pr_ReadEntry(tt, 0, pos, &tentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
tflags = tentry.flags;
if (mask & (PR_SF_NGROUPS | PR_SF_NUSERS)) {
if (!AccessOK(tt, *cid, 0, 0, 0))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
if ((tflags & PRQUOTA) == 0) { /* default if only setting one */
tentry.ngroups = tentry.nusers = 20;
}
} else {
if (!AccessOK(tt, *cid, &tentry, 0, 0))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
}
if (mask & 0xffff) { /* if setting flag bits */
afs_int32 flagsMask = mask & 0xffff;
tflags &= ~(flagsMask << PRIVATE_SHIFT);
tflags |= (flags & flagsMask) << PRIVATE_SHIFT;
tflags |= PRACCESS;
}
if (mask & PR_SF_NGROUPS) { /* setting group limit */
if (ngroups < 0)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRBADARG);
tentry.ngroups = ngroups;
tflags |= PRQUOTA;
}
if (mask & PR_SF_NUSERS) { /* setting foreign user limit */
if (nusers < 0)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRBADARG);
tentry.nusers = nusers;
tflags |= PRQUOTA;
}
tentry.flags = tflags;
code = pr_WriteEntry(tt, 0, pos, &tentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = ubik_EndTrans(tt);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit arp_tables_fini(void)
{
nf_unregister_sockopt(&arpt_sockopts);
xt_unregister_targets(arpt_builtin_tg, ARRAY_SIZE(arpt_builtin_tg));
unregister_pernet_subsys(&arp_tables_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ap_config_time_show(struct bus_type *bus, char *buf)
{
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", ap_config_time);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::RegisterMojoInterfaces() {
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameImpl::BindAutoplayConfiguration, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameImpl::BindFrameBindingsControl, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::BindFrameNavigationControl,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
if (IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled()) {
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameImpl::BindNavigationClient, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&RenderFrameImpl::BindFullscreen, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
registry_.AddInterface(base::Bind(&FrameInputHandlerImpl::CreateMojoService,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&InputTargetClientImpl::BindToRequest,
base::Unretained(&input_target_client_impl_)));
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::BindWidget, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
if (!frame_->Parent()) {
registry_.AddInterface(base::Bind(&ImageDownloaderImpl::CreateMojoService,
base::Unretained(this)));
GetAssociatedInterfaceRegistry()->AddInterface(base::Bind(
&RenderFrameImpl::OnHostZoomClientRequest, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&ManifestManager::BindToRequest,
base::Unretained(manifest_manager_.get())));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t BufferQueueConsumer::releaseBuffer(int slot, uint64_t frameNumber,
const sp<Fence>& releaseFence, EGLDisplay eglDisplay,
EGLSyncKHR eglFence) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ATRACE_BUFFER_INDEX(slot);
if (slot < 0 || slot >= BufferQueueDefs::NUM_BUFFER_SLOTS ||
releaseFence == NULL) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
sp<IProducerListener> listener;
{ // Autolock scope
Mutex::Autolock lock(mCore->mMutex);
if (frameNumber != mSlots[slot].mFrameNumber) {
return STALE_BUFFER_SLOT;
}
BufferQueueCore::Fifo::iterator current(mCore->mQueue.begin());
while (current != mCore->mQueue.end()) {
if (current->mSlot == slot) {
BQ_LOGE("releaseBuffer: buffer slot %d pending release is "
"currently queued", slot);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
++current;
}
if (mSlots[slot].mBufferState == BufferSlot::ACQUIRED) {
mSlots[slot].mEglDisplay = eglDisplay;
mSlots[slot].mEglFence = eglFence;
mSlots[slot].mFence = releaseFence;
mSlots[slot].mBufferState = BufferSlot::FREE;
listener = mCore->mConnectedProducerListener;
BQ_LOGV("releaseBuffer: releasing slot %d", slot);
} else if (mSlots[slot].mNeedsCleanupOnRelease) {
BQ_LOGV("releaseBuffer: releasing a stale buffer slot %d "
"(state = %d)", slot, mSlots[slot].mBufferState);
mSlots[slot].mNeedsCleanupOnRelease = false;
return STALE_BUFFER_SLOT;
} else {
BQ_LOGV("releaseBuffer: attempted to release buffer slot %d "
"but its state was %d", slot, mSlots[slot].mBufferState);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
mCore->mDequeueCondition.broadcast();
} // Autolock scope
if (listener != NULL) {
listener->onBufferReleased();
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add SN logging
Bug 27046057
Change-Id: Iede7c92e59e60795df1ec7768ebafd6b090f1c27
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_set_loopback(struct net_device *dev, netdev_features_t features)
{
struct tg3 *tp = netdev_priv(dev);
if (features & NETIF_F_LOOPBACK) {
if (tp->mac_mode & MAC_MODE_PORT_INT_LPBACK)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
tg3_mac_loopback(tp, true);
netif_carrier_on(tp->dev);
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
netdev_info(dev, "Internal MAC loopback mode enabled.\n");
} else {
if (!(tp->mac_mode & MAC_MODE_PORT_INT_LPBACK))
return;
spin_lock_bh(&tp->lock);
tg3_mac_loopback(tp, false);
/* Force link status check */
tg3_setup_phy(tp, 1);
spin_unlock_bh(&tp->lock);
netdev_info(dev, "Internal MAC loopback mode disabled.\n");
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int invalidate_drive(struct block_device *bdev)
{
/* invalidate the buffer track to force a reread */
set_bit((long)bdev->bd_disk->private_data, &fake_change);
process_fd_request();
check_disk_change(bdev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t queueBuffer(int buf,
const QueueBufferInput& input, QueueBufferOutput* output) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferProducer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(buf);
data.write(input);
status_t result = remote()->transact(QUEUE_BUFFER, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
memcpy(output, reply.readInplace(sizeof(*output)), sizeof(*output));
result = reply.readInt32();
return result;
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 160,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_clist_fill_path(gx_device *dev, const gs_gstate *pgs,
gx_path *ppath, const gx_fill_params *params,
const gx_drawing_color *pdcolor,
const gx_clip_path *pcpath)
{
pdf14_clist_device * pdev = (pdf14_clist_device *)dev;
gs_gstate new_pgs = *pgs;
int code;
gs_pattern2_instance_t *pinst = NULL;
gx_device_forward * fdev = (gx_device_forward *)dev;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile, *fwd_profile;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile_fwd, *icc_profile_dev;
code = dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = dev_proc(fdev->target, get_profile)(fdev->target, &fwd_profile);
if (code < 0)
return code;
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, fwd_profile, &icc_profile_fwd,
&render_cond);
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile, &icc_profile_dev,
&render_cond);
/*
* Ensure that that the PDF 1.4 reading compositor will have the current
* blending parameters. This is needed since the fill_rectangle routines
* do not have access to the gs_gstate. Thus we have to pass any
* changes explictly.
*/
code = pdf14_clist_update_params(pdev, pgs, false, NULL);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If we are doing a shading fill and we are in a transparency group of a
different color space, then we do not want to do the shading in the
device color space. It must occur in the source space. To handle it in
the device space would require knowing all the nested transparency group
color space as well as the transparency. Some of the shading code ignores
this, so we have to pass on the clist_writer device to enable proper
mapping to the transparency group color space. */
if (pdcolor != NULL && gx_dc_is_pattern2_color(pdcolor)) {
pinst =
(gs_pattern2_instance_t *)pdcolor->ccolor.pattern;
pinst->saved->has_transparency = true;
/* The transparency color space operations are driven by the pdf14
clist writer device. */
pinst->saved->trans_device = dev;
}
update_lop_for_pdf14(&new_pgs, pdcolor);
new_pgs.trans_device = dev;
new_pgs.has_transparency = true;
code = gx_forward_fill_path(dev, &new_pgs, ppath, params, pdcolor, pcpath);
new_pgs.trans_device = NULL;
new_pgs.has_transparency = false;
if (pinst != NULL){
pinst->saved->trans_device = NULL;
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetUniformBlocksCHROMIUMHelper(
GLuint program,
std::vector<int8_t>* result) {
DCHECK(result);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
helper_->GetUniformBlocksCHROMIUM(program, kResultBucketId);
GetBucketContents(kResultBucketId, result);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_send_XCrossingEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
int error;
if ((error = do_send_XAnyEvent(message, xevent)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xcrossing.root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xcrossing.subwindow)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xcrossing.time)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.x_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.y_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.mode)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.detail)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.same_screen)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, xevent->xcrossing.focus)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, xevent->xcrossing.state)) < 0)
return error;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void test_base64_decode(void)
{
char buffer[16];
int len = mutt_b64_decode(buffer, encoded);
if (!TEST_CHECK(len == sizeof(clear) - 1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", sizeof(clear) - 1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", len);
}
buffer[len] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strcmp(buffer, clear) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", clear);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int entersafe_gen_random(sc_card_t *card,u8 *buff,size_t size)
{
int r=SC_SUCCESS;
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE]={0};
sc_apdu_t apdu;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
sc_format_apdu(card,&apdu,SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT,0x84,0x00,0x00);
apdu.resp=rbuf;
apdu.le=size;
apdu.resplen=sizeof(rbuf);
r=sc_transmit_apdu(card,&apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "entersafe gen random failed");
if(apdu.resplen!=size)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
memcpy(buff,rbuf,size);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_client_key_file (GsmClient *client,
const char *desktop_file_path,
GError **error) {
GKeyFile *keyfile;
keyfile = g_key_file_new ();
if (desktop_file_path != NULL) {
g_key_file_load_from_file (keyfile,
desktop_file_path,
G_KEY_FILE_KEEP_COMMENTS |
G_KEY_FILE_KEEP_TRANSLATIONS,
error);
} else {
set_desktop_file_keys_from_client (client, keyfile);
}
return keyfile;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 63,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_snd(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, saddr, msg->msg_name);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
__be16 proto;
unsigned char *addr;
int err, reserve = 0;
struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
int offset = 0;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int hlen, tlen;
int extra_len = 0;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
if (likely(saddr == NULL)) {
dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po);
proto = po->num;
addr = NULL;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr)))
goto out;
proto = saddr->sll_protocol;
addr = saddr->sll_addr;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);
}
err = -ENXIO;
if (unlikely(dev == NULL))
goto out_unlock;
err = -ENETDOWN;
if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)))
goto out_unlock;
sockc.tsflags = sk->sk_tsflags;
sockc.mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = sock_cmsg_send(sk, msg, &sockc);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out_unlock;
}
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW)
reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
err = packet_snd_vnet_parse(msg, &len, &vnet_hdr);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
if (unlikely(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_NOFCS))) {
if (!netif_supports_nofcs(dev)) {
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
goto out_unlock;
}
extra_len = 4; /* We're doing our own CRC */
}
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (!vnet_hdr.gso_type &&
(len > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN + extra_len))
goto out_unlock;
err = -ENOBUFS;
hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;
skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len,
__virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len),
msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out_unlock;
skb_set_network_header(skb, reserve);
err = -EINVAL;
if (sock->type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
offset = dev_hard_header(skb, dev, ntohs(proto), addr, NULL, len);
if (unlikely(offset < 0))
goto out_free;
}
/* Returns -EFAULT on error */
err = skb_copy_datagram_from_iter(skb, offset, &msg->msg_iter, len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW &&
!dev_validate_header(dev, skb->data, len)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, sockc.tsflags, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags);
if (!vnet_hdr.gso_type && (len > dev->mtu + reserve + extra_len) &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out_free;
}
skb->protocol = proto;
skb->dev = dev;
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sockc.mark;
packet_pick_tx_queue(dev, skb);
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
err = packet_snd_vnet_gso(skb, &vnet_hdr);
if (err)
goto out_free;
len += sizeof(vnet_hdr);
}
skb_probe_transport_header(skb, reserve);
if (unlikely(extra_len == 4))
skb->no_fcs = 1;
err = po->xmit(skb);
if (err > 0 && (err = net_xmit_errno(err)) != 0)
goto out_unlock;
dev_put(dev);
return len;
out_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_unlock:
if (dev)
dev_put(dev);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: isdn_net_autohup(void)
{
isdn_net_dev *p = dev->netdev;
int anymore;
anymore = 0;
while (p) {
isdn_net_local *l = p->local;
if (jiffies == last_jiffies)
l->cps = l->transcount;
else
l->cps = (l->transcount * HZ) / (jiffies - last_jiffies);
l->transcount = 0;
if (dev->net_verbose > 3)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d bogocps\n", p->dev->name, l->cps);
if ((l->flags & ISDN_NET_CONNECTED) && (!l->dialstate)) {
anymore = 1;
l->huptimer++;
/*
* if there is some dialmode where timeout-hangup
* should _not_ be done, check for that here
*/
if ((l->onhtime) &&
(l->huptimer > l->onhtime))
{
if (l->hupflags & ISDN_MANCHARGE &&
l->hupflags & ISDN_CHARGEHUP) {
while (time_after(jiffies, l->chargetime + l->chargeint))
l->chargetime += l->chargeint;
if (time_after(jiffies, l->chargetime + l->chargeint - 2 * HZ))
if (l->outgoing || l->hupflags & ISDN_INHUP)
isdn_net_hangup(p->dev);
} else if (l->outgoing) {
if (l->hupflags & ISDN_CHARGEHUP) {
if (l->hupflags & ISDN_WAITCHARGE) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "isdn_net: Hupflags of %s are %X\n",
p->dev->name, l->hupflags);
isdn_net_hangup(p->dev);
} else if (time_after(jiffies, l->chargetime + l->chargeint)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG
"isdn_net: %s: chtime = %lu, chint = %d\n",
p->dev->name, l->chargetime, l->chargeint);
isdn_net_hangup(p->dev);
}
} else
isdn_net_hangup(p->dev);
} else if (l->hupflags & ISDN_INHUP)
isdn_net_hangup(p->dev);
}
if(dev->global_flags & ISDN_GLOBAL_STOPPED || (ISDN_NET_DIALMODE(*l) == ISDN_NET_DM_OFF)) {
isdn_net_hangup(p->dev);
break;
}
}
p = (isdn_net_dev *) p->next;
}
last_jiffies = jiffies;
isdn_timer_ctrl(ISDN_TIMER_NETHANGUP, anymore);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kg_caller_provided_ccache_name (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
int *out_caller_provided_name)
{
if (out_caller_provided_name) {
*out_caller_provided_name =
(k5_getspecific(K5_KEY_GSS_KRB5_CCACHE_NAME) != NULL);
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOLEAN btif_hl_proc_cch_open_cfm(tBTA_HL *p_data)
{
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx;
BOOLEAN status = FALSE;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
if (btif_hl_find_app_idx_using_app_id(p_data->cch_open_cfm.app_id, &app_idx))
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d", app_idx);
if (btif_hl_find_mcl_idx(app_idx, p_data->cch_open_cfm.bd_addr, &mcl_idx))
{
BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(app_idx);
p_mcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("mcl_idx=%d, mcl_handle=%d", mcl_idx,p_data->cch_open_cfm.mcl_handle);
p_mcb->mcl_handle = p_data->cch_open_cfm.mcl_handle;
p_mcb->is_connected = TRUE;
status = btif_hl_proc_pending_op(app_idx, mcl_idx);
if (status)
btif_hl_start_cch_timer(app_idx, mcl_idx);
}
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void init_decode_cache(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
memset(&ctxt->rip_relative, 0,
(void *)&ctxt->modrm - (void *)&ctxt->rip_relative);
ctxt->io_read.pos = 0;
ctxt->io_read.end = 0;
ctxt->mem_read.end = 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ifb_setup(struct net_device *dev)
{
/* Initialize the device structure. */
dev->destructor = free_netdev;
dev->netdev_ops = &ifb_netdev_ops;
/* Fill in device structure with ethernet-generic values. */
ether_setup(dev);
dev->tx_queue_len = TX_Q_LIMIT;
dev->features |= IFB_FEATURES;
dev->vlan_features |= IFB_FEATURES;
dev->flags |= IFF_NOARP;
dev->flags &= ~IFF_MULTICAST;
dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE;
random_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, setDefaultStub)
{
char *index = NULL, *webindex = NULL, *error = NULL;
zend_string *stub = NULL;
size_t index_len = 0, webindex_len = 0;
int created_stub = 0;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
if (phar_obj->archive->is_tar) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"A Phar stub cannot be set in a plain tar archive");
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"A Phar stub cannot be set in a plain zip archive");
}
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|s!s", &index, &index_len, &webindex, &webindex_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 0 && (phar_obj->archive->is_tar || phar_obj->archive->is_zip)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "method accepts no arguments for a tar- or zip-based phar stub, %d given", ZEND_NUM_ARGS());
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (PHAR_G(readonly)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot change stub: phar.readonly=1");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!phar_obj->archive->is_tar && !phar_obj->archive->is_zip) {
stub = phar_create_default_stub(index, webindex, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
if (stub) {
zend_string_free(stub);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
created_stub = 1;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, stub ? ZSTR_VAL(stub) : 0, stub ? ZSTR_LEN(stub) : 0, 1, &error);
if (created_stub) {
zend_string_free(stub);
}
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta, zend_bool extended)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
tmp_name = "public";
}
if (extended) {
smart_str_appends(&querystr,
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotNULL, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype, "
"d.description "
"FROM pg_class as c "
" JOIN pg_attribute a ON (a.attrelid = c.oid) "
" JOIN pg_type t ON (a.atttypid = t.oid) "
" JOIN pg_namespace n ON (c.relnamespace = n.oid) "
" LEFT JOIN pg_description d ON (d.objoid=a.attrelid AND d.objsubid=a.attnum AND c.oid=d.objoid) "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND c.relname = '");
} else {
smart_str_appends(&querystr,
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype "
"FROM pg_class as c "
" JOIN pg_attribute a ON (a.attrelid = c.oid) "
" JOIN pg_type t ON (a.atttypid = t.oid) "
" JOIN pg_namespace n ON (c.relnamespace = n.oid) "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND c.relname = '");
}
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.s->val);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
array_init(&elem);
/* pg_attribute.attnum */
add_assoc_long_ex(&elem, "num", sizeof("num") - 1, atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 1)));
/* pg_type.typname */
add_assoc_string_ex(&elem, "type", sizeof("type") - 1, PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 2));
/* pg_attribute.attlen */
add_assoc_long_ex(&elem, "len", sizeof("len") - 1, atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
/* pg_attribute.attnonull */
add_assoc_bool_ex(&elem, "not null", sizeof("not null") - 1, !strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 4), "t"));
/* pg_attribute.atthasdef */
add_assoc_bool_ex(&elem, "has default", sizeof("has default") - 1, !strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t"));
/* pg_attribute.attndims */
add_assoc_long_ex(&elem, "array dims", sizeof("array dims") - 1, atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 6)));
/* pg_type.typtype */
add_assoc_bool_ex(&elem, "is enum", sizeof("is enum") - 1, !strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 7), "e"));
if (extended) {
/* pg_type.typtype */
add_assoc_bool_ex(&elem, "is base", sizeof("is base") - 1, !strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 7), "b"));
add_assoc_bool_ex(&elem, "is composite", sizeof("is composite") - 1, !strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 7), "c"));
add_assoc_bool_ex(&elem, "is pesudo", sizeof("is pesudo") - 1, !strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 7), "p"));
/* pg_description.description */
add_assoc_string_ex(&elem, "description", sizeof("description") - 1, PQgetvalue(pg_result, i, 8));
}
/* pg_attribute.attname */
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, &elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copyMultiCh16(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i];
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Accept(const content::MediaStreamDevices& devices,
content::MediaStreamRequestResult result,
std::unique_ptr<content::MediaStreamUI> ui) {
if (policy_value_ || request_url_allowed_via_whitelist_) {
ASSERT_EQ(1U, devices.size());
ASSERT_EQ("fake_dev", devices[0].id);
} else {
ASSERT_EQ(0U, devices.size());
}
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HTMLInputElement::selectionStartForBinding(ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
if (!m_inputType->supportsSelectionAPI()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "The input element's type ('" + m_inputType->formControlType() + "') does not support selection.");
return 0;
}
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::selectionStart();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::OnMouseCaptureLost() {
selection_controller_.OnMouseCaptureLost();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static js_Ast *returntarget(JF, js_Ast *node)
{
while (node) {
if (isfun(node->type))
return node;
node = node->parent;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 7,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void php_wddx_destructor(wddx_packet *packet)
{
smart_str_free(packet);
efree(packet);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void xhci_dma_read_u32s(XHCIState *xhci, dma_addr_t addr,
uint32_t *buf, size_t len)
{
int i;
assert((len % sizeof(uint32_t)) == 0);
pci_dma_read(PCI_DEVICE(xhci), addr, buf, len);
for (i = 0; i < (len / sizeof(uint32_t)); i++) {
buf[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf[i]);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadConnectionSecurity CheckDownloadConnectionSecurity(
const GURL& download_url,
const std::vector<GURL>& url_chain) {
DownloadConnectionSecurity state = DOWNLOAD_TARGET_OTHER;
if (download_url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
bool is_final_download_secure = download_url.SchemeIsCryptographic();
bool is_redirect_chain_secure = true;
if (url_chain.size() > std::size_t(1)) {
for (std::size_t i = std::size_t(0); i < url_chain.size() - 1; i++) {
if (!url_chain[i].SchemeIsCryptographic()) {
is_redirect_chain_secure = false;
break;
}
}
}
state = is_final_download_secure
? is_redirect_chain_secure ? DOWNLOAD_SECURE
: DOWNLOAD_REDIRECT_INSECURE
: is_redirect_chain_secure ? DOWNLOAD_TARGET_INSECURE
: DOWNLOAD_REDIRECT_TARGET_INSECURE;
} else if (download_url.SchemeIsBlob()) {
state = DOWNLOAD_TARGET_BLOB;
} else if (download_url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme)) {
state = DOWNLOAD_TARGET_DATA;
} else if (download_url.SchemeIsFile()) {
state = DOWNLOAD_TARGET_FILE;
} else if (download_url.SchemeIsFileSystem()) {
state = DOWNLOAD_TARGET_FILESYSTEM;
} else if (download_url.SchemeIs(url::kFtpScheme)) {
state = DOWNLOAD_TARGET_FTP;
}
return state;
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutPoint RenderBox::flipForWritingMode(const LayoutPoint& position) const
{
if (!style()->isFlippedBlocksWritingMode())
return position;
return isHorizontalWritingMode() ? LayoutPoint(position.x(), height() - position.y()) : LayoutPoint(width() - position.x(), position.y());
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint NotificationsEngine::Notify(const QString &app_name, uint replaces_id,
const QString &app_icon, const QString &summary, const QString &body,
const QStringList &actions, const QVariantMap &hints, int timeout)
{
uint partOf = 0;
const QString appRealName = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-appname")].toString();
const QString eventId = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-eventId")].toString();
const bool skipGrouping = hints[QStringLiteral("x-kde-skipGrouping")].toBool();
if (!replaces_id && m_activeNotifications.values().contains(app_name + summary) && !skipGrouping && !m_alwaysReplaceAppsList.contains(app_name)) {
partOf = m_activeNotifications.key(app_name + summary).midRef(13).toUInt();
}
qDebug() << "Currrent active notifications:" << m_activeNotifications;
qDebug() << "Guessing partOf as:" << partOf;
qDebug() << " New Notification: " << summary << body << timeout << "& Part of:" << partOf;
QString _body;
if (partOf > 0) {
const QString source = QStringLiteral("notification %1").arg(partOf);
Plasma::DataContainer *container = containerForSource(source);
if (container) {
_body = container->data()[QStringLiteral("body")].toString();
if (_body != body) {
_body.append("\n").append(body);
} else {
_body = body;
}
replaces_id = partOf;
CloseNotification(partOf);
}
}
uint id = replaces_id ? replaces_id : m_nextId++;
if (m_alwaysReplaceAppsList.contains(app_name)) {
if (m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.contains(app_name)) {
id = m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.value(app_name);
} else {
m_notificationsFromReplaceableApp.insert(app_name, id);
}
}
QString appname_str = app_name;
if (appname_str.isEmpty()) {
appname_str = i18n("Unknown Application");
}
bool isPersistent = timeout == 0;
const int AVERAGE_WORD_LENGTH = 6;
const int WORD_PER_MINUTE = 250;
int count = summary.length() + body.length();
timeout = 60000 * count / AVERAGE_WORD_LENGTH / WORD_PER_MINUTE;
timeout = 2000 + qMax(timeout, 3000);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 165,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Polkit1Backend::checkForResultChanged()
{
foreach(const QString &action, m_cachedResults.keys()) {
if (m_cachedResults[action] != actionStatus(action)) {
m_cachedResults[action] = actionStatus(action);
emit actionStatusChanged(action, m_cachedResults[action]);
}
}
PolkitQt1::Authority::instance()->enumerateActions();
m_flyingActions = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290 | 0 | 7,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API char *zend_get_type_by_const(int type) /* {{{ */
{
switch(type) {
case IS_BOOL:
return "boolean";
case IS_LONG:
return "integer";
case IS_DOUBLE:
return "double";
case IS_STRING:
return "string";
case IS_OBJECT:
return "object";
case IS_RESOURCE:
return "resource";
case IS_NULL:
return "null";
case IS_CALLABLE:
return "callable";
case IS_ARRAY:
return "array";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rpza_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx,
void *data, int *got_frame,
AVPacket *avpkt)
{
const uint8_t *buf = avpkt->data;
int buf_size = avpkt->size;
RpzaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int ret;
s->buf = buf;
s->size = buf_size;
if ((ret = ff_reget_buffer(avctx, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
rpza_decode_stream(s);
if ((ret = av_frame_ref(data, &s->frame)) < 0)
return ret;
*got_frame = 1;
/* always report that the buffer was completely consumed */
return buf_size;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/rpza: Perform pointer advance and checks before using the pointers
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2850
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_coal_tx_init(struct tg3 *tp, struct ethtool_coalesce *ec)
{
int i = 0;
if (!tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_TSS)) {
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOL_TICKS, ec->tx_coalesce_usecs);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXMAX_FRAMES, ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT, ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq);
} else {
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOL_TICKS, 0);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXMAX_FRAMES, 0);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT, 0);
for (; i < tp->txq_cnt; i++) {
u32 reg;
reg = HOSTCC_TXCOL_TICKS_VEC1 + i * 0x18;
tw32(reg, ec->tx_coalesce_usecs);
reg = HOSTCC_TXMAX_FRAMES_VEC1 + i * 0x18;
tw32(reg, ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames);
reg = HOSTCC_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT_VEC1 + i * 0x18;
tw32(reg, ec->tx_max_coalesced_frames_irq);
}
}
for (; i < tp->irq_max - 1; i++) {
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOL_TICKS_VEC1 + i * 0x18, 0);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXMAX_FRAMES_VEC1 + i * 0x18, 0);
tw32(HOSTCC_TXCOAL_MAXF_INT_VEC1 + i * 0x18, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,519 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HostCache::Entry::CountHit(bool hit_is_stale) {
++total_hits_;
if (hit_is_stale)
++stale_hits_;
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PageSerializer::shouldAddURL(const KURL& url)
{
return url.isValid() && !m_resourceURLs.contains(url) && !url.protocolIsData();
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm *kvm, int isr)
{
u16 status;
u8 old;
if (isr == -1)
isr = 0;
status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
old = status >> 8;
if (isr != old) {
status &= 0xff;
status |= isr << 8;
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CheckDigestServerAuth(const AuthChallengeInfo* auth_challenge) {
if (!auth_challenge)
return false;
EXPECT_FALSE(auth_challenge->is_proxy);
EXPECT_EQ("www.google.com:80", auth_challenge->challenger.ToString());
EXPECT_EQ("digestive", auth_challenge->realm);
EXPECT_EQ("digest", auth_challenge->scheme);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool cmd_queue_full(struct ImapData *idata)
{
if ((idata->nextcmd + 1) % idata->cmdslots == idata->lastcmd)
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: partition_modify_data_unref (ModifyPartitionData *data)
{
g_object_unref (data->device);
g_object_unref (data->enclosing_device);
g_free (data->type);
g_free (data->label);
g_free (data->flags);
g_free (data);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<KeyboardUI> KeyboardUI::Create() {
return base::WrapUnique(new KeyboardUIImpl);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash happens when VK tray is clicked after VK is disabled.
Bug: 749989
Test: manually
Change-Id: I547151f5950e07e3669d0f13ce41b951cd354f4f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/593434
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keigo Oka <oka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Keigo Oka <oka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492052}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 127,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
struct pid_namespace *pid = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
struct task_struct *task;
bool has_perms;
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
has_perms = has_pid_permissions(pid, task, 1);
put_task_struct(task);
if (!has_perms) {
if (pid->hide_pid == 2) {
/*
* Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
* consistent with each other. If a process
* may not stat() a file, it shouldn't be seen
* in procfs at all.
*/
return -ENOENT;
}
return -EPERM;
}
return generic_permission(inode, mask);
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::ChromeExtensionsAPIClient() {}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void streamLogListpackContent(unsigned char *lp) {
unsigned char *p = lpFirst(lp);
while(p) {
unsigned char buf[LP_INTBUF_SIZE];
int64_t v;
unsigned char *ele = lpGet(p,&v,buf);
serverLog(LL_WARNING,"- [%d] '%.*s'", (int)v, (int)v, ele);
p = lpNext(lp,p);
}
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nl80211_disassociate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev = info->user_ptr[0];
struct net_device *dev = info->user_ptr[1];
const u8 *ie = NULL, *bssid;
int ie_len = 0;
u16 reason_code;
bool local_state_change;
if (!is_valid_ie_attr(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]))
return -EINVAL;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MAC])
return -EINVAL;
if (!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_REASON_CODE])
return -EINVAL;
if (!rdev->ops->disassoc)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
dev->ieee80211_ptr->iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
bssid = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_MAC]);
reason_code = nla_get_u16(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_REASON_CODE]);
if (reason_code == 0) {
/* Reason Code 0 is reserved */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]) {
ie = nla_data(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
ie_len = nla_len(info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_IE]);
}
local_state_change = !!info->attrs[NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_STATE_CHANGE];
return cfg80211_mlme_disassoc(rdev, dev, bssid, ie, ie_len, reason_code,
local_state_change);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip_print_inner(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp,
u_int length, u_int nh,
const u_char *bp2)
{
struct ip_print_demux_state ipd;
ipd.ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
ipd.cp = bp;
ipd.len = length;
ipd.off = 0;
ipd.nh = nh;
ipd.advance = 0;
ip_print_demux(ndo, &ipd);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13037/IP: Add bounds checks when printing time stamp options.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionService::GetExtensionContentSettingsStore() {
return extension_prefs()->content_settings_store();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: agent_pending_query *agent_query(
void *in, int inlen, void **out, int *outlen,
void (*callback)(void *, void *, int), void *callback_ctx)
{
HWND hwnd;
char *mapname;
HANDLE filemap;
unsigned char *p, *ret;
int id, retlen;
COPYDATASTRUCT cds;
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES sa, *psa;
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR psd = NULL;
PSID usersid = NULL;
*out = NULL;
*outlen = 0;
hwnd = FindWindow("Pageant", "Pageant");
if (!hwnd)
return NULL; /* *out == NULL, so failure */
mapname = dupprintf("PageantRequest%08x", (unsigned)GetCurrentThreadId());
psa = NULL;
#ifndef NO_SECURITY
if (got_advapi()) {
/*
* Make the file mapping we create for communication with
* Pageant owned by the user SID rather than the default. This
* should make communication between processes with slightly
* different contexts more reliable: in particular, command
* prompts launched as administrator should still be able to
* run PSFTPs which refer back to the owning user's
* unprivileged Pageant.
*/
usersid = get_user_sid();
if (usersid) {
psd = (PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR)
LocalAlloc(LPTR, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_MIN_LENGTH);
if (psd) {
if (p_InitializeSecurityDescriptor
(psd, SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR_REVISION) &&
p_SetSecurityDescriptorOwner(psd, usersid, FALSE)) {
sa.nLength = sizeof(sa);
sa.bInheritHandle = TRUE;
sa.lpSecurityDescriptor = psd;
psa = &sa;
} else {
LocalFree(psd);
psd = NULL;
}
}
}
}
#endif /* NO_SECURITY */
filemap = CreateFileMapping(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, psa, PAGE_READWRITE,
0, AGENT_MAX_MSGLEN, mapname);
if (filemap == NULL || filemap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
sfree(mapname);
return NULL; /* *out == NULL, so failure */
}
p = MapViewOfFile(filemap, FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0, 0, 0);
memcpy(p, in, inlen);
cds.dwData = AGENT_COPYDATA_ID;
cds.cbData = 1 + strlen(mapname);
cds.lpData = mapname;
/*
* The user either passed a null callback (indicating that the
* query is required to be synchronous) or CreateThread failed.
* Either way, we need a synchronous request.
*/
id = SendMessage(hwnd, WM_COPYDATA, (WPARAM) NULL, (LPARAM) &cds);
if (id > 0) {
retlen = 4 + GET_32BIT(p);
ret = snewn(retlen, unsigned char);
if (ret) {
memcpy(ret, p, retlen);
*out = ret;
*outlen = retlen;
}
}
UnmapViewOfFile(p);
CloseHandle(filemap);
sfree(mapname);
if (psd)
LocalFree(psd);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::queue_meta_buffer(OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
struct pmem &Input_pmem_info)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE ret = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned long address = 0,p2,id;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("In queue Meta Buffer");
if (!psource_frame || !pdest_frame) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("convert_queue_buffer invalid params");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (psource_frame->nFilledLen > 0) {
if (dev_use_buf(&Input_pmem_info,PORT_INDEX_IN,0) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: in dev_use_buf");
post_event ((unsigned long)psource_frame,0,OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EBD);
ret = OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone)
ret = empty_this_buffer_proxy(hComp,psource_frame);
if (ret == OMX_ErrorNone) {
psource_frame = NULL;
if (!psource_frame && m_opq_meta_q.m_size) {
m_opq_meta_q.pop_entry(&address,&p2,&id);
psource_frame = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* ) address;
}
} else {
psource_frame = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: point_sub(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *p1 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
Point *p2 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
Point *result;
result = (Point *) palloc(sizeof(Point));
result->x = (p1->x - p2->x);
result->y = (p1->y - p2->y);
PG_RETURN_POINT_P(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlBufferAllocationScheme xmlThrDefBufferAllocScheme(xmlBufferAllocationScheme v) {
xmlBufferAllocationScheme ret;
xmlMutexLock(xmlThrDefMutex);
ret = xmlBufferAllocSchemeThrDef;
xmlBufferAllocSchemeThrDef = v;
xmlMutexUnlock(xmlThrDefMutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void udp_encap_enable(void)
{
if (!static_key_enabled(&udp_encap_needed))
static_key_slow_inc(&udp_encap_needed);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,941 |
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