instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoBindTexImage2DWithInternalformatCHROMIUM(
GLenum target,
GLenum internalformat,
GLint imageId) {
return BindTexImage2DCHROMIUMImpl(target, internalformat, imageId);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtnet_remove(struct virtio_device *vdev)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = vdev->priv;
unregister_hotcpu_notifier(&vi->nb);
/* Make sure no work handler is accessing the device. */
flush_work(&vi->config_work);
unregister_netdev(vi->dev);
remove_vq_common(vi);
free_percpu(vi->stats);
free_netdev(vi->dev);
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didChangeName(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebString& name) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
if (SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible() ||
render_view_->renderer_preferences_.report_frame_name_changes) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidChangeName(
routing_id_, base::UTF16ToUTF8(base::StringPiece16(name))));
}
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int am_read_post_data(request_rec *r, char **data, apr_size_t *length)
{
apr_size_t bytes_read;
apr_size_t bytes_left;
apr_size_t len;
long read_length;
int rc;
/* Prepare to receive data from the client. We request that apache
* dechunks data if it is chunked.
*/
rc = ap_setup_client_block(r, REQUEST_CHUNKED_DECHUNK);
if (rc != OK) {
return rc;
}
/* This function will send a 100 Continue response if the client is
* waiting for that. If the client isn't going to send data, then this
* function will return 0.
*/
if (!ap_should_client_block(r)) {
len = 0;
} else {
len = r->remaining;
}
if (len >= 1024*1024) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Too large POST data payload (%lu bytes).",
(unsigned long)len);
return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (length != NULL) {
*length = len;
}
*data = (char *)apr_palloc(r->pool, len + 1);
if (*data == NULL) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Failed to allocate memory for %lu bytes of POST data.",
(unsigned long)len);
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
/* Make sure that the data is null-terminated. */
(*data)[len] = '\0';
bytes_read = 0;
bytes_left = len;
while (bytes_left > 0) {
/* Read data from the client. Returns 0 on EOF and -1 on
* error, the number of bytes otherwise.
*/
read_length = ap_get_client_block(r, &(*data)[bytes_read],
bytes_left);
if (read_length == 0) {
/* got the EOF */
(*data)[bytes_read] = '\0';
if (length != NULL) {
*length = bytes_read;
}
break;
}
else if (read_length < 0) {
AM_LOG_RERROR(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r,
"Failed to read POST data from client.");
return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
}
bytes_read += read_length;
bytes_left -= read_length;
}
am_diag_printf(r, "POST data: %s\n", *data);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 91,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_put_long(void __user **buf, size_t *size, unsigned long val,
bool neg)
{
int len;
char tmp[TMPBUFLEN], *p = tmp;
sprintf(p, "%s%lu", neg ? "-" : "", val);
len = strlen(tmp);
if (len > *size)
len = *size;
if (copy_to_user(*buf, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
*size -= len;
*buf += len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init chr_dev_init(void)
{
int minor;
if (register_chrdev(MEM_MAJOR, "mem", &memory_fops))
printk("unable to get major %d for memory devs\n", MEM_MAJOR);
mem_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "mem");
if (IS_ERR(mem_class))
return PTR_ERR(mem_class);
mem_class->devnode = mem_devnode;
for (minor = 1; minor < ARRAY_SIZE(devlist); minor++) {
if (!devlist[minor].name)
continue;
/*
* Create /dev/port?
*/
if ((minor == DEVPORT_MINOR) && !arch_has_dev_port())
continue;
device_create(mem_class, NULL, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, minor),
NULL, devlist[minor].name);
}
return tty_init();
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t calculate_camera_metadata_size(size_t entry_count,
size_t data_count) {
size_t memory_needed = sizeof(camera_metadata_t);
memory_needed = ALIGN_TO(memory_needed, ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
memory_needed += sizeof(camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t[entry_count]);
memory_needed = ALIGN_TO(memory_needed, DATA_ALIGNMENT);
memory_needed += sizeof(uint8_t[data_count]);
return memory_needed;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::Remove(const FilePath& file_path,
bool is_recursive,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
RunTaskOnUIThread(base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::RemoveOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
is_recursive,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 117,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hw_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
perf_event_release_pmc();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int pdf_xref_obj_is_unsaved_signature(pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *obj)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < doc->num_incremental_sections; i++)
{
pdf_xref *xref = &doc->xref_sections[i];
pdf_unsaved_sig *usig;
for (usig = xref->unsaved_sigs; usig; usig = usig->next)
{
if (usig->field == obj)
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void watchdog_overflow_callback(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* Ensure the watchdog never gets throttled */
event->hw.interrupts = 0;
if (__this_cpu_read(watchdog_nmi_touch) == true) {
__this_cpu_write(watchdog_nmi_touch, false);
return;
}
/* check for a hardlockup
* This is done by making sure our timer interrupt
* is incrementing. The timer interrupt should have
* fired multiple times before we overflow'd. If it hasn't
* then this is a good indication the cpu is stuck
*/
if (is_hardlockup()) {
int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
/* only print hardlockups once */
if (__this_cpu_read(hard_watchdog_warn) == true)
return;
if (hardlockup_panic)
panic("Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu %d", this_cpu);
else
WARN(1, "Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu %d", this_cpu);
__this_cpu_write(hard_watchdog_warn, true);
return;
}
__this_cpu_write(hard_watchdog_warn, false);
return;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_get_dev_info(void __user *arg)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev;
struct rfcomm_dev_info di;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("");
if (copy_from_user(&di, arg, sizeof(di)))
return -EFAULT;
dev = rfcomm_dev_get(di.id);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
di.flags = dev->flags;
di.channel = dev->channel;
di.state = dev->dlc->state;
bacpy(&di.src, &dev->src);
bacpy(&di.dst, &dev->dst);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &di, sizeof(di)))
err = -EFAULT;
tty_port_put(&dev->port);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 94,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnShutdown() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
is_shutdown_ = true;
pending_loaders_.clear();
update_load_states_timer_.reset();
std::set<ProcessRouteIDs> ids;
for (BlockedLoadersMap::const_iterator iter = blocked_loaders_map_.begin();
iter != blocked_loaders_map_.end(); ++iter) {
std::pair<std::set<ProcessRouteIDs>::iterator, bool> result =
ids.insert(iter->first);
DCHECK(result.second);
}
for (std::set<ProcessRouteIDs>::const_iterator iter = ids.begin();
iter != ids.end(); ++iter) {
CancelBlockedRequestsForRoute(iter->first, iter->second);
}
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ProCamera2Client::enforceRequestPermissions(CameraMetadata& metadata) {
const int pid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid();
const int selfPid = getpid();
camera_metadata_entry_t entry;
/**
* Mixin default important security values
* - android.led.transmit = defaulted ON
*/
CameraMetadata staticInfo = mDevice->info();
entry = staticInfo.find(ANDROID_LED_AVAILABLE_LEDS);
for(size_t i = 0; i < entry.count; ++i) {
uint8_t led = entry.data.u8[i];
switch(led) {
case ANDROID_LED_AVAILABLE_LEDS_TRANSMIT: {
uint8_t transmitDefault = ANDROID_LED_TRANSMIT_ON;
if (!metadata.exists(ANDROID_LED_TRANSMIT)) {
metadata.update(ANDROID_LED_TRANSMIT,
&transmitDefault, 1);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (pid == selfPid) {
return true;
}
/**
* Permission check special fields in the request
* - android.led.transmit = android.permission.CAMERA_DISABLE_TRANSMIT
*/
entry = metadata.find(ANDROID_LED_TRANSMIT);
if (entry.count > 0 && entry.data.u8[0] != ANDROID_LED_TRANSMIT_ON) {
String16 permissionString =
String16("android.permission.CAMERA_DISABLE_TRANSMIT_LED");
if (!checkCallingPermission(permissionString)) {
const int uid = IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid();
ALOGE("Permission Denial: "
"can't disable transmit LED pid=%d, uid=%d", pid, uid);
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const wchar_t* GetBaseAppId() {
return InstallDetails::Get().base_app_id();
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 152,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_inobp_check(
xfs_mount_t *mp,
xfs_buf_t *bp)
{
int i;
int j;
xfs_dinode_t *dip;
j = mp->m_inode_cluster_size >> mp->m_sb.sb_inodelog;
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
dip = xfs_buf_offset(bp, i * mp->m_sb.sb_inodesize);
if (!dip->di_next_unlinked) {
xfs_alert(mp,
"Detected bogus zero next_unlinked field in inode %d buffer 0x%llx.",
i, (long long)bp->b_bn);
}
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 79,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iakerb_gss_inquire_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, gss_name_t *src_name,
gss_name_t *targ_name, OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec,
gss_OID *mech_type, OM_uint32 *ctx_flags,
int *initiate, int *opened)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (src_name != NULL)
*src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (targ_name != NULL)
*targ_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (lifetime_rec != NULL)
*lifetime_rec = 0;
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ctx_flags != NULL)
*ctx_flags = 0;
if (initiate != NULL)
*initiate = ctx->initiate;
if (opened != NULL)
*opened = ctx->established;
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
ret = krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, ctx->gssc, src_name,
targ_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type,
ctx_flags, initiate, opened);
if (!ctx->established) {
/* Report IAKERB as the mech OID until the context is established. */
if (mech_type != NULL)
*mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
/* We don't support exporting partially-established contexts. */
if (ctx_flags != NULL)
*ctx_flags &= ~GSS_C_TRANS_FLAG;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::setVisibleContentsRect(const IntRect& rect, float scale, const FloatPoint& trajectoryVector)
{
bool contentsRectDidChange = rect != m_visibleContentsRect;
bool contentsScaleDidChange = scale != m_contentsScale;
toCoordinatedGraphicsLayer(m_nonCompositedContentLayer.get())->setVisibleContentRectTrajectoryVector(trajectoryVector);
if (contentsRectDidChange || contentsScaleDidChange) {
m_visibleContentsRect = rect;
m_contentsScale = scale;
HashSet<WebCore::CoordinatedGraphicsLayer*>::iterator end = m_registeredLayers.end();
for (HashSet<WebCore::CoordinatedGraphicsLayer*>::iterator it = m_registeredLayers.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
if (contentsScaleDidChange)
(*it)->setContentsScale(scale);
if (contentsRectDidChange)
(*it)->adjustVisibleRect();
}
}
scheduleLayerFlush();
if (m_webPage->useFixedLayout())
m_webPage->setFixedVisibleContentRect(rect);
if (contentsRectDidChange)
m_shouldSendScrollPositionUpdate = true;
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 97,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_pps(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 value;
WORD32 pps_id;
pps_t *ps_pps;
sps_t *ps_sps;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
UEV_PARSE("pic_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
pps_id = value;
if((pps_id >= MAX_PPS_CNT) || (pps_id < 0))
{
if(ps_codec->i4_pps_done)
return IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_PPS_ID;
else
pps_id = 0;
}
ps_pps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps_base + MAX_PPS_CNT - 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_id = pps_id;
UEV_PARSE("seq_parameter_set_id", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = value;
ps_pps->i1_sps_id = CLIP3(ps_pps->i1_sps_id, 0, MAX_SPS_CNT - 2);
ps_sps = (ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps_base + ps_pps->i1_sps_id);
/* If the SPS that is being referred to has not been parsed,
* copy an existing SPS to the current location */
if(0 == ps_sps->i1_sps_valid)
{
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
/*
sps_t *ps_sps_ref = ps_codec->ps_sps_base;
while(0 == ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_valid)
ps_sps_ref++;
ihevcd_copy_sps(ps_codec, ps_pps->i1_sps_id, ps_sps_ref->i1_sps_id);
*/
}
BITS_PARSE("dependent_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_dependent_slice_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("output_flag_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_output_flag_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("num_extra_slice_header_bits", value, ps_bitstrm, 3);
ps_pps->i1_num_extra_slice_header_bits = value;
BITS_PARSE("sign_data_hiding_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_sign_data_hiding_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cabac_init_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cabac_init_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l0_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l0_default_active = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_ref_idx_l1_default_active_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_ref_idx_l1_default_active = value + 1;
SEV_PARSE("pic_init_qp_minus26", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_init_qp = value + 26;
BITS_PARSE("constrained_intra_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_constrained_intra_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transform_skip_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transform_skip_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("diff_cu_qp_delta_depth", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = value;
}
else
{
ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth = 0;
}
ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size = ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size - ps_pps->i1_diff_cu_qp_delta_depth;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cb_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cb_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
SEV_PARSE("cr_qp_offset", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_pic_cr_qp_offset = value;
/* Print different */
BITS_PARSE("slicelevel_chroma_qp_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_slice_level_chroma_qp_offsets_present_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_pred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_pred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("weighted_bipred_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_weighted_bipred_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("transquant_bypass_enable_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_transquant_bypass_enable_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_entropy_coding_sync_enabled_flag = value;
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_tiles_enabled_flag)
{
WORD32 wd = ALIGN64(ps_codec->i4_wd);
WORD32 ht = ALIGN64(ps_codec->i4_ht);
WORD32 max_tile_cols = (wd + MIN_TILE_WD - 1) / MIN_TILE_WD;
WORD32 max_tile_rows = (ht + MIN_TILE_HT - 1) / MIN_TILE_HT;
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_columns_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = value + 1;
UEV_PARSE("num_tile_rows_minus1", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = value + 1;
if((ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns > max_tile_cols) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows < 1) ||
(ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows > max_tile_rows))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
BITS_PARSE("uniform_spacing_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = value;
{
WORD32 start;
WORD32 i, j;
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("column_width_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + j * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + i;
ps_tile->u1_pos_x = start;
ps_tile->u2_wd = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
start = 0;
for(i = 0; i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows); i++)
{
tile_t *ps_tile;
if(!ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag)
{
if(i < (ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows - 1))
{
UEV_PARSE("row_height_minus1[ i ]", value, ps_bitstrm);
value += 1;
}
else
{
value = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb - start;
}
}
else
{
value = ((i + 1) * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows -
(i * ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) / ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows;
}
for(j = 0; j < ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns; j++)
{
ps_tile = ps_pps->ps_tile + i * ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns + j;
ps_tile->u1_pos_y = start;
ps_tile->u2_ht = value;
}
start += value;
if((start > ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb) ||
(value <= 0))
return IHEVCD_INVALID_HEADER;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_tiles_enabled_flag = value;
}
else
{
/* If tiles are not present, set first tile in each PPS to have tile
width and height equal to picture width and height */
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_columns = 1;
ps_pps->i1_num_tile_rows = 1;
ps_pps->i1_uniform_spacing_flag = 1;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_x = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u1_pos_y = 0;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_wd = ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
ps_pps->ps_tile->u2_ht = ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
}
BITS_PARSE("loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_loop_filter_across_slices_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_control_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag = value;
/* Default values */
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = 0;
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = 0;
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = 0;
if(ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_control_present_flag)
{
BITS_PARSE("deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_deblocking_filter_override_enabled_flag = value;
BITS_PARSE("pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag = value;
if(!ps_pps->i1_pic_disable_deblocking_filter_flag)
{
SEV_PARSE("pps_beta_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_beta_offset_div2 = value;
SEV_PARSE("pps_tc_offset_div2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_tc_offset_div2 = value;
}
}
BITS_PARSE("pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag = value;
if(ps_pps->i1_pps_scaling_list_data_present_flag)
{
COPY_DEFAULT_SCALING_LIST(ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
ihevcd_scaling_list_data(ps_codec, ps_pps->pi2_scaling_mat);
}
BITS_PARSE("lists_modification_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_lists_modification_present_flag = value;
UEV_PARSE("log2_parallel_merge_level_minus2", value, ps_bitstrm);
ps_pps->i1_log2_parallel_merge_level = value + 2;
BITS_PARSE("slice_header_extension_present_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_pps->i1_slice_header_extension_present_flag = value;
/* Not present in HM */
BITS_PARSE("pps_extension_flag", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
if((UWORD8 *)ps_bitstrm->pu4_buf > ps_bitstrm->pu1_buf_max)
return IHEVCD_INVALID_PARAMETER;
ps_codec->i4_pps_done = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid)
{
struct task_struct *p;
struct pid *grp;
int retval;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!pid)
grp = task_pgrp(current);
else {
retval = -ESRCH;
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto out;
grp = task_pgrp(p);
if (!grp)
goto out;
retval = security_task_getpgid(p);
if (retval)
goto out;
}
retval = pid_vnr(grp);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16
| 0
| 21,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::SendTreeChangeEvent(
api::automation::TreeChangeType change_type,
ui::AXTree* tree,
ui::AXNode* node) {
if (!is_active_profile_)
return;
if (node->data().HasIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_CHILD_TREE_ID))
SendChildTreeIDEvent(tree, node);
switch (tree_change_observer_overall_filter_) {
case api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_NOTREECHANGES:
default:
return;
case api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_LIVEREGIONTREECHANGES:
if (!node->data().HasStringAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_CONTAINER_LIVE_STATUS) &&
node->data().role != ui::AX_ROLE_ALERT) {
return;
}
break;
case api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_ALLTREECHANGES:
break;
}
auto iter = axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree);
if (iter == axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
int tree_id = iter->second->tree_id;
v8::Isolate* isolate = GetIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
for (const auto& observer : tree_change_observers_) {
switch (observer.filter) {
case api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_NOTREECHANGES:
default:
continue;
case api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_LIVEREGIONTREECHANGES:
if (!node->data().HasStringAttribute(
ui::AX_ATTR_CONTAINER_LIVE_STATUS) &&
node->data().role != ui::AX_ROLE_ALERT) {
continue;
}
break;
case api::automation::TREE_CHANGE_OBSERVER_FILTER_ALLTREECHANGES:
break;
}
v8::Local<v8::Array> args(v8::Array::New(GetIsolate(), 4U));
args->Set(0U, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), observer.id));
args->Set(1U, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), tree_id));
args->Set(2U, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), node->id()));
args->Set(3U, CreateV8String(isolate, ToString(change_type)));
context()->DispatchEvent("automationInternal.onTreeChange", args);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void longMethodOptionalLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "longMethodOptionalLongArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->longMethodOptionalLongArg());
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, optionalLongArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->longMethodOptionalLongArg(optionalLongArg));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *url_encode(char *str) {
char *buf, *pbuf;
pbuf = buf = mallocz(strlen(str) * 3 + 1);
while (*str) {
if (isalnum(*str) || *str == '-' || *str == '_' || *str == '.' || *str == '~')
*pbuf++ = *str;
else if (*str == ' ')
*pbuf++ = '+';
else
*pbuf++ = '%', *pbuf++ = to_hex(*str >> 4), *pbuf++ = to_hex(*str & 15);
str++;
}
*pbuf = '\0';
pbuf = strdupz(buf);
freez(buf);
return pbuf;
}
Commit Message: fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 93,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: native_pixmap_handle(const gfx::GpuMemoryBufferHandle& handle) {
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
return handle.native_pixmap_handle;
#else
static gfx::NativePixmapHandle pixmap_handle;
return pixmap_handle;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::UpdateForSameDocumentNavigation(
const KURL& new_url,
SameDocumentNavigationSource same_document_navigation_source,
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> data,
HistoryScrollRestorationType scroll_restoration_type,
FrameLoadType type,
Document* initiating_document) {
if (initiating_document && !initiating_document->CanCreateHistoryEntry())
type = kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem;
KURL old_url = request_.Url();
original_request_.SetURL(new_url);
request_.SetURL(new_url);
SetReplacesCurrentHistoryItem(type != kFrameLoadTypeStandard);
if (same_document_navigation_source == kSameDocumentNavigationHistoryApi) {
request_.SetHTTPMethod(HTTPNames::GET);
request_.SetHTTPBody(nullptr);
}
ClearRedirectChain();
if (is_client_redirect_)
AppendRedirect(old_url);
AppendRedirect(new_url);
SetHistoryItemStateForCommit(
history_item_.Get(), type,
same_document_navigation_source == kSameDocumentNavigationHistoryApi
? HistoryNavigationType::kHistoryApi
: HistoryNavigationType::kFragment);
history_item_->SetDocumentState(frame_->GetDocument()->FormElementsState());
if (same_document_navigation_source == kSameDocumentNavigationHistoryApi) {
history_item_->SetStateObject(std::move(data));
history_item_->SetScrollRestorationType(scroll_restoration_type);
}
HistoryCommitType commit_type = LoadTypeToCommitType(type);
frame_->FrameScheduler()->DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
commit_type == kHistoryInertCommit, type == kFrameLoadTypeReload,
frame_->IsLocalRoot());
GetLocalFrameClient().DispatchDidNavigateWithinPage(
history_item_.Get(), commit_type, initiating_document);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::GetSelection(uint32_t* selection_start_page_index,
uint32_t* selection_start_char_index,
uint32_t* selection_end_page_index,
uint32_t* selection_end_char_index) {
size_t len = selection_.size();
if (len == 0) {
*selection_start_page_index = 0;
*selection_start_char_index = 0;
*selection_end_page_index = 0;
*selection_end_char_index = 0;
return;
}
*selection_start_page_index = selection_[0].page_index();
*selection_start_char_index = selection_[0].char_index();
*selection_end_page_index = selection_[len - 1].page_index();
if (len == 1) {
*selection_end_char_index =
selection_[0].char_index() + selection_[0].char_count();
} else {
*selection_end_char_index = selection_[len - 1].char_count();
}
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,396
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::CheckResizeLock() {
if (!resize_lock_ ||
resize_lock_->expected_size() != current_frame_size_in_dip_)
return;
resize_lock_->UnlockCompositor();
ui::Compositor* compositor = client_->GetCompositor();
if (compositor) {
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
}
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutSVGResourceMarker::layout()
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
if (m_isInLayout)
return;
TemporaryChange<bool> inLayoutChange(m_isInLayout, true);
LayoutSVGContainer::layout();
clearInvalidationMask();
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl::CreateWebSocketHandshakeThrottle() {
WebLocalFrame* web_local_frame = GetWebFrame();
if (!web_local_frame)
return nullptr;
auto* render_frame = content::RenderFrame::FromWebFrame(web_local_frame);
if (!render_frame)
return nullptr;
int render_frame_id = render_frame->GetRoutingID();
if (!websocket_handshake_throttle_provider_) {
websocket_handshake_throttle_provider_ =
GetContentClient()
->renderer()
->CreateWebSocketHandshakeThrottleProvider();
if (!websocket_handshake_throttle_provider_)
return nullptr;
}
return websocket_handshake_throttle_provider_->CreateThrottle(
render_frame_id);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::initSecurityContext()
{
if (haveInitializedSecurityOrigin()) {
ASSERT(securityOrigin());
return;
}
if (!m_frame) {
m_cookieURL = KURL(ParsedURLString, emptyString());
setSecurityOrigin(SecurityOrigin::createUnique());
setContentSecurityPolicy(ContentSecurityPolicy::create(this));
return;
}
m_cookieURL = m_url;
enforceSandboxFlags(m_frame->loader()->effectiveSandboxFlags());
setSecurityOrigin(isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin) ? SecurityOrigin::createUnique() : SecurityOrigin::create(m_url));
setContentSecurityPolicy(ContentSecurityPolicy::create(this));
if (Settings* settings = this->settings()) {
if (!settings->webSecurityEnabled()) {
securityOrigin()->grantUniversalAccess();
} else if (securityOrigin()->isLocal()) {
if (settings->allowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs() || m_frame->loader()->client()->shouldForceUniversalAccessFromLocalURL(m_url)) {
securityOrigin()->grantUniversalAccess();
} else if (!settings->allowFileAccessFromFileURLs()) {
securityOrigin()->enforceFilePathSeparation();
}
}
securityOrigin()->setStorageBlockingPolicy(settings->storageBlockingPolicy());
}
Document* parentDocument = ownerElement() ? ownerElement()->document() : 0;
if (parentDocument && m_frame->loader()->shouldTreatURLAsSrcdocDocument(url())) {
m_isSrcdocDocument = true;
setBaseURLOverride(parentDocument->baseURL());
}
m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent = isEligibleForSeamless(parentDocument, this);
if (!shouldInheritSecurityOriginFromOwner(m_url))
return;
Frame* ownerFrame = m_frame->tree()->parent();
if (!ownerFrame)
ownerFrame = m_frame->loader()->opener();
if (!ownerFrame) {
didFailToInitializeSecurityOrigin();
return;
}
if (isSandboxed(SandboxOrigin)) {
if (ownerFrame->document()->securityOrigin()->canLoadLocalResources())
securityOrigin()->grantLoadLocalResources();
return;
}
m_cookieURL = ownerFrame->document()->cookieURL();
setSecurityOrigin(ownerFrame->document()->securityOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::AddPendingObserver(
int32_t observer_id,
const IndexedDBObserver::Options& options) {
DCHECK_NE(mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
pending_observers_.push_back(std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
observer_id, object_store_ids_, options));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t mqueue_read_file(struct file *filp, char __user *u_data,
size_t count, loff_t *off)
{
struct mqueue_inode_info *info = MQUEUE_I(file_inode(filp));
char buffer[FILENT_SIZE];
ssize_t ret;
spin_lock(&info->lock);
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer),
"QSIZE:%-10lu NOTIFY:%-5d SIGNO:%-5d NOTIFY_PID:%-6d\n",
info->qsize,
info->notify_owner ? info->notify.sigev_notify : 0,
(info->notify_owner &&
info->notify.sigev_notify == SIGEV_SIGNAL) ?
info->notify.sigev_signo : 0,
pid_vnr(info->notify_owner));
spin_unlock(&info->lock);
buffer[sizeof(buffer)-1] = '\0';
ret = simple_read_from_buffer(u_data, count, off, buffer,
strlen(buffer));
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
file_inode(filp)->i_atime = file_inode(filp)->i_ctime = current_time(file_inode(filp));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <geneblue.mail@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Shader* GetShader(GLuint client_id) {
return shader_manager()->GetShader(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sas_init_disc(struct sas_discovery *disc, struct asd_sas_port *port)
{
int i;
static const work_func_t sas_event_fns[DISC_NUM_EVENTS] = {
[DISCE_DISCOVER_DOMAIN] = sas_discover_domain,
[DISCE_REVALIDATE_DOMAIN] = sas_revalidate_domain,
[DISCE_PROBE] = sas_probe_devices,
[DISCE_SUSPEND] = sas_suspend_devices,
[DISCE_RESUME] = sas_resume_devices,
[DISCE_DESTRUCT] = sas_destruct_devices,
};
disc->pending = 0;
for (i = 0; i < DISC_NUM_EVENTS; i++) {
INIT_SAS_WORK(&disc->disc_work[i].work, sas_event_fns[i]);
disc->disc_work[i].port = port;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 169,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(u32 new_ctl)
{
/*
* These bits in the secondary execution controls field
* are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
* architecture and the guest's CPUID. Do not touch the
* dynamic bits.
*/
u32 mask =
SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
u32 cur_ctl = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
(new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InterstitialPageRVHDelegateView(InterstitialPageImpl* page)
: interstitial_page_(page) {
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AudioHandler::~AudioHandler() {
mixer_.reset();
};
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<AudioFlinger::EffectModule> AudioFlinger::EffectChain::getEffectFromType_l(
const effect_uuid_t *type)
{
size_t size = mEffects.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (memcmp(&mEffects[i]->desc().type, type, sizeof(effect_uuid_t)) == 0) {
return mEffects[i];
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::GetSchemaAdditions(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> additions = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "EventType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_EVENT_NONE, ui::AX_EVENT_LAST));
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "RoleType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_ROLE_NONE, ui::AX_ROLE_LAST));
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "StateType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_STATE_NONE, ui::AX_STATE_LAST));
additions->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(GetIsolate(), "TreeChangeType"),
ToEnumObject(GetIsolate(), ui::AX_MUTATION_NONE, ui::AX_MUTATION_LAST));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(additions);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_disable_intercept_msr_read_x2apic(u32 msr)
{
__vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy_x2apic,
msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
__vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx_msr_bitmap_longmode_x2apic,
msr, MSR_TYPE_R);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HarfBuzzShaper::createHarfBuzzRunsForSingleCharacter()
{
ASSERT(m_normalizedBufferLength == 1);
UChar32 character = m_normalizedBuffer[0];
if (!U16_IS_SINGLE(character))
return false;
const SimpleFontData* fontData = m_font->glyphDataForCharacter(character, false, m_run.normalizeSpace()).fontData;
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
UScriptCode script = uscript_getScript(character, &errorCode);
if (U_FAILURE(errorCode))
return false;
addHarfBuzzRun(0, 1, fontData, script);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: net::ProxyInfo GetDirectProxyInfo() {
net::ProxyInfo proxy_info;
proxy_info.UseDirect();
return proxy_info;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 136,935
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_ppe_init_hw(struct hns_ppe_cb *ppe_cb)
{
struct ppe_common_cb *ppe_common_cb = ppe_cb->ppe_common_cb;
u32 port = ppe_cb->index;
struct dsaf_device *dsaf_dev = ppe_common_cb->dsaf_dev;
int i;
/* get default RSS key */
netdev_rss_key_fill(ppe_cb->rss_key, HNS_PPEV2_RSS_KEY_SIZE);
dsaf_dev->misc_op->ppe_srst(dsaf_dev, port, 0);
mdelay(10);
dsaf_dev->misc_op->ppe_srst(dsaf_dev, port, 1);
/* clr and msk except irq*/
hns_ppe_exc_irq_en(ppe_cb, 0);
if (ppe_common_cb->ppe_mode == PPE_COMMON_MODE_DEBUG) {
hns_ppe_set_port_mode(ppe_cb, PPE_MODE_GE);
dsaf_write_dev(ppe_cb, PPE_CFG_PAUSE_IDLE_CNT_REG, 0);
} else {
hns_ppe_set_port_mode(ppe_cb, PPE_MODE_XGE);
}
hns_ppe_checksum_hw(ppe_cb, 0xffffffff);
hns_ppe_cnt_clr_ce(ppe_cb);
if (!AE_IS_VER1(dsaf_dev->dsaf_ver)) {
hns_ppe_set_vlan_strip(ppe_cb, 0);
dsaf_write_dev(ppe_cb, PPE_CFG_MAX_FRAME_LEN_REG,
HNS_PPEV2_MAX_FRAME_LEN);
/* set default RSS key in h/w */
hns_ppe_set_rss_key(ppe_cb, ppe_cb->rss_key);
/* Set default indrection table in h/w */
for (i = 0; i < HNS_PPEV2_RSS_IND_TBL_SIZE; i++)
ppe_cb->rss_indir_table[i] = i;
hns_ppe_set_indir_table(ppe_cb, ppe_cb->rss_indir_table);
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8Float64Array::GetRawTemplate()
{
V8BindingPerIsolateData* data = V8BindingPerIsolateData::current();
V8BindingPerIsolateData::TemplateMap::iterator result = data->rawTemplateMap().find(&info);
if (result != data->rawTemplateMap().end())
return result->second;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> templ = createRawTemplate();
data->rawTemplateMap().add(&info, templ);
return templ;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameValue);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 107,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConnectionCallback(const BluetoothDevice *device,
scoped_refptr<BluetoothSocket> socket) {
++connection_callback_count_;
last_device_ = device;
last_socket_ = socket;
message_loop_.Quit();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int des3_ede_x86_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct des3_ede_x86_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
u32 i, j, tmp;
int err;
/* Generate encryption context using generic implementation. */
err = __des3_ede_setkey(ctx->enc_expkey, &tfm->crt_flags, key, keylen);
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Fix encryption context for this implementation and form decryption
* context. */
j = DES3_EDE_EXPKEY_WORDS - 2;
for (i = 0; i < DES3_EDE_EXPKEY_WORDS; i += 2, j -= 2) {
tmp = ror32(ctx->enc_expkey[i + 1], 4);
ctx->enc_expkey[i + 1] = tmp;
ctx->dec_expkey[j + 0] = ctx->enc_expkey[i + 0];
ctx->dec_expkey[j + 1] = tmp;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::StopFinding(StopFindAction action) {
if (browser_plugin_embedder_ &&
browser_plugin_embedder_->StopFinding(action)) {
return;
}
GetMainFrame()->Send(
new FrameMsg_StopFinding(GetMainFrame()->GetRoutingID(), action));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_ENQUEUE(const struct ofpact_enqueue *enqueue,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version == OFP10_VERSION) {
struct ofp10_action_enqueue *oae;
oae = put_OFPAT10_ENQUEUE(out);
oae->port = htons(ofp_to_u16(enqueue->port));
oae->queue_id = htonl(enqueue->queue);
} else {
put_OFPAT_SET_QUEUE(out, ofp_version, enqueue->queue);
struct ofp11_action_output *oao = put_OFPAT11_OUTPUT(out);
oao->port = ofputil_port_to_ofp11(enqueue->port);
oao->max_len = OVS_BE16_MAX;
put_NXAST_POP_QUEUE(out);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InspectorNetworkAgent::CanGetResponseBodyBlob(const String& request_id) {
NetworkResourcesData::ResourceData const* resource_data =
resources_data_->Data(request_id);
BlobDataHandle* blob =
resource_data ? resource_data->DownloadedFileBlob() : nullptr;
if (!blob)
return false;
if (worker_global_scope_)
return true;
LocalFrame* frame = IdentifiersFactory::FrameById(inspected_frames_,
resource_data->FrameId());
return frame && frame->GetDocument();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int http_send_name_header(struct http_txn *txn, struct proxy* be, const char* srv_name) {
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
char *hdr_name = be->server_id_hdr_name;
int hdr_name_len = be->server_id_hdr_len;
struct channel *chn = txn->req.chn;
char *hdr_val;
unsigned int old_o, old_i;
ctx.idx = 0;
old_o = http_hdr_rewind(&txn->req);
if (old_o) {
/* The request was already skipped, let's restore it */
b_rew(chn->buf, old_o);
txn->req.next += old_o;
txn->req.sov += old_o;
}
old_i = chn->buf->i;
while (http_find_header2(hdr_name, hdr_name_len, txn->req.chn->buf->p, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx)) {
/* remove any existing values from the header */
http_remove_header2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, &ctx);
}
/* Add the new header requested with the server value */
hdr_val = trash.str;
memcpy(hdr_val, hdr_name, hdr_name_len);
hdr_val += hdr_name_len;
*hdr_val++ = ':';
*hdr_val++ = ' ';
hdr_val += strlcpy2(hdr_val, srv_name, trash.str + trash.size - hdr_val);
http_header_add_tail2(&txn->req, &txn->hdr_idx, trash.str, hdr_val - trash.str);
if (old_o) {
/* If this was a forwarded request, we must readjust the amount of
* data to be forwarded in order to take into account the size
* variations. Note that the current state is >= HTTP_MSG_BODY,
* so we don't have to adjust ->sol.
*/
old_o += chn->buf->i - old_i;
b_adv(chn->buf, old_o);
txn->req.next -= old_o;
txn->req.sov -= old_o;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dwc3_gadget_set_speed(struct usb_gadget *g,
enum usb_device_speed speed)
{
struct dwc3 *dwc = gadget_to_dwc(g);
unsigned long flags;
u32 reg;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dwc->lock, flags);
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCFG);
reg &= ~(DWC3_DCFG_SPEED_MASK);
/*
* WORKAROUND: DWC3 revision < 2.20a have an issue
* which would cause metastability state on Run/Stop
* bit if we try to force the IP to USB2-only mode.
*
* Because of that, we cannot configure the IP to any
* speed other than the SuperSpeed
*
* Refers to:
*
* STAR#9000525659: Clock Domain Crossing on DCTL in
* USB 2.0 Mode
*/
if (dwc->revision < DWC3_REVISION_220A &&
!dwc->dis_metastability_quirk) {
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED;
} else {
switch (speed) {
case USB_SPEED_LOW:
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_LOWSPEED;
break;
case USB_SPEED_FULL:
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_FULLSPEED;
break;
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_HIGHSPEED;
break;
case USB_SPEED_SUPER:
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED;
break;
case USB_SPEED_SUPER_PLUS:
if (dwc3_is_usb31(dwc))
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED_PLUS;
else
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED;
break;
default:
dev_err(dwc->dev, "invalid speed (%d)\n", speed);
if (dwc->revision & DWC3_REVISION_IS_DWC31)
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED_PLUS;
else
reg |= DWC3_DCFG_SUPERSPEED;
}
}
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCFG, reg);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dwc->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fiemap_check_ranges(struct super_block *sb,
u64 start, u64 len, u64 *new_len)
{
u64 maxbytes = (u64) sb->s_maxbytes;
*new_len = len;
if (len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (start > maxbytes)
return -EFBIG;
/*
* Shrink request scope to what the fs can actually handle.
*/
if (len > maxbytes || (maxbytes - len) < start)
*new_len = maxbytes - start;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(recvmsg, int, fd, struct user_msghdr __user *, msg,
unsigned int, flags)
{
return __sys_recvmsg(fd, msg, flags, true);
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 82,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ldb_dn_compare_base(struct ldb_dn *base, struct ldb_dn *dn)
{
int ret;
unsigned int n_base, n_dn;
if ( ! base || base->invalid) return 1;
if ( ! dn || dn->invalid) return -1;
if (( ! base->valid_case) || ( ! dn->valid_case)) {
if (base->linearized && dn->linearized && dn->special == base->special) {
/* try with a normal compare first, if we are lucky
* we will avoid exploding and casfolding */
int dif;
dif = strlen(dn->linearized) - strlen(base->linearized);
if (dif < 0) {
return dif;
}
if (strcmp(base->linearized,
&dn->linearized[dif]) == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
if ( ! ldb_dn_casefold_internal(base)) {
return 1;
}
if ( ! ldb_dn_casefold_internal(dn)) {
return -1;
}
}
/* if base has more components,
* they don't have the same base */
if (base->comp_num > dn->comp_num) {
return (dn->comp_num - base->comp_num);
}
if ((dn->comp_num == 0) || (base->comp_num == 0)) {
if (dn->special && base->special) {
return strcmp(base->linearized, dn->linearized);
} else if (dn->special) {
return -1;
} else if (base->special) {
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
n_base = base->comp_num - 1;
n_dn = dn->comp_num - 1;
while (n_base != (unsigned int) -1) {
char *b_name = base->components[n_base].cf_name;
char *dn_name = dn->components[n_dn].cf_name;
char *b_vdata = (char *)base->components[n_base].cf_value.data;
char *dn_vdata = (char *)dn->components[n_dn].cf_value.data;
size_t b_vlen = base->components[n_base].cf_value.length;
size_t dn_vlen = dn->components[n_dn].cf_value.length;
/* compare attr names */
ret = strcmp(b_name, dn_name);
if (ret != 0) return ret;
/* compare attr.cf_value. */
if (b_vlen != dn_vlen) {
return b_vlen - dn_vlen;
}
ret = strncmp(b_vdata, dn_vdata, b_vlen);
if (ret != 0) return ret;
n_base--;
n_dn--;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ParamTraits<GURL>::Read(const Message* m, PickleIterator* iter, GURL* p) {
std::string s;
if (!m->ReadString(iter, &s) || s.length() > content::kMaxURLChars) {
*p = GURL();
return false;
}
*p = GURL(s);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 117,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrintPreviewUIUnitTest() {}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(ignore_user_abort)
{
char *arg = NULL;
int arg_len = 0;
int old_setting;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &arg, &arg_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
old_setting = PG(ignore_user_abort);
if (arg) {
zend_alter_ini_entry_ex("ignore_user_abort", sizeof("ignore_user_abort"), arg, arg_len, PHP_INI_USER, PHP_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
}
RETURN_LONG(old_setting);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_config_info (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
int bytecnt = wpmd->byte_length;
unsigned char *byteptr = wpmd->data;
if (bytecnt >= 3) {
wpc->config.flags &= 0xff;
wpc->config.flags |= (int32_t) *byteptr++ << 8;
wpc->config.flags |= (int32_t) *byteptr++ << 16;
wpc->config.flags |= (int32_t) *byteptr++ << 24;
bytecnt -= 3;
if (bytecnt && (wpc->config.flags & CONFIG_EXTRA_MODE)) {
wpc->config.xmode = *byteptr++;
bytecnt--;
}
if (bytecnt) {
wpc->config.qmode = (wpc->config.qmode & ~0xff) | *byteptr;
wpc->version_five = 1;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BrokerDuplicateHandle(void* source_handle,
unsigned int process_id,
void** target_handle,
unsigned int desired_access,
unsigned int options) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return content::BrokerDuplicateHandle(source_handle, process_id,
target_handle, desired_access,
options);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::UsingCustomPopupFrame() const {
GtkThemeService* theme_provider = GtkThemeService::GetFrom(
browser()->profile());
return !theme_provider->UsingNativeTheme() && browser()->is_type_popup();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void remove_hash_table(struct cache *cache, struct cache_entry *entry)
{
if(entry->hash_prev)
entry->hash_prev->hash_next = entry->hash_next;
else
cache->hash_table[CALCULATE_HASH(entry->block)] =
entry->hash_next;
if(entry->hash_next)
entry->hash_next->hash_prev = entry->hash_prev;
entry->hash_prev = entry->hash_next = NULL;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void hfsplus_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode, u32 cnid)
{
dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)(unsigned long)cnid;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,064
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _single_copy_to_wide( SQLWCHAR *out, LPCSTR in, int len )
{
while ( len >= 0 )
{
*out = *in;
out++;
in++;
len --;
}
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set(const v8::Handle<GCObject>& handle, const T& value)
{
m_map.set(*handle, value);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_httpdesc_init(struct client *clt)
{
struct http_descriptor *desc;
if ((desc = calloc(1, sizeof(*desc))) == NULL)
return (-1);
RB_INIT(&desc->http_headers);
clt->clt_descreq = desc;
if ((desc = calloc(1, sizeof(*desc))) == NULL) {
/* req will be cleaned up later */
return (-1);
}
RB_INIT(&desc->http_headers);
clt->clt_descresp = desc;
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
| 0
| 68,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WaitTopSitesLoaded() {
DCHECK(top_sites_impl_);
WaitTopSitesLoadedObserver wait_top_sites_loaded_observer(top_sites_impl_);
wait_top_sites_loaded_observer.Run();
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnTargetPathSelected(const FilePath& target_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_EQ(TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT, target_disposition_);
target_path_ = target_path;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs_finish_clear_delegation_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state)
{
nfs_remove_bad_delegation(state->inode);
write_seqlock(&state->seqlock);
nfs4_stateid_copy(&state->stateid, &state->open_stateid);
write_sequnlock(&state->seqlock);
clear_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fiber_check(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value fib)
{
struct RFiber *f = fiber_ptr(fib);
mrb_assert(f->tt == MRB_TT_FIBER);
if (!f->cxt) {
mrb_raise(mrb, E_FIBER_ERROR, "uninitialized Fiber");
}
return f->cxt;
}
Commit Message: Extend stack when pushing arguments that does not fit in; fix #4038
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestForCursorName(CursorPtr pCursor, void *closure)
{
Atom *pName = closure;
return pCursor->name == *pName;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::HasConnection() const {
return is_initialized_ && !is_dead_;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void S_AL_SrcUpdate( void )
{
int i;
int entityNum;
ALint state;
src_t *curSource;
for(i = 0; i < srcCount; i++)
{
entityNum = srcList[i].entity;
curSource = &srcList[i];
if(curSource->isLocked)
continue;
if(!curSource->isActive)
continue;
if((s_alGain->modified) || (s_volume->modified))
curSource->curGain = s_alGain->value * s_volume->value;
if((s_alRolloff->modified) && (!curSource->local))
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_ROLLOFF_FACTOR, s_alRolloff->value);
if(s_alMinDistance->modified)
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_REFERENCE_DISTANCE, s_alMinDistance->value);
if(curSource->isLooping)
{
sentity_t *sent = &entityList[ entityNum ];
if(sent->loopAddedThisFrame)
{
alSfx_t *curSfx;
if(curSource->isActive && !sent->startLoopingSound &&
curSource->sfx != sent->loopSfx)
{
S_AL_NewLoopMaster(curSource, qtrue);
curSource->isPlaying = qfalse;
qalSourceStop(curSource->alSource);
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_BUFFER, 0);
sent->startLoopingSound = qtrue;
}
if(sent->startLoopingSound)
{
S_AL_SrcSetup(i, sent->loopSfx, sent->loopPriority,
entityNum, -1, curSource->local);
curSource->isLooping = qtrue;
knownSfx[curSource->sfx].loopCnt++;
sent->startLoopingSound = qfalse;
}
curSfx = &knownSfx[curSource->sfx];
S_AL_ScaleGain(curSource, curSource->loopSpeakerPos);
if(!curSource->scaleGain)
{
if(curSource->isPlaying)
{
S_AL_NewLoopMaster(curSource, qfalse);
qalSourceStop(curSource->alSource);
curSource->isPlaying = qfalse;
}
else if(!curSfx->loopActiveCnt && curSfx->masterLoopSrc < 0)
curSfx->masterLoopSrc = i;
continue;
}
if(!curSource->isPlaying)
{
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_LOOPING, AL_TRUE);
curSource->isPlaying = qtrue;
qalSourcePlay(curSource->alSource);
if(curSource->priority == SRCPRI_AMBIENT)
{
if(curSfx->loopActiveCnt)
{
int offset, error;
S_AL_ClearError(qfalse);
qalGetSourcei(srcList[curSfx->masterLoopSrc].alSource, AL_SAMPLE_OFFSET, &offset);
if((error = qalGetError()) != AL_NO_ERROR)
{
if(error != AL_INVALID_ENUM)
{
Com_Printf(S_COLOR_YELLOW "WARNING: Cannot get sample offset from source %d: "
"%s\n", i, S_AL_ErrorMsg(error));
}
}
else
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SAMPLE_OFFSET, offset);
}
else if(curSfx->loopCnt && curSfx->masterLoopSrc >= 0)
{
float secofs;
src_t *master = &srcList[curSfx->masterLoopSrc];
if(master->lastTimePos >= 0)
{
secofs = master->lastTimePos + (Sys_Milliseconds() - master->lastSampleTime) / 1000.0f;
secofs = fmodf(secofs, (float) curSfx->info.samples / curSfx->info.rate);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_SEC_OFFSET, secofs);
}
curSfx->masterLoopSrc = i;
}
else
curSfx->masterLoopSrc = i;
}
else if(curSource->lastTimePos >= 0)
{
float secofs;
secofs = curSource->lastTimePos + (Sys_Milliseconds() - curSource->lastSampleTime) / 1000.0f;
secofs = fmodf(secofs, (float) curSfx->info.samples / curSfx->info.rate);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_SEC_OFFSET, secofs);
}
curSfx->loopActiveCnt++;
}
if(curSource->local)
{
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SOURCE_RELATIVE, AL_TRUE);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_ROLLOFF_FACTOR, 0.0f);
}
else
{
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SOURCE_RELATIVE, AL_FALSE);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_ROLLOFF_FACTOR, s_alRolloff->value);
}
}
else if(curSource->priority == SRCPRI_AMBIENT)
{
if(curSource->isPlaying)
{
S_AL_NewLoopMaster(curSource, qfalse);
qalSourceStop(curSource->alSource);
curSource->isPlaying = qfalse;
}
}
else
S_AL_SrcKill(i);
continue;
}
if(!curSource->isStream)
{
qalGetSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SOURCE_STATE, &state);
if(state == AL_STOPPED)
{
curSource->isPlaying = qfalse;
S_AL_SrcKill(i);
continue;
}
}
qalGetSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SOURCE_RELATIVE, &state);
if(curSource->isTracking && !state)
{
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_POSITION, entityList[entityNum].origin);
S_AL_ScaleGain(curSource, entityList[entityNum].origin);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::timerFired(TimerBase*) {
m_keepAlive.clear();
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void date_object_free_storage_timezone(void *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_timezone_obj *intern = (php_timezone_obj *)object;
if (intern->type == TIMELIB_ZONETYPE_ABBR) {
free(intern->tzi.z.abbr);
}
zend_object_std_dtor(&intern->std TSRMLS_CC);
efree(object);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(DocumentLoader) {
visitor->Trace(frame_);
visitor->Trace(fetcher_);
visitor->Trace(main_resource_);
visitor->Trace(history_item_);
visitor->Trace(writer_);
visitor->Trace(subresource_filter_);
visitor->Trace(document_load_timing_);
visitor->Trace(application_cache_host_);
visitor->Trace(content_security_policy_);
RawResourceClient::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ih264d_init_decoder(void * ps_dec_params)
{
dec_struct_t * ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)ps_dec_params;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice;
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc, *ps_cur_poc;
WORD32 size;
size = sizeof(pred_info_t) * 2 * 32;
memset(ps_dec->ps_pred, 0 , size);
size = sizeof(disp_mgr_t);
memset(ps_dec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, 0 , size);
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
memset(ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dec_err_status_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status, 0, size);
size = sizeof(sei);
memset(ps_dec->ps_sei, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dpb_commands_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dec_bit_stream_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_bitstrm, 0, size);
size = sizeof(dec_slice_params_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice, 0, size);
size = MAX(sizeof(dec_seq_params_t), sizeof(dec_pic_params_t));
memset(ps_dec->pv_scratch_sps_pps, 0, size);
size = sizeof(ctxt_inc_mb_info_t);
memset(ps_dec->ps_left_mb_ctxt_info, 0, size);
size = (sizeof(neighbouradd_t) << 2);
memset(ps_dec->ps_left_mvpred_addr, 0 ,size);
size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + ithread_get_mutex_lock_size();
memset(ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr, 0, size);
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ih264d_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
ps_dec->init_done = 0;
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 1;
ps_dec->u2_pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd = 0;
ps_dec->u1_separate_parse = DEFAULT_SEPARATE_PARSE;
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_type = 0;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics = 0;
ps_dec->i4_app_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
ps_dec->i4_dec_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
memset(ps_dec->ps_pps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_pic_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAMS));
memset(ps_dec->ps_sps, 0,
((sizeof(dec_seq_params_t)) * MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAMS));
/* Initialization of function pointers ih264d_deblock_picture function*/
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[0] = ih264d_deblock_picture_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->p_DeblockPicture[1] = ih264d_deblock_picture_mbaff;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
ps_dec->u4_num_fld_in_frm = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = ps_dec;
/* Initialize the sei validity u4_flag with zero indiacting sei is not valid*/
ps_dec->ps_sei->u1_is_valid = 0;
/* decParams Initializations */
ps_dec->ps_cur_pps = NULL;
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps = NULL;
ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag = 0;
ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream = 1;
ps_dec->u1_first_pb_nal_in_pic = 1;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_app_disp_width = 0;
ps_dec->i4_header_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u4_total_frames_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = 0;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS; //REJECT_PB_PICS;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_frm_sei_sync = SYNC_FRM_DEFAULT;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u4_cur_frm = INIT_FRAME;
ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
ps_dec->u1_pr_sl_type = 0xFF;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/* POC initializations */
ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_top_field_order_count = ps_cur_poc->i4_top_field_order_count =
0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count =
ps_cur_poc->i4_bottom_field_order_count = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field = 0;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5 = 0;
ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp = 4;
/* Field PIC initializations */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
/* Set the cropping parameters as zero */
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_y = 0;
ps_dec->u2_crop_offset_uv = 0;
/* The Initial Frame Rate Info is not Present */
ps_dec->i4_vui_frame_rate = -1;
ps_dec->i4_pic_type = -1;
ps_dec->i4_frametype = -1;
ps_dec->i4_content_type = -1;
ps_dec->u1_res_changed = 0;
ps_dec->u1_frame_decoded_flag = 0;
/* Set the default frame seek mask mode */
ps_dec->u4_skip_frm_mask = SKIP_NONE;
/********************************************************/
/* Initialize CAVLC residual decoding function pointers */
/********************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[0] = ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_1;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_2to10;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_4x4res_block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_4x4res_block_totalcoeff_11to16;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[0] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n0to7;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse4x4coeff[1] = ih264d_cavlc_parse4x4coeff_n8;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[0] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_none_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[1] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_left_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[2] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_top_available;
ps_dec->pf_cavlc_parse_8x8block[3] =
ih264d_cavlc_parse_8x8block_both_available;
/***************************************************************************/
/* Initialize Bs calculation function pointers for P and B, 16x16/non16x16 */
/***************************************************************************/
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[0][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_pslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][0] = ih264d_fill_bs1_16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs1[1][1] = ih264d_fill_bs1_non16x16mb_bslice;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[0] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_frm;
ps_dec->pf_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge[1] =
ih264d_fill_bs_xtra_left_edge_cur_fld;
/* Initialize Reference Pic Buffers */
ih264d_init_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_dec->u2_prv_frame_num = 0;
ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u1_dangling_field = 0;
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.cabac_table = gau4_ih264d_cabac_table;
ps_dec->pu1_left_mv_ctxt_inc = ps_dec->u1_left_mv_ctxt_inc_arr[0];
ps_dec->pi1_left_ref_idx_ctxt_inc =
&ps_dec->i1_left_ref_idx_ctx_inc_arr[0][0];
ps_dec->pu1_left_yuv_dc_csbp = &ps_dec->u1_yuv_dc_csbp_topmb;
/* ! */
/* Initializing flush frame u4_flag */
ps_dec->u1_flushfrm = 0;
{
ps_dec->s_cab_dec_env.pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle = (void*)ps_dec;
}
memset(ps_dec->disp_bufs, 0, (MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(disp_buf_t));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
memset(ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed, 0,
(MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW) * sizeof(UWORD32));
ih264d_init_arch(ps_dec);
ih264d_init_function_ptr(ps_dec);
ps_dec->e_frm_out_mode = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
ps_dec->init_done = 1;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize slice parameters before concealing error MBs
Also memset ps_dec_op structure to zero.
For error input, this ensures dimensions are initialized to zero
Bug: 28165661
Change-Id: I66eb2ddc5e02e74b7ff04da5f749443920f37141
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API ut64 r_bin_java_annotation_default_attr_calc_size(RBinJavaAttrInfo *attr) {
ut64 size = 0;
if (attr) {
size += 6;
size += r_bin_java_element_value_calc_size (attr->info.annotation_default_attr.default_value);
}
return size;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 79,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int iscsi_update_param_value(struct iscsi_param *param, char *value)
{
kfree(param->value);
param->value = kstrdup(value, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!param->value) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for value.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
pr_debug("iSCSI Parameter updated to %s=%s\n",
param->name, param->value);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 30,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_alg *crypto_larval_wait(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_larval *larval = (void *)alg;
long timeout;
timeout = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(
&larval->completion, 60 * HZ);
alg = larval->adult;
if (timeout < 0)
alg = ERR_PTR(-EINTR);
else if (!timeout)
alg = ERR_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT);
else if (!alg)
alg = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
else if (crypto_is_test_larval(larval) &&
!(alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED))
alg = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
else if (!crypto_mod_get(alg))
alg = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
crypto_mod_put(&larval->alg);
return alg;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterGRAYImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("GRAY");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadGRAYImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteGRAYImage;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Raw gray samples");
entry->module=ConstantString("GRAY");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool netdev_has_any_upper_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
ASSERT_RTNL();
return !list_empty(&dev->adj_list.upper);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunTwoClosures(const base::Closure* first, const base::Closure* second) {
first->Run();
second->Run();
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa)
{
return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePTIFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*images,
*next,
*pyramid_image;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
resolution;
size_t
columns,
rows;
/*
Create pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
exception=(&image->exception);
images=NewImageList();
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
Image
*clone_image;
clone_image=CloneImage(next,0,0,MagickFalse,exception);
clone_image->previous=NewImageList();
clone_image->next=NewImageList();
AppendImageToList(&images,clone_image);
columns=next->columns;
rows=next->rows;
resolution.x=next->x_resolution;
resolution.y=next->y_resolution;
while ((columns > 64) && (rows > 64))
{
columns/=2;
rows/=2;
resolution.x/=2.0;
resolution.y/=2.0;
pyramid_image=ResizeImage(next,columns,rows,image->filter,image->blur,
exception);
if (pyramid_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
pyramid_image->x_resolution=resolution.x;
pyramid_image->y_resolution=resolution.y;
AppendImageToList(&images,pyramid_image);
}
}
/*
Write pyramid-encoded TIFF image.
*/
write_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
write_info->adjoin=MagickTrue;
status=WriteTIFFImage(write_info,GetFirstImageInList(images));
images=DestroyImageList(images);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init proto_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&proto_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t TIFFReadCustomStream(unsigned char *data,const size_t count,
void *user_data)
{
PhotoshopProfile
*profile;
size_t
total;
ssize_t
remaining;
if (count == 0)
return(0);
profile=(PhotoshopProfile *) user_data;
remaining=(MagickOffsetType) profile->length-profile->offset;
if (remaining <= 0)
return(-1);
total=MagickMin(count, (size_t) remaining);
(void) memcpy(data,profile->data->datum+profile->offset,total);
profile->offset+=total;
return(total);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible memory leak reported in #1206
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 77,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void add_index_objects_to_pending(struct rev_info *revs, unsigned flags)
{
int i;
read_cache();
for (i = 0; i < active_nr; i++) {
struct cache_entry *ce = active_cache[i];
struct blob *blob;
if (S_ISGITLINK(ce->ce_mode))
continue;
blob = lookup_blob(ce->sha1);
if (!blob)
die("unable to add index blob to traversal");
add_pending_object_with_path(revs, &blob->object, "",
ce->ce_mode, ce->name);
}
if (active_cache_tree) {
struct strbuf path = STRBUF_INIT;
add_cache_tree(active_cache_tree, revs, &path);
strbuf_release(&path);
}
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_stream_getc_func(jas_stream_t *stream)
{
assert(stream->ptr_ - stream->bufbase_ <= stream->bufsize_ +
JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK);
return jas_stream_getc_macro(stream);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: M_fs_error_t M_fs_path_get_cwd(char **cwd)
{
char *temp;
size_t path_max;
#ifdef _WIN32
DWORD dpath_max;
#endif
if (cwd == NULL)
return M_FS_ERROR_INVALID;
*cwd = NULL;
path_max = M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO)+1;
temp = M_malloc(path_max);
#ifdef _WIN32
if (!M_win32_size_t_to_dword(path_max, &dpath_max))
return M_FS_ERROR_INVALID;
if (GetCurrentDirectory(dpath_max, temp) == 0) {
M_free(temp);
return M_fs_error_from_syserr(GetLastError());
}
#else
if (getcwd(temp, path_max) == NULL) {
M_free(temp);
return M_fs_error_from_syserr(errno);
}
#endif
*cwd = M_strdup(temp);
M_free(temp);
return M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 79,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebView::componentComplete()
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
QQuickFlickable::componentComplete();
d->onComponentComplete();
d->updateViewportSize();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct object *get_reference(struct rev_info *revs, const char *name,
const unsigned char *sha1,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct object *object;
object = parse_object(sha1);
if (!object) {
if (revs->ignore_missing)
return object;
die("bad object %s", name);
}
object->flags |= flags;
return object;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 54,995
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FeatureInfo::EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear() {
if (!oes_texture_half_float_linear_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear");
feature_flags_.enable_texture_half_float_linear = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RGBA_F16);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 172,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UserSelectionScreen::ShowBannerMessage(const base::string16& message,
bool is_warning) {
view_->ShowBannerMessage(message, is_warning);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Release(FPDF_SYSFONTINFO* sysfontinfo) {
auto* fontinfo_with_metrics =
static_cast<FPDF_SYSFONTINFO_WITHMETRICS*>(sysfontinfo);
if (!fontinfo_with_metrics->default_sysfontinfo->Release)
return;
fontinfo_with_metrics->default_sysfontinfo->Release(
fontinfo_with_metrics->default_sysfontinfo);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 146,195
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: InputDispatcher::InjectionState::~InjectionState() {
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string SessionManager::url_base() const {
return url_base_;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int ndpoffset)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(skb_in->dev);
struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if ((ndpoffset + sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) > skb_in->len) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid NDP offset <%u>\n",
ndpoffset);
goto error;
}
ndp16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *)(skb_in->data + ndpoffset);
if (le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength) < USB_CDC_NCM_NDP16_LENGTH_MIN) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "invalid DPT16 length <%u>\n",
le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength));
goto error;
}
ret = ((le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wLength) -
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16)) /
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16));
ret--; /* we process NDP entries except for the last one */
if ((sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16) +
ret * (sizeof(struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16))) > skb_in->len) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net, "Invalid nframes = %d\n", ret);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_update_class_constants(zend_class_entry *class_type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if ((class_type->ce_flags & ZEND_ACC_CONSTANTS_UPDATED) == 0 || (!CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type) && class_type->default_static_members_count)) {
zend_class_entry **scope = EG(in_execution)?&EG(scope):&CG(active_class_entry);
zend_class_entry *old_scope = *scope;
int i;
*scope = class_type;
zend_hash_apply_with_argument(&class_type->constants_table, (apply_func_arg_t) zval_update_constant, (void *)1 TSRMLS_CC);
for (i = 0; i < class_type->default_properties_count; i++) {
if (class_type->default_properties_table[i]) {
zval_update_class_constant(&class_type->default_properties_table[i], 0, i TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
if (!CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type) && class_type->default_static_members_count) {
zval **p;
if (class_type->parent) {
zend_update_class_constants(class_type->parent TSRMLS_CC);
}
#if ZTS
CG(static_members_table)[(zend_intptr_t)(class_type->static_members_table)] = emalloc(sizeof(zval*) * class_type->default_static_members_count);
#else
class_type->static_members_table = emalloc(sizeof(zval*) * class_type->default_static_members_count);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < class_type->default_static_members_count; i++) {
p = &class_type->default_static_members_table[i];
if (Z_ISREF_PP(p) &&
class_type->parent &&
i < class_type->parent->default_static_members_count &&
*p == class_type->parent->default_static_members_table[i] &&
CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type->parent)[i]
) {
zval *q = CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type->parent)[i];
Z_ADDREF_P(q);
Z_SET_ISREF_P(q);
CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type)[i] = q;
} else {
zval *r;
ALLOC_ZVAL(r);
*r = **p;
INIT_PZVAL(r);
zval_copy_ctor(r);
CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type)[i] = r;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < class_type->default_static_members_count; i++) {
zval_update_class_constant(&CE_STATIC_MEMBERS(class_type)[i], 1, i TSRMLS_CC);
}
*scope = old_scope;
class_type->ce_flags |= ZEND_ACC_CONSTANTS_UPDATED;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,842
|
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