instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct dentry *dentry,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, fmode_t fmode, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs,
gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), gfp_mask);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid, gfp_mask);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
nfs_sb_active(dentry->d_sb);
p->dentry = dget(dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags;
p->o_arg.fmode = fmode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_seqid.owner_id;
p->o_arg.name = &dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.dir_bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (attrs != NULL && attrs->ia_valid != 0) {
__be32 verf[2];
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
verf[0] = jiffies;
verf[1] = current->pid;
memcpy(p->o_arg.u.verifier.data, verf,
sizeof(p->o_arg.u.verifier.data));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void invalidate_stack_devices(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osbot;
while (op != ostop) {
if (r_has_type(op, t_device))
op->value.pdevice = 0;
op++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_query_path(struct ucma_context *ctx,
void __user *response, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_query_path_resp *resp;
int i, ret = 0;
if (out_len < sizeof(*resp))
return -ENOSPC;
resp = kzalloc(out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!resp)
return -ENOMEM;
resp->num_paths = ctx->cm_id->route.num_paths;
for (i = 0, out_len -= sizeof(*resp);
i < resp->num_paths && out_len > sizeof(struct ib_path_rec_data);
i++, out_len -= sizeof(struct ib_path_rec_data)) {
struct sa_path_rec *rec = &ctx->cm_id->route.path_rec[i];
resp->path_data[i].flags = IB_PATH_GMP | IB_PATH_PRIMARY |
IB_PATH_BIDIRECTIONAL;
if (rec->rec_type == SA_PATH_REC_TYPE_OPA) {
struct sa_path_rec ib;
sa_convert_path_opa_to_ib(&ib, rec);
ib_sa_pack_path(&ib, &resp->path_data[i].path_rec);
} else {
ib_sa_pack_path(rec, &resp->path_data[i].path_rec);
}
}
if (copy_to_user(response, resp,
sizeof(*resp) + (i * sizeof(struct ib_path_rec_data))))
ret = -EFAULT;
kfree(resp);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 79,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void exit_handler(int signo)
{
(void)signo;
running = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SkBitmap TaskManagerTableModel::GetIcon(int row) {
return model_->GetResourceIcon(row);
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,547 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetCipherPtr(VALUE obj)
{
if (rb_obj_is_kind_of(obj, cCipher)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
GetCipher(obj, ctx);
return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
}
else {
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
StringValueCStr(obj);
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(RSTRING_PTR(obj));
if (!cipher)
ossl_raise(rb_eArgError,
"unsupported cipher algorithm: %"PRIsVALUE, obj);
return cipher;
}
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 73,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputMethodStatusConnection* ChromeOSMonitorInputMethodStatus(
void* language_library,
LanguageCurrentInputMethodMonitorFunction current_input_method_changed,
LanguageRegisterImePropertiesFunction register_ime_properties,
LanguageUpdateImePropertyFunction update_ime_property,
LanguageConnectionChangeMonitorFunction connection_changed) {
DLOG(INFO) << "MonitorInputMethodStatus";
return InputMethodStatusConnection::GetConnection(
language_library,
current_input_method_changed,
register_ime_properties,
update_ime_property,
connection_changed);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjContentDocument(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
return shouldAllowAccessToNode(exec, impl->contentDocument()) ? toJS(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), WTF::getPtr(impl->contentDocument())) : jsNull();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ProfileSyncService::OnEncryptedTypesChanged(
syncable::ModelTypeSet encrypted_types,
bool encrypt_everything) {
encrypted_types_ = encrypted_types;
encrypt_everything_ = encrypt_everything;
DVLOG(1) << "Encrypted types changed to "
<< syncable::ModelTypeSetToString(encrypted_types_)
<< " (encrypt everything is set to "
<< (encrypt_everything_ ? "true" : "false") << ")";
DCHECK(encrypted_types_.Has(syncable::PASSWORDS));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkManagerView::FileSelected(const FilePath& path,
int index,
void* params) {
int id = reinterpret_cast<int>(params);
if (id == IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_IMPORT_MENU) {
ImporterHost* host = new ImporterHost();
ProfileInfo profile_info;
profile_info.browser_type = BOOKMARKS_HTML;
profile_info.source_path = path.ToWStringHack();
StartImportingWithUI(GetWidget()->GetNativeView(), FAVORITES, host,
profile_info, profile_,
new ImportObserverImpl(profile()), false);
} else if (id == IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_EXPORT_MENU) {
if (g_browser_process->io_thread()) {
bookmark_html_writer::WriteBookmarks(
g_browser_process->io_thread()->message_loop(), GetBookmarkModel(),
path.ToWStringHack());
}
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: generic_file_buffered_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t pos, loff_t *ppos,
size_t count, ssize_t written)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
const struct address_space_operations *a_ops = mapping->a_ops;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
ssize_t status;
struct iov_iter i;
iov_iter_init(&i, iov, nr_segs, count, written);
if (a_ops->write_begin)
status = generic_perform_write(file, &i, pos);
else
status = generic_perform_write_2copy(file, &i, pos);
if (likely(status >= 0)) {
written += status;
*ppos = pos + status;
/*
* For now, when the user asks for O_SYNC, we'll actually give
* O_DSYNC
*/
if (unlikely((file->f_flags & O_SYNC) || IS_SYNC(inode))) {
if (!a_ops->writepage || !is_sync_kiocb(iocb))
status = generic_osync_inode(inode, mapping,
OSYNC_METADATA|OSYNC_DATA);
}
}
/*
* If we get here for O_DIRECT writes then we must have fallen through
* to buffered writes (block instantiation inside i_size). So we sync
* the file data here, to try to honour O_DIRECT expectations.
*/
if (unlikely(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && written)
status = filemap_write_and_wait(mapping);
return written ? written : status;
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_MSIRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
/* XXX: Undocumented behaviour */
if ( CUR.GS.gep0 == 0 ) /* if in twilight zone */
{
CUR.zp1.org_x[point] = CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0];
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] = CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0];
CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] = CUR.zp1.org_x[point];
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] = CUR.zp1.org_y[point];
}
distance = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, args[1] - distance );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 1) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool lockdep_rtnl_is_held(void)
{
return lockdep_is_held(&rtnl_mutex);
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: M_fs_system_t M_fs_path_get_system_type(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
if (sys_type == M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO) {
#ifdef _WIN32
return M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS;
#else
return M_FS_SYSTEM_UNIX;
#endif
}
return sys_type;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 79,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastCastView::UpdateLabel() {
if (cast_config_delegate_ == nullptr ||
cast_config_delegate_->HasCastExtension() == false)
return;
cast_config_delegate_->GetReceiversAndActivities(
base::Bind(&CastCastView::UpdateLabelCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType GetImageEntropy(const Image *image,
double *entropy,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=GetImageChannelEntropy(image,CompositeChannels,entropy,exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int proc_nr_files(ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
files_stat.nr_files = get_nr_files();
return proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_stream_puts(jas_stream_t *stream, const char *s)
{
while (*s != '\0') {
if (jas_stream_putc_macro(stream, *s) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
++s;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jffs2_acl_count(size_t size)
{
size_t s;
size -= sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_header);
s = size - 4 * sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
if (s < 0) {
if (size % sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short))
return -1;
return size / sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry_short);
} else {
if (s % sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry))
return -1;
return s / sizeof(struct jffs2_acl_entry) + 4;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetCompositionCharacterBounds(uint32 index,
gfx::Rect* rect) {
DCHECK(rect);
if (index >= composition_character_bounds_.size())
return false;
*rect = ConvertRectToScreen(composition_character_bounds_[index]);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ar6000_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ar6_softc *ar;
int status;
s32 timeleft;
s16 i;
int ret = 0;
if((ar = ar6k_priv(dev)) == NULL)
{
return -EIO;
}
if (wlaninitmode == WLAN_INIT_MODE_USR || wlaninitmode == WLAN_INIT_MODE_DRV) {
ar6000_update_bdaddr(ar);
if (enablerssicompensation) {
ar6000_copy_cust_data_from_target(ar->arHifDevice, ar->arTargetType);
read_rssi_compensation_param(ar);
for (i=-95; i<=0; i++) {
rssi_compensation_table[0-i] = rssi_compensation_calc(ar,i);
}
}
}
dev_hold(dev);
rtnl_unlock();
/* Do we need to finish the BMI phase */
if ((wlaninitmode == WLAN_INIT_MODE_USR || wlaninitmode == WLAN_INIT_MODE_DRV) &&
(BMIDone(ar->arHifDevice) != 0))
{
ret = -EIO;
goto ar6000_init_done;
}
if (!bypasswmi)
{
#if 0 /* TBDXXX */
if (ar->arVersion.host_ver != ar->arVersion.target_ver) {
A_PRINTF("WARNING: Host version 0x%x does not match Target "
" version 0x%x!\n",
ar->arVersion.host_ver, ar->arVersion.target_ver);
}
#endif
/* Indicate that WMI is enabled (although not ready yet) */
ar->arWmiEnabled = true;
if ((ar->arWmi = wmi_init((void *) ar)) == NULL)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("%s() Failed to initialize WMI.\n", __func__));
ret = -EIO;
goto ar6000_init_done;
}
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("%s() Got WMI @ 0x%lx.\n", __func__,
(unsigned long) ar->arWmi));
}
do {
struct htc_service_connect_req connect;
/* the reason we have to wait for the target here is that the driver layer
* has to init BMI in order to set the host block size,
*/
status = HTCWaitTarget(ar->arHtcTarget);
if (status) {
break;
}
A_MEMZERO(&connect,sizeof(connect));
/* meta data is unused for now */
connect.pMetaData = NULL;
connect.MetaDataLength = 0;
/* these fields are the same for all service endpoints */
connect.EpCallbacks.pContext = ar;
connect.EpCallbacks.EpTxCompleteMultiple = ar6000_tx_complete;
connect.EpCallbacks.EpRecv = ar6000_rx;
connect.EpCallbacks.EpRecvRefill = ar6000_rx_refill;
connect.EpCallbacks.EpSendFull = ar6000_tx_queue_full;
/* set the max queue depth so that our ar6000_tx_queue_full handler gets called.
* Linux has the peculiarity of not providing flow control between the
* NIC and the network stack. There is no API to indicate that a TX packet
* was sent which could provide some back pressure to the network stack.
* Under linux you would have to wait till the network stack consumed all sk_buffs
* before any back-flow kicked in. Which isn't very friendly.
* So we have to manage this ourselves */
connect.MaxSendQueueDepth = MAX_DEFAULT_SEND_QUEUE_DEPTH;
connect.EpCallbacks.RecvRefillWaterMark = AR6000_MAX_RX_BUFFERS / 4; /* set to 25 % */
if (0 == connect.EpCallbacks.RecvRefillWaterMark) {
connect.EpCallbacks.RecvRefillWaterMark++;
}
/* connect to control service */
connect.ServiceID = WMI_CONTROL_SVC;
status = ar6000_connectservice(ar,
&connect,
"WMI CONTROL");
if (status) {
break;
}
connect.LocalConnectionFlags |= HTC_LOCAL_CONN_FLAGS_ENABLE_SEND_BUNDLE_PADDING;
/* limit the HTC message size on the send path, although we can receive A-MSDU frames of
* 4K, we will only send ethernet-sized (802.3) frames on the send path. */
connect.MaxSendMsgSize = WMI_MAX_TX_DATA_FRAME_LENGTH;
/* to reduce the amount of committed memory for larger A_MSDU frames, use the recv-alloc threshold
* mechanism for larger packets */
connect.EpCallbacks.RecvAllocThreshold = AR6000_BUFFER_SIZE;
connect.EpCallbacks.EpRecvAllocThresh = ar6000_alloc_amsdu_rxbuf;
/* for the remaining data services set the connection flag to reduce dribbling,
* if configured to do so */
if (reduce_credit_dribble) {
connect.ConnectionFlags |= HTC_CONNECT_FLAGS_REDUCE_CREDIT_DRIBBLE;
/* the credit dribble trigger threshold is (reduce_credit_dribble - 1) for a value
* of 0-3 */
connect.ConnectionFlags &= ~HTC_CONNECT_FLAGS_THRESHOLD_LEVEL_MASK;
connect.ConnectionFlags |=
((u16)reduce_credit_dribble - 1) & HTC_CONNECT_FLAGS_THRESHOLD_LEVEL_MASK;
}
/* connect to best-effort service */
connect.ServiceID = WMI_DATA_BE_SVC;
status = ar6000_connectservice(ar,
&connect,
"WMI DATA BE");
if (status) {
break;
}
/* connect to back-ground
* map this to WMI LOW_PRI */
connect.ServiceID = WMI_DATA_BK_SVC;
status = ar6000_connectservice(ar,
&connect,
"WMI DATA BK");
if (status) {
break;
}
/* connect to Video service, map this to
* to HI PRI */
connect.ServiceID = WMI_DATA_VI_SVC;
status = ar6000_connectservice(ar,
&connect,
"WMI DATA VI");
if (status) {
break;
}
/* connect to VO service, this is currently not
* mapped to a WMI priority stream due to historical reasons.
* WMI originally defined 3 priorities over 3 mailboxes
* We can change this when WMI is reworked so that priorities are not
* dependent on mailboxes */
connect.ServiceID = WMI_DATA_VO_SVC;
status = ar6000_connectservice(ar,
&connect,
"WMI DATA VO");
if (status) {
break;
}
A_ASSERT(arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_BE) != 0);
A_ASSERT(arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_BK) != 0);
A_ASSERT(arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_VI) != 0);
A_ASSERT(arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_VO) != 0);
/* setup access class priority mappings */
ar->arAcStreamPriMap[WMM_AC_BK] = 0; /* lowest */
ar->arAcStreamPriMap[WMM_AC_BE] = 1; /* */
ar->arAcStreamPriMap[WMM_AC_VI] = 2; /* */
ar->arAcStreamPriMap[WMM_AC_VO] = 3; /* highest */
#ifdef EXPORT_HCI_BRIDGE_INTERFACE
if (setuphci && (NULL != ar6kHciTransCallbacks.setupTransport)) {
struct hci_transport_misc_handles hciHandles;
hciHandles.netDevice = ar->arNetDev;
hciHandles.hifDevice = ar->arHifDevice;
hciHandles.htcHandle = ar->arHtcTarget;
status = (int)(ar6kHciTransCallbacks.setupTransport(&hciHandles));
}
#else
if (setuphci) {
/* setup HCI */
status = ar6000_setup_hci(ar);
}
#endif
} while (false);
if (status) {
ret = -EIO;
goto ar6000_init_done;
}
if (regscanmode) {
u32 param;
if (BMIReadMemory(ar->arHifDevice,
HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar,
hi_option_flag),
(u8 *)¶m,
4) != 0) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,
("BMIReadMemory forsetting "
"regscanmode failed\n"));
return A_ERROR;
}
if (regscanmode == 1)
param |= HI_OPTION_SKIP_REG_SCAN;
else if (regscanmode == 2)
param |= HI_OPTION_INIT_REG_SCAN;
if (BMIWriteMemory(ar->arHifDevice,
HOST_INTEREST_ITEM_ADDRESS(ar,
hi_option_flag),
(u8 *)¶m,
4) != 0) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,
("BMIWriteMemory forsetting "
"regscanmode failed\n"));
return A_ERROR;
}
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO, ("Regulatory scan mode set\n"));
}
/*
* give our connected endpoints some buffers
*/
ar6000_rx_refill(ar, ar->arControlEp);
ar6000_rx_refill(ar, arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_BE));
/*
* We will post the receive buffers only for SPE or endpoint ping testing so we are
* making it conditional on the 'bypasswmi' flag.
*/
if (bypasswmi) {
ar6000_rx_refill(ar,arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_BK));
ar6000_rx_refill(ar,arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_VI));
ar6000_rx_refill(ar,arAc2EndpointID(ar,WMM_AC_VO));
}
/* allocate some buffers that handle larger AMSDU frames */
ar6000_refill_amsdu_rxbufs(ar,AR6000_MAX_AMSDU_RX_BUFFERS);
/* setup credit distribution */
ar6000_setup_credit_dist(ar->arHtcTarget, &ar->arCreditStateInfo);
/* Since cookies are used for HTC transports, they should be */
/* initialized prior to enabling HTC. */
ar6000_cookie_init(ar);
/* start HTC */
status = HTCStart(ar->arHtcTarget);
if (status) {
if (ar->arWmiEnabled == true) {
wmi_shutdown(ar->arWmi);
ar->arWmiEnabled = false;
ar->arWmi = NULL;
}
ar6000_cookie_cleanup(ar);
ret = -EIO;
goto ar6000_init_done;
}
if (!bypasswmi) {
/* Wait for Wmi event to be ready */
timeleft = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(arEvent,
(ar->arWmiReady == true), wmitimeout * HZ);
if (ar->arVersion.abi_ver != AR6K_ABI_VERSION) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("ABI Version mismatch: Host(0x%x), Target(0x%x)\n", AR6K_ABI_VERSION, ar->arVersion.abi_ver));
#ifndef ATH6K_SKIP_ABI_VERSION_CHECK
ret = -EIO;
goto ar6000_init_done;
#endif /* ATH6K_SKIP_ABI_VERSION_CHECK */
}
if(!timeleft || signal_pending(current))
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("WMI is not ready or wait was interrupted\n"));
ret = -EIO;
goto ar6000_init_done;
}
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("%s() WMI is ready\n", __func__));
/* Communicate the wmi protocol verision to the target */
if ((ar6000_set_host_app_area(ar)) != 0) {
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("Unable to set the host app area\n"));
}
ar6000_target_config_wlan_params(ar);
}
ar->arNumDataEndPts = 1;
if (bypasswmi) {
/* for tests like endpoint ping, the MAC address needs to be non-zero otherwise
* the data path through a raw socket is disabled */
dev->dev_addr[0] = 0x00;
dev->dev_addr[1] = 0x01;
dev->dev_addr[2] = 0x02;
dev->dev_addr[3] = 0xAA;
dev->dev_addr[4] = 0xBB;
dev->dev_addr[5] = 0xCC;
}
ar6000_init_done:
rtnl_lock();
dev_put(dev);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
int err = 0;
long current_timeo = *timeo_p;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld\n", __func__, asoc, *timeo_p);
/* Increment the association's refcnt. */
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
for (;;) {
prepare_to_wait_exclusive(&asoc->wait, &wait,
TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (!*timeo_p)
goto do_nonblock;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
break;
if (sk->sk_err || asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING ||
asoc->base.dead)
goto do_error;
if (signal_pending(current))
goto do_interrupted;
if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED))
break;
/* Let another process have a go. Since we are going
* to sleep anyway.
*/
release_sock(sk);
current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
*timeo_p = current_timeo;
}
out:
finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait);
/* Release the association's refcnt. */
sctp_association_put(asoc);
return err;
do_error:
if (asoc->init_err_counter + 1 > asoc->max_init_attempts)
err = -ETIMEDOUT;
else
err = -ECONNREFUSED;
goto out;
do_interrupted:
err = sock_intr_errno(*timeo_p);
goto out;
do_nonblock:
err = -EINPROGRESS;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lockd_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atalk_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
int rc = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
/*
* We permit SOCK_DGRAM and RAW is an extension. It is trivial to do
* and gives you the full ELAP frame. Should be handy for CAP 8)
*/
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_APPLETALK, GFP_KERNEL, &ddp_proto);
if (!sk)
goto out;
rc = 0;
sock->ops = &atalk_dgram_ops;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
/* Checksums on by default */
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __nd_alloc_stack(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct saved *p;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
p= kmalloc(MAXSYMLINKS * sizeof(struct saved),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!p))
return -ECHILD;
} else {
p= kmalloc(MAXSYMLINKS * sizeof(struct saved),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!p))
return -ENOMEM;
}
memcpy(p, nd->internal, sizeof(nd->internal));
nd->stack = p;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 51,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::GetAutoOpened() {
return auto_opened_;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline signed short ReadPropertySignedShort(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned short
unsigned_value;
signed short
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 50,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ip6t_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
unsigned int *size, struct xt_counters *counters,
unsigned int i)
{
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct compat_ip6t_entry __user *ce;
u_int16_t target_offset, next_offset;
compat_uint_t origsize;
const struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
int ret = 0;
origsize = *size;
ce = *dstptr;
if (copy_to_user(ce, e, sizeof(struct ip6t_entry)) != 0 ||
copy_to_user(&ce->counters, &counters[i],
sizeof(counters[i])) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
*dstptr += sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
*size -= sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = xt_compat_match_to_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
}
target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
t = ip6t_get_target(e);
ret = xt_compat_target_to_user(t, dstptr, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
next_offset = e->next_offset - (origsize - *size);
if (put_user(target_offset, &ce->target_offset) != 0 ||
put_user(next_offset, &ce->next_offset) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::isTextControl() const {
if (hasContentEditableAttributeSet())
return true;
switch (roleValue()) {
case TextFieldRole:
case ComboBoxRole:
case SearchBoxRole:
case SpinButtonRole:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerHandler::Wire(UberDispatcher* dispatcher) {
frontend_.reset(new ServiceWorker::Frontend(dispatcher->channel()));
ServiceWorker::Dispatcher::wire(dispatcher, this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cancel_budget(struct ubifs_info *c, struct page *page,
struct ubifs_inode *ui, int appending)
{
if (appending) {
if (!ui->dirty)
ubifs_release_dirty_inode_budget(c, ui);
mutex_unlock(&ui->ui_mutex);
}
if (!PagePrivate(page)) {
if (PageChecked(page))
release_new_page_budget(c);
else
release_existing_page_budget(c);
}
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_disconnect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_disconnect cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_disconnect(ctx->cm_id);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 79,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void free_vm86_irq(int irqnumber)
{
unsigned long flags;
free_irq(irqnumber, NULL);
vm86_irqs[irqnumber].tsk = NULL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&irqbits_lock, flags);
irqbits &= ~(1 << irqnumber);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&irqbits_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_get_supported_key_sizes)
{
int i, count = 0;
int *key_sizes;
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
array_init(return_value);
key_sizes = mcrypt_module_get_algo_supported_key_sizes(module, dir, &count);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
add_index_long(return_value, i, key_sizes[i]);
}
mcrypt_free(key_sizes);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlnamePop(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *ret;
if (ctxt->nameNr <= 0)
return (NULL);
ctxt->nameNr--;
if (ctxt->nameNr < 0)
return (NULL);
if (ctxt->nameNr > 0)
ctxt->name = ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr - 1];
else
ctxt->name = NULL;
ret = ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr];
ctxt->nameTab[ctxt->nameNr] = NULL;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *proxytype(proxytypes_t proxytype)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; proxynames[i].name; i++)
if (proxynames[i].proxytype == proxytype)
return proxynames[i].name;
return "invalid";
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowSaveLocalState(
const content::ResourceContext& context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data =
reinterpret_cast<ProfileIOData*>(context.GetUserData(NULL));
return !io_data->clear_local_state_on_exit()->GetValue();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handleFatalErrorInV8()
{
CRASH();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::disable(GLenum cap) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateCapability("disable", cap))
return;
if (cap == GL_STENCIL_TEST) {
stencil_enabled_ = false;
ApplyStencilTest();
return;
}
if (cap == GL_SCISSOR_TEST)
scissor_enabled_ = false;
ContextGL()->Disable(cap);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebPlugin* RenderView::CreatePluginNoCheck(WebFrame* frame,
const WebPluginParams& params) {
webkit::npapi::WebPluginInfo info;
bool found;
std::string mime_type;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo(
routing_id_, params.url, frame->top()->document().url(),
params.mimeType.utf8(), &found, &info, &mime_type));
if (!found || !webkit::npapi::IsPluginEnabled(info))
return NULL;
bool pepper_plugin_was_registered = false;
scoped_refptr<webkit::ppapi::PluginModule> pepper_module(
pepper_delegate_.CreatePepperPlugin(info.path,
&pepper_plugin_was_registered));
if (pepper_plugin_was_registered) {
if (pepper_module)
return CreatePepperPlugin(frame, params, info.path, pepper_module.get());
return NULL;
}
return CreateNPAPIPlugin(frame, params, info.path, mime_type);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isLegacyTargetOriginDesignation(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value)
{
if (value->IsString() || value->IsStringObject())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CloseWindow() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("CloseWindow"), profile_);
window_->Close();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kgdb_arch_set_pc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long ip)
{
regs->ip = ip;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::StoreFocus() {
view_->StoreFocus();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
cxt = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cxt)
return -ENOMEM;
cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: devzvol_validate(struct sdev_node *dv)
{
dmu_objset_type_t do_type;
char *dsname;
char *nm = dv->sdev_name;
int rc;
sdcmn_err13(("validating ('%s' '%s')", dv->sdev_path, nm));
/*
* validate only READY nodes; if someone is sitting on the
* directory of a dataset that just got destroyed we could
* get a zombie node which we just skip.
*/
if (dv->sdev_state != SDEV_READY) {
sdcmn_err13(("skipping '%s'", nm));
return (SDEV_VTOR_SKIP);
}
if ((strcmp(dv->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR "/dsk") == 0) ||
(strcmp(dv->sdev_path, ZVOL_DIR "/rdsk") == 0))
return (SDEV_VTOR_VALID);
dsname = devzvol_make_dsname(dv->sdev_path, NULL);
if (dsname == NULL)
return (SDEV_VTOR_INVALID);
rc = devzvol_objset_check(dsname, &do_type);
sdcmn_err13((" '%s' rc %d", dsname, rc));
if (rc != 0) {
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_INVALID);
}
sdcmn_err13((" v_type %d do_type %d",
SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type, do_type));
if ((SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VLNK && do_type != DMU_OST_ZVOL) ||
((SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VBLK || SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VCHR) &&
do_type != DMU_OST_ZVOL) ||
(SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VDIR && do_type == DMU_OST_ZVOL)) {
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_STALE);
}
if (SDEVTOV(dv)->v_type == VLNK) {
char *ptr, *link;
long val = 0;
minor_t lminor, ominor;
rc = sdev_getlink(SDEVTOV(dv), &link);
ASSERT(rc == 0);
ptr = strrchr(link, ':') + 1;
rc = ddi_strtol(ptr, NULL, 10, &val);
kmem_free(link, strlen(link) + 1);
ASSERT(rc == 0 && val != 0);
lminor = (minor_t)val;
if (sdev_zvol_name2minor(dsname, &ominor) < 0 ||
ominor != lminor) {
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_STALE);
}
}
kmem_free(dsname, strlen(dsname) + 1);
return (SDEV_VTOR_VALID);
}
Commit Message: 5421 devzvol_readdir() needs to be more careful with strchr
Reviewed by: Keith Wesolowski <keith.wesolowski@joyent.com>
Reviewed by: Jerry Jelinek <jerry.jelinek@joyent.com>
Approved by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 46,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::RemovePendingRequest(int child_id,
int request_id) {
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(
GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id));
if (i == pending_requests_.end()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Trying to remove a request that's not here";
return;
}
RemovePendingRequest(i);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DWORD OmniboxViewWin::EditDropTarget::OnDrop(IDataObject* data_object,
DWORD key_state,
POINT cursor_position,
DWORD effect) {
effect = OnDragOver(data_object, key_state, cursor_position, effect);
ui::OSExchangeData os_data(new ui::OSExchangeDataProviderWin(data_object));
views::DropTargetEvent event(os_data, cursor_position.x, cursor_position.y,
ui::DragDropTypes::DropEffectToDragOperation(effect));
int drag_operation = edit_->OnPerformDropImpl(event, edit_->in_drag());
if (!drag_has_url_)
ResetDropHighlights();
return ui::DragDropTypes::DragOperationToDropEffect(drag_operation);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ttusbdecfe_dvbt_set_frontend(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct dtv_frontend_properties *p = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
struct ttusbdecfe_state* state = (struct ttusbdecfe_state*) fe->demodulator_priv;
u8 b[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff };
__be32 freq = htonl(p->frequency / 1000);
memcpy(&b[4], &freq, sizeof (u32));
state->config->send_command(fe, 0x71, sizeof(b), b, NULL, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] ttusb-dec: buffer overflow in ioctl
We need to add a limit check here so we don't overflow the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 35,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool EventTimeCueCompare(const std::pair<double, TextTrackCue*>& a,
const std::pair<double, TextTrackCue*>& b) {
if (a.first != b.first)
return a.first - b.first < 0;
if (a.second->track() != b.second->track())
return TrackIndexCompare(a.second->track(), b.second->track());
return a.second->CueIndex() < b.second->CueIndex();
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lo_req_flush(struct loop_device *lo, struct request *rq)
{
struct file *file = lo->lo_backing_file;
int ret = vfs_fsync(file, 0);
if (unlikely(ret && ret != -EINVAL))
ret = -EIO;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 84,702 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::didFirstLayout()
{
if (m_frame->page() && isBackForwardLoadType(m_loadType))
history()->restoreScrollPositionAndViewState();
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteTGAImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
count,
y;
TGAInfo
tga_info;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
/*
Initialize TGA raster file header.
*/
if ((image->columns > 65535L) || (image->rows > 65535L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
tga_info.id_length=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment");
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
tga_info.id_length=(unsigned char) MagickMin(strlen(value),255);
tga_info.colormap_type=0;
tga_info.colormap_index=0;
tga_info.colormap_length=0;
tga_info.colormap_size=0;
tga_info.x_origin=0;
tga_info.y_origin=0;
tga_info.width=(unsigned short) image->columns;
tga_info.height=(unsigned short) image->rows;
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
tga_info.attributes=0;
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(image_info->type != TrueColorMatteType) &&
(image_info->type != PaletteType) &&
(image->matte == MagickFalse) &&
(IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
tga_info.image_type=compression == RLECompression ? TGARLEMonochrome :
TGAMonochrome;
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
/*
Full color TGA raster.
*/
tga_info.image_type=compression == RLECompression ? TGARLERGB :
TGARGB;
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=24;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
tga_info.bits_per_pixel=32;
tga_info.attributes=8; /* # of alpha bits */
}
}
else
{
/*
Colormapped TGA raster.
*/
tga_info.image_type=compression == RLECompression ? TGARLEColormap
: TGAColormap;
tga_info.colormap_type=1;
tga_info.colormap_length=(unsigned short) image->colors;
tga_info.colormap_size=24;
}
/*
Write TGA header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.id_length);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.colormap_type);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) tga_info.image_type);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.colormap_index);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.colormap_length);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.colormap_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.x_origin);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.y_origin);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,tga_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,tga_info.attributes);
if (tga_info.id_length != 0)
(void) WriteBlob(image,tga_info.id_length,(unsigned char *) value);
if (tga_info.colormap_type != 0)
{
unsigned char
*targa_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file (blue, green, red byte order).
*/
targa_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
tga_info.colormap_length,3UL*sizeof(*targa_colormap));
if (targa_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
q=targa_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (3*tga_info.colormap_length),
targa_colormap);
targa_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(targa_colormap);
}
/*
Convert MIFF to TGA raster pixels.
*/
for (y=(ssize_t) (image->rows-1); y >= 0; y--)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
if (compression == RLECompression)
{
x=0;
count=0;
while (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
{
i=1;
while ((i < 128) && (count + i < 128) &&
((x + i) < (ssize_t) image->columns))
{
if (tga_info.image_type == TGARLEColormap)
{
if (GetPixelIndex(indexes+i) != GetPixelIndex(indexes+(i-1)))
break;
}
else if (tga_info.image_type == TGARLEMonochrome)
{
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p+i) != GetPixelLuma(image,p+(i-1)))
break;
}
else
{
if ((GetPixelBlue(p+i) != GetPixelBlue(p+(i-1))) ||
(GetPixelGreen(p+i) != GetPixelGreen(p+(i-1))) ||
(GetPixelRed(p+i) != GetPixelRed(p+(i-1))))
break;
if ((image->matte != MagickFalse) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(p+i) != GetPixelAlpha(p+(i-1))))
break;
}
i++;
}
if (i < 3)
{
count+=i;
p+=i;
indexes+=i;
}
if ((i >= 3) || (count == 128) ||
((x + i) == (ssize_t) image->columns))
{
if (count > 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) (--count));
while (count >= 0)
{
WriteTGAPixel(image,tga_info.image_type,
indexes-(count+1),p-(count+1));
count--;
}
count=0;
}
}
if (i >= 3)
{
WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) ((i-1) | 0x80));
WriteTGAPixel(image,tga_info.image_type,indexes,p);
p+=i;
indexes+=i;
}
x+=i;
}
}
else
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
WriteTGAPixel(image,tga_info.image_type,indexes+x,p++);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_parse_finished( ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
unsigned int hash_len;
unsigned char buf[36];
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse finished" ) );
ssl->handshake->calc_finished( ssl, buf, ssl->endpoint ^ 1 );
/*
* Switch to our negotiated transform and session parameters for inbound data.
*/
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "switching to new transform spec for inbound data" ) );
ssl->transform_in = ssl->transform_negotiate;
ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
memset( ssl->in_ctr, 0, 8 );
if( ( ret = ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
hash_len = ( ssl->minor_ver == SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) ? 36 : 12;
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != SSL_HS_FINISHED ||
ssl->in_hslen != 4 + hash_len )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED );
}
if( memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 4, buf, hash_len ) != 0 )
{
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad finished message" ) );
return( POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_FINISHED );
}
ssl->verify_data_len = hash_len;
memcpy( ssl->peer_verify_data, buf, hash_len );
if( ssl->handshake->resume != 0 )
{
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_CLIENT )
ssl->state = SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
if( ssl->endpoint == SSL_IS_SERVER )
ssl->state = SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
}
else
ssl->state++;
SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse finished" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int instance_mkdir(const char *name)
{
struct trace_array *tr;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&event_mutex);
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
ret = -EEXIST;
list_for_each_entry(tr, &ftrace_trace_arrays, list) {
if (tr->name && strcmp(tr->name, name) == 0)
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = -ENOMEM;
tr = kzalloc(sizeof(*tr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tr)
goto out_unlock;
tr->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tr->name)
goto out_free_tr;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&tr->tracing_cpumask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_free_tr;
tr->trace_flags = global_trace.trace_flags & ~ZEROED_TRACE_FLAGS;
cpumask_copy(tr->tracing_cpumask, cpu_all_mask);
raw_spin_lock_init(&tr->start_lock);
tr->max_lock = (arch_spinlock_t)__ARCH_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
tr->current_trace = &nop_trace;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tr->systems);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tr->events);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tr->hist_vars);
if (allocate_trace_buffers(tr, trace_buf_size) < 0)
goto out_free_tr;
tr->dir = tracefs_create_dir(name, trace_instance_dir);
if (!tr->dir)
goto out_free_tr;
ret = event_trace_add_tracer(tr->dir, tr);
if (ret) {
tracefs_remove_recursive(tr->dir);
goto out_free_tr;
}
ftrace_init_trace_array(tr);
init_tracer_tracefs(tr, tr->dir);
init_trace_flags_index(tr);
__update_tracer_options(tr);
list_add(&tr->list, &ftrace_trace_arrays);
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return 0;
out_free_tr:
free_trace_buffers(tr);
free_cpumask_var(tr->tracing_cpumask);
kfree(tr->name);
kfree(tr);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
mutex_unlock(&event_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CreateTemporaryFile(FilePath* path) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed(); // For call to close().
FilePath directory;
if (!GetTempDir(&directory))
return false;
int fd = CreateAndOpenFdForTemporaryFile(directory, path);
if (fd < 0)
return false;
ignore_result(HANDLE_EINTR(close(fd)));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ring_buffer_iter_empty(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
cpu_buffer = iter->cpu_buffer;
return iter->head_page == cpu_buffer->commit_page &&
iter->head == rb_commit_index(cpu_buffer);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ipgre_init(void)
{
int err;
printk(KERN_INFO "GRE over IPv4 tunneling driver\n");
if (inet_add_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE) < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ipgre init: can't add protocol\n");
return -EAGAIN;
}
err = register_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto gen_device_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_link_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto rtnl_link_failed;
err = rtnl_link_register(&ipgre_tap_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto tap_ops_failed;
out:
return err;
tap_ops_failed:
rtnl_link_unregister(&ipgre_link_ops);
rtnl_link_failed:
unregister_pernet_device(&ipgre_net_ops);
gen_device_failed:
inet_del_protocol(&ipgre_protocol, IPPROTO_GRE);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void addReplySds(client *c, sds s) {
if (prepareClientToWrite(c) != C_OK) {
/* The caller expects the sds to be free'd. */
sdsfree(s);
return;
}
if (_addReplyToBuffer(c,s,sdslen(s)) == C_OK) {
sdsfree(s);
} else {
/* This method free's the sds when it is no longer needed. */
_addReplySdsToList(c,s);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void numtostr(js_State *J, const char *fmt, int w, double n)
{
char buf[32], *e;
sprintf(buf, fmt, w, n);
e = strchr(buf, 'e');
if (e) {
int exp = atoi(e+1);
sprintf(e, "e%+d", exp);
}
js_pushstring(J, buf);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void longLongAttrAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "longLongAttr", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(long long, cppValue, toInt64(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setLongLongAttr(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int trunc_dealloc(struct gfs2_inode *ip, u64 size)
{
struct gfs2_sbd *sdp = GFS2_SB(&ip->i_inode);
unsigned int height = ip->i_height;
u64 lblock;
struct metapath mp;
int error;
if (!size)
lblock = 0;
else
lblock = (size - 1) >> sdp->sd_sb.sb_bsize_shift;
find_metapath(sdp, lblock, &mp, ip->i_height);
if (!gfs2_alloc_get(ip))
return -ENOMEM;
error = gfs2_quota_hold(ip, NO_QUOTA_CHANGE, NO_QUOTA_CHANGE);
if (error)
goto out;
while (height--) {
struct strip_mine sm;
sm.sm_first = !!size;
sm.sm_height = height;
error = recursive_scan(ip, NULL, &mp, 0, 0, 1, &sm);
if (error)
break;
}
gfs2_quota_unhold(ip);
out:
gfs2_alloc_put(ip);
return error;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetBooleanv(GLenum pname,
GLboolean* params,
GLsizei params_size) {
DCHECK(params);
std::unique_ptr<GLint[]> values(new GLint[params_size]);
memset(values.get(), 0, params_size * sizeof(GLint));
DoGetIntegerv(pname, values.get(), params_size);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < params_size; ++ii) {
params[ii] = static_cast<GLboolean>(values[ii]);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShellContentClient::GetSandboxProfileForSandboxType(
int sandbox_type,
int* sandbox_profile_resource_id) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_add_pixels_clamped_c(const int16_t *block, uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
ptrdiff_t line_size)
{
int i;
/* read the pixels */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
pixels[0] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[0] + block[0]);
pixels[1] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[1] + block[1]);
pixels[2] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[2] + block[2]);
pixels[3] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[3] + block[3]);
pixels[4] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[4] + block[4]);
pixels[5] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[5] + block[5]);
pixels[6] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[6] + block[6]);
pixels[7] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[7] + block[7]);
pixels += line_size;
block += 8;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 81,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: quit_cmd(thread_t * thread)
{
smtp_t *smtp = THREAD_ARG(thread);
if (send(thread->u.fd, SMTP_QUIT_CMD, strlen(SMTP_QUIT_CMD), 0) == -1)
smtp->stage = ERROR;
else
smtp->stage++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long elf_map(struct file *filep, unsigned long addr,
struct elf_phdr *eppnt, int prot, int type,
unsigned long total_size)
{
unsigned long map_addr;
unsigned long size = eppnt->p_filesz + ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr);
unsigned long off = eppnt->p_offset - ELF_PAGEOFFSET(eppnt->p_vaddr);
addr = ELF_PAGESTART(addr);
size = ELF_PAGEALIGN(size);
/* mmap() will return -EINVAL if given a zero size, but a
* segment with zero filesize is perfectly valid */
if (!size)
return addr;
/*
* total_size is the size of the ELF (interpreter) image.
* The _first_ mmap needs to know the full size, otherwise
* randomization might put this image into an overlapping
* position with the ELF binary image. (since size < total_size)
* So we first map the 'big' image - and unmap the remainder at
* the end. (which unmap is needed for ELF images with holes.)
*/
if (total_size) {
total_size = ELF_PAGEALIGN(total_size);
map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, total_size, prot, type, off);
if (!BAD_ADDR(map_addr))
vm_munmap(map_addr+size, total_size-size);
} else
map_addr = vm_mmap(filep, addr, size, prot, type, off);
return(map_addr);
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DateTimeFieldElement::didFocus()
{
if (m_fieldOwner)
m_fieldOwner->didFocusOnField();
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *ext4_kvzalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
void *ret;
ret = kzalloc(size, flags);
if (!ret)
ret = __vmalloc(size, flags | __GFP_ZERO, PAGE_KERNEL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UnregisterNodeListWithIdNameCache(const LiveNodeListBase* list) {
DCHECK(node_lists_[kInvalidateOnIdNameAttrChange].Contains(list));
node_lists_[kInvalidateOnIdNameAttrChange].erase(list);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThread::AddRoute(int32 routing_id,
IPC::Channel::Listener* listener) {
widget_count_++;
return ChildThread::AddRoute(routing_id, listener);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<uint8_t> NtlmClient::GetNegotiateMessage() const {
return negotiate_message_;
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 132,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PresentationConnection::send(DOMArrayBufferView* arrayBufferView,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
ASSERT(arrayBufferView);
if (!canSendMessage(exceptionState))
return;
m_messages.append(new Message(arrayBufferView->buffer()));
handleMessageQueue();
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpact_outputs_to_port(const struct ofpact *ofpact, ofp_port_t port)
{
switch (ofpact->type) {
case OFPACT_OUTPUT:
return ofpact_get_OUTPUT(ofpact)->port == port;
case OFPACT_ENQUEUE:
return ofpact_get_ENQUEUE(ofpact)->port == port;
case OFPACT_CONTROLLER:
return port == OFPP_CONTROLLER;
case OFPACT_OUTPUT_REG:
case OFPACT_OUTPUT_TRUNC:
case OFPACT_BUNDLE:
case OFPACT_SET_VLAN_VID:
case OFPACT_SET_VLAN_PCP:
case OFPACT_STRIP_VLAN:
case OFPACT_PUSH_VLAN:
case OFPACT_SET_ETH_SRC:
case OFPACT_SET_ETH_DST:
case OFPACT_SET_IPV4_SRC:
case OFPACT_SET_IPV4_DST:
case OFPACT_SET_IP_DSCP:
case OFPACT_SET_IP_ECN:
case OFPACT_SET_IP_TTL:
case OFPACT_SET_L4_SRC_PORT:
case OFPACT_SET_L4_DST_PORT:
case OFPACT_REG_MOVE:
case OFPACT_SET_FIELD:
case OFPACT_STACK_PUSH:
case OFPACT_STACK_POP:
case OFPACT_DEC_TTL:
case OFPACT_SET_MPLS_LABEL:
case OFPACT_SET_MPLS_TC:
case OFPACT_SET_MPLS_TTL:
case OFPACT_DEC_MPLS_TTL:
case OFPACT_SET_TUNNEL:
case OFPACT_WRITE_METADATA:
case OFPACT_SET_QUEUE:
case OFPACT_POP_QUEUE:
case OFPACT_FIN_TIMEOUT:
case OFPACT_RESUBMIT:
case OFPACT_LEARN:
case OFPACT_CONJUNCTION:
case OFPACT_MULTIPATH:
case OFPACT_NOTE:
case OFPACT_EXIT:
case OFPACT_UNROLL_XLATE:
case OFPACT_PUSH_MPLS:
case OFPACT_POP_MPLS:
case OFPACT_SAMPLE:
case OFPACT_CLEAR_ACTIONS:
case OFPACT_CLONE:
case OFPACT_WRITE_ACTIONS:
case OFPACT_GOTO_TABLE:
case OFPACT_METER:
case OFPACT_GROUP:
case OFPACT_DEBUG_RECIRC:
case OFPACT_CT:
case OFPACT_CT_CLEAR:
case OFPACT_NAT:
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <infile> <outfile>\n", exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::LoadURL(
const GURL& url,
const Referrer& referrer,
PageTransition transition,
const std::string& extra_headers) {
LoadURLParams params(url);
params.referrer = referrer;
params.transition_type = transition;
params.extra_headers = extra_headers;
LoadURLWithParams(params);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Tracks::Tracks(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_trackEntries(NULL),
m_trackEntriesEnd(NULL)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_interface(const char *name, interface_info *info)
{
strcpy(info->name, name);
info->id = if_nametoindex(name);
return WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
{
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&child->ptrace_entry));
list_add(&child->ptrace_entry, &new_parent->ptraced);
child->parent = new_parent;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_handle_auth_sasl_steplen(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
AsyncRead *obj = &link->async_read;
RedsSASL *sasl = &link->stream->sasl;
spice_info("Got steplen %d", sasl->len);
if (sasl->len > SASL_DATA_MAX_LEN) {
spice_warning("Too much SASL data %d", sasl->len);
reds_link_free(link);
return;
}
if (sasl->len == 0) {
return reds_handle_auth_sasl_step(opaque);
} else {
sasl->data = spice_realloc(sasl->data, sasl->len);
obj->now = (uint8_t *)sasl->data;
obj->end = obj->now + sasl->len;
obj->done = reds_handle_auth_sasl_step;
async_read_handler(0, 0, &link->async_read);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: link_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
CopyMoveJob *job;
job = user_data;
if (job->done_callback)
{
job->done_callback (job->debuting_files,
!job_aborted ((CommonJob *) job),
job->done_callback_data);
}
g_list_free_full (job->files, g_object_unref);
g_object_unref (job->destination);
g_hash_table_unref (job->debuting_files);
g_free (job->icon_positions);
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) job);
nautilus_file_changes_consume_changes (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: des_setkey(const char *key, struct php_crypt_extended_data *data)
{
uint32_t k0, k1, rawkey0, rawkey1;
int shifts, round;
rawkey0 =
(uint32_t)(u_char)key[3] |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[2] << 8) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[1] << 16) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[0] << 24);
rawkey1 =
(uint32_t)(u_char)key[7] |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[6] << 8) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[5] << 16) |
((uint32_t)(u_char)key[4] << 24);
if ((rawkey0 | rawkey1)
&& rawkey0 == data->old_rawkey0
&& rawkey1 == data->old_rawkey1) {
/*
* Already setup for this key.
* This optimisation fails on a zero key (which is weak and
* has bad parity anyway) in order to simplify the starting
* conditions.
*/
return(0);
}
data->old_rawkey0 = rawkey0;
data->old_rawkey1 = rawkey1;
/*
* Do key permutation and split into two 28-bit subkeys.
*/
k0 = key_perm_maskl[0][rawkey0 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskl[1][(rawkey0 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[2][(rawkey0 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[3][(rawkey0 >> 1) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[4][rawkey1 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskl[5][(rawkey1 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[6][(rawkey1 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskl[7][(rawkey1 >> 1) & 0x7f];
k1 = key_perm_maskr[0][rawkey0 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskr[1][(rawkey0 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[2][(rawkey0 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[3][(rawkey0 >> 1) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[4][rawkey1 >> 25]
| key_perm_maskr[5][(rawkey1 >> 17) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[6][(rawkey1 >> 9) & 0x7f]
| key_perm_maskr[7][(rawkey1 >> 1) & 0x7f];
/*
* Rotate subkeys and do compression permutation.
*/
shifts = 0;
for (round = 0; round < 16; round++) {
uint32_t t0, t1;
shifts += key_shifts[round];
t0 = (k0 << shifts) | (k0 >> (28 - shifts));
t1 = (k1 << shifts) | (k1 >> (28 - shifts));
data->de_keysl[15 - round] =
data->en_keysl[round] = comp_maskl[0][(t0 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[1][(t0 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[2][(t0 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[3][t0 & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[4][(t1 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[5][(t1 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[6][(t1 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskl[7][t1 & 0x7f];
data->de_keysr[15 - round] =
data->en_keysr[round] = comp_maskr[0][(t0 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[1][(t0 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[2][(t0 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[3][t0 & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[4][(t1 >> 21) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[5][(t1 >> 14) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[6][(t1 >> 7) & 0x7f]
| comp_maskr[7][t1 & 0x7f];
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 10,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cirrus_linear_bitblt_write(void *opaque,
hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val,
unsigned size)
{
CirrusVGAState *s = opaque;
if (s->cirrus_srcptr != s->cirrus_srcptr_end) {
/* bitblt */
*s->cirrus_srcptr++ = (uint8_t) val;
if (s->cirrus_srcptr >= s->cirrus_srcptr_end) {
cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo_next(s);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int symlink_idempotent(const char *from, const char *to) {
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
int r;
assert(from);
assert(to);
if (symlink(from, to) < 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST)
return -errno;
r = readlink_malloc(to, &p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!streq(p, from))
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 96,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gc_generational_mode_set(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_bool enable;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "b", &enable);
if (mrb->gc.generational != enable)
change_gen_gc_mode(mrb, &mrb->gc, enable);
return mrb_bool_value(enable);
}
Commit Message: Clear unused stack region that may refer freed objects; fix #3596
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_rdfxml_parse_init(raptor_parser* rdf_parser, const char *name)
{
raptor_rdfxml_parser* rdf_xml_parser = (raptor_rdfxml_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
raptor_sax2* sax2;
raptor_world* world = rdf_parser->world;
/* Allocate sax2 object */
sax2 = raptor_new_sax2(rdf_parser->world, &rdf_parser->locator, rdf_parser);
rdf_xml_parser->sax2 = sax2;
if(!sax2)
return 1;
/* Initialize sax2 element handlers */
raptor_sax2_set_start_element_handler(sax2, raptor_rdfxml_start_element_handler);
raptor_sax2_set_end_element_handler(sax2, raptor_rdfxml_end_element_handler);
raptor_sax2_set_characters_handler(sax2, raptor_rdfxml_characters_handler);
raptor_sax2_set_cdata_handler(sax2, raptor_rdfxml_cdata_handler);
raptor_sax2_set_comment_handler(sax2, raptor_rdfxml_comment_handler);
raptor_sax2_set_namespace_handler(sax2, raptor_rdfxml_sax2_new_namespace_handler);
/* Allocate uris */
RAPTOR_DAML_NS_URI(rdf_xml_parser) = raptor_new_uri_from_counted_string(world,
daml_namespace_uri_string,
daml_namespace_uri_string_len);
RAPTOR_DAML_List_URI(rdf_xml_parser) = raptor_new_uri_from_uri_local_name(world, RAPTOR_DAML_NS_URI(rdf_xml_parser), (const unsigned char *)"List");
RAPTOR_DAML_first_URI(rdf_xml_parser) = raptor_new_uri_from_uri_local_name(world, RAPTOR_DAML_NS_URI(rdf_xml_parser) ,(const unsigned char *)"first");
RAPTOR_DAML_rest_URI(rdf_xml_parser) = raptor_new_uri_from_uri_local_name(world, RAPTOR_DAML_NS_URI(rdf_xml_parser), (const unsigned char *)"rest");
RAPTOR_DAML_nil_URI(rdf_xml_parser) = raptor_new_uri_from_uri_local_name(world, RAPTOR_DAML_NS_URI(rdf_xml_parser), (const unsigned char *)"nil");
/* Check for uri allocation failures */
if(!RAPTOR_DAML_NS_URI(rdf_xml_parser) ||
!RAPTOR_DAML_List_URI(rdf_xml_parser) ||
!RAPTOR_DAML_first_URI(rdf_xml_parser) ||
!RAPTOR_DAML_rest_URI(rdf_xml_parser) ||
!RAPTOR_DAML_nil_URI(rdf_xml_parser))
return 1;
/* Everything succeeded */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clear_buddies(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
if (cfs_rq->last == se)
__clear_buddies_last(se);
if (cfs_rq->next == se)
__clear_buddies_next(se);
if (cfs_rq->skip == se)
__clear_buddies_skip(se);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::DetachFromFrame() {
DCHECK(frame_);
StopLoading();
fetcher_->ClearContext();
if (!frame_)
return;
application_cache_host_->DetachFromDocumentLoader();
application_cache_host_.Clear();
service_worker_network_provider_ = nullptr;
WeakIdentifierMap<DocumentLoader>::NotifyObjectDestroyed(this);
ClearResource();
frame_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int php_mb_regex_set_default_mbctype(const char *encname TSRMLS_DC)
{
OnigEncoding mbctype = _php_mb_regex_name2mbctype(encname);
if (mbctype == ONIG_ENCODING_UNDEF) {
return FAILURE;
}
MBREX(default_mbctype) = mbctype;
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 51,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inet_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
if (sk->sk_prot->compat_ioctl)
err = sk->sk_prot->compat_ioctl(sk, cmd, arg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void imap_cachepath(struct ImapData *idata, const char *mailbox, char *dest, size_t dlen)
{
char *s = NULL;
const char *p = mailbox;
for (s = dest; p && *p && dlen; dlen--)
{
if (*p == idata->delim)
{
*s = '/';
/* simple way to avoid collisions with UIDs */
if (*(p + 1) >= '0' && *(p + 1) <= '9')
{
if (--dlen)
*++s = '_';
}
}
else
*s = *p;
p++;
s++;
}
*s = '\0';
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderAddTraps (ClientPtr client)
{
int ntraps;
PicturePtr pPicture;
REQUEST(xRenderAddTrapsReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderAddTrapsReq);
VERIFY_PICTURE (pPicture, stuff->picture, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (!pPicture->pDrawable)
return BadDrawable;
ntraps = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderAddTrapsReq);
if (ntraps % sizeof (xTrap))
return BadLength;
ntraps /= sizeof (xTrap);
if (ntraps)
AddTraps (pPicture,
stuff->xOff, stuff->yOff,
ntraps, (xTrap *) &stuff[1]);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_eeprom (struct net_device *dev)
{
int i, j;
long ioaddr = dev->base_addr;
u8 sromdata[256];
u8 *psib;
u32 crc;
PSROM_t psrom = (PSROM_t) sromdata;
struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
int cid, next;
#ifdef MEM_MAPPING
ioaddr = pci_resource_start (np->pdev, 0);
#endif
/* Read eeprom */
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++) {
((__le16 *) sromdata)[i] = cpu_to_le16(read_eeprom (ioaddr, i));
}
#ifdef MEM_MAPPING
ioaddr = dev->base_addr;
#endif
if (np->pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_DLINK) { /* D-Link Only */
/* Check CRC */
crc = ~ether_crc_le (256 - 4, sromdata);
if (psrom->crc != cpu_to_le32(crc)) {
printk (KERN_ERR "%s: EEPROM data CRC error.\n",
dev->name);
return -1;
}
}
/* Set MAC address */
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
dev->dev_addr[i] = psrom->mac_addr[i];
if (np->pdev->vendor != PCI_VENDOR_ID_DLINK) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse Software Information Block */
i = 0x30;
psib = (u8 *) sromdata;
do {
cid = psib[i++];
next = psib[i++];
if ((cid == 0 && next == 0) || (cid == 0xff && next == 0xff)) {
printk (KERN_ERR "Cell data error\n");
return -1;
}
switch (cid) {
case 0: /* Format version */
break;
case 1: /* End of cell */
return 0;
case 2: /* Duplex Polarity */
np->duplex_polarity = psib[i];
writeb (readb (ioaddr + PhyCtrl) | psib[i],
ioaddr + PhyCtrl);
break;
case 3: /* Wake Polarity */
np->wake_polarity = psib[i];
break;
case 9: /* Adapter description */
j = (next - i > 255) ? 255 : next - i;
memcpy (np->name, &(psib[i]), j);
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: /* Reversed */
break;
default: /* Unknown cell */
return -1;
}
i = next;
} while (1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bt_status_t src_connect_sink(RawAddress* bd_addr) {
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__);
CHECK_BTAV_INIT();
return btif_queue_connect(UUID_SERVCLASS_AUDIO_SOURCE, bd_addr, connect_int);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 163,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_find_slot(struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl)
{
u32 slotid;
u32 ret_id = NFS4_NO_SLOT;
dprintk("--> %s used_slots=%04lx highest_used=%u max_slots=%u\n",
__func__, tbl->used_slots[0], tbl->highest_used_slotid,
tbl->max_slots);
slotid = find_first_zero_bit(tbl->used_slots, tbl->max_slots);
if (slotid >= tbl->max_slots)
goto out;
__set_bit(slotid, tbl->used_slots);
if (slotid > tbl->highest_used_slotid ||
tbl->highest_used_slotid == NFS4_NO_SLOT)
tbl->highest_used_slotid = slotid;
ret_id = slotid;
out:
dprintk("<-- %s used_slots=%04lx highest_used=%d slotid=%d \n",
__func__, tbl->used_slots[0], tbl->highest_used_slotid, ret_id);
return ret_id;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DialogPlusConsoleObserverDelegate(
content::WebContentsDelegate* original_delegate,
WebContents* web_contents,
const std::string& filter)
: content::ConsoleObserverDelegate(web_contents, filter),
web_contents_(web_contents),
original_delegate_(original_delegate) {}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_submit_direct_hook(int rw, struct btrfs_dio_private *dip,
int skip_sum)
{
struct inode *inode = dip->inode;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct bio *bio;
struct bio *orig_bio = dip->orig_bio;
struct bio_vec *bvec = orig_bio->bi_io_vec;
u64 start_sector = orig_bio->bi_sector;
u64 file_offset = dip->logical_offset;
u64 submit_len = 0;
u64 map_length;
int nr_pages = 0;
int ret = 0;
int async_submit = 0;
map_length = orig_bio->bi_size;
ret = btrfs_map_block(root->fs_info, READ, start_sector << 9,
&map_length, NULL, 0);
if (ret) {
bio_put(orig_bio);
return -EIO;
}
if (map_length >= orig_bio->bi_size) {
bio = orig_bio;
goto submit;
}
async_submit = 1;
bio = btrfs_dio_bio_alloc(orig_bio->bi_bdev, start_sector, GFP_NOFS);
if (!bio)
return -ENOMEM;
bio->bi_private = dip;
bio->bi_end_io = btrfs_end_dio_bio;
atomic_inc(&dip->pending_bios);
while (bvec <= (orig_bio->bi_io_vec + orig_bio->bi_vcnt - 1)) {
if (unlikely(map_length < submit_len + bvec->bv_len ||
bio_add_page(bio, bvec->bv_page, bvec->bv_len,
bvec->bv_offset) < bvec->bv_len)) {
/*
* inc the count before we submit the bio so
* we know the end IO handler won't happen before
* we inc the count. Otherwise, the dip might get freed
* before we're done setting it up
*/
atomic_inc(&dip->pending_bios);
ret = __btrfs_submit_dio_bio(bio, inode, rw,
file_offset, skip_sum,
async_submit);
if (ret) {
bio_put(bio);
atomic_dec(&dip->pending_bios);
goto out_err;
}
start_sector += submit_len >> 9;
file_offset += submit_len;
submit_len = 0;
nr_pages = 0;
bio = btrfs_dio_bio_alloc(orig_bio->bi_bdev,
start_sector, GFP_NOFS);
if (!bio)
goto out_err;
bio->bi_private = dip;
bio->bi_end_io = btrfs_end_dio_bio;
map_length = orig_bio->bi_size;
ret = btrfs_map_block(root->fs_info, READ,
start_sector << 9,
&map_length, NULL, 0);
if (ret) {
bio_put(bio);
goto out_err;
}
} else {
submit_len += bvec->bv_len;
nr_pages ++;
bvec++;
}
}
submit:
ret = __btrfs_submit_dio_bio(bio, inode, rw, file_offset, skip_sum,
async_submit);
if (!ret)
return 0;
bio_put(bio);
out_err:
dip->errors = 1;
/*
* before atomic variable goto zero, we must
* make sure dip->errors is perceived to be set.
*/
smp_mb__before_atomic_dec();
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&dip->pending_bios))
bio_io_error(dip->orig_bio);
/* bio_end_io() will handle error, so we needn't return it */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dentry *lock_rename(struct dentry *p1, struct dentry *p2)
{
struct dentry *p;
if (p1 == p2) {
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
return NULL;
}
mutex_lock(&p1->d_sb->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
p = d_ancestor(p2, p1);
if (p) {
inode_lock_nested(p2->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_CHILD);
return p;
}
p = d_ancestor(p1, p2);
if (p) {
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(p2->d_inode, I_MUTEX_CHILD);
return p;
}
inode_lock_nested(p1->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
inode_lock_nested(p2->d_inode, I_MUTEX_PARENT2);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int luaD_precall (lua_State *L, StkId func, int nresults) {
LClosure *cl;
ptrdiff_t funcr;
if (!ttisfunction(func)) /* `func' is not a function? */
func = tryfuncTM(L, func); /* check the `function' tag method */
funcr = savestack(L, func);
cl = &clvalue(func)->l;
L->ci->savedpc = L->savedpc;
if (!cl->isC) { /* Lua function? prepare its call */
CallInfo *ci;
StkId st, base;
Proto *p = cl->p;
luaD_checkstack(L, p->maxstacksize);
func = restorestack(L, funcr);
if (!p->is_vararg) { /* no varargs? */
base = func + 1;
if (L->top > base + p->numparams)
L->top = base + p->numparams;
}
else { /* vararg function */
int nargs = cast_int(L->top - func) - 1;
base = adjust_varargs(L, p, nargs);
func = restorestack(L, funcr); /* previous call may change the stack */
}
ci = inc_ci(L); /* now `enter' new function */
ci->func = func;
L->base = ci->base = base;
ci->top = L->base + p->maxstacksize;
lua_assert(ci->top <= L->stack_last);
L->savedpc = p->code; /* starting point */
ci->tailcalls = 0;
ci->nresults = nresults;
for (st = L->top; st < ci->top; st++)
setnilvalue(st);
L->top = ci->top;
if (L->hookmask & LUA_MASKCALL) {
L->savedpc++; /* hooks assume 'pc' is already incremented */
luaD_callhook(L, LUA_HOOKCALL, -1);
L->savedpc--; /* correct 'pc' */
}
return PCRLUA;
}
else { /* if is a C function, call it */
CallInfo *ci;
int n;
luaD_checkstack(L, LUA_MINSTACK); /* ensure minimum stack size */
ci = inc_ci(L); /* now `enter' new function */
ci->func = restorestack(L, funcr);
L->base = ci->base = ci->func + 1;
ci->top = L->top + LUA_MINSTACK;
lua_assert(ci->top <= L->stack_last);
ci->nresults = nresults;
if (L->hookmask & LUA_MASKCALL)
luaD_callhook(L, LUA_HOOKCALL, -1);
lua_unlock(L);
n = (*curr_func(L)->c.f)(L); /* do the actual call */
lua_lock(L);
if (n < 0) /* yielding? */
return PCRYIELD;
else {
luaD_poscall(L, L->top - n);
return PCRC;
}
}
}
Commit Message: disable loading lua bytecode
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationController::CancelPendingReload() {
DCHECK(pending_reload_ != NO_RELOAD);
pending_reload_ = NO_RELOAD;
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,867 |
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