instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int set_attributes(char *pathname, int mode, uid_t uid, gid_t guid, time_t time,
unsigned int xattr, unsigned int set_mode)
{
struct utimbuf times = { time, time };
if(utime(pathname, ×) == -1) {
ERROR("set_attributes: failed to set time on %s, because %s\n",
pathname, strerror(errno));
return FALSE;
}
if(root_process) {
if(chown(pathname, uid, guid) == -1) {
ERROR("set_attributes: failed to change uid and gids "
"on %s, because %s\n", pathname,
strerror(errno));
return FALSE;
}
} else
mode &= ~07000;
if((set_mode || (mode & 07000)) && chmod(pathname, (mode_t) mode) == -1) {
ERROR("set_attributes: failed to change mode %s, because %s\n",
pathname, strerror(errno));
return FALSE;
}
write_xattr(pathname, xattr);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Console::valuesCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
info.GetReturnValue().Set(v8::Array::New(isolate));
ConsoleHelper helper(info);
v8::Local<v8::Object> obj;
if (!helper.firstArgAsObject().ToLocal(&obj))
return;
v8::Local<v8::Array> names;
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
if (!obj->GetOwnPropertyNames(context).ToLocal(&names))
return;
v8::Local<v8::Array> values = v8::Array::New(isolate, names->Length());
for (size_t i = 0; i < names->Length(); ++i) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> key;
if (!names->Get(context, i).ToLocal(&key))
continue;
v8::Local<v8::Value> value;
if (!obj->Get(context, key).ToLocal(&value))
continue;
if (!values->Set(context, i, value).FromMaybe(false))
continue;
}
info.GetReturnValue().Set(values);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static M_bool M_fs_isfileintodir(const char *p1, const char *p2, char **new_p2)
{
M_fs_info_t *info1 = NULL;
M_fs_info_t *info2 = NULL;
char *bname;
M_bool file_info_dir = M_FALSE;
if (M_str_isempty(p1) || M_str_isempty(p2) || new_p2 == NULL)
return M_FALSE;
if (M_fs_info(&info1, p1, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS &&
M_fs_info(&info2, p2, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS &&
M_fs_info_get_type(info1) != M_FS_TYPE_DIR &&
M_fs_info_get_type(info2) == M_FS_TYPE_DIR)
{
file_info_dir = M_TRUE;
}
M_fs_info_destroy(info1);
M_fs_info_destroy(info2);
if (!file_info_dir)
return M_FALSE;
bname = M_fs_path_basename(p1, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
*new_p2 = M_fs_path_join(p2, bname, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
M_free(bname);
return M_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 79,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::setWidth(unsigned width)
{
setUnsignedIntegralAttribute(widthAttr, width);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xfrm_dump_sa_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct xfrm_state_walk *walk = (struct xfrm_state_walk *) &cb->args[1];
xfrm_state_walk_done(walk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long debugctlmsr, cr4;
/* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked))
vmx->entry_time = ktime_get();
/* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return;
if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
}
if (vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs) {
copy_vmcs12_to_shadow(vmx);
vmx->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = false;
}
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RSP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
if (test_bit(VCPU_REGS_RIP, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
cr4 = read_cr4();
if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4)) {
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
vmx->host_state.vmcs_host_cr4 = cr4;
}
/* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
* corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
* vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
* exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
* case. */
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched;
asm(
/* Store host registers */
"push %%" _ASM_DX "; push %%" _ASM_BP ";"
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* placeholder for guest rcx */
"push %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
"je 1f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %c[host_rsp](%0) \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMWRITE_RSP_RDX) "\n\t"
"1: \n\t"
/* Reload cr2 if changed */
"mov %c[cr2](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"cmp %%" _ASM_AX ", %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"je 2f \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX", %%cr2 \n\t"
"2: \n\t"
/* Check if vmlaunch of vmresume is needed */
"cmpl $0, %c[launched](%0) \n\t"
/* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */
"mov %c[rax](%0), %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%0), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdx](%0), %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"mov %c[rsi](%0), %%" _ASM_SI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rdi](%0), %%" _ASM_DI " \n\t"
"mov %c[rbp](%0), %%" _ASM_BP " \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %c[r8](%0), %%r8 \n\t"
"mov %c[r9](%0), %%r9 \n\t"
"mov %c[r10](%0), %%r10 \n\t"
"mov %c[r11](%0), %%r11 \n\t"
"mov %c[r12](%0), %%r12 \n\t"
"mov %c[r13](%0), %%r13 \n\t"
"mov %c[r14](%0), %%r14 \n\t"
"mov %c[r15](%0), %%r15 \n\t"
#endif
"mov %c[rcx](%0), %%" _ASM_CX " \n\t" /* kills %0 (ecx) */
/* Enter guest mode */
"jne 1f \n\t"
__ex(ASM_VMX_VMLAUNCH) "\n\t"
"jmp 2f \n\t"
"1: " __ex(ASM_VMX_VMRESUME) "\n\t"
"2: "
/* Save guest registers, load host registers, keep flags */
"mov %0, %c[wordsize](%%" _ASM_SP ") \n\t"
"pop %0 \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[rax](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BX ", %c[rbx](%0) \n\t"
__ASM_SIZE(pop) " %c[rcx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DX ", %c[rdx](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_SI ", %c[rsi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_DI ", %c[rdi](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_BP ", %c[rbp](%0) \n\t"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
"mov %%r8, %c[r8](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r9, %c[r9](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r10, %c[r10](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r11, %c[r11](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r12, %c[r12](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r13, %c[r13](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r14, %c[r14](%0) \n\t"
"mov %%r15, %c[r15](%0) \n\t"
#endif
"mov %%cr2, %%" _ASM_AX " \n\t"
"mov %%" _ASM_AX ", %c[cr2](%0) \n\t"
"pop %%" _ASM_BP "; pop %%" _ASM_DX " \n\t"
"setbe %c[fail](%0) \n\t"
".pushsection .rodata \n\t"
".global vmx_return \n\t"
"vmx_return: " _ASM_PTR " 2b \n\t"
".popsection"
: : "c"(vmx), "d"((unsigned long)HOST_RSP),
[launched]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, __launched)),
[fail]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, fail)),
[host_rsp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, host_rsp)),
[rax]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX])),
[rbx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX])),
[rcx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX])),
[rdx]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX])),
[rsi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI])),
[rdi]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI])),
[rbp]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP])),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
[r8]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8])),
[r9]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9])),
[r10]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10])),
[r11]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11])),
[r12]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12])),
[r13]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13])),
[r14]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14])),
[r15]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15])),
#endif
[cr2]"i"(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu.arch.cr2)),
[wordsize]"i"(sizeof(ulong))
: "cc", "memory"
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
, "rax", "rbx", "rdi", "rsi"
, "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15"
#else
, "eax", "ebx", "edi", "esi"
#endif
);
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
/*
* The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
* a reasonable value ourselves.
*
* We can't defer this to vmx_load_host_state() since that function
* may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and restore segments
* around it, nullifying its effect.
*/
loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
#endif
vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) | (1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)
| (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
vmx->exit_reason = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
trace_kvm_exit(vmx->exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
/*
* the KVM_REQ_EVENT optimization bit is only on for one entry, and if
* we did not inject a still-pending event to L1 now because of
* nested_run_pending, we need to re-enable this bit.
*/
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
vmx_complete_atomic_exit(vmx);
vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
}
Commit Message: kvm: vmx: handle invvpid vm exit gracefully
On systems with invvpid instruction support (corresponding bit in
IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP MSR is set) guest invocation of invvpid
causes vm exit, which is currently not handled and results in
propagation of unknown exit to userspace.
Fix this by installing an invvpid vm exit handler.
This is CVE-2014-3646.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 37,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned nr, bool has_error, u32 error_code,
bool reinject)
{
u32 prev_nr;
int class1, class2;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
if (!vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
queue:
vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true;
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = has_error;
vcpu->arch.exception.nr = nr;
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
vcpu->arch.exception.reinject = reinject;
return;
}
/* to check exception */
prev_nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
if (prev_nr == DF_VECTOR) {
/* triple fault -> shutdown */
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return;
}
class1 = exception_class(prev_nr);
class2 = exception_class(nr);
if ((class1 == EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY && class2 == EXCPT_CONTRIBUTORY)
|| (class1 == EXCPT_PF && class2 != EXCPT_BENIGN)) {
/* generate double fault per SDM Table 5-5 */
vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true;
vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = true;
vcpu->arch.exception.nr = DF_VECTOR;
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = 0;
} else
/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
exception */
goto queue;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jpc_pchg_t *jpc_pchglist_get(jpc_pchglist_t *pchglist, int pchgno)
{
return pchglist->pchgs[pchgno];
}
Commit Message: Fixed an integer overflow problem in the JPC codec that later resulted
in the use of uninitialized data.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 70,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned lodepng_zlib_compress(unsigned char** out, size_t* outsize, const unsigned char* in,
size_t insize, const LodePNGCompressSettings* settings)
{
/*initially, *out must be NULL and outsize 0, if you just give some random *out
that's pointing to a non allocated buffer, this'll crash*/
ucvector outv;
size_t i;
unsigned error;
unsigned char* deflatedata = 0;
size_t deflatesize = 0;
unsigned ADLER32;
/*zlib data: 1 byte CMF (CM+CINFO), 1 byte FLG, deflate data, 4 byte ADLER32 checksum of the Decompressed data*/
unsigned CMF = 120; /*0b01111000: CM 8, CINFO 7. With CINFO 7, any window size up to 32768 can be used.*/
unsigned FLEVEL = 0;
unsigned FDICT = 0;
unsigned CMFFLG = 256 * CMF + FDICT * 32 + FLEVEL * 64;
unsigned FCHECK = 31 - CMFFLG % 31;
CMFFLG += FCHECK;
/*ucvector-controlled version of the output buffer, for dynamic array*/
ucvector_init_buffer(&outv, *out, *outsize);
if (!ucvector_push_back(&outv, (unsigned char)(CMFFLG / 256))) return 83;
if (!ucvector_push_back(&outv, (unsigned char)(CMFFLG % 256))) return 83;
error = deflate(&deflatedata, &deflatesize, in, insize, settings);
if(!error)
{
ADLER32 = adler32(in, (unsigned)insize);
for(i = 0; i < deflatesize; i++)
{
if (!ucvector_push_back(&outv, deflatedata[i])) return 83;
}
free(deflatedata);
error = !lodepng_add32bitInt(&outv, ADLER32);
}
if (!error)
{
*out = outv.data;
*outsize = outv.size;
}
else
{
*out = NULL;
*outsize = 0;
ucvector_cleanup(&outv);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iwgif_read_color_table(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx, struct iw_palette *ct)
{
int i;
if(ct->num_entries<1) return 1;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,3*ct->num_entries)) return 0;
for(i=0;i<ct->num_entries;i++) {
ct->entry[i].r = rctx->rbuf[3*i+0];
ct->entry[i].g = rctx->rbuf[3*i+1];
ct->entry[i].b = rctx->rbuf[3*i+2];
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 66,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ValidateCompressedTexDimensions(
const char* function_name,
GLint level, GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLenum format) {
switch (format) {
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT: {
if (!IsValidDXTSize(level, width) || !IsValidDXTSize(level, height)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
case GL_ATC_RGB_AMD:
case GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD:
case GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD:
case GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES: {
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG:
case GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG: {
if (!IsValidPVRTCSize(level, width) ||
!IsValidPVRTCSize(level, height)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"width or height invalid for level");
return false;
}
return true;
}
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 121,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DocumentLoader* FrameLoader::CreateDocumentLoader(
const ResourceRequest& request,
const FrameLoadRequest& frame_load_request,
FrameLoadType load_type,
NavigationType navigation_type) {
DocumentLoader* loader = Client()->CreateDocumentLoader(
frame_, request,
frame_load_request.GetSubstituteData().IsValid()
? frame_load_request.GetSubstituteData()
: DefaultSubstituteDataForURL(request.Url()),
frame_load_request.ClientRedirect(),
frame_load_request.GetDevToolsNavigationToken());
loader->SetLoadType(load_type);
loader->SetNavigationType(navigation_type);
bool replace_current_item = load_type == kFrameLoadTypeReplaceCurrentItem &&
(!Opener() || !request.Url().IsEmpty());
loader->SetReplacesCurrentHistoryItem(replace_current_item);
probe::lifecycleEvent(frame_, loader, "init", CurrentTimeTicksInSeconds());
return loader;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 125,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
union sctp_addr addr;
int i;
__u16 sat;
int retval = 1;
sctp_scope_t scope;
time_t stale;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
struct sctp_transport *t;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
/* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the
* time. This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters
* came from a fresh INIT, and INIT ACK, or were stored in a cookie.
*/
switch (param.p->type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 != asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
break;
goto do_addr_param;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
/* v4 addresses are not allowed on v6-only socket */
if (ipv6_only_sock(asoc->base.sk))
break;
do_addr_param:
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
scope = sctp_scope(peer_addr);
if (sctp_in_scope(net, &addr, scope))
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, gfp, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED))
return 0;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
if (!net->sctp.cookie_preserve_enable)
break;
stale = ntohl(param.life->lifespan_increment);
/* Suggested Cookie Life span increment's unit is msec,
* (1/1000sec).
*/
asoc->cookie_life = ktime_add_ms(asoc->cookie_life, stale);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
pr_debug("%s: unimplemented SCTP_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS\n", __func__);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
/* Turn off the default values first so we'll know which
* ones are really set by the peer.
*/
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 0;
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 0;
/* Assume that peer supports the address family
* by which it sends a packet.
*/
if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
else if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (sat)
sat /= sizeof(__u16);
for (i = 0; i < sat; ++i) {
switch (param.sat->types[i]) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 == asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.hostname_address = 1;
break;
default: /* Just ignore anything else. */
break;
}
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
asoc->peer.cookie_len =
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
asoc->peer.cookie = param.cookie->body;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
/* Would be odd to receive, but it causes no problems. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
/* Rejected during verify stage. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
asoc->peer.ecn_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = ntohl(param.aind->adaptation_ind);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
goto fall_through;
addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param,
htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
/* if the address is invalid, we can't process it.
* XXX: see spec for what to do.
*/
if (!af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, NULL))
break;
t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!t)
break;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, t);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
sctp_process_ext_param(asoc, param);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable) {
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
}
/* Fall Through */
goto fall_through;
case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's random parameter */
asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's HMAC list */
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
/* Set the default HMAC the peer requested*/
sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac(asoc, param.hmac_algo);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
retval = 0;
break;
fall_through:
default:
/* Any unrecognized parameters should have been caught
* and handled by sctp_verify_param() which should be
* called prior to this routine. Simply log the error
* here.
*/
pr_debug("%s: ignoring param:%d for association:%p.\n",
__func__, ntohs(param.p->type), asoc);
break;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 166,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RequestToLockMouse(bool user_gesture,
bool last_unlocked_by_target) {
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->RequestToLockMouse(this, user_gesture, last_unlocked_by_target);
} else {
GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
}
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,765
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int number_of_callbacks() const { return number_of_callbacks_; }
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int audit_arch(void)
{
int arch = EM_SH;
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
arch |= __AUDIT_ARCH_LE;
#endif
return arch;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
{
fd_set *setp;
int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
gettimeofday(&start, NULL);
}
if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
free(setp);
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
}
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
}
free(setp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void DeprecateAsSameValueMeasureAsOverloadedMethod2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "deprecateAsSameValueMeasureAsOverloadedMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t arg;
arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->deprecateAsSameValueMeasureAsOverloadedMethod(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t get_camera_metadata_entry_capacity(const camera_metadata_t *metadata) {
return metadata->entry_capacity;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_check_next_level(OPJ_INT32 pos,
opj_cp_t *cp,
OPJ_UINT32 tileno,
OPJ_UINT32 pino,
const OPJ_CHAR *prog)
{
OPJ_INT32 i;
opj_tcp_t *tcps = &cp->tcps[tileno];
opj_poc_t *tcp = &tcps->pocs[pino];
if (pos >= 0) {
for (i = pos; pos >= 0; i--) {
switch (prog[i]) {
case 'R':
if (tcp->res_t == tcp->resE) {
if (opj_pi_check_next_level(pos - 1, cp, tileno, pino, prog)) {
return OPJ_TRUE;
} else {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
} else {
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
break;
case 'C':
if (tcp->comp_t == tcp->compE) {
if (opj_pi_check_next_level(pos - 1, cp, tileno, pino, prog)) {
return OPJ_TRUE;
} else {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
} else {
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
break;
case 'L':
if (tcp->lay_t == tcp->layE) {
if (opj_pi_check_next_level(pos - 1, cp, tileno, pino, prog)) {
return OPJ_TRUE;
} else {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
} else {
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
break;
case 'P':
switch (tcp->prg) {
case OPJ_LRCP: /* fall through */
case OPJ_RLCP:
if (tcp->prc_t == tcp->prcE) {
if (opj_pi_check_next_level(i - 1, cp, tileno, pino, prog)) {
return OPJ_TRUE;
} else {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
} else {
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
break;
default:
if (tcp->tx0_t == tcp->txE) {
/*TY*/
if (tcp->ty0_t == tcp->tyE) {
if (opj_pi_check_next_level(i - 1, cp, tileno, pino, prog)) {
return OPJ_TRUE;
} else {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
} else {
return OPJ_TRUE;
}/*TY*/
} else {
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
break;
}/*end case P*/
}/*end switch*/
}/*end for*/
}/*end if*/
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 70,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_group_track_bfd_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
alloc_value_block(alloc_vrrp_group_track_bfd, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetActiveAttrib(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveAttrib& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetActiveAttrib*>(cmd_data);
GLuint program_id = c.program;
GLuint index = c.index;
uint32_t name_bucket_id = c.name_bucket_id;
typedef cmds::GetActiveAttrib::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (result->success != 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program_id, "glGetActiveAttrib");
if (!program) {
return error::kNoError;
}
const Program::VertexAttrib* attrib_info =
program->GetAttribInfo(index);
if (!attrib_info) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetActiveAttrib", "index out of range");
return error::kNoError;
}
result->success = 1; // true.
result->size = attrib_info->size;
result->type = attrib_info->type;
Bucket* bucket = CreateBucket(name_bucket_id);
bucket->SetFromString(attrib_info->name.c_str());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TypingCommand* Editor::LastTypingCommandIfStillOpenForTyping() const {
return TypingCommand::LastTypingCommandIfStillOpenForTyping(&GetFrame());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: configure_env(char **env, const char *prefix, const struct dhcp_message *dhcp,
const struct if_options *ifo)
{
unsigned int i;
const uint8_t *p;
int pl;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in_addr net;
struct in_addr brd;
char *val, *v;
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t len, e = 0;
char **ep;
char cidr[4];
uint8_t overl = 0;
get_option_uint8(&overl, dhcp, DHO_OPTIONSOVERLOADED);
if (!env) {
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (!opt->var)
continue;
if (has_option_mask(ifo->nomask, opt->option))
continue;
if (get_option_raw(dhcp, opt->option))
e++;
}
if (dhcp->yiaddr || dhcp->ciaddr)
e += 5;
if (*dhcp->bootfile && !(overl & 1))
e++;
if (*dhcp->servername && !(overl & 2))
e++;
return e;
}
ep = env;
if (dhcp->yiaddr || dhcp->ciaddr) {
/* Set some useful variables that we derive from the DHCP
* message but are not necessarily in the options */
addr.s_addr = dhcp->yiaddr ? dhcp->yiaddr : dhcp->ciaddr;
setvar(&ep, prefix, "ip_address", inet_ntoa(addr));
if (get_option_addr(&net, dhcp, DHO_SUBNETMASK) == -1) {
net.s_addr = get_netmask(addr.s_addr);
setvar(&ep, prefix, "subnet_mask", inet_ntoa(net));
}
i = inet_ntocidr(net);
snprintf(cidr, sizeof(cidr), "%d", inet_ntocidr(net));
setvar(&ep, prefix, "subnet_cidr", cidr);
if (get_option_addr(&brd, dhcp, DHO_BROADCAST) == -1) {
brd.s_addr = addr.s_addr | ~net.s_addr;
setvar(&ep, prefix, "broadcast_address", inet_ntoa(brd));
}
addr.s_addr = dhcp->yiaddr & net.s_addr;
setvar(&ep, prefix, "network_number", inet_ntoa(addr));
}
if (*dhcp->bootfile && !(overl & 1))
setvar(&ep, prefix, "filename", (const char *)dhcp->bootfile);
if (*dhcp->servername && !(overl & 2))
setvar(&ep, prefix, "server_name", (const char *)dhcp->servername);
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (!opt->var)
continue;
if (has_option_mask(ifo->nomask, opt->option))
continue;
val = NULL;
p = get_option(dhcp, opt->option, &pl, NULL);
if (!p)
continue;
/* We only want the FQDN name */
if (opt->option == DHO_FQDN) {
p += 3;
pl -= 3;
}
len = print_option(NULL, 0, opt->type, pl, p);
if (len < 0)
return -1;
e = strlen(prefix) + strlen(opt->var) + len + 4;
v = val = *ep++ = xmalloc(e);
v += snprintf(val, e, "%s_%s=", prefix, opt->var);
if (len != 0)
print_option(v, len, opt->type, pl, p);
}
return ep - env;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void out_flush_domain_queues(s2s_t s2s, const char *domain) {
char *rkey;
int rkeylen;
char *c;
int c_len;
if (xhash_iter_first(s2s->outq)) {
do {
xhash_iter_get(s2s->outq, (const char **) &rkey, &rkeylen, NULL);
c = memchr(rkey, '/', rkeylen);
c++;
c_len = rkeylen - (c - rkey);
if (strncmp(domain, c, c_len) == 0)
out_flush_route_queue(s2s, rkey, rkeylen);
} while(xhash_iter_next(s2s->outq));
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Time MockNetworkLayer::Now() {
if (clock_)
return clock_->Now();
return base::Time::Now();
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 119,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
long path_max = 0;
/* Set some defaults based on the system type in case the path length isn't
* actually defined anywhere. */
sys_type = M_fs_path_get_system_type(sys_type);
/* Try to determine the path length */
#ifdef PATH_MAX
path_max = PATH_MAX;
#elif !defined(_WIN32)
path_max = pathconf("/", _PC_PATH_MAX);
#endif
/* Ensure we didn't get an unreasonably long path. */
if (path_max <= 0 || path_max > 65536) {
if (sys_type == M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS) {
path_max = 260;
} else {
path_max = 4096;
}
}
return (size_t)path_max;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 79,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::clearNeverRememberSites()
{
#if ENABLE(BLACKBERRY_CREDENTIAL_PERSIST)
if (d->m_webSettings->isCredentialAutofillEnabled())
credentialManager().clearNeverRememberSites();
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SplashOutputDev::endType3Char(GfxState *state) {
T3GlyphStack *t3gs;
double *ctm;
if (t3GlyphStack->cacheTag) {
memcpy(t3GlyphStack->cacheData, bitmap->getDataPtr(),
t3GlyphStack->cache->glyphSize);
delete bitmap;
delete splash;
bitmap = t3GlyphStack->origBitmap;
splash = t3GlyphStack->origSplash;
ctm = state->getCTM();
state->setCTM(ctm[0], ctm[1], ctm[2], ctm[3],
t3GlyphStack->origCTM4, t3GlyphStack->origCTM5);
updateCTM(state, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
drawType3Glyph(t3GlyphStack->cache,
t3GlyphStack->cacheTag, t3GlyphStack->cacheData);
}
t3gs = t3GlyphStack;
t3GlyphStack = t3gs->next;
delete t3gs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SAPI_API void sapi_activate_headers_only(TSRMLS_D)
{
if (SG(request_info).headers_read == 1)
return;
SG(request_info).headers_read = 1;
zend_llist_init(&SG(sapi_headers).headers, sizeof(sapi_header_struct),
(void (*)(void *)) sapi_free_header, 0);
SG(sapi_headers).send_default_content_type = 1;
/* SG(sapi_headers).http_response_code = 200; */
SG(sapi_headers).http_status_line = NULL;
SG(sapi_headers).mimetype = NULL;
SG(read_post_bytes) = 0;
SG(request_info).post_data = NULL;
SG(request_info).raw_post_data = NULL;
SG(request_info).current_user = NULL;
SG(request_info).current_user_length = 0;
SG(request_info).no_headers = 0;
SG(request_info).post_entry = NULL;
SG(global_request_time) = 0;
/*
* It's possible to override this general case in the activate() callback,
* if necessary.
*/
if (SG(request_info).request_method && !strcmp(SG(request_info).request_method, "HEAD")) {
SG(request_info).headers_only = 1;
} else {
SG(request_info).headers_only = 0;
}
if (SG(server_context)) {
SG(request_info).cookie_data = sapi_module.read_cookies(TSRMLS_C);
if (sapi_module.activate) {
sapi_module.activate(TSRMLS_C);
}
}
if (sapi_module.input_filter_init ) {
sapi_module.input_filter_init(TSRMLS_C);
}
}
Commit Message: Update header handling to RFC 7230
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 56,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CredentialManagerImpl::IsZeroClickAllowed() const {
return *auto_signin_enabled_ && !client_->IsIncognito();
}
Commit Message: Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 155,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err sinf_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *p;
p = (GF_ProtectionSchemeInfoBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ProtectionSchemeInfoBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->original_format, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FRMA);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->scheme_type, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SCHM);
if (p->size)
gf_isom_box_dump_ex(p->info, trace, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SCHI);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ProtectionSchemeInfoBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void migration_end(void)
{
if (migration_bitmap) {
memory_global_dirty_log_stop();
g_free(migration_bitmap);
migration_bitmap = NULL;
}
XBZRLE_cache_lock();
if (XBZRLE.cache) {
cache_fini(XBZRLE.cache);
g_free(XBZRLE.encoded_buf);
g_free(XBZRLE.current_buf);
XBZRLE.cache = NULL;
XBZRLE.encoded_buf = NULL;
XBZRLE.current_buf = NULL;
}
XBZRLE_cache_unlock();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *set_limit_xml_req_body(cmd_parms *cmd, void *conf_,
const char *arg)
{
core_dir_config *conf = conf_;
conf->limit_xml_body = atol(arg);
if (conf->limit_xml_body < 0)
return "LimitXMLRequestBody requires a non-negative integer.";
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int type;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
PACKET extensions;
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
#endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
goto ri_check;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
return 0;
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
return 0;
/*
* We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
* unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
* resumption.
*/
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
PACKET extension;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
return 0;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
}
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
* syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
*
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
return 0;
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
return 0;
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
(unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *ext_data;
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
(&extension, &responder_id_list))
return 0;
/*
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
PACKET responder_id;
const unsigned char *id_data;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
&responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
return 0;
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL)
return 0;
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
|| ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
return 0;
}
}
} else
#endif
{
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
|| PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
* tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
*/
/*
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
* TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
* callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/*
* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
*/
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
* If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
* The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
* then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 168,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stco_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_ChunkOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_ChunkOffsetBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->nb_entries);
for (i = 0; i < ptr->nb_entries; i++) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->offsets[i]);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction()
: chrome_details_(this) {
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutObject* HTMLCanvasElement::CreateLayoutObject(
const ComputedStyle& style) {
LocalFrame* frame = GetDocument().GetFrame();
if (frame && GetDocument().CanExecuteScripts(kNotAboutToExecuteScript))
return new LayoutHTMLCanvas(this);
return HTMLElement::CreateLayoutObject(style);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,065
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_real_tpr_addr(VAPICROMState *s, CPUX86State *env)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(x86_env_get_cpu(env));
hwaddr paddr;
target_ulong addr;
if (s->state == VAPIC_ACTIVE) {
return 0;
}
/*
* If there is no prior TPR access instruction we could analyze (which is
* the case after resume from hibernation), we need to scan the possible
* virtual address space for the APIC mapping.
*/
for (addr = 0xfffff000; addr >= 0x80000000; addr -= TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
paddr = cpu_get_phys_page_debug(cs, addr);
if (paddr != APIC_DEFAULT_ADDRESS) {
continue;
}
s->real_tpr_addr = addr + 0x80;
update_guest_rom_state(s);
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hashciedefspace(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, gs_md5_state_t *md5)
{
int code = 0;
ref CIEdict1, spacename;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 0, &spacename);
if (code < 0)
return 0;
gs_md5_append(md5, (const gs_md5_byte_t *)&spacename.value.pname, sizeof(spacename.value.pname));
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &CIEdict1);
if (code < 0)
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"WhitePoint", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"BlackPoint", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"RangeABC", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"DecodeABC", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"MatrixABC", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"RangeLMN", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"DecodeLMN", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"MatrixMN", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"RangeDEF", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"DecodeDEF", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"RangeHIJ", md5))
return 0;
if (!hashdictkey(i_ctx_p, &CIEdict1, (char *)"Table", md5))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NavigationPolicy LocalFrameClientImpl::DecidePolicyForNavigation(
const ResourceRequest& request,
Document* origin_document,
DocumentLoader* document_loader,
WebNavigationType type,
NavigationPolicy policy,
bool replaces_current_history_item,
bool is_client_redirect,
WebTriggeringEventInfo triggering_event_info,
HTMLFormElement* form,
ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition
should_check_main_world_content_security_policy,
mojom::blink::BlobURLTokenPtr blob_url_token,
base::TimeTicks input_start_time) {
if (!web_frame_->Client())
return kNavigationPolicyIgnore;
WebDocumentLoaderImpl* web_document_loader =
WebDocumentLoaderImpl::FromDocumentLoader(document_loader);
WrappedResourceRequest wrapped_resource_request(request);
WebLocalFrameClient::NavigationPolicyInfo navigation_info(
wrapped_resource_request);
navigation_info.navigation_type = type;
navigation_info.default_policy = static_cast<WebNavigationPolicy>(policy);
CHECK(!web_document_loader || !web_document_loader->GetExtraData());
navigation_info.replaces_current_history_item = replaces_current_history_item;
navigation_info.is_client_redirect = is_client_redirect;
navigation_info.triggering_event_info = triggering_event_info;
navigation_info.should_check_main_world_content_security_policy =
should_check_main_world_content_security_policy ==
kCheckContentSecurityPolicy
? kWebContentSecurityPolicyDispositionCheck
: kWebContentSecurityPolicyDispositionDoNotCheck;
navigation_info.blob_url_token = blob_url_token.PassInterface().PassHandle();
navigation_info.input_start = input_start_time;
LocalFrame* local_parent_frame = GetLocalParentFrame(web_frame_);
navigation_info.is_history_navigation_in_new_child_frame =
IsBackForwardNavigationInProgress(local_parent_frame);
navigation_info.archive_status =
IsLoadedAsMHTMLArchive(local_parent_frame)
? WebLocalFrameClient::NavigationPolicyInfo::ArchiveStatus::Present
: WebLocalFrameClient::NavigationPolicyInfo::ArchiveStatus::Absent;
if (form)
navigation_info.form = WebFormElement(form);
std::unique_ptr<SourceLocation> source_location =
origin_document
? SourceLocation::Capture(origin_document)
: SourceLocation::Capture(web_frame_->GetFrame()->GetDocument());
if (source_location && !source_location->IsUnknown()) {
navigation_info.source_location.url = source_location->Url();
navigation_info.source_location.line_number = source_location->LineNumber();
navigation_info.source_location.column_number =
source_location->ColumnNumber();
}
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* devtools = DevToolsAgent()) {
navigation_info.devtools_initiator_info =
devtools->NavigationInitiatorInfo(web_frame_->GetFrame());
}
WebNavigationPolicy web_policy =
web_frame_->Client()->DecidePolicyForNavigation(navigation_info);
return static_cast<NavigationPolicy>(web_policy);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType LevelizeImage(Image *image,
const double black_point,const double white_point,const double gamma,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define LevelizeImageTag "Levelize/Image"
#define LevelizeValue(x) ClampToQuantum(((MagickRealType) gamma_pow((double) \
(QuantumScale*(x)),gamma))*(white_point-black_point)+black_point)
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate and initialize levels map.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
/*
Level colormap.
*/
if ((GetPixelRedTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].red=(double) LevelizeValue(image->colormap[i].red);
if ((GetPixelGreenTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].green=(double) LevelizeValue(
image->colormap[i].green);
if ((GetPixelBlueTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) LevelizeValue(image->colormap[i].blue);
if ((GetPixelAlphaTraits(image) & UpdatePixelTrait) != 0)
image->colormap[i].alpha=(double) LevelizeValue(
image->colormap[i].alpha);
}
/*
Level image.
*/
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
j;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); j++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,j);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
q[j]=LevelizeValue(q[j]);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,LevelizeImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1611
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 89,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::DestinationCompleted(
int64_t total_bytes,
std::unique_ptr<crypto::SecureHash> secure_hash) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(state_ == TARGET_PENDING_INTERNAL || state_ == IN_PROGRESS_INTERNAL);
DVLOG(20) << __func__ << "() download=" << DebugString(true);
OnAllDataSaved(total_bytes, std::move(secure_hash));
MaybeCompleteDownload();
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_disconnect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_disconnect cmd;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
int ret;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ret = rdma_disconnect(ctx->cm_id);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FS_SortFileList( char **filelist, int numfiles ) {
int i, j, k, numsortedfiles;
char **sortedlist;
sortedlist = Z_Malloc( ( numfiles + 1 ) * sizeof( *sortedlist ) );
sortedlist[0] = NULL;
numsortedfiles = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < numfiles; i++ ) {
for ( j = 0; j < numsortedfiles; j++ ) {
if ( FS_PathCmp( filelist[i], sortedlist[j] ) < 0 ) {
break;
}
}
for ( k = numsortedfiles; k > j; k-- ) {
sortedlist[k] = sortedlist[k - 1];
}
sortedlist[j] = filelist[i];
numsortedfiles++;
}
Com_Memcpy( filelist, sortedlist, numfiles * sizeof( *filelist ) );
Z_Free( sortedlist );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nscroll(int n, int mode)
{
Buffer *buf = Currentbuf;
Line *top = buf->topLine, *cur = buf->currentLine;
int lnum, tlnum, llnum, diff_n;
if (buf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
lnum = cur->linenumber;
buf->topLine = lineSkip(buf, top, n, FALSE);
if (buf->topLine == top) {
lnum += n;
if (lnum < buf->topLine->linenumber)
lnum = buf->topLine->linenumber;
else if (lnum > buf->lastLine->linenumber)
lnum = buf->lastLine->linenumber;
}
else {
tlnum = buf->topLine->linenumber;
llnum = buf->topLine->linenumber + buf->LINES - 1;
if (nextpage_topline)
diff_n = 0;
else
diff_n = n - (tlnum - top->linenumber);
if (lnum < tlnum)
lnum = tlnum + diff_n;
if (lnum > llnum)
lnum = llnum + diff_n;
}
gotoLine(buf, lnum);
arrangeLine(buf);
if (n > 0) {
if (buf->currentLine->bpos &&
buf->currentLine->bwidth >= buf->currentColumn + buf->visualpos)
cursorDown(buf, 1);
else {
while (buf->currentLine->next && buf->currentLine->next->bpos &&
buf->currentLine->bwidth + buf->currentLine->width <
buf->currentColumn + buf->visualpos)
cursorDown0(buf, 1);
}
}
else {
if (buf->currentLine->bwidth + buf->currentLine->width <
buf->currentColumn + buf->visualpos)
cursorUp(buf, 1);
else {
while (buf->currentLine->prev && buf->currentLine->bpos &&
buf->currentLine->bwidth >=
buf->currentColumn + buf->visualpos)
cursorUp0(buf, 1);
}
}
displayBuffer(buf, mode);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int FS_ReturnPath( const char *zname, char *zpath, int *depth ) {
int len, at, newdep;
newdep = 0;
zpath[0] = 0;
len = 0;
at = 0;
while(zname[at] != 0)
{
if (zname[at]=='/' || zname[at]=='\\') {
len = at;
newdep++;
}
at++;
}
strcpy(zpath, zname);
zpath[len] = 0;
*depth = newdep;
return len;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 96,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_layoutget_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &lgp->res.seq_res))
return;
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
break;
case -NFS4ERR_LAYOUTTRYLATER:
case -NFS4ERR_RECALLCONFLICT:
task->tk_status = -NFS4ERR_DELAY;
/* Fall through */
default:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server, NULL) == -EAGAIN) {
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return;
}
}
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fst_init_dma(struct fst_card_info *card)
{
/*
* This is only required for the PLX 9054
*/
if (card->family == FST_FAMILY_TXU) {
pci_set_master(card->device);
outl(0x00020441, card->pci_conf + DMAMODE0);
outl(0x00020441, card->pci_conf + DMAMODE1);
outl(0x0, card->pci_conf + DMATHR);
}
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 39,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long aio_read_events_ring(struct kioctx *ctx,
struct io_event __user *event, long nr)
{
struct aio_ring *ring;
unsigned head, tail, pos;
long ret = 0;
int copy_ret;
mutex_lock(&ctx->ring_lock);
/* Access to ->ring_pages here is protected by ctx->ring_lock. */
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
head = ring->head;
tail = ring->tail;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
/*
* Ensure that once we've read the current tail pointer, that
* we also see the events that were stored up to the tail.
*/
smp_rmb();
pr_debug("h%u t%u m%u\n", head, tail, ctx->nr_events);
if (head == tail)
goto out;
head %= ctx->nr_events;
tail %= ctx->nr_events;
while (ret < nr) {
long avail;
struct io_event *ev;
struct page *page;
avail = (head <= tail ? tail : ctx->nr_events) - head;
if (head == tail)
break;
avail = min(avail, nr - ret);
avail = min_t(long, avail, AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE -
((head + AIO_EVENTS_OFFSET) % AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE));
pos = head + AIO_EVENTS_OFFSET;
page = ctx->ring_pages[pos / AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE];
pos %= AIO_EVENTS_PER_PAGE;
ev = kmap(page);
copy_ret = copy_to_user(event + ret, ev + pos,
sizeof(*ev) * avail);
kunmap(page);
if (unlikely(copy_ret)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
ret += avail;
head += avail;
head %= ctx->nr_events;
}
ring = kmap_atomic(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
ring->head = head;
kunmap_atomic(ring);
flush_dcache_page(ctx->ring_pages[0]);
pr_debug("%li h%u t%u\n", ret, head, tail);
out:
mutex_unlock(&ctx->ring_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: AIO: properly check iovec sizes
In Linus's tree, the iovec code has been reworked massively, but in
older kernels the AIO layer should be checking this before passing the
request on to other layers.
Many thanks to Ben Hawkes of Google Project Zero for pointing out the
issue.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::BindFragDataLocationIndexedEXT(GLuint program,
GLuint colorName,
GLuint index,
const char* name) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glBindFragDataLocationEXT("
<< program << ", " << colorName << ", " << index << ", "
<< name << ")");
SetBucketAsString(kResultBucketId, name);
helper_->BindFragDataLocationIndexedEXTBucket(program, colorName, index,
kResultBucketId);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::SetBackgroundOpaqueForWidget(bool opaque) {
if (!frame_widget_)
return;
if (opaque) {
frame_widget_->ClearBaseBackgroundColorOverride();
frame_widget_->ClearBackgroundColorOverride();
} else {
frame_widget_->SetBaseBackgroundColorOverride(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT);
frame_widget_->SetBackgroundColorOverride(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf::DestroyTask() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
while (!input_job_queue_.empty())
input_job_queue_.pop();
while (!running_job_queue_.empty())
running_job_queue_.pop();
DestroyInputBuffers();
DestroyOutputBuffers();
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void isdn_net_softint(struct work_struct *work)
{
isdn_net_local *lp = container_of(work, isdn_net_local, tqueue);
struct sk_buff *skb;
spin_lock_bh(&lp->xmit_lock);
while (!isdn_net_lp_busy(lp)) {
skb = skb_dequeue(&lp->super_tx_queue);
if (!skb)
break;
isdn_net_writebuf_skb(lp, skb);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&lp->xmit_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EventSelectForWindow(WindowPtr pWin, ClientPtr client, Mask mask)
{
Mask check;
OtherClients *others;
DeviceIntPtr dev;
int rc;
if (mask & ~AllEventMasks) {
client->errorValue = mask;
return BadValue;
}
check = (mask & ManagerMask);
if (check) {
rc = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, pWin->drawable.id,
RT_WINDOW, pWin, RT_NONE, NULL, DixManageAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
}
check = (mask & AtMostOneClient);
if (check & (pWin->eventMask | wOtherEventMasks(pWin))) {
/* It is illegal for two different clients to select on any of the
events for AtMostOneClient. However, it is OK, for some client to
continue selecting on one of those events. */
if ((wClient(pWin) != client) && (check & pWin->eventMask))
return BadAccess;
for (others = wOtherClients(pWin); others; others = others->next) {
if (!SameClient(others, client) && (check & others->mask))
return BadAccess;
}
}
if (wClient(pWin) == client) {
check = pWin->eventMask;
pWin->eventMask = mask;
}
else {
for (others = wOtherClients(pWin); others; others = others->next) {
if (SameClient(others, client)) {
check = others->mask;
if (mask == 0) {
FreeResource(others->resource, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
else
others->mask = mask;
goto maskSet;
}
}
check = 0;
if (!pWin->optional && !MakeWindowOptional(pWin))
return BadAlloc;
others = malloc(sizeof(OtherClients));
if (!others)
return BadAlloc;
others->mask = mask;
others->resource = FakeClientID(client->index);
others->next = pWin->optional->otherClients;
pWin->optional->otherClients = others;
if (!AddResource(others->resource, RT_OTHERCLIENT, (void *) pWin))
return BadAlloc;
}
maskSet:
if ((mask & PointerMotionHintMask) && !(check & PointerMotionHintMask)) {
for (dev = inputInfo.devices; dev; dev = dev->next) {
if (dev->valuator && dev->valuator->motionHintWindow == pWin)
dev->valuator->motionHintWindow = NullWindow;
}
}
RecalculateDeliverableEvents(pWin);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::EmulatedColorBuffer::EmulatedColorBuffer(
gl::GLApi* api,
const EmulatedDefaultFramebufferFormat& format_in)
: api(api), format(format_in) {
ScopedTexture2DBindingReset scoped_texture_reset(api);
GLuint color_buffer_texture = 0;
api->glGenTexturesFn(1, &color_buffer_texture);
api->glBindTextureFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, color_buffer_texture);
api->glTexParameteriFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MAG_FILTER, GL_LINEAR);
api->glTexParameteriFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_MIN_FILTER, GL_LINEAR);
api->glTexParameteriFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_S, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
api->glTexParameteriFn(GL_TEXTURE_2D, GL_TEXTURE_WRAP_T, GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE);
texture = new TexturePassthrough(color_buffer_texture, GL_TEXTURE_2D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::InitWithNode(
const WebKit::WebNode& web_node) {
DCHECK(!web_node.isNull());
state_ = INITIALIZED;
frame_ = web_node.document().frame();
node_.reset(new WebNode(web_node));
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
int interlaced = dctx->interlaced;
int cur_field = dctx->cur_field;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
interlaced = (state&2)>>1; /* byte following the 5-byte header prefix */
cur_field = state&1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i >= dctx->remaining && (!dctx->interlaced || dctx->cur_field)) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = cur_field;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 168,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::create(const ScriptValue& value, WebBlobInfoArray* blobInfo, ExceptionState& exceptionState, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
ASSERT(isolate->InContext());
return adoptRef(new SerializedScriptValue(value.v8Value(), 0, 0, blobInfo, exceptionState, isolate));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,442
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int UDPSocketWin::SendToOrWrite(IOBuffer* buf,
int buf_len,
const IPEndPoint* address,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK_NE(INVALID_SOCKET, socket_);
DCHECK(write_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(!callback.is_null()); // Synchronous operation not supported.
DCHECK_GT(buf_len, 0);
DCHECK(!send_to_address_.get());
int nwrite = InternalSendTo(buf, buf_len, address);
if (nwrite != ERR_IO_PENDING)
return nwrite;
if (address)
send_to_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(*address));
write_callback_ = callback;
return ERR_IO_PENDING;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OxideQQuickWebView::canGoBack() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
if (!d->proxy_) {
return false;
}
return d->proxy_->canGoBack();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,070
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_cpu_inactive(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
unsigned long flags;
long cpu = (long)hcpu;
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
set_cpu_active(cpu, false);
/* explicitly allow suspend */
if (!(action & CPU_TASKS_FROZEN)) {
struct dl_bw *dl_b = dl_bw_of(cpu);
bool overflow;
int cpus;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&dl_b->lock, flags);
cpus = dl_bw_cpus(cpu);
overflow = __dl_overflow(dl_b, cpus, 0, 0);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dl_b->lock, flags);
if (overflow)
return notifier_from_errno(-EBUSY);
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be16 sctp_process_asconf_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf,
sctp_addip_param_t *asconf_param)
{
struct sctp_transport *peer;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr addr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
addr_param = (void *)asconf_param + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
if (asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP &&
asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP &&
asconf_param->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY)
return SCTP_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PARAM;
switch (addr_param->p.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (!asoc->peer.ipv6_address)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
if (!asoc->peer.ipv4_address)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
break;
default:
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
}
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(addr_param->p.type));
if (unlikely(!af))
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
/* ADDIP 4.2.1 This parameter MUST NOT contain a broadcast
* or multicast address.
* (note: wildcard is permitted and requires special handling so
* make sure we check for that)
*/
if (!af->is_any(&addr) && !af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, asconf->skb))
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
switch (asconf_param->param_hdr.type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
/* Section 4.2.1:
* If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, the source
* address of the packet MUST be added.
*/
if (af->is_any(&addr))
memcpy(&addr, &asconf->source, sizeof(addr));
/* ADDIP 4.3 D9) If an endpoint receives an ADD IP address
* request and does not have the local resources to add this
* new address to the association, it MUST return an Error
* Cause TLV set to the new error code 'Operation Refused
* Due to Resource Shortage'.
*/
peer = sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, GFP_ATOMIC, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED);
if (!peer)
return SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW;
/* Start the heartbeat timer. */
if (!mod_timer(&peer->hb_timer, sctp_transport_timeout(peer)))
sctp_transport_hold(peer);
asoc->new_transport = peer;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP:
/* ADDIP 4.3 D7) If a request is received to delete the
* last remaining IP address of a peer endpoint, the receiver
* MUST send an Error Cause TLV with the error cause set to the
* new error code 'Request to Delete Last Remaining IP Address'.
*/
if (asoc->peer.transport_count == 1)
return SCTP_ERROR_DEL_LAST_IP;
/* ADDIP 4.3 D8) If a request is received to delete an IP
* address which is also the source address of the IP packet
* which contained the ASCONF chunk, the receiver MUST reject
* this request. To reject the request the receiver MUST send
* an Error Cause TLV set to the new error code 'Request to
* Delete Source IP Address'
*/
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&asconf->source, &addr))
return SCTP_ERROR_DEL_SRC_IP;
/* Section 4.2.2
* If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, all
* addresses of the peer except the source address of the
* packet MUST be deleted.
*/
if (af->is_any(&addr)) {
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, asconf->transport);
sctp_assoc_del_nonprimary_peers(asoc,
asconf->transport);
} else
sctp_assoc_del_peer(asoc, &addr);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
/* ADDIP Section 4.2.4
* If the address 0.0.0.0 or ::0 is provided, the receiver
* MAY mark the source address of the packet as its
* primary.
*/
if (af->is_any(&addr))
memcpy(&addr.v4, sctp_source(asconf), sizeof(addr));
peer = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!peer)
return SCTP_ERROR_DNS_FAILED;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, peer);
break;
}
return SCTP_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
[<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
[<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
[<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
[<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.
The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.
When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...
length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: media::VideoCaptureDeviceInfo* VideoCaptureManager::GetDeviceInfoById(
const std::string& id) {
for (auto& it : devices_info_cache_) {
if (it.descriptor.device_id == id)
return ⁢
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SetDefaultConnectionService(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
/*static const char resp[] =
"<u:SetDefaultConnectionServiceResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:Layer3Forwarding:1\">"
"</u:SetDefaultConnectionServiceResponse>";*/
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
struct NameValueParserData data;
char * p;
ParseNameValue(h->req_buf + h->req_contentoff, h->req_contentlen, &data);
p = GetValueFromNameValueList(&data, "NewDefaultConnectionService");
if(p) {
/* 720 InvalidDeviceUUID
* 721 InvalidServiceID
* 723 InvalidConnServiceSelection */
#ifdef UPNP_STRICT
char * service;
service = strchr(p, ',');
if(0 != memcmp(uuidvalue_wcd, p, sizeof("uuid:00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000") - 1)) {
SoapError(h, 720, "InvalidDeviceUUID");
} else if(service == NULL || 0 != strcmp(service+1, SERVICE_ID_WANIPC)) {
SoapError(h, 721, "InvalidServiceID");
} else
#endif
{
syslog(LOG_INFO, "%s(%s) : Ignored", action, p);
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns, action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
}
} else {
/* missing argument */
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
}
ClearNameValueList(&data);
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err cslg_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *p;
p = (GF_CompositionToDecodeBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "CompositionToDecodeBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "compositionToDTSShift=\"%d\" leastDecodeToDisplayDelta=\"%d\" compositionStartTime=\"%d\" compositionEndTime=\"%d\">\n", p->leastDecodeToDisplayDelta, p->greatestDecodeToDisplayDelta, p->compositionStartTime, p->compositionEndTime);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("CompositionToDecodeBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TIFFWarnings(const char *module,const char *format,va_list warning)
{
char
message[MaxTextExtent];
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
(void) vsnprintf(message,MaxTextExtent,format,warning);
#else
(void) vsprintf(message,format,warning);
#endif
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(message,".",MaxTextExtent);
exception=(ExceptionInfo *) GetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception);
if (exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderWarning,
message,"`%s'",module);
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 69,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxTilingPattern::~GfxTilingPattern() {
resDict.free();
contentStream.free();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sysvipc_proc_show(struct seq_file *s, void *it)
{
struct ipc_proc_iter *iter = s->private;
struct ipc_proc_iface *iface = iter->iface;
if (it == SEQ_START_TOKEN) {
seq_puts(s, iface->header);
return 0;
}
return iface->show(s, it);
}
Commit Message: Initialize msg/shm IPC objects before doing ipc_addid()
As reported by Dmitry Vyukov, we really shouldn't do ipc_addid() before
having initialized the IPC object state. Yes, we initialize the IPC
object in a locked state, but with all the lockless RCU lookup work,
that IPC object lock no longer means that the state cannot be seen.
We already did this for the IPC semaphore code (see commit e8577d1f0329:
"ipc/sem.c: fully initialize sem_array before making it visible") but we
clearly forgot about msg and shm.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 42,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_mask_cancellation(uint32_t *old_mask)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *s = NULL;
uint32_t m;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&s);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
m = s->cancel_mask;
s->cancel_mask = true;
return tee_svc_copy_to_user(old_mask, &m, sizeof(m));
}
Commit Message: core: svc: always check ta parameters
Always check TA parameters from a user TA. This prevents a user TA from
passing invalid pointers to a pseudo TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0007: "Buffer checks missing when calling pseudo
TAs".
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *xt_match_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *ppos)
{
return xt_mttg_seq_next(seq, v, ppos, false);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *chpl_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_ChapterListBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CHPL);
tmp->list = gf_list_new();
tmp->version = 1;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int32 TIFFWritePixels(TIFF *tiff,TIFFInfo *tiff_info,ssize_t row,
tsample_t sample,Image *image)
{
int32
status;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_tiles,
tile_width;
ssize_t
bytes_per_pixel,
j,
k,
l;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) == 0)
return(TIFFWriteScanline(tiff,tiff_info->scanline,(uint32) row,sample));
/*
Fill scanlines to tile height.
*/
i=(ssize_t) (row % tiff_info->tile_geometry.height)*TIFFScanlineSize(tiff);
(void) memcpy(tiff_info->scanlines+i,(char *) tiff_info->scanline,
(size_t) TIFFScanlineSize(tiff));
if (((size_t) (row % tiff_info->tile_geometry.height) !=
(tiff_info->tile_geometry.height-1)) &&
(row != (ssize_t) (image->rows-1)))
return(0);
/*
Write tile to TIFF image.
*/
status=0;
bytes_per_pixel=TIFFTileSize(tiff)/(ssize_t) (
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height*tiff_info->tile_geometry.width);
number_tiles=(image->columns+tiff_info->tile_geometry.width)/
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_tiles; i++)
{
tile_width=(i == (ssize_t) (number_tiles-1)) ? image->columns-(i*
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width) : tiff_info->tile_geometry.width;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) ((row % tiff_info->tile_geometry.height)+1); j++)
for (k=0; k < (ssize_t) tile_width; k++)
{
if (bytes_per_pixel == 0)
{
p=tiff_info->scanlines+(j*TIFFScanlineSize(tiff)+(i*
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width+k)/8);
q=tiff_info->pixels+(j*TIFFTileRowSize(tiff)+k/8);
*q++=(*p++);
continue;
}
p=tiff_info->scanlines+(j*TIFFScanlineSize(tiff)+(i*
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width+k)*bytes_per_pixel);
q=tiff_info->pixels+(j*TIFFTileRowSize(tiff)+k*bytes_per_pixel);
for (l=0; l < bytes_per_pixel; l++)
*q++=(*p++);
}
if ((i*tiff_info->tile_geometry.width) != image->columns)
status=TIFFWriteTile(tiff,tiff_info->pixels,(uint32) (i*
tiff_info->tile_geometry.width),(uint32) ((row/
tiff_info->tile_geometry.height)*tiff_info->tile_geometry.height),0,
sample);
if (status < 0)
break;
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible memory leak reported in #1206
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 77,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<ComputedStyle> SVGElement::CustomStyleForLayoutObject() {
if (!CorrespondingElement())
return GetDocument().EnsureStyleResolver().StyleForElement(this);
const ComputedStyle* style = nullptr;
if (Element* parent = ParentOrShadowHostElement())
style = parent->GetComputedStyle();
return GetDocument().EnsureStyleResolver().StyleForElement(
CorrespondingElement(), style, style);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NormalPage::isEmpty() {
HeapObjectHeader* header = reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(payload());
return header->isFree() && header->size() == payloadSize();
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rds_inc_init(struct rds_incoming *inc, struct rds_connection *conn,
__be32 saddr)
{
atomic_set(&inc->i_refcount, 1);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&inc->i_item);
inc->i_conn = conn;
inc->i_saddr = saddr;
inc->i_rdma_cookie = 0;
}
Commit Message: rds: set correct msg_namelen
Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug,
that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel
memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than
sizeof(struct sockaddr_in).
rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before
returning, but that's just a bug.
There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus
address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does
not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path
at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory
to userspace.
And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in
rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be
destroyed.
Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is
better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in
such case.
How to run the test programs ?
I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7.
1 compile
gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c
gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c
2 run ./rds_server on one console
3 run ./rds_client on another console
4 you will see something like:
server is waiting to receive data...
old socket fd=3
server received data from client:data from client
msg.msg_namelen=32
new socket fd=-1067277685
sendmsg()
: Bad file descriptor
/***************** rds_client.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
struct sockaddr_in toAddr;
char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client";
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(1);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr));
toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendto() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer);
memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128);
msg.msg_name = &toAddr;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr);
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer);
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
/***************** rds_server.c ********************/
int main(void)
{
struct sockaddr_in fromAddr;
int sock_fd;
struct sockaddr_in serverAddr;
unsigned int addrLen;
char recvBuffer[128];
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if(sock_fd < 0) {
perror("create socket error\n");
exit(0);
}
memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr));
serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET;
serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000);
if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) {
perror("bind error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n");
msg.msg_name = &fromAddr;
/*
* I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32,
* and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr,
* recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd,
* since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace.
*
* If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine.
* */
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16;
/* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer;
msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128;
msg.msg_control = 0;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
while (1) {
printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("recvmsg() error\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer);
printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen);
printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd);
strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server");
if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) {
perror("sendmsg()\n");
close(sock_fd);
exit(1);
}
}
close(sock_fd);
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __net_init packet_net_init(struct net *net)
{
mutex_init(&net->packet.sklist_lock);
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->packet.sklist);
if (!proc_create("packet", 0, net->proc_net, &packet_seq_fops))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseBalancedChunkMemoryRecover(xmlDocPtr doc, xmlSAXHandlerPtr sax,
void *user_data, int depth, const xmlChar *string, xmlNodePtr *lst,
int recover) {
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt;
xmlDocPtr newDoc;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr oldsax = NULL;
xmlNodePtr content, newRoot;
int size;
int ret = 0;
if (depth > 40) {
return(XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP);
}
if (lst != NULL)
*lst = NULL;
if (string == NULL)
return(-1);
size = xmlStrlen(string);
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt((char *) string, size);
if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
if (sax != NULL) {
oldsax = ctxt->sax;
ctxt->sax = sax;
if (user_data != NULL)
ctxt->userData = user_data;
}
newDoc = xmlNewDoc(BAD_CAST "1.0");
if (newDoc == NULL) {
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return(-1);
}
newDoc->properties = XML_DOC_INTERNAL;
if ((doc != NULL) && (doc->dict != NULL)) {
xmlDictFree(ctxt->dict);
ctxt->dict = doc->dict;
xmlDictReference(ctxt->dict);
ctxt->str_xml = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, BAD_CAST "xml", 3);
ctxt->str_xmlns = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, BAD_CAST "xmlns", 5);
ctxt->str_xml_ns = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, XML_XML_NAMESPACE, 36);
ctxt->dictNames = 1;
} else {
xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal(ctxt, XML_PARSE_NODICT, NULL);
}
if (doc != NULL) {
newDoc->intSubset = doc->intSubset;
newDoc->extSubset = doc->extSubset;
}
newRoot = xmlNewDocNode(newDoc, NULL, BAD_CAST "pseudoroot", NULL);
if (newRoot == NULL) {
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
return(-1);
}
xmlAddChild((xmlNodePtr) newDoc, newRoot);
nodePush(ctxt, newRoot);
if (doc == NULL) {
ctxt->myDoc = newDoc;
} else {
ctxt->myDoc = newDoc;
newDoc->children->doc = doc;
/* Ensure that doc has XML spec namespace */
xmlSearchNsByHref(doc, (xmlNodePtr)doc, XML_XML_NAMESPACE);
newDoc->oldNs = doc->oldNs;
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
ctxt->depth = depth;
/*
* Doing validity checking on chunk doesn't make sense
*/
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->loadsubset = 0;
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
if ( doc != NULL ){
content = doc->children;
doc->children = NULL;
xmlParseContent(ctxt);
doc->children = content;
}
else {
xmlParseContent(ctxt);
}
if ((RAW == '<') && (NXT(1) == '/')) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED, NULL);
} else if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_EXTRA_CONTENT, NULL);
}
if (ctxt->node != newDoc->children) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED, NULL);
}
if (!ctxt->wellFormed) {
if (ctxt->errNo == 0)
ret = 1;
else
ret = ctxt->errNo;
} else {
ret = 0;
}
if ((lst != NULL) && ((ret == 0) || (recover == 1))) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
/*
* Return the newly created nodeset after unlinking it from
* they pseudo parent.
*/
cur = newDoc->children->children;
*lst = cur;
while (cur != NULL) {
xmlSetTreeDoc(cur, doc);
cur->parent = NULL;
cur = cur->next;
}
newDoc->children->children = NULL;
}
if (sax != NULL)
ctxt->sax = oldsax;
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
newDoc->intSubset = NULL;
newDoc->extSubset = NULL;
newDoc->oldNs = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(newDoc);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void menu_cache_remove_reload_notify(MenuCache* cache, MenuCacheNotifyId notify_id)
{
MENU_CACHE_LOCK;
g_slice_free( CacheReloadNotifier, ((GSList*)notify_id)->data );
cache->notifiers = g_slist_delete_link( cache->notifiers, (GSList*)notify_id );
MENU_CACHE_UNLOCK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_status __init acpi_os_initialize1(void)
{
kacpid_wq = alloc_workqueue("kacpid", 0, 1);
kacpi_notify_wq = alloc_workqueue("kacpi_notify", 0, 1);
kacpi_hotplug_wq = alloc_ordered_workqueue("kacpi_hotplug", 0);
BUG_ON(!kacpid_wq);
BUG_ON(!kacpi_notify_wq);
BUG_ON(!kacpi_hotplug_wq);
acpi_install_interface_handler(acpi_osi_handler);
acpi_osi_setup_late();
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RouteCloseEvent(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
if (rvh->GetSiteInstance()->IsRelatedSiteInstance(GetSiteInstance()))
ClosePage();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FreeMenu(const PP_Flash_Menu* menu) {
if (menu->items) {
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < menu->count; ++i)
FreeMenuItem(menu->items + i);
delete [] menu->items;
}
delete menu;
}
Commit Message: IPC: defend against excessive number of submenu entries in PPAPI message.
BUG=168710
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11794037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175576 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserLauncherItemController::Clicked() {
views::Widget* widget =
views::Widget::GetWidgetForNativeView(window_);
if (widget && widget->IsActive()) {
widget->Minimize();
} else {
Activate();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(SoapServer, setClass)
{
soapServicePtr service;
char *classname;
zend_class_entry **ce;
int classname_len, found, num_args = 0;
zval ***argv = NULL;
SOAP_SERVER_BEGIN_CODE();
FETCH_THIS_SERVICE(service);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s*", &classname, &classname_len, &argv, &num_args) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
found = zend_lookup_class(classname, classname_len, &ce TSRMLS_CC);
if (found != FAILURE) {
service->type = SOAP_CLASS;
service->soap_class.ce = *ce;
service->soap_class.persistance = SOAP_PERSISTENCE_REQUEST;
service->soap_class.argc = num_args;
if (service->soap_class.argc > 0) {
int i;
service->soap_class.argv = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval), service->soap_class.argc, 0);
for (i = 0;i < service->soap_class.argc;i++) {
service->soap_class.argv[i] = *(argv[i]);
zval_add_ref(&service->soap_class.argv[i]);
}
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Tried to set a non existent class (%s)", classname);
return;
}
if (argv) {
efree(argv);
}
SOAP_SERVER_END_CODE();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_JROT( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
if ( args[1] != 0 )
Ins_JMPR( exc, args );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmci_transport_peer_attach_cb(u32 sub_id,
const struct vmci_event_data *e_data,
void *client_data)
{
struct sock *sk = client_data;
const struct vmci_event_payload_qp *e_payload;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
e_payload = vmci_event_data_const_payload(e_data);
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
/* We don't ask for delayed CBs when we subscribe to this event (we
* pass 0 as flags to vmci_event_subscribe()). VMCI makes no
* guarantees in that case about what context we might be running in,
* so it could be BH or process, blockable or non-blockable. So we
* need to account for all possible contexts here.
*/
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* XXX This is lame, we should provide a way to lookup sockets by
* qp_handle.
*/
if (vmci_handle_is_equal(vmci_trans(vsk)->qp_handle,
e_payload->handle)) {
/* XXX This doesn't do anything, but in the future we may want
* to set a flag here to verify the attach really did occur and
* we weren't just sent a datagram claiming it was.
*/
goto out;
}
out:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: selCreateFromColorPix(PIX *pixs,
char *selname)
{
PIXCMAP *cmap;
SEL *sel;
l_int32 hascolor, hasorigin, nohits;
l_int32 w, h, d, i, j, red, green, blue;
l_uint32 pixval;
PROCNAME("selCreateFromColorPix");
if (!pixs)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("pixs not defined", procName, NULL);
hascolor = FALSE;
cmap = pixGetColormap(pixs);
if (cmap)
pixcmapHasColor(cmap, &hascolor);
pixGetDimensions(pixs, &w, &h, &d);
if (hascolor == FALSE && d != 32)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("pixs has no color", procName, NULL);
if ((sel = selCreate (h, w, NULL)) == NULL)
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR ("sel not made", procName, NULL);
selSetOrigin (sel, h / 2, w / 2);
selSetName(sel, selname);
hasorigin = FALSE;
nohits = TRUE;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < w; j++) {
pixGetPixel (pixs, j, i, &pixval);
if (cmap) {
pixcmapGetColor (cmap, pixval, &red, &green, &blue);
} else {
red = GET_DATA_BYTE (&pixval, COLOR_RED);
green = GET_DATA_BYTE (&pixval, COLOR_GREEN);
blue = GET_DATA_BYTE (&pixval, COLOR_BLUE);
}
if (red < 255 && green < 255 && blue < 255) {
if (hasorigin)
L_WARNING("multiple origins in sel image\n", procName);
selSetOrigin (sel, i, j);
hasorigin = TRUE;
}
if (!red && green && !blue) {
nohits = FALSE;
selSetElement (sel, i, j, SEL_HIT);
} else if (red && !green && !blue) {
selSetElement (sel, i, j, SEL_MISS);
} else if (red && green && blue) {
selSetElement (sel, i, j, SEL_DONT_CARE);
} else {
selDestroy(&sel);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("invalid color", procName, NULL);
}
}
}
if (nohits) {
selDestroy(&sel);
return (SEL *)ERROR_PTR("no hits in sel", procName, NULL);
}
return sel;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetTitleBarIcon(HWND hDlg)
{
int i16, s16, s32;
HICON hSmallIcon, hBigIcon;
i16 = GetSystemMetrics(SM_CXSMICON);
s16 = i16;
s32 = (int)(32.0f*fScale);
if (s16 >= 54)
s16 = 64;
else if (s16 >= 40)
s16 = 48;
else if (s16 >= 28)
s16 = 32;
else if (s16 >= 20)
s16 = 24;
if (s32 >= 54)
s32 = 64;
else if (s32 >= 40)
s32 = 48;
else if (s32 >= 28)
s32 = 32;
else if (s32 >= 20)
s32 = 24;
hSmallIcon = (HICON)LoadImage(hMainInstance, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDI_ICON), IMAGE_ICON, s16, s16, 0);
SendMessage (hDlg, WM_SETICON, ICON_SMALL, (LPARAM)hSmallIcon);
hBigIcon = (HICON)LoadImage(hMainInstance, MAKEINTRESOURCE(IDI_ICON), IMAGE_ICON, s32, s32, 0);
SendMessage (hDlg, WM_SETICON, ICON_BIG, (LPARAM)hBigIcon);
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494
| 0
| 62,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableNotifications(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setNotificationsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 116,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const std::string& MediaStreamDevicesController::GetSecurityOriginSpec() const {
return request_.security_origin.spec();
}
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
R=xians@chromium.org, yzshen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useGraphicBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<GraphicBuffer>& graphicBuffer,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer) {
if (graphicBuffer == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
if (OMX_GetExtensionIndex(
mHandle,
const_cast<OMX_STRING>("OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer2"),
&index) == OMX_ErrorNone) {
return useGraphicBuffer2_l(portIndex, graphicBuffer, buffer);
}
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.useAndroidNativeBuffer");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
BufferMeta *bufferMeta = new BufferMeta(graphicBuffer, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_VERSIONTYPE ver;
ver.s.nVersionMajor = 1;
ver.s.nVersionMinor = 0;
ver.s.nRevision = 0;
ver.s.nStep = 0;
UseAndroidNativeBufferParams params = {
sizeof(UseAndroidNativeBufferParams), ver, portIndex, bufferMeta,
&header, graphicBuffer,
};
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u meta=%p GB=%p", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, bufferMeta, graphicBuffer->handle);
delete bufferMeta;
bufferMeta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, bufferMeta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
CLOG_BUFFER(useGraphicBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "GB=%p", graphicBuffer->handle));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollingBackgroundDisplayItemClient::OwnerNodeId()
const {
return static_cast<const DisplayItemClient*>(scrollable_area_->GetLayoutBox())
->OwnerNodeId();
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_parse)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind;
char *data;
int data_len, ret;
long isFinal = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|l", &pind, &data, &data_len, &isFinal) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
parser->isparsing = 1;
ret = XML_Parse(parser->parser, data, data_len, isFinal);
parser->isparsing = 0;
RETVAL_LONG(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sco_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_sco *sa = (struct sockaddr_sco *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->src, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 167,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DaemonProcessTest::QuitMessageLoop() {
message_loop_.PostTask(FROM_HERE, MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rpc_async_release(struct work_struct *work)
{
rpc_free_task(container_of(work, struct rpc_task, u.tk_work));
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType OrderedDitherImageChannel(Image *image,
const ChannelType channel,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
/*
Call the augumented function OrderedPosterizeImage()
*/
status=OrderedPosterizeImageChannel(image,channel,"o8x8",exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 89,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool MagicCmp(const char* magic_entry, const char* content, size_t len) {
while (len) {
if ((*magic_entry != '.') && (*magic_entry != *content))
return false;
++magic_entry;
++content;
--len;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WaitForCallback() {
if (!use_audio_thread_) {
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
return;
}
media::WaitableMessageLoopEvent event;
audio_thread_.task_runner()->PostTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&base::DoNothing), event.GetClosure());
event.RunAndWait();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Camera3Device::RequestThread::setPaused(bool paused) {
Mutex::Autolock l(mPauseLock);
mDoPause = paused;
mDoPauseSignal.signal();
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,099
|
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