instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long do_mount(const char *dev_name, const char __user *dir_name,
const char *type_page, unsigned long flags, void *data_page)
{
struct path path;
int retval = 0;
int mnt_flags = 0;
/* Discard magic */
if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
/* Basic sanity checks */
if (data_page)
((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
/* ... and get the mountpoint */
retval = user_path(dir_name, &path);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &path,
type_page, flags, data_page);
if (!retval && !may_mount())
retval = -EPERM;
if (!retval && (flags & MS_MANDLOCK) && !may_mandlock())
retval = -EPERM;
if (retval)
goto dput_out;
/* Default to relatime unless overriden */
if (!(flags & MS_NOATIME))
mnt_flags |= MNT_RELATIME;
/* Separate the per-mountpoint flags */
if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOSUID;
if (flags & MS_NODEV)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NOATIME;
if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODIRATIME;
if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
mnt_flags &= ~(MNT_RELATIME | MNT_NOATIME);
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
mnt_flags |= MNT_READONLY;
/* The default atime for remount is preservation */
if ((flags & MS_REMOUNT) &&
((flags & (MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME |
MS_STRICTATIME)) == 0)) {
mnt_flags &= ~MNT_ATIME_MASK;
mnt_flags |= path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK;
}
flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NODEV | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN |
MS_NOATIME | MS_NODIRATIME | MS_RELATIME| MS_KERNMOUNT |
MS_STRICTATIME);
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
retval = do_remount(&path, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT, mnt_flags,
data_page);
else if (flags & MS_BIND)
retval = do_loopback(&path, dev_name, flags & MS_REC);
else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
retval = do_change_type(&path, flags);
else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
retval = do_move_mount(&path, dev_name);
else
retval = do_new_mount(&path, type_page, flags, mnt_flags,
dev_name, data_page);
dput_out:
path_put(&path);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: span_t* InputHandler::firstSpanInString(spannable_string_t* spannableString, SpannableStringAttribute attrib)
{
span_t* span = spannableString->spans;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < spannableString->spans_count; i++) {
if (span->attributes_mask & attrib)
return span;
span++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wc_ecc_is_point(ecc_point* ecp, mp_int* a, mp_int* b, mp_int* prime)
{
#ifndef WOLFSSL_SP_MATH
int err;
mp_int t1, t2;
if ((err = mp_init_multi(&t1, &t2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != MP_OKAY) {
return err;
}
/* compute y^2 */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_sqr(ecp->y, &t1);
/* compute x^3 */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_sqr(ecp->x, &t2);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_mod(&t2, prime, &t2);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_mul(ecp->x, &t2, &t2);
/* compute y^2 - x^3 */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_sub(&t1, &t2, &t1);
/* Determine if curve "a" should be used in calc */
#ifdef WOLFSSL_CUSTOM_CURVES
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
/* Use a and prime to determine if a == 3 */
err = mp_set(&t2, 0);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_submod(prime, a, prime, &t2);
}
if (err == MP_OKAY && mp_cmp_d(&t2, 3) != MP_EQ) {
/* compute y^2 - x^3 + a*x */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_mulmod(&t2, ecp->x, prime, &t2);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_addmod(&t1, &t2, prime, &t1);
}
else
#endif /* WOLFSSL_CUSTOM_CURVES */
{
/* assumes "a" == 3 */
(void)a;
/* compute y^2 - x^3 + 3x */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_add(&t1, ecp->x, &t1);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_add(&t1, ecp->x, &t1);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_add(&t1, ecp->x, &t1);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_mod(&t1, prime, &t1);
}
/* adjust range (0, prime) */
while (err == MP_OKAY && mp_isneg(&t1)) {
err = mp_add(&t1, prime, &t1);
}
while (err == MP_OKAY && mp_cmp(&t1, prime) != MP_LT) {
err = mp_sub(&t1, prime, &t1);
}
/* compare to b */
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_cmp(&t1, b) != MP_EQ) {
err = MP_VAL;
} else {
err = MP_OKAY;
}
}
mp_clear(&t1);
mp_clear(&t2);
return err;
#else
(void)a;
(void)b;
(void)prime;
return sp_ecc_is_point_256(ecp->x, ecp->y);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 81,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool tcp_may_raise_cwnd(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)
{
/* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is
* delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative
* and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/
* new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce
* cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.
*/
if (tcp_sk(sk)->reordering > sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering)
return flag & FLAG_FORWARD_PROGRESS;
return flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED;
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 51,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static glfs_t* gluster_cache_query(gluster_server *dst, char *cfgstring)
{
struct gluster_cacheconn **entry;
char** config;
char* cfg_copy = NULL;
bool cfgmatch = false;
darray_foreach(entry, cache) {
if (strcmp((*entry)->volname, dst->volname))
continue;
if (gluster_compare_hosts((*entry)->server, dst->server)) {
darray_foreach(config, (*entry)->cfgstring) {
if (!strcmp(*config, cfgstring)) {
cfgmatch = true;
break;
}
}
if (!cfgmatch) {
cfg_copy = strdup(cfgstring);
darray_append((*entry)->cfgstring, cfg_copy);
}
return (*entry)->fs;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: glfs: discard glfs_check_config
Signed-off-by: Prasanna Kumar Kalever <prasanna.kalever@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabRecordingIndicatorAnimation(const gfx::MultiAnimation::Parts& parts,
const base::TimeDelta interval)
: MultiAnimation(parts, interval) {}
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,910
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AffineTransform::recompose(const DecomposedType& decomp)
{
this->setA(decomp.remainderA);
this->setB(decomp.remainderB);
this->setC(decomp.remainderC);
this->setD(decomp.remainderD);
this->setE(decomp.translateX);
this->setF(decomp.translateY);
this->rotateRadians(decomp.angle);
this->scale(decomp.scaleX, decomp.scaleY);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rpng2_x_reload_bg_image(void)
{
char *dest;
uch r1, r2, g1, g2, b1, b2;
uch r1_inv, r2_inv, g1_inv, g2_inv, b1_inv, b2_inv;
int k, hmax, max;
int xidx, yidx, yidx_max;
int even_odd_vert, even_odd_horiz, even_odd;
int invert_gradient2 = (bg[pat].type & 0x08);
int invert_column;
ulg i, row;
bgscale = (pat == 0)? 8 : bgscale_default;
yidx_max = bgscale - 1;
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertical gradients (ramps) in NxN squares, alternating direction and
colors (N == bgscale).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 0) {
uch r1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].r;
uch g1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].g;
uch b1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].b;
uch r2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].r;
uch g2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].g;
uch b2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].b;
int r1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].r - r1_min;
int g1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].g - g1_min;
int b1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].b - b1_min;
int r2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].r - r2_min;
int g2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].g - g2_min;
int b2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].b - b2_min;
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
yidx = (int)(row % bgscale);
even_odd_vert = (int)((row / bgscale) & 1);
r1 = r1_min + (r1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
g1 = g1_min + (g1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
b1 = b1_min + (b1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
r1_inv = r1_min + (r1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
g1_inv = g1_min + (g1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
b1_inv = b1_min + (b1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
r2 = r2_min + (r2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
g2 = g2_min + (g2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
b2 = b2_min + (b2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
r2_inv = r2_min + (r2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
g2_inv = g2_min + (g2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
b2_inv = b2_min + (b2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
dest = (char *)bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
even_odd_horiz = (int)((i / bgscale) & 1);
even_odd = even_odd_vert ^ even_odd_horiz;
invert_column =
(even_odd_horiz && (bg[pat].type & 0x10));
if (even_odd == 0) { /* gradient #1 */
if (invert_column) {
*dest++ = r1_inv;
*dest++ = g1_inv;
*dest++ = b1_inv;
} else {
*dest++ = r1;
*dest++ = g1;
*dest++ = b1;
}
} else { /* gradient #2 */
if ((invert_column && invert_gradient2) ||
(!invert_column && !invert_gradient2))
{
*dest++ = r2; /* not inverted or */
*dest++ = g2; /* doubly inverted */
*dest++ = b2;
} else {
*dest++ = r2_inv;
*dest++ = g2_inv; /* singly inverted */
*dest++ = b2_inv;
}
}
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soft gradient-diamonds with scale = bgscale. Code contributed by Adam
M. Costello.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
} else if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 1) {
hmax = (bgscale-1)/2; /* half the max weight of a color */
max = 2*hmax; /* the max weight of a color */
r1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].r;
g1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].g;
b1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].b;
r2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].r;
g2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].g;
b2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].b;
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
yidx = (int)(row % bgscale);
if (yidx > hmax)
yidx = bgscale-1 - yidx;
dest = (char *)bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
xidx = (int)(i % bgscale);
if (xidx > hmax)
xidx = bgscale-1 - xidx;
k = xidx + yidx;
*dest++ = (k*r1 + (max-k)*r2) / max;
*dest++ = (k*g1 + (max-k)*g2) / max;
*dest++ = (k*b1 + (max-k)*b2) / max;
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radial "starburst" with azimuthal sinusoids; [eventually number of sinu-
soids will equal bgscale?]. This one is slow but very cool. Code con-
tributed by Pieter S. van der Meulen (originally in Smalltalk).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
} else if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 2) {
uch ch;
int ii, x, y, hw, hh, grayspot;
double freq, rotate, saturate, gray, intensity;
double angle=0.0, aoffset=0.0, maxDist, dist;
double red=0.0, green=0.0, blue=0.0, hue, s, v, f, p, q, t;
hh = (int)(rpng2_info.height / 2);
hw = (int)(rpng2_info.width / 2);
/* variables for radial waves:
* aoffset: number of degrees to rotate hue [CURRENTLY NOT USED]
* freq: number of color beams originating from the center
* grayspot: size of the graying center area (anti-alias)
* rotate: rotation of the beams as a function of radius
* saturate: saturation of beams' shape azimuthally
*/
angle = CLIP(angle, 0.0, 360.0);
grayspot = CLIP(bg[pat].bg_gray, 1, (hh + hw));
freq = MAX((double)bg[pat].bg_freq, 0.0);
saturate = (double)bg[pat].bg_bsat * 0.1;
rotate = (double)bg[pat].bg_brot * 0.1;
gray = 0.0;
intensity = 0.0;
maxDist = (double)((hw*hw) + (hh*hh));
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
y = (int)(row - hh);
dest = (char *)bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
x = (int)(i - hw);
angle = (x == 0)? PI_2 : atan((double)y / (double)x);
gray = (double)MAX(ABS(y), ABS(x)) / grayspot;
gray = MIN(1.0, gray);
dist = (double)((x*x) + (y*y)) / maxDist;
intensity = cos((angle+(rotate*dist*PI)) * freq) *
gray * saturate;
intensity = (MAX(MIN(intensity,1.0),-1.0) + 1.0) * 0.5;
hue = (angle + PI) * INV_PI_360 + aoffset;
s = gray * ((double)(ABS(x)+ABS(y)) / (double)(hw + hh));
s = MIN(MAX(s,0.0), 1.0);
v = MIN(MAX(intensity,0.0), 1.0);
if (s == 0.0) {
ch = (uch)(v * 255.0);
*dest++ = ch;
*dest++ = ch;
*dest++ = ch;
} else {
if ((hue < 0.0) || (hue >= 360.0))
hue -= (((int)(hue / 360.0)) * 360.0);
hue /= 60.0;
ii = (int)hue;
f = hue - (double)ii;
p = (1.0 - s) * v;
q = (1.0 - (s * f)) * v;
t = (1.0 - (s * (1.0 - f))) * v;
if (ii == 0) { red = v; green = t; blue = p; }
else if (ii == 1) { red = q; green = v; blue = p; }
else if (ii == 2) { red = p; green = v; blue = t; }
else if (ii == 3) { red = p; green = q; blue = v; }
else if (ii == 4) { red = t; green = p; blue = v; }
else if (ii == 5) { red = v; green = p; blue = q; }
*dest++ = (uch)(red * 255.0);
*dest++ = (uch)(green * 255.0);
*dest++ = (uch)(blue * 255.0);
}
}
}
}
} /* end function rpng2_x_reload_bg_image() */
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::listboxActiveIndexChanged(HTMLSelectElement* select) {
AXObject* obj = get(select);
if (!obj || !obj->isAXListBox())
return;
toAXListBox(obj)->activeIndexChanged();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t show_tabletDiagnosticMessage(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
char *retMsg;
switch (aiptek->diagnostic) {
case AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_NA:
retMsg = "no errors\n";
break;
case AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_SENDING_RELATIVE_IN_ABSOLUTE:
retMsg = "Error: receiving relative reports\n";
break;
case AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_SENDING_ABSOLUTE_IN_RELATIVE:
retMsg = "Error: receiving absolute reports\n";
break;
case AIPTEK_DIAGNOSTIC_TOOL_DISALLOWED:
if (aiptek->curSetting.pointerMode ==
AIPTEK_POINTER_ONLY_MOUSE_MODE) {
retMsg = "Error: receiving stylus reports\n";
} else {
retMsg = "Error: receiving mouse reports\n";
}
break;
default:
return 0;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, retMsg);
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_run_loopback(struct tg3 *tp, u32 pktsz, bool tso_loopback)
{
u32 rx_start_idx, rx_idx, tx_idx, opaque_key;
u32 base_flags = 0, mss = 0, desc_idx, coal_now, data_off, val;
u32 budget;
struct sk_buff *skb;
u8 *tx_data, *rx_data;
dma_addr_t map;
int num_pkts, tx_len, rx_len, i, err;
struct tg3_rx_buffer_desc *desc;
struct tg3_napi *tnapi, *rnapi;
struct tg3_rx_prodring_set *tpr = &tp->napi[0].prodring;
tnapi = &tp->napi[0];
rnapi = &tp->napi[0];
if (tp->irq_cnt > 1) {
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_RSS))
rnapi = &tp->napi[1];
if (tg3_flag(tp, ENABLE_TSS))
tnapi = &tp->napi[1];
}
coal_now = tnapi->coal_now | rnapi->coal_now;
err = -EIO;
tx_len = pktsz;
skb = netdev_alloc_skb(tp->dev, tx_len);
if (!skb)
return -ENOMEM;
tx_data = skb_put(skb, tx_len);
memcpy(tx_data, tp->dev->dev_addr, 6);
memset(tx_data + 6, 0x0, 8);
tw32(MAC_RX_MTU_SIZE, tx_len + ETH_FCS_LEN);
if (tso_loopback) {
struct iphdr *iph = (struct iphdr *)&tx_data[ETH_HLEN];
u32 hdr_len = TG3_TSO_IP_HDR_LEN + TG3_TSO_TCP_HDR_LEN +
TG3_TSO_TCP_OPT_LEN;
memcpy(tx_data + ETH_ALEN * 2, tg3_tso_header,
sizeof(tg3_tso_header));
mss = TG3_TSO_MSS;
val = tx_len - ETH_ALEN * 2 - sizeof(tg3_tso_header);
num_pkts = DIV_ROUND_UP(val, TG3_TSO_MSS);
/* Set the total length field in the IP header */
iph->tot_len = htons((u16)(mss + hdr_len));
base_flags = (TXD_FLAG_CPU_PRE_DMA |
TXD_FLAG_CPU_POST_DMA);
if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_1) ||
tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_2) ||
tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_3)) {
struct tcphdr *th;
val = ETH_HLEN + TG3_TSO_IP_HDR_LEN;
th = (struct tcphdr *)&tx_data[val];
th->check = 0;
} else
base_flags |= TXD_FLAG_TCPUDP_CSUM;
if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_3)) {
mss |= (hdr_len & 0xc) << 12;
if (hdr_len & 0x10)
base_flags |= 0x00000010;
base_flags |= (hdr_len & 0x3e0) << 5;
} else if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_2))
mss |= hdr_len << 9;
else if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_TSO_1) ||
tg3_asic_rev(tp) == ASIC_REV_5705) {
mss |= (TG3_TSO_TCP_OPT_LEN << 9);
} else {
base_flags |= (TG3_TSO_TCP_OPT_LEN << 10);
}
data_off = ETH_ALEN * 2 + sizeof(tg3_tso_header);
} else {
num_pkts = 1;
data_off = ETH_HLEN;
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_JUMBO_BDFLAG) &&
tx_len > VLAN_ETH_FRAME_LEN)
base_flags |= TXD_FLAG_JMB_PKT;
}
for (i = data_off; i < tx_len; i++)
tx_data[i] = (u8) (i & 0xff);
map = pci_map_single(tp->pdev, skb->data, tx_len, PCI_DMA_TODEVICE);
if (pci_dma_mapping_error(tp->pdev, map)) {
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
val = tnapi->tx_prod;
tnapi->tx_buffers[val].skb = skb;
dma_unmap_addr_set(&tnapi->tx_buffers[val], mapping, map);
tw32_f(HOSTCC_MODE, tp->coalesce_mode | HOSTCC_MODE_ENABLE |
rnapi->coal_now);
udelay(10);
rx_start_idx = rnapi->hw_status->idx[0].rx_producer;
budget = tg3_tx_avail(tnapi);
if (tg3_tx_frag_set(tnapi, &val, &budget, map, tx_len,
base_flags | TXD_FLAG_END, mss, 0)) {
tnapi->tx_buffers[val].skb = NULL;
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
tnapi->tx_prod++;
/* Sync BD data before updating mailbox */
wmb();
tw32_tx_mbox(tnapi->prodmbox, tnapi->tx_prod);
tr32_mailbox(tnapi->prodmbox);
udelay(10);
/* 350 usec to allow enough time on some 10/100 Mbps devices. */
for (i = 0; i < 35; i++) {
tw32_f(HOSTCC_MODE, tp->coalesce_mode | HOSTCC_MODE_ENABLE |
coal_now);
udelay(10);
tx_idx = tnapi->hw_status->idx[0].tx_consumer;
rx_idx = rnapi->hw_status->idx[0].rx_producer;
if ((tx_idx == tnapi->tx_prod) &&
(rx_idx == (rx_start_idx + num_pkts)))
break;
}
tg3_tx_skb_unmap(tnapi, tnapi->tx_prod - 1, -1);
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
if (tx_idx != tnapi->tx_prod)
goto out;
if (rx_idx != rx_start_idx + num_pkts)
goto out;
val = data_off;
while (rx_idx != rx_start_idx) {
desc = &rnapi->rx_rcb[rx_start_idx++];
desc_idx = desc->opaque & RXD_OPAQUE_INDEX_MASK;
opaque_key = desc->opaque & RXD_OPAQUE_RING_MASK;
if ((desc->err_vlan & RXD_ERR_MASK) != 0 &&
(desc->err_vlan != RXD_ERR_ODD_NIBBLE_RCVD_MII))
goto out;
rx_len = ((desc->idx_len & RXD_LEN_MASK) >> RXD_LEN_SHIFT)
- ETH_FCS_LEN;
if (!tso_loopback) {
if (rx_len != tx_len)
goto out;
if (pktsz <= TG3_RX_STD_DMA_SZ - ETH_FCS_LEN) {
if (opaque_key != RXD_OPAQUE_RING_STD)
goto out;
} else {
if (opaque_key != RXD_OPAQUE_RING_JUMBO)
goto out;
}
} else if ((desc->type_flags & RXD_FLAG_TCPUDP_CSUM) &&
(desc->ip_tcp_csum & RXD_TCPCSUM_MASK)
>> RXD_TCPCSUM_SHIFT != 0xffff) {
goto out;
}
if (opaque_key == RXD_OPAQUE_RING_STD) {
rx_data = tpr->rx_std_buffers[desc_idx].data;
map = dma_unmap_addr(&tpr->rx_std_buffers[desc_idx],
mapping);
} else if (opaque_key == RXD_OPAQUE_RING_JUMBO) {
rx_data = tpr->rx_jmb_buffers[desc_idx].data;
map = dma_unmap_addr(&tpr->rx_jmb_buffers[desc_idx],
mapping);
} else
goto out;
pci_dma_sync_single_for_cpu(tp->pdev, map, rx_len,
PCI_DMA_FROMDEVICE);
rx_data += TG3_RX_OFFSET(tp);
for (i = data_off; i < rx_len; i++, val++) {
if (*(rx_data + i) != (u8) (val & 0xff))
goto out;
}
}
err = 0;
/* tg3_free_rings will unmap and free the rx_data */
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vm_unlock_anon_vma(struct anon_vma *anon_vma)
{
if (test_bit(0, (unsigned long *) &anon_vma->root->rb_root.rb_root.rb_node)) {
/*
* The LSB of head.next can't change to 0 from under
* us because we hold the mm_all_locks_mutex.
*
* We must however clear the bitflag before unlocking
* the vma so the users using the anon_vma->rb_root will
* never see our bitflag.
*
* No need of atomic instructions here, head.next
* can't change from under us until we release the
* anon_vma->root->rwsem.
*/
if (!__test_and_clear_bit(0, (unsigned long *)
&anon_vma->root->rb_root.rb_root.rb_node))
BUG();
anon_vma_unlock_write(anon_vma);
}
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision) {
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 30;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 164,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ui::MenuModel* ExtensionAppItem::GetContextMenuModel() {
context_menu_.reset(new app_list::AppContextMenu(
this, profile_, extension_id_, GetController()));
context_menu_->set_is_platform_app(is_platform_app_);
if (IsInFolder())
context_menu_->set_is_in_folder(true);
return context_menu_->GetMenuModel();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static HB_Error Load_LigatureArray( HB_LigatureArray* la,
HB_UShort num_classes,
HB_Stream stream )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UShort n, m, count;
HB_UInt cur_offset, new_offset, base_offset;
HB_LigatureAttach* lat;
base_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
count = la->LigatureCount = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
la->LigatureAttach = NULL;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( la->LigatureAttach, count, HB_LigatureAttach ) )
return error;
lat = la->LigatureAttach;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail;
new_offset = GET_UShort() + base_offset;
FORGET_Frame();
cur_offset = FILE_Pos();
if ( FILE_Seek( new_offset ) ||
( error = Load_LigatureAttach( &lat[n], num_classes,
stream ) ) != HB_Err_Ok )
goto Fail;
(void)FILE_Seek( cur_offset );
}
return HB_Err_Ok;
Fail:
for ( m = 0; m < n; m++ )
Free_LigatureAttach( &lat[m], num_classes );
FREE( lat );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_one_reflog(const char *path, const struct object_id *oid,
int flag, void *cb_data)
{
struct all_refs_cb *cb = cb_data;
cb->warned_bad_reflog = 0;
cb->name_for_errormsg = path;
for_each_reflog_ent(path, handle_one_reflog_ent, cb_data);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
{
int no_nice;
if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) {
error = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) {
error = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval);
if (no_nice) {
error = no_nice;
goto out;
}
if (error == -ESRCH)
error = 0;
set_user_nice(p, niceval);
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mp_block_til_ready(struct file *filp, struct sb_uart_state *state)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct sb_uart_info *info = state->info;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
unsigned int mctrl;
info->blocked_open++;
state->count--;
add_wait_queue(&info->open_wait, &wait);
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (tty_hung_up_p(filp) || info->tty == NULL)
break;
if (!(info->flags & UIF_INITIALIZED))
break;
if ((filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) ||
(info->tty->termios.c_cflag & CLOCAL) ||
(info->tty->flags & (1 << TTY_IO_ERROR))) {
break;
}
if (info->tty->termios.c_cflag & CBAUD)
uart_set_mctrl(port, TIOCM_DTR);
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
port->ops->enable_ms(port);
mctrl = port->ops->get_mctrl(port);
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
if (mctrl & TIOCM_CAR)
break;
MP_STATE_UNLOCK(state);
schedule();
MP_STATE_LOCK(state);
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
}
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(&info->open_wait, &wait);
state->count++;
info->blocked_open--;
if (signal_pending(current))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (!info->tty || tty_hung_up_p(filp))
return -EAGAIN;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int devinet_sysctl_register(struct in_device *idev)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool reg_is_pkt_pointer(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
return type_is_pkt_pointer(reg->type);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zcolor_remap_one_finish(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
return zcolor_remap_one_store(i_ctx_p, 0.0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ensure_open_passwd(pool *p) {
/* Make sure pass/group is open.
*/
pr_auth_setpwent(p);
pr_auth_setgrent(p);
/* On some unices the following is necessary to ensure the files
* are open. (BSDI 3.1)
*/
pr_auth_getpwent(p);
pr_auth_getgrent(p);
}
Commit Message: Backporting recursive handling of DefaultRoot path, when AllowChrootSymlinks
is off, to 1.3.5 branch.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 95,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usbmidi_output_close(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream)
{
return substream_open(substream, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_ext_split(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_extent *newext, int at)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int depth = ext_depth(inode);
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct ext4_extent_idx *fidx;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
int i = at, k, m, a;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, oldblock;
__le32 border;
ext4_fsblk_t *ablocks = NULL; /* array of allocated blocks */
int err = 0;
/* make decision: where to split? */
/* FIXME: now decision is simplest: at current extent */
/* if current leaf will be split, then we should use
* border from split point */
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_ext > EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr));
if (path[depth].p_ext != EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
border = path[depth].p_ext[1].ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be split."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
} else {
border = newext->ee_block;
ext_debug("leaf will be added."
" next leaf starts at %d\n",
le32_to_cpu(border));
}
/*
* If error occurs, then we break processing
* and mark filesystem read-only. index won't
* be inserted and tree will be in consistent
* state. Next mount will repair buffers too.
*/
/*
* Get array to track all allocated blocks.
* We need this to handle errors and free blocks
* upon them.
*/
ablocks = kzalloc(sizeof(ext4_fsblk_t) * depth, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ablocks)
return -ENOMEM;
/* allocate all needed blocks */
ext_debug("allocate %d blocks for indexes/leaf\n", depth - at);
for (a = 0; a < depth - at; a++) {
newblock = ext4_ext_new_meta_block(handle, inode, path,
newext, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
goto cleanup;
ablocks[a] = newblock;
}
/* initialize new leaf */
newblock = ablocks[--a];
BUG_ON(newblock == 0);
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = 0;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_depth = 0;
ex = EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh);
/* move remainder of path[depth] to the new leaf */
BUG_ON(path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries != path[depth].p_hdr->eh_max);
/* start copy from next extent */
/* TODO: we could do it by single memmove */
m = 0;
path[depth].p_ext++;
while (path[depth].p_ext <=
EXT_MAX_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr)) {
ext_debug("move %d:%llu:[%d]%d in new leaf %llu\n",
le32_to_cpu(path[depth].p_ext->ee_block),
ext_pblock(path[depth].p_ext),
ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(path[depth].p_ext),
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(path[depth].p_ext),
newblock);
/*memmove(ex++, path[depth].p_ext++,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent));
neh->eh_entries++;*/
path[depth].p_ext++;
m++;
}
if (m) {
memmove(ex, path[depth].p_ext-m, sizeof(struct ext4_extent)*m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old leaf */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[depth].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
/* create intermediate indexes */
k = depth - at - 1;
BUG_ON(k < 0);
if (k)
ext_debug("create %d intermediate indices\n", k);
/* insert new index into current index block */
/* current depth stored in i var */
i = depth - 1;
while (k--) {
oldblock = newblock;
newblock = ablocks[--a];
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, newblock);
if (!bh) {
err = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
neh->eh_depth = cpu_to_le16(depth - i);
fidx = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh);
fidx->ei_block = border;
ext4_idx_store_pblock(fidx, oldblock);
ext_debug("int.index at %d (block %llu): %u -> %llu\n",
i, newblock, le32_to_cpu(border), oldblock);
/* copy indexes */
m = 0;
path[i].p_idx++;
ext_debug("cur 0x%p, last 0x%p\n", path[i].p_idx,
EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
BUG_ON(EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr) !=
EXT_LAST_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr));
while (path[i].p_idx <= EXT_MAX_INDEX(path[i].p_hdr)) {
ext_debug("%d: move %d:%llu in new index %llu\n", i,
le32_to_cpu(path[i].p_idx->ei_block),
idx_pblock(path[i].p_idx),
newblock);
/*memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx++,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx));
neh->eh_entries++;
BUG_ON(neh->eh_entries > neh->eh_max);*/
path[i].p_idx++;
m++;
}
if (m) {
memmove(++fidx, path[i].p_idx - m,
sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx) * m);
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_entries, m);
}
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
/* correct old index */
if (m) {
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
le16_add_cpu(&path[i].p_hdr->eh_entries, -m);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + i);
if (err)
goto cleanup;
}
i--;
}
/* insert new index */
err = ext4_ext_insert_index(handle, inode, path + at,
le32_to_cpu(border), newblock);
cleanup:
if (bh) {
if (buffer_locked(bh))
unlock_buffer(bh);
brelse(bh);
}
if (err) {
/* free all allocated blocks in error case */
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++) {
if (!ablocks[i])
continue;
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, 0, ablocks[i], 1,
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_METADATA);
}
}
kfree(ablocks);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBox::shrinkToAvoidFloats() const
{
if ((isInline() && !isHTMLMarquee()) || !avoidsFloats() || isFloating())
return false;
return style()->width().isAuto();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int enable_net_traffic(struct net_device *dev, struct usb_device *usb)
{
__u16 linkpart;
__u8 data[4];
pegasus_t *pegasus = netdev_priv(dev);
int ret;
read_mii_word(pegasus, pegasus->phy, MII_LPA, &linkpart);
data[0] = 0xc8; /* TX & RX enable, append status, no CRC */
data[1] = 0;
if (linkpart & (ADVERTISE_100FULL | ADVERTISE_10FULL))
data[1] |= 0x20; /* set full duplex */
if (linkpart & (ADVERTISE_100FULL | ADVERTISE_100HALF))
data[1] |= 0x10; /* set 100 Mbps */
if (mii_mode)
data[1] = 0;
data[2] = loopback ? 0x09 : 0x01;
memcpy(pegasus->eth_regs, data, sizeof(data));
ret = set_registers(pegasus, EthCtrl0, 3, data);
if (usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_LINKSYS ||
usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_LINKSYS2 ||
usb_dev_id[pegasus->dev_index].vendor == VENDOR_DLINK) {
u16 auxmode;
read_mii_word(pegasus, 0, 0x1b, &auxmode);
auxmode |= 4;
write_mii_word(pegasus, 0, 0x1b, &auxmode);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pegasus: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
References: https://bugs.debian.org/852556
Reported-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Tested-by: Lisandro Damián Nicanor Pérez Meyer <lisandro@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Document> HTMLDocument::cloneDocumentWithoutChildren()
{
return create(DocumentInit(url()).withRegistrationContext(registrationContext()));
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _save_mc(struct microcode_intel **mc_saved, u8 *ucode_ptr,
unsigned int *mc_saved_count_p)
{
int i;
int found = 0;
unsigned int mc_saved_count = *mc_saved_count_p;
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header;
mc_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)ucode_ptr;
for (i = 0; i < mc_saved_count; i++) {
unsigned int sig, pf;
unsigned int new_rev;
struct microcode_header_intel *mc_saved_header =
(struct microcode_header_intel *)mc_saved[i];
sig = mc_saved_header->sig;
pf = mc_saved_header->pf;
new_rev = mc_header->rev;
if (get_matching_sig(sig, pf, ucode_ptr, new_rev)) {
found = 1;
if (update_match_revision(mc_header, new_rev)) {
/*
* Found an older ucode saved before.
* Replace the older one with this newer
* one.
*/
mc_saved[i] =
(struct microcode_intel *)ucode_ptr;
break;
}
}
}
if (i >= mc_saved_count && !found)
/*
* This ucode is first time discovered in ucode file.
* Save it to memory.
*/
mc_saved[mc_saved_count++] =
(struct microcode_intel *)ucode_ptr;
*mc_saved_count_p = mc_saved_count;
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_append_deep (void)
{
bson_t *a;
bson_t *tmp;
int i;
a = bson_new ();
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
tmp = a;
a = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_document (a, "a", -1, tmp));
bson_destroy (tmp);
}
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL_FILE (a, "test38.bson");
bson_destroy (a);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceLoader::DidReceiveResponse(const WebURLResponse& response) {
DidReceiveResponse(response, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_push_boolean(gs_main_instance * minst, bool value)
{
ref vref;
make_bool(&vref, value);
return push_value(minst, &vref);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hstoreCheckKeyLen(size_t len)
{
if (len > HSTORE_MAX_KEY_LEN)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_STRING_DATA_RIGHT_TRUNCATION),
errmsg("string too long for hstore key")));
return len;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void do_shm_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct shmid_kernel *shp;
shp = container_of(ipcp, struct shmid_kernel, shm_perm);
if (shp->shm_nattch){
shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_DEST;
/* Do not find it any more */
shp->shm_perm.key = IPC_PRIVATE;
shm_unlock(shp);
} else
shm_destroy(ns, shp);
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::GetPageSizeAndContentAreaFromPageLayout(
const PageSizeMargins& page_layout_in_points,
gfx::Size* page_size,
gfx::Rect* content_area) {
*page_size = gfx::Size(
page_layout_in_points.content_width + page_layout_in_points.margin_right +
page_layout_in_points.margin_left,
page_layout_in_points.content_height + page_layout_in_points.margin_top +
page_layout_in_points.margin_bottom);
*content_area = gfx::Rect(page_layout_in_points.margin_left,
page_layout_in_points.margin_top,
page_layout_in_points.content_width,
page_layout_in_points.content_height);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void apply()
{
m_element->setAttribute(m_name, m_value);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport char *XMLTreeInfoToXML(XMLTreeInfo *xml_info)
{
char
*xml;
register char
*p,
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
extent,
length;
ssize_t
j,
k;
XMLTreeInfo
*ordered,
*parent;
XMLTreeRoot
*root;
assert(xml_info != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL);
assert((xml_info->signature == MagickSignature) ||
(((XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info)->signature == MagickSignature));
if (xml_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (xml_info->tag == (char *) NULL)
return((char *) NULL);
xml=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
length=0;
extent=MaxTextExtent;
root=(XMLTreeRoot *) xml_info;
while (root->root.parent != (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
root=(XMLTreeRoot *) root->root.parent;
parent=xml_info->parent;
if (parent == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
for (i=0; root->processing_instructions[i] != (char **) NULL; i++)
{
/*
Pre-root processing instructions.
*/
for (k=2; root->processing_instructions[i][k-1]; k++) ;
p=root->processing_instructions[i][1];
for (j=1; p != (char *) NULL; j++)
{
if (root->processing_instructions[i][k][j-1] == '>')
{
p=root->processing_instructions[i][j];
continue;
}
q=root->processing_instructions[i][0];
if ((length+strlen(p)+strlen(q)+MaxTextExtent) > extent)
{
extent=length+strlen(p)+strlen(q)+MaxTextExtent;
xml=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(xml,extent,sizeof(*xml));
if (xml == (char *) NULL)
return(xml);
}
length+=FormatLocaleString(xml+length,extent,"<?%s%s%s?>\n",q,
*p != '\0' ? " " : "",p);
p=root->processing_instructions[i][j];
}
}
ordered=xml_info->ordered;
xml_info->parent=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml_info->ordered=(XMLTreeInfo *) NULL;
xml=XMLTreeTagToXML(xml_info,&xml,&length,&extent,0,root->attributes);
xml_info->parent=parent;
xml_info->ordered=ordered;
if (parent == (XMLTreeInfo *) NULL)
for (i=0; root->processing_instructions[i] != (char **) NULL; i++)
{
/*
Post-root processing instructions.
*/
for (k=2; root->processing_instructions[i][k-1]; k++) ;
p=root->processing_instructions[i][1];
for (j=1; p != (char *) NULL; j++)
{
if (root->processing_instructions[i][k][j-1] == '<')
{
p=root->processing_instructions[i][j];
continue;
}
q=root->processing_instructions[i][0];
if ((length+strlen(p)+strlen(q)+MaxTextExtent) > extent)
{
extent=length+strlen(p)+strlen(q)+MaxTextExtent;
xml=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(xml,extent,sizeof(*xml));
if (xml == (char *) NULL)
return(xml);
}
length+=FormatLocaleString(xml+length,extent,"\n<?%s%s%s?>",q,
*p != '\0' ? " " : "",p);
p=root->processing_instructions[i][j];
}
}
return((char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(xml,length+1,sizeof(*xml)));
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 71,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType SetMSLAttributes(MSLInfo *msl_info,const char *keyword,
const char *value)
{
Image
*attributes;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
int
flags;
ssize_t
n;
assert(msl_info != (MSLInfo *) NULL);
if (keyword == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickTrue);
exception=msl_info->exception;
n=msl_info->n;
attributes=msl_info->attributes[n];
image_info=msl_info->image_info[n];
draw_info=msl_info->draw_info[n];
image=msl_info->image[n];
switch (*keyword)
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"adjoin") == 0)
{
ssize_t
adjoin;
adjoin=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (adjoin < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedType",value);
image_info->adjoin=(MagickBooleanType) adjoin;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"alpha") == 0)
{
ssize_t
alpha;
alpha=ParseCommandOption(MagickAlphaChannelOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (alpha < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedType",value);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,(AlphaChannelOption) alpha,
exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"antialias") == 0)
{
ssize_t
antialias;
antialias=ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (antialias < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedGravityType",value);
image_info->antialias=(MagickBooleanType) antialias;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"area-limit") == 0)
{
MagickSizeType
limit;
limit=MagickResourceInfinity;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"unlimited") != 0)
limit=(MagickSizeType) StringToDoubleInterval(value,100.0);
(void) SetMagickResourceLimit(AreaResource,limit);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"attenuate") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"authenticate") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image_info->density,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"background") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image_info->background_color,exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"blue-primary") == 0)
{
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"bordercolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image_info->border_color,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"density") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image_info->density,value);
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->density,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"fill") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,&draw_info->fill,
exception);
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"filename") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,value,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"gravity") == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (gravity < 0)
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedGravityType",value);
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"id") == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(attributes,keyword,value,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"magick") == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->magick,value,MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"mattecolor") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image_info->matte_color,exception);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"pointsize") == 0)
{
image_info->pointsize=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
draw_info->pointsize=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
case 'Q':
case 'q':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"quality") == 0)
{
image_info->quality=StringToLong(value);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image->quality=StringToLong(value);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'S':
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"size") == 0)
{
(void) CloneString(&image_info->size,value);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare(keyword,"stroke") == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,&draw_info->stroke,
exception);
(void) SetImageOption(image_info,keyword,value);
break;
}
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
default:
{
ThrowMSLException(OptionError,"UnrecognizedAttribute",keyword);
break;
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void update_rate_histogram(struct rate_hist *hist,
const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
int i;
int64_t then = 0;
int64_t avg_bitrate = 0;
int64_t sum_sz = 0;
const int64_t now = pkt->data.frame.pts * 1000 *
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.num /
(uint64_t)cfg->g_timebase.den;
int idx = hist->frames++ % hist->samples;
hist->pts[idx] = now;
hist->sz[idx] = (int)pkt->data.frame.sz;
if (now < cfg->rc_buf_initial_sz)
return;
then = now;
/* Sum the size over the past rc_buf_sz ms */
for (i = hist->frames; i > 0 && hist->frames - i < hist->samples; i--) {
const int i_idx = (i - 1) % hist->samples;
then = hist->pts[i_idx];
if (now - then > cfg->rc_buf_sz)
break;
sum_sz += hist->sz[i_idx];
}
if (now == then)
return;
avg_bitrate = sum_sz * 8 * 1000 / (now - then);
idx = (int)(avg_bitrate * (RATE_BINS / 2) / (cfg->rc_target_bitrate * 1000));
if (idx < 0)
idx = 0;
if (idx > RATE_BINS - 1)
idx = RATE_BINS - 1;
if (hist->bucket[idx].low > avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].low = (int)avg_bitrate;
if (hist->bucket[idx].high < avg_bitrate)
hist->bucket[idx].high = (int)avg_bitrate;
hist->bucket[idx].count++;
hist->total++;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewPrivate::_q_onReceivedResponseFromDownload(QWebDownloadItem* downloadItem)
{
if (!downloadItem)
return;
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
QQmlEngine::setObjectOwnership(downloadItem, QQmlEngine::JavaScriptOwnership);
emit q->experimental()->downloadRequested(downloadItem);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_proc_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *sattr,
int flags)
{
struct nfs4_label l, *ilabel = NULL;
struct nfs_open_context *ctx;
struct nfs4_state *state;
int opened = 0;
int status = 0;
ctx = alloc_nfs_open_context(dentry, FMODE_READ);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
ilabel = nfs4_label_init_security(dir, dentry, sattr, &l);
sattr->ia_mode &= ~current_umask();
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, ctx, flags, sattr, ilabel, &opened);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
status = PTR_ERR(state);
goto out;
}
out:
nfs4_label_release_security(ilabel);
put_nfs_open_context(ctx);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseValue TabsUpdateFunction::GetResult() {
if (!has_callback())
return NoArguments();
return ArgumentList(
tabs::Get::Results::Create(*ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabObject(
web_contents_, ExtensionTabUtil::kScrubTab, extension())));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void treatReturnedNullStringAsUndefinedStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::treatReturnedNullStringAsUndefinedStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tun_free_netdev(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct tun_struct *tun = netdev_priv(dev);
BUG_ON(!test_bit(SOCK_EXTERNALLY_ALLOCATED, &tun->socket.flags));
sk_release_kernel(tun->socket.sk);
}
Commit Message: net/tun: fix ioctl() based info leaks
The tun module leaks up to 36 bytes of memory by not fully initializing
a structure located on the stack that gets copied to user memory by the
TUNGETIFF and SIOCGIFHWADDR ioctl()s.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,096
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_search_clear(void) {
evdns_base_search_clear(current_base);
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_mq_all_tag_busy_iter(struct blk_mq_tags *tags, busy_tag_iter_fn *fn,
void *priv)
{
if (tags->nr_reserved_tags)
bt_tags_for_each(tags, &tags->breserved_tags, 0, fn, priv, true);
bt_tags_for_each(tags, &tags->bitmap_tags, tags->nr_reserved_tags, fn, priv,
false);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BidiRun* RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForSegment(RootInlineBox* lineBox, const LineInfo& lineInfo, ETextAlign textAlign, float& logicalLeft,
float& availableLogicalWidth, BidiRun* firstRun, BidiRun* trailingSpaceRun, GlyphOverflowAndFallbackFontsMap& textBoxDataMap, VerticalPositionCache& verticalPositionCache,
WordMeasurements& wordMeasurements)
{
bool needsWordSpacing = false;
float totalLogicalWidth = lineBox->getFlowSpacingLogicalWidth();
unsigned expansionOpportunityCount = 0;
bool isAfterExpansion = true;
Vector<unsigned, 16> expansionOpportunities;
RenderObject* previousObject = 0;
BidiRun* r = firstRun;
for (; r; r = r->next()) {
if (r->m_startsSegment)
break;
if (!r->m_box || r->m_object->isOutOfFlowPositioned() || r->m_box->isLineBreak())
continue; // Positioned objects are only participating to figure out their
if (r->m_object->isText()) {
RenderText* rt = toRenderText(r->m_object);
if (textAlign == JUSTIFY && r != trailingSpaceRun) {
if (!isAfterExpansion)
toInlineTextBox(r->m_box)->setCanHaveLeadingExpansion(true);
unsigned opportunitiesInRun;
if (rt->is8Bit())
opportunitiesInRun = Font::expansionOpportunityCount(rt->characters8() + r->m_start, r->m_stop - r->m_start, r->m_box->direction(), isAfterExpansion);
else
opportunitiesInRun = Font::expansionOpportunityCount(rt->characters16() + r->m_start, r->m_stop - r->m_start, r->m_box->direction(), isAfterExpansion);
expansionOpportunities.append(opportunitiesInRun);
expansionOpportunityCount += opportunitiesInRun;
}
if (int length = rt->textLength()) {
if (!r->m_start && needsWordSpacing && isSpaceOrNewline(rt->characterAt(r->m_start)))
totalLogicalWidth += rt->style(lineInfo.isFirstLine())->font().wordSpacing();
needsWordSpacing = !isSpaceOrNewline(rt->characterAt(r->m_stop - 1)) && r->m_stop == length;
}
setLogicalWidthForTextRun(lineBox, r, rt, totalLogicalWidth, lineInfo, textBoxDataMap, verticalPositionCache, wordMeasurements);
} else {
isAfterExpansion = false;
if (!r->m_object->isRenderInline()) {
RenderBox* renderBox = toRenderBox(r->m_object);
if (renderBox->isRubyRun())
setMarginsForRubyRun(r, toRenderRubyRun(renderBox), previousObject, lineInfo);
r->m_box->setLogicalWidth(logicalWidthForChild(renderBox));
totalLogicalWidth += marginStartForChild(renderBox) + marginEndForChild(renderBox);
}
}
totalLogicalWidth += r->m_box->logicalWidth();
previousObject = r->m_object;
}
if (isAfterExpansion && !expansionOpportunities.isEmpty()) {
expansionOpportunities.last()--;
expansionOpportunityCount--;
}
updateLogicalWidthForAlignment(textAlign, lineBox, trailingSpaceRun, logicalLeft, totalLogicalWidth, availableLogicalWidth, expansionOpportunityCount);
computeExpansionForJustifiedText(firstRun, trailingSpaceRun, expansionOpportunities, expansionOpportunityCount, totalLogicalWidth, availableLogicalWidth);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: s32 brcmf_cfg80211_up(struct net_device *ndev)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = ifp->drvr->config;
s32 err = 0;
mutex_lock(&cfg->usr_sync);
err = __brcmf_cfg80211_up(ifp);
mutex_unlock(&cfg->usr_sync);
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cdf_read_catalog(cdf_info_t *info, const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_sat_t *sat, const cdf_sat_t *ssat, const cdf_stream_t *sst,
const cdf_dir_t *dir, cdf_stream_t *scn)
{
return cdf_read_user_stream(info, h, sat, ssat, sst, dir,
"Catalog", scn);
}
Commit Message: Prevent wrap around (Remi Collet at redhat)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pkinit_eku_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int valid_eku;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
*authinds_out = NULL;
/* Verify the client EKU. */
ret = verify_client_eku(context, req_opts->plgctx, req_opts->reqctx,
&valid_eku);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!valid_eku) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_EKU_REJECT(context);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 1
| 170,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GfxIndexedColorSpace::getCMYK(GfxColor *color, GfxCMYK *cmyk) {
GfxColor color2;
base->getCMYK(mapColorToBase(color, &color2), cmyk);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int picolcd_probe_lcd(struct hid_device *hdev, struct picolcd_data *data)
{
int error;
/* Setup keypad input device */
error = picolcd_init_keys(data, picolcd_in_report(REPORT_KEY_STATE, hdev));
if (error)
goto err;
/* Setup CIR input device */
error = picolcd_init_cir(data, picolcd_in_report(REPORT_IR_DATA, hdev));
if (error)
goto err;
/* Set up the framebuffer device */
error = picolcd_init_framebuffer(data);
if (error)
goto err;
/* Setup lcd class device */
error = picolcd_init_lcd(data, picolcd_out_report(REPORT_CONTRAST, hdev));
if (error)
goto err;
/* Setup backlight class device */
error = picolcd_init_backlight(data, picolcd_out_report(REPORT_BRIGHTNESS, hdev));
if (error)
goto err;
/* Setup the LED class devices */
error = picolcd_init_leds(data, picolcd_out_report(REPORT_LED_STATE, hdev));
if (error)
goto err;
picolcd_init_devfs(data, picolcd_out_report(REPORT_EE_READ, hdev),
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_EE_WRITE, hdev),
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_READ_MEMORY, hdev),
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_WRITE_MEMORY, hdev),
picolcd_out_report(REPORT_RESET, hdev));
return 0;
err:
picolcd_exit_leds(data);
picolcd_exit_backlight(data);
picolcd_exit_lcd(data);
picolcd_exit_framebuffer(data);
picolcd_exit_cir(data);
picolcd_exit_keys(data);
return error;
}
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES];
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
void *resp_buf;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
struct page *localpage = NULL;
int ret;
if (buflen < PAGE_SIZE) {
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
localpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
resp_buf = page_address(localpage);
if (localpage == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
args.acl_pages[0] = localpage;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
args.acl_len = PAGE_SIZE;
} else {
resp_buf = buf;
buf_to_pages(buf, buflen, args.acl_pages, &args.acl_pgbase);
}
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode), &msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
if (res.acl_len > args.acl_len)
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, NULL, res.acl_len);
else
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, resp_buf, res.acl_len);
if (buf) {
ret = -ERANGE;
if (res.acl_len > buflen)
goto out_free;
if (localpage)
memcpy(buf, resp_buf, res.acl_len);
}
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
if (localpage)
__free_page(localpage);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::TraceWrappers(
const ScriptWrappableVisitor* visitor) const {
visitor->TraceWrappers(read_framebuffer_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(transform_feedback_binding_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_copy_read_buffer_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_copy_write_buffer_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_pixel_pack_buffer_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(bound_uniform_buffer_);
for (auto& buf : bound_indexed_uniform_buffers_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(buf);
}
visitor->TraceWrappers(current_boolean_occlusion_query_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(current_transform_feedback_primitives_written_query_);
visitor->TraceWrappers(current_elapsed_query_);
for (auto& unit : sampler_units_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(unit);
}
WebGLRenderingContextBase::TraceWrappers(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL drag_url() {
return drag_url_;
}
Commit Message: Add unit test for AllowBindings check.
BUG=117418
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9701038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126929 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 109,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ExtractPrintPreviewPageIndex(const std::string& src_url) {
std::vector<std::string> url_substr;
base::SplitString(src_url.substr(strlen(kChromePrint)), '/', &url_substr);
if (url_substr.size() != 3)
return -1;
if (url_substr[2] != "print.pdf")
return -1;
int page_index = 0;
if (!base::StringToInt(url_substr[1], &page_index))
return -1;
return page_index;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *co64_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CO64);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ax25_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the
* queue for us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (!ax25_sk(sk)->pidincl)
skb_pull(skb, 1); /* Remove PID */
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (msg->msg_namelen != 0) {
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
ax25_digi digi;
ax25_address src;
const unsigned char *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25));
ax25_addr_parse(mac + 1, skb->data - mac - 1, &src, NULL,
&digi, NULL, NULL);
sax->sax25_family = AF_AX25;
/* We set this correctly, even though we may not let the
application know the digi calls further down (because it
did NOT ask to know them). This could get political... **/
sax->sax25_ndigis = digi.ndigi;
sax->sax25_call = src;
if (sax->sax25_ndigis != 0) {
int ct;
struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *fsa = (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *)sax;
for (ct = 0; ct < digi.ndigi; ct++)
fsa->fsa_digipeater[ct] = digi.calls[ct];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
err = copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 166,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void red_channel_client_cancel_ping_timer(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
if (!rcc->latency_monitor.timer) {
return;
}
if (rcc->latency_monitor.state != PING_STATE_TIMER) {
return;
}
rcc->channel->core->timer_cancel(rcc->latency_monitor.timer);
rcc->latency_monitor.state = PING_STATE_NONE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::RemoveFromSet(UnloadListenerSet* set, TabContents* tab) {
DCHECK(is_attempting_to_close_browser_);
UnloadListenerSet::iterator iter = std::find(set->begin(), set->end(), tab);
if (iter != set->end()) {
set->erase(iter);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<net::test_server::HttpResponse> GetConfigResponse(
const net::test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
auto response = std::make_unique<net::test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
response->set_content(config_.SerializeAsString());
response->set_content_type("text/plain");
if (config_run_loop_)
config_run_loop_->Quit();
return response;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t o2nm_cluster_fence_method_store(
struct config_item *item, const char *page, size_t count)
{
unsigned int i;
if (page[count - 1] != '\n')
goto bail;
for (i = 0; i < O2NM_FENCE_METHODS; ++i) {
if (count != strlen(o2nm_fence_method_desc[i]) + 1)
continue;
if (strncasecmp(page, o2nm_fence_method_desc[i], count - 1))
continue;
if (to_o2nm_cluster(item)->cl_fence_method != i) {
printk(KERN_INFO "ocfs2: Changing fence method to %s\n",
o2nm_fence_method_desc[i]);
to_o2nm_cluster(item)->cl_fence_method = i;
}
return count;
}
bail:
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FoFiType1C::cvtNum(double x, GBool isFP, GooString *charBuf) {
Guchar buf[12];
int y, n;
n = 0;
if (isFP) {
if (x >= -32768 && x < 32768) {
y = (int)(x * 256.0);
buf[0] = 255;
buf[1] = (Guchar)(y >> 24);
buf[2] = (Guchar)(y >> 16);
buf[3] = (Guchar)(y >> 8);
buf[4] = (Guchar)y;
buf[5] = 255;
buf[6] = 0;
buf[7] = 0;
buf[8] = 1;
buf[9] = 0;
buf[10] = 12;
buf[11] = 12;
n = 12;
} else {
}
} else {
y = (int)x;
if (y >= -107 && y <= 107) {
buf[0] = (Guchar)(y + 139);
n = 1;
} else if (y > 107 && y <= 1131) {
y -= 108;
buf[0] = (Guchar)((y >> 8) + 247);
buf[1] = (Guchar)(y & 0xff);
n = 2;
} else if (y < -107 && y >= -1131) {
y = -y - 108;
buf[0] = (Guchar)((y >> 8) + 251);
buf[1] = (Guchar)(y & 0xff);
n = 2;
} else {
buf[0] = 255;
buf[1] = (Guchar)(y >> 24);
buf[2] = (Guchar)(y >> 16);
buf[3] = (Guchar)(y >> 8);
buf[4] = (Guchar)y;
n = 5;
}
}
charBuf->append((char *)buf, n);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 2,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_request_header(char *var, unsigned int var_len, char *val, unsigned int val_len, void *arg TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *return_value = (zval*)arg;
char *str = NULL;
char *p;
ALLOCA_FLAG(use_heap)
if (var_len > 5 &&
var[0] == 'H' &&
var[1] == 'T' &&
var[2] == 'T' &&
var[3] == 'P' &&
var[4] == '_') {
var_len -= 5;
p = var + 5;
var = str = do_alloca(var_len + 1, use_heap);
*str++ = *p++;
while (*p) {
if (*p == '_') {
*str++ = '-';
p++;
if (*p) {
*str++ = *p++;
}
} else if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'Z') {
*str++ = (*p++ - 'A' + 'a');
} else {
*str++ = *p++;
}
}
*str = 0;
} else if (var_len == sizeof("CONTENT_TYPE")-1 &&
memcmp(var, "CONTENT_TYPE", sizeof("CONTENT_TYPE")-1) == 0) {
var = "Content-Type";
} else if (var_len == sizeof("CONTENT_LENGTH")-1 &&
memcmp(var, "CONTENT_LENGTH", sizeof("CONTENT_LENGTH")-1) == 0) {
var = "Content-Length";
} else {
return;
}
add_assoc_stringl_ex(return_value, var, var_len+1, val, val_len, 1);
if (str) {
free_alloca(var, use_heap);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,245
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::AllowCertificateError(
SSLCertErrorHandler* handler,
bool overridable,
Callback2<SSLCertErrorHandler*, bool>::Type* callback) {
TabContents* tab = tab_util::GetTabContentsByID(
handler->render_process_host_id(),
handler->tab_contents_id());
if (!tab) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
prerender::PrerenderManager* prerender_manager =
tab->profile()->GetPrerenderManager();
if (prerender_manager && prerender_manager->IsTabContentsPrerendering(tab)) {
if (prerender_manager->prerender_tracker()->TryCancel(
handler->render_process_host_id(),
handler->tab_contents_id(),
prerender::FINAL_STATUS_SSL_ERROR)) {
handler->CancelRequest();
return;
}
}
SSLBlockingPage* blocking_page = new SSLBlockingPage(
handler, overridable, callback);
blocking_page->Show();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_deobfuscate_font_resource(xps_context_t *ctx, xps_part_t *part)
{
byte buf[33];
byte key[16];
char *p;
int i;
p = strrchr(part->name, '/');
if (!p)
p = part->name;
for (i = 0; i < 32 && *p; p++)
{
if (isxdigit(*p))
buf[i++] = *p;
}
buf[i] = 0;
if (i != 32)
{
gs_warn("cannot extract GUID from obfuscated font part name");
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
key[i] = unhex(buf[i*2+0]) * 16 + unhex(buf[i*2+1]);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
part->data[i] ^= key[15-i];
part->data[i+16] ^= key[15-i];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jp2_boxinfo_t *jp2_boxinfolookup(int type)
{
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
for (boxinfo = jp2_boxinfos; boxinfo->name; ++boxinfo) {
if (boxinfo->type == type) {
return boxinfo;
}
}
return &jp2_boxinfo_unk;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipv6_cleanup_mibs(struct net *net)
{
free_percpu(net->mib.udp_stats_in6);
free_percpu(net->mib.udplite_stats_in6);
free_percpu(net->mib.ipv6_statistics);
free_percpu(net->mib.icmpv6_statistics);
kfree(net->mib.icmpv6msg_statistics);
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcp4WHSTest01 (void)
{
int ret = 0;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = 0;
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(20);
p->tcph->th_ack = 0;
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
if ((!(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS))) {
printf("STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS flag not set: ");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(10);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(21); /* the SYN/ACK uses the SEQ from the first SYN pkt */
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN|TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(21);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(10);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
printf("state is not ESTABLISHED: ");
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterSVGImage(void)
{
char
version[MaxTextExtent];
MagickInfo
*entry;
*version='\0';
#if defined(LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION)
(void) CopyMagickString(version,"XML " LIBXML_DOTTED_VERSION,MaxTextExtent);
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_RSVG_DELEGATE)
#if !GLIB_CHECK_VERSION(2,35,0)
g_type_init();
#endif
(void) FormatLocaleString(version,MaxTextExtent,"RSVG %d.%d.%d",
LIBRSVG_MAJOR_VERSION,LIBRSVG_MINOR_VERSION,LIBRSVG_MICRO_VERSION);
#endif
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_XML_DELEGATE)
xmlInitParser();
#endif
entry=SetMagickInfo("SVG");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_XML_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadSVGImage;
#endif
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteSVGImage;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Scalable Vector Graphics");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/svg+xml");
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsSVG;
entry->module=ConstantString("SVG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("SVGZ");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_XML_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadSVGImage;
#endif
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteSVGImage;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Compressed Scalable Vector Graphics");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/svg+xml");
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsSVG;
entry->module=ConstantString("SVG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("MSVG");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_XML_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadSVGImage;
#endif
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteSVGImage;
entry->blob_support=MagickFalse;
entry->seekable_stream=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("ImageMagick's own SVG internal renderer");
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsSVG;
entry->module=ConstantString("SVG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool param_defined(const char* name) {
char* v = param_without_default(name);
if (NULL == v) return false;
free(v);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMAPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
depth,
packet_size;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Allocate colormap.
*/
if (IsPaletteImage(image,&image->exception) == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageType(image,PaletteType);
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
packet_size=(size_t) (depth/8);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->columns,packet_size*
sizeof(*pixels));
packet_size=(size_t) (image->colors > 256 ? 6UL : 3UL);
colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,packet_size*
sizeof(*colormap));
if ((pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL) ||
(colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Write colormap to file.
*/
q=colormap;
if (image->depth <= 8)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].red;
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].green;
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].blue;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].red >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].red;
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].green >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].green;
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) image->colormap[i].blue >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) image->colormap[i].blue;
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,packet_size*image->colors,colormap);
colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colormap);
/*
Write image pixels to file.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->colors > 256)
*q++=(unsigned char) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) >> 8);
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in SIXEL, PDB, MAP, and CALS coders (bug report from Donghai Zhu)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InsertGDataCachePathsPermissions(
Profile* profile,
scoped_ptr<std::vector<FilePath> > gdata_paths,
std::vector<std::pair<FilePath, int> >* cache_paths,
const base::Closure& callback) {
DCHECK(profile);
DCHECK(gdata_paths.get());
DCHECK(cache_paths);
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
GDataFileSystem* file_system = GetGDataFileSystem(profile);
if (!file_system || gdata_paths->empty()) {
callback.Run();
return;
}
FilePath gdata_path = gdata_paths->back();
gdata_paths->pop_back();
file_system->GetFileInfoByPath(
gdata_path,
base::Bind(&OnGetFileInfoForInsertGDataCachePathsPermissions,
profile,
cache_paths,
base::Bind(&InsertGDataCachePathsPermissions,
profile,
base::Passed(&gdata_paths),
cache_paths,
callback)));
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: KURL PageSerializer::urlForBlankFrame(Frame* frame)
{
HashMap<Frame*, KURL>::iterator iter = m_blankFrameURLs.find(frame);
if (iter != m_blankFrameURLs.end())
return iter->value;
String url = "wyciwyg://frame/" + String::number(m_blankFrameCounter++);
KURL fakeURL(ParsedURLString, url);
m_blankFrameURLs.add(frame, fakeURL);
return fakeURL;
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 118,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hns_tx_timeout_reset(struct hns_nic_priv *priv)
{
/* Do the reset outside of interrupt context */
if (!test_bit(NIC_STATE_DOWN, &priv->state)) {
set_bit(NIC_STATE2_RESET_REQUESTED, &priv->state);
netdev_warn(priv->netdev,
"initiating reset due to tx timeout(%llu,0x%lx)\n",
priv->tx_timeout_count, priv->state);
priv->tx_timeout_count++;
hns_nic_task_schedule(priv);
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 85,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
ktime_t start, cur;
DECLARE_SWAITQUEUE(wait);
bool waited = false;
u64 block_ns;
start = cur = ktime_get();
if (vcpu->halt_poll_ns) {
ktime_t stop = ktime_add_ns(ktime_get(), vcpu->halt_poll_ns);
++vcpu->stat.halt_attempted_poll;
do {
/*
* This sets KVM_REQ_UNHALT if an interrupt
* arrives.
*/
if (kvm_vcpu_check_block(vcpu) < 0) {
++vcpu->stat.halt_successful_poll;
if (!vcpu_valid_wakeup(vcpu))
++vcpu->stat.halt_poll_invalid;
goto out;
}
cur = ktime_get();
} while (single_task_running() && ktime_before(cur, stop));
}
kvm_arch_vcpu_blocking(vcpu);
for (;;) {
prepare_to_swait_exclusive(&vcpu->wq, &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (kvm_vcpu_check_block(vcpu) < 0)
break;
waited = true;
schedule();
}
finish_swait(&vcpu->wq, &wait);
cur = ktime_get();
kvm_arch_vcpu_unblocking(vcpu);
out:
block_ns = ktime_to_ns(cur) - ktime_to_ns(start);
if (!vcpu_valid_wakeup(vcpu))
shrink_halt_poll_ns(vcpu);
else if (halt_poll_ns) {
if (block_ns <= vcpu->halt_poll_ns)
;
/* we had a long block, shrink polling */
else if (vcpu->halt_poll_ns && block_ns > halt_poll_ns)
shrink_halt_poll_ns(vcpu);
/* we had a short halt and our poll time is too small */
else if (vcpu->halt_poll_ns < halt_poll_ns &&
block_ns < halt_poll_ns)
grow_halt_poll_ns(vcpu);
} else
vcpu->halt_poll_ns = 0;
trace_kvm_vcpu_wakeup(block_ns, waited, vcpu_valid_wakeup(vcpu));
kvm_arch_vcpu_block_finish(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 91,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcm_loop_tpg_release_fabric_acl(
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
struct se_node_acl *se_nacl)
{
struct tcm_loop_nacl *tl_nacl = container_of(se_nacl,
struct tcm_loop_nacl, se_node_acl);
kfree(tl_nacl);
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool readNumber(v8::Handle<v8::Value>* value)
{
double number;
if (!doReadNumber(&number))
return false;
*value = v8::Number::New(isolate(), number);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct perf_event *event = vma->vm_file->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *rb = ring_buffer_get(event);
struct user_struct *mmap_user = rb->mmap_user;
int mmap_locked = rb->mmap_locked;
unsigned long size = perf_data_size(rb);
if (event->pmu->event_unmapped)
event->pmu->event_unmapped(event);
/*
* rb->aux_mmap_count will always drop before rb->mmap_count and
* event->mmap_count, so it is ok to use event->mmap_mutex to
* serialize with perf_mmap here.
*/
if (rb_has_aux(rb) && vma->vm_pgoff == rb->aux_pgoff &&
atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&rb->aux_mmap_count, &event->mmap_mutex)) {
atomic_long_sub(rb->aux_nr_pages, &mmap_user->locked_vm);
vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm -= rb->aux_mmap_locked;
rb_free_aux(rb);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
}
atomic_dec(&rb->mmap_count);
if (!atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&event->mmap_count, &event->mmap_mutex))
goto out_put;
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/* If there's still other mmap()s of this buffer, we're done. */
if (atomic_read(&rb->mmap_count))
goto out_put;
/*
* No other mmap()s, detach from all other events that might redirect
* into the now unreachable buffer. Somewhat complicated by the
* fact that rb::event_lock otherwise nests inside mmap_mutex.
*/
again:
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(event, &rb->event_list, rb_entry) {
if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&event->refcount)) {
/*
* This event is en-route to free_event() which will
* detach it and remove it from the list.
*/
continue;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
/*
* Check we didn't race with perf_event_set_output() which can
* swizzle the rb from under us while we were waiting to
* acquire mmap_mutex.
*
* If we find a different rb; ignore this event, a next
* iteration will no longer find it on the list. We have to
* still restart the iteration to make sure we're not now
* iterating the wrong list.
*/
if (event->rb == rb)
ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
put_event(event);
/*
* Restart the iteration; either we're on the wrong list or
* destroyed its integrity by doing a deletion.
*/
goto again;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* It could be there's still a few 0-ref events on the list; they'll
* get cleaned up by free_event() -- they'll also still have their
* ref on the rb and will free it whenever they are done with it.
*
* Aside from that, this buffer is 'fully' detached and unmapped,
* undo the VM accounting.
*/
atomic_long_sub((size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1, &mmap_user->locked_vm);
vma->vm_mm->pinned_vm -= mmap_locked;
free_uid(mmap_user);
out_put:
ring_buffer_put(rb); /* could be last */
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
int res = 0;
switch (cr) {
case 0:
res = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr0(vcpu), val));
break;
case 2:
vcpu->arch.cr2 = val;
break;
case 3:
res = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
break;
case 4:
res = kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr4(vcpu), val));
break;
case 8:
res = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, val);
break;
default:
kvm_err("%s: unexpected cr %u\n", __func__, cr);
res = -1;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void writeArrayBufferView(const ArrayBufferView& arrayBufferView)
{
append(ArrayBufferViewTag);
#if ENABLE(ASSERT)
const ArrayBuffer& arrayBuffer = *arrayBufferView.buffer();
ASSERT(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(arrayBuffer.data()) + arrayBufferView.byteOffset() ==
static_cast<const uint8_t*>(arrayBufferView.baseAddress()));
#endif
ArrayBufferView::ViewType type = arrayBufferView.type();
if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeInt8)
append(ByteArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeUint8Clamped)
append(UnsignedByteClampedArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeUint8)
append(UnsignedByteArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeInt16)
append(ShortArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeUint16)
append(UnsignedShortArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeInt32)
append(IntArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeUint32)
append(UnsignedIntArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeFloat32)
append(FloatArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeFloat64)
append(DoubleArrayTag);
else if (type == ArrayBufferView::TypeDataView)
append(DataViewTag);
else
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
doWriteUint32(arrayBufferView.byteOffset());
doWriteUint32(arrayBufferView.byteLength());
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ContentRestrictionsChanged(WebContents* source) {
command_controller_->ContentRestrictionsChanged();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long cr2,
int emulation_type,
void *insn,
int insn_len)
{
int r;
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
bool writeback = true;
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
if (!(emulation_type & EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE)) {
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ctxt->interruptibility = 0;
ctxt->have_exception = false;
ctxt->perm_ok = false;
ctxt->only_vendor_specific_insn
= emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD;
r = x86_decode_insn(ctxt, insn, insn_len);
trace_kvm_emulate_insn_start(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.insn_emulation;
if (r != EMULATION_OK) {
if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
if (reexecute_instruction(vcpu, cr2))
return EMULATE_DONE;
if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
return handle_emulation_failure(vcpu);
}
}
if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) {
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->_eip);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
if (retry_instruction(ctxt, cr2, emulation_type))
return EMULATE_DONE;
/* this is needed for vmware backdoor interface to work since it
changes registers values during IO operation */
if (vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu) {
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = false;
memcpy(ctxt->regs, vcpu->arch.regs, sizeof ctxt->regs);
}
restart:
r = x86_emulate_insn(ctxt);
if (r == EMULATION_INTERCEPTED)
return EMULATE_DONE;
if (r == EMULATION_FAILED) {
if (reexecute_instruction(vcpu, cr2))
return EMULATE_DONE;
return handle_emulation_failure(vcpu);
}
if (ctxt->have_exception) {
inject_emulated_exception(vcpu);
r = EMULATE_DONE;
} else if (vcpu->arch.pio.count) {
if (!vcpu->arch.pio.in)
vcpu->arch.pio.count = 0;
else
writeback = false;
r = EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
} else if (vcpu->mmio_needed) {
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
writeback = false;
r = EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
} else if (r == EMULATION_RESTART)
goto restart;
else
r = EMULATE_DONE;
if (writeback) {
toggle_interruptibility(vcpu, ctxt->interruptibility);
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
memcpy(vcpu->arch.regs, ctxt->regs, sizeof ctxt->regs);
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
} else
vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = true;
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int fz_colorspace_is_gray(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return cs && cs->type == FZ_COLORSPACE_GRAY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bdrv_open_common(BlockDriverState *bs, BlockDriverState *file,
QDict *options, int flags, BlockDriver *drv, Error **errp)
{
int ret, open_flags;
const char *filename;
const char *node_name = NULL;
Error *local_err = NULL;
assert(drv != NULL);
assert(bs->file == NULL);
assert(options != NULL && bs->options != options);
if (file != NULL) {
filename = file->filename;
} else {
filename = qdict_get_try_str(options, "filename");
}
if (drv->bdrv_needs_filename && !filename) {
error_setg(errp, "The '%s' block driver requires a file name",
drv->format_name);
return -EINVAL;
}
trace_bdrv_open_common(bs, filename ?: "", flags, drv->format_name);
node_name = qdict_get_try_str(options, "node-name");
ret = bdrv_assign_node_name(bs, node_name, errp);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
qdict_del(options, "node-name");
/* bdrv_open() with directly using a protocol as drv. This layer is already
* opened, so assign it to bs (while file becomes a closed BlockDriverState)
* and return immediately. */
if (file != NULL && drv->bdrv_file_open) {
bdrv_swap(file, bs);
return 0;
}
bs->open_flags = flags;
bs->guest_block_size = 512;
bs->request_alignment = 512;
bs->zero_beyond_eof = true;
open_flags = bdrv_open_flags(bs, flags);
bs->read_only = !(open_flags & BDRV_O_RDWR);
if (use_bdrv_whitelist && !bdrv_is_whitelisted(drv, bs->read_only)) {
error_setg(errp,
!bs->read_only && bdrv_is_whitelisted(drv, true)
? "Driver '%s' can only be used for read-only devices"
: "Driver '%s' is not whitelisted",
drv->format_name);
return -ENOTSUP;
}
assert(bs->copy_on_read == 0); /* bdrv_new() and bdrv_close() make it so */
if (flags & BDRV_O_COPY_ON_READ) {
if (!bs->read_only) {
bdrv_enable_copy_on_read(bs);
} else {
error_setg(errp, "Can't use copy-on-read on read-only device");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (filename != NULL) {
pstrcpy(bs->filename, sizeof(bs->filename), filename);
} else {
bs->filename[0] = '\0';
}
bs->drv = drv;
bs->opaque = g_malloc0(drv->instance_size);
bs->enable_write_cache = !!(flags & BDRV_O_CACHE_WB);
/* Open the image, either directly or using a protocol */
if (drv->bdrv_file_open) {
assert(file == NULL);
assert(!drv->bdrv_needs_filename || filename != NULL);
ret = drv->bdrv_file_open(bs, options, open_flags, &local_err);
} else {
if (file == NULL) {
error_setg(errp, "Can't use '%s' as a block driver for the "
"protocol level", drv->format_name);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto free_and_fail;
}
bs->file = file;
ret = drv->bdrv_open(bs, options, open_flags, &local_err);
}
if (ret < 0) {
if (local_err) {
error_propagate(errp, local_err);
} else if (bs->filename[0]) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not open '%s'", bs->filename);
} else {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not open image");
}
goto free_and_fail;
}
ret = refresh_total_sectors(bs, bs->total_sectors);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not refresh total sector count");
goto free_and_fail;
}
bdrv_refresh_limits(bs);
assert(bdrv_opt_mem_align(bs) != 0);
assert((bs->request_alignment != 0) || bs->sg);
#ifndef _WIN32
if (bs->is_temporary) {
assert(bs->filename[0] != '\0');
unlink(bs->filename);
}
#endif
return 0;
free_and_fail:
bs->file = NULL;
g_free(bs->opaque);
bs->opaque = NULL;
bs->drv = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DidConsume(int bytes) {
SetOffset(used_ + bytes);
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int ip6_hashfn(struct inet_frag_queue *q)
{
struct frag_queue *fq;
fq = container_of(q, struct frag_queue, q);
return inet6_hash_frag(fq->id, &fq->saddr, &fq->daddr, ip6_frags.rnd);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: discard overlapping fragment
RFC5722 prohibits reassembling fragments when some data overlaps.
Bug spotted by Zhang Zuotao <zuotao.zhang@6wind.com>.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringCustomStringAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueString(info, imp->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::customContentStringAttrAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport Image *SmushImages(const Image *images,
const MagickBooleanType stack,const ssize_t offset,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SmushImageTag "Smush/Image"
const Image
*image;
Image
*smush_image;
MagickBooleanType
proceed,
status;
MagickOffsetType
n;
PixelTrait
alpha_trait;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register const Image
*next;
size_t
height,
number_images,
width;
ssize_t
x_offset,
y_offset;
/*
Compute maximum area of smushed area.
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=images;
alpha_trait=image->alpha_trait;
number_images=1;
width=image->columns;
height=image->rows;
next=GetNextImageInList(image);
for ( ; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
if (next->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
number_images++;
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
if (next->columns > width)
width=next->columns;
height+=next->rows;
if (next->previous != (Image *) NULL)
height+=offset;
continue;
}
width+=next->columns;
if (next->previous != (Image *) NULL)
width+=offset;
if (next->rows > height)
height=next->rows;
}
/*
Smush images.
*/
smush_image=CloneImage(image,width,height,MagickTrue,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(smush_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
smush_image=DestroyImage(smush_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
smush_image->alpha_trait=alpha_trait;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(smush_image,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
x_offset=0;
y_offset=0;
for (n=0; n < (MagickOffsetType) number_images; n++)
{
SetGeometry(smush_image,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,&geometry);
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
x_offset-=geometry.x;
y_offset-=SmushYGap(smush_image,image,offset,exception);
}
else
{
x_offset-=SmushXGap(smush_image,image,offset,exception);
y_offset-=geometry.y;
}
status=CompositeImage(smush_image,image,OverCompositeOp,MagickTrue,x_offset,
y_offset,exception);
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,SmushImageTag,n,number_images);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
if (stack == MagickFalse)
{
x_offset+=(ssize_t) image->columns;
y_offset=0;
}
else
{
x_offset=0;
y_offset+=(ssize_t) image->rows;
}
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (stack == MagickFalse)
smush_image->columns=(size_t) x_offset;
else
smush_image->rows=(size_t) y_offset;
if (status == MagickFalse)
smush_image=DestroyImage(smush_image);
return(smush_image);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_crc_finish(png_structrp png_ptr, png_uint_32 skip)
{
/* The size of the local buffer for inflate is a good guess as to a
* reasonable size to use for buffering reads from the application.
*/
while (skip > 0)
{
png_uint_32 len;
png_byte tmpbuf[PNG_INFLATE_BUF_SIZE];
len = (sizeof tmpbuf);
if (len > skip)
len = skip;
skip -= len;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, tmpbuf, len);
}
if (png_crc_error(png_ptr) != 0)
{
if (PNG_CHUNK_ANCILLARY(png_ptr->chunk_name) != 0 ?
(png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_CRC_ANCILLARY_NOWARN) == 0 :
(png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_CRC_CRITICAL_USE) != 0)
{
png_chunk_warning(png_ptr, "CRC error");
}
else
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "CRC error");
return (1);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_pit_load_count(struct kvm *kvm, int channel, u32 val, int hpet_legacy_start)
{
u8 saved_mode;
if (hpet_legacy_start) {
/* save existing mode for later reenablement */
saved_mode = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].mode;
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].mode = 0xff; /* disable timer */
pit_load_count(kvm, channel, val);
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].mode = saved_mode;
} else {
pit_load_count(kvm, channel, val);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 37,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: close_log_file(void)
{
if (log_file) {
fclose(log_file);
log_file = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 76,093
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: catenate_stringinfo_string(StringInfo buffer, const char *addon)
{
/* custom version of cstring_to_text_with_len */
int buflen = buffer->len;
int addlen = strlen(addon);
text *result = (text *) palloc(buflen + addlen + VARHDRSZ);
SET_VARSIZE(result, buflen + addlen + VARHDRSZ);
memcpy(VARDATA(result), buffer->data, buflen);
memcpy(VARDATA(result) + buflen, addon, addlen);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::DidMoveTreeToNewDocument(const Node& root) {
DCHECK_NE(root.GetDocument(), this);
if (!ranges_.IsEmpty()) {
AttachedRangeSet ranges = ranges_;
for (Range* range : ranges)
range->UpdateOwnerDocumentIfNeeded();
}
NotifyMoveTreeToNewDocument(root);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cryp_set_dma_transfer(struct cryp_ctx *ctx,
struct scatterlist *sg,
int len,
enum dma_data_direction direction)
{
struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *desc;
struct dma_chan *channel = NULL;
dma_cookie_t cookie;
dev_dbg(ctx->device->dev, "[%s]: ", __func__);
if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED((u32)sg, 4))) {
dev_err(ctx->device->dev, "[%s]: Data in sg list isn't "
"aligned! Addr: 0x%08x", __func__, (u32)sg);
return -EFAULT;
}
switch (direction) {
case DMA_TO_DEVICE:
channel = ctx->device->dma.chan_mem2cryp;
ctx->device->dma.sg_src = sg;
ctx->device->dma.sg_src_len = dma_map_sg(channel->device->dev,
ctx->device->dma.sg_src,
ctx->device->dma.nents_src,
direction);
if (!ctx->device->dma.sg_src_len) {
dev_dbg(ctx->device->dev,
"[%s]: Could not map the sg list (TO_DEVICE)",
__func__);
return -EFAULT;
}
dev_dbg(ctx->device->dev, "[%s]: Setting up DMA for buffer "
"(TO_DEVICE)", __func__);
desc = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(channel,
ctx->device->dma.sg_src,
ctx->device->dma.sg_src_len,
direction, DMA_CTRL_ACK);
break;
case DMA_FROM_DEVICE:
channel = ctx->device->dma.chan_cryp2mem;
ctx->device->dma.sg_dst = sg;
ctx->device->dma.sg_dst_len = dma_map_sg(channel->device->dev,
ctx->device->dma.sg_dst,
ctx->device->dma.nents_dst,
direction);
if (!ctx->device->dma.sg_dst_len) {
dev_dbg(ctx->device->dev,
"[%s]: Could not map the sg list (FROM_DEVICE)",
__func__);
return -EFAULT;
}
dev_dbg(ctx->device->dev, "[%s]: Setting up DMA for buffer "
"(FROM_DEVICE)", __func__);
desc = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(channel,
ctx->device->dma.sg_dst,
ctx->device->dma.sg_dst_len,
direction,
DMA_CTRL_ACK |
DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT);
desc->callback = cryp_dma_out_callback;
desc->callback_param = ctx;
break;
default:
dev_dbg(ctx->device->dev, "[%s]: Invalid DMA direction",
__func__);
return -EFAULT;
}
cookie = dmaengine_submit(desc);
dma_async_issue_pending(channel);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_cmd_hb_timer_update(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
struct sctp_transport *t)
{
/* Update the heartbeat timer. */
if (!mod_timer(&t->hb_timer, sctp_transport_timeout(t)))
sctp_transport_hold(t);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_find_changing_element(const byte *line, int x, int w)
{
int a, b;
if (line == 0)
return w;
if (x == -1) {
a = 0;
x = 0;
} else {
}
while (x < w) {
b = getbit(line, x);
if (a != b)
break;
x++;
}
return x;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Wait() {
if (web_contents()->GetController().GetVisibleEntry())
return;
run_loop_.Run();
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit MockTabStripModelObserver(TabStripModel* model)
: empty_(true),
model_(model) {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerWebKitThread::removeFromSuperlayer()
{
if (m_superlayer)
m_superlayer->removeSublayerOrOverlay(this);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] GraphicsLayer: rename notifySyncRequired to notifyFlushRequired
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111997
Patch by Alberto Garcia <agarcia@igalia.com> on 2013-03-11
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
This changed in r130439 but the old name was introduced again by
mistake in r144465.
* platform/graphics/blackberry/GraphicsLayerBlackBerry.h:
(WebCore::GraphicsLayerBlackBerry::notifyFlushRequired):
* platform/graphics/blackberry/LayerWebKitThread.cpp:
(WebCore::LayerWebKitThread::setNeedsCommit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145363 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 119,112
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.