instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOLEAN btif_hl_find_avail_app_idx(UINT8 *p_idx){
BOOLEAN found = FALSE;
UINT8 i;
for (i=0; i < BTA_HL_NUM_APPS ; i ++)
{
if (!btif_hl_cb.acb[i].in_use)
{
found = TRUE;
*p_idx = i;
break;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s found=%d app_idx=%d", __FUNCTION__, found, i);
return found;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_ext_insert_index(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *curp,
int logical, ext4_fsblk_t ptr)
{
struct ext4_extent_idx *ix;
int len, err;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, curp);
if (err)
return err;
BUG_ON(logical == le32_to_cpu(curp->p_idx->ei_block));
len = EXT_MAX_INDEX(curp->p_hdr) - curp->p_idx;
if (logical > le32_to_cpu(curp->p_idx->ei_block)) {
/* insert after */
if (curp->p_idx != EXT_LAST_INDEX(curp->p_hdr)) {
len = (len - 1) * sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx);
len = len < 0 ? 0 : len;
ext_debug("insert new index %d after: %llu. "
"move %d from 0x%p to 0x%p\n",
logical, ptr, len,
(curp->p_idx + 1), (curp->p_idx + 2));
memmove(curp->p_idx + 2, curp->p_idx + 1, len);
}
ix = curp->p_idx + 1;
} else {
/* insert before */
len = len * sizeof(struct ext4_extent_idx);
len = len < 0 ? 0 : len;
ext_debug("insert new index %d before: %llu. "
"move %d from 0x%p to 0x%p\n",
logical, ptr, len,
curp->p_idx, (curp->p_idx + 1));
memmove(curp->p_idx + 1, curp->p_idx, len);
ix = curp->p_idx;
}
ix->ei_block = cpu_to_le32(logical);
ext4_idx_store_pblock(ix, ptr);
le16_add_cpu(&curp->p_hdr->eh_entries, 1);
BUG_ON(le16_to_cpu(curp->p_hdr->eh_entries)
> le16_to_cpu(curp->p_hdr->eh_max));
BUG_ON(ix > EXT_LAST_INDEX(curp->p_hdr));
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, curp);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AsyncFileSystemChromium::fileExists(const KURL& path, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
m_webFileSystem->fileExists(path, new WebKit::WebFileSystemCallbacksImpl(callbacks));
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 102,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::DeleteUIResource(cc::UIResourceId resource_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("compositor", "CompositorImpl::DeleteUIResource");
host_->GetUIResourceManager()->DeleteUIResource(resource_id);
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Condor_Auth_SSL :: client_share_status( int client_status )
{
int server_status;
if( receive_status( server_status ) == AUTH_SSL_ERROR ) {
return AUTH_SSL_ERROR;
}
if( send_status( client_status ) == AUTH_SSL_ERROR ) {
return AUTH_SSL_ERROR;
}
return server_status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit eseqiv_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&eseqiv_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> BackendImpl::OpenNextEntryImpl(
Rankings::Iterator* iterator) {
if (disabled_)
return NULL;
const int kListsToSearch = 3;
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> entries[kListsToSearch];
if (!iterator->my_rankings) {
iterator->my_rankings = &rankings_;
bool ret = false;
for (int i = 0; i < kListsToSearch; i++) {
ret |= OpenFollowingEntryFromList(static_cast<Rankings::List>(i),
&iterator->nodes[i], &entries[i]);
}
if (!ret) {
iterator->Reset();
return NULL;
}
} else {
for (int i = 0; i < kListsToSearch; i++) {
if (iterator->list == i) {
OpenFollowingEntryFromList(iterator->list, &iterator->nodes[i],
&entries[i]);
} else {
entries[i] = GetEnumeratedEntry(iterator->nodes[i],
static_cast<Rankings::List>(i));
}
}
}
int newest = -1;
int oldest = -1;
Time access_times[kListsToSearch];
for (int i = 0; i < kListsToSearch; i++) {
if (entries[i].get()) {
access_times[i] = entries[i]->GetLastUsed();
if (newest < 0) {
DCHECK_LT(oldest, 0);
newest = oldest = i;
continue;
}
if (access_times[i] > access_times[newest])
newest = i;
if (access_times[i] < access_times[oldest])
oldest = i;
}
}
if (newest < 0 || oldest < 0) {
iterator->Reset();
return NULL;
}
scoped_refptr<EntryImpl> next_entry = entries[newest];
iterator->list = static_cast<Rankings::List>(newest);
return next_entry;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,265
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImeObserver::HasListener(const std::string& event_name) const {
return extensions::EventRouter::Get(profile_)->HasEventListener(event_name);
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 144,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vhost_memory_reg_sort_cmp(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
const struct vhost_memory_region *r1 = p1, *r2 = p2;
if (r1->guest_phys_addr < r2->guest_phys_addr)
return 1;
if (r1->guest_phys_addr > r2->guest_phys_addr)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static h2_session *h2_session_create_int(conn_rec *c,
request_rec *r,
h2_ctx *ctx,
h2_workers *workers)
{
nghttp2_session_callbacks *callbacks = NULL;
nghttp2_option *options = NULL;
uint32_t n;
apr_pool_t *pool = NULL;
apr_status_t status = apr_pool_create(&pool, c->pool);
h2_session *session;
if (status != APR_SUCCESS) {
return NULL;
}
apr_pool_tag(pool, "h2_session");
session = apr_pcalloc(pool, sizeof(h2_session));
if (session) {
int rv;
nghttp2_mem *mem;
session->id = c->id;
session->c = c;
session->r = r;
session->s = h2_ctx_server_get(ctx);
session->pool = pool;
session->config = h2_config_sget(session->s);
session->workers = workers;
session->state = H2_SESSION_ST_INIT;
session->local.accepting = 1;
session->remote.accepting = 1;
apr_pool_pre_cleanup_register(pool, session, session_pool_cleanup);
session->max_stream_count = h2_config_geti(session->config,
H2_CONF_MAX_STREAMS);
session->max_stream_mem = h2_config_geti(session->config,
H2_CONF_STREAM_MAX_MEM);
status = apr_thread_cond_create(&session->iowait, session->pool);
if (status != APR_SUCCESS) {
return NULL;
}
session->mplx = h2_mplx_create(c, session->pool, session->config,
session->s->timeout, workers);
h2_mplx_set_consumed_cb(session->mplx, update_window, session);
/* Install the connection input filter that feeds the session */
session->cin = h2_filter_cin_create(session->pool,
h2_session_receive, session);
ap_add_input_filter("H2_IN", session->cin, r, c);
h2_conn_io_init(&session->io, c, session->config);
session->bbtmp = apr_brigade_create(session->pool, c->bucket_alloc);
status = init_callbacks(c, &callbacks);
if (status != APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, status, c, APLOGNO(02927)
"nghttp2: error in init_callbacks");
h2_session_destroy(session);
return NULL;
}
rv = nghttp2_option_new(&options);
if (rv != 0) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, APR_EGENERAL, c,
APLOGNO(02928) "nghttp2_option_new: %s",
nghttp2_strerror(rv));
h2_session_destroy(session);
return NULL;
}
nghttp2_option_set_peer_max_concurrent_streams(
options, (uint32_t)session->max_stream_count);
/* We need to handle window updates ourself, otherwise we
* get flooded by nghttp2. */
nghttp2_option_set_no_auto_window_update(options, 1);
if (APLOGctrace6(c)) {
mem = apr_pcalloc(session->pool, sizeof(nghttp2_mem));
mem->mem_user_data = session;
mem->malloc = session_malloc;
mem->free = session_free;
mem->calloc = session_calloc;
mem->realloc = session_realloc;
rv = nghttp2_session_server_new3(&session->ngh2, callbacks,
session, options, mem);
}
else {
rv = nghttp2_session_server_new2(&session->ngh2, callbacks,
session, options);
}
nghttp2_session_callbacks_del(callbacks);
nghttp2_option_del(options);
if (rv != 0) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, APR_EGENERAL, c,
APLOGNO(02929) "nghttp2_session_server_new: %s",
nghttp2_strerror(rv));
h2_session_destroy(session);
return NULL;
}
n = h2_config_geti(session->config, H2_CONF_PUSH_DIARY_SIZE);
session->push_diary = h2_push_diary_create(session->pool, n);
if (APLOGcdebug(c)) {
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, APLOGNO(03200)
"h2_session(%ld) created, max_streams=%d, "
"stream_mem=%d, workers_limit=%d, workers_max=%d, "
"push_diary(type=%d,N=%d)",
session->id, (int)session->max_stream_count,
(int)session->max_stream_mem,
session->mplx->workers_limit,
session->mplx->workers_max,
session->push_diary->dtype,
(int)session->push_diary->N);
}
}
return session;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 48,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XpmCreateDataFromXpmImage(
char ***data_return,
XpmImage *image,
XpmInfo *info)
{
/* calculation variables */
int ErrorStatus;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char **header = NULL, **data, **sptr, **sptr2, *s;
unsigned int header_size, header_nlines;
unsigned int data_size, data_nlines;
unsigned int extensions = 0, ext_size = 0, ext_nlines = 0;
unsigned int offset, l, n;
*data_return = NULL;
extensions = info && (info->valuemask & XpmExtensions)
&& info->nextensions;
/* compute the number of extensions lines and size */
if (extensions)
CountExtensions(info->extensions, info->nextensions,
&ext_size, &ext_nlines);
/*
* alloc a temporary array of char pointer for the header section which
*/
header_nlines = 1 + image->ncolors; /* this may wrap and/or become 0 */
/* 2nd check superfluous if we do not need header_nlines any further */
if(header_nlines <= image->ncolors ||
header_nlines >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return(XpmNoMemory);
header_size = sizeof(char *) * header_nlines;
if (header_size >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return (XpmNoMemory);
header = (char **) XpmCalloc(header_size, sizeof(char *)); /* can we trust image->ncolors */
if (!header)
return (XpmNoMemory);
/* print the hints line */
s = buf;
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, "%d %d %d %d", image->width, image->height,
image->ncolors, image->cpp);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
if (info && (info->valuemask & XpmHotspot)) {
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, " %d %d", info->x_hotspot, info->y_hotspot);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
}
if (extensions) {
strcpy(s, " XPMEXT");
s += 7;
}
l = s - buf + 1;
*header = (char *) XpmMalloc(l);
if (!*header)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
header_size += l;
strcpy(*header, buf);
/* print colors */
ErrorStatus = CreateColors(header + 1, &header_size,
image->colorTable, image->ncolors, image->cpp);
if (ErrorStatus != XpmSuccess)
RETURN(ErrorStatus);
/* now we know the size needed, alloc the data and copy the header lines */
offset = image->width * image->cpp + 1;
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
if( (image->height + ext_nlines) >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size = (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
if( (header_size + ext_size) >= (UINT_MAX - data_size) )
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += header_size + ext_size;
data_nlines = header_nlines + image->height + ext_nlines;
*data = (char *) (data + data_nlines);
/* can header have less elements then n suggests? */
n = image->ncolors;
for (l = 0, sptr = data, sptr2 = header; l <= n && sptr && sptr2; l++, sptr++, sptr2++) {
strcpy(*sptr, *sptr2);
*(sptr + 1) = *sptr + strlen(*sptr2) + 1;
}
/* print pixels */
data[header_nlines] = (char *) data + header_size
+ (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
CreatePixels(data + header_nlines, data_size-header_nlines, image->width, image->height,
image->cpp, image->data, image->colorTable);
/* print extensions */
if (extensions)
CreateExtensions(data + header_nlines + image->height - 1,
data_size - header_nlines - image->height + 1, offset,
info->extensions, info->nextensions,
ext_nlines);
*data_return = data;
ErrorStatus = XpmSuccess;
/* exit point, free only locally allocated variables */
exit:
if (header) {
for (l = 0; l < header_nlines; l++)
if (header[l])
XpmFree(header[l]);
XpmFree(header);
}
return(ErrorStatus);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 165,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0;
unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
unsigned char *q;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
goto retry_cert;
/*
* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
* TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
* switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
* will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
s->first_packet = 1;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->first_packet = 0;
d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/*
* 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
* for session id length
*/
if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
* differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
p += 2;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version &&
s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
: (s->client_version < s->version)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
* number
*/
s->version = s->client_version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
/*
* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
* return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
* cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
if (cookie_length == 0)
return 1;
}
/* load the client random */
memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* get the session-id */
j = *(p++);
if (p + j > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
s->hit = 0;
/*
* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
* renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
* ignore resumption requests with flag
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
* than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this
* for security won't even compile against older library versions).
* 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
* request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
* unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
* SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored.
*/
if ((s->new_session
&& (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
} else {
i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
/*
* Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
* version.
* RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
* with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
* the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
* In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
* will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous
* session */
s->hit = 1;
} else if (i == -1)
goto err;
else { /* i == 0 */
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
}
}
p += j;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* cookie stuff */
if (p + 1 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_len = *(p++);
if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/*
* The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
* HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
* does not cause an overflow.
*/
if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
/* too much data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) {
memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
cookie_len) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
/* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
/* default verification */
else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
cookie_valid = 1;
}
p += cookie_len;
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Select version to use */
if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
} else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
} else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
s->version = s->client_version;
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
}
if (p + 2 > d + n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p, i);
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
/* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) {
goto err;
}
p += i;
/* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
if (s->hit) {
j = 0;
id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
if (c->id == id) {
j = 1;
break;
}
}
/*
* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack:
* CVE-2010-4180.
*/
#if 0
if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
&& (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
/*
* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
* cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
* might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
* chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
* connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
*/
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
s->session->cipher = c;
j = 1;
}
}
#endif
if (j == 0) {
/*
* we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
* to reuse it
*/
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* compression */
i = *(p++);
if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
/* not enough data */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
q = p;
#endif
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (p[j] == 0)
break;
}
p += i;
if (j >= i) {
/* no compress */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
* for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
* calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
* processing to use it in key derivation.
*/
{
unsigned char *pos;
pos = s->s3->server_random;
if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
goto f_err;
}
}
if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
&s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
&pref_cipher,
s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
s->hit = 1;
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
ciphers = NULL;
/* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
pref_cipher =
pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
s->
session->ciphers,
SSL_get_ciphers
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
if (s->cipher_list)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed compression method */
for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
if (comp_id == comp->id) {
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
break;
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
if (q[m] == comp_id)
break;
}
if (m >= i) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
} else if (s->hit)
comp = NULL;
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
if (v == q[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
}
if (done)
break;
}
if (done)
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
else
comp = NULL;
}
#else
/*
* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
/*
* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
*/
if (!s->hit) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
s->session->compress_meth = 0;
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
retry_cert:
if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return -1;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
if (c == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
} else {
/* Session-id reuse */
#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL;
SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) {
sk = s->session->ciphers;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc = c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec = c;
}
if (nc != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc;
else if (ec != NULL)
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec;
else
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
} else
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto f_err;
}
/*-
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
* ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
* s->hit - session reuse flag
* s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
*/
/* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
}
if (ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: update_info_linux_dmmp (Device *device)
{
const gchar *dm_name;
const gchar* const *target_types;
const gchar* const *target_parameters;
gchar *decoded_params;
gboolean is_dmmp;
guint n;
GPtrArray *p;
Device *component;
gchar *s;
is_dmmp = FALSE;
p = NULL;
decoded_params = NULL;
dm_name = g_udev_device_get_property (device->priv->d, "DM_NAME");
if (dm_name == NULL)
goto out;
target_types = g_udev_device_get_property_as_strv (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_TYPE");
if (target_types == NULL || g_strcmp0 (target_types[0], "multipath") != 0)
goto out;
if (device->priv->slaves_objpath->len == 0)
goto out;
target_parameters = g_udev_device_get_property_as_strv (device->priv->d, "UDISKS_DM_TARGETS_PARAMS");
if (target_parameters == NULL || g_strv_length ((gchar **) target_parameters) != 1)
goto out;
decoded_params = decode_udev_encoded_string (target_parameters[0]);
device_set_linux_dmmp_name (device, dm_name);
device_set_linux_dmmp_parameters (device, decoded_params);
p = g_ptr_array_new ();
component = NULL;
for (n = 0; n < device->priv->slaves_objpath->len; n++)
{
const gchar *component_objpath = device->priv->slaves_objpath->pdata[n];
if (component == NULL)
{
component = daemon_local_find_by_object_path (device->priv->daemon, component_objpath);
}
g_ptr_array_add (p, (gpointer) component_objpath);
}
g_ptr_array_add (p, NULL);
device_set_linux_dmmp_slaves (device, (GStrv) p->pdata);
if (component == NULL)
goto out;
/* Copy only drive properties used for identification to the multipath device. Yes,
* this means, we'll get serial/wwn clashes but this is already so for each path.
*
* Also, clients *should* be smart about things and special-handle linux_dmmp and
* linux_dmmp_component devices.
*/
device_set_drive_vendor (device, component->priv->drive_vendor);
device_set_drive_model (device, component->priv->drive_model);
device_set_drive_revision (device, component->priv->drive_revision);
device_set_drive_serial (device, component->priv->drive_serial);
device_set_drive_wwn (device, component->priv->drive_wwn);
/* connection interface */
device_set_drive_connection_interface (device, "virtual_multipath");
device_set_drive_connection_speed (device, 0);
s = g_strdup_printf ("/dev/mapper/%s", dm_name);
device_set_device_file_presentation (device, s);
g_free (s);
is_dmmp = TRUE;
out:
g_free (decoded_params);
if (p != NULL)
g_ptr_array_free (p, TRUE);
device_set_device_is_linux_dmmp (device, is_dmmp);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fmt_job_stats(char *buf, size_t size, job j)
{
usec t;
uint64_t time_left;
t = now_usec();
if (j->state == JOB_STATE_RESERVED || j->state == JOB_STATE_DELAYED) {
time_left = (j->deadline_at - t) / 1000000;
} else {
time_left = 0;
}
return snprintf(buf, size, STATS_JOB_FMT,
j->id,
j->tube->name,
job_state(j),
j->pri,
(t - j->created_at) / 1000000,
j->delay / 1000000,
j->ttr / 1000000,
time_left,
j->reserve_ct,
j->timeout_ct,
j->release_ct,
j->bury_ct,
j->kick_ct);
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btrfs_test_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, 0, (u64)-1, 0);
kmem_cache_free(btrfs_inode_cachep, BTRFS_I(inode));
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ib_uverbs_cq_event_handler(struct ib_event *event, void *context_ptr)
{
struct ib_ucq_object *uobj = container_of(event->element.cq->uobject,
struct ib_ucq_object, uobject);
ib_uverbs_async_handler(uobj->uverbs_file, uobj->uobject.user_handle,
event->event, &uobj->async_list,
&uobj->async_events_reported);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void RunWork() {
if (!base::FlushPlatformFile(file_))
set_error_code(base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 97,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *p,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t pms_offset )
{
int ret;
size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
unsigned char ver[2];
unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48];
unsigned char mask;
size_t i, peer_pmslen;
unsigned int diff;
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
{
if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) ||
*p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
}
#endif
if( p + len != end )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE );
}
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver,
ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport, ver );
/*
* Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
* must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a
* bad_record_mac later in the handshake.
* Also, avoid data-dependant branches here to protect against
* timing-based variants.
*/
ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), p, len,
peer_pms, &peer_pmslen,
sizeof( peer_pms ),
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
diff = (unsigned int) ret;
diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48;
diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0];
diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL)
if( diff != 0 )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) );
#endif
if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset ||
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
/* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
#endif
mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) );
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ )
pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 86,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileReaderLoader::Cleanup() {
handle_watcher_.Cancel();
consumer_handle_.reset();
if (error_code_) {
raw_data_.reset();
string_result_ = "";
is_raw_data_converted_ = true;
decoder_.reset();
array_buffer_result_ = nullptr;
UnadjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 155,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_open_uri)
{
char *valid_file = NULL;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *source;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
int source_len;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
ze_xmlwriter_object *ze_obj = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
xmlOutputBufferPtr out_buffer;
void *ioctx;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
if (this) {
/* We do not use XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT, xmlwriter init function here */
ze_obj = (ze_xmlwriter_object*) zend_object_store_get_object(this TSRMLS_CC);
}
#endif
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string as source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
valid_file = _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to resolve file path");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* TODO: Fix either the PHP stream or libxml APIs: it can then detect when a given
path is valid and not report out of memory error. Once it is done, remove the
directory check in _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path */
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
ioctx = php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(valid_file TSRMLS_CC);
if (ioctx == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out_buffer = xmlOutputBufferCreateIO(php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_write,
php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_close, ioctx, NULL);
if (out_buffer == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create output buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ptr = xmlNewTextWriter(out_buffer);
#else
ptr = xmlNewTextWriterFilename(valid_file, 0);
#endif
if (!ptr) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern = emalloc(sizeof(xmlwriter_object));
intern->ptr = ptr;
intern->output = NULL;
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
intern->uri_output = out_buffer;
#else
if (this) {
if (ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr) {
xmlwriter_free_resource_ptr(ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr = intern;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else
#endif
{
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value,intern,le_xmlwriter);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 1
| 165,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FreeMatShaper(cmsContext ContextID, void* Data)
{
if (Data != NULL) _cmsFree(ContextID, Data);
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* CMSEXPORT cmsAllocNamedColorList(cmsContext ContextID, cmsUInt32Number n, cmsUInt32Number ColorantCount, const char* Prefix, const char* Suffix)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST));
if (v == NULL) return NULL;
v ->List = NULL;
v ->nColors = 0;
v ->ContextID = ContextID;
while (v -> Allocated < n)
GrowNamedColorList(v);
strncpy(v ->Prefix, Prefix, sizeof(v ->Prefix));
strncpy(v ->Suffix, Suffix, sizeof(v ->Suffix));
v->Prefix[32] = v->Suffix[32] = 0;
v -> ColorantCount = ColorantCount;
return v;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 1
| 166,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mget(struct magic_set *ms, const unsigned char *s, struct magic *m,
size_t nbytes, size_t o, unsigned int cont_level, int mode, int text,
int flip, int recursion_level, int *printed_something,
int *need_separator, int *returnval)
{
uint32_t soffset, offset = ms->offset;
uint32_t lhs;
int rv, oneed_separator, in_type;
char *sbuf, *rbuf;
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
struct mlist ml;
if (recursion_level >= 20) {
file_error(ms, 0, "recursion nesting exceeded");
return -1;
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, m->flag & INDIR, s, (uint32_t)(offset + o),
(uint32_t)nbytes, m) == -1)
return -1;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "mget(type=%d, flag=%x, offset=%u, o=%zu, "
"nbytes=%zu)\n", m->type, m->flag, offset, o, nbytes);
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p, sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
if (m->flag & INDIR) {
int off = m->in_offset;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINDIRECT) {
const union VALUETYPE *q = CAST(const union VALUETYPE *,
((const void *)(s + offset + off)));
switch (cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
off = q->b;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
off = q->h;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[0]<<8)|(q->hs[1]));
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
off = (short)((q->hs[1]<<8)|(q->hs[0]));
break;
case FILE_LONG:
off = q->l;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[0]<<24)|(q->hl[1]<<16)|
(q->hl[2]<<8)|(q->hl[3]));
break;
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_LELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[3]<<24)|(q->hl[2]<<16)|
(q->hl[1]<<8)|(q->hl[0]));
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
off = (int32_t)((q->hl[1]<<24)|(q->hl[0]<<16)|
(q->hl[3]<<8)|(q->hl[2]));
break;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect offs=%u\n", off);
}
switch (in_type = cvt_flip(m->in_type, flip)) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 1))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->b & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->b | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->b ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->b + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->b - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->b * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->b / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->b % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->b;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BESHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hs[0] << 8) | p->hs[1];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hs[1] << 8) | p->hs[0];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->h & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->h | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->h ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->h + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->h - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->h * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->h / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->h % off;
break;
}
}
else
offset = p->h;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_BEID3:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hl[0] << 24) | (p->hl[1] << 16) |
(p->hl[2] << 8) | p->hl[3];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_LEID3:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hl[3] << 24) | (p->hl[2] << 16) |
(p->hl[1] << 8) | p->hl[0];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_MELONG:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
lhs = (p->hl[1] << 24) | (p->hl[0] << 16) |
(p->hl[3] << 8) | p->hl[2];
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = lhs & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = lhs | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = lhs ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = lhs + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = lhs - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = lhs * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = lhs / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = lhs % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = lhs;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
if (off) {
switch (m->in_op & FILE_OPS_MASK) {
case FILE_OPAND:
offset = p->l & off;
break;
case FILE_OPOR:
offset = p->l | off;
break;
case FILE_OPXOR:
offset = p->l ^ off;
break;
case FILE_OPADD:
offset = p->l + off;
break;
case FILE_OPMINUS:
offset = p->l - off;
break;
case FILE_OPMULTIPLY:
offset = p->l * off;
break;
case FILE_OPDIVIDE:
offset = p->l / off;
break;
case FILE_OPMODULO:
offset = p->l % off;
break;
}
} else
offset = p->l;
if (m->in_op & FILE_OPINVERSE)
offset = ~offset;
break;
default:
break;
}
switch (in_type) {
case FILE_LEID3:
case FILE_BEID3:
offset = ((((offset >> 0) & 0x7f) << 0) |
(((offset >> 8) & 0x7f) << 7) |
(((offset >> 16) & 0x7f) << 14) |
(((offset >> 24) & 0x7f) << 21)) + 10;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (m->flag & INDIROFFADD) {
offset += ms->c.li[cont_level-1].off;
if (offset == 0) {
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr,
"indirect *zero* offset\n");
return 0;
}
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect +offs=%u\n", offset);
}
if (mcopy(ms, p, m->type, 0, s, offset, nbytes, m) == -1)
return -1;
ms->offset = offset;
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0) {
mdebug(offset, (char *)(void *)p,
sizeof(union VALUETYPE));
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
file_mdump(m);
#endif
}
}
/* Verify we have enough data to match magic type */
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 1))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 2))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 4))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, 8))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (OFFSET_OOB(nbytes, offset, m->vallen))
return 0;
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
if (offset == 0)
return 0;
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = ms->o.buf;
soffset = ms->offset;
ms->o.buf = NULL;
ms->offset = 0;
rv = file_softmagic(ms, s + offset, nbytes - offset,
recursion_level, BINTEST, text);
if ((ms->flags & MAGIC_DEBUG) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "indirect @offs=%u[%d]\n", offset, rv);
rbuf = ms->o.buf;
ms->o.buf = sbuf;
ms->offset = soffset;
if (rv == 1) {
if ((ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE)) == 0 &&
file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"), offset) == -1) {
free(rbuf);
return -1;
}
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", rbuf) == -1) {
free(rbuf);
return -1;
}
}
free(rbuf);
return rv;
case FILE_USE:
if (nbytes < offset)
return 0;
sbuf = m->value.s;
if (*sbuf == '^') {
sbuf++;
flip = !flip;
}
if (file_magicfind(ms, sbuf, &ml) == -1) {
file_error(ms, 0, "cannot find entry `%s'", sbuf);
return -1;
}
oneed_separator = *need_separator;
if (m->flag & NOSPACE)
*need_separator = 0;
rv = match(ms, ml.magic, ml.nmagic, s, nbytes, offset + o,
mode, text, flip, recursion_level, printed_something,
need_separator, returnval);
if (rv != 1)
*need_separator = oneed_separator;
return rv;
case FILE_NAME:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
return 1;
case FILE_DEFAULT: /* nothing to check */
case FILE_CLEAR:
default:
break;
}
if (!mconvert(ms, m, flip))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Correctly compute the truncated pascal string size (Francisco Alonso and
Jan Kaluza at RedHat)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateTitle(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
int32_t page_id,
const base::string16& title,
base::i18n::TextDirection title_direction) {
SetNotWaitingForResponse();
NavigationEntryImpl* entry = controller_.GetEntryWithPageID(
render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance(), page_id);
NavigationEntryImpl* new_entry = controller_.GetEntryWithUniqueID(
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(render_frame_host)->nav_entry_id());
DCHECK_EQ(entry, new_entry);
if (!entry && render_frame_host != GetMainFrame())
return;
if (!UpdateTitleForEntry(entry, title))
return;
if (entry == controller_.GetEntryAtOffset(0))
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_TITLE);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::resetLinkColor()
{
m_linkColor = Color(0, 0, 238);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(int clientid, unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client *client;
mm_segment_t fs;
int result;
client = clientptr(clientid);
if (client == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
fs = snd_enter_user();
result = snd_seq_do_ioctl(client, cmd, (void __force __user *)arg);
snd_leave_user(fs);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RBinElfSection* get_section_by_name(ELFOBJ *bin, const char *section_name) {
int i;
if (!bin->g_sections) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; !bin->g_sections[i].last; i++) {
if (!strncmp (bin->g_sections[i].name, section_name, ELF_STRING_LENGTH-1)) {
return &bin->g_sections[i];
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttribI4iv(GLuint index,
const volatile GLint* v) {
GLint t[4] = {v[0], v[1], v[2], v[3]};
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttribI4iv", index, t)) {
state_.SetGenericVertexAttribBaseType(
index, SHADER_VARIABLE_INT);
api()->glVertexAttribI4ivFn(index, t);
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init early_coherent_pool(char *p)
{
atomic_pool_size = memparse(p, &p);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 56,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~RenderbufferAttachment() { }
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx,
void *(*allocfunc)(void *, u_int, u_int),
void (*freefunc)(void *, void *))
{
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.opaque = ctx;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.opaque = ctx;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void stroke_list(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stroke_msg_t *msg,
FILE *out)
{
if (msg->list.flags & LIST_CAINFOS)
{
this->ca->list(this->ca, msg, out);
}
this->list->list(this->list, msg, out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 12,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_file_walk(request_rec *r)
{
ap_conf_vector_t *now_merged = NULL;
core_dir_config *dconf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->per_dir_config);
ap_conf_vector_t **sec_ent = NULL;
int num_sec = 0;
walk_cache_t *cache;
const char *test_file;
int cached;
if (dconf->sec_file) {
sec_ent = (ap_conf_vector_t **)dconf->sec_file->elts;
num_sec = dconf->sec_file->nelts;
}
/* To allow broken modules to proceed, we allow missing filenames to pass.
* We will catch it later if it's heading for the core handler.
* directory_walk already posted an INFO note for module debugging.
*/
if (r->filename == NULL) {
return OK;
}
cache = prep_walk_cache(AP_NOTE_FILE_WALK, r);
cached = (cache->cached != NULL);
/* No tricks here, there are just no <Files > to parse in this context.
* We won't destroy the cache, just in case _this_ redirect is later
* redirected again to a context containing the same or similar <Files >.
*/
if (!num_sec) {
return OK;
}
/* Get the basename .. and copy for the cache just
* in case r->filename is munged by another module
*/
test_file = strrchr(r->filename, '/');
if (test_file == NULL) {
test_file = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, r->filename);
}
else {
test_file = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, ++test_file);
}
/* If we have an cache->cached file name that matches test_file,
* and the directory's list of file sections hasn't changed, we
* can skip rewalking the file_walk entries.
*/
if (cached
&& (cache->dir_conf_tested == sec_ent)
&& (strcmp(test_file, cache->cached) == 0)) {
/* Well this looks really familiar! If our end-result (per_dir_result)
* didn't change, we have absolutely nothing to do :)
* Otherwise (as is the case with most dir_merged requests)
* we must merge our dir_conf_merged onto this new r->per_dir_config.
*/
if (r->per_dir_config == cache->per_dir_result) {
return OK;
}
if (cache->walked->nelts) {
now_merged = ((walk_walked_t*)cache->walked->elts)
[cache->walked->nelts - 1].merged;
}
}
else {
/* We start now_merged from NULL since we want to build
* a file section list that can be merged to any dir_walk.
*/
int sec_idx;
int matches = cache->walked->nelts;
int cached_matches = matches;
walk_walked_t *last_walk = (walk_walked_t*)cache->walked->elts;
apr_pool_t *rxpool = NULL;
cached &= auth_internal_per_conf;
cache->cached = test_file;
/* Go through the location entries, and check for matches.
* We apply the directive sections in given order, we should
* really try them with the most general first.
*/
for (sec_idx = 0; sec_idx < num_sec; ++sec_idx) {
core_dir_config *entry_core;
entry_core = ap_get_core_module_config(sec_ent[sec_idx]);
if (entry_core->r) {
int nmatch = 0;
int i;
ap_regmatch_t *pmatch = NULL;
if (entry_core->refs && entry_core->refs->nelts) {
if (!rxpool) {
apr_pool_create(&rxpool, r->pool);
}
nmatch = entry_core->refs->nelts;
pmatch = apr_palloc(rxpool, nmatch*sizeof(ap_regmatch_t));
}
if (ap_regexec(entry_core->r, cache->cached, nmatch, pmatch, 0)) {
continue;
}
for (i = 0; i < nmatch; i++) {
if (pmatch[i].rm_so >= 0 && pmatch[i].rm_eo >= 0 &&
((const char **)entry_core->refs->elts)[i]) {
apr_table_setn(r->subprocess_env,
((const char **)entry_core->refs->elts)[i],
apr_pstrndup(r->pool,
cache->cached + pmatch[i].rm_so,
pmatch[i].rm_eo - pmatch[i].rm_so));
}
}
}
else {
if ((entry_core->d_is_fnmatch
? apr_fnmatch(entry_core->d, cache->cached, APR_FNM_PATHNAME)
: strcmp(entry_core->d, cache->cached))) {
continue;
}
}
/* If we merged this same section last time, reuse it
*/
if (matches) {
if (last_walk->matched == sec_ent[sec_idx]) {
now_merged = last_walk->merged;
++last_walk;
--matches;
continue;
}
/* We fell out of sync. This is our own copy of walked,
* so truncate the remaining matches and reset remaining.
*/
cache->walked->nelts -= matches;
matches = 0;
cached = 0;
}
if (now_merged) {
now_merged = ap_merge_per_dir_configs(r->pool,
now_merged,
sec_ent[sec_idx]);
}
else {
now_merged = sec_ent[sec_idx];
}
last_walk = (walk_walked_t*)apr_array_push(cache->walked);
last_walk->matched = sec_ent[sec_idx];
last_walk->merged = now_merged;
}
if (rxpool) {
apr_pool_destroy(rxpool);
}
/* Whoops - everything matched in sequence, but either the original
* walk found some additional matches (which we need to truncate), or
* this walk found some additional matches.
*/
if (matches) {
cache->walked->nelts -= matches;
cached = 0;
}
else if (cache->walked->nelts > cached_matches) {
cached = 0;
}
}
if (cached
&& r->per_dir_config == cache->dir_conf_merged) {
r->per_dir_config = cache->per_dir_result;
return OK;
}
cache->dir_conf_tested = sec_ent;
cache->dir_conf_merged = r->per_dir_config;
/* Merge our cache->dir_conf_merged construct with the r->per_dir_configs,
* and note the end result to (potentially) skip this step next time.
*/
if (now_merged) {
r->per_dir_config = ap_merge_per_dir_configs(r->pool,
r->per_dir_config,
now_merged);
}
cache->per_dir_result = r->per_dir_config;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::didComposite()
{
if (!m_page->settings()->developerExtrasEnabled())
return;
InspectorInstrumentation::didComposite(m_page);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::startAnimations()
{
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> > timeContainers;
timeContainers.appendRange(m_timeContainers.begin(), m_timeContainers.end());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator end = timeContainers.end();
for (WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<SVGSVGElement> >::iterator itr = timeContainers.begin(); itr != end; ++itr)
(*itr)->timeContainer()->begin();
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_filterbpf_insn (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
proto_tree *tree, *code_tree;
proto_item *ti, *code_ti;
guint8 inst_class;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_filterbpf_insn, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_filterbpf_insn);
code_ti = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_code, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
code_tree = proto_item_add_subtree (code_ti, ett_filterbpf_insn_code);
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_class, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
inst_class = tvb_get_guint8 (tvb, offset + 1) & 0x07;
proto_item_append_text (ti, ": %s", val_to_str_const (inst_class, bpf_class, ""));
switch (inst_class) {
case 0x00: /* ld */
case 0x01: /* ldx */
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_ld_size, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_ld_mode, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
break;
case 0x04: /* alu */
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_src, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_alu_op, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
break;
case 0x05: /* jmp */
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_src, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_jmp_op, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
break;
case 0x06: /* ret */
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_rval, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
break;
case 0x07: /* misc */
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_misc_op, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item (code_tree, hf_code_fields, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
break;
}
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_jt, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_jf, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_instr_value, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
return offset;
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 51,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_attr_leaf_order(
struct xfs_buf *leaf1_bp,
struct xfs_buf *leaf2_bp)
{
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr1;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr2;
struct xfs_mount *mp = leaf1_bp->b_target->bt_mount;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(mp->m_attr_geo, &ichdr1, leaf1_bp->b_addr);
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(mp->m_attr_geo, &ichdr2, leaf2_bp->b_addr);
return xfs_attr3_leaf_order(leaf1_bp, &ichdr1, leaf2_bp, &ichdr2);
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 79,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::applyPendingOrientationIfNeeded()
{
if (d->m_pendingOrientation != -1)
d->setScreenOrientation(d->m_pendingOrientation);
d->m_inputHandler->redrawSpellCheckDialogIfRequired(false /* shouldMoveDialog */);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::IsSlotAssignmentOrLegacyDistributionDirty() const {
if (ChildNeedsDistributionRecalc())
return true;
if (slot_assignment_engine_ &&
slot_assignment_engine_->HasPendingSlotAssignmentRecalc()) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dvcman_free(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, IWTSVirtualChannelManager* pChannelMgr)
{
int i;
IWTSPlugin* pPlugin;
DVCMAN_LISTENER* listener;
DVCMAN* dvcman = (DVCMAN*) pChannelMgr;
UINT error;
ArrayList_Free(dvcman->channels);
for (i = 0; i < dvcman->num_listeners; i++)
{
listener = (DVCMAN_LISTENER*) dvcman->listeners[i];
free(listener->channel_name);
free(listener);
}
dvcman->num_listeners = 0;
for (i = 0; i < dvcman->num_plugins; i++)
{
pPlugin = dvcman->plugins[i];
if (pPlugin->Terminated)
if ((error = pPlugin->Terminated(pPlugin)))
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Terminated failed with error %"PRIu32"!", error);
}
dvcman->num_plugins = 0;
StreamPool_Free(dvcman->pool);
free(dvcman);
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
| 0
| 74,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
struct page *page)
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void t1_subset_charstrings(PDF pdf)
{
cs_entry *ptr;
t1_check_unusual_charstring();
cs_size_pos = (int) (strstr(t1_line_array, charstringname) + strlen(charstringname) - t1_line_array + 1);
/*tex |cs_size_pos| points to the number indicating dict size after |/CharStrings|. */
cs_size = (int) t1_scan_num(t1_line_array + cs_size_pos, 0);
cs_ptr = cs_tab = xtalloc((unsigned) cs_size, cs_entry);
for (ptr = cs_tab; ptr - cs_tab < cs_size; ptr++)
init_cs_entry(ptr);
cs_notdef = NULL;
cs_dict_start = xstrdup(t1_line_array);
t1_getline();
while (t1_cslen) {
store_cs();
t1_getline();
}
cs_dict_end = xstrdup(t1_line_array);
t1_mark_glyphs();
if (subr_tab != NULL) {
if (cs_token_pair == NULL)
formatted_error("type 1","mismatched subroutine begin/end token pairs");
t1_subr_flush();
}
for (cs_counter = 0, ptr = cs_tab; ptr < cs_ptr; ptr++)
if (ptr->used)
cs_counter++;
t1_cs_flush();
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Dispatcher::OnSetSystemFont(const std::string& font_family,
const std::string& font_size) {
system_font_family_ = font_family;
system_font_size_ = font_size;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(PharFileInfo, __destruct)
{
phar_entry_object *entry_obj = (phar_entry_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC); \
if (entry_obj->ent.entry && entry_obj->ent.entry->is_temp_dir) {
if (entry_obj->ent.entry->filename) {
efree(entry_obj->ent.entry->filename);
entry_obj->ent.entry->filename = NULL;
}
efree(entry_obj->ent.entry);
entry_obj->ent.entry = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MediaControlsHeaderView::MediaControlsHeaderView() {
SetLayoutManager(std::make_unique<views::BoxLayout>(
views::BoxLayout::Orientation::kHorizontal, kMediaControlsHeaderInsets,
kMediaControlsHeaderChildSpacing));
auto app_icon_view = std::make_unique<views::ImageView>();
app_icon_view->SetImageSize(gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize));
app_icon_view->SetVerticalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::ImageView::Alignment::kLeading);
app_icon_view->SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kIconPadding));
app_icon_view->SetBackground(
views::CreateRoundedRectBackground(SK_ColorWHITE, kIconCornerRadius));
app_icon_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_icon_view));
gfx::Font default_font;
int font_size_delta = kHeaderTextFontSize - default_font.GetFontSize();
gfx::Font font = default_font.Derive(font_size_delta, gfx::Font::NORMAL,
gfx::Font::Weight::NORMAL);
gfx::FontList font_list(font);
auto app_name_view = std::make_unique<views::Label>();
app_name_view->SetFontList(font_list);
app_name_view->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
app_name_view->SetEnabledColor(SK_ColorWHITE);
app_name_view->SetAutoColorReadabilityEnabled(false);
app_name_view_ = AddChildView(std::move(app_name_view));
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 172,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType EncodeImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
const size_t data_size)
{
#define MaxCode(number_bits) ((one << (number_bits))-1)
#define MaxHashTable 5003
#define MaxGIFBits 12UL
#define MaxGIFTable (1UL << MaxGIFBits)
#define GIFOutputCode(code) \
{ \
/* \
Emit a code. \
*/ \
if (bits > 0) \
datum|=(size_t) (code) << bits; \
else \
datum=(size_t) (code); \
bits+=number_bits; \
while (bits >= 8) \
{ \
/* \
Add a character to current packet. \
*/ \
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff); \
if (length >= 254) \
{ \
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length); \
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet); \
length=0; \
} \
datum>>=8; \
bits-=8; \
} \
if (free_code > max_code) \
{ \
number_bits++; \
if (number_bits == MaxGIFBits) \
max_code=MaxGIFTable; \
else \
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits); \
} \
}
IndexPacket
index;
short
*hash_code,
*hash_prefix,
waiting_code;
size_t
bits,
clear_code,
datum,
end_of_information_code,
free_code,
length,
max_code,
next_pixel,
number_bits,
one,
pass;
ssize_t
displacement,
offset,
k,
y;
unsigned char
*packet,
*hash_suffix;
/*
Allocate encoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
one=1;
packet=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,sizeof(*packet));
hash_code=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_code));
hash_prefix=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_prefix));
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,
sizeof(*hash_suffix));
if ((packet == (unsigned char *) NULL) || (hash_code == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_prefix == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_suffix == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
if (packet != (unsigned char *) NULL)
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
if (hash_code != (short *) NULL)
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
if (hash_prefix != (short *) NULL)
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
if (hash_suffix != (unsigned char *) NULL)
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Initialize GIF encoder.
*/
(void) memset(packet,0,256*sizeof(*packet));
(void) memset(hash_code,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_code));
(void) memset(hash_prefix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_prefix));
(void) memset(hash_suffix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_suffix));
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
clear_code=((short) one << (data_size-1));
end_of_information_code=clear_code+1;
free_code=clear_code+2;
length=0;
datum=0;
bits=0;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
/*
Encode pixels.
*/
offset=0;
pass=0;
waiting_code=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
if (y == 0)
{
waiting_code=(short) (*indexes);
p++;
}
for (x=(ssize_t) (y == 0 ? 1 : 0); x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/*
Probe hash table.
*/
index=(IndexPacket) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) & 0xff);
p++;
k=(ssize_t) (((size_t) index << (MaxGIFBits-8))+waiting_code);
if (k >= MaxHashTable)
k-=MaxHashTable;
next_pixel=MagickFalse;
displacement=1;
if (hash_code[k] > 0)
{
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
continue;
}
if (k != 0)
displacement=MaxHashTable-k;
for ( ; ; )
{
k-=displacement;
if (k < 0)
k+=MaxHashTable;
if (hash_code[k] == 0)
break;
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
next_pixel=MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
if (next_pixel != MagickFalse)
continue;
}
GIFOutputCode(waiting_code);
if (free_code < MaxGIFTable)
{
hash_code[k]=(short) free_code++;
hash_prefix[k]=waiting_code;
hash_suffix[k]=(unsigned char) index;
}
else
{
/*
Fill the hash table with empty entries.
*/
for (k=0; k < MaxHashTable; k++)
hash_code[k]=0;
/*
Reset compressor and issue a clear code.
*/
free_code=clear_code+2;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
}
waiting_code=(short) index;
}
if (image_info->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
}
/*
Flush out the buffered code.
*/
GIFOutputCode(waiting_code);
GIFOutputCode(end_of_information_code);
if (bits > 0)
{
/*
Add a character to current packet.
*/
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff);
if (length >= 254)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
length=0;
}
}
/*
Flush accumulated data.
*/
if (length > 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
}
/*
Free encoder memory.
*/
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1595
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 169,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltApplyStylesheetInternal(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlDocPtr doc,
const char **params, const char *output,
FILE * profile, xsltTransformContextPtr userCtxt)
{
xmlDocPtr res = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlNodePtr root, node;
const xmlChar *method;
const xmlChar *doctypePublic;
const xmlChar *doctypeSystem;
const xmlChar *version;
const xmlChar *encoding;
xsltStackElemPtr variables;
xsltStackElemPtr vptr;
xsltInitGlobals();
if ((style == NULL) || (doc == NULL))
return (NULL);
if (style->internalized == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Stylesheet was not fully internalized !\n");
#endif
}
if (doc->intSubset != NULL) {
/*
* Avoid hitting the DTD when scanning nodes
* but keep it linked as doc->intSubset
*/
xmlNodePtr cur = (xmlNodePtr) doc->intSubset;
if (cur->next != NULL)
cur->next->prev = cur->prev;
if (cur->prev != NULL)
cur->prev->next = cur->next;
if (doc->children == cur)
doc->children = cur->next;
if (doc->last == cur)
doc->last = cur->prev;
cur->prev = cur->next = NULL;
}
/*
* Check for XPath document order availability
*/
root = xmlDocGetRootElement(doc);
if (root != NULL) {
if (((long) root->content) >= 0 && (xslDebugStatus == XSLT_DEBUG_NONE))
xmlXPathOrderDocElems(doc);
}
if (userCtxt != NULL)
ctxt = userCtxt;
else
ctxt = xsltNewTransformContext(style, doc);
if (ctxt == NULL)
return (NULL);
ctxt->initialContextDoc = doc;
ctxt->initialContextNode = (xmlNodePtr) doc;
if (profile != NULL)
ctxt->profile = 1;
if (output != NULL)
ctxt->outputFile = output;
else
ctxt->outputFile = NULL;
/*
* internalize the modes if needed
*/
if (ctxt->dict != NULL) {
if (ctxt->mode != NULL)
ctxt->mode = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->mode, -1);
if (ctxt->modeURI != NULL)
ctxt->modeURI = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->modeURI, -1);
}
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(method, style, method)
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(doctypePublic, style, doctypePublic)
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(doctypeSystem, style, doctypeSystem)
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(version, style, version)
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(encoding, style, encoding)
if ((method != NULL) &&
(!xmlStrEqual(method, (const xmlChar *) "xml")))
{
if (xmlStrEqual(method, (const xmlChar *) "html")) {
ctxt->type = XSLT_OUTPUT_HTML;
if (((doctypePublic != NULL) || (doctypeSystem != NULL))) {
res = htmlNewDoc(doctypeSystem, doctypePublic);
} else {
if (version == NULL) {
xmlDtdPtr dtd;
res = htmlNewDoc(NULL, NULL);
/*
* Make sure no DTD node is generated in this case
*/
if (res != NULL) {
dtd = xmlGetIntSubset(res);
if (dtd != NULL) {
xmlUnlinkNode((xmlNodePtr) dtd);
xmlFreeDtd(dtd);
}
res->intSubset = NULL;
res->extSubset = NULL;
}
} else {
#ifdef XSLT_GENERATE_HTML_DOCTYPE
xsltGetHTMLIDs(version, &doctypePublic, &doctypeSystem);
#endif
res = htmlNewDoc(doctypeSystem, doctypePublic);
}
}
if (res == NULL)
goto error;
res->dict = ctxt->dict;
xmlDictReference(res->dict);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"reusing transformation dict for output\n");
#endif
} else if (xmlStrEqual(method, (const xmlChar *) "xhtml")) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, (xmlNodePtr) doc,
"xsltApplyStylesheetInternal: unsupported method xhtml, using html\n",
style->method);
ctxt->type = XSLT_OUTPUT_HTML;
res = htmlNewDoc(doctypeSystem, doctypePublic);
if (res == NULL)
goto error;
res->dict = ctxt->dict;
xmlDictReference(res->dict);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"reusing transformation dict for output\n");
#endif
} else if (xmlStrEqual(method, (const xmlChar *) "text")) {
ctxt->type = XSLT_OUTPUT_TEXT;
res = xmlNewDoc(style->version);
if (res == NULL)
goto error;
res->dict = ctxt->dict;
xmlDictReference(res->dict);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"reusing transformation dict for output\n");
#endif
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, (xmlNodePtr) doc,
"xsltApplyStylesheetInternal: unsupported method %s\n",
style->method);
goto error;
}
} else {
ctxt->type = XSLT_OUTPUT_XML;
res = xmlNewDoc(style->version);
if (res == NULL)
goto error;
res->dict = ctxt->dict;
xmlDictReference(ctxt->dict);
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG
xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"reusing transformation dict for output\n");
#endif
}
res->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_UTF8;
if (encoding != NULL)
res->encoding = xmlStrdup(encoding);
variables = style->variables;
/*
* Start the evaluation, evaluate the params, the stylesheets globals
* and start by processing the top node.
*/
if (xsltNeedElemSpaceHandling(ctxt))
xsltApplyStripSpaces(ctxt, xmlDocGetRootElement(doc));
/*
* Evaluate global params and user-provided params.
*/
ctxt->node = (xmlNodePtr) doc;
if (ctxt->globalVars == NULL)
ctxt->globalVars = xmlHashCreate(20);
if (params != NULL) {
xsltEvalUserParams(ctxt, params);
}
/* need to be called before evaluating global variables */
xsltCountKeys(ctxt);
xsltEvalGlobalVariables(ctxt);
ctxt->node = (xmlNodePtr) doc;
ctxt->output = res;
ctxt->insert = (xmlNodePtr) res;
ctxt->varsBase = ctxt->varsNr - 1;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->contextSize = 1;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->proximityPosition = 1;
ctxt->xpathCtxt->node = NULL; /* TODO: Set the context node here? */
/*
* Start processing the source tree -----------------------------------
*/
xsltProcessOneNode(ctxt, ctxt->node, NULL);
/*
* Remove all remaining vars from the stack.
*/
xsltLocalVariablePop(ctxt, 0, -2);
xsltShutdownCtxtExts(ctxt);
xsltCleanupTemplates(style); /* TODO: <- style should be read only */
/*
* Now cleanup our variables so stylesheet can be re-used
*
* TODO: this is not needed anymore global variables are copied
* and not evaluated directly anymore, keep this as a check
*/
if (style->variables != variables) {
vptr = style->variables;
while (vptr->next != variables)
vptr = vptr->next;
vptr->next = NULL;
xsltFreeStackElemList(style->variables);
style->variables = variables;
}
vptr = style->variables;
while (vptr != NULL) {
if (vptr->computed) {
if (vptr->value != NULL) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(vptr->value);
vptr->value = NULL;
vptr->computed = 0;
}
}
vptr = vptr->next;
}
#if 0
/*
* code disabled by wmb; awaiting kb's review
* problem is that global variable(s) may contain xpath objects
* from doc associated with RVT, so can't be freed at this point.
* xsltFreeTransformContext includes a call to xsltFreeRVTs, so
* I assume this shouldn't be required at this point.
*/
/*
* Free all remaining tree fragments.
*/
xsltFreeRVTs(ctxt);
#endif
/*
* Do some post processing work depending on the generated output
*/
root = xmlDocGetRootElement(res);
if (root != NULL) {
const xmlChar *doctype = NULL;
if ((root->ns != NULL) && (root->ns->prefix != NULL))
doctype = xmlDictQLookup(ctxt->dict, root->ns->prefix, root->name);
if (doctype == NULL)
doctype = root->name;
/*
* Apply the default selection of the method
*/
if ((method == NULL) &&
(root->ns == NULL) &&
(!xmlStrcasecmp(root->name, (const xmlChar *) "html"))) {
xmlNodePtr tmp;
tmp = res->children;
while ((tmp != NULL) && (tmp != root)) {
if (tmp->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
break;
if ((tmp->type == XML_TEXT_NODE) && (!xmlIsBlankNode(tmp)))
break;
tmp = tmp->next;
}
if (tmp == root) {
ctxt->type = XSLT_OUTPUT_HTML;
/*
* REVISIT TODO: XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE is set after the
* transformation on the doc, but functions like
*/
res->type = XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE;
if (((doctypePublic != NULL) || (doctypeSystem != NULL))) {
res->intSubset = xmlCreateIntSubset(res, doctype,
doctypePublic,
doctypeSystem);
#ifdef XSLT_GENERATE_HTML_DOCTYPE
} else if (version != NULL) {
xsltGetHTMLIDs(version, &doctypePublic,
&doctypeSystem);
if (((doctypePublic != NULL) || (doctypeSystem != NULL)))
res->intSubset =
xmlCreateIntSubset(res, doctype,
doctypePublic,
doctypeSystem);
#endif
}
}
}
if (ctxt->type == XSLT_OUTPUT_XML) {
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(doctypePublic, style, doctypePublic)
XSLT_GET_IMPORT_PTR(doctypeSystem, style, doctypeSystem)
if (((doctypePublic != NULL) || (doctypeSystem != NULL))) {
xmlNodePtr last;
/* Need a small "hack" here to assure DTD comes before
possible comment nodes */
node = res->children;
last = res->last;
res->children = NULL;
res->last = NULL;
res->intSubset = xmlCreateIntSubset(res, doctype,
doctypePublic,
doctypeSystem);
if (res->children != NULL) {
res->children->next = node;
node->prev = res->children;
res->last = last;
} else {
res->children = node;
res->last = last;
}
}
}
}
xmlXPathFreeNodeSet(ctxt->nodeList);
if (profile != NULL) {
xsltSaveProfiling(ctxt, profile);
}
/*
* Be pedantic.
*/
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->state == XSLT_STATE_ERROR)) {
xmlFreeDoc(res);
res = NULL;
}
if ((res != NULL) && (ctxt != NULL) && (output != NULL)) {
int ret;
ret = xsltCheckWrite(ctxt->sec, ctxt, (const xmlChar *) output);
if (ret == 0) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, NULL,
"xsltApplyStylesheet: forbidden to save to %s\n",
output);
} else if (ret < 0) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, NULL,
"xsltApplyStylesheet: saving to %s may not be possible\n",
output);
}
}
#ifdef XSLT_DEBUG_PROFILE_CACHE
printf("# Cache:\n");
printf("# Reused tree fragments: %d\n", ctxt->cache->dbgReusedRVTs);
printf("# Reused variables : %d\n", ctxt->cache->dbgReusedVars);
#endif
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (userCtxt == NULL))
xsltFreeTransformContext(ctxt);
return (res);
error:
if (res != NULL)
xmlFreeDoc(res);
#ifdef XSLT_DEBUG_PROFILE_CACHE
printf("# Cache:\n");
printf("# Reused tree fragments: %d\n", ctxt->cache->dbgReusedRVTs);
printf("# Reused variables : %d\n", ctxt->cache->dbgReusedVars);
#endif
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (userCtxt == NULL))
xsltFreeTransformContext(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 173,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickPrivate void *GetPixelCachePixels(Image *image,MagickSizeType *length,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
assert(length != (MagickSizeType *) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
*length=0;
if ((cache_info->type != MemoryCache) && (cache_info->type != MapCache))
return((void *) NULL);
*length=cache_info->length;
return((void *) cache_info->pixels);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RootInlineBox* RenderBlock::constructLine(BidiRunList<BidiRun>& bidiRuns, const LineInfo& lineInfo)
{
ASSERT(bidiRuns.firstRun());
bool rootHasSelectedChildren = false;
InlineFlowBox* parentBox = 0;
int runCount = bidiRuns.runCount() - lineInfo.runsFromLeadingWhitespace();
for (BidiRun* r = bidiRuns.firstRun(); r; r = r->next()) {
bool isOnlyRun = (runCount == 1);
if (runCount == 2 && !r->m_object->isListMarker())
isOnlyRun = (!style()->isLeftToRightDirection() ? bidiRuns.lastRun() : bidiRuns.firstRun())->m_object->isListMarker();
if (lineInfo.isEmpty())
continue;
InlineBox* box = createInlineBoxForRenderer(r->m_object, false, isOnlyRun);
r->m_box = box;
ASSERT(box);
if (!box)
continue;
if (!rootHasSelectedChildren && box->renderer()->selectionState() != RenderObject::SelectionNone)
rootHasSelectedChildren = true;
bool runStartsSegment = r->m_startsSegment;
if (!parentBox || parentBox->renderer() != r->m_object->parent() || runStartsSegment)
parentBox = createLineBoxes(r->m_object->parent(), lineInfo, box, runStartsSegment);
else {
parentBox->addToLine(box);
}
bool visuallyOrdered = r->m_object->style()->rtlOrdering() == VisualOrder;
box->setBidiLevel(r->level());
if (box->isInlineTextBox()) {
InlineTextBox* text = toInlineTextBox(box);
text->setStart(r->m_start);
text->setLen(r->m_stop - r->m_start);
text->setDirOverride(r->dirOverride(visuallyOrdered));
if (r->m_hasHyphen)
text->setHasHyphen(true);
}
}
ASSERT(lastLineBox() && !lastLineBox()->isConstructed());
if (rootHasSelectedChildren)
lastLineBox()->root()->setHasSelectedChildren(true);
bool isLogicallyLastRunWrapped = bidiRuns.logicallyLastRun()->m_object && bidiRuns.logicallyLastRun()->m_object->isText() ? !reachedEndOfTextRenderer(bidiRuns) : true;
lastLineBox()->determineSpacingForFlowBoxes(lineInfo.isLastLine(), isLogicallyLastRunWrapped, bidiRuns.logicallyLastRun()->m_object);
lastLineBox()->setConstructed();
return lastRootBox();
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_descriptor_addr(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
int desc_type, struct ti_i2c_desc *rom_desc)
{
int start_address;
int status;
/* Search for requested descriptor in I2C */
start_address = 2;
do {
status = read_rom(serial,
start_address,
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc),
(__u8 *)rom_desc);
if (status)
return 0;
if (rom_desc->Type == desc_type)
return start_address;
start_address = start_address + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_desc)
+ rom_desc->Size;
} while ((start_address < TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE) && rom_desc->Type);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 33,347
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool JSTestInterfaceOwner::isReachableFromOpaqueRoots(JSC::Handle<JSC::Unknown> handle, void*, SlotVisitor& visitor)
{
JSTestInterface* jsTestInterface = jsCast<JSTestInterface*>(handle.get().asCell());
if (jsTestInterface->impl()->hasPendingActivity())
return true;
if (!isObservable(jsTestInterface))
return false;
UNUSED_PARAM(visitor);
return false;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usbmidi_get_ms_info(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
struct snd_usb_midi_endpoint_info *endpoints)
{
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct usb_host_interface *hostif;
struct usb_interface_descriptor *intfd;
struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *ms_header;
struct usb_host_endpoint *hostep;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ep;
struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *ms_ep;
int i, epidx;
intf = umidi->iface;
if (!intf)
return -ENXIO;
hostif = &intf->altsetting[0];
intfd = get_iface_desc(hostif);
ms_header = (struct usb_ms_header_descriptor *)hostif->extra;
if (hostif->extralen >= 7 &&
ms_header->bLength >= 7 &&
ms_header->bDescriptorType == USB_DT_CS_INTERFACE &&
ms_header->bDescriptorSubtype == UAC_HEADER)
dev_dbg(&umidi->dev->dev, "MIDIStreaming version %02x.%02x\n",
ms_header->bcdMSC[1], ms_header->bcdMSC[0]);
else
dev_warn(&umidi->dev->dev,
"MIDIStreaming interface descriptor not found\n");
epidx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < intfd->bNumEndpoints; ++i) {
hostep = &hostif->endpoint[i];
ep = get_ep_desc(hostep);
if (!usb_endpoint_xfer_bulk(ep) && !usb_endpoint_xfer_int(ep))
continue;
ms_ep = (struct usb_ms_endpoint_descriptor *)hostep->extra;
if (hostep->extralen < 4 ||
ms_ep->bLength < 4 ||
ms_ep->bDescriptorType != USB_DT_CS_ENDPOINT ||
ms_ep->bDescriptorSubtype != UAC_MS_GENERAL)
continue;
if (usb_endpoint_dir_out(ep)) {
if (endpoints[epidx].out_ep) {
if (++epidx >= MIDI_MAX_ENDPOINTS) {
dev_warn(&umidi->dev->dev,
"too many endpoints\n");
break;
}
}
endpoints[epidx].out_ep = usb_endpoint_num(ep);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(ep))
endpoints[epidx].out_interval = ep->bInterval;
else if (snd_usb_get_speed(umidi->dev) == USB_SPEED_LOW)
/*
* Low speed bulk transfers don't exist, so
* force interrupt transfers for devices like
* ESI MIDI Mate that try to use them anyway.
*/
endpoints[epidx].out_interval = 1;
endpoints[epidx].out_cables =
(1 << ms_ep->bNumEmbMIDIJack) - 1;
dev_dbg(&umidi->dev->dev, "EP %02X: %d jack(s)\n",
ep->bEndpointAddress, ms_ep->bNumEmbMIDIJack);
} else {
if (endpoints[epidx].in_ep) {
if (++epidx >= MIDI_MAX_ENDPOINTS) {
dev_warn(&umidi->dev->dev,
"too many endpoints\n");
break;
}
}
endpoints[epidx].in_ep = usb_endpoint_num(ep);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(ep))
endpoints[epidx].in_interval = ep->bInterval;
else if (snd_usb_get_speed(umidi->dev) == USB_SPEED_LOW)
endpoints[epidx].in_interval = 1;
endpoints[epidx].in_cables =
(1 << ms_ep->bNumEmbMIDIJack) - 1;
dev_dbg(&umidi->dev->dev, "EP %02X: %d jack(s)\n",
ep->bEndpointAddress, ms_ep->bNumEmbMIDIJack);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void php_gd_error_method(int type, const char *format, va_list args)
{
TSRMLS_FETCH();
switch (type) {
case GD_DEBUG:
case GD_INFO:
case GD_NOTICE:
type = E_NOTICE;
break;
case GD_WARNING:
type = E_WARNING;
break;
default:
type = E_ERROR;
}
php_verror(NULL, "", type, format, args TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 50,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
char *digest)
{
return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest);
}
Commit Message: evm: checking if removexattr is not a NULL
The following lines of code produce a kernel oops.
fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0);
fchmod(fd, 0666);
[ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000
[ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [#5] SMP
[ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button
[ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ #465 Bochs Bochs
[ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
[ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0
[ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2
[ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4
[ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
[ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0
[ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
[ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
[ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000)
[ 139.924982] Stack:
[ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940
[ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3
[ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08
[ 139.924982] Call Trace:
[ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62
[ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26
[ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281
[ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76
[ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33
[ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c
[ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb
[ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value.
This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation.
Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is
not NULL.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long kvm_get_linear_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
return kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
return (u32)(get_segment_base(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS) +
kvm_rip_read(vcpu));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void clear_IF(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs)
{
VEFLAGS &= ~X86_EFLAGS_VIF;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::Rect visible_rect() const { return visible_rect_; }
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 148,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebUILoginView::WebUILoginView()
: webui_login_(NULL),
login_window_(NULL),
host_window_frozen_(false),
should_emit_login_prompt_visible_(true) {
registrar_.Add(this,
chrome::NOTIFICATION_LOGIN_WEBUI_VISIBLE,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
accel_map_[ui::Accelerator(ui::VKEY_ESCAPE, ui::EF_NONE)] =
kAccelNameCancel;
accel_map_[ui::Accelerator(ui::VKEY_E,
ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN | ui::EF_ALT_DOWN)] =
kAccelNameEnrollment;
accel_map_[ui::Accelerator(ui::VKEY_V, ui::EF_ALT_DOWN)] =
kAccelNameVersion;
for (AccelMap::iterator i(accel_map_.begin()); i != accel_map_.end(); ++i)
AddAccelerator(i->first);
}
Commit Message: [cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MagickPathExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MagickPathExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MagickPathExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MagickPathExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MagickPathExtent);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->filename,image->filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MagickPathExtent);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(image2->magick,image->magick,MagickPathExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/120
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline TCGMemOp mo_b_d(int b, TCGMemOp ot)
{
return b & 1 ? ot : MO_8;
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::TimeDelta GetPasswordRevealDuration() {
return ViewsDelegate::GetInstance()
? ViewsDelegate::GetInstance()
->GetTextfieldPasswordRevealDuration()
: base::TimeDelta();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb *nested_vmcb;
struct vmcb *hsave = svm->nested.hsave;
struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb;
struct page *page;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit_inject(vmcb->control.exit_code,
vmcb->control.exit_info_1,
vmcb->control.exit_info_2,
vmcb->control.exit_int_info,
vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err,
KVM_ISA_SVM);
nested_vmcb = nested_svm_map(svm, svm->nested.vmcb, &page);
if (!nested_vmcb)
return 1;
/* Exit Guest-Mode */
leave_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu);
svm->nested.vmcb = 0;
/* Give the current vmcb to the guest */
disable_gif(svm);
nested_vmcb->save.es = vmcb->save.es;
nested_vmcb->save.cs = vmcb->save.cs;
nested_vmcb->save.ss = vmcb->save.ss;
nested_vmcb->save.ds = vmcb->save.ds;
nested_vmcb->save.gdtr = vmcb->save.gdtr;
nested_vmcb->save.idtr = vmcb->save.idtr;
nested_vmcb->save.efer = svm->vcpu.arch.efer;
nested_vmcb->save.cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(&svm->vcpu);
nested_vmcb->save.cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(&svm->vcpu);
nested_vmcb->save.cr2 = vmcb->save.cr2;
nested_vmcb->save.cr4 = svm->vcpu.arch.cr4;
nested_vmcb->save.rflags = kvm_get_rflags(&svm->vcpu);
nested_vmcb->save.rip = vmcb->save.rip;
nested_vmcb->save.rsp = vmcb->save.rsp;
nested_vmcb->save.rax = vmcb->save.rax;
nested_vmcb->save.dr7 = vmcb->save.dr7;
nested_vmcb->save.dr6 = vmcb->save.dr6;
nested_vmcb->save.cpl = vmcb->save.cpl;
nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl = vmcb->control.int_ctl;
nested_vmcb->control.int_vector = vmcb->control.int_vector;
nested_vmcb->control.int_state = vmcb->control.int_state;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_code = vmcb->control.exit_code;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_code_hi = vmcb->control.exit_code_hi;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_info_1 = vmcb->control.exit_info_1;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_info_2 = vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_int_info = vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
nested_vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err = vmcb->control.exit_int_info_err;
if (svm->nrips_enabled)
nested_vmcb->control.next_rip = vmcb->control.next_rip;
/*
* If we emulate a VMRUN/#VMEXIT in the same host #vmexit cycle we have
* to make sure that we do not lose injected events. So check event_inj
* here and copy it to exit_int_info if it is valid.
* Exit_int_info and event_inj can't be both valid because the case
* below only happens on a VMRUN instruction intercept which has
* no valid exit_int_info set.
*/
if (vmcb->control.event_inj & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID) {
struct vmcb_control_area *nc = &nested_vmcb->control;
nc->exit_int_info = vmcb->control.event_inj;
nc->exit_int_info_err = vmcb->control.event_inj_err;
}
nested_vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = 0;
nested_vmcb->control.event_inj = 0;
nested_vmcb->control.event_inj_err = 0;
/* We always set V_INTR_MASKING and remember the old value in hflags */
if (!(svm->vcpu.arch.hflags & HF_VINTR_MASK))
nested_vmcb->control.int_ctl &= ~V_INTR_MASKING_MASK;
/* Restore the original control entries */
copy_vmcb_control_area(vmcb, hsave);
kvm_clear_exception_queue(&svm->vcpu);
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(&svm->vcpu);
svm->nested.nested_cr3 = 0;
/* Restore selected save entries */
svm->vmcb->save.es = hsave->save.es;
svm->vmcb->save.cs = hsave->save.cs;
svm->vmcb->save.ss = hsave->save.ss;
svm->vmcb->save.ds = hsave->save.ds;
svm->vmcb->save.gdtr = hsave->save.gdtr;
svm->vmcb->save.idtr = hsave->save.idtr;
kvm_set_rflags(&svm->vcpu, hsave->save.rflags);
svm_set_efer(&svm->vcpu, hsave->save.efer);
svm_set_cr0(&svm->vcpu, hsave->save.cr0 | X86_CR0_PE);
svm_set_cr4(&svm->vcpu, hsave->save.cr4);
if (npt_enabled) {
svm->vmcb->save.cr3 = hsave->save.cr3;
svm->vcpu.arch.cr3 = hsave->save.cr3;
} else {
(void)kvm_set_cr3(&svm->vcpu, hsave->save.cr3);
}
kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, hsave->save.rax);
kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, hsave->save.rsp);
kvm_register_write(&svm->vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, hsave->save.rip);
svm->vmcb->save.dr7 = 0;
svm->vmcb->save.cpl = 0;
svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info = 0;
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
nested_svm_unmap(page);
nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(&svm->vcpu);
kvm_mmu_reset_context(&svm->vcpu);
kvm_mmu_load(&svm->vcpu);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int srpt_cm_req_recv(struct ib_cm_id *cm_id,
struct ib_cm_req_event_param *param,
void *private_data)
{
struct srpt_device *sdev = cm_id->context;
struct srpt_port *sport = &sdev->port[param->port - 1];
struct srp_login_req *req;
struct srp_login_rsp *rsp;
struct srp_login_rej *rej;
struct ib_cm_rep_param *rep_param;
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch, *tmp_ch;
struct se_node_acl *se_acl;
u32 it_iu_len;
int i, ret = 0;
unsigned char *p;
WARN_ON_ONCE(irqs_disabled());
if (WARN_ON(!sdev || !private_data))
return -EINVAL;
req = (struct srp_login_req *)private_data;
it_iu_len = be32_to_cpu(req->req_it_iu_len);
pr_info("Received SRP_LOGIN_REQ with i_port_id 0x%llx:0x%llx,"
" t_port_id 0x%llx:0x%llx and it_iu_len %d on port %d"
" (guid=0x%llx:0x%llx)\n",
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&req->initiator_port_id[0]),
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&req->initiator_port_id[8]),
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&req->target_port_id[0]),
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&req->target_port_id[8]),
it_iu_len,
param->port,
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&sdev->port[param->port - 1].gid.raw[0]),
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)&sdev->port[param->port - 1].gid.raw[8]));
rsp = kzalloc(sizeof *rsp, GFP_KERNEL);
rej = kzalloc(sizeof *rej, GFP_KERNEL);
rep_param = kzalloc(sizeof *rep_param, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rsp || !rej || !rep_param) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (it_iu_len > srp_max_req_size || it_iu_len < 64) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_REQ_IT_IU_LENGTH_TOO_LARGE);
ret = -EINVAL;
pr_err("rejected SRP_LOGIN_REQ because its"
" length (%d bytes) is out of range (%d .. %d)\n",
it_iu_len, 64, srp_max_req_size);
goto reject;
}
if (!sport->enabled) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
ret = -EINVAL;
pr_err("rejected SRP_LOGIN_REQ because the target port"
" has not yet been enabled\n");
goto reject;
}
if ((req->req_flags & SRP_MTCH_ACTION) == SRP_MULTICHAN_SINGLE) {
rsp->rsp_flags = SRP_LOGIN_RSP_MULTICHAN_NO_CHAN;
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ch, tmp_ch, &sdev->rch_list, list) {
if (!memcmp(ch->i_port_id, req->initiator_port_id, 16)
&& !memcmp(ch->t_port_id, req->target_port_id, 16)
&& param->port == ch->sport->port
&& param->listen_id == ch->sport->sdev->cm_id
&& ch->cm_id) {
enum rdma_ch_state ch_state;
ch_state = srpt_get_ch_state(ch);
if (ch_state != CH_CONNECTING
&& ch_state != CH_LIVE)
continue;
/* found an existing channel */
pr_debug("Found existing channel %s"
" cm_id= %p state= %d\n",
ch->sess_name, ch->cm_id, ch_state);
__srpt_close_ch(ch);
rsp->rsp_flags =
SRP_LOGIN_RSP_MULTICHAN_TERMINATED;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
} else
rsp->rsp_flags = SRP_LOGIN_RSP_MULTICHAN_MAINTAINED;
if (*(__be64 *)req->target_port_id != cpu_to_be64(srpt_service_guid)
|| *(__be64 *)(req->target_port_id + 8) !=
cpu_to_be64(srpt_service_guid)) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_UNABLE_ASSOCIATE_CHANNEL);
ret = -ENOMEM;
pr_err("rejected SRP_LOGIN_REQ because it"
" has an invalid target port identifier.\n");
goto reject;
}
ch = kzalloc(sizeof *ch, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ch) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
pr_err("rejected SRP_LOGIN_REQ because no memory.\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto reject;
}
INIT_WORK(&ch->release_work, srpt_release_channel_work);
memcpy(ch->i_port_id, req->initiator_port_id, 16);
memcpy(ch->t_port_id, req->target_port_id, 16);
ch->sport = &sdev->port[param->port - 1];
ch->cm_id = cm_id;
/*
* Avoid QUEUE_FULL conditions by limiting the number of buffers used
* for the SRP protocol to the command queue size.
*/
ch->rq_size = SRPT_RQ_SIZE;
spin_lock_init(&ch->spinlock);
ch->state = CH_CONNECTING;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ch->cmd_wait_list);
ch->rsp_size = ch->sport->port_attrib.srp_max_rsp_size;
ch->ioctx_ring = (struct srpt_send_ioctx **)
srpt_alloc_ioctx_ring(ch->sport->sdev, ch->rq_size,
sizeof(*ch->ioctx_ring[0]),
ch->rsp_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (!ch->ioctx_ring)
goto free_ch;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ch->free_list);
for (i = 0; i < ch->rq_size; i++) {
ch->ioctx_ring[i]->ch = ch;
list_add_tail(&ch->ioctx_ring[i]->free_list, &ch->free_list);
}
ret = srpt_create_ch_ib(ch);
if (ret) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
pr_err("rejected SRP_LOGIN_REQ because creating"
" a new RDMA channel failed.\n");
goto free_ring;
}
ret = srpt_ch_qp_rtr(ch, ch->qp);
if (ret) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(SRP_LOGIN_REJ_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
pr_err("rejected SRP_LOGIN_REQ because enabling"
" RTR failed (error code = %d)\n", ret);
goto destroy_ib;
}
/*
* Use the initator port identifier as the session name, when
* checking against se_node_acl->initiatorname[] this can be
* with or without preceeding '0x'.
*/
snprintf(ch->sess_name, sizeof(ch->sess_name), "0x%016llx%016llx",
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)ch->i_port_id),
be64_to_cpu(*(__be64 *)(ch->i_port_id + 8)));
pr_debug("registering session %s\n", ch->sess_name);
p = &ch->sess_name[0];
ch->sess = transport_init_session(TARGET_PROT_NORMAL);
if (IS_ERR(ch->sess)) {
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES);
pr_debug("Failed to create session\n");
goto destroy_ib;
}
try_again:
se_acl = core_tpg_get_initiator_node_acl(&sport->port_tpg_1, p);
if (!se_acl) {
pr_info("Rejected login because no ACL has been"
" configured yet for initiator %s.\n", ch->sess_name);
/*
* XXX: Hack to retry of ch->i_port_id without leading '0x'
*/
if (p == &ch->sess_name[0]) {
p += 2;
goto try_again;
}
rej->reason = cpu_to_be32(
SRP_LOGIN_REJ_CHANNEL_LIMIT_REACHED);
transport_free_session(ch->sess);
goto destroy_ib;
}
ch->sess->se_node_acl = se_acl;
transport_register_session(&sport->port_tpg_1, se_acl, ch->sess, ch);
pr_debug("Establish connection sess=%p name=%s cm_id=%p\n", ch->sess,
ch->sess_name, ch->cm_id);
/* create srp_login_response */
rsp->opcode = SRP_LOGIN_RSP;
rsp->tag = req->tag;
rsp->max_it_iu_len = req->req_it_iu_len;
rsp->max_ti_iu_len = req->req_it_iu_len;
ch->max_ti_iu_len = it_iu_len;
rsp->buf_fmt = cpu_to_be16(SRP_BUF_FORMAT_DIRECT
| SRP_BUF_FORMAT_INDIRECT);
rsp->req_lim_delta = cpu_to_be32(ch->rq_size);
atomic_set(&ch->req_lim, ch->rq_size);
atomic_set(&ch->req_lim_delta, 0);
/* create cm reply */
rep_param->qp_num = ch->qp->qp_num;
rep_param->private_data = (void *)rsp;
rep_param->private_data_len = sizeof *rsp;
rep_param->rnr_retry_count = 7;
rep_param->flow_control = 1;
rep_param->failover_accepted = 0;
rep_param->srq = 1;
rep_param->responder_resources = 4;
rep_param->initiator_depth = 4;
ret = ib_send_cm_rep(cm_id, rep_param);
if (ret) {
pr_err("sending SRP_LOGIN_REQ response failed"
" (error code = %d)\n", ret);
goto release_channel;
}
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
list_add_tail(&ch->list, &sdev->rch_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
goto out;
release_channel:
srpt_set_ch_state(ch, CH_RELEASING);
transport_deregister_session_configfs(ch->sess);
transport_deregister_session(ch->sess);
ch->sess = NULL;
destroy_ib:
srpt_destroy_ch_ib(ch);
free_ring:
srpt_free_ioctx_ring((struct srpt_ioctx **)ch->ioctx_ring,
ch->sport->sdev, ch->rq_size,
ch->rsp_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
free_ch:
kfree(ch);
reject:
rej->opcode = SRP_LOGIN_REJ;
rej->tag = req->tag;
rej->buf_fmt = cpu_to_be16(SRP_BUF_FORMAT_DIRECT
| SRP_BUF_FORMAT_INDIRECT);
ib_send_cm_rej(cm_id, IB_CM_REJ_CONSUMER_DEFINED, NULL, 0,
(void *)rej, sizeof *rej);
out:
kfree(rep_param);
kfree(rsp);
kfree(rej);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcRenderCreateLinearGradient(ClientPtr client)
{
PicturePtr pPicture;
int len;
int error = 0;
xFixed *stops;
xRenderColor *colors;
REQUEST(xRenderCreateLinearGradientReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreateLinearGradientReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->pid, client);
len = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof(xRenderCreateLinearGradientReq);
if (stuff->nStops > UINT32_MAX / (sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
if (len != stuff->nStops * (sizeof(xFixed) + sizeof(xRenderColor)))
return BadLength;
stops = (xFixed *) (stuff + 1);
colors = (xRenderColor *) (stops + stuff->nStops);
pPicture = CreateLinearGradientPicture(stuff->pid, &stuff->p1, &stuff->p2,
stuff->nStops, stops, colors,
&error);
if (!pPicture)
return error;
/* security creation/labeling check */
error = XaceHook(XACE_RESOURCE_ACCESS, client, stuff->pid, PictureType,
pPicture, RT_NONE, NULL, DixCreateAccess);
if (error != Success)
return error;
if (!AddResource(stuff->pid, PictureType, (void *) pPicture))
return BadAlloc;
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect RenderBox::reflectedRect(const IntRect& r) const
{
if (!style()->boxReflect())
return IntRect();
IntRect box = borderBoxRect();
IntRect result = r;
switch (style()->boxReflect()->direction()) {
case ReflectionBelow:
result.setY(box.maxY() + reflectionOffset() + (box.maxY() - r.maxY()));
break;
case ReflectionAbove:
result.setY(box.y() - reflectionOffset() - box.height() + (box.maxY() - r.maxY()));
break;
case ReflectionLeft:
result.setX(box.x() - reflectionOffset() - box.width() + (box.maxX() - r.maxX()));
break;
case ReflectionRight:
result.setX(box.maxX() + reflectionOffset() + (box.maxX() - r.maxX()));
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,629
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HttpStreamParser::SetConnectionReused() {
connection_->set_is_reused(true);
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,802
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TEE_Result syscall_obj_generate_key(unsigned long obj, unsigned long key_size,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
unsigned long param_count)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
struct tee_obj *o;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *key;
size_t byte_size;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
res = tee_obj_get(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx),
tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(obj), &o);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
/* Must be a transient object */
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_PERSISTENT) != 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
/* Must not be initialized already */
if ((o->info.handleFlags & TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED) != 0)
return TEE_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
/* Find description of object */
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(o->info.objectType);
if (!type_props)
return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
/* Check that maxKeySize follows restrictions */
if (key_size % type_props->quanta != 0)
return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
if (key_size < type_props->min_size)
return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
if (key_size > type_props->max_size)
return TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
size_t alloc_size = 0;
if (MUL_OVERFLOW(sizeof(TEE_Attribute), param_count, &alloc_size))
return TEE_ERROR_OVERFLOW;
params = malloc(alloc_size);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx), usr_params, param_count,
params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_svc_cryp_check_attr(ATTR_USAGE_GENERATE_KEY, type_props,
params, param_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
switch (o->info.objectType) {
case TEE_TYPE_AES:
case TEE_TYPE_DES:
case TEE_TYPE_DES3:
case TEE_TYPE_HMAC_MD5:
case TEE_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1:
case TEE_TYPE_HMAC_SHA224:
case TEE_TYPE_HMAC_SHA256:
case TEE_TYPE_HMAC_SHA384:
case TEE_TYPE_HMAC_SHA512:
case TEE_TYPE_GENERIC_SECRET:
byte_size = key_size / 8;
/*
* We have to do it like this because the parity bits aren't
* counted when telling the size of the key in bits.
*/
if (o->info.objectType == TEE_TYPE_DES ||
o->info.objectType == TEE_TYPE_DES3) {
byte_size = (key_size + key_size / 7) / 8;
}
key = (struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *)o->attr;
if (byte_size > key->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_EXCESS_DATA;
goto out;
}
res = crypto_rng_read((void *)(key + 1), byte_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
key->key_size = byte_size;
/* Set bits for all known attributes for this object type */
o->have_attrs = (1 << type_props->num_type_attrs) - 1;
break;
case TEE_TYPE_RSA_KEYPAIR:
res = tee_svc_obj_generate_key_rsa(o, type_props, key_size,
params, param_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
break;
case TEE_TYPE_DSA_KEYPAIR:
res = tee_svc_obj_generate_key_dsa(o, type_props, key_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
break;
case TEE_TYPE_DH_KEYPAIR:
res = tee_svc_obj_generate_key_dh(o, type_props, key_size,
params, param_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
break;
case TEE_TYPE_ECDSA_KEYPAIR:
case TEE_TYPE_ECDH_KEYPAIR:
res = tee_svc_obj_generate_key_ecc(o, type_props, key_size,
params, param_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_FORMAT;
}
out:
free(params);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
o->info.keySize = key_size;
o->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
return param->depth;
}
Commit Message: Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 83,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write(struct file *file,
loff_t pos,
size_t count)
{
int ret = 0, meta_level = 0;
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
loff_t end;
/*
* We start with a read level meta lock and only jump to an ex
* if we need to make modifications here.
*/
for(;;) {
ret = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, NULL, meta_level);
if (ret < 0) {
meta_level = -1;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/* Clear suid / sgid if necessary. We do this here
* instead of later in the write path because
* remove_suid() calls ->setattr without any hint that
* we may have already done our cluster locking. Since
* ocfs2_setattr() *must* take cluster locks to
* proceed, this will lead us to recursively lock the
* inode. There's also the dinode i_size state which
* can be lost via setattr during extending writes (we
* set inode->i_size at the end of a write. */
if (should_remove_suid(dentry)) {
if (meta_level == 0) {
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, meta_level);
meta_level = 1;
continue;
}
ret = ocfs2_write_remove_suid(inode);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out_unlock;
}
}
end = pos + count;
ret = ocfs2_check_range_for_refcount(inode, pos, count);
if (ret == 1) {
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, meta_level);
meta_level = -1;
ret = ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_refcount(inode,
file,
pos,
count,
&meta_level);
}
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out_unlock;
}
break;
}
out_unlock:
trace_ocfs2_prepare_inode_for_write(OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno,
pos, count);
if (meta_level >= 0)
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, meta_level);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,814
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ResetCompositor() {
if (!compositor_)
return;
resize_lock_.reset();
if (compositor_->HasObserver(this))
compositor_->RemoveObserver(this);
if (vsync_manager_) {
vsync_manager_->RemoveObserver(this);
vsync_manager_ = nullptr;
}
compositor_->RemoveFrameSink(frame_sink_id_);
compositor_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void disable() { disabled_ = true; }
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::focusAndSelectClearButtonOwner()
{
element()->focus();
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bn2cf(const BIGNUM *num, u8 *buf)
{
u8 tmp[512];
int r;
r = BN_bn2bin(num, tmp);
if (r <= 0)
return r;
invert_buf(buf, tmp, r);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: notifier::NotifierOptions ParseNotifierOptions(
const CommandLine& command_line,
const scoped_refptr<net::URLRequestContextGetter>&
request_context_getter) {
notifier::NotifierOptions notifier_options;
notifier_options.request_context_getter = request_context_getter;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSyncNotificationHostPort)) {
notifier_options.xmpp_host_port =
net::HostPortPair::FromString(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kSyncNotificationHostPort));
DVLOG(1) << "Using " << notifier_options.xmpp_host_port.ToString()
<< " for test sync notification server.";
}
notifier_options.try_ssltcp_first =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSyncTrySsltcpFirstForXmpp);
DVLOG_IF(1, notifier_options.try_ssltcp_first)
<< "Trying SSL/TCP port before XMPP port for notifications.";
notifier_options.invalidate_xmpp_login =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSyncInvalidateXmppLogin);
DVLOG_IF(1, notifier_options.invalidate_xmpp_login)
<< "Invalidating sync XMPP login.";
notifier_options.allow_insecure_connection =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSyncAllowInsecureXmppConnection);
DVLOG_IF(1, notifier_options.allow_insecure_connection)
<< "Allowing insecure XMPP connections.";
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kSyncNotificationMethod)) {
const std::string notification_method_str(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncNotificationMethod));
notifier_options.notification_method =
notifier::StringToNotificationMethod(notification_method_str);
}
return notifier_options;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CameraSource::signalBufferReturned(MediaBuffer *buffer) {
ALOGV("signalBufferReturned: %p", buffer->data());
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
for (List<sp<IMemory> >::iterator it = mFramesBeingEncoded.begin();
it != mFramesBeingEncoded.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->pointer() == buffer->data()) {
releaseOneRecordingFrame((*it));
mFramesBeingEncoded.erase(it);
++mNumFramesEncoded;
buffer->setObserver(0);
buffer->release();
mFrameCompleteCondition.signal();
return;
}
}
CHECK(!"signalBufferReturned: bogus buffer");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 173,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_puts(seq, "sk RefCnt Type Proto Iface R Rmem User Inode\n");
else {
struct sock *s = sk_entry(v);
const struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(s);
seq_printf(seq,
"%pK %-6d %-4d %04x %-5d %1d %-6u %-6u %-6lu\n",
s,
atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
s->sk_type,
ntohs(po->num),
po->ifindex,
po->running,
atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(seq), sock_i_uid(s)),
sock_i_ino(s));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Textfield::OnBeforeUserAction() {
DCHECK(!performing_user_action_);
performing_user_action_ = true;
if (controller_)
controller_->OnBeforeUserAction(this);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QuicClientPromisedInfo::CleanupAlarm::OnAlarm() {
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "self GC alarm for stream " << promised_->id_;
promised_->session()->OnPushStreamTimedOut(promised_->id_);
promised_->Reset(QUIC_PUSH_STREAM_TIMED_OUT);
}
Commit Message: Fix Stack Buffer Overflow in QuicClientPromisedInfo::OnPromiseHeaders
BUG=777728
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I6a80db88aafdf20c7abd3847404b818565681310
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748425
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513105}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_scan_period(struct task_struct *p, int new_cpu)
{
int src_nid = cpu_to_node(task_cpu(p));
int dst_nid = cpu_to_node(new_cpu);
if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_numa_balancing))
return;
if (!p->mm || !p->numa_faults || (p->flags & PF_EXITING))
return;
if (src_nid == dst_nid)
return;
/*
* Allow resets if faults have been trapped before one scan
* has completed. This is most likely due to a new task that
* is pulled cross-node due to wakeups or load balancing.
*/
if (p->numa_scan_seq) {
/*
* Avoid scan adjustments if moving to the preferred
* node or if the task was not previously running on
* the preferred node.
*/
if (dst_nid == p->numa_preferred_nid ||
(p->numa_preferred_nid != -1 && src_nid != p->numa_preferred_nid))
return;
}
p->numa_scan_period = task_scan_start(p);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ndp_msg_destroy(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
free(msg);
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: trace (const char *format, ...)
#else
trace (format, va_alist)
const char *format;
va_dcl
#endif
{
va_list args;
static FILE *tracefp = (FILE *)NULL;
if (tracefp == NULL)
tracefp = fopen("/tmp/bash-trace.log", "a+");
if (tracefp == NULL)
tracefp = stderr;
else
fcntl (fileno (tracefp), F_SETFD, 1); /* close-on-exec */
fprintf(tracefp, "TRACE: pid %ld: ", (long)getpid());
SH_VA_START (args, format);
vfprintf (tracefp, format, args);
fprintf (tracefp, "\n");
va_end (args);
fflush(tracefp);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserMainParts* ShellContentBrowserClient::CreateBrowserMainParts(
const MainFunctionParams& parameters) {
shell_browser_main_parts_ = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kRunLayoutTest)
? new LayoutTestBrowserMainParts(parameters)
: new ShellBrowserMainParts(parameters);
return shell_browser_main_parts_;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t setDefaultBufferFormat(PixelFormat defaultFormat) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferConsumer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(defaultFormat));
status_t result = remote()->transact(SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 160,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int add_camera_metadata_entry(camera_metadata_t *dst,
uint32_t tag,
const void *data,
size_t data_count) {
int type = get_camera_metadata_tag_type(tag);
if (type == -1) {
ALOGE("%s: Unknown tag %04x.", __FUNCTION__, tag);
return ERROR;
}
return add_camera_metadata_entry_raw(dst,
tag,
type,
data,
data_count);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetRoutingID() const {
return routing_id_;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::HasOriginalOpener() const {
return GetOriginalOpener() != NULL;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err free_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_FreeSpaceBox *p = (GF_FreeSpaceBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FREE) ? "FreeSpaceBox" : "SkipBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "dataSize=\"%d\">\n", p->dataSize);
gf_isom_box_dump_done( (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FREE) ? "FreeSpaceBox" : "SkipBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::UpdateDevTools() {
UpdateDevToolsForContents(GetActiveTabContents());
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectCanDiscardFalseAllReasons(const LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit,
DecisionFailureReason failure_reason) {
ExpectCanDiscardFalse(lifecycle_unit, failure_reason,
DiscardReason::kExternal);
ExpectCanDiscardFalse(lifecycle_unit, failure_reason,
DiscardReason::kProactive);
ExpectCanDiscardFalse(lifecycle_unit, failure_reason, DiscardReason::kUrgent);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd_create_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *resfhp,
struct iattr *iap)
{
/*
* Mode has already been set earlier in create:
*/
iap->ia_valid &= ~ATTR_MODE;
/*
* Setting uid/gid works only for root. Irix appears to
* send along the gid on create when it tries to implement
* setgid directories via NFS:
*/
if (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
iap->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID);
if (iap->ia_valid)
return nfsd_setattr(rqstp, resfhp, iap, 0, (time_t)0);
/* Callers expect file metadata to be committed here */
return nfserrno(commit_metadata(resfhp));
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int i;
cdf_header_t h;
cdf_sat_t sat, ssat;
cdf_stream_t sst, scn;
cdf_dir_t dir;
cdf_info_t info;
const cdf_directory_t *root;
if (argc < 2) {
(void)fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <filename>\n", getprogname());
return -1;
}
info.i_buf = NULL;
info.i_len = 0;
for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
if ((info.i_fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
err(1, "Cannot open `%s'", argv[1]);
if (cdf_read_header(&info, &h) == -1)
err(1, "Cannot read header");
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_header(&h);
#endif
if (cdf_read_sat(&info, &h, &sat) == -1)
err(1, "Cannot read sat");
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SAT", &sat, CDF_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if (cdf_read_ssat(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat) == -1)
err(1, "Cannot read ssat");
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_sat("SSAT", &ssat, CDF_SHORT_SEC_SIZE(&h));
#endif
if (cdf_read_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &dir) == -1)
err(1, "Cannot read dir");
if (cdf_read_short_stream(&info, &h, &sat, &dir, &sst, &root)
== -1)
err(1, "Cannot read short stream");
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_stream(&h, &sst);
#endif
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
cdf_dump_dir(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir);
#endif
if (cdf_read_summary_info(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir,
&scn) == -1)
warn("Cannot read summary info");
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
else
cdf_dump_summary_info(&h, &scn);
#endif
if (cdf_read_catalog(&info, &h, &sat, &ssat, &sst, &dir,
&scn) == -1)
warn("Cannot read catalog");
#ifdef CDF_DEBUG
else
cdf_dump_catalog(&h, &scn);
#endif
(void)close(info.i_fd);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent wrap around (Remi Collet at redhat)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 94,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport const IndexPacket *GetVirtualIndexesFromNexus(const Cache cache,
NexusInfo *nexus_info)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->storage_class == UndefinedClass)
return((IndexPacket *) NULL);
return(nexus_info->indexes);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ucma_get_event(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct rdma_ucm_get_event cmd;
struct ucma_event *uevent;
int ret = 0;
/*
* Old 32 bit user space does not send the 4 byte padding in the
* reserved field. We don't care, allow it to keep working.
*/
if (out_len < sizeof(uevent->resp) - sizeof(uevent->resp.reserved))
return -ENOSPC;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
while (list_empty(&file->event_list)) {
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
if (file->filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
return -EAGAIN;
if (wait_event_interruptible(file->poll_wait,
!list_empty(&file->event_list)))
return -ERESTARTSYS;
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
}
uevent = list_entry(file->event_list.next, struct ucma_event, list);
if (uevent->resp.event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST) {
ctx = ucma_alloc_ctx(file);
if (!ctx) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
uevent->ctx->backlog++;
ctx->cm_id = uevent->cm_id;
ctx->cm_id->context = ctx;
uevent->resp.id = ctx->id;
}
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response),
&uevent->resp,
min_t(size_t, out_len, sizeof(uevent->resp)))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
list_del(&uevent->list);
uevent->ctx->events_reported++;
if (uevent->mc)
uevent->mc->events_reported++;
kfree(uevent);
done:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 79,134
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_ofp11_port(struct ofputil_phy_port *pp,
const struct ofp11_port *op)
{
enum ofperr error;
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(op->port_no, &pp->port_no);
if (error) {
return error;
}
pp->hw_addr = op->hw_addr;
ovs_strlcpy(pp->name, op->name, OFP_MAX_PORT_NAME_LEN);
pp->config = ntohl(op->config) & OFPPC11_ALL;
pp->state = ntohl(op->state) & OFPPS11_ALL;
pp->curr = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(op->curr);
pp->advertised = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(op->advertised);
pp->supported = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(op->supported);
pp->peer = netdev_port_features_from_ofp11(op->peer);
pp->curr_speed = ntohl(op->curr_speed);
pp->max_speed = ntohl(op->max_speed);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _zip_dirent_process_ef_utf_8(const zip_dirent_t *de, zip_uint16_t id, zip_string_t *str)
{
zip_uint16_t ef_len;
zip_uint32_t ef_crc;
zip_buffer_t *buffer;
const zip_uint8_t *ef = _zip_ef_get_by_id(de->extra_fields, &ef_len, id, 0, ZIP_EF_BOTH, NULL);
if (ef == NULL || ef_len < 5 || ef[0] != 1) {
return str;
}
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new((zip_uint8_t *)ef, ef_len)) == NULL) {
return str;
}
_zip_buffer_get_8(buffer);
ef_crc = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
if (_zip_string_crc32(str) == ef_crc) {
zip_uint16_t len = (zip_uint16_t)_zip_buffer_left(buffer);
zip_string_t *ef_str = _zip_string_new(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, len), len, ZIP_FL_ENC_UTF_8, NULL);
if (ef_str != NULL) {
_zip_string_free(str);
str = ef_str;
}
}
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
return str;
}
Commit Message: Fix double free().
Found by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter using AFL.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 62,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static intList *get_vlan_table(VirtIONet *n)
{
intList *list, *entry;
int i, j;
list = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_VLAN >> 5; i++) {
for (j = 0; n->vlans[i] && j <= 0x1f; j++) {
if (n->vlans[i] & (1U << j)) {
entry = g_malloc0(sizeof(*entry));
entry->value = (i << 5) + j;
entry->next = list;
list = entry;
}
}
}
return list;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,813
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::GetPagesRemovedOnCacheReset(
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {
auto task = GetPagesTask::CreateTaskMatchingPagesRemovedOnCacheReset(
store_.get(), callback, policy_controller_.get());
task_queue_.AddTask(std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenCurrentURL() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("LoadURL"));
LocationBar* location_bar = window_->GetLocationBar();
if (!location_bar)
return;
WindowOpenDisposition open_disposition =
location_bar->GetWindowOpenDisposition();
if (OpenInstant(open_disposition))
return;
GURL url(location_bar->GetInputString());
if (open_disposition == CURRENT_TAB && TabFinder::IsEnabled()) {
Browser* existing_browser = NULL;
TabContents* existing_tab = TabFinder::GetInstance()->FindTab(
this, url, &existing_browser);
if (existing_tab) {
existing_browser->ActivateContents(existing_tab);
return;
}
}
browser::NavigateParams params(this, url, location_bar->GetPageTransition());
params.disposition = open_disposition;
params.tabstrip_add_types =
TabStripModel::ADD_FORCE_INDEX | TabStripModel::ADD_INHERIT_OPENER;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
DCHECK(profile_->GetExtensionService());
if (profile_->GetExtensionService()->IsInstalledApp(url)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_OMNIBOX_LOCATION,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jslMatchError(int expected_tk) {
char gotStr[30];
char expStr[30];
jslGetTokenString(gotStr, sizeof(gotStr));
jslTokenAsString(expected_tk, expStr, sizeof(expStr));
size_t oldPos = lex->tokenLastStart;
lex->tokenLastStart = jsvStringIteratorGetIndex(&lex->tokenStart.it)-1;
jsExceptionHere(JSET_SYNTAXERROR, "Got %s expected %s", gotStr, expStr);
lex->tokenLastStart = oldPos;
jslGetNextToken();
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 82,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::ProcessDied(bool already_dead) {
int exit_code = 0;
base::TerminationStatus status =
child_process_launcher_.get() ?
child_process_launcher_->GetChildTerminationStatus(already_dead,
&exit_code) :
base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
RendererClosedDetails details(GetHandle(), status, exit_code);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_PROCESS_CLOSED,
Source<RenderProcessHost>(this),
Details<RendererClosedDetails>(&details));
child_process_launcher_.reset();
channel_.reset();
gpu_message_filter_ = NULL;
IDMap<RenderWidgetHost>::iterator iter(&render_widget_hosts_);
while (!iter.IsAtEnd()) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(iter.GetCurrentValue())->OnMessageReceived(
ViewHostMsg_RenderViewGone(iter.GetCurrentKey(),
static_cast<int>(status),
exit_code));
iter.Advance();
}
ClearTransportDIBCache();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,549
|
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