instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qib_manage_rcvq(struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd, unsigned subctxt,
int start_stop)
{
struct qib_devdata *dd = rcd->dd;
unsigned int rcvctrl_op;
if (subctxt)
goto bail;
/* atomically clear receive enable ctxt. */
if (start_stop) {
/*
* On enable, force in-memory copy of the tail register to
* 0, so that protocol code doesn't have to worry about
* whether or not the chip has yet updated the in-memory
* copy or not on return from the system call. The chip
* always resets it's tail register back to 0 on a
* transition from disabled to enabled.
*/
if (rcd->rcvhdrtail_kvaddr)
qib_clear_rcvhdrtail(rcd);
rcvctrl_op = QIB_RCVCTRL_CTXT_ENB;
} else
rcvctrl_op = QIB_RCVCTRL_CTXT_DIS;
dd->f_rcvctrl(rcd->ppd, rcvctrl_op, rcd->ctxt);
/* always; new head should be equal to new tail; see above */
bail:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sfile_write(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
FILE *fp;
fp = JAS_CAST(FILE *, obj);
return fwrite(buf, 1, cnt, fp);
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 73,215
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_delegreturn(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_delegreturn *dr)
{
struct nfs4_delegation *dp;
stateid_t *stateid = &dr->dr_stateid;
struct nfs4_stid *s;
__be32 status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
if ((status = fh_verify(rqstp, &cstate->current_fh, S_IFREG, 0)))
return status;
status = nfsd4_lookup_stateid(cstate, stateid, NFS4_DELEG_STID, &s, nn);
if (status)
goto out;
dp = delegstateid(s);
status = check_stateid_generation(stateid, &dp->dl_stid.sc_stateid, nfsd4_has_session(cstate));
if (status)
goto put_stateid;
destroy_delegation(dp);
put_stateid:
nfs4_put_stid(&dp->dl_stid);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_SetAttlistDeclHandler(XML_Parser parser,
XML_AttlistDeclHandler attdecl)
{
if (parser != NULL)
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler = attdecl;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *tty_driver_name(const struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (!tty || !tty->driver)
return "";
return tty->driver->name;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_alg *crypto_spawn_alg(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
{
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct crypto_alg *alg2;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
alg = spawn->alg;
alg2 = alg;
if (alg2)
alg2 = crypto_mod_get(alg2);
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
if (!alg2) {
if (alg)
crypto_shoot_alg(alg);
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
return alg;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSValue listener = exec->argument(1);
if (!listener.isObject())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->removeEventListener(ustringToAtomicString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec)), JSEventListener::create(asObject(listener), castedThis, false, currentWorld(exec)).get(), exec->argument(2).toBoolean(exec));
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 170,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
const BN_ULONG b)
{
register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61;
register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8;
a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
a2 = a1 << 1;
a4 = a2 << 1;
a8 = a4 << 1;
tab[0] = 0;
tab[1] = a1;
tab[2] = a2;
tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
tab[4] = a4;
tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
tab[8] = a8;
tab[9] = a1 ^ a8;
tab[10] = a2 ^ a8;
tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8;
tab[12] = a4 ^ a8;
tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8;
tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
s = tab[b & 0xF];
l = s;
s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 4;
h = s >> 60;
s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 8;
h ^= s >> 56;
s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 12;
h ^= s >> 52;
s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 16;
h ^= s >> 48;
s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 20;
h ^= s >> 44;
s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 24;
h ^= s >> 40;
s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 28;
h ^= s >> 36;
s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 32;
h ^= s >> 32;
s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 36;
h ^= s >> 28;
s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 40;
h ^= s >> 24;
s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 44;
h ^= s >> 20;
s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 48;
h ^= s >> 16;
s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 52;
h ^= s >> 12;
s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 56;
h ^= s >> 8;
s = tab[b >> 60];
l ^= s << 60;
h ^= s >> 4;
/* compensate for the top three bits of a */
if (top3b & 01) {
l ^= b << 61;
h ^= b >> 3;
}
if (top3b & 02) {
l ^= b << 62;
h ^= b >> 2;
}
if (top3b & 04) {
l ^= b << 63;
h ^= b >> 1;
}
*r1 = h;
*r0 = l;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 44,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::ImageSkia AppListControllerDelegateImpl::GetWindowIcon() {
return gfx::ImageSkia();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int zend_parse_va_args(int num_args, const char *type_spec, va_list *va, int flags TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
const char *spec_walk;
int c, i;
int min_num_args = -1;
int max_num_args = 0;
int post_varargs = 0;
zval **arg;
int arg_count;
int quiet = flags & ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET;
zend_bool have_varargs = 0;
zval ****varargs = NULL;
int *n_varargs = NULL;
for (spec_walk = type_spec; *spec_walk; spec_walk++) {
c = *spec_walk;
switch (c) {
case 'l': case 'd':
case 's': case 'b':
case 'r': case 'a':
case 'o': case 'O':
case 'z': case 'Z':
case 'C': case 'h':
case 'f': case 'A':
case 'H': case 'p':
max_num_args++;
break;
case '|':
min_num_args = max_num_args;
break;
case '/':
case '!':
/* Pass */
break;
case '*':
case '+':
if (have_varargs) {
if (!quiet) {
zend_function *active_function = EG(current_execute_data)->function_state.function;
const char *class_name = active_function->common.scope ? active_function->common.scope->name : "";
zend_error(E_WARNING, "%s%s%s(): only one varargs specifier (* or +) is permitted",
class_name,
class_name[0] ? "::" : "",
active_function->common.function_name);
}
return FAILURE;
}
have_varargs = 1;
/* we expect at least one parameter in varargs */
if (c == '+') {
max_num_args++;
}
/* mark the beginning of varargs */
post_varargs = max_num_args;
break;
default:
if (!quiet) {
zend_function *active_function = EG(current_execute_data)->function_state.function;
const char *class_name = active_function->common.scope ? active_function->common.scope->name : "";
zend_error(E_WARNING, "%s%s%s(): bad type specifier while parsing parameters",
class_name,
class_name[0] ? "::" : "",
active_function->common.function_name);
}
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (min_num_args < 0) {
min_num_args = max_num_args;
}
if (have_varargs) {
/* calculate how many required args are at the end of the specifier list */
post_varargs = max_num_args - post_varargs;
max_num_args = -1;
}
if (num_args < min_num_args || (num_args > max_num_args && max_num_args > 0)) {
if (!quiet) {
zend_function *active_function = EG(current_execute_data)->function_state.function;
const char *class_name = active_function->common.scope ? active_function->common.scope->name : "";
zend_error(E_WARNING, "%s%s%s() expects %s %d parameter%s, %d given",
class_name,
class_name[0] ? "::" : "",
active_function->common.function_name,
min_num_args == max_num_args ? "exactly" : num_args < min_num_args ? "at least" : "at most",
num_args < min_num_args ? min_num_args : max_num_args,
(num_args < min_num_args ? min_num_args : max_num_args) == 1 ? "" : "s",
num_args);
}
return FAILURE;
}
arg_count = (int)(zend_uintptr_t) *(zend_vm_stack_top(TSRMLS_C) - 1);
if (num_args > arg_count) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "%s(): could not obtain parameters for parsing",
get_active_function_name(TSRMLS_C));
return FAILURE;
}
i = 0;
while (num_args-- > 0) {
if (*type_spec == '|') {
type_spec++;
}
if (*type_spec == '*' || *type_spec == '+') {
int num_varargs = num_args + 1 - post_varargs;
/* eat up the passed in storage even if it won't be filled in with varargs */
varargs = va_arg(*va, zval ****);
n_varargs = va_arg(*va, int *);
type_spec++;
if (num_varargs > 0) {
int iv = 0;
zval **p = (zval **) (zend_vm_stack_top(TSRMLS_C) - 1 - (arg_count - i));
*n_varargs = num_varargs;
/* allocate space for array and store args */
*varargs = safe_emalloc(num_varargs, sizeof(zval **), 0);
while (num_varargs-- > 0) {
(*varargs)[iv++] = p++;
}
/* adjust how many args we have left and restart loop */
num_args = num_args + 1 - iv;
i += iv;
continue;
} else {
*varargs = NULL;
*n_varargs = 0;
}
}
arg = (zval **) (zend_vm_stack_top(TSRMLS_C) - 1 - (arg_count-i));
if (zend_parse_arg(i+1, arg, va, &type_spec, quiet TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
/* clean up varargs array if it was used */
if (varargs && *varargs) {
efree(*varargs);
*varargs = NULL;
}
return FAILURE;
}
i++;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
static int called = 0;
debug("do_cleanup");
/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
if (is_child)
return;
/* avoid double cleanup */
if (called)
return;
called = 1;
if (authctxt == NULL)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
sshpam_cleanup();
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
}
#endif
if (!authctxt->authenticated)
return;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
authctxt->krb5_ctx)
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds)
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
#endif
/* remove agent socket */
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
/*
* Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *a, int n)
{
int i,j,k;
if (n < 0)
return 0;
i=n/BN_BITS2;
j=n%BN_BITS2;
if (a->top <= i)
{
if (bn_wexpand(a,i+1) == NULL) return(0);
for(k=a->top; k<i+1; k++)
a->d[k]=0;
a->top=i+1;
}
a->d[i]|=(((BN_ULONG)1)<<j);
bn_check_top(a);
return(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,555
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryLong(TIFF* tif, TIFFDirEntry* direntry, uint32* value)
{
enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr err;
if (direntry->tdir_count!=1)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrCount);
switch (direntry->tdir_type)
{
case TIFF_BYTE:
{
uint8 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedByte(tif,direntry,&m);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SBYTE:
{
int8 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSbyte(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSbyte(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SHORT:
{
uint16 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedShort(tif,direntry,&m);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SSHORT:
{
int16 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSshort(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSshort(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_LONG:
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedLong(tif,direntry,value);
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
case TIFF_SLONG:
{
int32 m;
TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSlong(tif,direntry,&m);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSlong(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_LONG8:
{
uint64 m;
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedLong8(tif,direntry,&m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongLong8(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
case TIFF_SLONG8:
{
int64 m;
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckedSlong8(tif,direntry,&m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
err=TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSlong8(m);
if (err!=TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk)
return(err);
*value=(uint32)m;
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
default:
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrType);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_integered_width(struct table *t, double *dwidth, short *iwidth)
{
int i, j, k, n, bcol, ecol, step;
short *indexarray;
char *fixed;
double *mod;
double sum = 0., x = 0.;
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
int rulewidth = table_rule_width(t);
indexarray = NewAtom_N(short, t->maxcol + 1);
mod = NewAtom_N(double, t->maxcol + 1);
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i++) {
iwidth[i] = ceil_at_intervals(ceil(dwidth[i]), rulewidth);
mod[i] = (double)iwidth[i] - dwidth[i];
}
sum = 0.;
for (k = 0; k <= t->maxcol; k++) {
x = mod[k];
sum += x;
i = bsearch_double(x, mod, indexarray, k);
if (k > i) {
int ii;
for (ii = k; ii > i; ii--)
indexarray[ii] = indexarray[ii - 1];
}
indexarray[i] = k;
}
fixed = NewAtom_N(char, t->maxcol + 1);
bzero(fixed, t->maxcol + 1);
for (step = 0; step < 2; step++) {
for (i = 0; i <= t->maxcol; i += n) {
int nn;
short *idx;
double nsum;
if (sum < 0.5)
return;
for (n = 0; i + n <= t->maxcol; n++) {
int ii = indexarray[i + n];
if (n == 0)
x = mod[ii];
else if (fabs(mod[ii] - x) > 1e-6)
break;
}
for (k = 0; k < n; k++) {
int ii = indexarray[i + k];
if (fixed[ii] < 2 &&
iwidth[ii] - rulewidth < t->minimum_width[ii])
fixed[ii] = 2;
if (fixed[ii] < 1 &&
iwidth[ii] - rulewidth < t->tabwidth[ii] &&
(double)rulewidth - mod[ii] > 0.5)
fixed[ii] = 1;
}
idx = NewAtom_N(short, n);
for (k = 0; k < cell->maxcell; k++) {
int kk, w, width, m;
j = cell->index[k];
bcol = cell->col[j];
ecol = bcol + cell->colspan[j];
m = 0;
for (kk = 0; kk < n; kk++) {
int ii = indexarray[i + kk];
if (ii >= bcol && ii < ecol) {
idx[m] = ii;
m++;
}
}
if (m == 0)
continue;
width = (cell->colspan[j] - 1) * t->cellspacing;
for (kk = bcol; kk < ecol; kk++)
width += iwidth[kk];
w = 0;
for (kk = 0; kk < m; kk++) {
if (fixed[(int)idx[kk]] < 2)
w += rulewidth;
}
if (width - w < cell->minimum_width[j]) {
for (kk = 0; kk < m; kk++) {
if (fixed[(int)idx[kk]] < 2)
fixed[(int)idx[kk]] = 2;
}
}
w = 0;
for (kk = 0; kk < m; kk++) {
if (fixed[(int)idx[kk]] < 1 &&
(double)rulewidth - mod[(int)idx[kk]] > 0.5)
w += rulewidth;
}
if (width - w < cell->width[j]) {
for (kk = 0; kk < m; kk++) {
if (fixed[(int)idx[kk]] < 1 &&
(double)rulewidth - mod[(int)idx[kk]] > 0.5)
fixed[(int)idx[kk]] = 1;
}
}
}
nn = 0;
for (k = 0; k < n; k++) {
int ii = indexarray[i + k];
if (fixed[ii] <= step)
nn++;
}
nsum = sum - (double)(nn * rulewidth);
if (nsum < 0. && fabs(sum) <= fabs(nsum))
return;
for (k = 0; k < n; k++) {
int ii = indexarray[i + k];
if (fixed[ii] <= step) {
iwidth[ii] -= rulewidth;
fixed[ii] = 3;
}
}
sum = nsum;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 84,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sc_get_authentic_driver(void)
{
return sc_get_driver();
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SkColor AutofillPopupBaseView::GetBackgroundColor() {
return GetNativeTheme()->GetSystemColor(
ui::NativeTheme::kColorId_MenuBackgroundColor);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::HistogramCustomizer::RenderViewNavigatedToHost(
const std::string& host, size_t view_count) {
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableHistogramCustomizer)) {
return;
}
if (view_count == 1)
SetCommonHost(host);
else if (host != common_host_)
SetCommonHost(std::string());
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSbyte(int8 value)
{
if (value<0)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::StartImpl() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::FILE);
GetDownloadTarget(base::Bind(
&WriteFromUrlOperation::Download,
this,
base::Bind(
&WriteFromUrlOperation::VerifyDownload,
this,
base::Bind(
&WriteFromUrlOperation::Unzip,
this,
base::Bind(&WriteFromUrlOperation::Write,
this,
base::Bind(&WriteFromUrlOperation::VerifyWrite,
this,
base::Bind(&WriteFromUrlOperation::Finish,
this)))))));
}
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 127,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_open)
{
zval * zip;
zval * zip_entry;
char *mode = NULL;
int mode_len = 0;
zip_read_rsrc * zr_rsrc;
zip_rsrc *z_rsrc;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rr|s", &zip, &zip_entry, &mode, &mode_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(zr_rsrc, zip_read_rsrc *, &zip_entry, -1, le_zip_entry_name, le_zip_entry);
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(z_rsrc, zip_rsrc *, &zip, -1, le_zip_dir_name, le_zip_dir);
if (zr_rsrc->zf != NULL) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 51,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PlatformWebView::postEvent(QEvent* event)
{
QCoreApplication::postEvent(m_window, event);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int pm_reset_counters(p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl, fm_mgr_type_t mgr, int argc, char *argv[]) {
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
fm_msg_ret_code_t ret_code;
if((res = fm_mgr_simple_query(hdl, FM_ACT_GET, FM_DT_PM_RESET_COUNTERS, mgr, 0, NULL, &ret_code)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pm_reset_counters: Failed to retrieve data: \n"
"\tError:(%d) %s \n\tRet code:(%d) %s\n",
res, fm_mgr_get_error_str(res),ret_code,
fm_mgr_get_resp_error_str(ret_code));
} else {
printf("pm_reset_counters: Successfully sent reset command "
"to the PM\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 96,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 5,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xenvif_receive_skb(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
netif_rx_ni(skb);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: shutdown the ring if it contains garbage.
A buggy or malicious frontend should not be able to confuse netback.
If we spot anything which is not as it should be then shutdown the
device and don't try to continue with the ring in a potentially
hostile state. Well behaved and non-hostile frontends will not be
penalised.
As well as making the existing checks for such errors fatal also add a
new check that ensures that there isn't an insane number of requests
on the ring (i.e. more than would fit in the ring). If the ring
contains garbage then previously is was possible to loop over this
insane number, getting an error each time and therefore not generating
any more pending requests and therefore not exiting the loop in
xen_netbk_tx_build_gops for an externded period.
Also turn various netdev_dbg calls which no precipitate a fatal error
into netdev_err, they are rate limited because the device is shutdown
afterwards.
This fixes at least one known DoS/softlockup of the backend domain.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 34,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsWebLocalFrame() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_num_721(unsigned char *p, uint16_t value)
{
archive_le16enc(p, value);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
long ret;
upayload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
ret = upayload->datalen;
/* we can return the data as is */
if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
if (buflen > upayload->datalen)
buflen = upayload->datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: jbig2_huffman_get(Jbig2HuffmanState *hs, const Jbig2HuffmanTable *table, bool *oob)
{
Jbig2HuffmanEntry *entry;
byte flags;
int offset_bits = hs->offset_bits;
uint32_t this_word = hs->this_word;
uint32_t next_word;
int RANGELEN;
int32_t result;
if (hs->offset_limit && hs->offset >= hs->offset_limit) {
jbig2_error(hs->ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, -1, "end of Jbig2WordStream reached at offset %d", hs->offset);
if (oob)
*oob = -1;
return -1;
}
for (;;) {
int log_table_size = table->log_table_size;
int PREFLEN;
/* SumatraPDF: shifting by the size of the operand is undefined */
entry = &table->entries[log_table_size > 0 ? this_word >> (32 - log_table_size) : 0];
flags = entry->flags;
PREFLEN = entry->PREFLEN;
if ((flags == (byte) - 1) && (PREFLEN == (byte) - 1) && (entry->u.RANGELOW == -1)) {
if (oob)
*oob = -1;
return -1;
}
next_word = hs->next_word;
offset_bits += PREFLEN;
if (offset_bits >= 32) {
this_word = next_word;
hs->offset += 4;
next_word = huff_get_next_word(hs, hs->offset + 4);
offset_bits -= 32;
hs->next_word = next_word;
PREFLEN = offset_bits;
}
if (PREFLEN)
this_word = (this_word << PREFLEN) | (next_word >> (32 - offset_bits));
if (flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISEXT) {
table = entry->u.ext_table;
} else
break;
}
result = entry->u.RANGELOW;
RANGELEN = entry->RANGELEN;
if (RANGELEN > 0) {
int32_t HTOFFSET;
HTOFFSET = this_word >> (32 - RANGELEN);
if (flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISLOW)
result -= HTOFFSET;
else
result += HTOFFSET;
offset_bits += RANGELEN;
if (offset_bits >= 32) {
this_word = next_word;
hs->offset += 4;
next_word = huff_get_next_word(hs, hs->offset + 4);
offset_bits -= 32;
hs->next_word = next_word;
RANGELEN = offset_bits;
}
if (RANGELEN)
this_word = (this_word << RANGELEN) | (next_word >> (32 - offset_bits));
}
hs->this_word = this_word;
hs->offset_bits = offset_bits;
if (oob != NULL)
*oob = (flags & JBIG2_HUFFMAN_FLAGS_ISOOB);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::HandleGestureBegin() {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->HandleGestureBegin();
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void snd_card_set_id(struct snd_card *card, const char *nid)
{
/* check if user specified own card->id */
if (card->id[0] != '\0')
return;
mutex_lock(&snd_card_mutex);
snd_card_set_id_no_lock(card, nid, nid);
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 36,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evutil_getenv_(const char *varname)
{
if (evutil_issetugid())
return NULL;
return getenv(varname);
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int use_append( const char * /* method */, const char *path )
{
return attr_list_has_file( ATTR_APPEND_FILES, path );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dut_mode_recv(uint16_t UNUSED opcode, uint8_t UNUSED *buf, uint8_t UNUSED len)
{
bdt_log("DUT MODE RECV : NOT IMPLEMENTED");
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 159,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t ndp_msg_opt_mtu(struct ndp_msg *msg, int offset)
{
struct nd_opt_mtu *mtu = ndp_msg_payload_opts_offset(msg, offset);
return ntohl(mtu->nd_opt_mtu_mtu);
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <julien.bernard@viagenie.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 53,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipgre_tunnel_unlink(struct ipgre_net *ign, struct ip_tunnel *t)
{
struct ip_tunnel __rcu **tp;
struct ip_tunnel *iter;
for (tp = ipgre_bucket(ign, t);
(iter = rtnl_dereference(*tp)) != NULL;
tp = &iter->next) {
if (t == iter) {
rcu_assign_pointer(*tp, t->next);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status =
pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (read_status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 173,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_buffered_input_packets(void)
{
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, active_state);
}
Commit Message: disable Unix-domain socket forwarding when privsep is disabled
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 72,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::SetIsNeverSuitableForReuse() {
is_never_suitable_for_reuse_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ohci_td_pkt(const char *msg, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,191
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: clump_splay_walk_bwd_init(clump_splay_walker *sw, const gs_ref_memory_t *mem)
{
clump_t *cp = mem->root;
if (cp)
{
SANITY_CHECK(cp);
sw->from = SPLAY_FROM_RIGHT;
while (cp->right)
{
cp = cp->right;
}
}
sw->cp = cp;
sw->end = NULL;
return cp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 5,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 tcm_loop_get_pr_transport_id_len(
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg,
struct se_node_acl *se_nacl,
struct t10_pr_registration *pr_reg,
int *format_code)
{
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg =
(struct tcm_loop_tpg *)se_tpg->se_tpg_fabric_ptr;
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba = tl_tpg->tl_hba;
switch (tl_hba->tl_proto_id) {
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_SAS:
return sas_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_FCP:
return fc_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
case SCSI_PROTOCOL_ISCSI:
return iscsi_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "Unknown tl_proto_id: 0x%02x, using"
" SAS emulation\n", tl_hba->tl_proto_id);
break;
}
return sas_get_pr_transport_id_len(se_tpg, se_nacl, pr_reg,
format_code);
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void eraser(unsigned char c, struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
enum { ERASE, WERASE, KILL } kill_type;
size_t head;
size_t cnt;
int seen_alnums;
if (ldata->read_head == ldata->canon_head) {
/* process_output('\a', tty); */ /* what do you think? */
return;
}
if (c == ERASE_CHAR(tty))
kill_type = ERASE;
else if (c == WERASE_CHAR(tty))
kill_type = WERASE;
else {
if (!L_ECHO(tty)) {
ldata->read_head = ldata->canon_head;
return;
}
if (!L_ECHOK(tty) || !L_ECHOKE(tty) || !L_ECHOE(tty)) {
ldata->read_head = ldata->canon_head;
finish_erasing(ldata);
echo_char(KILL_CHAR(tty), tty);
/* Add a newline if ECHOK is on and ECHOKE is off. */
if (L_ECHOK(tty))
echo_char_raw('\n', ldata);
return;
}
kill_type = KILL;
}
seen_alnums = 0;
while (ldata->read_head != ldata->canon_head) {
head = ldata->read_head;
/* erase a single possibly multibyte character */
do {
head--;
c = read_buf(ldata, head);
} while (is_continuation(c, tty) && head != ldata->canon_head);
/* do not partially erase */
if (is_continuation(c, tty))
break;
if (kill_type == WERASE) {
/* Equivalent to BSD's ALTWERASE. */
if (isalnum(c) || c == '_')
seen_alnums++;
else if (seen_alnums)
break;
}
cnt = ldata->read_head - head;
ldata->read_head = head;
if (L_ECHO(tty)) {
if (L_ECHOPRT(tty)) {
if (!ldata->erasing) {
echo_char_raw('\\', ldata);
ldata->erasing = 1;
}
/* if cnt > 1, output a multi-byte character */
echo_char(c, tty);
while (--cnt > 0) {
head++;
echo_char_raw(read_buf(ldata, head), ldata);
echo_move_back_col(ldata);
}
} else if (kill_type == ERASE && !L_ECHOE(tty)) {
echo_char(ERASE_CHAR(tty), tty);
} else if (c == '\t') {
unsigned int num_chars = 0;
int after_tab = 0;
size_t tail = ldata->read_head;
/*
* Count the columns used for characters
* since the start of input or after a
* previous tab.
* This info is used to go back the correct
* number of columns.
*/
while (tail != ldata->canon_head) {
tail--;
c = read_buf(ldata, tail);
if (c == '\t') {
after_tab = 1;
break;
} else if (iscntrl(c)) {
if (L_ECHOCTL(tty))
num_chars += 2;
} else if (!is_continuation(c, tty)) {
num_chars++;
}
}
echo_erase_tab(num_chars, after_tab, ldata);
} else {
if (iscntrl(c) && L_ECHOCTL(tty)) {
echo_char_raw('\b', ldata);
echo_char_raw(' ', ldata);
echo_char_raw('\b', ldata);
}
if (!iscntrl(c) || L_ECHOCTL(tty)) {
echo_char_raw('\b', ldata);
echo_char_raw(' ', ldata);
echo_char_raw('\b', ldata);
}
}
}
if (kill_type == ERASE)
break;
}
if (ldata->read_head == ldata->canon_head && L_ECHO(tty))
finish_erasing(ldata);
}
Commit Message: n_tty: Fix n_tty_write crash when echoing in raw mode
The tty atomic_write_lock does not provide an exclusion guarantee for
the tty driver if the termios settings are LECHO & !OPOST. And since
it is unexpected and not allowed to call TTY buffer helpers like
tty_insert_flip_string concurrently, this may lead to crashes when
concurrect writers call pty_write. In that case the following two
writers:
* the ECHOing from a workqueue and
* pty_write from the process
race and can overflow the corresponding TTY buffer like follows.
If we look into tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag, there is:
int space = __tty_buffer_request_room(port, goal, flags);
struct tty_buffer *tb = port->buf.tail;
...
memcpy(char_buf_ptr(tb, tb->used), chars, space);
...
tb->used += space;
so the race of the two can result in something like this:
A B
__tty_buffer_request_room
__tty_buffer_request_room
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...)
tb->used += space;
memcpy(buf(tb->used), ...) ->BOOM
B's memcpy is past the tty_buffer due to the previous A's tb->used
increment.
Since the N_TTY line discipline input processing can output
concurrently with a tty write, obtain the N_TTY ldisc output_lock to
serialize echo output with normal tty writes. This ensures the tty
buffer helper tty_insert_flip_string is not called concurrently and
everything is fine.
Note that this is nicely reproducible by an ordinary user using
forkpty and some setup around that (raw termios + ECHO). And it is
present in kernels at least after commit
d945cb9cce20ac7143c2de8d88b187f62db99bdc (pty: Rework the pty layer to
use the normal buffering logic) in 2.6.31-rc3.
js: add more info to the commit log
js: switch to bool
js: lock unconditionally
js: lock only the tty->ops->write call
References: CVE-2014-0196
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 39,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LogL16fromY(double Y, int em) /* get 16-bit LogL from Y */
{
if (Y >= 1.8371976e19)
return (0x7fff);
if (Y <= -1.8371976e19)
return (0xffff);
if (Y > 5.4136769e-20)
return itrunc(256.*(log2(Y) + 64.), em);
if (Y < -5.4136769e-20)
return (~0x7fff | itrunc(256.*(log2(-Y) + 64.), em));
return (0);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Track::Info::Copy(Info& dst) const
{
if (&dst == this)
return 0;
dst.type = type;
dst.number = number;
dst.defaultDuration = defaultDuration;
dst.codecDelay = codecDelay;
dst.seekPreRoll = seekPreRoll;
dst.uid = uid;
dst.lacing = lacing;
dst.settings = settings;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::nameAsUTF8, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::language, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::codecId, dst))
return status;
if (int status = CopyStr(&Info::codecNameAsUTF8, dst))
return status;
if (codecPrivateSize > 0)
{
if (codecPrivate == NULL)
return -1;
if (dst.codecPrivate)
return -1;
if (dst.codecPrivateSize != 0)
return -1;
dst.codecPrivate = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[codecPrivateSize];
if (dst.codecPrivate == NULL)
return -1;
memcpy(dst.codecPrivate, codecPrivate, codecPrivateSize);
dst.codecPrivateSize = codecPrivateSize;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CIFSSMBLock(const int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const __u16 smb_file_id, const __u64 len,
const __u64 offset, const __u32 numUnlock,
const __u32 numLock, const __u8 lockType,
const bool waitFlag, const __u8 oplock_level)
{
int rc = 0;
LOCK_REQ *pSMB = NULL;
/* LOCK_RSP *pSMBr = NULL; */ /* No response data other than rc to parse */
int bytes_returned;
int timeout = 0;
__u16 count;
cFYI(1, "CIFSSMBLock timeout %d numLock %d", (int)waitFlag, numLock);
rc = small_smb_init(SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX, 8, tcon, (void **) &pSMB);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (lockType == LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE) {
timeout = CIFS_ASYNC_OP; /* no response expected */
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
} else if (waitFlag) {
timeout = CIFS_BLOCKING_OP; /* blocking operation, no timeout */
pSMB->Timeout = cpu_to_le32(-1);/* blocking - do not time out */
} else {
pSMB->Timeout = 0;
}
pSMB->NumberOfLocks = cpu_to_le16(numLock);
pSMB->NumberOfUnlocks = cpu_to_le16(numUnlock);
pSMB->LockType = lockType;
pSMB->OplockLevel = oplock_level;
pSMB->AndXCommand = 0xFF; /* none */
pSMB->Fid = smb_file_id; /* netfid stays le */
if ((numLock != 0) || (numUnlock != 0)) {
pSMB->Locks[0].Pid = cpu_to_le16(current->tgid);
/* BB where to store pid high? */
pSMB->Locks[0].LengthLow = cpu_to_le32((u32)len);
pSMB->Locks[0].LengthHigh = cpu_to_le32((u32)(len>>32));
pSMB->Locks[0].OffsetLow = cpu_to_le32((u32)offset);
pSMB->Locks[0].OffsetHigh = cpu_to_le32((u32)(offset>>32));
count = sizeof(LOCKING_ANDX_RANGE);
} else {
/* oplock break */
count = 0;
}
inc_rfc1001_len(pSMB, count);
pSMB->ByteCount = cpu_to_le16(count);
if (waitFlag) {
rc = SendReceiveBlockingLock(xid, tcon, (struct smb_hdr *) pSMB,
(struct smb_hdr *) pSMB, &bytes_returned);
cifs_small_buf_release(pSMB);
} else {
rc = SendReceiveNoRsp(xid, tcon->ses, (struct smb_hdr *)pSMB,
timeout);
/* SMB buffer freed by function above */
}
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->num_locks);
if (rc)
cFYI(1, "Send error in Lock = %d", rc);
/* Note: On -EAGAIN error only caller can retry on handle based calls
since file handle passed in no longer valid */
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix possible memory corruption in CIFSFindNext
The name_len variable in CIFSFindNext is a signed int that gets set to
the resume_name_len in the cifs_search_info. The resume_name_len however
is unsigned and for some infolevels is populated directly from a 32 bit
value sent by the server.
If the server sends a very large value for this, then that value could
look negative when converted to a signed int. That would make that
value pass the PATH_MAX check later in CIFSFindNext. The name_len would
then be used as a length value for a memcpy. It would then be treated
as unsigned again, and the memcpy scribbles over a ton of memory.
Fix this by making the name_len an unsigned value in CIFSFindNext.
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Darren Lavender <dcl@hppine99.gbr.hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_zfs_ls(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
{
const char *filename = "/";
int part;
struct blk_desc *dev_desc;
disk_partition_t info;
struct device_s vdev;
if (argc < 2)
return cmd_usage(cmdtp);
if (argc == 4)
filename = argv[3];
part = blk_get_device_part_str(argv[1], argv[2], &dev_desc, &info, 1);
if (part < 0)
return 1;
zfs_set_blk_dev(dev_desc, &info);
vdev.part_length = info.size;
zfs_ls(&vdev, filename,
zfs_print);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CloseHandlesAndTerminateProcess(PROCESS_INFORMATION* process_information) {
if (process_information->hThread) {
CloseHandle(process_information->hThread);
process_information->hThread = NULL;
}
if (process_information->hProcess) {
TerminateProcess(process_information->hProcess, CONTROL_C_EXIT);
CloseHandle(process_information->hProcess);
process_information->hProcess = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __udp4_lib_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 info, struct udp_table *udptable)
{
struct inet_sock *inet;
const struct iphdr *iph = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
struct udphdr *uh = (struct udphdr *)(skb->data+(iph->ihl<<2));
const int type = icmp_hdr(skb)->type;
const int code = icmp_hdr(skb)->code;
struct sock *sk;
int harderr;
int err;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
sk = __udp4_lib_lookup(net, iph->daddr, uh->dest,
iph->saddr, uh->source, skb->dev->ifindex, udptable);
if (sk == NULL) {
ICMP_INC_STATS_BH(net, ICMP_MIB_INERRORS);
return; /* No socket for error */
}
err = 0;
harderr = 0;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
switch (type) {
default:
case ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED:
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
case ICMP_SOURCE_QUENCH:
goto out;
case ICMP_PARAMETERPROB:
err = EPROTO;
harderr = 1;
break;
case ICMP_DEST_UNREACH:
if (code == ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED) { /* Path MTU discovery */
ipv4_sk_update_pmtu(skb, sk, info);
if (inet->pmtudisc != IP_PMTUDISC_DONT) {
err = EMSGSIZE;
harderr = 1;
break;
}
goto out;
}
err = EHOSTUNREACH;
if (code <= NR_ICMP_UNREACH) {
harderr = icmp_err_convert[code].fatal;
err = icmp_err_convert[code].errno;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
ipv4_sk_redirect(skb, sk);
break;
}
/*
* RFC1122: OK. Passes ICMP errors back to application, as per
* 4.1.3.3.
*/
if (!inet->recverr) {
if (!harderr || sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
} else
ip_icmp_error(sk, skb, err, uh->dest, info, (u8 *)(uh+1));
sk->sk_err = err;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
out:
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t user_ta_get_instance_id(struct tee_ta_ctx *ctx)
{
return to_user_ta_ctx(ctx)->vm_info->asid;
}
Commit Message: core: clear the entire TA area
Previously we cleared (memset to zero) the size corresponding to code
and data segments, however the allocation for the TA is made on the
granularity of the memory pool, meaning that we did not clear all memory
and because of that we could potentially leak code and data of a
previous loaded TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0006: "Potential disclosure of previously loaded TA
code and data"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 86,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ITextDocument* OmniboxViewWin::GetTextObjectModel() const {
if (!text_object_model_) {
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IRichEditOle, NULL> ole_interface;
ole_interface.Attach(GetOleInterface());
if (ole_interface) {
ole_interface.QueryInterface(
__uuidof(ITextDocument),
reinterpret_cast<void**>(&text_object_model_));
}
}
return text_object_model_;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = kvm->arch.vioapic;
if (!ioapic)
return;
kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds accesses of rtc_eoi map
KVM was using arrays of size KVM_MAX_VCPUS with vcpu_id, but ID can be
bigger that the maximal number of VCPUs, resulting in out-of-bounds
access.
Found by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 at addr [...]
Write of size 1 by task a.out/27101
CPU: 1 PID: 27101 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:905
[...] kvm_apic_set_irq+0x10e/0x180 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:495
[...] kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0x732/0xc10 arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c:86
[...] ioapic_service+0x41d/0x760 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:360
[...] ioapic_set_irq+0x275/0x6c0 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:222
[...] kvm_ioapic_inject_all arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:235
[...] kvm_set_ioapic+0x223/0x310 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:670
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3668
[...] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x1a08/0x23c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3999
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x1fa/0x1a70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3099
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: af1bae5497b9 ("KVM: x86: bump KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID to 1023")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 47,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<FeatureEntry>* GetEntriesForTesting() {
static base::NoDestructor<std::vector<FeatureEntry>> entries;
return entries.get();
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 137,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::GetIndexedIntegerImpl(
const char* function_name, GLenum target, GLuint index, TYPE* data) {
DCHECK(data);
if (features().ext_window_rectangles && target == GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_EXT) {
if (index >= state_.GetMaxWindowRectangles()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"window rectangle index out of bounds");
}
state_.GetWindowRectangle(index, data);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<IndexedBufferBindingHost> bindings;
switch (target) {
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_BINDING:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_SIZE:
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_START:
if (index >= group_->max_transform_feedback_separate_attribs()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "invalid index");
return;
}
bindings = state_.bound_transform_feedback.get();
break;
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_BINDING:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_SIZE:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_START:
if (index >= group_->max_uniform_buffer_bindings()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "invalid index");
return;
}
bindings = state_.indexed_uniform_buffer_bindings.get();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
DCHECK(bindings);
switch (target) {
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_BINDING:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_BINDING:
{
Buffer* buffer = bindings->GetBufferBinding(index);
*data = static_cast<TYPE>(buffer ? buffer->service_id() : 0);
}
break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_SIZE:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_SIZE:
*data = static_cast<TYPE>(bindings->GetBufferSize(index));
break;
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_START:
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_START:
*data = static_cast<TYPE>(bindings->GetBufferStart(index));
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui32_e(const iw_byte *b, int endian)
{
if(endian==IW_ENDIAN_LITTLE)
return iw_get_ui32le(b);
return iw_get_ui32be(b);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
| 0
| 66,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(wddx_packet_start)
{
char *comment = NULL;
int comment_len = 0;
wddx_packet *packet;
comment = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &comment, &comment_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
packet = php_wddx_constructor();
php_wddx_packet_start(packet, comment, comment_len);
php_wddx_add_chunk_static(packet, WDDX_STRUCT_S);
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, packet, le_wddx);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73065: Out-Of-Bounds Read in php_wddx_push_element of wddx.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void blk_mq_bio_to_request(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
{
init_request_from_bio(rq, bio);
if (blk_do_io_stat(rq))
blk_account_io_start(rq, 1);
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 86,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table *table)
{
static const struct ctl_path null_path[] = { {} };
return register_sysctl_paths(null_path, table);
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int irda_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_irda *addr = (struct sockaddr_irda *) uaddr;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
int err;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_irda))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
#ifdef CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA
/* Special care for Ultra sockets */
if ((sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) &&
(sk->sk_protocol == IRDAPROTO_ULTRA)) {
self->pid = addr->sir_lsap_sel;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (self->pid & 0x80) {
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), extension in PID not supp!\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
err = irda_open_lsap(self, self->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
/* Pretend we are connected */
sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_state = TCP_ESTABLISHED;
err = 0;
goto out;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA */
self->ias_obj = irias_new_object(addr->sir_name, jiffies);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (self->ias_obj == NULL)
goto out;
err = irda_open_tsap(self, addr->sir_lsap_sel, addr->sir_name);
if (err < 0) {
irias_delete_object(self->ias_obj);
self->ias_obj = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Register with LM-IAS */
irias_add_integer_attrib(self->ias_obj, "IrDA:TinyTP:LsapSel",
self->stsap_sel, IAS_KERNEL_ATTR);
irias_insert_object(self->ias_obj);
err = 0;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: M_fs_error_t M_fs_path_set_cwd(const char *path)
{
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0')
return M_FS_ERROR_INVALID;
#ifdef _WIN32
if (SetCurrentDirectory(path) == 0) {
return M_fs_error_from_syserr(GetLastError());
}
#else
if (chdir(path) != 0) {
return M_fs_error_from_syserr(errno);
}
#endif
return M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 79,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfc_llcp_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock(sk);
int len, err = 0;
u16 miux, remote_miu;
u8 rw;
pr_debug("%p optname %d\n", sk, optname);
if (level != SOL_NFC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
local = llcp_sock->local;
if (!local)
return -ENODEV;
len = min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32));
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case NFC_LLCP_RW:
rw = llcp_sock->rw > LLCP_MAX_RW ? local->rw : llcp_sock->rw;
if (put_user(rw, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case NFC_LLCP_MIUX:
miux = be16_to_cpu(llcp_sock->miux) > LLCP_MAX_MIUX ?
be16_to_cpu(local->miux) : be16_to_cpu(llcp_sock->miux);
if (put_user(miux, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case NFC_LLCP_REMOTE_MIU:
remote_miu = llcp_sock->remote_miu > LLCP_MAX_MIU ?
local->remote_miu : llcp_sock->remote_miu;
if (put_user(remote_miu, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case NFC_LLCP_REMOTE_LTO:
if (put_user(local->remote_lto / 10, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case NFC_LLCP_REMOTE_RW:
if (put_user(llcp_sock->remote_rw, (u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct segment *new_init_section(struct playlist *pls,
struct init_section_info *info,
const char *url_base)
{
struct segment *sec;
char *ptr;
char tmp_str[MAX_URL_SIZE];
if (!info->uri[0])
return NULL;
sec = av_mallocz(sizeof(*sec));
if (!sec)
return NULL;
ff_make_absolute_url(tmp_str, sizeof(tmp_str), url_base, info->uri);
sec->url = av_strdup(tmp_str);
if (!sec->url) {
av_free(sec);
return NULL;
}
if (info->byterange[0]) {
sec->size = strtoll(info->byterange, NULL, 10);
ptr = strchr(info->byterange, '@');
if (ptr)
sec->url_offset = strtoll(ptr+1, NULL, 10);
} else {
/* the entire file is the init section */
sec->size = -1;
}
dynarray_add(&pls->init_sections, &pls->n_init_sections, sec);
return sec;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 61,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: apprentice_magic_strength(const struct magic *m)
{
#define MULT 10
size_t v, val = 2 * MULT; /* baseline strength */
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_DEFAULT: /* make sure this sorts last */
if (m->factor_op != FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE)
abort();
return 0;
case FILE_BYTE:
val += 1 * MULT;
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
val += 2 * MULT;
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
val += 4 * MULT;
break;
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_STRING:
val += m->vallen * MULT;
break;
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
val += m->vallen * MULT / 2;
break;
case FILE_SEARCH:
val += m->vallen * MAX(MULT / m->vallen, 1);
break;
case FILE_REGEX:
v = nonmagic(m->value.s);
val += v * MAX(MULT / v, 1);
break;
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
val += 4 * MULT;
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
val += 8 * MULT;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_NAME:
case FILE_USE:
break;
default:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "Bad type %d\n", m->type);
abort();
}
switch (m->reln) {
case 'x': /* matches anything penalize */
case '!': /* matches almost anything penalize */
val = 0;
break;
case '=': /* Exact match, prefer */
val += MULT;
break;
case '>':
case '<': /* comparison match reduce strength */
val -= 2 * MULT;
break;
case '^':
case '&': /* masking bits, we could count them too */
val -= MULT;
break;
default:
(void)fprintf(stderr, "Bad relation %c\n", m->reln);
abort();
}
if (val == 0) /* ensure we only return 0 for FILE_DEFAULT */
val = 1;
switch (m->factor_op) {
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE:
break;
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_PLUS:
val += m->factor;
break;
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_MINUS:
val -= m->factor;
break;
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_TIMES:
val *= m->factor;
break;
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_DIV:
val /= m->factor;
break;
default:
abort();
}
/*
* Magic entries with no description get a bonus because they depend
* on subsequent magic entries to print something.
*/
if (m->desc[0] == '\0')
val++;
return val;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void UnscopableVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->unscopableVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_OUTPUT(const char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
if (strstr(arg, "port") && strstr(arg, "max_len")) {
struct ofpact_output_trunc *output_trunc;
output_trunc = ofpact_put_OUTPUT_TRUNC(ofpacts);
return parse_truncate_subfield(output_trunc, arg);
}
ofp_port_t port;
if (ofputil_port_from_string(arg, &port)) {
struct ofpact_output *output = ofpact_put_OUTPUT(ofpacts);
output->port = port;
output->max_len = output->port == OFPP_CONTROLLER ? UINT16_MAX : 0;
return NULL;
}
struct mf_subfield src;
char *error = mf_parse_subfield(&src, arg);
if (!error) {
struct ofpact_output_reg *output_reg;
output_reg = ofpact_put_OUTPUT_REG(ofpacts);
output_reg->max_len = UINT16_MAX;
output_reg->src = src;
return NULL;
}
free(error);
return xasprintf("%s: output to unknown port", arg);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_replay_create_session(struct nfsd4_create_session *cr_ses,
struct nfsd4_clid_slot *slot)
{
memcpy(cr_ses, &slot->sl_cr_ses, sizeof(*cr_ses));
return slot->sl_status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<AudioParameters>::Log(const AudioParameters& p,
std::string* l) {
l->append(base::StringPrintf("<AudioParameters>"));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 118,579
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpEx (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile, int quality)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 168,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> ConfigureV8Float64ArrayTemplate(v8::Persistent<v8::FunctionTemplate> desc)
{
desc->ReadOnlyPrototype();
v8::Local<v8::Signature> defaultSignature;
defaultSignature = configureTemplate(desc, "Float64Array", V8ArrayBufferView::GetTemplate(), V8Float64Array::internalFieldCount,
0, 0,
0, 0);
UNUSED_PARAM(defaultSignature); // In some cases, it will not be used.
desc->SetCallHandler(V8Float64Array::constructorCallback);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> instance = desc->InstanceTemplate();
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate> proto = desc->PrototypeTemplate();
UNUSED_PARAM(instance); // In some cases, it will not be used.
UNUSED_PARAM(proto); // In some cases, it will not be used.
const int fooArgc = 1;
v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate> fooArgv[fooArgc] = { V8Float32Array::GetRawTemplate() };
v8::Handle<v8::Signature> fooSignature = v8::Signature::New(desc, fooArgc, fooArgv);
proto->Set(v8::String::New("foo"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback, v8::Handle<v8::Value>(), fooSignature));
desc->Set(getToStringName(), getToStringTemplate());
return desc;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* InterstitialPageImpl::GetWebContents() const {
return web_contents();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AdjustComponent(int delta, url::Component* component) {
if (!component->is_valid())
return;
DCHECK(delta >= 0 || component->begin >= -delta);
component->begin += delta;
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 137,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_ro(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
return kstrtouint(val, 10, (unsigned int *)&start_readonly);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_claiminterface(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
unsigned int ifnum;
if (get_user(ifnum, (unsigned int __user *)arg))
return -EFAULT;
return claimintf(ps, ifnum);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_trace_export(struct trace_export **list, struct trace_export *export)
{
rcu_assign_pointer(export->next, *list);
/*
* We are entering export into the list but another
* CPU might be walking that list. We need to make sure
* the export->next pointer is valid before another CPU sees
* the export pointer included into the list.
*/
rcu_assign_pointer(*list, export);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_pkcs15emu_sc_hsm_get_curve(struct ec_curve **curve, u8 *oid, size_t oidlen)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; curves[i].oid.value; i++) {
if ((curves[i].oid.len == oidlen) && !memcmp(curves[i].oid.value, oid, oidlen)) {
*curve = &curves[i];
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
}
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void MakeFourCCString(uint32_t x, char *s) {
s[0] = x >> 24;
s[1] = (x >> 16) & 0xff;
s[2] = (x >> 8) & 0xff;
s[3] = x & 0xff;
s[4] = '\0';
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ahci_map_clb_address(AHCIDevice *ad)
{
AHCIPortRegs *pr = &ad->port_regs;
ad->cur_cmd = NULL;
map_page(ad->hba->as, &ad->lst,
((uint64_t)pr->lst_addr_hi << 32) | pr->lst_addr, 1024);
if (ad->lst != NULL) {
pr->cmd |= PORT_CMD_LIST_ON;
return true;
}
pr->cmd &= ~PORT_CMD_LIST_ON;
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oidc_delete_oldest_state_cookies(request_rec *r,
int number_of_valid_state_cookies, int max_number_of_state_cookies,
oidc_state_cookies_t *first) {
oidc_state_cookies_t *cur = NULL, *prev = NULL, *prev_oldest = NULL,
*oldest = NULL;
while (number_of_valid_state_cookies >= max_number_of_state_cookies) {
oldest = first;
prev_oldest = NULL;
prev = first;
cur = first->next;
while (cur) {
if ((cur->timestamp < oldest->timestamp)) {
oldest = cur;
prev_oldest = prev;
}
prev = cur;
cur = cur->next;
}
oidc_warn(r,
"deleting oldest state cookie: %s (time until expiry %" APR_TIME_T_FMT " seconds)",
oldest->name, apr_time_sec(oldest->timestamp - apr_time_now()));
oidc_util_set_cookie(r, oldest->name, "", 0, NULL);
if (prev_oldest)
prev_oldest->next = oldest->next;
else
first = first->next;
number_of_valid_state_cookies--;
}
return number_of_valid_state_cookies;
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 87,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_peers(const char *s)
{
llist_t *item;
peer_t *p;
p = xzalloc(sizeof(*p) + strlen(s));
strcpy(p->p_hostname, s);
resolve_peer_hostname(p, /*loop_on_fail=*/ 1);
/* Names like N.<country2chars>.pool.ntp.org are randomly resolved
* to a pool of machines. Sometimes different N's resolve to the same IP.
* It is not useful to have two peers with same IP. We skip duplicates.
*/
for (item = G.ntp_peers; item != NULL; item = item->link) {
peer_t *pp = (peer_t *) item->data;
if (strcmp(p->p_dotted, pp->p_dotted) == 0) {
bb_error_msg("duplicate peer %s (%s)", s, p->p_dotted);
free(p->p_lsa);
free(p->p_dotted);
free(p);
return;
}
}
p->p_fd = -1;
p->p_xmt_msg.m_status = MODE_CLIENT | (NTP_VERSION << 3);
p->next_action_time = G.cur_time; /* = set_next(p, 0); */
reset_peer_stats(p, STEP_THRESHOLD);
llist_add_to(&G.ntp_peers, p);
G.peer_cnt++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip6_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev;
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
if (unlikely(idev->cnf.disable_ipv6)) {
IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
return NF_HOOK_COND(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
net, sk, skb, NULL, dev,
ip6_finish_output,
!(IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_REROUTED));
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 64,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t nfs4_xattr_list_nfs4_acl(struct dentry *dentry, char *list,
size_t list_len, const char *name,
size_t name_len, int type)
{
size_t len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_NFSV4_ACL);
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(NFS_SERVER(d_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
if (list && len <= list_len)
memcpy(list, XATTR_NAME_NFSV4_ACL, len);
return len;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldApplyStyle(StylePropertySet*, Range*)
{
notImplemented();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLFormElement* HTMLFormControlElement::formOwner() const {
return ListedElement::form();
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021
| 0
| 139,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint64_t address_space_ldq(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
MemTxAttrs attrs, MemTxResult *result)
{
return address_space_ldq_internal(as, addr, attrs, result,
DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_append_undefined (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_undefined (b, "undefined", -1));
b2 = get_bson ("test25.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~VideoDetectorTest() {}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int muscle_read_binary(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int idx, u8* buf, size_t count, unsigned long flags)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
int r;
msc_id objectId;
u8* oid = objectId.id;
mscfs_file_t *file;
r = mscfs_check_selection(fs, -1);
if(r < 0) SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
file = &fs->cache.array[fs->currentFileIndex];
objectId = file->objectId;
/* memcpy(objectId.id, file->objectId.id, 4); */
if(!file->ef) {
oid[0] = oid[2];
oid[1] = oid[3];
oid[2] = oid[3] = 0;
}
r = msc_read_object(card, objectId, idx, buf, count);
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
siz->comps = 0;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
goto error;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("reference grid cannot have zero area\n");
goto error;
}
if (!siz->tilewidth || !siz->tileheight) {
jas_eprintf("tile cannot have zero area\n");
goto error;
}
if (!siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
jas_eprintf("number of components not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->xoff >= siz->width) {
jas_eprintf("XOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->yoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("YOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->tilexoff > siz->xoff || siz->tilexoff + siz->tilewidth <= siz->xoff) {
jas_eprintf("XTOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (siz->tileyoff > siz->yoff || siz->tileyoff + siz->tileheight <= siz->yoff) {
jas_eprintf("YTOsiz not in permissible range\n");
goto error;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
goto error;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
goto error;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
goto error;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (siz->comps) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static boolean eat_white( const char **pcur )
{
const char *cur = *pcur;
eat_opt_white( pcur );
return *pcur > cur;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreMainMessageLoopRun() {
chromeos::AudioHandler::Initialize();
if (chromeos::system::runtime_environment::IsRunningOnChromeOS() &&
!parameters().ui_task) { // ui_task is non-NULL when running tests.
chromeos::SystemKeyEventListener::Initialize();
}
chromeos::XInputHierarchyChangedEventListener::GetInstance();
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreMainMessageLoopRun();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Textfield::IsCommandIdChecked(int command_id) const {
if (text_services_context_menu_ &&
text_services_context_menu_->SupportsCommand(command_id)) {
return text_services_context_menu_->IsCommandIdChecked(command_id);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(recvmmsg, int, fd, struct mmsghdr __user *, mmsg,
unsigned int, vlen, unsigned int, flags,
struct timespec __user *, timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec timeout_sys;
if (!timeout)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags, NULL);
if (copy_from_user(&timeout_sys, timeout, sizeof(timeout_sys)))
return -EFAULT;
datagrams = __sys_recvmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags, &timeout_sys);
if (datagrams > 0 &&
copy_to_user(timeout, &timeout_sys, sizeof(timeout_sys)))
datagrams = -EFAULT;
return datagrams;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled() const {
return offscreen_target_samples_ > 1;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Console::infoCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ConsoleHelper(info).reportCall(ConsoleAPIType::kInfo);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSoundFile::RetrigNote(CHANNELINDEX nChn, int param, int offset)
{
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
int retrigSpeed = param & 0x0F;
int16 retrigCount = chn.nRetrigCount;
bool doRetrig = false;
if(m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger])
{
if(m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == 0 && chn.rowCommand.note)
{
chn.nRetrigCount = param & 0xf;
} else if(!chn.nRetrigCount || !--chn.nRetrigCount)
{
chn.nRetrigCount = param & 0xf;
doRetrig = true;
}
} else if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] && (param & 0x100))
{
if(m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK])
{
if(chn.rowCommand.instr > 0 && chn.rowCommand.IsNoteOrEmpty()) retrigCount = 1;
if(chn.rowCommand.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME && chn.rowCommand.vol != 0)
{
chn.nRetrigCount = retrigCount;
return;
}
}
if(retrigCount >= retrigSpeed)
{
if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK] || !chn.rowCommand.IsNote())
{
doRetrig = true;
retrigCount = 0;
}
}
} else
{
if (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_S3M|MOD_TYPE_IT|MOD_TYPE_MPT))
{
if (!retrigSpeed) retrigSpeed = 1;
if ((retrigCount) && (!(retrigCount % retrigSpeed))) doRetrig = true;
retrigCount++;
} else if(GetType() == MOD_TYPE_MTM)
{
doRetrig = m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == static_cast<uint32>(param & 0x0F) && retrigSpeed != 0;
} else
{
int realspeed = retrigSpeed;
if ((param & 0x100) && (chn.rowCommand.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME) && (chn.rowCommand.param & 0xF0)) realspeed++;
if(!m_SongFlags[SONG_FIRSTTICK] || (param & 0x100))
{
if (!realspeed) realspeed = 1;
if ((!(param & 0x100)) && (m_PlayState.m_nMusicSpeed) && (!(m_PlayState.m_nTickCount % realspeed))) doRetrig = true;
retrigCount++;
} else if (GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM|MOD_TYPE_MT2)) retrigCount = 0;
if (retrigCount >= realspeed)
{
if ((m_PlayState.m_nTickCount) || ((param & 0x100) && (!chn.rowCommand.note))) doRetrig = true;
}
if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] && param == 0)
{
doRetrig = (m_PlayState.m_nTickCount == 0);
}
}
}
if(chn.nLength == 0 && m_playBehaviour[kITShortSampleRetrig] && !chn.HasMIDIOutput())
{
return;
}
if(doRetrig)
{
uint32 dv = (param >> 4) & 0x0F;
int vol = chn.nVolume;
if (dv)
{
if(!m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] || !(chn.rowCommand.volcmd == VOLCMD_VOLUME))
{
if (retrigTable1[dv])
vol = (vol * retrigTable1[dv]) >> 4;
else
vol += ((int)retrigTable2[dv]) << 2;
}
Limit(vol, 0, 256);
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_FASTVOLRAMP);
}
uint32 note = chn.nNewNote;
int32 oldPeriod = chn.nPeriod;
if (note >= NOTE_MIN && note <= NOTE_MAX && chn.nLength)
CheckNNA(nChn, 0, note, true);
bool resetEnv = false;
if(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_XM | MOD_TYPE_MT2))
{
if((chn.rowCommand.instr) && (param < 0x100))
{
InstrumentChange(&chn, chn.rowCommand.instr, false, false);
resetEnv = true;
}
if (param < 0x100) resetEnv = true;
}
bool fading = chn.dwFlags[CHN_NOTEFADE];
NoteChange(&chn, note, m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger], resetEnv);
if(fading && GetType() == MOD_TYPE_XM)
chn.dwFlags.set(CHN_NOTEFADE);
chn.nVolume = vol;
if(m_nInstruments)
{
chn.rowCommand.note = static_cast<ModCommand::NOTE>(note); // No retrig without note...
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
ProcessMidiOut(nChn); //Send retrig to Midi
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
}
if ((GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_IT|MOD_TYPE_MPT)) && (!chn.rowCommand.note) && (oldPeriod)) chn.nPeriod = oldPeriod;
if (!(GetType() & (MOD_TYPE_S3M|MOD_TYPE_IT|MOD_TYPE_MPT))) retrigCount = 0;
if(m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger]) chn.position.Set(0);
offset--;
if(offset >= 0 && offset <= static_cast<int>(CountOf(chn.pModSample->cues)) && chn.pModSample != nullptr)
{
if(offset == 0) offset = chn.oldOffset;
else offset = chn.oldOffset = chn.pModSample->cues[offset - 1];
SampleOffset(chn, offset);
}
}
if(m_playBehaviour[kFT2Retrigger] && (param & 0x100)) retrigCount++;
if(!m_playBehaviour[kITRetrigger])
chn.nRetrigCount = retrigCount;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_base_info(struct file *fp, void __user *ubase, __u32 len)
{
struct hfi1_base_info binfo;
struct hfi1_filedata *fd = fp->private_data;
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt = fd->uctxt;
struct hfi1_devdata *dd = uctxt->dd;
ssize_t sz;
unsigned offset;
int ret = 0;
trace_hfi1_uctxtdata(uctxt->dd, uctxt);
memset(&binfo, 0, sizeof(binfo));
binfo.hw_version = dd->revision;
binfo.sw_version = HFI1_KERN_SWVERSION;
binfo.bthqp = kdeth_qp;
binfo.jkey = uctxt->jkey;
/*
* If more than 64 contexts are enabled the allocated credit
* return will span two or three contiguous pages. Since we only
* map the page containing the context's credit return address,
* we need to calculate the offset in the proper page.
*/
offset = ((u64)uctxt->sc->hw_free -
(u64)dd->cr_base[uctxt->numa_id].va) % PAGE_SIZE;
binfo.sc_credits_addr = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(PIO_CRED, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, offset);
binfo.pio_bufbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(PIO_BUFS, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt,
uctxt->sc->base_addr);
binfo.pio_bufbase_sop = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(PIO_BUFS_SOP,
uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt,
uctxt->sc->base_addr);
binfo.rcvhdr_bufbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(RCV_HDRQ, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt,
uctxt->rcvhdrq);
binfo.rcvegr_bufbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(RCV_EGRBUF, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt,
uctxt->egrbufs.rcvtids[0].phys);
binfo.sdma_comp_bufbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(SDMA_COMP, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, 0);
/*
* user regs are at
* (RXE_PER_CONTEXT_USER + (ctxt * RXE_PER_CONTEXT_SIZE))
*/
binfo.user_regbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(UREGS, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, 0);
offset = offset_in_page((((uctxt->ctxt - dd->first_user_ctxt) *
HFI1_MAX_SHARED_CTXTS) + fd->subctxt) *
sizeof(*dd->events));
binfo.events_bufbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(EVENTS, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt,
offset);
binfo.status_bufbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(STATUS, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt,
dd->status);
if (HFI1_CAP_IS_USET(DMA_RTAIL))
binfo.rcvhdrtail_base = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(RTAIL, uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, 0);
if (uctxt->subctxt_cnt) {
binfo.subctxt_uregbase = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(SUBCTXT_UREGS,
uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, 0);
binfo.subctxt_rcvhdrbuf = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(SUBCTXT_RCV_HDRQ,
uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, 0);
binfo.subctxt_rcvegrbuf = HFI1_MMAP_TOKEN(SUBCTXT_EGRBUF,
uctxt->ctxt,
fd->subctxt, 0);
}
sz = (len < sizeof(binfo)) ? len : sizeof(binfo);
if (copy_to_user(ubase, &binfo, sz))
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,961
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestFindFormForInputElement(const char* html, bool unowned) {
LoadHTML(html);
WebLocalFrame* web_frame = GetMainFrame();
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, web_frame);
FormCache form_cache(web_frame);
std::vector<FormData> forms = form_cache.ExtractNewForms();
ASSERT_EQ(1U, forms.size());
WebInputElement input_element = GetInputElementById("firstname");
FormData form;
FormFieldData field;
EXPECT_TRUE(
FindFormAndFieldForFormControlElement(input_element, &form, &field));
EXPECT_EQ(GetCanonicalOriginForDocument(web_frame->GetDocument()),
form.origin);
if (!unowned) {
EXPECT_EQ(ASCIIToUTF16("TestForm"), form.name);
EXPECT_EQ(GURL("http://abc.com"), form.action);
}
const std::vector<FormFieldData>& fields = form.fields;
ASSERT_EQ(4U, fields.size());
FormFieldData expected;
expected.form_control_type = "text";
expected.max_length = WebInputElement::DefaultMaxLength();
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("firstname");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("John");
expected.label = ASCIIToUTF16("John");
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[0]);
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, field);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("lastname");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("Smith");
expected.label = ASCIIToUTF16("Smith");
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[1]);
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("email");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("john@example.com");
expected.label = ASCIIToUTF16("john@example.com");
expected.autocomplete_attribute = "off";
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[2]);
expected.autocomplete_attribute.clear();
expected.id_attribute = ASCIIToUTF16("phone");
expected.name = expected.id_attribute;
expected.value = ASCIIToUTF16("1.800.555.1234");
expected.label = ASCIIToUTF16("1.800.555.1234");
EXPECT_FORM_FIELD_DATA_EQUALS(expected, fields[3]);
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,829
|
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