instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lvm2_lv_create_device_not_seen_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
CreateLvm2LVData *data = user_data;
throw_error (data->context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error creating Logical Volume: timeout (10s) waiting for LV to show up");
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->daemon, data->device_added_signal_handler_id);
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->daemon, data->device_changed_signal_handler_id);
lvm2_lv_create_data_unref (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_top_run(mrb_state *mrb, struct RProc *proc, mrb_value self, unsigned int stack_keep)
{
mrb_callinfo *ci;
mrb_value v;
if (!mrb->c->cibase) {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, stack_keep);
}
if (mrb->c->ci == mrb->c->cibase) {
return mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, stack_keep);
}
ci = cipush(mrb);
ci->mid = 0;
ci->nregs = 1; /* protect the receiver */
ci->acc = CI_ACC_SKIP;
ci->target_class = mrb->object_class;
v = mrb_vm_run(mrb, proc, self, stack_keep);
cipop(mrb);
return v;
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 83,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool btif_config_has_section(const char *section) {
assert(config != NULL);
assert(section != NULL);
pthread_mutex_lock(&lock);
bool ret = config_has_section(config, section);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 159,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VerifyPagesPrinted(bool printed) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool did_print_msg = (render_thread_->sink().GetUniqueMessageMatching(
PrintHostMsg_TempFileForPrintingWritten::ID) != NULL);
ASSERT_EQ(printed, did_print_msg);
#else
const IPC::Message* print_msg =
render_thread_->sink().GetUniqueMessageMatching(
PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage::ID);
bool did_print_msg = (NULL != print_msg);
ASSERT_EQ(printed, did_print_msg);
if (printed) {
PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage::Param post_did_print_page_param;
PrintHostMsg_DidPrintPage::Read(print_msg, &post_did_print_page_param);
EXPECT_EQ(0, post_did_print_page_param.a.page_number);
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 105,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_checksum_math(u_int16_t *data, int len)
{
int sum = 0;
union {
u_int16_t s;
u_int8_t b[2];
} pad;
while (len > 1) {
sum += *data++;
len -= 2;
}
if (len == 1) {
pad.b[0] = *(u_int8_t *)data;
pad.b[1] = 0;
sum += pad.s;
}
return (sum);
}
Commit Message: #278 fail if capture has a packet that is too large (#286)
* #278 fail if capture has a packet that is too large
* Update CHANGELOG
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 68,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ciearange(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *ptr)
{
int code;
ref CIEdict, *tempref;
code = array_get(imemory, space, 1, &CIEdict);
if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If we have a RangeA entry in the dictionary, get the
* values from that
*/
code = dict_find_string(&CIEdict, "RangeA", &tempref);
if (code > 0 && !r_has_type(tempref, t_null)) {
code = get_cie_param_array(imemory, tempref, 2, ptr);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else {
/* Default values for CIEBasedA */
ptr[0] = 0;
ptr[1] = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo(gfx::Vector2d scroll_offset) {
gfx::Vector2d max_offset = max_scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2dF scroll_offset_dip;
if (max_offset.x()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_x((scroll_offset.x() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.x()) /
max_offset.x());
}
if (max_offset.y()) {
scroll_offset_dip.set_y((scroll_offset.y() * max_scroll_offset_dip_.y()) /
max_offset.y());
}
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.x());
DCHECK_LE(0.f, scroll_offset_dip.y());
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.x() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() ||
scroll_offset_dip.x() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.x() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.x() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.x();
DCHECK(scroll_offset_dip.y() < max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() ||
scroll_offset_dip.y() - max_scroll_offset_dip_.y() < kEpsilon)
<< scroll_offset_dip.y() << " " << max_scroll_offset_dip_.y();
if (scroll_offset_dip_ == scroll_offset_dip)
return;
scroll_offset_dip_ = scroll_offset_dip;
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT2("android_webview",
"BrowserViewRenderer::ScrollTo",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD,
"x",
scroll_offset_dip.x(),
"y",
scroll_offset_dip.y());
if (compositor_) {
compositor_->DidChangeRootLayerScrollOffset(
gfx::ScrollOffset(scroll_offset_dip_));
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderView* RenderView::Create(
RenderThreadBase* render_thread,
gfx::NativeViewId parent_hwnd,
int32 opener_id,
const RendererPreferences& renderer_prefs,
const WebPreferences& webkit_prefs,
SharedRenderViewCounter* counter,
int32 routing_id,
int64 session_storage_namespace_id,
const string16& frame_name) {
DCHECK(routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
return new RenderView(
render_thread,
parent_hwnd,
opener_id,
renderer_prefs,
webkit_prefs,
counter,
routing_id,
session_storage_namespace_id,
frame_name); // adds reference
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMB2_query_directory(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, int index,
struct cifs_search_info *srch_inf)
{
struct smb_rqst rqst;
struct smb2_query_directory_req *req;
struct smb2_query_directory_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int rc = 0;
int len;
int resp_buftype = CIFS_NO_BUFFER;
unsigned char *bufptr;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
__le16 asteriks = cpu_to_le16('*');
char *end_of_smb;
unsigned int output_size = CIFSMaxBufSize;
size_t info_buf_size;
int flags = 0;
unsigned int total_len;
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_QUERY_DIRECTORY, tcon, (void **) &req,
&total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (smb3_encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
switch (srch_inf->info_level) {
case SMB_FIND_FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO:
req->FileInformationClass = FILE_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION;
info_buf_size = sizeof(FILE_DIRECTORY_INFO) - 1;
break;
case SMB_FIND_FILE_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO:
req->FileInformationClass = FILEID_FULL_DIRECTORY_INFORMATION;
info_buf_size = sizeof(SEARCH_ID_FULL_DIR_INFO) - 1;
break;
default:
cifs_dbg(VFS, "info level %u isn't supported\n",
srch_inf->info_level);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto qdir_exit;
}
req->FileIndex = cpu_to_le32(index);
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
len = 0x2;
bufptr = req->Buffer;
memcpy(bufptr, &asteriks, len);
req->FileNameOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_query_directory_req) - 1);
req->FileNameLength = cpu_to_le16(len);
/*
* BB could be 30 bytes or so longer if we used SMB2 specific
* buffer lengths, but this is safe and close enough.
*/
output_size = min_t(unsigned int, output_size, server->maxBuf);
output_size = min_t(unsigned int, output_size, 2 << 15);
req->OutputBufferLength = cpu_to_le32(output_size);
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 1 for Buffer */
iov[0].iov_len = total_len - 1;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)(req->Buffer);
iov[1].iov_len = len;
memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));
rqst.rq_iov = iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 2;
trace_smb3_query_dir_enter(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
tcon->ses->Suid, index, output_size);
rc = cifs_send_recv(xid, ses, &rqst, &resp_buftype, flags, &rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
rsp = (struct smb2_query_directory_rsp *)rsp_iov.iov_base;
if (rc) {
if (rc == -ENODATA &&
rsp->sync_hdr.Status == STATUS_NO_MORE_FILES) {
trace_smb3_query_dir_done(xid, persistent_fid,
tcon->tid, tcon->ses->Suid, index, 0);
srch_inf->endOfSearch = true;
rc = 0;
} else {
trace_smb3_query_dir_err(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
tcon->ses->Suid, index, 0, rc);
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_QUERY_DIRECTORY_HE);
}
goto qdir_exit;
}
rc = smb2_validate_iov(le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset),
le32_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferLength), &rsp_iov,
info_buf_size);
if (rc) {
trace_smb3_query_dir_err(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
tcon->ses->Suid, index, 0, rc);
goto qdir_exit;
}
srch_inf->unicode = true;
if (srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start) {
if (srch_inf->smallBuf)
cifs_small_buf_release(srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
else
cifs_buf_release(srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start);
}
srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)rsp;
srch_inf->srch_entries_start = srch_inf->last_entry =
(char *)rsp + le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset);
end_of_smb = rsp_iov.iov_len + (char *)rsp;
srch_inf->entries_in_buffer =
num_entries(srch_inf->srch_entries_start, end_of_smb,
&srch_inf->last_entry, info_buf_size);
srch_inf->index_of_last_entry += srch_inf->entries_in_buffer;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "num entries %d last_index %lld srch start %p srch end %p\n",
srch_inf->entries_in_buffer, srch_inf->index_of_last_entry,
srch_inf->srch_entries_start, srch_inf->last_entry);
if (resp_buftype == CIFS_LARGE_BUFFER)
srch_inf->smallBuf = false;
else if (resp_buftype == CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER)
srch_inf->smallBuf = true;
else
cifs_dbg(VFS, "illegal search buffer type\n");
trace_smb3_query_dir_done(xid, persistent_fid, tcon->tid,
tcon->ses->Suid, index, srch_inf->entries_in_buffer);
return rc;
qdir_exit:
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jpc_enc_tcmpt_t *tcmpt_create(jpc_enc_tcmpt_t *tcmpt, jpc_enc_cp_t *cp,
jas_image_t *image, jpc_enc_tile_t *tile)
{
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
uint_fast16_t rlvlno;
jpc_enc_rlvl_t *rlvl;
uint_fast32_t tlx;
uint_fast32_t tly;
uint_fast32_t brx;
uint_fast32_t bry;
uint_fast32_t cmpttlx;
uint_fast32_t cmpttly;
jpc_enc_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bandinfos[JPC_MAXBANDS];
tcmpt->tile = tile;
tcmpt->tsfb = 0;
tcmpt->data = 0;
tcmpt->rlvls = 0;
/* Deduce the component number. */
cmptno = tcmpt - tile->tcmpts;
ccp = &cp->ccps[cmptno];
/* Compute the coordinates of the top-left and bottom-right
corners of this tile-component. */
tlx = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->tlx, ccp->sampgrdstepx);
tly = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->tly, ccp->sampgrdstepy);
brx = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->brx, ccp->sampgrdstepx);
bry = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->bry, ccp->sampgrdstepy);
/* Create a sequence to hold the tile-component sample data. */
if (!(tcmpt->data = jas_seq2d_create(tlx, tly, brx, bry))) {
goto error;
}
/* Get the image data associated with this tile-component. */
cmpttlx = JPC_CEILDIV(cp->imgareatlx, ccp->sampgrdstepx);
cmpttly = JPC_CEILDIV(cp->imgareatly, ccp->sampgrdstepy);
if (jas_image_readcmpt(image, cmptno, tlx - cmpttlx, tly - cmpttly,
brx - tlx, bry - tly, tcmpt->data)) {
goto error;
}
tcmpt->synweight = 0;
tcmpt->qmfbid = cp->tccp.qmfbid;
tcmpt->numrlvls = cp->tccp.maxrlvls;
tcmpt->numbands = 3 * tcmpt->numrlvls - 2;
if (!(tcmpt->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(tcmpt->qmfbid, tcmpt->numrlvls - 1))) {
goto error;
}
for (rlvlno = 0; rlvlno < tcmpt->numrlvls; ++rlvlno) {
tcmpt->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno] = cp->tccp.prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
tcmpt->prcheightexpns[rlvlno] = cp->tccp.prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
}
tcmpt->cblkwidthexpn = cp->tccp.cblkwidthexpn;
tcmpt->cblkheightexpn = cp->tccp.cblkheightexpn;
tcmpt->cblksty = cp->tccp.cblksty;
tcmpt->csty = cp->tccp.csty;
tcmpt->numstepsizes = tcmpt->numbands;
assert(tcmpt->numstepsizes <= JPC_MAXBANDS);
memset(tcmpt->stepsizes, 0, tcmpt->numstepsizes * sizeof(uint_fast16_t));
/* Retrieve information about the various bands. */
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcmpt->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcmpt->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcmpt->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcmpt->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcmpt->data), bandinfos);
if (!(tcmpt->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcmpt->numrlvls, sizeof(jpc_enc_rlvl_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcmpt->rlvls; rlvlno < tcmpt->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->tcmpt = tcmpt;
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcmpt->rlvls; rlvlno < tcmpt->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
if (!rlvl_create(rlvl, cp, tcmpt, bandinfos)) {
goto error;
}
}
return tcmpt;
error:
tcmpt_destroy(tcmpt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
if (is_paging(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu) && !is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
}
__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_processing_instruction_handler)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, **hdl;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rZ", &pind, &hdl) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
xml_set_handler(&parser->processingInstructionHandler, hdl);
XML_SetProcessingInstructionHandler(parser->parser, _xml_processingInstructionHandler);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnPpapiBrokerPermissionResult(int routing_id,
bool result) {
Send(new ViewMsg_PpapiBrokerPermissionResult(routing_id, result));
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dev_change_flags(struct net_device *dev, unsigned flags)
{
int ret, changes;
int old_flags = dev->flags;
ret = __dev_change_flags(dev, flags);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
changes = old_flags ^ dev->flags;
if (changes)
rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, dev, changes);
__dev_notify_flags(dev, old_flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnTimeout() {
LOG_IF(ERROR, is_removing_) << "Timed out";
SignalDone();
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 119,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ReportingIsEnforcedByPolicy(bool* crash_reporting_enabled) {
std::wstring policies_path = L"SOFTWARE\\Policies\\";
AppendChromeInstallSubDirectory(InstallDetails::Get().mode(),
false /* !include_suffix */, &policies_path);
DWORD value = 0;
if (nt::QueryRegValueDWORD(nt::HKLM, nt::NONE, policies_path.c_str(),
kMetricsReportingEnabled, &value)) {
*crash_reporting_enabled = (value != 0);
return true;
}
if (nt::QueryRegValueDWORD(nt::HKCU, nt::NONE, policies_path.c_str(),
kMetricsReportingEnabled, &value)) {
*crash_reporting_enabled = (value != 0);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
R=wfh@chromium.org
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 152,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::MoveRangeSelectionExtent(const gfx::Point& extent) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_MoveRangeSelectionExtent(
focused_frame->GetRoutingID(), extent));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,905
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: php_mysqlnd_net_field_length(zend_uchar **packet)
{
register zend_uchar *p= (zend_uchar *)*packet;
if (*p < 251) {
(*packet)++;
return (unsigned long) *p;
}
switch (*p) {
case 251:
(*packet)++;
return MYSQLND_NULL_LENGTH;
case 252:
(*packet) += 3;
return (unsigned long) uint2korr(p+1);
case 253:
(*packet) += 4;
return (unsigned long) uint3korr(p+1);
default:
(*packet) += 9;
return (unsigned long) uint4korr(p+1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct epitem *ep_item_from_wait(wait_queue_t *p)
{
return container_of(p, struct eppoll_entry, wait)->base;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long enabled;
int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
if (!error)
apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 51,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ServerOrder(void)
{
int whichbyte = 1;
if (*((char *) &whichbyte))
return LSBFirst;
return MSBFirst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 15,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_pi_next_rlcp(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi) {
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
OPJ_UINT32 index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
pi->first = 0;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
if(!pi->tp_on){
pi->poc.precno1 = res->pw * res->ph;
}
for (pi->precno = pi->poc.precno0; pi->precno < pi->poc.precno1; pi->precno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno * pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:;
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix an integer overflow issue (#809)
Prevent an integer overflow issue in function opj_pi_create_decode of
pi.c.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 50,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::init(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& pageGroupName)
{
ChromeClientBlackBerry* chromeClient = new ChromeClientBlackBerry(this);
ContextMenuClientBlackBerry* contextMenuClient = 0;
#if ENABLE(CONTEXT_MENUS)
contextMenuClient = new ContextMenuClientBlackBerry();
#endif
EditorClientBlackBerry* editorClient = new EditorClientBlackBerry(this);
DragClientBlackBerry* dragClient = 0;
#if ENABLE(DRAG_SUPPORT)
dragClient = new DragClientBlackBerry();
#endif
#if ENABLE(INSPECTOR)
m_inspectorClient = new InspectorClientBlackBerry(this);
#endif
FrameLoaderClientBlackBerry* frameLoaderClient = new FrameLoaderClientBlackBerry();
Page::PageClients pageClients;
pageClients.chromeClient = chromeClient;
pageClients.contextMenuClient = contextMenuClient;
pageClients.editorClient = editorClient;
pageClients.dragClient = dragClient;
pageClients.inspectorClient = m_inspectorClient;
m_page = new Page(pageClients);
#if !defined(PUBLIC_BUILD) || !PUBLIC_BUILD
if (isRunningDrt()) {
GeolocationClientMock* mock = new GeolocationClientMock();
WebCore::provideGeolocationTo(m_page, mock);
mock->setController(WebCore::GeolocationController::from(m_page));
} else
#endif
WebCore::provideGeolocationTo(m_page, new GeolocationClientBlackBerry(this));
#if !defined(PUBLIC_BUILD) || !PUBLIC_BUILD
if (getenv("drtRun"))
WebCore::provideDeviceOrientationTo(m_page, new DeviceOrientationClientMock);
else
#endif
WebCore::provideDeviceOrientationTo(m_page, new DeviceOrientationClientBlackBerry(this));
WebCore::provideDeviceMotionTo(m_page, new DeviceMotionClientBlackBerry(this));
#if ENABLE(VIBRATION)
WebCore::provideVibrationTo(m_page, new VibrationClientBlackBerry());
#endif
#if ENABLE(BATTERY_STATUS)
WebCore::provideBatteryTo(m_page, new WebCore::BatteryClientBlackBerry(this));
#endif
#if ENABLE(MEDIA_STREAM)
WebCore::provideUserMediaTo(m_page, new UserMediaClientImpl(m_webPage));
#endif
#if ENABLE(NOTIFICATIONS) || ENABLE(LEGACY_NOTIFICATIONS)
WebCore::provideNotification(m_page, new NotificationClientBlackBerry(this));
#endif
#if ENABLE(NAVIGATOR_CONTENT_UTILS)
WebCore::provideNavigatorContentUtilsTo(m_page, new NavigatorContentUtilsClientBlackBerry(this));
#endif
#if ENABLE(NETWORK_INFO)
WebCore::provideNetworkInfoTo(m_page, new WebCore::NetworkInfoClientBlackBerry(this));
#endif
m_webSettings = WebSettings::createFromStandardSettings();
m_webSettings->setUserAgentString(defaultUserAgent());
m_page->setDeviceScaleFactor(m_webSettings->devicePixelRatio());
m_page->addLayoutMilestones(DidFirstVisuallyNonEmptyLayout);
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
m_tapHighlight = DefaultTapHighlight::create(this);
m_selectionOverlay = SelectionOverlay::create(this);
m_page->settings()->setAcceleratedCompositingForFixedPositionEnabled(true);
#endif
m_webSettings->setPageGroupName(pageGroupName);
m_webSettings->setDelegate(this);
didChangeSettings(m_webSettings);
RefPtr<Frame> newFrame = Frame::create(m_page, /* HTMLFrameOwnerElement* */ 0, frameLoaderClient);
m_mainFrame = newFrame.get();
frameLoaderClient->setFrame(m_mainFrame, this);
m_mainFrame->init();
m_inRegionScroller = adoptPtr(new InRegionScroller(this));
#if ENABLE(WEBGL)
m_page->settings()->setWebGLEnabled(true);
#endif
#if ENABLE(ACCELERATED_2D_CANVAS)
m_page->settings()->setCanvasUsesAcceleratedDrawing(true);
m_page->settings()->setAccelerated2dCanvasEnabled(true);
#endif
m_page->settings()->setInteractiveFormValidationEnabled(true);
m_page->settings()->setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(false);
m_page->settings()->setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(false);
m_page->settings()->setFixedPositionCreatesStackingContext(true);
m_backingStoreClient = BackingStoreClient::create(m_mainFrame, /* parent frame */ 0, m_webPage);
m_backingStore = m_backingStoreClient->backingStore();
m_webkitThreadViewportAccessor = new WebKitThreadViewportAccessor(this);
blockClickRadius = int(roundf(0.35 * Platform::Graphics::Screen::primaryScreen()->pixelsPerInch(0).width())); // The clicked rectangle area should be a fixed unit of measurement.
m_page->settings()->setDelegateSelectionPaint(true);
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME)
m_page->windowScreenDidChange((PlatformDisplayID)0);
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEB_TIMING)
m_page->settings()->setMemoryInfoEnabled(true);
#endif
#if USE(ACCELERATED_COMPOSITING)
Platform::userInterfaceThreadMessageClient()->dispatchSyncMessage(
createMethodCallMessage(&WebPagePrivate::createCompositor, this));
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::VectorIcon& AuthenticatorWelcomeSheetModel::GetStepIllustration(
ImageColorScheme color_scheme) const {
return color_scheme == ImageColorScheme::kDark ? kWebauthnWelcomeDarkIcon
: kWebauthnWelcomeIcon;
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cc::ClipTree& PropertyTreeManager::GetClipTree() {
return property_trees_.clip_tree;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gfx::Rect ComputeGlobalNodeBounds(TreeCache* cache, ui::AXNode* node) {
gfx::Rect bounds = ComputeLocalNodeBounds(cache, node);
ui::AXNode* parent = node->parent();
bool need_to_offset_web_area = node->data().role == ui::AX_ROLE_WEB_AREA ||
node->data().role == ui::AX_ROLE_ROOT_WEB_AREA;
while (parent) {
if (bounds.IsEmpty()) {
bounds = parent->data().location;
} else if (need_to_offset_web_area && parent->data().location.width() > 0 &&
parent->data().location.height() > 0) {
bounds.Offset(parent->data().location.x(), parent->data().location.y());
need_to_offset_web_area = false;
}
if (parent->data().role == ui::AX_ROLE_WEB_AREA ||
parent->data().role == ui::AX_ROLE_ROOT_WEB_AREA) {
int sx = 0;
int sy = 0;
if (parent->data().GetIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_SCROLL_X, &sx) &&
parent->data().GetIntAttribute(ui::AX_ATTR_SCROLL_Y, &sy)) {
bounds.Offset(-sx, -sy);
}
need_to_offset_web_area = true;
}
parent = cache->owner->GetParent(parent, &cache);
}
return bounds;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MimeHandlerViewContainer::OnCreateMimeHandlerViewGuestACK(
int element_instance_id) {
DCHECK_NE(this->element_instance_id(), guest_view::kInstanceIDNone);
DCHECK_EQ(this->element_instance_id(), element_instance_id);
if (!render_frame())
return;
render_frame()->AttachGuest(element_instance_id);
}
Commit Message: Skip Service workers in requests for mime handler plugins
BUG=808838
TEST=./browser_tests --gtest_filter=*/ServiceWorkerTest.MimeHandlerView*
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I82e75c200091babbab648a04232db47e2938d914
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914150
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#537386}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *vnc_display_local_addr(DisplayState *ds)
{
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
return vnc_socket_local_addr("%s:%s", vs->lsock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::OnDestruct() {
if (ipc_nesting_level_ > 0) {
render_frame_gone_ = true;
return;
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::DidLazyLoad() const {
return did_lazy_load_;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MetaData> FLACExtractor::getMetaData()
{
return mFileMetadata;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init futex_init(void)
{
u32 curval;
int i;
/*
* This will fail and we want it. Some arch implementations do
* runtime detection of the futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
* functionality. We want to know that before we call in any
* of the complex code paths. Also we want to prevent
* registration of robust lists in that case. NULL is
* guaranteed to fault and we get -EFAULT on functional
* implementation, the non-functional ones will return
* -ENOSYS.
*/
if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, NULL, 0, 0) == -EFAULT)
futex_cmpxchg_enabled = 1;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(futex_queues); i++) {
plist_head_init(&futex_queues[i].chain);
spin_lock_init(&futex_queues[i].lock);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS TCReadDevice (PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject, PVOID buffer, LARGE_INTEGER offset, ULONG length)
{
return TCReadWriteDevice (FALSE, deviceObject, buffer, offset, length);
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PasswordAutofillManager::FindLoginInfo(
int key,
autofill::PasswordFormFillData* found_password) {
LoginToPasswordInfoMap::iterator iter = login_to_password_info_.find(key);
if (iter == login_to_password_info_.end())
return false;
*found_password = iter->second;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool lockdep_genl_is_held(void)
{
return lockdep_is_held(&genl_mutex);
}
Commit Message: genetlink: Fix a memory leak on error path
In genl_register_family(), when idr_alloc() fails,
we forget to free the memory we possibly allocate for
family->attrbuf.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 2ae0f17df1cd ("genetlink: use idr to track families")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 88,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tty_ldisc_deinit(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
tty_ldisc_put(tty->ldisc);
tty->ldisc = NULL;
}
Commit Message: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Chapters::Display::ShallowCopy(Display& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_string = m_string;
rhs.m_language = m_language;
rhs.m_country = m_country;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poppler_page_set_selection_alpha (PopplerPage *page,
double scale,
GdkPixbuf *pixbuf,
PopplerSelectionStyle style,
PopplerRectangle *selection)
{
/* Cairo doesn't need this, since cairo generates an alpha channel. */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void voidMethodDefaultUndefinedLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodDefaultUndefinedLongArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_height(const FieldMatchContext *fm, const AVFrame *f, int plane)
{
return plane ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(f->height, fm->vsub) : f->height;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::NotifyAllError(
const blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails& details) {
HostNotifier host_notifier;
AddAllAssociatedHostsToNotifier(&host_notifier);
host_notifier.SendErrorNotifications(details);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GetUniformSetup(
GLuint program, GLint fake_location,
uint32 shm_id, uint32 shm_offset,
error::Error* error, GLint* real_location,
GLuint* service_id, void** result_pointer, GLenum* result_type) {
DCHECK(error);
DCHECK(service_id);
DCHECK(result_pointer);
DCHECK(result_type);
DCHECK(real_location);
*error = error::kNoError;
SizedResult<GLint>* result;
result = GetSharedMemoryAs<SizedResult<GLint>*>(
shm_id, shm_offset, SizedResult<GLint>::ComputeSize(0));
if (!result) {
*error = error::kOutOfBounds;
return false;
}
*result_pointer = result;
result->SetNumResults(0);
ProgramManager::ProgramInfo* info = GetProgramInfoNotShader(
program, "glGetUniform");
if (!info) {
return false;
}
if (!info->IsValid()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetUniform", "program not linked");
return false;
}
*service_id = info->service_id();
GLint array_index = -1;
const ProgramManager::ProgramInfo::UniformInfo* uniform_info =
info->GetUniformInfoByFakeLocation(
fake_location, real_location, &array_index);
if (!uniform_info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetUniform", "unknown location");
return false;
}
GLenum type = uniform_info->type;
GLsizei size = GLES2Util::GetGLDataTypeSizeForUniforms(type);
if (size == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glGetUniform", "unknown type");
return false;
}
result = GetSharedMemoryAs<SizedResult<GLint>*>(
shm_id, shm_offset, SizedResult<GLint>::ComputeSizeFromBytes(size));
if (!result) {
*error = error::kOutOfBounds;
return false;
}
result->size = size;
*result_type = type;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl::createContentDecryptionModule(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebSecurityOrigin& security_origin,
const blink::WebString& key_system) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
return WebContentDecryptionModuleImpl::Create(
frame, security_origin, key_system);
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decrypt_response(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, unsigned char *out, size_t * out_len)
{
size_t cipher_len;
size_t i;
unsigned char iv[16] = { 0 };
unsigned char plaintext[4096] = { 0 };
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
/* no cipher */
if (in[0] == 0x99)
return 0;
/* parse cipher length */
if (0x01 == in[2] && 0x82 != in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[1];
i = 3;
}
else if (0x01 == in[3] && 0x81 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2];
i = 4;
}
else if (0x01 == in[4] && 0x82 == in[1]) {
cipher_len = in[2] * 0x100;
cipher_len += in[3];
i = 5;
}
else {
return -1;
}
if (cipher_len < 2 || i+cipher_len > inlen || cipher_len > sizeof plaintext)
return -1;
/* decrypt */
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == exdata->smtype)
aes128_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
else
des3_decrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_enc, 16, iv, &in[i], cipher_len - 1, plaintext);
/* unpadding */
while (0x80 != plaintext[cipher_len - 2] && (cipher_len - 2 > 0))
cipher_len--;
if (2 == cipher_len)
return -1;
memcpy(out, plaintext, cipher_len - 2);
*out_len = cipher_len - 2;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 169,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int add_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off)
{
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret;
if (off >= insn_cnt || off < 0) {
verbose(env, "call to invalid destination\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = find_subprog(env, off);
if (ret >= 0)
return 0;
if (env->subprog_cnt >= BPF_MAX_SUBPROGS) {
verbose(env, "too many subprograms\n");
return -E2BIG;
}
env->subprog_info[env->subprog_cnt++].start = off;
sort(env->subprog_info, env->subprog_cnt,
sizeof(env->subprog_info[0]), cmp_subprogs, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 76,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionWebContentsObserver::PepperInstanceCreated() {
ProcessManager* const process_manager = ProcessManager::Get(browser_context_);
const Extension* const extension =
process_manager->GetExtensionForWebContents(web_contents());
if (extension)
process_manager->IncrementLazyKeepaliveCount(extension);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint::StartPrinting() {
ResizeForPrinting();
blink::WebView* web_view = frame_.view();
web_view->GetSettings()->SetShouldPrintBackgrounds(should_print_backgrounds_);
expected_pages_count_ =
frame()->PrintBegin(web_print_params_, node_to_print_);
is_printing_started_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_IUP( TT_ExecContext exc )
{
IUP_WorkerRec V;
FT_Byte mask;
FT_UInt first_point; /* first point of contour */
FT_UInt end_point; /* end point (last+1) of contour */
FT_UInt first_touched; /* first touched point in contour */
FT_UInt cur_touched; /* current touched point in contour */
FT_UInt point; /* current point */
FT_Short contour; /* current contour */
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL
/* See `ttinterp.h' for details on backward compatibility mode. */
/* Allow IUP until it has been called on both axes. Immediately */
/* return on subsequent ones. */
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL &&
exc->backward_compatibility )
{
if ( exc->iupx_called && exc->iupy_called )
return;
if ( exc->opcode & 1 )
exc->iupx_called = TRUE;
else
exc->iupy_called = TRUE;
}
#endif
/* ignore empty outlines */
if ( exc->pts.n_contours == 0 )
return;
if ( exc->opcode & 1 )
{
mask = FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_X;
V.orgs = exc->pts.org;
V.curs = exc->pts.cur;
V.orus = exc->pts.orus;
}
else
{
mask = FT_CURVE_TAG_TOUCH_Y;
V.orgs = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)exc->pts.org + 1 );
V.curs = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)exc->pts.cur + 1 );
V.orus = (FT_Vector*)( (FT_Pos*)exc->pts.orus + 1 );
}
V.max_points = exc->pts.n_points;
contour = 0;
point = 0;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY &&
exc->ignore_x_mode )
{
exc->iup_called = TRUE;
if ( exc->sph_tweak_flags & SPH_TWEAK_SKIP_IUP )
return;
}
#endif /* TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_INFINALITY */
do
{
end_point = exc->pts.contours[contour] - exc->pts.first_point;
first_point = point;
if ( BOUNDS( end_point, exc->pts.n_points ) )
end_point = exc->pts.n_points - 1;
while ( point <= end_point && ( exc->pts.tags[point] & mask ) == 0 )
point++;
if ( point <= end_point )
{
first_touched = point;
cur_touched = point;
point++;
while ( point <= end_point )
{
if ( ( exc->pts.tags[point] & mask ) != 0 )
{
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
cur_touched + 1,
point - 1,
cur_touched,
point );
cur_touched = point;
}
point++;
}
if ( cur_touched == first_touched )
_iup_worker_shift( &V, first_point, end_point, cur_touched );
else
{
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
(FT_UShort)( cur_touched + 1 ),
end_point,
cur_touched,
first_touched );
if ( first_touched > 0 )
_iup_worker_interpolate( &V,
first_point,
first_touched - 1,
cur_touched,
first_touched );
}
}
contour++;
} while ( contour < exc->pts.n_contours );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 10,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vhost_poll_flush(struct vhost_poll *poll)
{
vhost_work_flush(poll->dev, &poll->work);
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix length for cross region descriptor
If a single descriptor crosses a region, the
second chunk length should be decremented
by size translated so far, instead it includes
the full descriptor length.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_pid_limits(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
{
unsigned int i;
int count = 0;
unsigned long flags;
char *bufptr = buffer;
struct rlimit rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags))
return 0;
memcpy(rlim, task->signal->rlim, sizeof(struct rlimit) * RLIM_NLIMITS);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
/*
* print the file header
*/
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "%-25s %-20s %-20s %-10s\n",
"Limit", "Soft Limit", "Hard Limit", "Units");
for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
if (rlim[i].rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY)
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "%-25s %-20s ",
lnames[i].name, "unlimited");
else
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "%-25s %-20lu ",
lnames[i].name, rlim[i].rlim_cur);
if (rlim[i].rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY)
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "%-20s ", "unlimited");
else
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "%-20lu ",
rlim[i].rlim_max);
if (lnames[i].unit)
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "%-10s\n",
lnames[i].unit);
else
count += sprintf(&bufptr[count], "\n");
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iwbmp_write(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx, const void *buf, size_t n)
{
(*wctx->iodescr->write_fn)(wctx->ctx,wctx->iodescr,buf,n);
wctx->total_written+=n;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,871
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp)
{
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*kp = NULL;
if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 ||
/* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || /* p */
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) /* q */
goto out;
/* Generate additional parameters */
if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
/* enable blinding */
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
r = 0; /* success */
out:
if (r == 0)
*kp = k;
else
sshkey_free(k);
return r;
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426
| 0
| 72,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool gs_is_null_device(gx_device *dev)
{
/* Assuming null_fill_path isn't used elswhere. */
return dev->procs.fill_path == gs_null_device.procs.fill_path;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 2,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_vs_stats_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, ip_vs_stats_show, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_CCtx_refPrefix_advanced(
ZSTD_CCtx* cctx, const void* prefix, size_t prefixSize, ZSTD_dictContentType_e dictContentType)
{
if (cctx->streamStage != zcss_init) return ERROR(stage_wrong);
cctx->cdict = NULL; /* prefix discards any prior cdict */
cctx->prefixDict.dict = prefix;
cctx->prefixDict.dictSize = prefixSize;
cctx->prefixDict.dictContentType = dictContentType;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 89,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_group_exit(int exit_code)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = current->signal;
BUG_ON(exit_code & 0x80); /* core dumps don't get here */
if (signal_group_exit(sig))
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else if (!thread_group_empty(current)) {
struct sighand_struct *const sighand = current->sighand;
spin_lock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig))
/* Another thread got here before we took the lock. */
exit_code = sig->group_exit_code;
else {
sig->group_exit_code = exit_code;
sig->flags = SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT;
zap_other_threads(current);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
}
do_exit(exit_code);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jas_icclut16_getsize(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval)
{
jas_icclut16_t *lut16 = &attrval->data.lut16;
return 44 + 2 * (lut16->numinchans * lut16->numintabents +
lut16->numoutchans * lut16->numouttabents +
jas_iccpowi(lut16->clutlen, lut16->numinchans) * lut16->numoutchans);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __sync_task_rss_stat(struct task_struct *task, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NR_MM_COUNTERS; i++) {
if (task->rss_stat.count[i]) {
add_mm_counter(mm, i, task->rss_stat.count[i]);
task->rss_stat.count[i] = 0;
}
}
task->rss_stat.events = 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int digi_read_inb_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct digi_port *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
int opcode = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[0];
int len = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[1];
int port_status = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer)[2];
unsigned char *data = ((unsigned char *)urb->transfer_buffer) + 3;
int flag, throttled;
int status = urb->status;
/* do not process callbacks on closed ports */
/* but do continue the read chain */
if (urb->status == -ENOENT)
return 0;
/* short/multiple packet check */
if (urb->actual_length != len + 2) {
dev_err(&port->dev, "%s: INCOMPLETE OR MULTIPLE PACKET, "
"status=%d, port=%d, opcode=%d, len=%d, "
"actual_length=%d, status=%d\n", __func__, status,
priv->dp_port_num, opcode, len, urb->actual_length,
port_status);
return -1;
}
spin_lock(&priv->dp_port_lock);
/* check for throttle; if set, do not resubmit read urb */
/* indicate the read chain needs to be restarted on unthrottle */
throttled = priv->dp_throttled;
if (throttled)
priv->dp_throttle_restart = 1;
/* receive data */
if (opcode == DIGI_CMD_RECEIVE_DATA) {
/* get flag from port_status */
flag = 0;
/* overrun is special, not associated with a char */
if (port_status & DIGI_OVERRUN_ERROR)
tty_insert_flip_char(&port->port, 0, TTY_OVERRUN);
/* break takes precedence over parity, */
/* which takes precedence over framing errors */
if (port_status & DIGI_BREAK_ERROR)
flag = TTY_BREAK;
else if (port_status & DIGI_PARITY_ERROR)
flag = TTY_PARITY;
else if (port_status & DIGI_FRAMING_ERROR)
flag = TTY_FRAME;
/* data length is len-1 (one byte of len is port_status) */
--len;
if (len > 0) {
tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag(&port->port, data,
flag, len);
tty_flip_buffer_push(&port->port);
}
}
spin_unlock(&priv->dp_port_lock);
if (opcode == DIGI_CMD_RECEIVE_DISABLE)
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s: got RECEIVE_DISABLE\n", __func__);
else if (opcode != DIGI_CMD_RECEIVE_DATA)
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s: unknown opcode: %d\n", __func__, opcode);
return throttled ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void usb_disable_device(struct usb_device *dev, int skip_ep0)
{
int i;
struct usb_hcd *hcd = bus_to_hcd(dev->bus);
/* getting rid of interfaces will disconnect
* any drivers bound to them (a key side effect)
*/
if (dev->actconfig) {
/*
* FIXME: In order to avoid self-deadlock involving the
* bandwidth_mutex, we have to mark all the interfaces
* before unregistering any of them.
*/
for (i = 0; i < dev->actconfig->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++)
dev->actconfig->interface[i]->unregistering = 1;
for (i = 0; i < dev->actconfig->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
struct usb_interface *interface;
/* remove this interface if it has been registered */
interface = dev->actconfig->interface[i];
if (!device_is_registered(&interface->dev))
continue;
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "unregistering interface %s\n",
dev_name(&interface->dev));
remove_intf_ep_devs(interface);
device_del(&interface->dev);
}
/* Now that the interfaces are unbound, nobody should
* try to access them.
*/
for (i = 0; i < dev->actconfig->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
put_device(&dev->actconfig->interface[i]->dev);
dev->actconfig->interface[i] = NULL;
}
if (dev->usb2_hw_lpm_enabled == 1)
usb_set_usb2_hardware_lpm(dev, 0);
usb_unlocked_disable_lpm(dev);
usb_disable_ltm(dev);
dev->actconfig = NULL;
if (dev->state == USB_STATE_CONFIGURED)
usb_set_device_state(dev, USB_STATE_ADDRESS);
}
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "%s nuking %s URBs\n", __func__,
skip_ep0 ? "non-ep0" : "all");
if (hcd->driver->check_bandwidth) {
/* First pass: Cancel URBs, leave endpoint pointers intact. */
for (i = skip_ep0; i < 16; ++i) {
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i, false);
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i + USB_DIR_IN, false);
}
/* Remove endpoints from the host controller internal state */
mutex_lock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
usb_hcd_alloc_bandwidth(dev, NULL, NULL, NULL);
mutex_unlock(hcd->bandwidth_mutex);
/* Second pass: remove endpoint pointers */
}
for (i = skip_ep0; i < 16; ++i) {
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i, true);
usb_disable_endpoint(dev, i + USB_DIR_IN, true);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcPanoramiXQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
/* REQUEST(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq); */
xPanoramiXQueryVersionReply rep = {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
.majorVersion = SERVER_PANORAMIX_MAJOR_VERSION,
.minorVersion = SERVER_PANORAMIX_MINOR_VERSION
};
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReq);
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swaps(&rep.majorVersion);
swaps(&rep.minorVersion);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXQueryVersionReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CursorFreeWindow(void *data, XID id)
{
WindowPtr pWindow = (WindowPtr) data;
CursorEventPtr e, next;
for (e = cursorEvents; e; e = next) {
next = e->next;
if (e->pWindow == pWindow) {
FreeResource(e->clientResource, 0);
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int CallStat(const char *path, stat_wrapper_t *sb) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
return stat(path, sb);
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 115,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int samldb_check_sAMAccountName(struct samldb_ctx *ac)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
const char *name;
int ret;
struct ldb_result *res;
const char * const noattrs[] = { NULL };
if (ldb_msg_find_element(ac->msg, "sAMAccountName") == NULL) {
ret = samldb_generate_sAMAccountName(ldb, ac->msg);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
}
name = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(ac->msg, "sAMAccountName", NULL);
if (name == NULL) {
/* The "sAMAccountName" cannot be nothing */
ldb_set_errstring(ldb,
"samldb: Empty account names aren't allowed!");
return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
}
ret = dsdb_module_search(ac->module, ac, &res,
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb), LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, noattrs,
DSDB_FLAG_NEXT_MODULE,
ac->req,
"(sAMAccountName=%s)",
ldb_binary_encode_string(ac, name));
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
if (res->count != 0) {
ldb_asprintf_errstring(ldb,
"samldb: Account name (sAMAccountName) '%s' already in use!",
name);
talloc_free(res);
return LDB_ERR_ENTRY_ALREADY_EXISTS;
}
talloc_free(res);
return samldb_next_step(ac);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void airo_handle_rx(struct airo_info *ai)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
__le16 fc, v, *buffer, tmpbuf[4];
u16 len, hdrlen = 0, gap, fid;
struct rx_hdr hdr;
int success = 0;
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI, &ai->flags)) {
if (test_bit(FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags))
mpi_receive_802_11(ai);
else
mpi_receive_802_3(ai);
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_RX);
return;
}
fid = IN4500(ai, RXFID);
/* Get the packet length */
if (test_bit(FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags)) {
bap_setup (ai, fid, 4, BAP0);
bap_read (ai, (__le16*)&hdr, sizeof(hdr), BAP0);
/* Bad CRC. Ignore packet */
if (le16_to_cpu(hdr.status) & 2)
hdr.len = 0;
if (ai->wifidev == NULL)
hdr.len = 0;
} else {
bap_setup(ai, fid, 0x36, BAP0);
bap_read(ai, &hdr.len, 2, BAP0);
}
len = le16_to_cpu(hdr.len);
if (len > AIRO_DEF_MTU) {
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name, "Bad size %d", len);
goto done;
}
if (len == 0)
goto done;
if (test_bit(FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags)) {
bap_read(ai, &fc, sizeof (fc), BAP0);
hdrlen = header_len(fc);
} else
hdrlen = ETH_ALEN * 2;
skb = dev_alloc_skb(len + hdrlen + 2 + 2);
if (!skb) {
ai->dev->stats.rx_dropped++;
goto done;
}
skb_reserve(skb, 2); /* This way the IP header is aligned */
buffer = (__le16 *) skb_put(skb, len + hdrlen);
if (test_bit(FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags)) {
buffer[0] = fc;
bap_read(ai, buffer + 1, hdrlen - 2, BAP0);
if (hdrlen == 24)
bap_read(ai, tmpbuf, 6, BAP0);
bap_read(ai, &v, sizeof(v), BAP0);
gap = le16_to_cpu(v);
if (gap) {
if (gap <= 8) {
bap_read(ai, tmpbuf, gap, BAP0);
} else {
airo_print_err(ai->dev->name, "gaplen too "
"big. Problems will follow...");
}
}
bap_read(ai, buffer + hdrlen/2, len, BAP0);
} else {
MICBuffer micbuf;
bap_read(ai, buffer, ETH_ALEN * 2, BAP0);
if (ai->micstats.enabled) {
bap_read(ai, (__le16 *) &micbuf, sizeof (micbuf), BAP0);
if (ntohs(micbuf.typelen) > 0x05DC)
bap_setup(ai, fid, 0x44, BAP0);
else {
if (len <= sizeof (micbuf)) {
dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
goto done;
}
len -= sizeof(micbuf);
skb_trim(skb, len + hdrlen);
}
}
bap_read(ai, buffer + ETH_ALEN, len, BAP0);
if (decapsulate(ai, &micbuf, (etherHead*) buffer, len))
dev_kfree_skb_irq (skb);
else
success = 1;
}
#ifdef WIRELESS_SPY
if (success && (ai->spy_data.spy_number > 0)) {
char *sa;
struct iw_quality wstats;
/* Prepare spy data : addr + qual */
if (!test_bit(FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags)) {
sa = (char *) buffer + 6;
bap_setup(ai, fid, 8, BAP0);
bap_read(ai, (__le16 *) hdr.rssi, 2, BAP0);
} else
sa = (char *) buffer + 10;
wstats.qual = hdr.rssi[0];
if (ai->rssi)
wstats.level = 0x100 - ai->rssi[hdr.rssi[1]].rssidBm;
else
wstats.level = (hdr.rssi[1] + 321) / 2;
wstats.noise = ai->wstats.qual.noise;
wstats.updated = IW_QUAL_LEVEL_UPDATED
| IW_QUAL_QUAL_UPDATED
| IW_QUAL_DBM;
/* Update spy records */
wireless_spy_update(ai->dev, sa, &wstats);
}
#endif /* WIRELESS_SPY */
done:
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_RX);
if (success) {
if (test_bit(FLAG_802_11, &ai->flags)) {
skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OTHERHOST;
skb->dev = ai->wifidev;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_802_2);
} else
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, ai->dev);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
netif_rx(skb);
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void uv__write_int(int fd, int val) {
ssize_t n;
do
n = write(fd, &val, sizeof(val));
while (n == -1 && errno == EINTR);
if (n == -1 && errno == EPIPE)
return; /* parent process has quit */
assert(n == sizeof(val));
}
Commit Message: unix: call setgoups before calling setuid/setgid
Partial fix for #1093
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CookieRetriever(std::unique_ptr<GetCookiesCallback> callback)
: callback_(std::move(callback)),
all_callback_(nullptr) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: server_process_dh(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
unsigned char *data,
unsigned int data_len,
unsigned char **dh_pubkey,
unsigned int *dh_pubkey_len,
unsigned char **server_key,
unsigned int *server_key_len)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
DH *dh = NULL, *dh_server = NULL;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL;
BIGNUM *client_pubkey = NULL;
const BIGNUM *server_pubkey;
*dh_pubkey = *server_key = NULL;
*dh_pubkey_len = *server_key_len = 0;
/* get client's received DH parameters that we saved in server_check_dh */
dh = cryptoctx->dh;
dh_server = dup_dh_params(dh);
if (dh_server == NULL)
goto cleanup;
/* decode client's public key */
p = data;
pub_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&p, (int)data_len);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
client_pubkey = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(pub_key, NULL);
if (client_pubkey == NULL)
goto cleanup;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
if (!DH_generate_key(dh_server))
goto cleanup;
DH_get0_key(dh_server, &server_pubkey, NULL);
/* generate DH session key */
*server_key_len = DH_size(dh_server);
if ((*server_key = malloc(*server_key_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
compute_dh(*server_key, *server_key_len, client_pubkey, dh_server);
#ifdef DEBUG_DH
print_dh(dh_server, "client&server's DH params\n");
print_pubkey(client_pubkey, "client's pub_key=");
print_pubkey(server_pubkey, "server's pub_key=");
pkiDebug("server computed key=");
print_buffer(*server_key, *server_key_len);
#endif
/* KDC reply */
/* pack DH public key */
/* Diffie-Hellman public key must be ASN1 encoded as an INTEGER; this
* encoding shall be used as the contents (the value) of the
* subjectPublicKey component (a BIT STRING) of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo
* data element
*/
pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(server_pubkey, NULL);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto cleanup;
*dh_pubkey_len = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, NULL);
if ((p = *dh_pubkey = malloc(*dh_pubkey_len)) == NULL)
goto cleanup;
i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &p);
if (pub_key != NULL)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key);
retval = 0;
if (dh_server != NULL)
DH_free(dh_server);
return retval;
cleanup:
BN_free(client_pubkey);
DH_free(dh_server);
free(*dh_pubkey);
free(*server_key);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix PKINIT cert matching data construction
Rewrite X509_NAME_oneline_ex() and its call sites to use dynamic
allocation and to perform proper error checking.
ticket: 8617
target_version: 1.16
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 60,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodDoubleOrDOMStringOrNullArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDoubleOrDOMStringOrNullArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
DoubleOrString arg;
V8DoubleOrString::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], arg, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodDoubleOrDOMStringOrNullArg(arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::AdapterPropertyChanged(
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path,
const std::string& property_name) {
if (object_path != object_path_)
return;
BluetoothAdapterClient::Properties* properties =
DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetBluetoothAdapterClient()->
GetProperties(object_path_);
if (property_name == properties->powered.name())
PoweredChanged(properties->powered.value());
else if (property_name == properties->discoverable.name())
DiscoverableChanged(properties->discoverable.value());
else if (property_name == properties->discovering.name())
DiscoveringChanged(properties->discovering.value());
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool alloc_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t *nid)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct free_nid *i = NULL;
retry:
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
if (time_to_inject(sbi, FAULT_ALLOC_NID)) {
f2fs_show_injection_info(FAULT_ALLOC_NID);
return false;
}
#endif
spin_lock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
if (unlikely(nm_i->available_nids == 0)) {
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
return false;
}
/* We should not use stale free nids created by build_free_nids */
if (nm_i->nid_cnt[FREE_NID_LIST] && !on_build_free_nids(nm_i)) {
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, list_empty(&nm_i->nid_list[FREE_NID_LIST]));
i = list_first_entry(&nm_i->nid_list[FREE_NID_LIST],
struct free_nid, list);
*nid = i->nid;
__remove_nid_from_list(sbi, i, FREE_NID_LIST, true);
i->state = NID_ALLOC;
__insert_nid_to_list(sbi, i, ALLOC_NID_LIST, false);
nm_i->available_nids--;
update_free_nid_bitmap(sbi, *nid, false, false);
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
return true;
}
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
/* Let's scan nat pages and its caches to get free nids */
build_free_nids(sbi, true, false);
goto retry;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void end_io_acct(struct dm_io *io)
{
struct mapped_device *md = io->md;
struct bio *bio = io->bio;
unsigned long duration = jiffies - io->start_time;
int pending;
int rw = bio_data_dir(bio);
generic_end_io_acct(md->queue, rw, &dm_disk(md)->part0, io->start_time);
if (unlikely(dm_stats_used(&md->stats)))
dm_stats_account_io(&md->stats, bio_data_dir(bio),
bio->bi_iter.bi_sector, bio_sectors(bio),
true, duration, &io->stats_aux);
/*
* After this is decremented the bio must not be touched if it is
* a flush.
*/
pending = atomic_dec_return(&md->pending[rw]);
atomic_set(&dm_disk(md)->part0.in_flight[rw], pending);
pending += atomic_read(&md->pending[rw^0x1]);
/* nudge anyone waiting on suspend queue */
if (!pending)
wake_up(&md->wait);
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 85,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::showContextMenu(
WebFrame* frame, const WebContextMenuData& data) {
content::ContextMenuParams params(data);
if (frame)
params.frame_id = frame->identifier();
if (params.src_url.spec().size() > content::kMaxURLChars)
params.src_url = GURL();
context_menu_node_ = data.node;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::setCssText(const String&, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
ec = NO_MODIFICATION_ALLOWED_ERR;
}
Commit Message: Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,501
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Location::Location(DOMWindow* dom_window) : dom_window_(dom_window) {}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_listen(struct socket *sock, int len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
res = -EINVAL;
else {
sock->state = SS_LISTENING;
res = 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fpu__alloc_mathframe(unsigned long sp, int ia32_frame,
unsigned long *buf_fx, unsigned long *size)
{
unsigned long frame_size = xstate_sigframe_size();
*buf_fx = sp = round_down(sp - frame_size, 64);
if (ia32_frame && use_fxsr()) {
frame_size += sizeof(struct fregs_state);
sp -= sizeof(struct fregs_state);
}
*size = frame_size;
return sp;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int retval;
struct inode *inode;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
handle_t *handle;
trace_ext4_unlink_enter(dir, dentry);
/* Initialize quotas before so that eventual writes go
* in separate transaction */
dquot_initialize(dir);
dquot_initialize(dentry->d_inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(dir, EXT4_DELETE_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
retval = -ENOENT;
bh = ext4_find_entry(dir, &dentry->d_name, &de, NULL);
if (!bh)
goto end_unlink;
inode = dentry->d_inode;
retval = -EIO;
if (le32_to_cpu(de->inode) != inode->i_ino)
goto end_unlink;
if (!inode->i_nlink) {
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"Deleting nonexistent file (%lu), %d",
inode->i_ino, inode->i_nlink);
set_nlink(inode, 1);
}
retval = ext4_delete_entry(handle, dir, de, bh);
if (retval)
goto end_unlink;
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = ext4_current_time(dir);
ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
drop_nlink(inode);
if (!inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode);
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
retval = 0;
end_unlink:
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
brelse(bh);
trace_ext4_unlink_exit(dentry, retval);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proxy_renameat(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *olddir,
const char *old_name, V9fsPath *newdir,
const char *new_name)
{
int ret;
V9fsString old_full_name, new_full_name;
v9fs_string_init(&old_full_name);
v9fs_string_init(&new_full_name);
v9fs_string_sprintf(&old_full_name, "%s/%s", olddir->data, old_name);
v9fs_string_sprintf(&new_full_name, "%s/%s", newdir->data, new_name);
ret = proxy_rename(ctx, old_full_name.data, new_full_name.data);
v9fs_string_free(&old_full_name);
v9fs_string_free(&new_full_name);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_groupnames(char **groupnames)
{
int i;
if (!groupnames)
return;
for (i = 0; groupnames[i]; i++)
free(groupnames[i]);
free(groupnames);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned
Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into
operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege.
This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by
temporarily dropping privilege.
Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-862
| 0
| 68,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::SetVirtualTimeStopped(bool virtual_time_stopped) {
if (main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped == virtual_time_stopped)
return;
main_thread_only().virtual_time_stopped = virtual_time_stopped;
if (!main_thread_only().use_virtual_time)
return;
virtual_time_domain_->SetCanAdvanceVirtualTime(!virtual_time_stopped);
if (virtual_time_stopped) {
VirtualTimePaused();
} else {
VirtualTimeResumed();
}
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_output(struct perf_event *event, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
/* protect the callchain buffers */
rcu_read_lock();
perf_prepare_sample(&header, data, event, regs);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size, nmi, 1))
goto exit;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, data, event);
perf_output_end(&handle);
exit:
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,832
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void vma_rb_insert(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct rb_root *root)
{
/* All rb_subtree_gap values must be consistent prior to insertion */
validate_mm_rb(root, NULL);
rb_insert_augmented(&vma->vm_rb, root, &vma_gap_callbacks);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void afterTest()
{
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lvm2_lv_create_filesystem_create_hook (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean filesystem_create_succeeded,
gpointer user_data)
{
if (!filesystem_create_succeeded)
{
/* dang.. FilesystemCreate already reported an error */
}
else
{
/* it worked.. */
dbus_g_method_return (context, device->priv->object_path);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setHasMarginAfterQuirk(bool b) { m_hasMarginAfterQuirk = b; }
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pp::Buffer_Dev PDFiumEngine::PrintPagesAsPDF(
const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev* page_ranges,
uint32_t page_range_count,
const PP_PrintSettings_Dev& print_settings) {
if (!page_range_count)
return pp::Buffer_Dev();
DCHECK(doc_);
FPDF_DOCUMENT output_doc = FPDF_CreateNewDocument();
if (!output_doc)
return pp::Buffer_Dev();
KillFormFocus();
std::string page_number_str;
for (uint32_t index = 0; index < page_range_count; ++index) {
if (!page_number_str.empty())
page_number_str.append(",");
const PP_PrintPageNumberRange_Dev& range = page_ranges[index];
page_number_str.append(base::UintToString(range.first_page_number + 1));
if (range.first_page_number != range.last_page_number) {
page_number_str.append("-");
page_number_str.append(base::UintToString(range.last_page_number + 1));
}
}
std::vector<uint32_t> page_numbers =
GetPageNumbersFromPrintPageNumberRange(page_ranges, page_range_count);
for (uint32_t page_number : page_numbers) {
pages_[page_number]->GetPage();
if (!IsPageVisible(page_number))
pages_[page_number]->Unload();
}
FPDF_CopyViewerPreferences(output_doc, doc_);
if (!FPDF_ImportPages(output_doc, doc_, page_number_str.c_str(), 0)) {
FPDF_CloseDocument(output_doc);
return pp::Buffer_Dev();
}
FitContentsToPrintableAreaIfRequired(output_doc, print_settings);
pp::Buffer_Dev buffer = GetFlattenedPrintData(output_doc);
FPDF_CloseDocument(output_doc);
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t trace_parse_run_command(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
int (*createfn)(int, char **))
{
char *kbuf, *buf, *tmp;
int ret = 0;
size_t done = 0;
size_t size;
kbuf = kmalloc(WRITE_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
while (done < count) {
size = count - done;
if (size >= WRITE_BUFSIZE)
size = WRITE_BUFSIZE - 1;
if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buffer + done, size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
kbuf[size] = '\0';
buf = kbuf;
do {
tmp = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (tmp) {
*tmp = '\0';
size = tmp - buf + 1;
} else {
size = strlen(buf);
if (done + size < count) {
if (buf != kbuf)
break;
/* This can accept WRITE_BUFSIZE - 2 ('\n' + '\0') */
pr_warn("Line length is too long: Should be less than %d\n",
WRITE_BUFSIZE - 2);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
done += size;
/* Remove comments */
tmp = strchr(buf, '#');
if (tmp)
*tmp = '\0';
ret = trace_run_command(buf, createfn);
if (ret)
goto out;
buf += size;
} while (done < count);
}
ret = done;
out:
kfree(kbuf);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lex_get_save(lex_t *lex, json_error_t *error)
{
int c = stream_get(&lex->stream, error);
if(c != STREAM_STATE_EOF && c != STREAM_STATE_ERROR)
lex_save(lex, c);
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix for issue #282
The fix limits recursion depths when parsing arrays and objects.
The limit is configurable via the `JSON_PARSER_MAX_DEPTH` setting
within `jansson_config.h` and is set by default to 2048.
Update the RFC conformance document to note the limit; the RFC
allows limits to be set by the implementation so nothing has
actually changed w.r.t. conformance state.
Reported by Gustavo Grieco.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 53,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool omx_vdec::ts_arr_list::reset_ts_list()
{
bool ret = true;
int idx = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("reset_ts_list(): Resetting timestamp array list");
for ( ; idx < MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS; idx++) {
m_ts_arr_list[idx].valid = false;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jp2_jp_putdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jp2_jp_t *jp = &box->data.jp;
if (jp2_putuint32(out, jp->magic)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 67,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mailimf_body_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
struct mailimf_body ** result)
{
size_t cur_token;
struct mailimf_body * body;
cur_token = * indx;
body = mailimf_body_new(message + cur_token, length - cur_token);
if (body == NULL)
return MAILIMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
cur_token = length;
* result = body;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activate_path(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct pgpath *pgpath =
container_of(work, struct pgpath, activate_path.work);
scsi_dh_activate(bdev_get_queue(pgpath->path.dev->bdev),
pg_init_done, pgpath);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct path *lowerpath,
struct kstat *stat, struct iattr *attr,
const char *link)
{
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry = NULL;
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out;
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
if (err)
goto out2;
if (S_ISREG(stat->mode)) {
struct path upperpath;
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &upperpath);
BUG_ON(upperpath.dentry != NULL);
upperpath.dentry = newdentry;
err = ovl_copy_up_data(lowerpath, &upperpath, stat->size);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
}
err = ovl_copy_xattr(lowerpath->dentry, newdentry);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
mutex_lock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = ovl_set_attr(newdentry, stat);
if (!err && attr)
err = notify_change(newdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&newdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, newdentry, udir, upper, 0);
if (err)
goto out_cleanup;
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
newdentry = NULL;
/*
* Non-directores become opaque when copied up.
*/
if (!S_ISDIR(stat->mode))
ovl_dentry_set_opaque(dentry, true);
out2:
dput(upper);
out1:
dput(newdentry);
out:
return err;
out_cleanup:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, newdentry);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix dentry reference leak
In ovl_copy_up_locked(), newdentry is leaked if the function exits through
out_cleanup as this just to out after calling ovl_cleanup() - which doesn't
actually release the ref on newdentry.
The out_cleanup segment should instead exit through out2 as certainly
newdentry leaks - and possibly upper does also, though this isn't caught
given the catch of newdentry.
Without this fix, something like the following is seen:
BUG: Dentry ffff880023e9eb20{i=f861,n=#ffff880023e82d90} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
BUG: Dentry ffff880023ece640{i=0,n=bigfile} still in use (1) [unmount of tmpfs tmpfs]
when unmounting the upper layer after an error occurred in copyup.
An error can be induced by creating a big file in a lower layer with
something like:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/lower/a/bigfile bs=65536 count=1 seek=$((0xf000))
to create a large file (4.1G). Overlay an upper layer that is too small
(on tmpfs might do) and then induce a copy up by opening it writably.
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.18+
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 167,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MediaStreamDevicesController::IsRequestAllowedByDefault() const {
if (ShouldAlwaysAllowOrigin())
return true;
struct {
bool has_capability;
const char* policy_name;
const char* list_policy_name;
ContentSettingsType settings_type;
} device_checks[] = {
{ microphone_requested_, prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowedUrls, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC },
{ webcam_requested_, prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowedUrls,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(device_checks); ++i) {
if (!device_checks[i].has_capability)
continue;
DevicePolicy policy = GetDevicePolicy(device_checks[i].policy_name,
device_checks[i].list_policy_name);
if (policy == ALWAYS_DENY ||
(policy == POLICY_NOT_SET &&
profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->GetContentSetting(
request_.security_origin, request_.security_origin,
device_checks[i].settings_type, NO_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER) !=
CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
R=xians@chromium.org, yzshen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 171,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CorePageLoadMetricsObserver::OnFailedProvisionalLoad(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
net::Error error = navigation_handle->GetNetErrorCode();
if (error == net::OK || error == net::ERR_ABORTED) {
return;
}
failed_provisional_load_info_.interval =
base::TimeTicks::Now() - navigation_handle->NavigationStart();
failed_provisional_load_info_.error = error;
}
Commit Message: Remove clock resolution page load histograms.
These were temporary metrics intended to understand whether high/low
resolution clocks adversely impact page load metrics. After collecting a few
months of data it was determined that clock resolution doesn't adversely
impact our metrics, and it that these histograms were no longer needed.
BUG=394757
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2155143003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#406143}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __devexit airo_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct net_device *dev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
airo_print_info(dev->name, "Unregistering...");
stop_airo_card(dev, 1);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
pci_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DeliverDeviceEvents(WindowPtr pWin, InternalEvent *event, GrabPtr grab,
WindowPtr stopAt, DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
Window child = None;
int deliveries = 0;
int mask;
verify_internal_event(event);
while (pWin) {
if ((mask = EventIsDeliverable(dev, event->any.type, pWin))) {
/* XI2 events first */
if (mask & EVENT_XI2_MASK) {
deliveries =
DeliverOneEvent(event, dev, XI2, pWin, child, grab);
if (deliveries > 0)
break;
}
/* XI events */
if (mask & EVENT_XI1_MASK) {
deliveries = DeliverOneEvent(event, dev, XI, pWin, child, grab);
if (deliveries > 0)
break;
}
/* Core event */
if ((mask & EVENT_CORE_MASK) && IsMaster(dev) && dev->coreEvents) {
deliveries =
DeliverOneEvent(event, dev, CORE, pWin, child, grab);
if (deliveries > 0)
break;
}
}
if ((deliveries < 0) || (pWin == stopAt) ||
(mask & EVENT_DONT_PROPAGATE_MASK)) {
deliveries = 0;
break;
}
child = pWin->drawable.id;
pWin = pWin->parent;
}
return deliveries;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HarfBuzzShaperBase::setPadding(int padding)
{
m_padding = padding;
m_padError = 0;
if (!m_padding)
return;
unsigned numWordEnds = 0;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_normalizedBufferLength; i++) {
if (isWordEnd(i))
numWordEnds++;
}
if (numWordEnds)
m_padPerWordBreak = m_padding / numWordEnds;
else
m_padPerWordBreak = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix uninitialized variables in HarfBuzzShaperBase
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=79546
Reviewed by Dirk Pranke.
These were introduced in r108733.
* platform/graphics/harfbuzz/HarfBuzzShaperBase.cpp:
(WebCore::HarfBuzzShaperBase::HarfBuzzShaperBase):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@108871 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 107,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextureManager::TextureInfo::SetLevelCleared(GLenum target, GLint level) {
DCHECK_GE(level, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<size_t>(GLTargetToFaceIndex(target)),
level_infos_.size());
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<size_t>(level),
level_infos_[GLTargetToFaceIndex(target)].size());
TextureInfo::LevelInfo& info =
level_infos_[GLTargetToFaceIndex(target)][level];
if (!info.cleared) {
DCHECK_NE(0, num_uncleared_mips_);
--num_uncleared_mips_;
}
info.cleared = true;
UpdateCleared();
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,735
|
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